Voices of Mexico

MEXICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CONTEMPORARY ISSUES

Mexico City

CISAN • UNAM

Challenges of the democratization process
by José Woldenberg

Mexico's new policies for the conservation and management of natural resources
by Julia Carabias

Estrada Sámano on drug trafficking

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

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Our voice

Our magazine is beginning a new era with greater enthusiasm and broader objectives. The fundamental goal will be to present Mexico's "best voices," as well as our country's most beautiful images, for foreign audiences.

Mexico is going through a period of transition towards becoming a better country, and our journal wishes to assist in this process by publicizing the best ideas presently circulating in the media for the consideration of public opinion.

In addition to a cultural section dealing with our greatest artistic splendors, we are publishing innovative articles on the society, economics and politics of the North American region. The goal is to provide the readers with ideas, proposals and creative analyses which stimulate the imagination and assist in thinking constructively about social practices and institutions. This means showing views of Mexico which will help provide our readers, both in Mexico and abroad, with the basis for informed opinion.

José Woldenberg presents an analysis of the development of democracy in Mexico. He describes how social differentiation leads to a differentiation in voting patterns, which has strengthened the political parties and made elections an increasingly competitive process pitting different options against each other. Nevertheless, he believes that the party system continues to be plagued by large imbalances, which must be overcome so that democracy may really advance. He underlines the responsibility that the various forces face for overcoming their differences and conflicts in order to build a democratic system.

This issue also includes an essay by Alonso Gómez Robledo, offering an interesting analysis and proposals on dual nationality, an issue which has become part of the general discussion on immigrants to the United States, who face the tragic decision of having to choose a single nationality. He stresses the importance of having the full effectiveness of one of the two nationalities be established as a clear criterion, since if the contrary were the case the result would be a juridical absurdity.

Ann Penner writes about the dilemma Canadians and Mexicans face in light of closer economic ties to the United States. This new closeness poses risks and raises fears about the loss of political autonomy, independence and identity. Yet it also presents opportunities: she believes that through NAFTA, Mexico and Canada were able to establish institutions and clear norms for handling trade disputes, thereby ceasing to be victims of U.S. protectionism.

Mónica Verea points out that the immigration issue will preponderate in bilateral relations, especially in the 1996 elections. Thus, she enumerates the different strategies and decisions which have been made for limiting illegal immigration to the United States. In particular, she stresses the turn immigration policy has taken by attacking the fiscal deficit caused by the welfare state, through the exclusion of illegals and non-immigrant legal residents from health and education services.

David Maciel stresses that the communications media have, without a doubt, been the most influential factor in recent xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment. He presents an analysis of films which have touched on this issue, concluding that, with honorable exceptions, most deal with immigration in a prejudiced and superficial way.

María Luisa López Vieyra tells us about the important role the National Art Museum (Munal) plays in promoting Mexican culture. She explains how the museum seeks to show our culture's diversity and richness, from the 16th century through the 1950s.

Jean Meyer reflects on the concept of national identity. He thinks that history for the masses should not necessarily consist of "heroes of bronze." It is also necessary to take into account the version presented by those who were defeated; yet he alerts us

to the danger that the attempt to include minority groups may lead to a mythical view of these groups.

An essay by Lászlo Moussong makes an ingenious comparison between Mexico City, New York and Montreal and the place three women occupy in his life.

Maricela González Cruz Manjarrez tells us about muralism, as a vanguard nationalist movement in Mexican painting, which reacted against Eurocentrism and questioned the historic period in which it arose.

In a very special article, Lynn Wehnes invites us to visit part of Mexico's history through the Panteón Francés. On the basis of the tombstones and crypts located in this historic area, she describes the lives of some of Mexican society's most prominent families. It has been said that visiting a country's burial places tells us a lot about its culture, and in Mexico cemeteries are certainly of particular importance.

Julia Carabias refers to the richness of the biodiversity of Mexico's ecosystems and highlights the danger involved in accelerated tendencies towards the degradation of these systems. She points out that, for the first time in the nation's economic planning, environmental criteria have been included, thereby linking our development to that of future generations of Mexicans. For the conservation of ecological reserves, she proposes the creation of contracts through which the various affected groups (including society as a whole) will participate in long-term projects.

Robert Finbow considers that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) leads developed and developing countries to recognize their interdependence, in terms of both economics and ecosystems. Nevertheless, he warns us of the danger that environmental protection may be used as a cover for U.S. protectionist interests.

Celia Toro takes on the theme of drug trafficking and indicates the need to consider new strategies for controlling the drug trade. She notes the possibility of forming small specialized bodies whose members would be adequately paid, rather than large and poorly paid groups, which are more susceptible to corruption.

The architect Francisco Pérez de Salazar V. relates the history of Mexico City, from its foundation as the great city of Tenochtitlán through our times. He describes the architectural traits which have taken shape over time. From the most ancient archeological vestiges through the Colonial period and up to the present, he explains how our city took on different characteristics in different eras. As a mix of pre-Hispanic, Colonial and Porfirian constructions, the edifices built by different social strata come together to give definition to Mexico City.

Rosalía Santín takes us through space and time to walk the astonishing streets of Morelia, whose architectural glory interweaves the Baroque, the Plateresque and the Churrigueresque, uniting with the area's natural beauty to produce a splendid whole.

This issue of our magazine includes an interview with the architect José de Yturbe, whose work has enriched "Mexican architecture."

Finally, we present reviews of two books: Eugenio Aguirre's Los niños de colores *(The Children of Color) and* Imágenes de un encuentro *(Images of an Encounter).*

Paz Consuelo Márquez Padilla
Editorial Director.

Challenges of the democratization process

*José Woldenberg**

The concept of "democracy" has suffered the most extreme forms of abuse; the meanings it takes on, ranging over diverse forms of discourse, not only differ from one another but are even counterposed. Needless to say, this neither aids comprehension of the subject nor contributes to establishing clear goals.

If by democracy we understand citizens' ability to choose between political options, and a formula by which these diverse options can coexist and compete in a civilized way, then in Mexico we find ourselves relatively close to a democratic solution. Nevertheless, this happy outcome (which the main political forces at least claim to desire) is not assured and may still be shifted in other directions or simply bog down.

But democracy must also be sustainable, that is, reproduce itself as such. This requires formulae of government which, while expressing and recreating existing political pluralism, are "efficient"; in other words, which have the capacity to lubricate a country's governability. This is the subject of the following notes.

The text is divided into four parts: a) "From the single-party to the multi-party system," which seeks to describe the changes undergone by the party system; b) "From elections without competition to competitive elections," which attempts to illustrate changes in the meaning and centrality of electoral processes; c) "The necessary electoral reform," which alludes to the changes required for the attempt to definitively establish intra-party contests through electoral processes; and d) "Continuity or change in the governmental system?" which seeks to draw attention to the way changes in the electoral and party systems seem to call for changes in the system of government *per se*.

From the single-party to the multi-party system

Among the changes required, in order to pave the way for the coexistence of diversity and the citizenry's ability to make choices, are these: a) the existence of a system of parties worthy of the name, and b) clean, free and equitable elections. Both conditions are blazing a trail for themselves in our country. Let us examine each in turn.

The party system has moved from a practically single-party formula to a (still asymmetrical) multi-party formula. For many decades the fundamentals of politics were processed under the mantle of a single party grouping, flanked by marginal or merely "testimonial" political formations.

The creation of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario (PNR, National Revolutionary Party) in 1929 dispelled an initial centrifugal wave set in motion by the revolutionary movement that occurred at the beginning of the century. Dispersion was changed into concentration; the multiplication of local, state and regional parties was reconverted into a centralizing movement.

This was a matter not of coincidence but of construction. After the multiplying wave of groupings that marked the end of the revolution's armed phase —which led to the creation of dozens, nay hundreds, of national, regional, state and even municipal parties— with the establishment of the Partido Nacional Revolucionario in 1929 this tendency was reversed and a centralizing process was begun, which, in its time, ordered and institutionalized the nation's political life.

For military officers, "strongmen," revolutionary *caudillos* [traditional leaders], politicians and so on, the PNR was a first civic formula for processing their interests and a common platform for reproducing the many-hued network of interests and expectations that arose with the armed struggle.

With the PNR's conversion into the Partido de la Revolución Mexicana (PRM, Party of the Mexican Revolution) in 1938, the great mass organizations (worker, peasant and "popular" or grass-roots federations) as well as the army were fully incorporated into the party; this meant the construction of a kind of all-embracing umbrella group which left a very narrow margin for the emergence and

* Professor at the Political and Social Science Faculty, UNAM, and citizen councillor to the General Council of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE).

reproduction of other party options. With the incorporation of the great mass organizations into the official party, a broad alliance of forces was consolidated, which would process their interests and demands beneath the initials and tricolor emblem of a single party grouping.

The PRM's conversion into the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI, Institutional Revolutionary Party) in 1946 followed this same impulse, although the "military sector" was no longer included in the party's organization. Thus, over the course of many years, the PNR, PRM and PRI were "virtually single" parties, while, on their flanks, alternative efforts arose and disappeared.

The hegemony of the ideology of the Mexican Revolution; the framework of institutions designed for dealing with various social demands; economic growth —which, while concentrating income and wealth, did allow for a better standard of living for every new generation; the (unequal) alliance between the governing "class" and huge mass groupings, etc.: all this led to the functioning of the system which Giovani Sartori considered a paradigm of pragmatic hegemonic party systems, that non-competitive system which, due to its pragmatic ideology, never committed the same excesses as totalitarian regimes.

The various splits undergone by the "revolutionary family" (from José Vasconcelos to Juan Andrew Almazán, Ezequiel Padilla and General Henríquez) turned out to be ephemeral. These schisms, which sought to compete on the basis of political platforms distinct from the official program, went the way —after the elections— of those who advanced them: political disappearance or death.

The initially narrow spaces slowly tended to expand. Organizations were built to the right and left of the official party, which began to build bridges of communication with ever-wider fringes of the electorate, expressing the fact that the nation's diversity does not fit beneath the umbrella of a single party.

By the late 1960s it seemed clear that the "virtually single" party system was unable to cover the plurality of sensibilities and options emerging from an increasingly complex and differentiated society. From this standpoint, the 1968 student movement can be viewed as a rebellion of the children of the middle layers who did not identify, and did not want to identify, with the traditional formula of political activity. The vertical channels of the PRI were too narrow for them, and they sought democratic means for expressing their diagnoses and needs.

1968 was followed by a "democratic opening," consisting of a liberalization of available areas in the press, which began to publish a growing number of critical inquiries and commentaries. The touchstone regarding reform of the party system may be found in the 1977 electoral reform.

After the student movement, conflicts arose in several universities, as well as a wave of trade-union insurgency which sought to found or regain spaces for expressing workers' demands. There were innumerable land seizures and the growth of peasant groups outside the official peasant federation; new publications and political groups appeared, together with both urban and rural guerrilla movements. Taken as a rather contradictory whole, these phenomena expressed the need for new channels for political activity.

Yet this growing conflictivity arose within a closed party system which was essentially disconnected from the conflicts taking place. Thus, while political tensions grew, the 1976 elections were held with just one presidential candidate running. The PRI candidate was also supported by the PPS (People's Socialist Party) and PARM (Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution), while the Partido Acción Nacional (PAN, National Action Party) was in the midst of an internal crisis and found itself unable to present a candidate. The Communist Party, excluded from the body politic, presented the candidacy of Valentín Campa as a way of highlighting its own existence as well as the artificiality of the legal norms which kept it segregated from the legal world.

The electoral reform of 1977 opened the way for the incorporation of political options which, until then, had been artificially marginalized, and restructured the traditional formula for the composition of the Chamber of Deputies so as to bring the winds of pluralism into the so-called lower house. At the time, this was a preventive measure which sought to liberalize political relations and reduce tensions, but which wound up being the keystone for a process which slowly turned into an avalanche.

The formation of new political parties and the strengthening of some of the traditional alternatives unleashed a seemingly unstoppable process. A process spurred on fundamentally by the differentiation of society, translating into a differentiation of votes and the forging of ever stronger and more deeply rooted electoral reference points.

We find ourselves in a system of parties which is quite different from the single-party system, since throughout the nation's territory one sees the (obviously unequal) strength of other options.

In recent years we have seen long-established parties multiply their voting base (the PAN), while others, produced by splits in the PRI together with long and complicated unification processes —such as the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)— have implanted themselves across broad regions of the nation. This is a

phenomenon which seems irreversible (can anyone imagine the complex Mexico of today and tomorrow resolving its political differences within the narrow framework of a single-party model?), fed by the process of differentiation undergone by Mexican society itself.

This strengthening of party options has been accompanied and stimulated by a succession of legal and institutional reforms which recognize parties as "public interest entities," on the basis of which the parties have a range of rights and obligations. Thus, parties receive public financing, free postage, radio and television access and are subject to special fiscal rules as well as being the only groupings permitted to run candidates for elected office.

Their legal status, rights and prerogatives, as well as their monopoly on political action within the electoral framework, make them central actors in political life, leading to the creation of a party system which is unlikely to be undone.

While the parties' asymmetries in terms of resources, their highly unequal social implantation and, above all, their different relations with government prevent us from speaking of a system of parties in the strict sense, the very dynamic of their recurring electoral competition is multiplying the possibilities for a transition from the virtually single-party system to a competitive and open system of parties.

Year	PRI candidate	%
1970	Luis Echeverría	84.63
1976	José López Portillo	100
1982	Miguel de la Madrid	70.99
1988	Carlos Salinas	50.74
1994	Ernesto Zedillo	48.77

From elections without competition to competitive elections

The transformations of the party system modified the very meaning of electoral processes, which went from being ritual moments to events increasingly characterized by competition. In turn, the mechanics of elections have been strengthening the need for a party system worthy of the name.

From 1929 through the present, the PRI has never lost a presidential election; the same was true until 1989 for gubernatorial elections and for senatorial races until 1988. This provides a picture of the extended period of elections without real competition (with a few, honorable exceptions). These were ritual elections, in which the winners and losers were predetermined. They complied with constitutional and legal prerequisites but were conditioned by a single-party political system.

Electoral proceedings were punctually carried out, for years, as a way of legitimizing government power. The elections were never suspended; they were held regularly and on time. Nevertheless, given the existing system of parties, they were more in the nature of formal procedures than genuine races for executive and legislative posts.

The key moment in the process was the *destape* (unveiling) of the PRI's candidate, after which the formula of a campaign —which served to consolidate accords and commitments— was adhered to. Much of our electoral mythology highlights and focuses more on the moment when the official party's candidate is named, rather than the day voters turn out to the polls. And this is not surprising. Over the course of many decades the moment which generated tension and passion was when the *destape* occurred, after which all the rest was a procedure devoid of real competition.

In recent years, however, competition has not only been increasing but has broken with many of the myths which seemed unchangeable for decades (suffice it to recall the idea that the PRI "could not give up a border state since this would imperil national sovereignty"). Little by little, the process of voting differentiation —flowing from a process of social differentiation which includes the wearing out of the ideology of the Mexican Revolution and the emergence of other ideological reference points— was creating and strengthening party poles other than the official one, until it converted the elections into increasingly competitive formulae. There are many indicators of this process, but it is sufficient to observe the voting percentages from presidential elections (see table).

Yet the important thing is that the dynamic of systematic and recurrent elections serves to consolidate the presence of political parties, whose own deployment is increasing the level of competitiveness in electoral races.

But just as parties have developed not only *de facto* but *de jure* as well, elections not only become an increasingly relevant and competitive moment, but their organization and conditions have merited a series of reforms which tend to make them increasingly impartial and equitable.

It would be sufficient to observe how the 1988 and 1994 elections were organized, the subjects covered by electoral legislation just five or six years ago in comparison to those covered today, or any other matter in this field (the progressive agenda for these changes is very extensive, and this is not the time or place to repeat it), in order to confirm

that the tendency is for elections to clear a path for themselves as the increasingly open formula through which the diverse political options compete.

It is true that the conditions in which electoral competition occurs continue to be markedly unequal, with flagrant advantages for the PRI (e.g., with regard to financial resources or television coverage), but the fact is that routine elections are ever fewer while competition increases from one election to the next.

Thus, just as when speaking of the system of parties we find a transition from a "virtually single" party system to another (nascent) one, in the electoral field we are slowly passing from non-competition to an increase in competitiveness.

The necessary electoral reform

The tendencies described above (strengthening of the party system and increasing competitive elections) could scarcely be obstructed for an extended period without generating a spiral of decomposition and authoritarianism.

The parties recognized this themselves when they signed the Commitments for a National Political Accord in January 1995, putting first on the agenda the realization of a federal electoral reform which would give rise to successive reforms in the various states and the Federal District (Mexico City).

What is involved here is paving the way for recreating and strengthening an authentic party system and for competition to develop in impartial and equitable terms.

If these two objectives (impartiality and equity) are achieved, then election races will wind up consolidating themselves in this country as the procedure, recognized by all, for winning government and legislative office. And this, in turn, will reinforce the centrality of parties and the mechanics according to which they coexist and compete.

Thus, I do not consider it excessive to highlight the enormous importance that an accord among the country's main political parties will have in this regard. On the basis of such an accord, electoral processes should be the source of legitimacy (rather than post-electoral wear and tear) and a formula presupposing partial and momentary victories and defeats, in counterposition to our old political code which involved total and eternal victories and defeats.

It is no accident that the agenda for the coming reform includes the issues of electoral institutions and procedures aimed at providing guarantees of absolute impartiality towards all contenders. Much progress has been made in this field, but we need electoral rules and authorities which win competitors' full and absolute trust, which is the only formula for definitively dismantling the spirals of challenges and conflicts resulting from electoral processes administered with real or suspected partiality.

Similarly, the reform must deal with the acute problems of inequality which mark our elections, since, when elections are held in conditions of flagrant inequality, the presumably democratic edifice tends to tilt to one side and thereby to become distorted. Two key links in this field seem to be the work of the mass media and campaign finances.

With regard to the former, they must contribute to affirming the culture and values of democracy. In terms of the latter, there seems to be an increasing consensus for establishing genuine spending caps and a more functional and timely supervision of parties' resources, so that the conditions for competition will not be so flagrantly unequal.

Each party, each analyst, every journalist may have their own agenda for change, but the compass for these changes must be the effort to open the doors wide so that what has already begun (the party system and competitive elections) will end up establishing itself definitively.

If we succeed in having parties and the competition among them begin to reproduce themselves without major difficulties, we will have reached —in many cases without being aware of it— the threshold of democratic politics. While they would not resolve all the country's problems, such politics would solve the two problems we referred to at the beginning of this article: citizens' ability to choose and decide between the different political options presented to them, and the possibilities for the already existing political plurality to express itself, coexist and compete in a civilized manner.

Such would be a promising outcome, because it involves a formula for bringing together national unity and plurality and, further, because it could open a horizon of democratic stability for the nation, which presently seems to be demanded by the political dynamic as well as the economic situation.

We should not forget that democracy as we have posed it here is the result of a construction in which political elites have an untransferable responsibility, since it is not a revealed truth and still less the mechanical product of the inertia of confrontation. This is the construction of a plurality of forces which recognize each other mutually and offer a civilized way to settle their differences and conflicts. A joint construction by a conjunction of contradictory currents which, if they were on the same ideological and programmatic wavelength, would make democracy itself unnecessary —since democracy offers a productive route for, but does not put an end to, conflict and dissension.

Within this framework, five citizen councillors from the General Council of the Federal Electoral Institute (Santiago Creel, Miguel Angel Granados Chapa, José Agustín Ortiz Pinchetti, Ricardo Pozas and myself)

presented a proposed agenda for a new electoral reform. This is an initiative which seeks to be read as one more input towards the eventual reform which we believe to be necessary and which has been spoken of by the leaders of the main political parties and the president himself.

The list of subjects and proposals does not claim to be exhaustive, much less to replace the work which the various parties' legislators must —if they come to an agreement— carry out. On the contrary, it is addressed, first and foremost, precisely to the parliamentary groups which will eventually concern themselves with this issue.

The proposals put forward are debatable, but the objectives are defensible and they can forge a solid national consensus. This would involve designing electoral legislation seeking to buttress four great values: 1) impartial electoral authorities and procedures; 2) equitable conditions for competition; 3) democratic representation formulae; and 4) a strong, functional system of parties.

Rather than reproducing a text whose nature and length exceed the space available here, we will provide a kind of "sampling" of what it contains:

1. *Guiding principles, electoral institutions and procedures.* It is proposed that political rights be considered individual guarantees which can be defended through court orders (*amparos*), as well as developing the principles of certitude, legality, independence, impartiality and objectivity already found, albeit merely stated, in legislation; and to further incorporate the principle of equity.

The executive branch would be removed from the higher collegiate body which presides over the electoral authority, in order to reinforce this body's impartiality. The citizen councillors would be the only ones with the right to voice and vote. The presence of party representatives would continue as it is now (equal representation, with the right of voice but not vote), while the councillors differ as to whether councillors from the legislative branch should participate and whether or not their presence should be transitory. In any case, such a presence should reflect the pluralism presently existing within that branch.

It would be optimal for the citizen councillors to arise from a consensus among the country's main political forces, but juridically it is stated that they shall result from a qualified vote [i.e., a two-thirds majority] in the Chamber of Deputies (no single party has enough votes to achieve its proposals without agreement of other parties), at the initiative of the parliamentary blocs. They would hold office for only six years (their term is currently eight years) and half of them would be chosen every three years, so that there would be a subset of "veterans" and another consisting of "novices." The president of the General Council would be named from among the citizen councillors.

The citizen councillors and the members of the Local Councils would be appointed through qualified vote by the General Council, and the district citizen councillors would be selected through the Local Councils' qualified votes.

The Director General of the reformed Federal Electoral Institute would be chosen from three candidates whom a qualified majority [two thirds] of the General Council would propose to the Chamber of Deputies; the Chamber, again by qualified majority, would make the final decision. This formula seeks to have the Director General enjoy the confidence both of the political parties (present in the Chamber of Deputies) and of the General Council. The executive directors would be elected by a qualified majority of the Council after being nominated by the councillors or the Director General.

The electoral body should increase its work regarding democratic civic education, be financially autonomous and strengthen its professional service.

Other proposals involve creating voting centers which would allow greater oversight on election day and speed up vote tabulation; redrawing electoral districts (as already mandated by law) so they will contain similar numbers of voters; and the abolition of the Electoral College, replacing it with the Federal Electoral Tribunal, which would have the last word in this field.

The Tribunal's magistrates would be appointed by a qualified majority of the Chamber (as is the case presently), but would be nominated by the parliamentary blocs and not by Mexico's President. The special district attorney would be appointed by the president after nomination by the General Council. The objective of all these measures is to have the authorities and procedures guarantee impartiality in electoral races.

2. *Conditions for competition.* Three main fields are explored in the pursuit of equity: the communications media, party financing and expenses, and preventing the illegitimate transfer of public resources to political parties.

With regard to the media, the major reform would derive from the "right to information," which is presently a constitutional dead letter due to lack of regulation. Nevertheless, in the specifically electoral field the proposal is to regulate news activity in order to make it "objective, equitable and truthful," without infringing on the freedom of expression; to establish the right of reply; to make available full information on the media's income; to increase official time for party programs; to establish specific caps on spending for advertisements; and to periodically publicize the findings gathered by the electoral authorities on the comportment of radio and television news programs.

With respect to party financing and spending, the proposal is to increase the equal shares of public financing given to the parties, establish an electoral comptroller's office under the auspices of the General Council, drastically lower the caps on campaign spending and the limits of private donations —so as to allow social and civic

organizations to contribute to a given party only with the prior consent of such organizations' members— and to have oversight of parties' financial reports before and after election day. All financing and spending (by candidates or others) should be charged to the parties themselves.

To prevent the illegitimate transfer of public funds to any party, the suggestion is that the Chamber of Deputies' Higher Treasury Accountancy Office be assigned to the largest minority bloc in the Chamber, and that the Penal Code also be fine-tuned in this regard.

Another recommendation is to begin a debate on parties' use of the national symbols and colors, as well as the question of voting by Mexicans living abroad. Support was also expressed for the idea (already embodied in the law) of producing a citizen identification card.

3. *Democratization of representation.* The goal is to have voting percentages in all legislative areas translate into a similar percentage of seats. We propose the continuation of the Chamber of Deputies' system of mixed composition, in which "plurinominal" seats are distributed in such a way as to avoid over-and under-representation of the various parties. Nevertheless, it would be necessary to study formulae for representation and agreements which do not promote ungovernability.

For the Senate, we suggest a system of proportional representation by entity, since the current model is quite rigid (three for the majority and one for the largest minority). For the Federal District's Representative Assembly, we propose a schema similar to the Chamber of Deputies' (mixed and proportional). We also called for the nation's capital to have an elected government.[1]

4. *Parties, political associations and coalitions.* To contribute to building a strong system of parties, it is necessary to keep the door wide open to the entry of new party formations, and also to widen the exit for those options which fail to achieve the minimal citizen support specified by the law. It would even be useful to differentiate between the minimal vote percentage required for a party to maintain its electoral registration (which could continue at 1.5% of the vote) and the minimum needed for entering the Chamber of Deputies by means of plurinominal seats (which could be 3%).

It would be appropriate to reestablish the category of political associations, in order to offer a channel of action for minority political tendencies or organized regional forces. Nevertheless, in order to prevent representation from becoming atomized, such associations should be able to participate in elections only when they form a coalition with a political party. Similarly, the law should not put up artificial barriers to the formation of coalitions.

[1] Mexico's President currently appoints the Regent of Mexico City. (Editor's note.)

Campaign periods should be shortened, since a country with scarcities and shortfalls such as Mexico's cannot afford the luxury of extravagance involved in campaigns of titanic proportions. And it also seems necessary to reduce the periods between the election, ratification and swearing-in of the President and Congress. All that these long delays accomplish is to introduce uncertainty and tension.

Thus we are dealing with a broad, densely packed agenda developed with the aim of forging electoral legislation which will lead to confidence, participation and civilized coexistence.

Continuity or change in the governmental system?

Is it possible to modify our party and electoral systems without changing the governmental system? In other words, can we construct an authentic system of parties and a competitive electoral system while the governmental system remains untouched? The answer is no, and I will attempt to explain why.

Our party system has undergone clear changes, as has our electoral system, while the formula of government has —despite some reforms— remained basically petrified.

The workings of political pluralism are what explain, in the final analysis, the changes undergone by our party and electoral systems, and they have left their imprint on all of national politics. Given that it is unthinkable (at least for me) that this tendency could be cut short or reversed, it therefore seems necessary to consider the impact that increasingly competitive elections will have, bringing with them alternation, oscillations in the votes received by different options, and the eventual disappearance of absolute majorities.

