

TRUMP'S ASYLUM BAN AND THE LÓPEZ OBRADOR RESPONSE*

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During his four years as president, Donald Trump drastically toughened U.S. immigration policy through multiple executive orders and federal regulations. His main objective was to accelerate apprehensions and deportations, restrict the admission of immigrants and temporary workers, substantially reduce the admission of refugees, and deny asylum to the growing number of applicants who arrived at the U.S. border during this period. Trump drastically complicated the established procedures for undocumented immigrants and asylum-seekers, including those already living in the United States, making their lives miserable and rendering them more vulnerable than before.

Simultaneously, during that, caravans of whole families coming from Central America's Northern Triangle countries (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) crossed Mexican territory heading toward the Mexico-U.S. border. They were mainly fleeing extreme poverty, unemployment, climate change, persecution, and growing criminal violence, in order to ask for asylum or cross the border irregularly to get to the "promised land."

At the beginning of his term, the new Mexican president, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO), established an "open door" migration policy oriented to respecting migrants' human rights and, in that vein, welcoming them and giving them an official permit to stay and even work, moving freely through Mexican territory. AMLO's attitude was drastically reversed in May 2019 due to Trump's pressure and threat to impose trade tariffs if Mexico did not halt all illegal migration and change to a high-enforcement policy. So, in this essay, I will examine the different measures imposed by the Trump administration during his four years in office to limit the admission of asylum-

* An initial version of this chapter can be found in a longer essay (Vereá, 2021).

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seekers. I argue that the implementation of an asylum ban has been consistent with Trump's anti-immigrant agenda and has made it almost impossible to gain asylum in the United States. The imposition of the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP, also known as Remain in Mexico), and the López Obrador response with a bilateral agreement has made our country into a buffer zone for our northern neighbor, stopping and detaining migrants mainly from Central America at a very high economic, political, social, and humanitarian cost.

The Central American Caravan and Trump's Asylum Ban

The thousands of migrants coming in a "caravan" from the Northern Triangle countries crossing Mexican territory began increasing significantly in early 2018, and, by March, new contingents followed the first caravan. Formed by multiple families, the caravans constitute a new form of collective organization of migration that initiated in Honduras, El Salvador, and then Guatemala. A group of around 7,000 persons in different contingents crossed Mexico hoping to reach the Mexico-U.S. border to request asylum in the U.S.¹

Migration from Central American countries to Mexico and through Mexico toward the United States is not new. A long migratory tradition exists, mainly from Guatemala; they come to work temporarily mainly in agriculture in Mexico's southern states. Traditionally, Central Americans have also crossed Mexican territory heading for the United States, but this flow has increased significantly during recent years as it can be seen in Graph 1, much more than that of Mexicans.² So, Mexico is a country of migrant destination, transit, and emigration, with the largest diaspora in the United States: 36.6 million people of Mexican origin population lived in the United States in 2017, and the Mexican-born accounted for 11.2 million in the same year (Bustamante, Flores, and Shah, 2019).

The approach of a caravan intensified Trump's anger, and he accused the Mexican government of doing nothing to stop the flows and once again

¹ The contingents were formed with the support of human smugglers, civil society organizations, and persons who spontaneously decided to join in when they found out it was forming (Mohar, at press).

² Apprehensions at the U.S. southern border came to 859,000 in 2019, double the number of the previous year; of these, Mexicans accounted for 169,000, while others, including Central Americans, accounted for 689,995 (United States Border Patrol, 2019).

threatened to withdraw from the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) if Mexico did not respond.³ In order to increase his political capital with his base, Trump flashily dispatched thousands of troops to the southern border to stop the flow, a very important deployment in recent years. Approximately 5,000 active-duty and National Guard troops are operating at the border in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).⁴

In response to the approach of the caravan in March 2018, Trump established a “zero tolerance” policy and started separating parents from their children when they attempted to cross the border “illegally” into the United States, an eminently immoral decision. Even though the law allows families who cross “illegally” to remain together while their case is decided, children were forcibly separated from their parents and placed into DHS custody while their parents were prosecuted; humanitarian organizations characterized this as inhumane.⁵ Fortunately, amid a national and international outcry demanding that families remain together, Trump was forced to sign an executive order reversing this highly controversial policy in June 2018, as ordered by Dana M. Sabraw, a California federal judge.⁶ The Office of the DHS Inspector General revealed that a group of separated families are unaccounted for, because the government lacks an effective tracking system. When this policy halted, more than 1,100 migrant families had been separated, according to the American Civil Liberties Union (Kelly, 2020).