Until recently, under the republican, democratic, federal and representative schema enshrined in the Constitution, there was a political bloc which always held the majority in every area of the state apparatus. The Executive and the two houses of Congress were in the hands of politicians who came from the ranks of a single party grouping.

While the basic provisions regarding the election of the federal and state executive branches have not changed at all, the norms for composition of the federal Chambers, local congresses and municipalities have undergone modifications, while maintaining a series of "padlocks" whose fundamental reservation is the need —as it is written and stated— to forge absolute majorities, even if no single party obtains an absolute majority of votes.

In our country the Executive is embodied in a single person. The President of the Republic is chosen by means of universal, secret and direct election, and can win —according to the Constitution— by a plurality of votes. In other words, one does not require an absolute majority

(50% plus one) of the vote in order to become president. It's a "game" of winner-take-all, while those who are defeated lose everything.

The Chamber of Deputies —which was the first to feel the winds of pluralism and the venue for experimentation in forming different political forces— nevertheless maintains a formula of composition which, in the most probable of scenarios, will wind up over-representing the majority and under-representing minorities, so that the plurality of votes (less than 50%) will end up with more than an absolute majority of seats. This is not mere speculation. In the 1994 federal elections we witnessed how the PRI, with 50.56% of the votes, obtained 60% of the seats. A number of different statistical exercises have shown that a party obtaining between 45% and 60% of the votes will always come out with 60% in the Chamber.

In the Senate, the formula of three senators for each state's majority and one for the largest minority will also have the effect of over-representing the majority and under-representing minorities.

With a schema such as this, which within certain parameters guarantees a comfortable absolute majority for the front-running party, why should problems arise? Because it is a schema which artificially constructs that majority in government institutions.

What will happen in the event of a federal election where no party receives more than half the effective votes, but which nonetheless results in one party having an absolute majority in both houses as well as controlling the executive branch? What will be the reaction of the minorities —which, taken together, could have more votes than the majority— to this way of translating electoral reality into institutional reality?

These questions are not the product of merely academic concerns. In the last two presidential races such a situation was on the point of crystallization. So we had better face it head on rather than closing our eyes.

Some Latin American countries now have a second round of voting when no presidential candidate receives an absolute majority of votes. Yet this cure is worse than the "disease." Such a procedure artificially polarizes the country into two great blocs, leading to the creation of shaky coalitions. But above all, since it is not applied to the composition of Congress (those countries normally use proportional representation formulae), it thereby creates the illusion of very strong presidents who nevertheless lack similar back-up in the legislative branch. As a result, recurrent conflicts between the two branches end up undermining governability and efficiency.

Second rounds in presidential elections are marked by the "mythological" yearning for presidents to have majority support, in absolute terms. Yet, given their very nature, they construct that majority for a single moment which is difficult to prolong when the elections come to an end.

With regard to the legislature, it seems necessary that votes be translated as faithfully as possible into seats. In the Chamber of Deputies, each political force must have the number of representatives indicated by the percentage of votes it has received. A mixed system such as our own could result in proportional representation if it is clearly accepted that plurinominal deputies will serve to correct tendencies towards over-and under-representation produced by the "uninominal" formula.

While maintaining the same number of senators per state, the criterion of proportional shares in each state could similarly be introduced, so that each state would be represented by an array of senators similar to the shares of votes received by the main political forces.

Nevertheless, electing a president who may win by a plurality of votes, while establishing strict proportionality at least in the Chamber of Deputies, could lead us into serious governability problems. Lacking sufficient votes, the executive branch could see many of its key initiatives repeatedly blocked (the Income Law and the Budget, for example), opening up a genuine "government crisis."

It is this fear which, up to the present, has motivated the design of our formulae for the composition of the legislative branch. This concern is appropriate, but the "solution" is less so, since by artificially constructing absolute majorities it may eventually lead to a much greater crisis than the one it seeks to prevent.

And so? I believe it is possible to find a way out of this labyrinth if we use a "recipe" from parliamentary regimes and inject it into our presidential regime. This would be the expedient of a presidential cabinet which is approved by the Chamber of Deputies. Thus, if a president and his party win an absolute majority of votes and thereby the same majority of seats, the president will have no problem in winning approval for a single-party cabinet. Yet if the president and his party lack the absolute majority of votes and seats, then they will be obliged to construct a two-or three-party legislative bloc which can provide support for their administration, and the first step will be negotiation of a coalition cabinet.

Given our presidentialist tradition, this proposal may sound like heresy. Nevertheless —above and beyond the specific "recipe"— there seems to be no turning back from the differentiation of voting and representation, and this makes it necessary to find formulae for the composition of government institutions which deal with the not so distant eventuality that none of the contending forces will win a majority of votes for itself alone. If that happens, it would be best to have legal procedures at hand which will clearly promote the formation of coalition governments.

Dual nationality

*Alonso Gómez-Robledo Verduzco**

The state has exclusive power over the granting or loss of nationality, as has been recognized since the old Permanent Court of International Justice ruled on Tunisia's and Morocco's nationality decrees in its consultative opinion of February 7, 1923.

Thus, every sovereign state is competent to grant its nationality to individuals born within its territory or residing within its borders.

Nevertheless, international jurisprudence is generally unanimous in stating that the exercise of this power is not discretionary; that is, that the attribution of nationality shall be conditioned by certain fundamental prerequisites in order to be valid or open to challenge by other states.

If nationality has traditionally been defined as an individual's belonging to the population that constitutes a state, it should be recalled that the International Court of Justice and the Commission on International Law, with a greater degree of clarity, have considered it to be a juridical link based on a social fact of cohesion, of adherence, an effective union of existence, interests and sentiments, in which such factors as history, language, religion and culture play a preponderant role within this set of traditions and common ideals.

What is most desirable is that the juridical notion of nationality coincide as closely as possible with the sociological notion, on both the collective and individual levels.

Criteria for the attribution of nationality of origin are practically universal. They are based on relationship, *ius sanguinis*, and connection to territory, *ius soli*; as well as the expressed desire making it possible for a person, on the basis of their request, to acquire a new nationality —in other words, nationality through nationalization.

The inevitable consequence of the nature and diversity of possible linkages in this field is that certain individuals will conform to the conditions for granting them more than one nationality; according to this hypothesis such a person simultaneously belongs to two or more states.

At present, this situation derives principally from the simultaneous application of the criteria of *ius sanguinis* and *ius soli* (in cases where these two elements do not coincide with regard to a given individual); from the acquisition, through marriage, of a spouse's nationality while the person's original nationality is maintained; and from the transmission of nationality *jure sanguinis* through both the mother and the father of the person involved.

From the viewpoint of the international community, it is clearly highly inconvenient that a person may choose between one or another nationality according to what is most in line with that individual's interests.

In conflicts where, for example, the question is which law may be applied by Mexican authorities in the case of an individual to whom both Mexican and Guatemalan laws attribute nationality, in practice the states involved resolve the problem through the principle of the law of location. In other words, in our example, the individual in question will be considered Mexican in Mexico and Guatemalan in Guatemala.

It is evident —and this has always been recognized in classic conceptions and arbitration jurisprudence— that the possibility that two or more nationalities may coexist in a



Angeles Torrejón/Imagenlatina.

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single individual is a genuine absurdity, in both juridical and political terms, leading to counterposed and incompatible situations.

A person cannot exercise rights in several states at the same time without this causing a series of personal difficulties; such a situation can become an inexhaustible source of international conflicts, above all with regard to the fulfillment of military obligations and the possible recourse to diplomatic protection.

According to most internal legislation, nationality may be lost in the case of some event expressly covered by a law in the state of origin; this is usually based on certain causes determining the severing of a person's connection with the state in question.

In some situations it is desirable that the loss of nationality be subordinated to an effective break of links with the country of origin, in order to counteract possible fraud consisting of evasion of the obligations connected with the attribution of nationality at the same time as the person concerned continues to enjoy prerogatives derived from the same attribution.

Thus, for example, a person should not be allowed to renounce their nationality at the same time as they maintain their principal domicile within their country of origin.

If one of the basic reasons for recent draft bills aimed at regulating "dual nationality" for Mexicans abroad —with special reference to our citizens who work in the United States— is to avoid the automatic loss of Mexican nationality due to the voluntary acquisition of another nationality, it will be sufficient to base ourselves on the Nationality Law of 1993. This law, like its predecessor of 1934, expressly and clearly states that Mexican nationality is not lost when the acquisition of a foreign nationality has occurred due to law, simple residency or because it is an indispensable condition for gaining employment or maintaining employment previously acquired.

A current of opinion has recently arisen which, in light of the new international context, increasingly accepts that dual nationality may be adopted as a juridical system; this leads to a deep-going change of mentality. A prominent example of this change is found in the European Community and its agreement, in principle, to establish a common passport which would be an expression of European citizenship coexistent with the various state nationalities.

But what is of vital importance is that if Mexico eventually signs dual-nationality treaties, it must be very clear that a person may juridically possess two nationalities on the condition that only one of them will, at a given time, be fully operative. In other words, the nationality of origin would remain in a latent state, with the inherent rights it involves suspended.

Conceived of in this way, the dual-nationality system would imply the "hibernation" (in A. Navarro's words) of one nationality while the other holds sway operationally. The two nationalities remain, but with different juridical effectiveness. In this sense, a person or entity, if he or it makes use of the dual nationality established by a treaty, will in no case be able to invoke both nationalities at the same time.

The principle of effectiveness, which is far-reaching in international law, acquires a particular relevance in matters of nationality, since in order to resolve a particular controversy judges will be guided, in an infinite number of cases, by this principle. (This has been true, for example, in the famous leading cases of the Canevaro Arbitration and the Nottebohm Sentence.)

In this context, we find a very apt rendering of the principle of effectiveness in the Statute of the International Court of Justice: "Any person who, in order to be elected a member of the tribunal, could be held to be a national of more than one state will be considered a national of the state where they usually exercise their civil and political rights" (Article 3, 72).

Under the Mexican law which has been in effect since 1993 (as well as the old Mexican Nationality and Naturalization Act of 1934), any Mexican citizen who holds another nationality, however acquired, must renounce that nationality and swear allegiance to Mexico.

Although this legal requirement has been in existence for many years, it was not strictly enforced by the Mexican government until January 1973, when the government decreed that all Mexicans holding another nationality must confirm their Mexican nationality by means of a certificate issued by the Secretariat of Foreign Relations.

The Mexican government allows its citizens to have dual nationality up to the age of eighteen, freely issuing them passports which permit them to exit and re-enter the country as Mexican citizens. At the age of 18, however, the government strictly enforces the law requiring such dual nationals to renounce any other nationality they may hold and pledge allegiance to Mexico.

This is accomplished by requiring the individual to sign an application for a Certificate of Mexican Nationality which contains this oath of allegiance and a renunciation of any other nationality.

Under current U.S. law, signing this application is a potential act of expatriation which usually results in the loss of American citizenship, since it involves a clear-cut oath of allegiance to a foreign state (U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Section 349, paragraph 2).

Canadians and Mexicans take heart! A call for confidence in the rules of NAFTA

*Ann E. Penner**

Canadians and Mexicans have many things in common. Perhaps the most important and widely discussed is their common neighbor and its role in their political, cultural and economic systems. Canada and Mexico have moved steadily towards a closer political and economic relationship with the United States throughout their histories. Nevertheless, some members of both countries have been fearful when doing so. For example, a healthy trade relationship with the United States has always been important in ensuring the vitality of the Canadian and Mexican economies because of the size, proximity and wealth of the American market.

However, some policy makers and academics in Canada and Mexico have been very cognizant of issues such as autonomy, sovereignty, independence and fairness. They have argued that a closer economic relationship would have negative political ramifications for Canada and Mexico. They have been torn between desires for the benefits that closer economic ties with the United States would offer, and fears that such ties would threaten political autonomy, independence and identity.

Critics of NAFTA have used these concerns to fuel the fires of their arguments against the trilateral agreement. They have charged that NAFTA will take away what is left of Canadian and Mexican sovereignty and individual decision making ability by not only beginning a process of economic integration but of political integration as well. By virtue of its size, power and wealth in the trilateral relationship, critics have alleged that the United States will be able to dictate foreign, monetary, trade, labor and environmental policies to Canada and Mexico.

In other words, critics have argued that the provisions of NAFTA will be manipulated by American interest groups and policy makers, thus removing the independence, sovereignty and autonomy of the other two countries. They have lamented the fact that NAFTA has taken effect, and has begun to integrate the economies of the "Three Amigos" into a closer, more interdependent relationship.

When asserting their critiques about sovereignty and autonomy, these critics forget a central element of NAFTA —the rule of law. Canadians and Mexicans worked

Marco A. Cruz/Imagenlatina.

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together during the NAFTA negotiations to ensure that effective rules and dispute settlement mechanisms were placed into the agreement. They fought and won against American resistance to the presence of binding trilateral dispute settlement panels to preserve and promote their independence, sovereignty and autonomy within an agreement that embodied the rule of law.

Both Canada and Mexico pursued free trade with the United States in order to institutionalize rules governing free and fair trade. Both had fallen victim to the rising levels of protectionism in the United States too many times during the 1970s and 1980s. Both Canada and Mexico wanted to reflect the importance of rules and effective dispute settlement mechanisms in North American trade. Rules were regarded as the best means to ensure that the fate of Canadian and Mexican domestic producers/ exporters, and the sovereignty, autonomy and independent decision-making ability of the two governments were not placed at the mercy of the American trade remedy regime which championed American interests above all others.

The common concerns of Canadian and Mexican negotiators bound them together and allowed them to achieve a very strong, effective system of dispute settlement within NAFTA. The institutional provisions that were built inside of NAFTA have been upheld around the world as the most comprehensive and rigorous examples of dispute settlement that have been included in a free trade agreement to date.

They have been singled out as examples which other regional agreements should pattern their institutions and dispute settlement provisions upon. For example, the provisions of NAFTA were pointed to as models which could improve the dispute settlement mechanisms of GATT during the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986-1994). Many of the provisions of NAFTA's dispute settlement mechanisms were entrenched into the new World Trade Organization which now governs global trade.

NAFTA contains a number of mechanisms to settle disputes. Chapter 11 (investments), Chapter 14 (financial services), Chapter 19 (anti-dumping and countervailing duties), and Chapter 20 (general dispute settlement mechanism) set out very specific, detailed, comprehensive dispute settlement provisions and institutions. The environmental and labor side deals also contain explicit rules and procedures that are to be used to settle disputes arising out of their provisions. Essentially, all of NAFTA's dispute settlement mechanisms follow a very similar pattern.

In the event that political consultations and negotiations are unable to settle a dispute, the disputing members of NAFTA (and individuals under their jurisdiction) have the right to demand that a trinational dispute settlement panel be convened to hear the dispute. Dispute settlement panels are made up of lawyers, judges or issue-area experts from all three countries. They are chosen collectively by the disputing parties from a roster held by NAFTA's Secretariat. After hearing a dispute within specified time frames, the panels are empowered to render decisions that are occasionally binding on the parties involved.

In the event that panel decisions are binding (e.g., disputes dealing with Chapter 19), the party which violated the agreement must amend its domestic laws to ensure that they comply with the rules of NAFTA. If decisions are not binding, the disputing parties must use the panel's report as a starting point to settle the dispute by negotiation. Safeguard measures, appeal procedures and sanctions are permitted in narrowly defined circumstances if the dispute settlement mechanisms are not allowed to work as they are intended to by one of the NAFTA members.

Skeptics argue that NAFTA's rules can be broken. They ask what assurances are there that the rule of law will be able to triumph over power politics within international trade? What guarantees are there that the dispute settlement mechanisms will work as intended? How can rules be used to ensure free, fair, equitable trade? How will NAFTA's dispute settlement mechanisms protect and promote the autonomy, sovereignty and independence of Canada, Mexico and the United States? Answering these questions requires one to recognize that there are no simple answers or solutions, as there are few, if any, in life itself. Rules and laws, whether domestic or international, are only as good and as strong as the will of the people to uphold them.

Nevertheless, critics of NAFTA would be wise to consider how the rule of law and binding forms of dispute settlement have become increasingly important in the global trading environment during the last 20 years when asking these questions. More importantly, they would also be wise to apply the lessons learned from the success of the dispute settlement mechanisms of the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) to their fears about the future of Canadian and Mexican sovereignty in the context of North American trade.

The FTA contained a system of dispute settlement that was very similar to NAFTA's. In fact, many of NAFTA's provisions were borrowed directly from the dispute settlement mechanisms of Chapter 18 (general dispute settlement mechanism) and Chapter 19 (antidumping and countervailing duties) of the FTA. The FTA's dispute settlement mechanisms have not worked perfectly, nor have they solved bilateral trade disputes altogether. Indeed, it is not realistic to assume that dispute settlement mechanisms could ever eliminate trade disputes altogether. Sovereign states such as Canada and the United States will always try to uphold their country's domestic interests and concerns.

Moreover, trade disputes over issues such as antidumping and countervailing duties will continue to occur as sovereign states continue to build upon their often irrational and politically motivated domestic laws. Nevertheless, the dispute settlement mechanisms of the FTA have been very successful in lowering the temperature in cross-border relations, because they have encouraged Canada and the United States to look to the rule of law when resolving actual or potential trade disputes between them.

For example, the dispute settlement mechanisms of the FTA significantly improved the ways that Canadians could voice their concerns regarding American protectionism and harmful trade remedy laws passed in the interests of "free and fair trade." Prior to the institutionalization of the rule of law in the FTA, Canadian governments and exporters were forced to use diplomacy and/or American trade tribunals to signal their displeasure with American trading practices.

As the smaller, weaker partner in the relationship, Canada's national interests and those of its domestic producers/exporters were often overridden by American ones. Power politics caused the balance of the trade relationship to be tipped clearly in favor of the United States. Canadian governments and exporters often lacked the time, money and political power needed to ensure that mutually beneficial solutions were applied to disputes arising out of bilateral trade. Canadian sovereignty and independent decision-making ability were sometimes threatened prior to 1989 in the absence of the rule of law, and effective, impartial, bilaterally created dispute settlement mechanisms.

Trade law experts have argued that the dispute settlement mechanisms of the FTA changed all of that when the agreement came into force in 1989. Canadians and Americans have submitted over 50 cases to FTA dispute settlement panels between 1989-1995. The vast majority of those cases dealt with antidumping and countervailing duties. They were ruled upon by bilateral panels that were able to issue binding decisions that had to be implemented by the government whose domestic laws violated the spirit and letter of the agreement.

Therefore, Chapters 18 and 19 of the FTA have offered Canadians and Americans a substantially more conciliatory, effective, objective, fair, efficient, faster and less politically motivated process of settling disputes than those that were used prior to 1989. The FTA's dispute settlement mechanisms have placed Canada and the United States on a more equitable footing despite the overwhelming political and economic disparities that characterize their relationship. The dispute settlement mechanisms have transferred the terms that governed the bilateral trade relationship from the context of power politics to the rule of law.

Because the FTA was a bilaterally created trade agreement, both Canada and the United States were given an equal voice in the way that domestic trade laws would be applied. The dispute settlement mechanisms have reduced the strength of power politics and American unilateralism from the trade relationship and application of domestic trade laws. Canadian sovereignty, autonomy and independent decision making ability have thus been enhanced because the rule of law made Canada and the United States more equal political, economic and legal partners within the agreement.

Based upon the positive experiences that Canada has had with the rules of the FTA, Canadians and Mexicans can take heart from the fact that those rules have been replicated in NAFTA. Indeed, trade law experts argue that NAFTA's rules and dispute settlement mechanisms are even more effective, binding and rigorous than those of its predecessor. NAFTA's rules have strengthened the FTA rules in three ways:

1. NAFTA included mechanisms to settle disputes arising out of investment issues, financial services as well as environmental and labor laws.

2. NAFTA created a permanent Secretariat to ensure that the administrative aspects of the dispute settlement mechanisms worked properly and smoothly.

3. NAFTA made the rules and procedures governing antidumping and countervailing duty disputes clearer, more transparent and permanent.

Canadians and Mexicans need to approach their relationship with the United States in a bold and confident manner in the future. Trade with the United States is vital to the health of their economies. Protectionism and isolationism are not appropriate responses in today's international political economy. Globalization, regional trading blocs and the very presence of NAFTA make aggressive, outward-looking trade policies essential and imperative for both Canada and Mexico. The rules and dispute settlement mechanisms of NAFTA are good reasons for Canadian and Mexican producers, exporters, policy makers and academics to recommend assertive, competitive trade policies and practices to their publics. NAFTA's rules and dispute settlement mechanisms are highly regarded in the international community as excellent means to promote free and fair trade, as well as ones that can protect and promote the equality, sovereignty and autonomy of each member state.

Therefore, Canadians and Mexicans, take heart! Place your confidence in the rules of NAFTA. You have the rule of law on your side to protect your domestic producers and exporters, as well as your country's autonomy, sovereignty and independence. The rule of law has already been working for Canada in the FTA. It can now work for all of NAFTA's "Three Amigos." VM

The U.S. immigration debate and its consequences for Mexico

*Mónica Verea Campos**

Mexican migration to the United States has traditionally been a difficult and thorny issue in bilateral relations. The United States has unilaterally opened and closed the door on legal and undocumented immigration many times during this century. At the end of the bilateral "Bracero Program" agreement that existed from 1942-1964, there was a significant increase in undocumented immigration as well as a rise in tension in bilateral relations. This was also the case during the 1920s and 30s, as well as in 1954 with the famous "Operation Wetback."

Perceptions of immigrants in the United States have become increasingly negative during the present decade. Measures for containing immigration include sanctions against employers of undocumented workers, promulgated as part of the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) of 1986; the recent Operations Blockade and Gatekeeper (1993 and 1994); and Proposition 187, a California law, approved by referendum in 1994, which excludes the undocumented from public schools and denies them other public services. U.S. public debates around these issues have caused a series of concerns among several sectors of Mexican and U.S. society, and have occasionally provoked tensions in bilateral relations.

In a recent article published jointly with Manuel García y Griego[1] the hypothesis was presented that Mexico-U.S. relations have advanced, along the road of dialogue, from scarcely cordial relations in the '70s to relations characterized by the spirit of bilateral collaboration in the '90s. In other words, there was a transition from a unilateral to a more bilateral approach. This development is surprising, precisely because it occurred in the context of new anti-immigrant attitudes which will probably be sources of conflict and tension in the near future.

Thus, in the last two years both the U.S. executive branch and Congress have been considering various immigration control laws, which have provoked strong reactions.

U.S. immigration policy and Mexican immigrants

In spite of the new anti-immigrant attitude, over the past eight years Mexicans have been favored by several legal measures included in immigration policy reforms. The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA) and the Immigration Act of 1990 had a direct effect on the make-up and volume of the undocumented population in the United States, as well as on admission policies for new immigrants.

In order to take stock of the impact these new laws' application has had on the legalization and admission of immigrants, especially Mexicans, it is important to note the following:

Through IRCA two types of groups were legalized. Under the first heading — those who could prove that they had resided in the U.S. continually since 1982 — 1,757,957[2] people were legalized. The second category

[1] García y Griego, Manuel and Mónica Verea, "Bilateralismo en tiempos difíciles: la migración en la nueva agenda bilateral México-Estados Unidos," paper presented during the international seminar on "The New Bilateral Agenda," CISAN, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM), University of Texas at Austin, in press.

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[2] Seventy percent, that is 1,230,457 of them, were Mexicans, of whom 54.4% were legalized in California and 17.7% in Texas. (Carlos González Gutiérrez, "The Mexican Diaspora in California: Limits and Possibilities for the Mexican Government," in Lowenthal, Abraham and Katrina Burgess, *The California-Mexico Connection*, Stanford University Press, 1993, pp. 224-225.)

consisted of 1,480,971 "special agricultural workers" (SAW) —those who could prove that they served as temporary workers in the agricultural sector for a minimum of 90 days between May 1985 and May 1986.[3] Thus, 2,270,725 Mexicans benefitted from these programs by regularizing their immigration status.

They also benefitted from the Immigration Act of 1990 since, starting in 1992, that law allowed for an increase in the legal immigration quota of Mexicans, through three provisions: overall, an increase of approximately 40 percent over and above the 500,000 corresponding to the number of immigrants who could be admitted annually; an increase in the limit per country, which in Mexico's case rose from 20,000 to 26,000; and an independent number (55,000) of three-year visas — which expire in 1995— for immediate family members of those recently legalized through IRCA and/or who were legally residing in the United States in May 1988. These measures were designed to reunite families of those who were recently legalized, the other members of which are, in some cases, already in the U.S. as undocumented immigrants. The law also made it easier to become employed in professional and highly skilled jobs, raising the limit from 58,000 to 140,000.[4]

While the North American Free Trade Agreement negotiations did not include immigration issues, they did lead to a number of provisions similar to those agreed upon in the Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the United States. The treaty permits entry of four categories of "business people" into the United States, Canada and Mexico, on a reciprocal basis. The limit set for Mexican professionals who may work temporarily in the United States is 5,500 annually.

The volume of undocumented workers has been more or less constant since 1990,[5] in spite of the legalization implemented by both laws. There was a considerable drop in volume immediately after IRCA's approval, when the legalization process began.

The debate in Congress and executive-branch proposals

Due to the debate generated primarily by California's Proposition 187, the immigration issue has resurfaced amidst enormous controversy, and may continue to be a key question both at the White House and during the upcoming sessions of the 104th Congress.

Lawmakers are seeking a range of restrictions on immigrants, since they consider that overall immigrants cost the nation much more than what they contribute. Up until now discussion has centered on stopping the entry of undocumented immigrants, through the following mechanisms: an increase in border security, so the undocumented may be deported; a struggle against smugglers of undocumented immigrants; promotion of a national identification registry; reduction of public benefits for non-citizens; and a push for reimbursement of expenses incurred by states with high levels of immigration.

The Clinton Administration, for its part, recently proposed a plan which includes the following measures: increasing the number of personnel responsible for tracking immigrants; extending and improving the system for work permits verification; denying all public services, except education and medical attention, to undocumented immigrants; and creating a border-crossing toll.

Both branches are discussing the immigration issue and, while illegal immigrants are the main target, there is a new skepticism regarding legal immigration, in terms of quotas and services utilized. In the following sections the principal initiatives on undocumented and legal immigration are explained.

Undocumented immigration

Increasing security on the southern border. Members of Congress as well as of the executive branch have been pressuring to stop the entry of and traffic in undocumented immigrants, increasing personnel for tracking them, primarily on the southern border. The main focus has been on improving and increasing human and economic resources for the Border Patrol, which currently employs 4,500 agents. In his budget, Clinton proposed allotting an additional billion dollars to the states with the aim of controlling the influx of undocumented immigrants, as well as denying them public benefits. In Congress, Representative Lamar Smith and Senator Phil Graham have proposed adding one thousand agents annually for the next five years, thereby increasing Border Patrol personnel to ten thousand agents in the year 2000.[6] While more modest than those put forward by members of Congress, Clinton's proposal in this field is quite significant and will have a key effect along the southern border with Mexico. It is important to point out that several operations have already been implemented in order to try to control the flow of undocumented immigrants at the border: "Gatekeeper" in San Diego, California, "Safeguard" in Arizona and "Hold the Line" in El Paso, Texas. This has led to an increase in

[3] 81.55% (i.e., 1,040,268) of the applicants were Mexican; the majority (53%) of applications were made in California. (*Ibid.*, p. 225.)

[4] Vernez, George, "Mexican Labor in California's Economy," in Lowenthal, Abraham and Katrina Burgess, *op. cit.*, p. 162.

[5] Between 1 and 3.5 million Mexicans are estimated to have immigrated to the U.S. without authorization. The net flow of undocumented people who settle in the U.S. each year is estimated at 150,000 to 300,000.

[6] "Clinton Will Seek Spending to Curb Aliens, Aides Say," *New York Times*, January 22, 1995.

the number of abuses committed, with virtual impunity, by the Border Patrol in its detentions of Mexican citizens.[7]

With the aim of supporting the costs of financing security on the southern border, the Clinton Administration originally suggested imposing a toll of $3 per vehicle and $1.50 per pedestrian crossing the border. This controversial measure was canceled and put at the consideration of each state, given that it was projected that it would discourage commercial and service sectors along the border, a zone affected by the recent devaluation of the peso. As a result of these criticisms, a plan was put forward for voluntary tolls to improve services.

Janet Reno has stated that she will present Congress with an initiative that would impose a $500 dollar daily fine on foreigners who fail to leave the United States once their visa expires. This measure is directed at those who enter with legal visas but remain after the expiration date. It is calculated that 50 percent of undocumented persons in the United States entered this way, while the other half cross the land borders with Mexico and Canada. The majority of resources for detention and subsequent deportation are spent on the latter type of undocumented immigrant.

With regard to the traffic in undocumented immigrants, there is a plan to establish field teams along the border with Mexico in order to find and identify organizations involved in smuggling undocumented immigrants. The urgency of combatting illegal immigration through the capture of traffickers in false documents has also been discussed.[8]

Reflecting concern about foreigners who commit crimes, a proposal for a 40 percent increase in related budget items (i.e., approximately 130 million dollars) has been put forward.[9] Warren Christopher specifically indicated his commitment to fighting not only illegal immigration but organized crime and terrorism as well.

Establishing a verification system. The goal is to interdict employment of immigrants without documents through the establishment of a computerized national identity system; this would permit employers to check the legal status of potential employees. This proposal has been strongly criticized by many groups since, on the one hand, it would tend to promote discrimination against people who look foreign, and on the other hand, mainly inside the Republican camp, it is opposed because of the high cost and invasion of privacy involved in setting up such a system. This proposal was one of the centerpieces of the Report of the Immigration Reform Commission presented for strengthening application of the 1986 law.

Representative Lamar Smith proposed creating a type of identity card with the aim of blocking illegal immigrants' access not only to employment but to public benefits as well. Majority leader Newt Gingrich, a Republican from Georgia, presented a more complex initiative that puts forward the idea of requiring a sponsor or financial guarantor for immigrants over a five-year period.[10]

The White House intends to apply severe sanctions against employers who hire undocumented workers and thereby violate Federal immigration and labor laws. To accomplish this a national system, parallel to that of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), would be established in order to permit rapid and accurate identification of undocumented foreign criminals and those seeking public benefits. Moreover, there is a plan to increase by 865 the number of inspectors who visit businesses in order to check documents, especially in traditionally low-wage industries.

INS Commissioner Doris Meissner stated that despite the agency's 25 percent budget increase (the highest to date), the amount for sanctioning employers was cut; this could spark a heated debate in Congress. The Commissioner pointed out that there are around 7 million employers in the United States and the INS has only 1,000 agents to verify that the workers being hired are legal, while voluntary personnel dedicated to this task are scarce.

Reimbursement for immigration expenses. The states with high rates of immigration intend to seek reimbursement for the expenses they incur through receiving large numbers of illegal immigrants, and the additional cost of imprisoning them. The main arguments in favor of this measure are that immigration is a national problem and should therefore be a responsibility shared by all the states, not only those along the border. California, Florida and other border states with fiscal problems have already requested Federal compensation. The Urban Institute reported costs for the seven states

[7] A report by Human Rights Watch Americas detailed numerous cases of beatings, shootings, rapes and killings allegedly committed by Border Patrol agents. ("Denuncia Human Rights a la patrulla fronteriza," *Reforma*, Mexico City, April 12, 1995.)

[8] Los Angeles immigration officials revealed that they had captured a network of traffickers in identification documents. They seized 115,000 blank green cards, Social Security cards and other false documents, which were being sold at approximately 50 dollars apiece. If convicted, each of the accused would be sentenced to five years in jail or a $75,000 fine, in accordance with Proposition 187's section on document fraud —the only part of this bill which was not welcomed by both Federal and state judges, given the potential for constitutional conflicts. It should be noted that, according to the U.S. Attorney General's office, the Federal contraband statute provides for punishments of up to five years in jail and $250,000 in fines for each person smuggled. ("INS Breaks Up Ring that Made Fake IDs," *Los Angeles Times*, January 4, 1995.)

[9] "White House Will Seek Increase in INS Efforts," *Wall Street Journal*, January 23, 1995.

[10] "Tougher Rules, ID System Planned, INS Chief Says," *Los Angeles Times*, January 10, 1995.

with the largest numbers of illegal immigrants reached 471 million dollars per year, and that in 1994 the Federal government provided 130 million dollars for partial reimbursement of their expenses.[11]

Denial of citizenship. One of the most radical proposals is to deny automatic citizenship for children born in the United States of undocumented parents. This was initially proposed by California Governor Pete Wilson and later supported, as a constitutional amendment or statute, by the Capitol.

Legal immigration

Lowering quotas. The majority of politicians have focused on discussing viable ways to stop illegal immigration. Some call for lowering the annual quota for entry of legal workers. The quota is presently 800,000, and covers refugees and immediate family members of residents, as well as those offering certain skills necessary to the labor market. Senator Simpson has proposed that the quota be reduced to 600,000 while others have proposed more drastic reductions, with some even considering a temporary moratorium on immigration.[12] Questions have also been raised regarding priorities for legalization, with debate on lowering the numbers of those legalized through family reunification and raising those related to job skills needed in the U.S. labor market.

Reforming the welfare system. The "Personal Responsibility Act," recently passed by the House of Representatives, involves reforming the Federal welfare system, decentralizing it so the states will have more control; this would generate a savings of 66 billion dollars.[13] One proposal for achieving this savings would deny legal immigrants access to almost all Federal public services. Until now, legal immigrants and their dependents were eligible for health-care and public assistance programs; this has generated intense debate on social welfare reform. The majority of Republican representatives support the initiative, which would lead to denying teenage mothers and legal immigrants help under Federal anti-poverty programs. The Federal government insists that states adopt a five-year minimum residency period as a prerequisite for granting assistance under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.

[11] "House Panel Backs U.S. Reimbursement for Jailing Illegal Immigrants," *Washington Post*, January 28, 1995.

[12] Idelson, Holly, "Proposals Would Crack Down on Illegals and Tighten Rules for Legal Immigrants," *Congressional Quarterly*, Vol. 53, No. 15, Washington, D.C., April 15, 1995.

[13] "House Passes Sweeping Welfare Reform Measure with Grim Immigration Consequences," *Interpreter Releases*, Vol. 72, No. 13, Federal Publications, Inc., Washington, D.C., March 31, 1995.

Conclusions

It is clear that in the United States, perspectives and views on immigration have changed in significant ways, and this has led to a debate which is quantitatively and qualitatively different from those heard only a few years ago. In this new situation, an anti-immigrant atmosphere prevails in the nation; Proposition 187 has fostered an anti-Hispanic and particularly anti-Mexican mood in California. Various sectors have taken advantage of this environment in order to push for drastic changes in the structure of U.S. immigration policy.

The recently published, controversial book *Alien Nation*[14] is representative of the new conservatism as well as the concerns voiced by certain sectors of U.S. society. One of its hypotheses is that current immigration flows are not only high in volume but also culturally distinct from previous immigrant groups. It calls the Immigration Law of 1965 disastrous because it did not pay attention to nationality; that is, it treated European immigration as less important, favoring entry of legal residents families —that is, immigrants from Latin America or Asia who, in the author's opinion, often fail to assimilate and are sometimes even rejected by their communities.

Thus, in a highly emotionally charged atmosphere, the immigration issue divides along partisan lines or viewpoints. It has more of an impact now, with the new Republican majority in Congress; traditionally, minorities are unlikely to support the Republicans, considered to favor restrictive measures which generate discrimination and racism. It is important to stress that both houses are led by Republicans: Alan Simpson in the Senate and Lamar Smith in the House of Representatives. Both have pushed for drastic measures to control immigration, above all from across the southern border.

For their part, the Clinton Administration and some Democrats are also considering putting more emphasis on border control. However, it seems that their goal is to be part of the political game, proposing and supporting immigration control measures to satisfy public opinion and reduce support to the Republicans.

Governor Pete Wilson's bid to be the Republican Party's presidential candidate aggravates the situation, since his most important campaign themes are immigration control and reform, and overhauling affirmative action programs.

What is quite clear, in any case, is that this has become a key, priority issue for both parties in the period leading to the 1996 elections. It will also be one of the most dynamic and intense issues on the bilateral relations agenda for years to come.

[14] Brimelow, Peter, *Alien Nation*, Random House, New York, 1995.

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

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Hollywood views Mexican immigration

*David R. Maciel**

Mexican undocumented immigration to the United States is the single most complex and difficult issue currently facing these two countries. The controversy concerning Mexican undocumented workers in the United States includes economic, political, legal, social, cultural and even moral considerations. Mexican immigration has, in fact, become one of the salient political issues of the 1990s. The immigration question has intensified in the political discourse of both countries[1] and, as such, has received considerable attention from the academic community, policy makers, and the media.

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1 "Inside Proposition 187," *Los Angeles Times*, November 10, 1994, p. A-28.

Associated Film Distribution.

Charles Bronson in Borderline *(1980).*

Although there is a growing and important body of scholarly studies on the subject, the media have been by far the most influential force in setting the agenda for the political debate and molding public opinion in the United States and Mexico. Printed and visual media coverage and representation of the issues surrounding Mexican immigration have been greatly responsible for the current rise in xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S.[2] In Mexico, media portrayals of the immigrant experience have contributed to the move for political action on the subject. Among the visual media, cinema is the one that, because of its consistency and popularity, has been singularly influential in addressing the theme of Mexican immigration.

Mexican immigration to the U.S. has been a dominant cinematic theme on both sides of the border from the early decades of the century up to the present. Just as the process of Mexican immigration to the United States encompasses the entire 20th century, representations and images of Mexican immigrants on the silver screen followed an equally long path.

While the majority of immigration films do not necessarily provide narrative elements that contribute to a more insightful understanding of the complexity of Mexican immigration, films on immigration do reveal national idiosyncracies. As such they are an important measure of national attitudes on Mexican immigration to the U.S.; as a noted scholar has demonstrated, "recurrent screen motifs reflect the needs and fears of the entire nation."[3]

Hollywood immigration films are particularly significant because of their origin, ideological constructs and popularity. The American film industry, the largest and most powerful in the world, produces and distributes more films than any other national cinema.[4] Hollywood features are the most widely viewed motion pictures in almost every country in the world. Because of this mass consumption, American cinema is highly influential. The Hollywood style has set the standard for popular films both thematically and artistically.

The conceptual mode of analysis applied in this discussion of immigration films is the study of "genre," defined as a "category, kind or form of film distinguished by subject matter, theme or techniques."[5] Genre films, then, are features that are imitations of previous ones. Such films follow a similar discursive pattern or formula. Basic common ingredients found in genre narratives include: setting, plot (conflict and resolution), recurring images and interchangeable cinematic techniques.[6] Foremost is the fact that genre films "are commercial films which, through repetition and variation, tell familiar stories with familiar characters in familiar situations."[7] This also has to do with the relationship between groups of films, as well as with the societies in which they are produced and the cultures in which they are shown. Genre films are almost exclusively popular movies, as compared to art films, which generally serve specific tastes or viewing publics. In the words of a recent critic, genre films are "pure emotional articulation, fictional constructs of the imagination, growing essentially out of group interests and values."[8]

Moreover, recent genre film studies stress the importance of acknowledging and understanding the milieu and background of the work through its relationship with history, popular culture and politics.[9]

On the theme of immigration, Hollywood has followed a distinct path. Unlike other cinematic themes that have reflected creativity and diversity in American cinema, in immigration genre films the Hollywood style has opted for a static and rather conventional format.

On the whole, Hollywood genre films on immigration share certain characteristics: 1) they cover a lengthy historical period of production, from the silent period to the present; 2) they follow one basic discursive formula, a modified version of the Western where the hero struggles valiantly against the gangs involved in trafficking undocumented workers, always defeating them at the end; 3) although these films are supposed to deal with the theme of Mexican immigration, in reality the immigrant experience is always vague, the least developed aspect of the film; 4) Hollywood immigration movies are, without an exception, vehicles for a traditional action story for the principal star, be it Tom Mix or Jack Nicholson; 5) they have a clear policy message —the importance of the control of our southern border and the need to institutionalize a campaign against the smuggling of undocumented workers to the U.S.; 6) the films reveal U.S. preoccupations and concerns with the immigration issue on U.S. soil; 7) the roots and causes of Mexican immigration and the substantial contributions of Mexican immigrants to the U.S. economy are never addressed in much detail; 8) these movies do not offer any alternative solutions to Mexican undocumented immigration;

[2] The excellent article by Juan Gómez-Quiñones, "Una interpretación de las relaciones entre la comunidad chicana y México" in David R. Maciel, ed., *El México olvidado: historia del pueblo chicano* (Ciudad Juárez), forthcoming, covers this theme well.

[3] Cited in Robert C. Allen and Douglas Gomery. *Film History* (New York, 1985), p. 160.

[4] Gerald Mast's *A Short History of the Movies* (Indianapolis, 1976) discusses the rise and the influence of Hollywood on world cinema in an excellent manner.

[5] Harry M. Geduld and Ronald Gottesman, *An Illustrated Glossary of Film Terms* (New York, 1973), p. 73.

[6] Barry Keith Grant. *Film Genre Reader* (Austin, 1986), p. XI.

[7] Ibid, p. 52.

[8] Allen, *Film History* addresses this theme in an exceptional manner.

[9] See the recent study by David G. Gutiérrez, *Walls and Mirrors* (Berkeley, 1995), pp. 39-69.

9) almost without exception, women are totally secondary as characters —there is, then, a serious lack of important or interesting gender representation; 10) for the most part, they can be classified as "B" category movies (that is, low-budget and of secondary billing); 11) Hollywood films are the least developed in narration or character development of the three cinematic perspectives on immigration.

The Hollywood style on immigration provides an important glance at the blend of art, politics and commercialism prevailing in the United States. Certain immigration films have proved moderately successful at the box office. More critically, they have reinforced widely held beliefs, reflecting the political and ideological ambiance at the time of production in America. What follows is a chronological assessment of Hollywood immigration genre films from their origins to the present.

Her Last Resort (1912) is perhaps the first American film on the theme of Mexican immigration. This unusually sympathetic portrayal of the plight of Mexican workers has the protagonist crossing the Rio Grande in search of employment, after exhausting all possibilities in Mexico. Yet, after he enters the U.S., all he encounters is discrimination and exploitation.

The film's narrative develops as follows. On his way back to Mexico, after reaching the breaking point with constant oppression, the protagonist heroically saves the life of a rancher who has suffered a serious accident. The rancher, ironically, had earlier denied him employment and run him off his land. Asking for no compensation for his noble deed, the protagonist continues his trip home. Upon his arrival, he discovers that his wife had stolen a cow from an American rancher to get milk for their infant son. A posse arrives and, in spite of the wife's confession, is about to hang the Mexican man. In the nick of time, the rancher he rescued arrives and saves the day. To fully repay his debt, the rancher provides stock as gifts and a permanent job to the protagonist. The film, thus, closes on a happy note.[10]

The Mexican (1914) is the single other silent immigration film. Legendary Western star Tom Mix acts in and directs this melodrama that traces the story of a Mexican worker who crosses the border seeking employment to feed his starving family. While working under oppressive conditions, he is badly abused and even physically harmed. The Mexican seeks revenge upon his aggressors by burning their fields and ranch houses. In the middle of doing this, he comes upon the daughter of one of the ranch owners who had done him harm earlier. The young woman had been bitten by a rattlesnake and was gravely ill. The Mexican, putting aside his vendetta, acts quickly and is able to save the victim's life. In appreciation for his daughter's life, the rancher rewards the Mexican worker by permanently providing for him and his family in Mexico. Another happy ending with redemption and justice emerging in the conclusion.[11]

By this time, Mexican-origin characters had become another type of institution in early American cinema —the convenient villain.[12] From the earliest productions on, Mexican archetype characters appeared consistently in films, always portrayed as villains, cowards and buffoons.[13]

Contrary to this tradition, these two initial U.S. immigration genre films represent Mexican immigrant characters in a positive light. Nonetheless, they do so in a condescending way, leaving little doubt as to the implied superiority of the Anglo who has to "save" the Mexican from his fate.

In addition, *Her Last Resort* and *The Mexican* reflect the immigration issues of the times transposed with the silent cinematic discourse of the period. By those years, Mexican immigration to the Southwest had increased by the thousands.[14] These immigrants had become an essential part of the economic and social life of the U.S. border states and of cities such as Los Angeles, San Antonio, San Diego, Tucson and Chicago.[15] Although Mexican immigrants were instrumental in helping build the U.S. Southwest into an economic bonanza, their numbers and origin caused concerns about the possible social and cultural impact this most recent and extensive immigrant group would have on American institutions. In this environment, scholars, educators and social workers were sent to study "the Mexican problem" in the Southwest.[16]

Years later, U.S. filmmakers would once again merge a political and social concern with artistic creation, producing a number of films whose main themes derived from aspects related to the Bracero Program (1942-1964).

Border Patrol (1943) builds on the immigration genre in this period. The ever-popular Western genre and one of its great early stars, "Hopalong Cassidy" William Boyd, combine this narrative format with the theme of illegal Mexican immigration. The narrative of this film has the Texas Rangers —Hopalong Cassidy being one— in a struggle to the death against a vicious gang which is importing illegal Mexican aliens to the U.S. and farming them out to the highest bidder.

[10] Alfred Charles Richard, *The Hispanic Image on the Silver Screen* (New York, 1992), pp. 67-68.

[11] *Ibid*, p. 124.

[12] Blaine B. Lamb, "The Convenient Villain: The Early Cinema Views the Mexican-American," *Journal of the West* XIV:4 (October 1975), pp. 75-81.

[13] Arthur G. Pettit, *Images of the Mexican-American in Fiction and Film* (College Station, 1980), pp. 111-131.

[14] Gutiérrez, *op.cit*., pp. 39-69.

[15] Ricardo Romo and Raymund Paredes, eds., *New Directions in Chicano Scholarship* (San Diego, 1977), pp. 183-201.

[16] Ricardo Romo, *East Los Angeles* (Austin, 1983), pp. 89-112.



A scene from Border Incident *(1949).*

As in a typical Western narration, in *Border Patrol* the heroes face grave adversity. They are initially captured by the villains, tried in a "kangaroo court" and sentenced to death. As expected, just before the executions, the pendulum shifts. They manage to escape, turn the tide against the villains, and eliminate the gang in a climatic and predictable shoot-out, thus saving the poor *indocumentados*. Once again, in this movie the "valiant" Texas Rangers defeat the evil perpetrators.[17] What an irony is presented here! The Texas Rangers coming to the aid of Mexicans flies in the face of documented historical reality. For the Mexican-origin population of Texas, the Texas Rangers were always *"los diablos texanos"* (the Texan devils).

Border Incident (1949) is chronologically the next production on the theme of immigration. This social-problem movie is important for various reasons: it was produced by a paramount Hollywood studio, MGM, and directed by the respected Arthur Mann; the film was generally devoid of the negative stereotyping of Mexicans evident in the Hollywood cinema of previous decades; the plot showed a certain knowledge and sensitivity toward Mexican immigration to the U.S.; and, for once, Mexican-origin actors were cast in feature roles.

The story centers on the plight of Mexican migrant workers who, unable to secure work permits under the Bracero Program, cross the border illegally to toil in the agricultural fields of California's Imperial Valley. The laborers are constantly exploited by a brutal gang. The workers are frequently robbed, and some are even murdered by this gang on their return trip home. United States and Mexican immigration officers, played effectively by George Murphy and Ricardo Montalbán, are assigned to uncover and apprehend all those involved in the murders on both sides of the border. Montalbán is able successfully to

[17] William K. Everson, *The Hollywood Western*, (New York, 1969), pp. 166-67.

infiltrate the gang, disguised as a would-be worker, while Murphy poses as a fugitive carrying stolen bracero permits. As the story unfolds, the sufferings of undocumented workers are vividly detailed in hard-hitting scenes.

When the workings of the ring are uncovered, an intricate capture is planned. But before the plan can be put into effect, Murphy's true identity is discovered by the villains. He is then tortured and brutally murdered. The same fate awaits Montalbán and his coworkers, but they put up a courageous struggle until the authorities arrive and capture all of the gang members.

The film is effective, well-made and one of the best Hollywood immigration films ever. Ricardo Montalbán and George Murphy deliver solid performances. They are supported by an equally good secondary cast. The filming was done at an actual border location in the San Joaquin Valley. The director, Arthur Mann, develops the narrative convincingly in a semi-documentary format. Suspense and interest are maintained until the final scene. Clearly, *Border Incident*, because of its political message and attention to developing its theme and characters, can be classified as one of the very best of the social-problem films of the decade and probably the single most accomplished Hollywood immigration feature.[18]

In *Illegal Entry* (1949), once again, the narrative revolves around a well-organized band of smugglers who are illegally transporting Mexican undocumented workers to various areas of the U.S. A crack government agent, played by Howard Duff, is given the task of bringing to justice these criminals involved in the trafficking of human contraband.

While the theme of Mexican immigration is supposed to be central to the film, as has so often been the case in this genre's features, the Mexican workers are the least represented or visible characters in the film. Their plight is only marginally alluded to and they remain invisible topics of the narrative. After the usual escapades and twists in fortune, the movie closes with the expected conclusion: the hero, with the help of the central female character, is able to defeat and capture the entire smuggling gang. Justice prevails once again and one more illicit cartel is eliminated.[19]

Borderline (1980) was the first major contemporary Hollywood genre film on the theme of Mexican immigration. It stars the international action-film favorite Charles Bronson as the hero. He plays a compassionate and honest cop, chief of a Border Patrol office near the San Diego-Tijuana border. The protagonist does his job well, although he does not particularly like what he sees or has to do —that is, by his own account, capture and deport hard-working individuals who just seek a decent job.

The plot is an update of the typical "hero of the West in search of the killer of a colleague and close friend" story. When a truck loaded with undocumented workers is routinely stopped by a veteran Border Patrol officer, instead of surrendering the head of the smuggling gang shoots the officer and a young Mexican witness in cold blood. The narrative revolves around a cat-and-mouse game between Bronson and the killer. Before the final scene and duel on the border, in which the outcome is as predictable as in any Western, other characters are introduced in caricature form: the smuggling ring (the real villains), the defenseless victims (the undocumented workers), the good guys (the Border Patrol), and the leader of the gang —a deranged killer and Vietnam veteran who uses all his military training for profit and evil.

The intentions of *Borderline* are essentially good; the film shows a genuine sympathy for the exploitation of Mexican undocumented workers. Yet the lukewarm social message is entirely lost. The dilemma of Mexican immigration is never really addressed in any fashion. The ambiguity is reflected throughout by the dialogue. "How can you bust people for trying to better themselves?", Bronson asks one of his men. However, at the close of the film, statistics appear stating that over a million undocumented Mexican workers have been apprehended and deported, and that more than that number escaped detection and apprehension and are currently residing and working in the U.S.

Borderline, as could be expected, was filmed with the full cooperation of the U.S. Border Patrol. Many agents participated as extras and technical advisors. Its implicit message is that the Immigration and Naturalization Service needs more resources and stricter immigration legislation to carry out its mission of controlling our borders, particularly the border with Mexico.[20]

The characters in the movie are all secondary to the hero and the villain. The undocumented workers, the supposed subject matter of the story, are —as in all these films— the least developed aspect of the film. They have no faces, no names, no personal histories, motivations or feelings. The reasons for their ordeal or circumstances are never revealed or addressed. There are countless stories that *Borderline* could have told or developed, but unfortunately the filmmakers were content to use a contemporary issue to exploit the star quality of Charles Bronson, hoping the combination could pay off commercially. To a certain degree it did.

Similar to *Borderline* in certain aspects, and quite different in others, is *The Border* (1982), directed by Tony Richardson and starring Jack Nicholson. This movie is Hollywood's most recent contribution to the immigration

[18] David R. Maciel, "Braceros, Mojados, and Alambristas: Mexican Immigration to the U.S. in the Contemporary Cinema," *Hispanic Journal of Behavioral Sciences* VIII: 4, 1986, pp. 374-375.

[19] *Variety*, March 12, 1949, p. 4.

[20] *The San Diego Union*, October 22, 1980, B-7.

genre. Like other films, *The Border* is nothing more than a vehicle for the acting talent and star power of Jack Nicholson. The narrative and the supporting actors are all secondary to a typical Nicholson characterization of contemporary man —at odds with the values and corruption of the system— who has to make a choice between good and evil, accommodation or resistance, complacency or turmoil.

The narrative develops around Nicholson, a Border Patrol agent, who is assigned to El Paso where he joins a former best friend, also a Border Patrol officer. After several raids and apprehensions, Nicholson learns that many border agents, including his friend and the chief, are in business with the contractors and "coyotes" to smuggle certain *indocumentados* into the United States. Nicholson ultimately rebels against his corrupt colleagues when killing is involved. Symbolically, he states that this is the line (the border) he will not cross.

In the course of the story, he meets María (Elpidia Carrillo) and her brother, both undocumented Mexicans who face constant ill-treatment and oppression. When María's baby is abducted and her brother is shot by the coyotes and dies, Nicholson lashes out in revenge. In disbelief of her newly acquired champion, María asks him why he helped her. The Nicholson character just answers: "I guess I got to feel good about something I do." The predictable climatic gunfight at the border ensues and the equally expected triumph by the hero occurs. The film closes with Nicholson crossing to Mexico with the rescued baby to join the virtuous María and live in bliss.