The Trump administration used a system called “metering” at the border. This limits the number of migrants who can apply daily for asylum with officials of U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) at any port of entry, leading to waits that can last months or even years.⁷ Moreover, the waiting

³ During recent years, NAFTA was renegotiated and implemented on July 1, 2020 as T-MEC in Mexico, USMCA in the United States, and CUSMA in Canada.

⁴ In March 2019, 2,900 active-duty troops were operating at the border in support of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), along with approximately 2,000 National Guard troops. The Pentagon declared that they might send more military on assignments that could put them in contact with migrants, signaling a break with current practice, since the military is not a law-enforcement body (Burns, 2019). In April 2020, Trump deployed 540 additional troops at the border due to COVID-19 concerns (Snow, 2020).

⁵ Fourteen thousand migrant children, the vast majority unaccompanied, were in the custody of the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR), which is responsible for the facilities where they were being held at the end of 2018 (Mittelstadt, 2018).

⁶ Dana M. Sabraw ordered a halt to family separation at the U.S. border and the reunification of all families that had been separated (Jordan, 2018).

⁷ It was first implemented by the Obama administration in 2016 to deal with the surge of Haitians arriving at California's San Ysidro port (Chishti and Bolder, 2020).

period to be heard in court can be years because of a backlog of more than 1,218,737 immigration cases by June 2020 (TRAC Immigration, 2020). Trump disliked the fact that by the time immigrants show up for their hearings, they have often put down roots with their children, jobs, and mortgages.

In June 2018, Trump took another very aggressive unilateral measure in response to the Central American caravan in order to dismantle the asylum system. The system gives immigrants a legal opportunity to live in the United States only when they can demonstrate that they would face persecution, torture, or death if they returned to their home countries. Trump began formulating a policy called “Remain in Mexico,” which would require asylum-seekers to wait in Mexico until their cases are decided, regardless of their nationality; this system was formally implemented later. Alternatively, Senate Republicans proposed barring Central American minors from seeking asylum unless they applied at home. Barring migrants who enter the country between border checkpoints from claiming asylum is a flagrant disregard for U.S. and international law. In order to sidestep that, the Trump administration established the Transit-Country Asylum Ban, a very important weapon for the DHS to make any asylum-seeker ineligible who transited through another country but cannot demonstrate they had applied for and were denied asylum there. The rule is a *de facto* asylum ban applied to most asylum-seekers entering the U.S. through the southern border. Thus, migrants deemed ineligible to apply for asylum under the new transit-country rule are formally treated as having failed to comply with the credible-fear requirement (Chishti and Bolter, 2020). Due to this situation, the Department of Justice and the DHS have proposed to amend the regulations governing credible-fear determinations. This is unconstitutional because, by law (established in the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigration Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the DHS must implement a screening process to identify potentially valid claims for asylum, to prevent aliens placed in expedited removal from being expelled to a country where they would face persecution or torture (Federal Register, 2020). Initially, separate court rulings allowed the asylum ban to move forward; nevertheless, in September 2019, a federal court reinstated a nationwide block on the ban along the southern border.