The Border, despite fine performances by Jack Nicholson and the supporting cast and solid directing, is highly routine and stereotypical. The villains are all totally bad, corrupt, with only a single motivation: money. The women are either pure, kind, innocent and helpless like María, or sexual ornaments interested only in immediate gratification, like the Nicholson character's wife. The undocumented workers in *Borderline* are objects as well and not real characters. Nowhere in the film do we learn anything about the Mexicans —not even about María or her brother. Their plight is never addressed. Whatever social message was intended is obscured again by the superficiality of the characters and the plot. In spite of the fact that the performances and direction of *The Border* exceed those in *Borderline*, its faults and overall purposes are similar. However, in *The Border* at least the Border Patrol is represented as morally corrupt thugs and violators of civil rights rather than the guardians of our sovereignty.[21]

After *The Border*, Hollywood has not premiered any major film addressing the immigrant experience. Yet given current national concern on immigration, it is likely only a matter of time before American cinema will return to the theme of immigration. Based on previous trends, the films to come will be more of the same.

The celluloid immigrant has appeared on the silver screen throughout decades of time and dozens of features. For the most part, though, film representation of Mexican immigration, with the exception of a few select features, does not do justice to the complexity, humanity, triumphs and tragedies of the journey "North from Mexico." VM

[21] *Motion Pictures*, February 13, 1982, A-18.



Universal City Studios, Inc.

Jack Nicholson and Elpidia Carrillo in The Border *(1982).*

The National Art Museum

María Luisa López Vieyra*

Front view of the museum.

The necessity of having a grand art collection which would bring together the aesthetic accomplishments of Mexico's art history led to the creation of the National Museum of Art (Munal), at the beginning of the 1980s. The museum is part of the National Institute of Fine Arts.

A presidential accord published in the *Diario Oficial de la Federación* on June 18, 1982, crystallized a proposal put forward by the country's intellectuals. Among the fundamental considerations which led to the foundation of this museum was the fact that it would be indispensable "...to have a museum which gathers, preserves and exhibits significant and important works of art...as a means to strengthen national identity."

The collection

Located in Mexico City's Historic Center, the National Museum of Art safeguards what are considered to be the nation's most important works of art. With 24 permanent exhibition halls, visitors are offered many diverse works of art such as: paintings, sculptures, graphics, handicrafts, photography and documental material, from the 16th century up to the 1950s. Special emphasis is placed on the period from the foundation of the Academy of San Carlos to the culmination of the Mexican School of Painting.

The permanent exhibition offers examples of the Renaissance, Mannerist and Baroque paintings of New Spain from the 16th and 17th centuries, with works of the painters Echave, Xuárez, Miguel Cabrera and Juan Correa. The Academy of San Carlos is represented by works from its first period (1781-1821), which includes the works of the sculptors José María Labastida and Pedro Patiño Ixtolinque and their ideas about emancipation. The museum also displays the outstanding artwork of Manuel Vilar and Pelegrín Clavé from the Academy's second period.

The evolution of landscape painting is depicted, from the middle of last century with the figure of José María Velasco up to the appearance of art that abruptly turned towards Realism and the folkloric painting which was cultivated in the last third of the 19th century. The halls dedicated to Symbolism demonstrate how this tendency prevailed at the end of the century, with outstanding artists such as the sculptor Jesús F. Contreras and the painter Julio Ruelas.

The halls dedicated to the 20th century give an account of the influence of the European vanguard with works by Alfredo Ramos Martínez and Adolfo Best Maugard, as well as the easel painting of the muralists Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco and David Alfaro Siqueiros.

The end of the tour includes exhibits from the Open Air Schools of Painting, and the formation of the Mexican School and the Workshop of Popular Graphics. The 1940s exhibit refers to international Abstractionism, which was reflected by the artists Rufino Tamayo and Carlos Mérida, at the same time explaining the diversification of the artistic panorama resulting from the gradual transformation of the country's social conditions.

The building

Since its inauguration on July 23, 1982, the National Museum of Art has been located in the old Palace of Communications. That building was constructed by the Italian architect Silvio Contri in the era of the Porfirio Díaz government. The building's iron structure was designed in accordance with rationalist ideals fashionable in Europe at that time.

The construction of the Palace of Communications began in 1904. It is composed of three wings and four facades covered with stone from the Tlaxcaltecan banks of San Martín Xalcotan. On the main facade, Contri combined Florentine Renaissance and Classic French styles. There are three exceptional entryways with ornate ironwork doors. The doors were made in the workshops of the Sociedad Anónima del Pignone in Florence.

The Pignone Company was contracted to produce the architectural stone ornamentation, ornamental ironwork and interior decoration. In turn, the Pignone Company contracted the services of Mariano Coppedé and Sons, a renowned family of Italian artists. The paintings on the ceilings, stairway and the Reception Hall allude to the mottos of the Porfirio Díaz government and were painted by Carlo Coppedé. The first represents an allegory of peace, while the second refers to progress based on science, liberty, history, work and art.

The National Museum of Art recognizes two main components in its process of communication: the work and the public. With the goal of communication in mind, it receives, generates, processes and provides information in order to produce cognitive and aesthetic answers for the visitor.

* Administrator of Educational Services at the National Art Museum.



Central staircase.

Detail of ceiling.



Another view of ceiling.

Exhibition hall.

Exhibition hall.

The museum cafe.

Photos by Arturo Piera.

History as national identity

*Jean Meyer**

When we say "national identity" we are also saying "history," thereby bestowing and imposing a "social responsibility" on those who produce, conserve and teach history. Not just any history. National history. Such a social responsibility may clash with the professionalization of historians' work, a recent process which has had two variants: the "scientific" one —history as social or human science— which aims at objectivity, seeking the truth; and the instrumental variant, which puts history at the service of a state, an ideology, a church, etc. Sociology, psychology and philosophy find themselves in the same situation. For simple reasons of common sense I will not use Mexican examples. Those who understand will need little explanation, but the transposition will be simple since the problem is a universal one. Today, nationalism is an essential principle of political legitimacy. It is therefore necessary to begin by reviewing the nature of nationalism.

I. National identity

Nation, nationalism, nationality, feeling, national identity.... The multiplicity of words does not mean that the concept is clear. It is not sufficient to separate, as does Marcel Mauss, the good nation from the bad nationalism —Mauss distinguished the idea of the nation from nationalism, "which generates sickness in national consciousness"; it doesn't work to oppose positive patriotism to catastrophic nationalism, Rousseau to Herder, Renan to Strauss, the left to the right, the elective community to the ethnic community, the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen to the Germanic forest. What Stefan Zweig, in his *Memoirs of a European*, called the "nationalist plague" is nothing but the dark side of a two-faced Janus.[1]

Those who simply condemn and reject nationalism run the risk of understanding nothing about what is occurring in the world. The national fact, in addition to being a fact, is at the same time an idea, a project. It seems to be something evident when it is really an enigma. It is also feeling, and it can be passion. Strong emotion, weak definition. Rather than finding the reasons for this non-reason, we often counterpose Reason and its faithful, "us," to the Nation and "them," its fanatics. While more comfortable, this is quite useless. The historical cost for not recognizing the national fact will be no lower tomorrow than it was yesterday. We liberals face the nation as those before Freud faced sex. Enlightenment men, universalists by conviction and profession, we are, as Régis Debray aptly puts it, "the Victorians of the nation, stifled by prudery."

A poet may help us clear up the mystery: "The essential fact," writes Paul Valéry, "which constitutes nations, their principle of existence, the internal bond which links the individual members of a people to each other and one generation to another, is not of the same nature in the various nations. Sometimes race, sometimes language, sometimes, territory, sometimes memories and sometimes interests institute the national unity of an organized human agglomeration in different ways. The deep-going cause of one such grouping may be completely different than it is in another."[2]

Nationalism works on something invisible: each person receives an education, that of the family, the school, the group; each person needs to be recognized, to belong, to share a common destiny. *Natio*: those who were born together, etymology tells us. Belonging to a nation is a double bond, the right to have an identity, to receive protection, and the duty of conforming to customs, to laws, even to die for the fatherland ("it is a fate

Translated from *Vuelta*, February 1995.

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[1] I will cite just a few authors from an interminable but recently much expanded bibliography.

[2] Paul Valéry, *Oeuvres complètes*, Paris, Gallimard, 1988, Vol. II, p. 934.

worth envying," says a French republican anthem).

At the same time we all have a "small fatherland," a motherland in Luis González's words, and we belong to humanity. Still, for most of us, the nation weighs more heavily in the balance. Why? I do not know. Why not the region, the continent, a cultural area? Why is Central America made up of several nations, while Mexico is not? Why is it that today we have Catalonia and Slovakia and Croatia, while yesterday we did not? I do not know. National identity has affirmed itself and identified itself with its own nation-state over the past two centuries. A series of waves has swept the world: after the first republican wave (the United States and France) came the Romantic wave; from the two of them together there was born the wave of political independence movements of the 19th century and of 1919, prolonged by the decolonization wave after 1945 and the disintegration of the Communist system in Eurasia.[3]

It is as if, in our era, politics can create nothing which is not a nation. On the basis of this fundamental fact, nationalism serves as an ideological label and, as such, is protean. A national ideology presupposes a policy of mass mobilization. It has been a universal political challenge since the French Revolution. Schools and history are therefore mobilized. At least we know what a state is, what a culture is, but we still do not know what a nation is: a state and a culture, various states and one culture (European, Latin American), one state with various cultures (the United States of tomorrow)? Nationalism can be a very weak glue, or reinforced concrete. Ernest Gellner[4] obliges us to be modest in our convictions. According to him, contrary to popular and even academic belief, nationalism does not have such deep roots in human psychology. Nor is there a scientific basis for the idea that nations are the Sleeping Beauties of history, needing only the appearance of an enchanted prince in order to become states. We must reject this myth: nations are not a political version of the theory of natural classes; and national states have not been the evident final destiny of ethnic or cultural groups. Gellner notes that the great majority of potential national groups (around eight thousand languages are spoken on the planet) have failed to fight for their homogeneous cultures to have the perimeters and infrastructure necessary for achieving political independence. While it presents itself as an ancient, hidden and lethargic force, nationalism is but the consequence of a new form of social organization, derived from industrialization and a complex division of labor —although it does take advantage of cultural wealth and economic growth, technological innovation, occupational mobility, generalized literacy and an overall educational system protected by a state. Nobody has yet provided a better explanation for why nationalism is now such a prominent principle of political legitimacy.

Thus, our nations, with their corresponding states, persist in the fundamental enterprise pursued by the society of men: it is a grouping of men who depend on the same *res publica*, acquire a collective identity, inscribe their respective positions within the same natural space, build their institutions in the same cultural space, and determine themselves as a community vis à vis foreign peoples, seeking the means for their security and development. This enterprise repeats itself, it is eternal, but it operates in variable conditions; for each society, in each era, there is a singular environment, an inherited situation, a legacy delimiting possibilities and impossibilities. That is the reality and that is the history.

"History can also be a 'teacher of life' and, as such, a positive factor in national identity, if it is able to retrieve the voice of the «vanquished» and the forgotten. So long as it does not fall into the temptation of giving such priority to the new history of women, blacks, Jews and Catholics to the point of mythologizing that history"

II. History

If history is that which is real, historiography is more than the narration, the retelling, the analysis of

[3] Gil Delanoui, "Réflexions sur la nation," *Esprit*, January 1994.

[4] Ernest Gellner, *Naciones y nacionalismo*, Alianza Universal, 1988, p. 1588.

that reality. If national identity is a moment of history, historiography has no reason to identify itself with that moment and thereby become instrumental.

Over the course of two centuries historiography has transformed itself in a remarkable way. Its professionalization established norms of objectivity and, theoretically, freed historians from the need to work for the powerful or adapt themselves to the tastes and values of the public. Until recently the academy and the university functioned like Benedictine convents, or like Rabelais' abbey of Thélème, like islands where science could escape from external pressures —those of the Palace, the Temple and the Town Square. Professionalization meant autonomy. Nevertheless, historians, albeit later than their "social scientist" colleagues in sociology, psychology and economics, as well as jurists, found themselves unable to escape the demands of Power, which never forgot the close relationship between power and knowledge.

Every day there is a greater demand for a "public" history; every day the market for historians grows, to the point that now they are able to choose between the Palace and the Town Square in order to go with the highest bidder. The government, the ministries, state industries, the schools, companies, private individuals, social, religious, cultural and ethnic groups, genders, unions —all are buyers. So what happens to our objectivity? In this century historians have known the imperative demands posed by the totalitarian state and suffered the pressures and seductions of the authoritarian state; now they experience the temptations of the market. How can they maintain their professional integrity when they are subjected to the pressure to produce the expected results? History as national identity is but one aspect of a larger problem: the issue of public history, history on demand, with or without conviction, cynicism, prostitution.

Every social state demands fictions and myths. History can be a myth, given that it is considered essential for the creation and maintenance of national identity. Valéry stated: "Give me a pen and paper and I will write you a history book or a sacred text. I will invent a king of France, a cosmogony, a moral or a gnosis. What will warn an ignorant person or a child of the fact that I am deceiving them?"[5]

In "De l'Histoire," Valéry affirms:

> "History is the most dangerous product made by the chemistry of intellect. Its properties are well known. It produces dreams, makes peoples drunk, gives them false memories, exaggerates their reflexes, keeps old wounds open, torments them in their sleep, leads them to delusions of grandeur or persecution, and makes nations bitter, arrogant, insufferable and vain."[6]

Nietzsche believed that Europe "suffered a malignant fever of history," caused by "man's prodigious memory, his inability to forget anything."[7]

When one sees what is happening today in the Balkans, or Rwanda, or the Caucasus; when one hears certain historians invoke the past —it matters little whether or not this past is mythical— to justify everything; when one hears the university academic Milorad Ekmetic say "we do not hide our desire for vengeance,"[8] one feels like agreeing with Nietzsche and Valéry: "Happy peoples have no history." This would lead to the inference that suppressing history would make peoples happier. A glance at this world's events leads to the same conclusion. "Forgetfulness is a blessing which seeks to corrupt history."[9]

III. History as national identity

Why not shield ourselves behind Renan? He wrote: "Forgetfulness and, I dare say, even historical error are an essential factor in the formation of a nation and, therefore, the progress of historical studies is often a danger to nationality."[10] Renan spoke of history as a science, not of history as a servant.

1. False social responsibility. Public history presents an (apparent) disorder of images, symbols and exemplary personages. Everything is a thesis. They color in some scenes for us, which are always repeated: Clodoveus, Charlemagne and the students, Philip Augustus in Bouvines, Saint Louis beneath the oak, Joan of Arc, etc., up to De Gaulle's entrance to Paris in 1944. That is for little, and not so little, Frenchmen. This catechism, this rosary with its mysteries, this *via crucis* makes our past and our common future into a single destiny. These history books are false, yet they present an irresistible "truth." I have not forgotten, nor will I forget, "le petit Lavisse," our primary-school primer, written by a great professional historian and admired by Justo Sierra. Every nation has its lying and admirable Lavisse.[11]

That more or less fantastic past, that set of founding myths acts on the future because it is a present action. The real

5 Valéry, p. 903.
6 Valéry, p. 935.
7 Nietzsche, *Au delà du bien et du mal*, chapters 7 and 8, "The Genealogy of Morals" (second essay), *De l'utilité et de l'inconvénient des études historiques pour la vie.*

8 *Esprit*, July 7, 1993.
9 Valéry, p. 903.
10 Ernest Renan, *Qu'est ce qu'une nation?* (1882), new edition, Paris, 1992.
11 Marc Ferro, *op. cit.*

nature of that history is to take part in history. The future, by definition, cannot be imagined. That type of history almost performs the miracle, for us, of giving the future a face. That history is therefore iconographic, inseparable from the anthem and flag, all of it consisting of religious references. It offers us a repertoire of situations and catastrophes, a gallery of forebears, a recipe book of behaviors, expressions and attitudes to help us be and become. "Let's not deceive ourselves: the image we have of other peoples, and even of ourselves, is associated with the History we were told when we were children."[12]

Independent of its scientific vocation, history fulfills a militant function. I will leave aside the party-politics and purely ideological function,[13] and refer to its role as missionary of the nation. Yesterday in France, today in Catalonia. History is rewritten, for schools as well as universities, for encyclopedias and television, in Barcelona, Bratislava, Tashkent, Bishkek, Baku and Erivan. In the United States, history is ceasing to be that of the "melting pot" and becoming that of the "salad bowl," of the ethnic, culture and gender mosaic. It does not cease to mold collective consciousness, to offer a model.[14] In 1969 in the USSR, the new kindergarten Preschool Program stated: "Particular attention will be given to engendering, from the tenderest age, such important moral feelings as love for the fatherland and the Soviet people." Who can throw the first stone at those mentors? What differentiates the republican cult of Joan of Arc from the Soviet cult of Vladimir Ilyich?[15]

Elise Marienstras, a French historian of the United States, stresses the fact that American historiography, from textbooks to scientific works, is a compendium of the national ideology and myths. But she warns: "A critical history of nationalism will relativize its myths. Far from questioning the mystery of national identity, as do the writers of megahistory, the historian will discover the imperative necessity of national myth in its functional aspect: building a nation where one did not exist."[16]

Negation is no less important than affirmation. In the face of the "revelation" of "forgotten" facts, reactions may be violent and may reveal the panic that an attempt to objectivize a mythologized national history may provoke. It took France two centuries to face the reality of revolutionary terror and the martyrdom of the Vendée.[17]

Collaboration with the Nazi invaders, anti-Semitism and the Algerian war are other examples of conscious or unconscious amnesia in France. Every nation is in the same boat. A Japanese minister just resigned after an international scandal which he provoked when he denied the massacres that the imperial army carried out when it seized Nanking in 1937. For many Japanese this is a Chinese "invention," a "lie" aimed at sullying Japan's image. These reactions show the fear of knowing, the rejection of any attempt to "disenchant" national history.

All this is normal. What is hard to accept is the relation it has with our profession. Our discipline is subject to a constant revision, a broadening of fields and methods; yet, in all the countries I know, school programs and textbooks persist in being what they are: cruelly nationalistic and deceitful. The history which is taught to the masses outside of primary-school classrooms is no less dishonest and brutish. Why does it escape the process of correction, revision and extension which characterizes historiography?

The same man who is wise while sitting in his study forgets his professionalism when he writes for the public at large or for television; he accentuates development, national pride, the glories of the revolution and the empire, the grandeur of the heroes of the past. He lacks the excuse enjoyed by the men of the 19th century, who were convinced that they were doing pious works when they wrote their "history of bronze." He is consciously committing fraud, intentionally fooling people, accepting a split personality.

> *"The idea of civilization demands a society which is at once open and closed, in a constantly reconstructed equilibrium, on three levels which are never found in an absolute, pure or separate form: humanity, the group, the individual"*

[12] Ferro, p. 9.

[13] Meyer, *Perestroika...*, 1994.

[14] Novick, *op. cit.*

[15] Gerd Krumeich, *Jeanne d'Arc à travers l'histoire*, Paris, Albin Michel, 1994.

[16] E. Marienstras, *Nous le peuple. Les origines du nationalisme américain*, Paris, Gallimard, 1988, p. 7.

[17] *La Vendée dans l'histoire*, Paris, Perrin, 1994.

It is true that the pedagogical institution is immense and few people have the desire to change things, but there is also the sincere conviction that history should teach a certain number of "essential facts," which are considered the framework of history. These essential facts are political, since the traditional, institutional definition of history has to do with events whose explanation is always of a political nature, even though it sometimes disguises itself as military, economic or intellectual. Among the best there is the cynical idea that it doesn't matter, that anything defective will correct itself, will be complemented at the university and that in the meantime it is indispensable that the children be enthusiastic about these fairy tales. It is clear that for them, history has a framework, and that this framework is of a political nature. This is because it is linked to national identity (or to any political or religious "general line"). This cuts off all other types of history, specifically those which have been developed by the new history, which made just one mistake: disdaining and abandoning political history ("histoire évenementielle," "histoire-batailles").

For these reasons, the education of the masses and the molding of their opinion fall outside the influence of university debate and intellectual criticism, even in the most democratic societies. For this reason history for the masses recognizes nothing beyond a small set of stereotypes, of personalities, and God help the brave person who dares to suppress a single stereotype, a single hero! They want the masses to identify with wonderful characters from the past, men, women and children heroes who are dead (one must flee from history which is too contemporary) but ever alive. Lenin lives, Lenin will live forever!

This is done in order to tranquilize, in order to ensure the legitimacy and strength of national society. A big dose of "daily life" can be added to this political history in order to make it more vivid, more "truthful" for students, readers and television viewers. It continues to be political, nationalist, conceited, anti-historical.

Not without surprise, I realize that the free university researcher, working in free countries' free institutions, writes books which are quite similar to those by historians in totalitarian countries, when it is a matter of patriotism and national pride, even, at times, of racial and religious superiority.[18]

Thus, we historians show the Jansenist Pierre Nicole to be right when he says: "It is our conviction that every historian is a liar, involuntarily if he is sincere, as a con man if he is not. But since neither the former nor the latter warn me of their perversity, it is impossible for me to avoid being fooled."

2. Genuine social responsibility. The professional historian can undertake a sincere fight to improve textbooks. French and German scholars have done this regarding a very concrete point: suppressing all chauvinism, all xenophobia, giving them no ground in the teaching of history. After the First World War Jules Isaac, director of the famous Malet-Isaac manual collection, worked in a binational commission. This group was revived after the Second World War, and every summer for more than twenty years German and French historians worked at scrupulously cleaning up textbooks.[19]

It is much more difficult to read national history with the same clinical eye. It is no accident that a young American historian, Robert A. Paxton, was the first to pose the problem of the Vichy regime and French collaboration in the 1940-44 period. He opened a breach which many French historians subsequently climbed through. But in 1973 the first reaction of the university community was indignation against the stranger who dared to stick his nose into the nation's closet since, supposedly, as a foreigner he was unable to understand anything about France. In those days I was surprised by some of academia's glories.

It is a difficult but not impossible task, as Edmundo O'Gorman and Luis González showed us long ago and Enrique Krauze has shown us recently.[20] "But I ask myself now: Should such a mistaken way of envisaging and expressing love for the fatherland really be maintained? Because, in addition to everything which has been said, beyond the vain hopes it all feeds and the fallacious idea it sustains regarding the extent of one's own forces, this stale attitude implies a shameful shame towards what is, neither more nor less; and it winds up turning our past into always-fertile ground for harvesting bad Mexican citizens. Not to know the weaknesses of heroes, thereby turning them into cardboard figures who can no longer communicate anything to the heart; to concede, on the other hand, not a jot of good intentions, abnegation or patriotism to the men and women who embraced historically erroneous or lost causes; to preach, in sum, a kind of national evangel about a historical development which was fatefully predestined to see the triumph of a succession of good men over a succession of very bad men —all this is nothing but a clear echo of an outworn and harmful nationalism whose survival reveals an unfortunate

[18] Ferro, *op. cit.* and Peter Laslett, *op. cit.*

[19] Claparède, 1931.

[20] O'Gorman, *Del amor del historiador a su patria*, Mexico City, Condumex, 1975; Luis González, "La historia académica y los rezongos del público," *Diálogos*, January 1979; Enrique Krauze, *Siglo de caudillos*, Madrid-Mexico City, 1994.

lack of historical maturity. Must we then be underdeveloped in this aspect of intelligence as well?"[21]

Enrique Krauze followed Luis González's recommendations for putting an end to the "history of bronze" and those of Edmundo O'Gorman for a true and historical love of country. "Mexico has not succeeded in reconciling itself with its past; that is why it lives a lie, or rather a half-truth. This book is an attempt at taking a look, with balance and perspective, at the 19th century, without the pressure to judge, condemn or absolve its characters, but rather with the objective of understanding them...and taking them off their pedestals." Thus, it seeks to contribute "to Mexicans' tolerance towards ourselves and reconciliation with our conflicting ancestors."[22]

History can also be a "teacher of life" and, as such, a positive factor in national identity, if it is able to retrieve the voice of the "vanquished" and the forgotten. So long as it does not fall into the temptation of giving such priority to the new history of women, blacks, Jews and Catholics to the point of mythologizing that history. As a conservationist of memory, the historian must always subject it to criticism, with all the rigor of positivism. Thus, the historian is aware of the distance separating commemoration from science, the conviction of experience from critical questioning, convenient amnesias from hard methodological reality, retrospective anachronisms from the obligation to maintain distance, memory as identity from the checking of that memory against truth. The historian cannot accept the highly popular theory which holds that "living memory is the only kind which is able to say what is just and unjust."

[21] O'Gorman, *op. cit.*, p. 23.

[22] Enrique Krauze, *op. cit.*, Introduction.

IV. Personal conclusions

The historian in search of national identity can seem like Oedipus; his quest may lead to catastrophe just as it led Oedipus to disaster, since he wanted to know too much about what he was. The Serbs and the Irish Catholics are our modern Oedipuses, while I consider the Palestinians and Israelis who met in Brussels in March 1988 to have been right when they stated that "simply, in order to begin talking, one must put history between parentheses."[23]

Calmed and tolerant, national consciousness strikes a subtle balance between memory and forgetfulness, lucidity and amnesia, tradition and imagination. If the dosage is modified —and historians can and usually do have a great share of responsibility in such a chemical operation— the result is a ferocious humanity made up of fanatical individuals.

The problem is not to know identity in order the better to preserve it, but to guarantee the diversity which is manifested, among other things, by several identities, which are simultaneously sensitive and imprecise. The idea of civilization demands a society which is at once open and closed, in a constantly reconstructed equilibrium, on three levels which are never found in an absolute, pure or separate form: humanity, the group, the individual. None of these three levels should be presented as an absolute, since the person is situated in his or her triple context.

In his *Reflections*, Burke sees civil society as a very particular contract among three categories of persons, of whom two are not living; it is an association between the living, the dead and those to come. Thus Burke puts us on guard both against disdain for one's forebears and indifference towards posterity. This allows us to reject paradigms and "necessities," to find our freedom in space and time. A little bit of internationalism distances us from the nation; a lot of internationalism returns the nation to us.

[23] Tzvetan Todorov, "La mémoire et ses abus," *Esprit*, July 1993.

An historian can be loyal to his national community and at the same time cosmopolitan; for a Mexican, studying New Spain or the 15th century on the highlands means being cosmopolitan, as cosmopolitan as when we study 15th-century Castile or New France. If he works on national as well as contemporary subjects he will have more difficulty in conciliating scientific deontology with ideological and sociological pressures; nonetheless, he knows that the most difficult and noble task facing the historian is that of debate and reexamination. Genuine revision requires benevolent comprehension. It means open scientific interchange in order to confront divergent viewpoints and achieve an analytic and critical vision which is evolutionary without being relativist. There is no definitive truth, but honesty is necessary.

While it is true that history is an element of national identity, I do not see why it should be up to the historian, as a "social scientist," to vouch for the "truth," for the veracity of the so-called founding myths. I prefer to base myself on Renan.