In January 2019, Trump started implementing the “Remain in Mexico” policy formally known as Migration Protection Protocols (MPP) without a

formal bilateral agreement.⁸ The objective is to return non-Mexican undocumented migrants or asylum-seekers to Mexico indefinitely while their claims are processed. The law states that once an asylum-seeker has been screened and interviewed by an immigration judge, he or she must wait in U.S. territory until an individual decision is reached on whether that person should be released or detained. Since then, as of March 2020, more than 50,000 asylum-seekers were sent to Mexico to wait, where almost none have access to legal help with their claims (Ibe, 2020a). This constitutes a violation of the principle of non-refoulement, a principle of international law that prevents countries from returning, expelling, or extraditing migrants to territories where they might be subject to persecution, torture, or death. This is the case of Mexican border cities such as Tijuana and Ciudad Juárez, highly violent locations, placing asylum-seekers in further danger (Verea, 2020). The announcement and implementation of an asylum ban has been categorized as an audacious and inhumane move consistent with Trump's anti-immigrant agenda.

In April 2019, San Francisco District Judge Richard Seeborg blocked Trump's "Remain in Mexico" policy, enjoining the MPP. In his ruling, Seeborg stated, "The program probably violates the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Administrative Procedure Act, and other legal protections to ensure that immigrants are not returned to unduly dangerous circumstances."⁹ In March 2020, the Supreme Court said the Trump administration could continue to implement the policy while lower-court challenges continued (Ibe, 2020a).

It is important to note that, throughout 2018, Trump pressured former Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto to sign a safe third country agreement but was formally rejected several times. These agreements state that asylum-seekers must make their claim in the first country they enter with safe third country status after fleeing their home countries, which in this case would force them to seek asylum in Mexico instead of the United States.¹⁰ Trump

⁸ It is part of section 235(b)(2)(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (SRE, 2018) and was called the Migration Protection Protocols (MPP).

⁹ The U.S. government could appeal the ruling to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit but has not indicated whether it will do so (Sacchetti, 2019).

¹⁰ If a country has not been designated a "safe third country," as Mexico has not, an asylum-seeker may pass through it and apply for asylum in the next country with safe third country status. For example, an asylum-seeker from Honduras may pass through Guatemala and apply for asylum there, since it is the next country with safe third country status.

believed that this type of deal would discourage Central American families from coming to the U.S. in caravans (Partlow and Miroff, 2018).

The Prompt Asylum Case Review (PARC) program for non-Mexicans and the Humanitarian Asylum Review Program (HARP) for Mexicans were established by the Trump administration in October 2019.¹¹ Both have the purpose of barring asylum eligibility for individuals who transit through another country to reach the U.S.-Mexico border. They aim to adjudicate any humanitarian claims and remove within ten days for those who do not meet the standards. Both programs have given the government new tools to deny the vast majority of protection claims made by Central Americans, Mexicans, and, potentially, migrants from other corners of the world (Chishti and Bolter, 2020).

After that, the Trump administration reached a safe third country agreement with Guatemala, which would require asylum-seekers passing through Guatemala to the U.S. to apply for asylum there. This has been interpreted as a violation of U.S. refugee protection laws due to the fact that Guatemala cannot qualify as a safe third country, as it lacks infrastructure to assist large numbers of refugees. Trump made an agreement with El Salvador that they can receive non-Salvadorans sent from the United States and forced to seek asylum there. And finally, with Honduras, he established a similar agreement stipulating that the U.S. could send asylum-seekers back to Honduras if they passed through the country without first seeking asylum there. These agreements include a commitment to developing the capacity of the asylum system within these countries, as they are incapable of offering asylum-seekers protection (Ibe, 2020a). Therefore, under the new rule, Hondurans and Salvadorans would have to apply for asylum in Guatemala or Mexico before they are eligible to apply for asylum in the United States. Guatemalans would have to apply for and be denied asylum in Mexico. Since then, the U.S. has deported around 1,000 Honduran and Salvadoran asylum-seekers to Guatemala (Ibe, 2020b). These agreements could be a violation of U.S. refugee protection laws due to the fact that Guatemala cannot qualify as a “safe third country” since it lacks the infrastructure to assist large numbers of refugees and is incapable of offering them protection. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the U.S. has temporarily halted the deportation of non-Guatemalan asylum-seekers to Guatemala, because reports revealed that the

¹¹ Mexican asylum-seekers have one of the lowest asylum grant rates: 11 percent in fiscal year 2019 (Chishti and Bolter, 2020).

U.S. was deporting infected migrants. Advocates are now challenging these agreements in U.S. courts, but meanwhile Trump strategically moved the U.S. border further south in order to dismantle the U.S. asylum system.

AMLO Shifted Mexican Migratory Policy from a Humanitarian to an Enforcement Strategy

Since the beginning of his presidential term in December 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador took a different approach and began to assist Central American migrants crossing through Mexican territory under a “humanitarian policy.” He offered them shelter and Visitor Permits/Visas for Humanitarian Reasons (TVRH). These renewable visas, which allowed them to work, in addition to the help offered by some Mexican authorities for their transportation to the northern border, constituted an important pull factor; this was interpreted even by migrants coming from long distances like Africa and Asia as an invitation to cross our territory. According to the Centro de Estudios Sociales y de Opinión Pública from December 2018 to April 2019, 26,584 TVRH were given out, while one year before, from January to November 2018, only 8,000 had been issued, a significant difference (Cámara de Diputados, 2019). In order to reduce migration through our territory, López Obrador announced at the beginning of his administration that it would allocate one US\$100 million from the Yucatan Fund to Mexico’s Sowing Life Program to Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. However, none of the government agencies have information on the investments that have been made, the type of jobs created, or the number of people benefited from the program (*Forbes* Staff, 2020).

On the other hand, at the beginning of his administration, AMLO de facto accepted Trump’s “Remain in Mexico” policy without a formal bilateral agreement, providing the U.S. with detention centers in different northern-border Mexican cities where asylum-seekers could be held indefinitely. AMLO’s passive response was interpreted as part of a non-confrontational policy with Trump, perceived as a very powerful man greater than himself, probably seeking to promote the signing of USMCA in exchange, or to try to diminish Trump’s anti-Mexican attitude policy throughout almost his entire term, and also the eventual creation of what AMLO called a “Marshall Plan” for Central

America. To address the root causes of Central American migration, AMLO proposed a US\$30-billion initiative to invest in the region. Trump informally supported it, declaring that his government would commit to giving US\$5.8 billion in private and public investments in the Northern Triangle as well as an additional US\$4.8 billion for Mexico, including US\$2 billion in development aid for southern Mexico (SRE, 2018).

In March 2019, President Trump again reacted aggressively, demanding that AMLO stop the irregular migratory flows increasingly coming in caravans, threatening to close the U.S.-Mexico border, besides withdrawing U.S. economic support to Central American countries. One month later, Trump gave the Mexican government a “one-year warning” before closing the southern border and threatened to impose trade tariffs if Mexico did not put a stop to all illegal migration (Karni and Kanno-Youngs, 2019). This caused AMLO to shift his government’s humanitarian strategy, a reversal of his initial “open-doors” policy welcoming migrants and providing them with the means to continue their journey to the U.S. Table 1 (see annex) shows the shift by AMLO’s government due to the significant growth of migrant detentions in Mexico, a product of the implementation of the enforcement policy: 31,396 migrants were detained in June 2019, four times the number of 8,521 in January of the same year (mostly Central American migrants), showing a change in strategy similar to Peña Nieto’s in 2014.¹² Since then, these detentions have fallen by half (16,066 by August 2019) and a third (8,328 by February 2020), which shows that the enforcement policy, a change of strategy, did work. On the other hand, U.S. apprehensions varied after the beginning of the Trump administration: during fiscal years (FY) 2017 and 2018, apprehensions at the U.S. border fluctuated between 12,000 and 46,000 apprehensions monthly. Nevertheless, in FY 2019 apprehensions started to raise significantly, from 51,000 in October 2018 to 92,833 in March 2019 and 132,856 in May; and since then they have diminished every month to reach 40,507 apprehensions in September 2019 and 21,475 in May 2020 (see annex, Table 2). The downturn in detentions since June 2019 shows that the huge pressure imposed by Trump to AMLO did work for the U.S. The majority of migrants apprehended now come from Central America, compared to the year 2000, when Mexicans were the majority (see annex, Graph 1).