Moreover, my hope, my wish as a citizen, is that in our conception of public life we will be making the transition from a society in which legitimacy comes from tradition to one governed by the model of a contract, adhered to —or not— by each individual. Memory, tradition and history will then give way not to forgetfulness but to some universal principles, to the "general will." Our public life does not need a "public" history as a source of legitimacy.

The three women in my life

*Laszlo Moussong**

For now, there are three great women in my life and my feelings. Two are my lovers and the other is my wife.

One of my lovers is the most phenomenal prostitute I have ever known; when I think of her, I am engulfed by obsessions about pleasures that no one else could give me, and all my principles and values are overshadowed by the idea of having her so far away and barely being able to enjoy her when I have the chance to sacrifice my money and squander it on her, she who is incapable of love but still so exciting to me.

The other is young, beautiful, sweet, sensitive and intelligent. She is also far from my home, her memory pulverizes into nostalgia all the structures of my immediate reality; when we have seen each other and I must leave, she fills the suitcases of my memory with smiles, intense discussions, tokens of generosity, caresses that cover body and soul.

With regard to my wife, I cannot help thinking (she gives me enough reasons to reaffirm it every day) that she is a woman little given to thought, slovenly, dirty, extemporaneous and difficult, but despite these and many other defects, she has qualities and blemishes which by now have become essential to my life; perhaps because of that, and not just because we are married, this lady is the one who is truly mine and to whom I really belong. This is something I've learned through loving my two girlfriends.

I have the right to say their names, given that they are such an important part of my life: the first is New York, the second Montreal and the third Mexico City.

I love all three in different ways, but I am in love with the first two. I understand. To fall in love with a city is not to know her, not to have lived in irremediable attachment to her presence, limitations and demands, not to be her spouse. We can fall in love with a city thanks to not knowing her in depth; this is possible, because we see her on weekends and spend some vacations with her; because we seek in her, above all, the delights of her shapes, her laughter, her caresses, personality, discoveries. For the same reason, falling in love with a human being is like being a tourist.

Streets that on the first day were bewitching, you no longer see when you walk through them frequently and your mind is occupied only with your destination.

I tremble when I think of you, New York, woman of sensations even in culture; I gasp for breath as I penetrate your museums and galleries, concert halls and theaters, your architecture, and this joyful delight goes beyond the aesthetic experience, the artistic value which could predominate only if I were to stabilize myself with you in conjugal life; you are violent, haughty, giddy, incapable of cohering fully-rounded feelings. Sensations and emotions are what you can give me, but you surpass my rate of speed; you know of seduction, not love; you have known men from all parts and I am yet another; your cost is high and it is paid in cash.

When I come close to hating you, you disarm me with innocent

Angeles Torrejón/Imagenlatina.

* Writer and journalist. Author of *Castillos en la letra* (Letter Castles) and *Tórrido quehacer* (Torrid Work).

provincial gestures, with your people who play music in the street, but not the music of poverty like in the streets of Mexico City; or with Broadway converted into a small-town, night-time hangout; or with a wedding at Saint Patrick's which provokes naive smiles from the passers-by on Fifth Avenue.

Demented, alienated, delirious, aberrant, you confuse respect for human beings with the rigid demand that your own rights be respected. I would hate you if all this were not part of your seductive wiles; love can be pure, but passion cannot; that is why you impassion me.

Of you, Montreal, I only string together shining images, because I truly love you. Your eyes are of clear, bright colors; you live with the superior attitude of one who is searching for their true nature; besieged by English-speaking millionaires, you defend your language and your essence. They should stop calling you French or Canadian, since you are Quebecois, different, unique; you are very young, but you know what you yearn for; serene, you do not deafen us with raucous laughter nor scandal; instead you express yourself with a smile. I know I couldn't live with you; I am made of the same stuff as my wife; you are too civilized for me and are forging your own culture. I, in turn, bring too much stagnant culture and too little civilized behavior from my Mexico City.

Angeles Torrejón/Imagenlatina.

You are a woman of dialogue, conceptual, honorable, lucid, although you lack that something without which I cannot breathe: the magic which my old witch of a wife brings forth in all its colors.

Your innocence tempers my malice, while you make me breathe fresh air. I like to idealize you, to hold onto your memory through our likenesses and our understandable and tolerable differences. I become enthused getting carried away with you and laughing with you amidst the songs of Gilles Bigneault, savoring wines together, or having a Brador in the open air of the rue Saint-Denis; to solidarize with your voices and all your Quebec —although, as you well know, I have my wife...

Angeles Torrejón/Imagenlatina.

...To you, fat disorderly pork-taco addict, with whom I speak the same language and share the same expressions; you who recognize me in all your warm laughter and your insults, you who have shared all your secrets with me; whom I can yell at or advise.

You, I do possess; you, to whom I can talk a blue streak without remorse because you get your own back soon enough; woman of verdant mountains where you keep your mysteries buried.

Somehow I love you; we always end up forgiving each other for everything, even if this is just from wearing each other out. Baroque idler, compulsive smoker, resentful drunk, you still know how to be my friend, you know how to give your life for someone, you know how to cook with flavor and variety, you like to give to others.

You are touchy but not jealous; conventional but no longer sanctimonious; you're full of tricks, you want to find a non-existent way out of your vices, you're capable of the best despite the fact that you do everything wrong and by halves.

With you I hear names that I recognize; you don't abandon me to solitude; you offend me but you don't forget to encourage me. We know everything about each other; we tolerate one another; we let each other live; we identify.

I am married to you; that's just how it is. I may fall in love with many others, but it is only with you that I can live. VM

The muralist movement: Orozco, Rivera and Siqueiros

*Maricela González Cruz Manjarrez**

Antonio Pulido.

Diego Rivera, *Water, Origin of Life, detail. Polystyrene and cement, 1951. Chapultepec Park, Mexico City.*

Photos from the book *El muralismo de Orozco, Rivera y Siqueiros*, Institute for Aesthetic Research, UNAM.

Muralism is one of the fundamental artistic movements in the culture of contemporary Mexico. Because of its aesthetic conceptions, artistic force and political connotations, this movement is a key historical reference point and has become a part of our cultural codes and values. Nevertheless, the movement is often evaluated on the basis of commonplaces; its images are sometimes applied in ways which distort the movement's meaning or reduce it to cardboard-figure stereotypes.

We are living in a period when relativism, ambiguity, obsolescence and the fragmentary impose themselves on economic, political and cultural life. At the same time everything is run according to the prevalence of saturation, massiveness, uniformity and cosmopolitanism. In this context it is necessary to reevaluate movements such as muralism on the basis of their own development and from our contemporary viewpoint. The objective: understanding, for example, how and why mural art not only succeeded in presenting itself on the walls where it was originally painted, but also moved to museums, was reproduced in schoolbook illustrations and mass-media images; how it has been used as a backdrop for public and government events, in information pamphlets, as images on banners at demonstrations, in cartoons as well as deluxe art-book editions.

Mexican muralism is one and many, subject to different interpretations, depending on the focus, time or "use" it is judged by. This is due to its heterogeneity, its relation to the post-revolutionary Mexican government (its main sponsor), its proximity to political tendencies such as Populism, Stalinism and Trotskyism as well as anti-fascist and anti-government positions, its internal contradictions, and the expressive wealth —or, sometimes, the reiteration and schematism— of its images.

Despite this diversity, certain characteristics remain constant in this movement. These are the traits that, affinities, rejections, political positions or cultural preferences aside, allow it to be defined as a movement and make possible its evaluation and in some cases even its validity. Some of these characteristics are:

Like other vanguard artistic movements, Muralism shares artistic proposals that promote new perceptions and aesthetic practices. It renews language and seeks to break with the predominant modes of artistic production and circulation. It organized groups for presenting its conceptions (the Union of Workers, Technicians, Painters and Sculptors —SOTPE— was founded in 1922); put out a manifesto (the SOTPE Manifesto, published in late 1923); and used writings, conferences, communications media (*El Machete*, 1924-1925), as well as the creation of public art in association with daily life.

Muralism participated in all of these arenas. Key was the way it used nationalist practices to question Eurocentrism. The need to provide public art and create a Mexican aesthetic in the plastic arts led these artists to take realism as a point of departure in order to recreate, assimilate and reevaluate the customs, features, fiestas, myths, geography and history of communities which constitute the base of national cultures.

Art understood as social practice, knowledge and life flowed together in the poetry of the muralist movement. Its attempt to recuperate the elemental dimensions of daily life and the importance of social groups, so as to form values in accordance with the search for a national aesthetic, have given this movement a vital, subversive, spontaneous and dynamic potential. This made it into the obligatory reference point mentioned above.

When muralism lost the above-mentioned characteristics, joining and blurring itself into the Mexican School of Painting, this dynamic feeling was transformed. From that point on artistic forms and practices were determined more by a feeling of permanency and sticking to codes or closed structures, rather than searching and experimentation.

At different times and in different ways, Siqueiros, Orozco and Rivera —founders of the muralist movement who were also linked to the Mexican School of Painting— carried out work that traced key lines of demarcation. A basic premise of their work was that art would use images, practice and writing in order to question the historic period in which it was created.

Thus, from their personal style —linked to such 20th-century artistic vanguards as Expressionism, Cubism and Futurism— to the way they sought an integral artistic approach, these men became the most important figures in a period which spanned two decades (1920-1940). Their influence continues to this day.

These three muralists' artistic trajectories did not develop in the same way. Although all three founders of the muralist movement began their artistic training at the old Academia de San Carlos, and their work established the principal lines that would characterize the movement over the course of two decades, they had widely divergent artistic languages and ways of concretely realizing their murals and using painting to express their concerns.

Born in different states —Orozco in Jalisco (1883), Rivera in Guanajuato (1886) and Siqueiros in Chihuahua (1896)— all three came to Mexico City as young boys and it was

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there that they carried out their most important artistic work.

While Rivera did important easel paintings in Europe, especially those of his Cubist period (still not fully appreciated on an international level), Siqueiros painted murals in Latin America. The three later worked in the United States during the 1930s, leaving behind significant murals like those painted by Rivera in Detroit, Orozco in New York and Siqueiros in California. (It was in California that Siqueiros first put into practice a new muralistic concept in terms of the use of materials, placement, the movement of spectators and dynamic expression in representation.)

Of the three, it is Siqueiros who experimented with and theoretically proposed the use of new materials and artistic forms of perception. Siqueiros, above all, put into practice his desire to maintain harmony between new subjects and artistic objects, within the framework of modernity through group work (in New York, San Miguel Allende and Mexico City), conferences and writings.

He came to produce works where experimentation, monumentality and dynamic feeling (showing a certain affinity with Futurism) are linked to a political position associating the revolutionary with socialism.

Diego Rivera was probably the muralist with the most solid artistic training and the one who assimilated schools and artistic currents as diverse as those of the Italian Renaissance, the French Cubism of Cézanne and Gauguin and the Spanish Realism of El Greco, among others.

In his re-creation of Mexican culture, he used all types of artistic resources, synthetic forms, curved lines, planar and pyramidal composition and rich coloring.

José Clemente Orozco, *The Carnival of Ideologies or the Political Circus. Fresco, 1937. Government Palace, Guadalajara, Jalisco.*

Vicente Guijosa.

David Alfaro Siqueiros, *Social Security for All Mexicans. Pyroxyline and vinyl on celotex, 1952-1954, Hospital de La Raza, Mexico City.*

Guillermina Vázquez Ramírez.

José Clemente Orozco, *Allegory of Nationality. Fresco, 1940. Gabino Ortiz Library, Jiquilpan, Michoacán.*

Pedro Angeles.

Diego Rivera,
The Elements and Technical Man. Mother Earth. Fresco, 1923-27. Autonomous University of Chapingo, state of Mexico.

Detail and the grouping of figures form a didactic and eclectic narration which maintains a constant and optimistic reference to socialism.

Rivera's synthesis and codification of elements from Mexican reality, together with his expressive capacity, make him one of the most popular muralists.

Social criticism and individual concerns alternate, within a humanistic framework, in Orozco's murals. This is manifested artistically through symbols, allegories or metaphors and sarcasm, irony and denunciation. The expressionistic force of his style of angular lines, the use of diagonals, wide brushstrokes, tension and restricted tonal range (gray, ocher, red and orange) are masterfully used to question —among other things— false established values, mass movements, political and religious dogmatism and totalitarianism.

The expressive capacity and coherence of discourse, on the basis of an aesthetic linked to nationalism —elements present in all three of these masters of muralism— give the muralist movement a place of honor in the Mexico's art and within the contemporary artistic movements (such as Constructivism) which seek to integrate art with politics and daily life.

Maricela González Cruz Manjarrez.

David Alfaro Siqueiros, *Portrait of the Bourgeoisie, detail. Pyroxyline on cement, 1939. Union of Mexican Electrical Workers, Mexico City.*

Mexican architecture: a conversation with José de Yturbe

The architect José de Yturbe seeks "the dialogue between the site and the building, the changing daily echo between light and shadow, the light modulated by shutters, the naive color of the small town walls, a view encountered, the shadow of a pergola that betrays time, the serene, the gentle and austere, where 'less is more'."

His current projects are on the coast of Nayarit and Valle de Bravo, in the state of Mexico. They combine beauty and utility with the surrounding landscape. *Voices of Mexico* presents the following interview with the architect José de Yturbe.



House in Valle de Bravo.

● *What is architecture to you?*

■ What I attempt to accomplish as a designer is architecture, not just construction. The difference between the two concepts consists of the fact that architecture, besides being functional and meeting a set of requirements, includes art, it is creative, it offers something new.

● *Which architects have influenced your style?*

■ My architectural style is the result of a mixture of the present, past and future. From the present, the beauty and functionalism of modern architecture; from the past I have extracted the tradition learned from my teachers in Europe during the year I spent with the architect Luigi Moretti, and later in Mexico from Luis Barragán.

● *What is the difference between Mexican architecture and others?*

■ I think that simply through being architecture, it all fulfills the same function. Mexican architecture, like all others, carries out similar functions resulting from specific architectural programs which are virtually the same as anywhere in the world, despite the fact that works vary from one to another due to the materials used in their construction.

Golf club in Malinalco, state of Mexico, designed by Javier Sordo Madaleno and José de Yturbe from Sordo Madaleno Arquitectos.

● *Which architectural tendency has had the most influence in Mexico?*

■ The Spanish, Mediterranean influence has been the most palpable within Mexican architecture. Thanks to present-day communications, we are seeing all kinds of influences today. The Mexican style is based on a mixture of cultures. Mediterranean influences joined with the Colonial heritage in shaping our style: a great deal of color, broad spaces, light and natural materials.

● *Do you prefer pure or eclectic styles?*

■ In this case I understand purity to mean the simple and straightforward, and eclectic to mean an elaborate mixture of styles. I consider my architecture to be purist, but full of minimalist ideas that intermingle, forming a style and a way of thinking. It is interesting to pose this question as well in terms of the old and the new, the Classical and the Romantic. Goethe, probably the best poet of all time, expressed this sentiment for the contemporary poets of his day: "I call what is healthy Classical and what is sick Romantic. Much of what is new is not Romantic simply because it is new, but rather because it is weak, sick and infected; while the old is not Classical because it is old but because it has strength, it is fresh, proud and healthy." I think this entire comment can also fit architecture completely.

● *Is this kind of architecture the same for all regions and climates?*

■ Each region and climate has its own architecture. I think it's impossible to make different architectural programs fit the same characteristics, since each of them will have very different formal representation.

● *Is it an architecture for housing only?*

■ Many people have the unfortunate habit of identifying Mexican architecture according either to somber tomes or "pueblito" (small town) colors. I think Mexican

architecture goes far beyond this. I think Mexican architecture is what is made in Mexico, without signposts or traits of any kind.

● *What does Mexican architecture propose for multi-family dwellings or low-income housing developments?*

■ Low-income housing faces the problem of costs, and thus it is difficult to identify multi-family projects with others, since construction methods and spaces are necessarily minimal.

● *What is the importance of patios in Mexican architecture?*

■ The way I see things, they are all-important. The patio is the basis for circulation. It could be the most important area in a building.

● *What kind of materials do you prefer to use?*

■ The simplest, the traditional Mexican materials, such as mortar surfaces with color, adobe, wood, tile, etc. Nevertheless, I think each type of building may involve a change of materials, since an office building is not the same as housing.



House in Patzcuaritos, Nayarit.

Hotel Westin Regina, Los Cabos, Baja California Sur (Javier Sordo Madaleno and José de Yturbe).

● *Is there an architectural solution for a city as large and populated as Mexico City?*

■ No way. All you have to do is look at it to see that there's no order or system. I think all the world's urban planners should study Mexico City, since I think it's the only city in the world which includes absolutely every type and genre of urban design in existence, but all mixed together and therefore completely unsuccessful. It would be important to do an analysis of the buildings which have played a decisive role in Mexico's architectural history.

● *Does Mexican architecture have an important place with international architecture?*

■ Mexican architecture is very poorly publicized. I think that Mexico has great architects whom the world has yet to discover, but the time will come when they will be.

Mexico's new policies for the conservation and management of natural resources

*Julia Carabias Lillo**

Scientific evidence on our country's environment has amply demonstrated two points: 1) Mexico is one of the world's richest nations in terms of bio-diversity, a country where almost every type of ecosystem can be found (with the exception of those climates characteristic of extreme cold); and 2) the accelerated degradation of nature puts its renewability at risk.

These concerns, which in previous times were voiced only by the academic sector, are now shared by almost all of society.

International discussion over the past few years, which found its maximum expression in the United Nations Environmental and Development Conference, has made it clear that environmental themes are one of the basic pillars of national planning, since the material basis of development is at risk of irreversible deterioration.

* Secretary of the Environment, Natural Resources and Fishing.

A new responsibility has been incorporated into reflections and decisions about the course development policies should take. This has to do with an inter-generational commitment demanding the establishment of policies for solving current problems of poverty and inequality without compromising the development possibilities of future generations. This is sustainable development. A complex, integral and long-term process, it means taking on the responsibility of replacing the natural capital that we are consuming with our current way of life.

For the first time in Mexico, the National Development Plan incorporates the concept of sustainable development; the chapter on the economy also defines the broad parameters for environmental and natural-resource management policies. The addition of environmental criteria in economic planning, without diminishing the link between environmental and social development, highlights the importance of economic growth, which is indispensable for the strengthening of the country's development. This must occur within the framework of environmental sustainability, in order to be long-lasting and fair to future generations.

Visible environmental deterioration has taken place over the course of decades, reducing the capacity to renew forests and an important part of our fishing resources, affecting water quality and impoverishing the soil. There are cases in which the efforts of a whole generation will be insufficient to correct the errors committed by society, since resources have long life cycles.

In large metropolitan areas, norms have been lowered due to pollution; we have grave problems in the collection and disposal of waste products; more waste is being thrown out than nature can assimilate; technology and infrastructure are incapable of disposing of solid waste

Biodiversity

Flora and fauna

Mexico is one of the world's seven richest countries in plant and animal species, thereby belonging to the group of "megadiverse" countries which, among them, hold around 60 percent of the planet's living species.

One of the most important characteristics of Mexico's biological diversity is that between 30 and 50 percent of all its species are endemic; in other words, they are found only in this country. Suffice it to note that it has 200 species of butterfly, 128 of birds, 144 of mammals, more than 300 kinds of phanerogamous species, 373 types of reptile, as well as the amphibians, which occupy a key position since 177 of the 282 amphibian species in Mexico are endemic. According to the National Commission for the Knowledge and Use of Biodiversity (CONABIO), 38 species of vertebrates and 11 types of vascular plants have become extinct.

With regard to fauna, of the 4,170 species existing on the planet, Mexico has 449. Bird fauna is particularly rich, both in resident and migratory species; 1,150 of the 9,198 registered species may be found in this country. 717 of the 6,300 known reptile species are found in Mexico.

Of the species of flora and fauna existent in Mexico, preliminary estimates state that 336 are in danger of extinction, of which 170 are endemic; 801 are threatened, of which 442 are endemic; 1,130 are considered rare species, 605 of which are endemic; and 154 are subject to special protection, of which 43 are endemic. Reptiles are the group with the largest number of threatened species, with more than 300; the amphibians include the largest number of species in danger of extinction. Of the endemic species, the largest number of cases is among the mammals, with around 100, while the fish group has the largest number of species in danger of extinction. With regard to flora, threatened species include around 140 cacti, followed by approximately 100 types of orchid; both groups occupy leading positions in terms of endemic species as well as those in danger of extinction.

products. Even more worrisome are the 7 million tons of dangerous industrial waste products that are produced annually. This country still lacks an infrastructure with sufficient capacity to deal with the elimination of dangerous industrial waste.

The main problems confronted by rural environments are deforestation —we have a high rate, the highest in Latin America— and the loss of topsoil as a result of this deforestation. Close to 90 percent of national territory has a significant level of erosion damage. The problem of water pollution is also a grave one: 29 out of 37 water-supply regions are highly contaminated.

Mexico has a long tradition of forestry, water conservation and use of fishing resources. However, until now, our country's renewable and non-renewable natural resources have been used in a sectoral manner, without organized common strategies. Environmental protection has a more recent history, but in less than twenty-five years valuable knowledge has been gathered about restoration and the prevention of ecological deterioration.

On December 29, 1994, the Secretariat of Environment, Natural Resources and Fishing (SEMARNAP) was created to promote the transition toward sustainable development and coordinate the programs, efforts and strategies of different government departments designed to promote the permanent use of renewable natural resources and efficient preservation and improvement of the environment. The move toward sustainable development will bring about a better quality of life for all, contribute to overcoming poverty and strengthen economic productivity based on processes and technology that do not damage resources or the quality of the environment. This involves putting forward more efficient criteria for the use of resources, attempting to balance economic, social and environmental objectives. This is a mission that should be translated into actions with practical effects, whether the desired results are achieved in the short or long term.

Environmental protection and restoration

The new ecological policy stresses a more complete use of natural resources within the perspective of environmental protection and restoration. Among the most relevant and urgent matters requiring attention are the following:

It is necessary to improve existing ecological guidelines, in order to avoid, for example, situations where rules are applied to the same problem in different ways. The technical guidelines should look toward setting short, medium and long-term goals.

In the field of social and environmental policy toward sustainable development, changes in regional modernization programs and institutions have brought about a series of successful experiences which demonstrate the benefits of programs which integrate productive, social and environmental aspects.

Some of the projects that have been carried out were based on noteworthy prior efforts aimed at the promotion of better living conditions for the population, attention to socially and economically backward areas, fostering all-sided development for rural zones and combating extreme poverty. All of this demonstrates that the success of these actions depends on, among other factors, the elimination of centralized plans, participation by local governments, coordination of sectoral programs, creation of self-sustaining income sources through productive channels and the strengthening of the population's organizational capacity.

Still, it is clear that we face a serious challenge and that in order to advance toward the solution of Mexico's environmental problems, it is important to design organizational plans which will guarantee viable answers to the problem. It is crucial to work out policies on this subject, taking into account the country's ecological heterogeneity as well as the productive sector's particularities and the conditions of social groups.

It is also necessary to consider that Mexico's indigenous population, while possessing a large share of ecosystems and natural resources, is generally submerged in poverty. Thus, they stress their interest in maintaining their own economic and social forms of organization, involving collective and normative access to natural resources. The solution to these problems is necessary to an integral strategy for sustainable development not only to overcome poverty but also to protect bio-diversity.

Thus, sustainable development requires sketching an orientation and guidelines that will permit solid and permanent growth, in which positive links to the environment will be favored and consolidated, creating jobs and a better distribution of income. Sustainable development also alerts us to the need to encourage decisions fostering improved relations between technology and resource usage. This leads to the question of which kind of technology is appropriate for responding to the modernization demands of productive sectors, improve the quality of their products and make them more compatible with the environment. Thus the door has been opened wide to the participation of universities and research institutions, which, without being distracted from their main purpose, will provide scientific and technological advances through research and educational programs, furthering sustainable development in different regions and diverse productive sectors.

The environmental policies put forward by the current government recognize the need to avoid negative effects on businesses, particularly with the current, highly restrictive situation involving closures of existing enterprises and obstacles to opening new ones —a situation that has brought the loss of many jobs. Nevertheless, this does not cancel out environmental regulation derived from the juridical framework, above all in extreme cases which present unacceptable risks to human or environmental health and safety.

A new industrial policy

In terms of investments and new opportunities for industry, there is an important opportunity for accelerated participation in several domestic and external market sectors. This opportunity is the result of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and Mexico's entry into the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as well as the increasing preference of some domestic and, above all, foreign consumers for environment-friendly products produced by clean technology and production processes. This clearly demands that industry undertake the transition towards sustainable development.

Thus it is crucial to develop an environmental strategy in the context of a new industrial policy allowing businessmen to broaden their competitive space, not only in terms of the quality and price of their products but also, and most importantly, regarding efficiency and natural-resource utilization focused on

sustainability and adequate environmental performance.

Both the problems and the opportunities facing exports and employment vary by sector and region, which means that the objectives of environmental quality, job growth and business competitiveness cannot be universally achieved at the same time and with the same intensity. This situation requires the establishment of an environmental strategy which is *differentiated* by economic sector, region and business size. Such a strategy would result from new evaluation and decision-making plans fostering a gradual, selective differentiation in state support and, above all, a linkage with industrialists' economic obligations, strategies and prospects.

The priorities for environmental management in the industrial field lie in those sectors and activities which have experienced the most impact from resource usage and which generate more waste in regions with high environmental damage or are vulnerable to such damage.

We cannot lose sight of the urgent need to promote production on a natural basis, in order to create jobs and income and to overcome poverty. Thus, the new policy creation framework keeps sight of the social and economic interests of the population, seeking to protect those interests while preventing further destruction of nature, and seeking the restoration of that which has already been damaged.

The secretariat will also promote compliance with international strategy objectives in light of global change, in particular regarding climatic changes and effects on the ozone layer. The idea is to promote a national environmental information system, so society will be better informed and public policy will be based on precise information for the design and evaluation of environmental protection actions and resource utilization.

Additionally, the new environmental policy involves coordination with other offices, state governments, municipalities, social and private sectors, in order to carry out water and soil conservation projects, protect resources, and see that productive processes, infrastructure construction and other economic activities are carried out with the least possible environmental impact. This will make it easier for our

The Border Ecological Cooperation Commission

On the basis of the signing of the Free Trade Agreement, a specific parallel accord was signed for the common border between the United States and Mexico, considered to be a 62-mile strip within each of the two countries starting at their respective borders. The objective is to resolve the region's environmental problems, principally those derived from the lack of an infrastructure for providing potable water, drainage, residual water treatment and the management of municipal wastes.

This Commission (BECC) was born together with its sister institution, the North American Development Bank (NADB). BECC's role is to examine border infrastructure projects presented to it by the communities, their priority and environmental viability, while the NADB has the responsibility of receiving the projects certified by BECC and, after examining their financial viability, to decide whether or not to provide them with resources.

The distinctive characteristic of this mechanism is that projects must be examined and proposed by the beneficiaries of the infrastructure works which are required, and that the financing granted to the projects can be recovered by the Bank, which implies that the beneficiaries must know that they will have to finance part or all of the cost of the project by means of the payments they will have to make as users of the systems which are constructed.

At this point both Mexico and the United States have appointed their representatives to the executive board and advisory council of BECC and the NADB. The hope is that by the time BECC holds its next public meeting, projects will be ready to be certified by the Commission and, in the event of a positive decision, to receive NADB funds for their construction.

country to adequately meet its international responsibilities in matters of environmental protection and sustainable use of resources.

Mexico's highly diverse natural resources are a national treasure which has not yet been fully used, and which could generate key competitive and comparative advantages. There will be a heavier emphasis on stimulating fishing and forestry, aimed at increasing jobs and income, at the same time as the resources on which future viability depends are protected against excessive exploitation. Flora and fauna would be used more rationally, and projects to benefit producers in this area would be encouraged. It is important that resource utilization be regionally coherent, which requires participation and coordination among various levels of government.

Grass-roots participation

There is agreement that these objectives will be reached by creating and consolidating real areas for social participation on a series of levels. There are presently a number of important means by which the population participates in the adoption and oversight of environmental policy —in policy formulation, reporting violations and through the work of consultative groups.

In the first half of this year many different consultations were held on issues related to the environment, water, fishing and soil conservation. The results of these consultations —a grass-roots component in the process of designing the 1995-2000 National Plan of Development— have helped locate and evaluate the problems we face in terms of environmental and natural-resource issues.

This first step was not a one-time-only grass-roots consultation. On the contrary, the very recognition of sustainability as a strategic factor in our development model demands the cooperation of public, private and social forces, so we may arrive at national, regional and local strategies.

To open the road to such cooperation, four Regional Consultative Councils were formed, with representatives from grass-roots and academic organizations, private agencies, non-government organizations and state governments. The National Consultative Council was formed through a process of democratic selection among the representatives of the Regional Councils. These Councils will be an important arena for policy discussion and evaluation, and for providing direction to proposals that may eventually become guidelines or programs.

Complementing the development of improved mechanisms of participation and co-responsibility, a strategy will be put forward for the decentralization of environmental and natural-resource management, aimed at strengthening local management capacity, particularly at the municipal level. A central part of decentralization will be promoting regional forms of resource-usage planning oriented to local recognition of the specific characteristics of these resources and a local consensus on development alternatives.

The determining factor in the transition to sustainable development is the formation of a culture of prevention, sustainable usage of our resources and improvement in the quality of life, viewed as one of the main tasks shared by government and society, where priority is given to education, training and communication aimed at consumption patterns which will be more favorable to sustainability.

Protected nature areas

The effort to preserve bio-diversity is one of the commitments we have made to the nation and the world. In this effort, protected nature areas play an important role as the foundation for new development opportunities. These reserves are not limitations on the use of resources, but rather different options which promote and strengthen the regions.

The creation of protected areas is an important means for promoting the preservation of ecosystems, regulating activities and strengthening research.

Mexico has 91 protected nature areas, making up 5.6 percent of the nation's territory. While this is a significant area (over 26 million acres), it continues to be insufficient given that Mexico has many ecosystems and endemic species (i.e., species found only in this country) which still require protection.

In order for the reserves to fulfill their function of preservation —and in light of the opportunities for new forms of natural-resource utilization to help overcome poverty and assist regional development— it is necessary for society to make a commitment to this preservation. Such a commitment cannot be limited to the groups of peasants, fishermen and communal land owners who live on the reserves.

If we as a society want to conserve, then as a society we must find, contribute to and pay for mechanisms to finance this conservation. It is necessary to direct the flow of public and private investment towards the protected areas. Preservation is not free; it costs

North American Environmental Cooperation Commission

Chapters 7 and 9 of the North American Free Trade Agreement contain environmental measures. Complementing these measures, the three member countries adopted a parallel Accord creating various mechanisms to assist the NAFTA nations in better fulfilling their respective environmental legislations.

The Accord created a Commission made up of a Council of Ministers, a Secretariat and a Joint Public Consultative Committee. The Council is made up of the three countries' environment ministers and is responsible for making decisions and, through the other two bodies, overseeing the fulfillment of the Accord. The Secretariat is an organ of the Commission, made up of an Executive Director and employees from the three nationalities; its main objective is to process all the documentation and information the Commission receives, as well as to keep the public informed. The Joint Public Consultative Committee is made up of members of civil society from the three countries who are active in the various fields involved in environmental matters.

The Accord's objective is to protect the environment and assist in the sustainable development of the entire North American region. Public participation is key to the Commission's ability to attain these objectives.

The Accord recognizes the importance of having the three countries reinforce their respective environmental legislations, and promotes cooperation for the conservation and protection of natural resources, as well as the effective application and fulfillment of each of the countries' internal environmental laws.

Through its Secretariat, the Commission has the obligation to produce an annual report on the environmental situation in the North American region; work out measures for preventing environmental emergencies; promote environmental education among the member countries' populations; carry out environmental impact evaluations; and promote the use of economic instruments for achieving the objectives of its environmental legislation and of the Accord itself, as well as preventing any member country from obtaining commercial advantages over the others by failing to comply with environmental norms.

The Accord foresees participation by society at large through a procedure for presenting grievances against the government of any member country which is not complying with applicable environmental norms. It also projects a mechanism for public hearings in which the three organs of the Commission would participate, together with organized civil society, in order to provide a channel for mutual concerns.

money and we must find sources of financing. A key element is the link between the protected areas and the academic sector, which is carrying out research and can really provide its support and contribute its knowledge of what exists, as well as how to use and preserve it.

Another possibility we are exploring is that of establishing trusts for the protected nature areas. This would be a contract, a multilateral pact among communities, local interests and society as a whole. These trusts might make it possible to manage resources with more autonomy, transparency, efficiency, confidence and information; thus long-term projects will not come to a halt for lack of funding, which would lead to environmental damage and the reserves losing their reason for existence.

Such trusts would also involve participation by local communities, communal land owners and peasant communities, local businessmen, academic groups and different levels of government.

The strategies broadly sketched out in this presentation are concretized in the sectoral programs for the environment and natural resources, providing the opportunity for a deeper discussion, in which the heterogeneity of regional and population-group problems will be recognized in detail, and strategies, policies and mechanisms for participation and co-responsibility will come to fruition. Only in this way will we advance toward sustainable development. VM

The greening of North America? Environmental aspects of NAFTA

*Robert Finbow**

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) puts to the test the willingness of developed and developing countries to recognize their interdependence in a global economy and ecosystem by agreeing on how to manage the impact of economic development on the environment. This linkage has become strong, since many countries now use trade sanctions to enforce environmental agreements or to change the polluting behaviors of other nations. While many ecological concerns are valid, at times these sanctions may be disguised forms of protectionism, or reflect contentious disagreements over environmental issues. As Dixon Thompson suggests, the result can be heightened tensions between nations, as trade is "used increasingly as a legitimate tool for good resource and environmental management or as a weapon in the international battle of environmental ideologies."[1]

In the negotiation of the NAFTA, much attention was given to the environmental effects of freer trade and the trade sanctions which can be applied to environmental issues. Free trade in itself does not cause environmental problems. But it can potentially make them worse by encouraging rapid development without commensurate requirements for sound ecological practices. Free trade agreements which are silent on ecological matters can be used by one state to challenge regulatory regimes in another, undermining efforts at environmental protection, by treating such policies as trade sanctions to be weakened in the name of economic liberalization.[2]

The NAFTA debate raised complex questions over what mechanisms can be developed to enforce environmental standards across national boundaries. How can Canada and Mexico, which are so heavily dependent on U.S. markets, enter equitable enforcement mechanisms with that country, which is less reliant on trade with its neighbors? Will NAFTA and its environmental side agreement effectively control the development-ecology nexus in North America?

Supportive interpretations of NAFTA

Supporters argue that NAFTA provides a unique opportunity to tackle transborder problems of pollution, especially between Mexico and the United States. Without this accord, Mexico would have fewer resources and incentives to cooperate; U.S. tariffs would require Mexico to cut production costs by accepting polluting industries to compete in American and Canadian markets. Under free trade, Mexico's trade advantage will mostly be in labor-intensive and agricultural industries which may be "cleaner" than American or Canadian industry. As Grossman and Kruege argue: "Mexico, with a (purchasing power adjusted) per capita GDP of $5,000, now is at the critical juncture in its development process where further growth should generate increased political pressures for environmental protection and perhaps a change in

[1] Dixon Thompson, "The Environmental Implications of North American Free Trade" in Stephen Randall (ed.), *North America Without Borders: Integrating Canada, the United States and Mexico* (Calgary, University of Calgary Press, 1992), p. 237.

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[2] Steven Shrybman, "Trading Away the Environment" in Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron (eds.) *The Political Economy of North American Free Trade* (Montreal, McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993), p. 272.

private consumption behavior."[3] For free trade advocates, NAFTA will push Mexico across this threshold, and induce greater resources and public awareness to rectify the country's environmental challenges.

Some economists argue that lax environmental regulations are a small incentive to industrial location. If not, there would already be an exodus of North American companies to countries with less regulations. Studies show that few industries would be induced to move south by creation of pollution havens in Mexico. Most companies would find it more costly to recreate their capital in Mexico than to comply with American or Canadian pollution controls.

If new plants are constructed in Mexico to take advantage of low-cost labor, these plants will use new pollution-free technologies, and may be cleaner than older Canadian or American plants. Liability rules for pollution and industrial accidents (like Bhopal) have forced most MNCs to adopt standards similar to U.S. laws, for fear of civil court penalties, which can be more effective than regulations in controlling pollution.[4]

Supporters of NAFTA argue that Mexico has increased its commitment to enforce its environmental laws, which on paper are comparable with those of North America. Mexico has acknowledged its environmental problems, and is taking steps to rectify them; including a ten-fold increase in resources for environmental protection and a border environmental plan for waste and water management, with funding exceeding U.S. commitments to border cleanup as a percentage of GNP. NAFTA will provide the resources needed for Mexico to avoid becoming a "pollution haven."[5]

Advocates hailed NAFTA as an environmentally-sensitive agreement. Canada's official assessment of the treaty suggested: "The NAFTA establishes a new benchmark for environmentally sensitive international trade and economic relations. The environmental provisions of the NAFTA go well beyond those of any previous trade agreement."[6]

NAFTA partners agreed not to lower environmental standards to attract investment, and to promote sustainable growth. NAFTA reduced tariffs on pollution control technologies, promoted information sharing on ecological standards, created a disputes resolution process with consultation of environmental experts, and gave precedence to major international environmental agreements.[7]

Defenders like Bruce Yandle concede that, "expanded trade with Mexico will surely generate instances of environmental degradation. But instead of viewing trade through static glasses, and isolated cases, we must focus on the broad, general tendencies that emanate from the dynamic economy."[8]

Free market environmentalism and its gradual improvement of the environment is superior to a "command and control" regulatory approach which seeks instant protection at great cost. In the words of one Canadian official, "Environmental sensitivity is a competitive advantage. Environmental protection is a marketplace commodity."[9]

Critical interpretations of NAFTA

Critics argued that NAFTA in its original form contained only non-binding commitments to environmental sensitivity. NAFTA enshrined adverse GATT rulings limiting the use of trade sanctions to force changes in ecologically-damaging behaviors in other nations. NAFTA treated environmental matters as scientific concerns, subject to technical standards set by unaccountable international agencies.

NAFTA also created closed enforcement procedures, with advice on environmental concerns from a closed circle of advisors, not an accountable process of public review. NAFTA's provision giving precedence to a few international environmental agreements may imply that future agreements signed by any of the parties will be subordinate to NAFTA unless all parties explicitly recognize them. For instance, if Mexico and Canada sign the accord on global warming, but the U.S. does not, the latter may use NAFTA to challenge Mexican and Canadian regulations designed to conform to this accord.

The agreement might work against the Brundtland Commission proposals by encouraging energy mega-projects and increasing energy consumption. Market forces, not environmental criteria would govern resource exploitation. In short, NAFTA would enshrine practices which work against sustainable development; practices

[3] Gene M. Grossman and Alan B. Krueger, "Environmental Impacts of a North American Free Trade Agreement" in Peter M. Garber (ed.), *The Mexico-U.S. Free Trade Agreement* (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1993), p.48.

[4] Steven Globerman, "The Environmental Impacts of Trade Liberalization" in Terry L. Anderson (ed.), *NAFTA and the Environment* (Vancouver, Fraser Institute, 1993), pp. 35-6. Bruce Yandle, "Is Free Trade an Enemy of Environmental Quality?" in Anderson, 1993, p. 8.

[5] Roberto Salinas-Leon, "Free Trade and Free Markets: A Mexican Perspective on the NAFTA" in Anderson, 1993, p. 23.

[6] Government of Canada, *North American Free Trade Agreement: Canadian Environmental Review* (Executive Summary), Ottawa, 1992, p. 20.

[7] William C. Clark, "NAFTA: a promising first step," *Environment* 36 (March, 1994).

[8] Yandle, 1993, p. 9.

[9] Harry G. Rogers, "The Department of Science, Trade and Industry" in John Kirton and Sarah Richardson (eds.), *Trade, Environment and Competitiveness* (Ottawa, National Round Table on the Environment, 1992), p. 109. For the business position see Thomas D'Aquino, "Trade-Environment Links: Issues for Canadian Industry" in Kirton and Richardson, 1992, p. 33.

driven by economic logic and not ecological concerns.[10]

NAFTA's provisions against development of "pollution havens" were not enforceable; there were no mechanisms to enforce Mexico's existing environmental regulations, or to prevent an increasing gap between its practices and those of Canada or the U.S. Competitive pressures may work in the opposite direction, by encouraging Mexico to continue lax regulations to retain cost advantages for industry.

Free trade may encourage economic growth similar to that found already in Mexico in "maquiladora" industries, where environmentally damaging practices are common. Rapid growth can create new hazards, with little political will or infrastructure to tackle such problems. Despite Mexican efforts to increase resources for environmental inspections and control, critics feared that the lack of financial resources and technical capability would restrict Mexico's ability to ensure corporate compliance.[11]

Mexican responses to environmental crisis

Mexican environmental problems have increased because of rapid growth since the adoption of the maquiladora program. Population growth and unplanned urban development have generated industrial waste, air pollution and domestic sewage. These problems have prompted cooperation between Mexico and the United States, especially the 1983 La Paz accord, which created a working relationship between environmental agencies in both countries.

The La Paz Agreement introduced joint planning on sewage treatment, hazardous waste disposal, ecological emergencies and air emissions standards.[12] While Mexican regulations are advanced for a developing nation, lack of finances and personnel creates problems for enforcement, including a climate in which underpaid officers accept bribes from companies.

But not all of the blame can be laid on domestic actors, given the failure of American corporations to live up to their commitments to help control hazardous emissions. Roberto Sánchez argues that up to 26% of American companies relocating in Mexico cite lower costs of compliance with environmental regulations as an important factor in their relocation decision.[13] Despite the La Paz Agreement, American firms often do not return hazardous wastes for disposal in the U.S.; instead, factories often dump hazardous metals like mercury and aluminum, and toxic chemicals like xylene, vinyl chloride and PCBs. Combined with the dumping of raw sewage and garbage into these river systems, these chemicals pose health hazards to those who drink the water, eat foods irrigated from these rivers or even approach them in some places.[14]

Since 1989, Mexico has started new programs in response to growing concerns about environmental degradation. The national development plan required consideration of environmental effects of development; laws were strengthened, new projects were subjected to stricter environmental criteria, air pollution and solid waste disposal in urban areas were targeted for improvement, and education and recycling initiatives were begun.[15]

The Secretaría de Desarrollo Urbano y Ecología (SEDUE) revamped its enforcement programs, increased the number of inspectors, forced companies to post bonds linked to compliance with targets for pollution and closed plants which didn't comply with these tougher standards. Local government powers were increased, with stronger guidelines for waste water disposal and construction of new sewage treatment plants.[16]

But much remains to be done, since SEDUE's budget remains low. American companies still leave up to 30% of their hazardous wastes in Mexico. A study by SEDUE suggested that only 35% of maquiladoras comply with Mexico's environmental standards. Foreign and domestic companies refuse to assume financial responsibility for ecological harm. And it is still politically difficult to enforce automobile emission standards in cities like Mexico City, where pollution has worsened because of increased traffic.[17]

[10] See the discussion of the environmental problems associated with the existing maquiladora industries in Kathryn Kopinak, "The Maquiladorization of the Mexican Economy," in Grinspun and Cameron, 1993, pp. 154-55.

[11] Dianna Soulis, "Punishing Polluters," *Wall Street Journal*, Sept. 24, 1992.

[12] Jean Gilbreath Rich, *Planning the Border's Future: The Mexican-U.S. Integrated Border Environmental Plan* (Austin, LBJ School of Public Affairs, University of Texas, 1992).

[13] Rodney E. Leonard and Eric Christensen, "Lax Enforcement of Environmental Laws in Mexico" in John Cavanagh, John Gershman, Karen Baker and Gretchen Helmke, *Trading Freedom: How Free Trade Affects Our Lives, Work, Environment* (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1992), pp. 73-4.

[14] Stanford Lewis, Marco Kaltofen and Gregory Ormsby, "Border Rivers in Peril" in John Cavanagh, John Gershman, Karen Baker and Gretchen Helmke, *Trading Freedom: How Free Trade Affects Our Lives, Work, Environment* (San Francisco: Institute for Food and Development Policy, 1992), pp. 68-70.

[15] Comisión Nacional de Ecología, *Informe de la situación general en materia de equilibrio, ecología y protección al ambiente, 1989-1990* (México, CONADE, 1990), p. 32.

[16] Jan Gilbreath Rich, "Mexico: Free Trade and Ecology" *Hemisphere* 4,1 (Fall, 1991). "Mexico: More Muck than Money," *Economist*, Oct. 16, 1993.

[17] Eugenio O. Valenciano, "El Acuerdo de Libre Comercio México-Estados Unidos y sus repercusiones en la frontera," *Integración latinoamericana* 17, Aug.-Sept. 1992. "Mexico: Under a cloud," *Economist*, April 4, 1992.

In 1991, under pressure from Congressional critics, the U.S. and Mexican governments started hearings on a plan for border environmental management. The plan was criticized for the lack of specific projects, inadequate coordination between agencies, and the low financial commitment. The plan did not address infrastructure, housing, environmentally-related health problems, water supply and quality, and disappearing flora and fauna. A revised plan was adopted in 1992, with improvements in monitoring, enforcement and the range of issues covered. Lack of transnational coordination, and an emphasis on local, as opposed to national or industrial, funding were still criticized. Mexico had to carry more than 50% of the costs, as the U.S. was reluctant to commit to funding of effective transboundary programs.[18]

Mexican observers suggest that opposition to NAFTA was motivated by protectionism, not by genuine ecological concerns. The Bootleggers and Baptists analogy used by Yandle to describe the unholy alliance of labor and environmentalists as NAFTA opponents is not without foundation, since some critics are concerned about protecting Northern jobs, not Southern ecology.[19] Mexico cannot improve environmental standards in industry if national wealth and living standards are not rising sufficiently to produce adequate resources.

However, environmental problems in the border states of Mexico will remain troublesome to bilateral relations. National sovereignty cannot be used to justify inaction on what are now inherently transnational environmental issues. Transborder problems could provide justification for American trade sanctions to promote change, or to protect against competitive Mexican imports. While public pressures and technological capacity create a cleaner productive sector, higher incomes bring an increase in consumption, generating new and intractable ecological problems.[20]

As MacNeill states, "we have to ensure that trade liberalization agreements do not limit the range and choice of policy instruments that may be used to achieve environmental goals" by banning incentives to ecologically sound practices as "subsidies," or negating anti-pollution programs as "import restrictions."[21]

The negotiation of the environmental side agreement

Many environmental groups saw the negotiations as a chance to create trinational agencies, charged with promotion of sound environmental practices. Unprecedented transnational cooperation occurred as environmental groups from the three countries developed proposals for the "greening" of NAFTA, through the creation of a North American Commission on the Environment (NACE).

As originally proposed, the NACE would respond to public complaints about practices in the three countries, hold public hearings on enforcement issues, and turn cases over to NAFTA disputes-resolution panels, which could apply trade sanctions.[22] All three governments accepted a trinational institution in 1992, when President Bush was facing reelection. But the NACE had an advisory role, without enforcement mechanisms, as the three governments refused to surrender sovereignty to a trinational agency.

During the 1992 campaign, Bill Clinton pledged to strengthen the NACE to permit enforcement. After his inauguration, the Americans called for trade sanctions to be applied against any country which failed to enforce its environmental laws. Complaints could be brought by governments, the NACE secretariat or by private parties and non-government organizations. Canada and Mexico resisted this as a violation of their sovereignty and proposed weaker policies without recourse to trade sanctions.[23] Clinton forced the negotiation of a side agreement which compromised between the U.S. desire for enforcement and Mexican and Canadian preference for non-binding cooperation.

The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NACEC) accepted that national laws were the main means for environmental protection, and recognized the differences between the economic, environmental and technological situations of the countries. The agreement emphasizes cooperation and information exchange, through the North American Commission on Environmental Cooperation.

The NACEC has a secretariat and public advisory committee, and is directed by cabinet-level officers of environmental affairs. The agreement encourages the countries to enforce their laws. "Under the side agreement, the secretariat may

[18] Rich, 1992, p. 28 and *passim*; Leonard and Christensen, p. 73.

[19] Bruce Yandle, "Bootleggers and Baptists —Environmentalists and Protectionists: Old Reasons for New Coalitions" in Anderson, 1993, p. 93.

[20] Jeffrey A. Mello, "The Environmental Cost of Free Trade" *Business and Society Review*, 91 (Fall, 1994), pp. 18-28.

[21] Jim MacNeill, "Trade-Environment Links: The Global Dimension" in Kirton and Richardson, 1992, p. 17.

[22] "Presentaron grupos ecologistas de México, Canadá y EU una propuesta: La Comisión para el Ambiente debe proteger la salud y los recursos naturales de las tres naciones," *La Jornada*, April 16, 1993. Stewart Hudson, "The NAFTA-NACE Relationship" in Sarah Richardson (ed.), *The North American Free Trade Agreement and the North American Commission on the Environment* (Ottawa, National Round Table on the Environment and the Economy, 1993), pp. 16-9.

[23] Gilbert R. Winham, "Enforcement of Environmental Measures: The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation" (unpublished manuscript, 1993), pp. 3-8; forthcoming in *Journal of Environment and Development*.

consider a submission from any individual or public group asserting that a party is failing to effectively enforce its environmental law, so long as the secretariat finds the submission 'appears to be aimed at promoting enforcement rather than at harassing industry.' "[24]

Supporters argued that the NACEC allowed effective monitoring of each country's compliance with its own environmental laws, and should promote improvements in Mexican standards. Groups like the World Wildlife Foundation supported NACEC as an improvement over the present unregulated system of trade and investment. Conservative critics suggested that NAFTA and its side agreement would lead to a strengthening of regulation at the expense of free markets.[25]

However, the side agreement deviates from Clinton's ambitions, reflecting Mexican and Canadian concern over sovereignty and their fear of the U.S. ability to use trade sanctions to harass its trading partners. The independence of the NACE secretariat was limited and its role was subordinated to the ministerial council. The secretariat and private complainants have no authority to initiate disputes settlement hearings or trade sanctions. The grounds for sanctions were limited by removing references to "unjustifiable" failure to enforce laws, and giving greater recognition to the discretion of national officials.

[24] "U.S. Green Groups to Provide Input on NACEC Complaint Process," *Inside NAFTA*, Jan 11, 1995, p. 12. Luis Miguel Díaz, "Private Rights Under the Environment and Labor Agreements", *US-Mexico Labor Law Journal* (Vol. 2 Symposium, 1994).

[25] Daniel Magraw and Steve Charnovitz, "NAFTA's Repercussions: Is Green Trade Possible?," *Environment* 36, 2 (March, 1994); Alexander Cockburn, "Land of the Free-For-All," *New Statesman & Society* 6, 279 (Nov. 19, 1993). "By a Side Door" *National Review* 45, 21 (Nov. 1, 1993).

Canada insisted on exemptions for commercial harvests, natural resources, and aboriginal rights. While trade sanctions (or fines on government in Canada's case) may be used against failure of any country to enforce its own laws, sanctions can only be invoked by a panel set up by a ministerial decision of two of the countries; and then after a lengthy process to seek alternative solutions.[26]

Some environmental groups are unhappy that the NACE was not given the full scope of powers which they had advocated. Greenpeace argued that the side agreement did not rectify NAFTA's detrimental impact on resource conservation, sustainable agriculture, "green" procurement, workplace environment and health conditions, and border pollution.

Greenpeace decried the lack of strong mechanisms for investigating complaints and the secret process which relies on national data collection; the complex procedures for implementation of trade sanctions which make restraint in cases of persistent national failure to enforce environmental laws highly unlikely; the reliance on existing national laws, and the failure to require nations to implement regulations consistent with international standards; the exclusion of natural resource development and prohibition on national restrictions on foreign corporate access to natural resources; and a deregulatory emphasis that may encourage nations to avoid new environmental standards to attract investment.[27]

[26] Winham, "Enforcement of Environmental Measures," pp. 11-18. "Comisiones trilaterales, sin carácter supranacional: México y Canadá" *El Día*, April 15, 1993.

[27] Greenpeace, *NAFTA & The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation* (NAAEC): *Side-stepping the Environment* (Washington, 1993).

Other groups lament the lack of agreement on criteria for genuine complaints as opposed to trade harassment. Business groups have balked at a "primary purpose test" of complaints, and it has been difficult for the NACEC to develop standards necessary to hear its first complaints. Business and agricultural producers allege that environmental guidelines have already been used to block competition, with Mexican limitations on imports of American peaches and eggs, and American restrictions on Mexican avocados, for alleged phytosanitary reasons.

This reflects a basic problem in reconciling trade and environmental standards: whether regulations should have to be justified in advance as non-protectionist, or whether challengers must prove that regulations do not have a legitimate ecological objective.[28]

However, there have been accomplishments since the adoption of NAFTA. The North American Development Bank, based in San Antonio, made a substantial financial commitment to border environmental and infrastructure projects, especially for the Frontier Environment Program. The Inter-American Development Bank and World Bank loans to Mexico provide substantial new sources of funding for water and sanitation services, border cleanup and solid waste disposal, committing up to $1.8 billion over five years.[29]

[28] "U.S. Green Groups to Provide Input on NACEC Complaint Process," *Inside NAFTA*, Jan. 11, 1995, p. 12. Kevin Hall, "California Peach Growers Missing Fruits of NAFTA in Mexican Barrier Dispute," *Journal of Commerce*, August 3, 1994. Stewart Hudson, "Trade, Environment and the Pursuit of Sustainable Development" in Patrick Low (ed.), *International Trade and the Environment* (World Bank Discussion Paper No. 159, Washington, 1992).