¹² Table 3 (see annex) shows how detentions grew significantly in 2015 and 2016 and dropped in 2017.

It is important to note that since 2014, violence in Central America has prompted the migration of tens of thousands of families and unaccompanied minors seeking asylum in the United States, which U.S. law permits. In response to this, Obama and Peña Nieto made an agreement whereby the Mexican government established the Southern Border Plan, which increased the number of detentions from 88,506 in 2012 to the 198,141 peak in 2015. In 2018, the number declined to 131,445 but rose again to 179,445 detentions in 2019, mostly of migrants from Central America (see Table 1). It is still unclear what Mexico received in exchange.

Unsatisfied with this shift in AMLO's approach, Trump announced in May 2019 that he would levy a 5 percent tariff on imports from Mexico starting June 10, stating that "until such time as illegal migrants coming through Mexico, and into our Country, stop . . . the tariff will gradually increase until the illegal immigration problem is fixed" (Karni and Kanno-Youngs, 2019). In an extremely hasty response, AMLO formally accepted "Remain in Mexico" and signed a bilateral Migration Collaboration Agreement (MCA) in June 2019.¹³ This agreement allows for the deployment of the National Guard to combat irregular migration; the expansion of the Migrant Protection Protocols along the entire U.S.-Mexico border; and increased collaboration to disrupt migrant smuggling networks. López Obrador accepted that asylum-seekers would wait in Mexico under the MPP, and Trump agreed to address the conditions driving migration by investing in economic development efforts in southern Mexico and Central America. An eventual negotiation of a safe third country agreement that would require non-Mexican asylum-seekers who transit through Mexico to pursue their protection claims in the United States was mentioned. Nevertheless, AMLO has stated that with the intensification of the detentions in Mexico there would be no need to sign that kind of agreement (Ruiz Soto, 2020). López did not warn his counterparts that Mexico's institutions could not possibly stop all migrant flows because we have neither the staff and infrastructure nor the economic means to handle it. This agreement gave Trump shelters in different cities for asylum-seekers in deplorable conditions, migrants who can wait months or even years at Mexico's expense. As of March 2020, nearly 65,000 people had been put under the

¹³ Mexico's Foreign Minister Marcelo Ebrard flew to Washington D.C. on May 31, 2019 to prevent the levying of 5 percent tariffs on all imports from Mexico, which would otherwise have come into effect on June 10.

jurisdiction of the MPP, and only 517 of them won protection out of 44,916 completed cases (Loweree, Reichlin-Melnick, and Ewing, 2020).

In order to fully cooperate with the persecution and deportation of migrants, López Obrador obsequiously responded to Trump's pressure by deploying around 25,000 brand new Mexican National Guard troops to our southern and northern borders and in the interior;¹⁴ the economic cost implied in this also means leaving states and municipalities unguarded, when they are in great need of heightened security. Since then, National Guard troops have served as border patrols, with little or no training to carry out migratory operations and prevent the transit of Mexican and Central American migrants to the United States, a highly controversial policy compared to AMLO's previous humanitarian one, and unprecedented in the history of migratory bilateral relations. This new enforcement policy gave Trump sufficient arguments to say, "I am using Mexico to protect our border . . . I want to thank Mexico . . . for the 27,000 soldiers . . .," to which AMLO replied in one of his morning press conferences, "We have nothing to be ashamed of; Mexico's sovereignty has been defended. At the same time, we don't want confrontation" (Ramos, 2019). And he is right. Trump managed to get the Mexican government to pay for the controversial wall with the deployment of National Guards to deport them to their country of origin, and also with shelters, where thousands of Central Americans await a resolution by U.S. immigration judges. By January 2020, Mexico had received a total of 61,000 migrants returned by U.S. authorities under the agreement. As of March 2020, 31 percent of the 65,000 cases under MPP were pending, and 12 percent had not yet had a first hearing (Ruiz Soto, 2020).