[29] *La Jornada*, October 28, 1993; "U.S., Mexico to Sign Environment Loan," *Journal of Commerce*, October 21, 1993.

The Border Environmental Cooperation Commission brought together Americans and Mexicans to develop projects for cleanup of the border environment. Plants in the maquiladora zone faced stronger environmental enforcement, and new provisions for governing hazardous wastes, air emissions and landfills. Maquiladora plants in Matamoros were ordered to pay $10 million to settle law suits over birth defects in Brownsville, Texas. Firms from the U.S., Britain and France cooperated with municipalities like Cuernavaca, Aguascalientes and Cancun to construct new sewage and water treatment facilities.[30]

Critics point out that these programs require matching funds from Mexico, which will be hard to raise in the current crisis. These financial arrangements will increase Mexico's debt without correcting existing problems, like lack of participation, secrecy in monitoring and violations, lack of tracking of hazardous waste, insufficient coordination, and absence of sustainable funding such as making polluters pay for cleanups.

Under fiscal pressure, the Mexican government might invest in job-creating industries, rather than in environmental cleanup. Mexico continued its GATT challenge to the U.S. ban on imports of Mexican tuna, harvested in a manner threatening to dolphins. The Chamber of Deputies rejected a ban on imports of toxic wastes, allowing companies to bring in such wastes for dumping or as an alternative fuel.

Mexican environmentalists protested their exclusion from the advisory committee to the NACEC.[31]

Texas communities are concerned about new projects near the border, including a power generation plant whose emissions could become an environmental challenge under the NACEC. The U.S. EPA has refused requests from border communities to require U.S. companies in Mexico to report on discharges into shared waterways.[32]

Reconciling environmental accords with national sovereignty

In sum, while much remains to be done, the NAFTA debate witnessed important gains for environmentalists. The inclusion of environmental issues in a trade agreement established a precedent which could affect future trade negotiations. NAFTA's rejection of pollution havens, establishment of the NACE, and the commitment to financing for cleanup projects, reflected the success of environmental groups in forming a new awareness of the impact of trade and development on the environment.

The transnational connections established during the NAFTA debate also hold out the prospect for concerted action by groups in the three countries, and the exchange of information will help increase awareness on environmental issues. While anti-NAFTA environmentalists reject the free trade ideology, many groups recognize that transnational environmental problems will not be solved by a retreat to closed borders. Creation of transnational institutions and coalitions in favor of environmental protection will be required, and the institutions created by NAFTA, although imperfect, may be a first step in this cross-border cooperation.

How extensive the changes in Mexican and North American environmental practices have been remains to be seen. The U.S. goal upon entering the side agreement was to ensure enforcement of environmental aspects of NAFTA by trade sanctions. This goal was only partially realized because the governments of Canada and Mexico perceived a threat to national sovereignty from trade sanctions. Because Canada and Mexico are more dependent on trade with the U.S. as a percentage of GNP, trade sanctions would be a more potent weapon for the U.S. than for the Canadians or Mexicans.

On the other hand, these societies have little choice but to enter into some arrangement with their powerful neighbor to improve environmental quality on the continent. For Canada, this is crucial, since a high percentage of air and water borne pollutants affecting its environment originate in the United States. For Mexico, the political issue of transborder pollution from that country into the southern United States will be a continuing irritant in bilateral relations.

The sovereignty concerns of small states are major stumbling blocks to international accords on environmental protection. Trade partners must develop mechanisms which are more readily reconciled with the concerns of small states but which at the same time promote the enforcement of environmental standards. Without any effective accord (or even with one) Canada and Mexico will remain vulnerable to unilateral trade actions by the U.S., responding to the local and industry interests which are so powerful in Congress.

Environmental concerns as well as trade disputes will possibly be employed by those with protectionist motives, in an effort to mould trade partners' actions in ways desirable to the U.S.

[30] Scott Pendleton, "Mexican Sewage Plant Proves to be 'NAFTA Dream Come True,'" *Christian Science Monitor*, July 11, 1994.

[31] Leon Lazaroff, "The Polluted Border," *El Financiero International*, November 29-December 5, 1993. Michael Kleinberg, "Eco-Groups Balk at NAFTA Choices," *The News* Mexico City, July 23, 1994.

[32] "Mexican Power Plant Could Be Target of NAFTA Green Complaint," *Inside NAFTA*, April 20, 1994. "Is Scrutiny in Store for Cross-Border Polluters?" *National Law Journal*, March 28, 1994.

Mexico City: growth and development

Francisco Pérez de Salazar V.*

By the time of the fifth millennium B.C. the Valley of Mexico had become an area of stable settlements where farmers cultivated corn, chiles, squash, avocados and beans. Development continued slowly, under these conditions, until the year 1,000 B.C.; the *altiplano* (highlands) began to feel the influence of the Olmec "mother culture," originating along the coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The first influences arose in what is now Tlatilco, where the oldest archeological remnants are to be found. At the same time, Cuicuilco flourished to the southeast of the Valley of Mexico.

Teotihuacan was founded just a few miles from the Anáhuac Valley, becoming the first great city in all of Mesoamerica —we understand Mesoamerica to be the area from the northern center of Mexico, in the state of Zacatecas, to Honduras and Nicaragua in Central America.

The great Tenochtitlan —today Mexico City— served as headquarters for the greatest kingdom, consolidating itself in the 15th century A.D. throughout the vast territories of the *altiplano*.

The location of the great capital was due to a mythical-religious occurrence which motivated settlement on the small islands within the Valley of Mexico's system of lakes. This enormous natural basin contained the salt water of Texcoco lake as well as the fresh waters of Xochimilco and Chalco lakes. According to legend, on one of the islands the leader of the Mexicas (Aztecs) found an eagle perched on a cactus plant devouring a serpent, and that is what led to the foundation of this great city.

The island gradually grew in size due to the deliberate drying out of several small adjoining surfaces. This



Map published by Pierre Bertius, ca. 1620, derived from the map attributed to Hernán Cortés.

* Doctorate in architecture and master's degree in monument restoration.

was the result of an invention called *chinampas* —plots built on a pile of wood filled with earth. This technique arose in the Valley of Mexico and can still be seen in Xochimilco and Chalco.

The huge, open religious capital had no evident defenses, although its island location allowed for visual oversight of all access points. One must also take into account the support provided by the city's allies and tributaries along the banks of the lake.

Tenochtitlan was founded in 1325. Developing together with the capital was Tlatelolco, founded around the year 1337 and home to the huge provisions market as well as great schools for warriors and nobles. In addition, the lakeside cities of Azcapotzalco, Tlacopan, Xochimilco, Chalco and Texcoco achieved great splendor.

The first four of these settlements are now included within the metropolitan area of Mexico City. This provides us with an idea of how big Lake Texcoco was in the 16th century.

Island towns such as Tláhuac, Mixquiq and Xochimilco followed the same pattern as Tenochtitlan. They grew together with the parceling out of *chinampas* (averaging 1640 square feet each), which provided the framework for the establishment of "Indian patios" —family groups which made it possible to carry out complementary activities such as farming the plots and orchards as raising domestic animals.

The areas set aside for religious activities and for housing the upper classes (both the clergy and the military) were clearly delimited from the areas for commoners, who congregated in neighborhoods called *calpulis*. The *calpulis* were linked by means of a system of canals and irrigation channels navigated by canoe. This provided the

Map sent to Charles V by Hernán Cortés.

interconnections for the social life of the metropolis.

At the time of the Conquest, according to the scholar González Aparicio, the city had a basically rectangular shape and measured approximately two miles wide, from east to west, and two and a half miles long. Thus, the total area covered was around 5 square miles.

After the arrival of Hernán Cortés, many maps were made during the era of the Conquest. The most important are "Cortés' Map" and the "Map of Santa Cruz." The first was published around 1524, together with the Conquistador's *Cartas de relación* (Narrative Letters). The second, clearly made by the Indians themselves, is preserved at the University of Upsala, Sweden.

After the Conquest, Alonso García Bravo had the task of reconstructing the city. His design was based on the layout of the Aztec capital. Thus, the old access roads were preserved: Tenayuca (today the Vallejo causeway), Tlacopan (presently the Mexico-Tacuba road), Iztapalapa (today Tlalpan avenue), and Tepeyac (now called Misterios road).

The four great Indian neighborhoods were also preserved, and now bear both their Christianized names from the Colonial period,

together with their old Nahuatl or Mexica names: Santa María Tlaquechiucan (today Santa María la Redonda); San Juan Moyotla in the southwest; San Sebastián Atzacoalco in the northeast and Santiago Teopan in the southeast. When this design was begun, Tlatelolco, the equivalent of a fifth neighborhood, already formed part of the city.

According to Fray Bernardino de Sahagún the Mexica ceremonial center had 78 important buildings. It was here that the most important public edifices were built during the Colonial period and where a Renaissance plaza was constructed, surrounded by buildings on its four sides.

The most important ruins from Tenochtitlan's ceremonial center are found in the plaza which was discovered east of the Cathedral and Metropolitan Sanctuary and underneath both buildings, causing serious structural problems in the Cathedral.

For their participation in the conquest of land and subjects for the Crown, the Spaniards were given concessions of Indians, who were forced to pay the conquistadors tribute in labor as well as in kind. Indians played a key role in the construction of the great Spanish cities, built by the Indians' indefatigable hands as they worked as bricklayers, stonemasons and carpenters, as well as in the transportation of construction materials.

The most important representatives of the Crown were the viceroy and the *audiencias* (High Court). Below these were the *cabildos* (councils), which in general terms —depending on the importance of the given population area— were made up of government aldermen and "ordinary mayors" charged with administering justice. All these officials were subordinate to the Chief Mayor.

Large commercial and administrative centers developed in conjunction with the foundation of Mexico City, such as Oaxaca, Puebla, Guadalajara, Atlixco and Valladolid (now Michoacán). Around 1574 there were already thirty of these cities. Other centers were built in Indian towns, such as Tlaxcala, Cholula, Huejotzingo and Texcoco.

By the 16th century the urban structure of the island had been divided into three parts: in the north was the Indian community of Santiago Tlatelolco, to the south was another Indian community, San Juan Tenochtitlan, while the central area was occupied by the Spaniards. This central urban area is clearly outlined by the streets of San Juan de Letrán (now Lázaro Cardenas) to the west, Santísima to the east, Colombia on the northern side and Izazaga to the south.

In accordance with the "state of alert" in effect during the first years after the Conquest, Hernán Cortés permitted the conquistadors to build their homes as if they were fortresses, with walls and towers featuring many small windows. Cortés installed four towers in his home, while his great captain Sandoval built but two, doubtless so as to denote that he had less status than his superior. In 1524 the Hospital of Jesus was founded, and it is there that the remains of Hernán Cortés are to be found today.

Four large religious convents —San Francisco, Santo Domingo, La Merced and San Agustín— already occupied an important place in the city's layout. The first three were modifications of the same rectangular design, occupying several blocks. Inside the Indian neighborhoods the *cihuacalli* was preserved —a Roman-style "women's house." The aqueducts of Tlaxpan were preserved and reconstructed, using water from Santa Fe, Cuajimalpa and Chapultepec.

Convents, while originally prohibited, were eventually built —mainly during the 17th century—



Manuel Toussaint's interpretation of the map drawn by Juan Gómez de Transmonte around 1628.

and were small cities in themselves. Buildings such as hospitals, the Viceregal Palace, the Cabildo halls and the University made up the rest of the city's great edifices.

The geological structure of the valley's basin, constant rain and the lack of control over accumulated water brought about several floods, despite the large number of containment works based on stone dams built during the reign of Ahuizótl and Nezahualcóyotl. A great flood, beginning in 1629 and lasting three years, caused the cement to soften in most buildings, leaving them in total ruin; this is the reason for the city's reconstruction in the 17th century.

One year before the flood, Juan Gómez de Transmonte drew a beautiful perspective of the city. Lithographed centuries later in Florence, it gives us a picture of the development of the city, which had spread to the east and west. The most important buildings represented in this perspective are: 18 religious convents, 14 other religious buildings, 8 hospitals, 4 colleges and parish churches, the Cathedral (still under construction), the Royal Palace and the Cabildo hall. One can also see the aqueduct which reached the fountain of Tlaxpana near the Alameda, bringing spring water from Chapultepec. On the east side, the ancient dam built by Ahuizótl and later reconstructed by Luis de Velazco after the flood of 1555 can also be seen.

Despite periodic great plagues, large-scale immigration and population growth caused land to be distributed in ever smaller plots. This did not hinder the rich from building majestic homes as well as buildings for rent, leading to construction along such streets and plazas as Mayor, Volador, Tlatelolco, Regina, Santo Domingo, San Juan and Concepción. By the 18th century there were 78 such areas.



Map by Diego García Conde, ca. 1793.

Two types of housing units were characteristic of the 18th century. The first, called a *vecindad*, was made up of two or three patios joined in linear fashion, providing ample sleeping spaces. This type of housing arrangement promoted communal life through the carrying out of collective activities, such as preparing food and washing laundry. Following a rigid class criterion, the front dwellings were reserved for Spanish colonists, while the interior rooms were inhabited by *criollo*, *mestizo*,[1] Indian or mulatto families, in accordance with their social position.

The second type was made up of artisan and commercial dwellings and workshops, organized under the "cup and plate" plan —that is, a workshop on the bottom floor and living quarters for the artisan or shopkeeper on the upper level. In addition to artisan and manufacturing activity, commerce and mining developed as the most productive fields during the Colonial period.

Mexico City's large, majestic homes were built during the 18th century. Among them are: Los Azulejos (or the house of the Condes del Valle de Orizaba) on Madero street; on the same street, the Palace of Iturbide (or of the Marqueses del Jaral de Berrio); on Isabel la Católica avenue, the Palace of the Condes de San Mateo Valparaíso; on Pino Suárez, the Palace of the Condes de Santiago

[1] *Criollos* were "pure" Spaniards born in the colonies (as distinguished from *peninsulares*, who were colonists born in Spain). *Mestizos* means people of mixed racial ancestry. (Editor's note.)

de Calimaya —and many other palaces which give grandeur to our city, which Alexander von Humboldt baptized the "City of Palaces."

18th-century nobles' homes were traditionally two-story buildings; in some cases there was a third level with towers. As in the case of the Palace of Iturbide, these were later converted into loggias. The first floor usually had two patios —the main patio and the service patio— designed for general use, as well as garages, sheds, barns for the animals and streetside annexes along the lines of the aforementioned "cup and plate" system. The mezzanine, which was part of the second floor, held offices, guest-rooms and service areas.

The second floor had two main areas: the social and the private or family area. The social area included the "Salon of the Dais" (a parlor featuring portraits of the viceroy and various members of the royal family). Homes whose owners boasted Castilian titles of nobility included the "Salon of the Docel." This salon was furnished with a raised throne and a portrait of the ruling monarch, whom the family hoped someday to receive in their home. Another area was called the "Cabinet," a salon filled with collections and scientific objects used to demonstrate culture and display family members' travel mementoes.

These noble homes also had a chapel as well as a library, music and game rooms on the second floor. The private area contained bed-chambers and antechambers —hallways to the bed-chambers. The service rooms, servants' quarters and kitchens were located in the second-floor patio area. The houses were decorated with applied Mexican artwork, folding screens of Chinese lacquer and Japanese inlays, walnut-wood beds, Chinese marble and silk, Egyptian and Turkish rugs.

By the end of the century the urban area covered about 2,658 acres, compared to 1,633 acres in the 17th



Reconstruction of the map of Mexico City around 1869.

century. In 1786 the Academy of San Carlos was founded (its original name was the Academy of Noble Arts of San Carlos and New Spain), featuring both civilian and military teachers who had settled in Mexico. This led to such works as the Royal Tribunal of Mines, built by Manuel Tolsá; the Church of Loreto, by the same architect; the Royal Tobacco Factory (now the Ciudadela), by Manuel Constanzó, and other great urban works like the famous Paseo de Bucareli.

The urban areas as they were in 1793 can be seen clearly on the map produced by Diego García Conde, with 897 streets and alleys, 78 plazas, small squares and taverns, the Cathedral, 14 parish churches, 41 convents and 3 retreats, 10 colleges, 7 hospitals and a poorhouse, as well as the Royal Factory of Cigars and Cigarettes.

Starting in 1762 public lighting was provided by property owners, who had to install lanterns in front of their homes. By 1790, when the clergy possessed more than 40 percent of Mexico's urban real estate, road-paving and cleaning began. Toward the end of the century the Indians were expelled once again from the urban center for non-payment of taxes, thereby accentuating social differences and discontent.

In the 19th century, due to turbulent political, economic and social changes, Academy architects were unable to carry out many projects. However, during the French intervention the city was modernized and key buildings such as the National Palace and Chapultepec Castle were remodeled. In the Juárez era Church property was secularized; many ecclesiastical edifices were demolished or divided and converted into public buildings such as libraries, hospitals and *vecindades*.

During the presidency of Lerdo de Tejada, the capital was influenced by a powerful impulse for innovative change. The haciendas located

on the outskirts of the urban area began to be divided up, creating such neighborhoods as Guerrero, Santa María la Ribera, Juárez and San Miguel Chapultepec in the Tacubaya area.

The economic prosperity generated during the 30-year government of Porfirio Díaz led the government to create buildings which represented modernity and the beginning of a new epoch. The Ayuntamiento (municipal government) redivided the city into 12 municipalities, introduced electrical power, trams, telegraph, telephone, water supply and drainage systems. A large drainage channel was also constructed.

In 1910, as part of the celebration of 100 years of independence, huge public works like the Palace of Fine Arts, Central Post Office, Palace of Communications and the Geologic Institute were built. Mexico City's wealthy families moved from the city center to the Juárez neighborhood. Most streets and avenues in the city center and wealthy neighborhoods were paved, and public roads in general were improved. The Paseo de la Reforma was laid out in the style of the Champs Elysées in Paris, with monuments to Cuauhtémoc and Columbus, as well as the Column of Independence. Around this same time large commercial stores were built, like the Casa Boker, Puerto de Veracruz and Palacio de Hierro.

At this time the city's population reached 470,000 inhabitants, occupying an area of about 20 square miles. By 1920 the city had 740,000 inhabitants, who began to move toward the southwest, creating the Guadalupe Inn, San Angel Inn and La Florida neighborhoods. Industrial and working-class neighborhoods —such as today's Industrial Vallejo, Lindavista, Rastro and Michoacán areas— were established in the north of the city. In December of 1918, the "Organic Law of Federal Districts and Territories" was approved, creating the Department of the Federal District.

Twelve years later the city had 1,500,000 inhabitants, distributed in four main *delegaciones* (administrative regions) — Cuauhtémoc, Venustiano Carranza, Benito Juárez and Miguel Hidalgo— occupying approximately 50 square miles, with an average population density of 129 people per hectare.[2] By 1948 1,595,000 people lived in the Federal District, whose urban area covered almost 72 square miles. In 1950 the number had grown to 3,283,000, of whom 93 percent were part of the Federal District and 7 percent part of the adjoining municipalities in the state of Mexico —Naucalpan and Tlalnepantla. The urban population in 1960 occupied nearly 250 square miles and about 410 square miles in 1970, with a density of 135 people per hectare. This rose to 167 per hectare when the population of the Mexico City metropolitan zone reached 7,500,000 inhabitants. The metropolitan transport system —the "metro"— was established around this time.

Although it was prohibited, people settled to the east, in the flood zone of the former Lake Texcoco. Between 1974 and 1976 these settlements were regulated, and in 1980 they became Ciudad Nezahualcóyotl. Mexico City's population grew from 14,455,000 in 1980 to 19,000,000 in 1988.

The National Population Institute estimates that programs designed to slow the growth rate may lower the rate from the 1.87 percent reached during the 1990s to 1.67 percent by the year 2000. It is estimated that the metropolitan area's population will reach 25 million by the year 2000, and 30 million by the year 2010.

In 1980, the agency which carries out the "census" of Mexico City's historical legacy promulgated a decree outlining an area with two subdivisions: perimeter "A," the Historic Center, which covers the zone occupied by the pre-Hispanic city and the areas it occupied through its expansion during the Colonial era, up to the War of Independence; and perimeter "B," which covers the areas into which the city expanded, up to the end of the 19th century.

Today the population of the Mexican Republic is almost 93 million. The Federal District is home to 11.56 percent of that total, while the state of Mexico has 15.54 percent. If we add together the figures for these areas —many of which are adjoining and overlapping— we observe that one fourth of the country's population is concentrated in the metropolitan area of Mexico City and a number of municipalities in the state of Mexico.

The growth rate of the Federal District is the country's lowest, at 0.19 percent, while states like Quintana Roo and Baja California have rates of 6.26 percent and 3.99 percent respectively. Thus, action must be taken to bring about immediate decentralization, with the aim of correcting Mexico's unequal population distribution. It is only through such measures that we can minimize disorderly growth, which, judging by the dimensions of the problem, has reached uncontrollable levels in the large cities, inevitably bringing social and economic damage, as well as risk that we may lose such national treasures as our unparalleled Historic Center, the "City of Palaces." VM

[2] A hectare is approximately equal to 2.5 acres. (Editor's note.)

Morelia

Rosalía Santín*

The city of Morelia, capital of the state of Michoacán, was founded in the valley of Guayangareo in 1541. At that time the city was called Nueva Ciudad de Mechoacán, and was founded in line with orders issued by Viceroy Antonio de Mendoza and carried out by Juan de Alvarado, Juan de Villaseñor and Luis de León. The first designs for the city are credited to the architect Juan Ponce. In 1545 the city's name was changed to Valladolid; it was changed to Morelia on August 23, 1828 in remembrance of General José María Morelos y Pavón.

The Colonial period brought a great economic, social and artistic growth to Valladolid. The public and religious buildings constructed then bear witness to this era's vitality. As with the whole state of Michoacán, the city benefitted from the labor of an educated clergy. The state-wide foundation of towns organized around convents, the development of irrigation and other improvements in agriculture and urban life testify to the work of Franciscans, Augustines and Jesuits.

The Napoleonic invasion of Spain and the abduction of the king gave rise to doubts about the legitimacy of the Spanish government and the hegemony of

Pastor Ojeda.

Church of San Agustín.

* Historian.

the Spaniards in New Spain. The first conspiracies took place in Valladolid, which —under the protection of Querétaro's Chief Magistrate Domínguez— provided the basis for Miguel Hidalgo's insurgency of September 15, 1810.

As the insurgents traveled through Michoacán they were joined by numerous volunteers, prominent among them the priest José María Morelos, Hidalgo's disciple from the College of San Nicolás, where he had been the rector. As is well known, Morelos successfully organized the war; distinguished by military and political genius, this fighter for independence wrote, in his *Sentimientos de la nación* (Sentiments of the Nation), a proclamation of what the foundation of the new country should be.

Agustín de Iturbide, also from Michoacán, achieved an accord between the insurgents Bravo and Guerrero and the most sensible royalists, under the *Plan de Iguala*, which led their army to victory and the proclamation of Mexican independence in 1821.

During Mexico's Independence epoch, the struggle between Liberals and Conservatives was of great importance. Prominent thinkers engaged in ideological polemics, among them Melchor Ocampo, governor of Michoacán, one of the authors of the Constitution of 1857. He also followed Benito Juárez in the Liberal government's peregrinations and was one of the most important ideologues of the Reform Laws.

Other important Michoacán natives, such as Salvador Escalante and the generals Francisco Mújica and Lázaro Cárdenas, participated in the Revolution initiated by Francisco I. Madero in 1910. Cárdenas became President of the Republic, as did Pascual Ortiz Rubio, also from Michoacán. General Cárdenas, who carried out the oil expropriation of 1938, is remembered as an exceptional statesman.

Places of interest

While the entire state of Michoacán has a rich historical and cultural past, the capital is without a doubt the most representative of the state's Colonial splendor. Many of the magnificent public and religious buildings from that era have been preserved, providing the key landmarks of the city. The following monuments of Morelia's artistic and cultural heritage are worth visiting.

The *Cathedral* (17th-18th century). The greatest expression of Michoacán Baroque: sober Baroque. As Elisa Vargas points out in her work *Las portadas religiosas de México* (Mexico's Religious Facades), the construction project was the creation of the Italian architect Vicenzo Barocio de la Escayola, who began work in 1660 and directed the project until 1690. In 1707 he was replaced by Juan Silva. The Cathedral's dome, built in 1715, is the work of Juan Antonio de la Cruz. The facades were finished at the same time as the towers, in 1744, according to the date inscribed on the main facade, composed of three doorways and built by an architect from Puebla, José de Medina. The facades as well as the church transepts have stone pilasters. Important bas-relief work can be seen in the second and third sections. Only the final cornices provide a small echo of the 18th-century buildings of New Spain's capital (Mexico City). The magnificent towers, with octagonal first and second floors, are composed along the same flat and geometric lines which characterize Morelia Baroque.

Inside, the altars in front of the aisle are attributed to the architect Zápari. The choir stalls, composed of 73 carved chairs, were completed in 1706. The main altar was made in 1707 and consisted of three parts with 24 spiral columns and 12 statues. The pulpit is another beautiful and valuable piece.

Isabel Montejano.

Handicraft and candy market.

Francisco de la Cruz was the silversmith who crafted the presbytery lamp and the chorus presbytery corridor, also made of silver. Today only the silver monstrance remains (it can be found in the main altar), sculpted and covered in relief, in the style of the majestic monstrances of the Spanish Renaissance.

San Francisco Convent (16th century). Located to the east of the Cathedral, this is a Renaissance-style Franciscan convent, founded after 1531 and finished in 1610. It has a beautiful cloister and, due to architectural similarities, is attributed to the unknown creator of the church facade in Tzintzuntzan, Michoacán. Today the convent houses the Casa de las Artesanías de Morelia (Morelia Crafts House).

San Agustín Convent (16th century). This is the second Renaissance-style convent built between 1550 and 1620. It is more sober and classical than the previously mentioned convent, and has a courtyard surrounded by doorways, where today you can eat delicious, traditional Morelia-style enchiladas. This convent is located behind the Cathedral.