Final Remarks

President Trump violently changed the asylum system at the U.S.-Mexico border, and only very few asylum-seekers, mainly from Central America, can obtain protection today. He stopped virtually all caravans coming from Central America, people fleeing persecution and poverty, from entering the United States, deliberately ignoring U.S. and international law. The imple-

¹⁴ Ten thousand Mexican National Guard troops patrolled the Mexico-Guatemala border and fifteen thousand the U.S.-Mexico border (Arista, 2020).

mentation of an asylum ban has been categorized as an audacious and inhumane move consistent with Trump's anti-immigrant agenda.

AMLO's informal acceptance and then the formal Migration Protection Protocols agreement made our country a buffer zone for our northern neighbor, stopping, detaining, and sometimes forcibly deporting migrants entering the U.S. and has made it almost impossible to gain asylum in the U.S. The type of MPP bilateral agreement is an unprecedented policy in the history of U.S.-Mexico migratory relations, as it is highly costly in economic, political, social, and humanitarian terms. As a result, Mexicans have been paying the high cost of the deployment of one-third of our National Guard troops, urgently needed to deal with our deteriorated internal security, all over the country in order to detain and deport migrants and asylum-seekers, doing the job the Trump administration should do. We have created shelters in different cities for asylum-seekers in deplorable conditions, where they can wait months, or even years, at our expense. Mexico's new National Guard should not be implementing Mexican migration policy as border patrols, with little or no training to carry out this kind of operation. This important deployment of guards has caused migrants to move to more dangerous routes, where migrants are more vulnerable to attacks by criminal groups and corrupt officials. Even though we recognize that National Immigration Institute (INM) agents are overwhelmed by their new functions, advocates have reported numerous human rights abuses by them and also by National Guard troops during enforcement actions.¹⁵

During his four years in power, Trump aggressively threatened the Mexican government demanding it pay for the building of an important extension of the border wall. Its construction has been constantly jeopardized and rejected by several congressmen and civil rights groups because of its high economic cost and its unnecessary purpose. So, Trump managed to force AMLO to pay for the controversial wall with a virtual one: the deployment of National Guards and the establishment of shelters with food at a very high economic, political, and social cost. We have migrants stationed on our southern border, desperate to cross our territory, and asylum-seekers who have crossed Mexico's border, plus those deported by the U.S. government or who are waiting to be granted asylum along the northern border;

¹⁵ Migrants interviewed said they suffered sexual abuse, kidnapping, and theft in Mexico (Binford and García Bochenek, 2020).

they are living in deplorable conditions with limited shelter capacity, at a high human cost. This situation has raised significant concerns about the dangerous conditions and the increased number of migrants waiting in Mexico, concerns that AMLO seldom deals with. López Obrador did not warn the Trump administration that Mexico's institutions could not possibly stop all migrant flows because they have neither the staff and infrastructure nor the economic means to do so.

It is important to highlight that Central Americans do not want to stay in Mexico; they want to get to the "Promised Land," be it as asylum-seekers or irregular migrants. Nevertheless, the immediate and unintended consequence of this situation has been a significant increase of asylum-seekers in Mexico because now they have no opportunity to ask for it in the U.S. and many have decided to stay in Mexico. Thus, between January 2018 and October 2019, 90,397 applicants for asylum in Mexico were registered (29,631 in 2018 and 60,766 in 2019, double the amount). At the end of 2019, 70 percent of them had not received information about their cases.¹⁶ In August 2019, migratory stations were hosting an average of 61 percent more migrants over their capacity, and some up to 300 percent of their capacity.

The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted negatively in Mexico since March 2020. The AMLO administration, through the INM, followed United Nations instructions to evict shelters to avoid contagion and, in March 2020, deported 3,653 Central American migrants, regardless of whether they were waiting for their asylum request to United States (Pradilla, 2020). At the same time, in order to reduce the spread of the virus, the Trump administration temporarily restricted nonessential travel across the border during 2020. López Obrador again agreed to receive Central American migrants denied entry into the United States (DHS, 2020). The return of large numbers of migrants to Mexico's northern border, all placed in crowded shelters without knowing if they have COVID, could aggravate the contagion. If we add the migrants waiting or detained along our southern border, the situation becomes a time bomb that could have a significant negative impact, especially in those specific regions. Thus, AMLO's open door policy was radically

¹⁶ Forty-five percent of the applicants are from Honduras, 16 percent from El Salvador, and 14 percent from Venezuela. Of the total, 27.52 percent are minors, and 62 percent applied for asylum in Chiapas and 11.25 percent in Mexico City. The number of applications in Chiapas increased sharply in the first seven months of 2019 and has decreased since then (Asylum Access, 2020).

transformed, leading him to accept the unacceptable in foreign policy, adopting since then a closed-door immigration policy to ensure non-confrontation with President Trump, a radical change of strategy with high costs for our citizens and finances.

Annex

TABLE I
DETENTION OF MIGRANTS IN MEXICO 2018-2020 BY MONTH

<i>Month</i>	2018	2019	2020
January	8,721	8,521	13,672
February	10,779	10,194	8,328
March	11,425	13,508	
April	11,032	21,197	
May	9,911	23,241	
June	9,033	31,396	
July	8,614	19,822	
August	12,748	16,066	
September	12,780	13,517	
October	18,044	12,256	
November	12,080	9,727	
December	6,278	7,305	
Total	131,445	179,445	

SOURCE: Secretaría de Gobernación, Unidad de Política Migratoria, *Boletín Mensual de Estadísticas Migratorias 2018, 2019, 2020*, Cuadro: 3.1 Eventos de extranjeros presentados ante la autoridad migratoria, según entidad federativa, http://www.politicamigratoria.gob.mx/es/PoliticaMigratoria/Direccion_de_Estadistica

TABLE 2
US APPREHENSIONS IN THE US-MEXICO BORDER FY2017-2020

<i>Months</i>	<i>2017</i>	<i>2018</i>	<i>2019</i>	<i>2020</i>
October	46,184	25,488	51,005	35,406
November	47,211	29,085	51,857	33,524
December	43,251	28,995	50,751	32,857
January	31,576	25,975	47,979	29,205
February	18,754	26,666	66,883	30,076
March	12,195	37,390	92,833	30,236
April	11,127	38,243	99,273	16,039
May	14,519	40,339	132,856	21,475
June	16,087	34,089	94,902	
July	18,187	31,299	71,978	
August	22,288	37,524	50,684	
September	22,537	41,486	40,507	
Total	303,916	396,579	851,508	228,818

SOURCE: U. S. Department of Homeland Security, U. S. Customs and Border Protection, in: <https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/sw-border-migration>.


TABLE 3
DETENTIONS OF MIGRANTS IN MEXICO 2012-2019 BY YEAR

<i>Year</i>	<i>Total</i>	<i>Central Americans</i>
2012	88,506	82,161
2013	86,298	80,757
2014	127,149	119,714
2015	198,141	179,618
2016	186,216	151,429
2017	93,846	80,599
2018	138,612	123,797
2019*	144,591	132,107

* Data as of August

SOURCE: Unidad de Política Migratoria, Secretaría de Gobernación, Registro e identidad de personas, "Boletín Mensual de Estadísticas Migratorias Síntesis 2019", http://portales.segob.gob.mx/work/models/PoliticaMigratoria/CEM/Estadisticas/Boletines_Estadisticos/2019/Boletin_2019.pdf

GRAPH I
ILLEGAL ALIEN APRENHESIONS BY FISCAL YEAR 2000-2019



SOURCE: United States Border Patrol, tables: Total Illegal Alien Apprehensions By Fiscal Year; Illegal Alien Apprehensions From México By Fiscal Year, in. <https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2019-Mar/BP%20Total%20Apps%2C%20Mexico%2C%20OTM%20FY2000-FY2018%20REV.pdf>

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