Del Carmen Convent (17th century). After the 16th-century monasteries we find the year 1619 inscribed on the first Baroque facade of this enormous convent of the barefoot Carmelite nuns. Created by Friar Andrés de San Miguel, the architect Francisco de Chavira also lent his hand to the work. The convent includes mystical cells, an interesting crypt and a large central patio with a fountain that supplies water to the two wings of the beautiful enclosure. During the 17th and 18th centuries the Convent of Carmen was the seat of the College of Moral Theology; during the War of Independence it served as a prison for the Valladolid conspirators. In 1839 the interior was remodeled, replacing the Baroque altarpiece with a Neoclassical one. The government appropriated the convent in 1833 and it became the quarters of the first State Cavalry Corps. During the years of the Reform the orchards were divided and sold. During the post-Revolution period the convent was the site of the Seminary up until 1956. Between 1974 and 1978, the building was restored in order to house the Casa de la Cultura, home of the Michoacán Cultural Institute. The convent church is the Minor Seminary of Morelia's Archdiocese.

Pastor Ojeda.

Morelos Museum.

Las Monjas (18th century). Another of the city's architectural jewels, this church dates from 1778. It is a typical religious temple, with matching facades and a lovely tower. Las Monjas is located on Madero Avenue, the historic center's main street, which runs east to west.

Las Rosas Convent (18th century). Located across the street from the State Museum, in front of a small, traditional plaza. A splendid convent whose facade was finished in 1757 and whose elements were greatly influenced by the Cathedral. The entablature provides ample space for reliefs of saints, and between the border and the pilasters we find phytomorphic caryatids, religious medallions and reliefs.

The convent church preserves a beautiful choir with iron grillwork and one of the few churrigueresque altarpieces left in Morelia. Today Las Rosas houses the city Conservatory.

La Merced (18th century). Another churrigueresque facade belongs to this church, with enormous stipites and a classical entryway.

San José (18th century). This church is one of Morelia's great works. A monument of considerable height, with bell-shaped towers like those of Mexico City's Cathedral, it adds splendor to the enchanting natural sunken park nearby.

San Diego (18th century). Located at the end of the lovely street of Fray Andrés de San Miguel, which evokes a Colonial street with a number of sober homes, stands the temple of San Diego. Today the Sanctuary of Guadalupe, it was built

Plaza de Armas (central square).



Pastor Ojeda.

Pastor Ojeda.

Fountain at the Church of San Agustín.

Pastor Ojeda.

Morelia Cathedral.

in 1716. The naves are profusely decorated with glazed tiles with designs of flowers, scrolls, fleurons and pineapples. The composition of the facade is traditional with the classical door and semi-circular window, accompanied by pilasters on both sides.

La Casa de las Artesanías. After visiting the main churches in Morelia, it is worth spending some time in the Casa de las Artesanías, which is found in the Convent of San Francisco. Each community in Michoacán is known for its own type of handicraft, with time and authentic creative expression shaping each of the crafts we find displayed here. For example:

Pottery from Capula, Tzintzuntzan, Cocucho, Santa Fe de la Laguna, San José de Gracia, Patamban and Tlalpujahua.

Woodwork from Paracho, Ahuirán, Sevina, Zacán, Uruapan, Cuanajo, Erongarícuaro and Tocuaro. They also make stringed musical instruments: guitars, violins, violas, cellos, double basses and *guitarrones*. The selection of wood is very important to achieve the proper color, texture and form.

Lacquered handcrafts from Pátzcuaro and Uruapan.

Metalwork from San Felipe de los Herreros, Pátzcuaro and other places.

Textiles from Jarácuaro, Zacán, San Lucas Pío and hats from Sahuayo.

Stonework from Tlalpujahua, Patambicho, Tzurumutaro and Morelia.

Fiestas and fairs. In Michoacán there are religious festivals, competitions, exhibits, fairs and markets every month of the year. In the towns there are candles, archways aromatic with *guinomo* and *cempasúchil* flower festoons, and the taste of *nurte* tea and *charanda* liquor. The murmur of prayers and the yells of people celebrating echo against altars, where the magic of devotion is a daily act in the towns of San Nuevo Parangaricutero, Cherán, Ihuatzio, Zitácuaro, Zacán, Angahua, Pechátaro, Opopeo, Quiroga and Jarácuaro.

The *Government Palace.* Previously the Tridentine Seminary, this building faces the Alameda. Solid and architecturally beautiful, it features great arcaded patios and curious, Oriental-style crests on the corners of the main facade. The palace houses murals by the great Pátzcuaro painter Alfredo Zalce. One of them, in the staircase, is titled *Independence, Reform and Revolution* (1956). Other murals show different events of historical importance, as well as features of the state of Michoacán. The final one depicts the peasantry's struggle against bureaucracy.

The *State Museum*. Housed in a beautiful Colonial building with a central patio and two wings, it includes exhibition halls displaying handwritten testimonials, pre-Hispanic and Colonial objects from the state's various cultures, as well as objects bearing witness to Michoacán's development in the 19th and 20th centuries. An interesting 19th-century pharmacy is located at the museum's entrance; the furnishings and pharmaceutical equipment are worth seeing.

Museum of Contemporary Art. Recently named the "Alfredo Zalce" museum in homage to the distinguished painter from Michoacán, the museum is situated near the city's aqueduct. There are exhibits of painting, sculpture and other domestic and foreign artistic works. The museum has fostered an important artistic movement and is located in a late 19th-century house, built in the center of a lush park known as El Bosque.

San Nicolás College. The seat of the Universidad Michoacana de San Nicolás de Hidalgo and today a preparatory school, this building is only a few blocks from the State Museum. At this time the university is housed in one modern building, with facade archways that evoke the Colonial architecture of Morelia.

The House Where Morelos Was Born. Morelia is a city with a large student population; thus, this house located on Alzate Street in the historic center has been made into an important library. Inside we find reference books for students and significant archives well-catalogued by the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH). The property, as part of Mexico's historic legacy, has been excellently restored.

Walking through the city, it is a pleasure to admire the beautiful and stately Colonial homes in the historic center, with their large windows, balconies and doorways that are sometimes open, allowing us to enjoy the interior gardens or flower-filled patios.

Traveling outside Morelia we come to lovely areas such as Pátzcuaro, the beautiful magical-mystical city of Spanish design, with its enormous plaza, perhaps one of the most attractive in Mexico: La Plaza de Tata Vasco. On the banks of Lake Pátzcuaro we encounter other charming towns, rich in history and in the handicrafts mentioned above: Tzintzuntzan, Santa Fe de la Laguna (where Vasco de Quiroga founded the first "huatapera" or health center), Ihuatzio, Tzurumutaro, Jarácuaro, Erongarícuaro, San Andrés and San Jerónimo Purenchécuaro, among others.

Beyond Pátzcuaro, on the road to Uruapan, there is a luminous but little-known lake, the Lago de Zirahuen, a miracle of nature offered us by Michoacán.

CANADÁ EN TRANSICIÓN
Teresa Gutiérrez H. Mónica Verea C.
(Coordinadoras)

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

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La administración Bush
Mónica Verea Campos, Paz Consuelo Márquez Padilla (coords.), Serie: Estudios, 1991, 210 pp.
Fifteen Mexican and U.S. specialists examine the main events of the first year of the Bush administration. This includes studies on minorities, arms control, the war on drugs, the economic crisis, foreign policy, and the North American Free Trade Agreement.



La política exterior norteamericana hacia Centroamérica: reflexiones y perspectivas
Mónica Verea Campos y José Luis Barros Horcasitas, FLACSO, CISEUA-UNAM, Editorial Miguel Angel Porrúa, Serie: Las Ciencias Sociales, 1991, 442 pp.
This book contains various articles written by North American and Central American specialists regarding the role of the United States in Central America's recent history.



¿Se desindustrializa Estados Unidos?
Rosa Cusminsky Mogilner, Serie: Cuadernos de Trabajo, 1993, 139 pp.
Fears relating to the industrial decline of the United States are associated with questions about the ability of the U.S. to maintain its position of influence and world leadership.
This book summarizes current debates on whether U.S. industry has ceased to be competitive.





Mito y realidad de la declinación de los Estados Unidos
Rosa Cusminsky Mogilner (ed.), Serie: Estudios, 1992, 180 pp.
This book contains the contributions of lecturers from various countries who participated in the seminar "The Myth and Reality of the Decline of the United States of America," on the present academic debate about the crisis of the United States' hegemony.



La Cuenca del Pacífico, Estados Unidos y la nueva hegemonía mundial
Ma. Antonieta Benejam, Serie: Cuadernos de Apoyo a la Docencia, 1991, 106 pp.
A book on the leading role played by the United States in the geopolitical processes of the Pacific Rim countries, a region of decisive importance to the future World Order.



Arte chicano como cultura de protesta
Sylvia Gorodezky, 1993, 169 pp.
An incisive analysis of how Chicanos give artistic expression to the effects of the social and political oppression they experience within "mainstream" society. Includes photographs of key murals, sculptures and other works of art.

México-Estados Unidos. Energía y medio ambiente
Rosío Vargas and Mariano Bauer (eds.), 1993, 259 pp.
An overview of Mexican and American environmental legislation as well as its social, political and economic implications in the context of NAFTA. Also analyzes the relation between energy policy and environment in both countries.

El Tratado de Libre Comercio. Entre el viejo y el nuevo orden
Mónica C. Gambrill y Bárbara Driscoll de Alvarado (eds.), 1992, 283 pp.
This book analyzes the likely impact of NAFTA on: the energy industry, agriculture, geographical regions, in-bond industry; labor rights, immigration to the U.S., social classes, democracy, diplomatic relations, telecommunications and higher education. NAFTA is considered in light of other trade agreements, U.S. economic requirements and political processes.

México y la protección de sus nacionales en Estados Unidos
Remedios Gómez Arnau, 1990, 245 pp.
A chronicle of the Mexican goverment's efforts to protect the rights of Mexican migrant workers in the United States. An impressive study that sheds new light on the issue. Recommended for experts and non-experts in U.S.-Mexican relations and human rights.









Sectoral labor effects of North American Free Trade/TLC: Los impactos laborales en sectores clave de las economías
Rafael Fernández de Castro, Mónica Verea Campos and Sydney Weintraub (eds.), 1993, 368 pp.
This book examines possible effects on the labor force of the countries involved in NAFTA, particularly in such industrial sectors as autos and textile as well as in agriculture and the *maquiladoras*. Some of NAFTA's legal implications are also reviewed.

Elecciones en Canadá
Julián Castro Rea (coord.), 1995, 152 pp.
On November 4, 1993, Liberal Party leader Jean Chrétien took office as Canada´s twentieth prime minister. CISAN asked seven academic and journalistic specialists from Canada's key provinces of British Columbia, Ontario and Quebec to analyze the changes expected from the new Liberal government. This publication is one of the few works in Spanish on Canadian politics and repercussions for Mexico.

Un estudio comparativo sobre el desarrollo de México y Canadá después de la segunda guerra mundial (1945-1994)
Thomas Legler, 1995, 80 pp. (42 pages in spanish and 38 in english).
Comparison of the evolution of Mexico and Canada postwar economic and political models in the international capitalist context.

The Panteón Francés: a walk through Mexico's history

*Lynn Wehnes**

One of the best places to stroll through Mexican history is also one of the least visited: the Panteón Francés. This Mexico City cemetery serves as a guide to much of the city's tightly interwoven high society, particularly from the Porfiriato (the dictatorship of President Porfirio Díaz, 1876-1911). To those whose interests lie in funerary architecture, the Panteón also offers an impressive collection of elaborate crypts designed to flaunt the wealth of their inhabitants. Yet every grave, simple or ornate, hides a vast array of stories that reveal much about the country and its people.

In the main avenue near the cemetery's entrance, for example, the remains of the Braniff family are housed. Tomás Braniff (1850-1905), born in New York City, started his career as a bricklayer but ended it as a millionaire. He worked as an engineer on the Mexican railroad and managed the Mexican Gas and Electric Light Company, controlled by the English company that then ran the railroad.

In 1882, as a representative of the Brush Electric Company, he asked the government's permission to produce and distribute electric light, and in

* Historian.

Crypts along main path in the Panteón.

August of 1883 he installed 20 lights on the city's main streets (although residents were alarmed by the possible danger posed by poles and wires). He founded the wool factory of San Ildefonso and was a contributor of capital to and principal stockholder in a number of significant enterprises, including the Banco de Londres y México, S.A., which he also served as president of its Consejo.

The family lived in a "sumptuous residence" on the Paseo de la Reforma, according to one Mexico City memorist, with a living room upholstered in yellow silk. Although he was proud of his bricklaying beginnings, his wife didn't like him to mention them according to this source.

Tomás' son Arturo (1879-1970) dedicated himself to financial and commercial enterprises and was one of the first to build *fraccionamientos urbanos* (urban residential developments) in Mexico City. Alberto Braniff (1884-1966) was a precursor of Mexican aviation. He attended neither primary or secondary school because his parents knew he would inherit a large fortune. However, his parents hired the best professors available to give him private lessons in business and banking. He learned to be a pilot in 1909 in France, where he acquired a Voisin airplane which he brought to Mexico. On January 8, 1910, he was able to get the plane off the ground on the planes of Balbuena, on property owned by the Braniffs. He thus was the first native speaker of Spanish in the world to conduct a flight.

Landa y Escandón family crypt.

When the Carrancistas took over during the Mexican revolution, they seized the houses of the rich as booty, and split them among themselves. Tomás Braniff's house was taken over by General Buelna, and the house of Alberto Braniff was taken over by General Alvaro Obregón.

Another crypt is devoted to the Limantours, although its most famous member, José Yves, was buried in France. José Yves, finance minister during the Porfiriato, was largely responsible for the country's spectacular economic development during that period. He was also responsible for a large number of improvements in Chapultepec Park and commissioned Guillermo Kahlo (father of the artist Frida) to photograph buildings constructed during the Porfiriato.

Limantour lived in a house that faced the center of Mixcoac, where the Díaz family had a vacation home. The streetcar was then the most convenient way to travel into Mexico City, and, according to Carlos Tello in his book *El exilio: Retrato de una familia*, "On it the Díaz family often ran into José Limantour, the finance wizard, who greeted them from his seat without ever losing his composure." Limantour was also building a mansion on the Paseo de la Reforma but was never able to enjoy it thanks to the Mexican revolution.

Limantour argued vigorously for Díaz's resignation, believing only that could prevent the country from exploding. When Francisco Madero became president of Mexico, Limantour briefly considered continuing on as finance minister but then left for France, to which Díaz had already fled.

In exile, Limantour lived in one of Paris' most elegant areas and spent his days driving his car around the Saint-Cloud forest and playing the piano. He kept up with developments in Mexico through the most recently published books on the revolution, sent to him from Mexico. He eventually lost his ability to move his muscles and to function due to arteriosclerosis. "It broke one's heart to see a man so intelligent in that state," Tello quotes Limantour's granddaughter, Sonia, as remembering. He died in 1935, the last surviving member of Díaz's cabinet.

The Escandón family also played important roles in pre-revolutionary Mexico. As John Womack explained in *Zapata and the Mexican Revolution*, "Escandón had graced Maximilian's Imperial court, helped finance the Veracruz-Mexico City railroad, made haciendas famous, and recently, an Escandón having been appointed the

Federal District governor, taken over metropolitan society.

"Among Mexico's fanciest showplaces, veritable luxury-rate tourist attractions, they had shown off for so long that by 1900 they had almost lost their capacity for anything else. In the early years of the new century the name Escandón still appeared prominently in the newspapers —but in the society columns. Of this mighty, dying tree, Pablo was the last frail twig."

Pablo was a member of Díaz's staff until appointed governor of Morelos prior to the Mexican revolution. Other Escandóns of note included Manuel, one of the richest men in Mexico at the beginning of the Porfiriato; the successful Mexican capitalist Antonio, who donated to the city the monument of Christopher Columbus that was built in 1877; and Guillermo de Landa y Escandón, who was governor of the Federal District during the Porfiriato.

It was Guillermo Landa y Escandón who introduced Porfirio Díaz to high society, and because of that Díaz had a special appreciation for him. Landa y Escandón made a great deal of money through the *Dos Estrellas* mine. His daughter Sofía married Guillermo Limantour, son of finance minister José Yves.

The Quintanilla family has a grave on the cemetery's Sixth Avenue. The family members buried here reflected much of the Porfirian spirit. Ana María del Valle Lerdo de Tejada de Quintanilla was born the year Díaz took power by overthrowing her uncle, President Sebastián Lerdo de Tejada. A descendant of the grand Chamberlain of the Court of Emperor Maximilian and one of Empress Carlota's ladies-in-waiting, she embodied the merging of one of Mexico's great conservative with one of its great liberal families.

Ana María was born in France, the country which served as a model for so

Braniff and other family crypts along main path.

much of Mexican high society, and was the daughter of Count Pierre del Val (the family had changed its name after moving to France following Maximilian's demise). She spent most of her life there until curiosity caused her to journey to Mexico to visit her mother's family. At the opera, she met her future husband, Luis Quintanilla y Fortuno, a descendant of an aristocratic family with the oldest lineage in Mexico, the Rincón Gallardos, whose crypt is on the Panteón's Avenida Central.

Much of their married life was spent living in Paris, where Luis served as a diplomat in the Mexican embassy, and traveling throughout Europe. Their patronage of the arts included financial support of and close relationships with the poets Amado Nervo and Rubén Darío. When the Quintanillas returned to Mexico after the revolution, their home in Coyoacán served as a meeting place for many of Mexico's most prominent artists and intellectuals, including Dr. Atl (Gerardo Murillo), Diego Rivera and David Alfaro Siqueiros. Also buried in this grave is the couple's son José Quintanilla del Valle, who visited his parents in Coyoacán with his lover, the photographer Tina Modotti.

A new strategy against drug trafficking

*María Celia Toro**

It has been argued that, relative to other source-country control efforts, Mexico's antidrug program has more funding, a more substantial commitment by the country itself, and more clearly defined goals; according to this view, "Mexico may even represent an 'end case' in terms of the drug control efforts the United States can expect from the government of a major producing country."[1] Although this overall assessment of Mexican antidrug programs may lead to a more positive U.S. evaluation of Mexican policy, or to the abandonment of aggressive diplomatic rhetoric, both of which would be welcome and positive outcomes, it does not identify the most important challenges related to drug trafficking that Mexico has to confront. Thinking about the drug problem in terms of what Mexico can do to stop drug smuggling into the United States and what the U.S. can expect from a major drug-producing and -exporting country obscures Mexico's most important drug-policy objectives and rationale.

Two essential goals have remained constant over time: authority over drug traffickers and autonomy from U.S. enforcement programs. The Mexican government's decision to prohibit international trade in drugs at the beginning of this century was an attempt to impose a minimum of order along what had become a perilous border and to keep U.S. agents from crossing into Mexican territory in search of opium and heroin smugglers. As the black market for drugs grew, largely in response to the increase in prices that derived from prohibition, antidrug policies in Mexico were bound to focus on drug producers as well.

A drastic change in U.S. policy in the 1980s, consisting of an intensive border interdiction program and a more permissive policy regarding the extraterritorial assertion of U.S. narcotics laws, ended up working against Mexico's main policy goals. More stringent anti-narcotics programs in the United States did not halt the tide of drug trafficking and drove U.S. import prices to historically unparalleled levels. Although the new approach also elevated the risks associated with

In Mexico, keeping drug traffickers and foreign police at bay will remain priorities.

[1] Reuter and Ronfeldt, "Quest for Integrity," vi.

* Conclusion to her book *Mexico's "War" on Drugs: Causes and Consequences*, Boulder, Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995.

smuggling drugs into the United States —being apprehended and having merchandise and vehicles confiscated— drug traffickers were not discouraged. They found ways of coping with those risks by incorporating them as an additional cost; thus, they benefitted from the higher prices that U.S. importers were still willing to pay.

Despite refurbished and better-funded programs, the Mexican government could not counter the new financial incentives to smuggle drugs into the United States. Eradication and interdiction figures, as well as the notable increase in cases of drug-related corruption, human rights violations and violence in Mexico over the last decade, all suggest that the domestic costs of enforcing antidrug laws have mounted while the very hand of drug traffickers has been strengthened.

Drug trafficking and policies to stop it have affected, in particular, the Mexican criminal justice system. Courts and jails are full of drug cases, limiting the system in terms of what can be accomplished in other areas of domestic law. Police units have had to be disbanded periodically because of their collusion with drug traffickers, which has led to a heightened awareness of both the need to have a professional police force and the difficulties of actually creating one. Although so far the Mexican government has prevented traffickers from openly challenging the authority of the state, it has been able to reduce neither the collusion of authorities in drug traffic nor the violence among and by traffickers and enforcement agencies. How much longer the Mexican state, with its weak criminal justice institutions, can continue to fight an ever stronger criminal element such as the drug traffickers remains a matter of speculation.

Largely independent of what the Mexican government was doing or could do to reduce the amount of drugs exported to the United States, over the last decade the U.S. government maintained a position of circumventing international norms and bilateral agreements, if necessary, to achieve its own policy and enforcement goals. Thus, the other paramount objective of Mexican policy —bringing U.S. authorities to recognize Mexico's exclusive jurisdiction over law enforcement in its territory— has not been fully achieved either. Although nothing resembling Operation Blastfurnace in Bolivia has occurred,[2] DEA agents have been playing a significant role in the Mexican drug scene since the mid-1980s and have been willing to act as an unauthorized police force in Mexico.

These political challenges, domestic and international, that drug trafficking and its containment have come to represent for the Mexican state explain why the criminal justice system has been concentrating the bulk of its resources and attention on enforcing antidrug laws, even though domestic drug use is relatively low in Mexico and the drug industry's impact on the economy is not consequential at the national level. However, by and large, these laws have been (and if this analysis is correct, will remain) impossible to enforce. The costs of simply trying to redress dangerous developments in the drug market (e.g., changes in smuggling routes negatively affecting Mexico) or to avoid unacceptable scenarios (e.g., traffickers operating with greater impunity and immobilizing law enforcement, the creation of ties between traffickers and other kind of outlaws, the escalation of violence and corruption, traffickers usurping the state's power and imposing their own version of law and order, and the loss of sovereignty in the implementation of justice) have increased exponentially over time. In sum, current policies need to be altered because their implementation is exacerbating the problems that justified fighting drug production and trafficking in the first place.

The realities of the "war on drugs" have dragged the Mexican government into a spiral of increasingly punitive programs that have rendered the manufacture and smuggling of narcotics more (rather than less) appealing and the organization of this

"Few reasons to believe that following the same basic path will contribute to the solution of Mexico's most pressing drug problems. Thus, a critical examination of long-held beliefs and policies is in order"

[2] Admittedly at the request of the Bolivian government, in 1986 the United States sent 170 soldiers and an unknown number of DEA agents to destroy coca crops and cocaine laboratories in Bolivia. The joint operation lasted for more than 1,890 days. Malcolm Anderson, *Policing the World: Interpol and the Politics of International Police Co-operation*, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1989, p. 122.

CUADERNOS AMERICANOS
NUEVA ÉPOCA
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En este número ofrecemos a nuestros lectores artículos que tratan sobre varias figuras cimeras de la intelectualidad en América Latina: *José Martí, José Vasconcelos* y *José Carlos Mariátegui.*
Se conmemora el centenario de la muerte de *José Martí (1895-1953)* con la sección *Martí en América*, en la que aparecen artículos de *Leopoldo Zea, Ismael González, Guillermo Castro Herrera, José Antonio Matesanz, Alfonso Herrera Franyutti, Luis Ángel Argüelles Espinosa, Ibrahim Hidalgo Paz, Liliana Giorgis, Adalberto Santana y Pedro Pablo Rodríguez.*
Sobre Mariátegui y Vasconcelos publicamos los textos de *Claude Fell, Gregorio Weinberg* y *Núria Vilanova.*



illegal market a threat to civilized and effective governance. There are few reasons to believe that following the same basic path will contribute to the solution of Mexico's most pressing drug problems. Thus, a critical examination of long-held beliefs and policies is in order.

Any alternative to the current policy of over-criminalization of the drug market will have to be evaluated in terms of its capacity to advance the different goals of antidrug policies, which are neither the same nor similarly ranked in all countries. In the case of Mexico, keeping drug traffickers and foreign police at bay will remain priorities. Preserving the integrity of enforcement agencies and blocking their involvement in the traffic, as well as limiting the use of violence, should also be placed high among Mexican drug-policy objectives. None of these goals, however, is necessarily advanced by launching "all-out wars" against drug traffickers; in fact, as the experience of the 1980s showed, the goals may even be undermined.

Furthermore, any change in Mexican policy must take into account the dynamics of the international narcotics market; because the price of drugs in the U.S. market is such an important variable, and one over which the Mexican government has no influence, Mexico cannot unilaterally disentangle itself from the international drug trade. Simply put, Mexico is bound to work within the limits imposed to so-called price-takers in world markets.

Given these objectives and restrictions, Mexican policy-makers could start thinking about a change in strategy that can advance Mexican interests without further weakening Mexican institutions. An overall reduction in enforcement levels may be a good starting point. Still, for all the limitations and unintended consequences of the current regulatory framework, radical departures should perhaps be strongly discouraged. In most countries, instability in the organization of the illegal drug market, so far largely explained by major escalations in antidrug campaigns, has been associated with the unbounded use of violence rather than with the elimination of drug trafficking. A sudden change in policy, albeit in the opposite direction, could lead to a similar violence-promoting outcome.

In any event, the short-term effects of a drastic reduction in antidrug law enforcement are not easy to anticipate. But the Mexican government could try a gradual decrease and reorientation of its drug law enforcement budget; a change in strategy toward less, but also more focused, enforcement may prove beneficial in many ways. Reducing the number of police and soldiers involved in antidrug law enforcement, focusing instead on the use of small and better-trained anti-narcotics units, would positively affect the performance of enforcement agencies by reducing their exposure to bribery and limiting the chances of violent encounters. Eradication and interdiction programs would gradually be replaced by programs oriented to preventing the creation of groups of traffickers that impose their own version of law and order, especially in the countryside (as opposed to the currently indiscriminate spraying of plants); in addition, enforcement could be geared toward setting limits to traffickers' behavior vis à vis government and society (as opposed to incarcerating an ever-larger number of small-time drug dealers). Redirecting the antidrug law enforcement apparatus in this way could yield better results in terms in Mexico's main policy objectives without

necessarily augmenting drug production and contraband significantly.

Of course, within the prohibition framework, eliminating drug-related corruption and violence is not a realistic goal. The two are intimately tied to the workings of illegal markets and should thus be seen as inevitable consequences —the containment of which has become a political imperative in Mexico— of current policies rather than as a cause of their failure. Something similar could be said about whether it is realistic to reduce permanently the amount of marijuana, heroin and cocaine illegally exported into the United States, simply because the Mexican government cannot modify the relevant price for Mexican drug smugglers, namely the U.S. import price.

An important change in the new strategy would be to stop thinking about Mexican antidrug policy as an instrument of public health. Not only is the relationship between enforcement-dominant antidrug programs and drug use still a matter of debate, but in Mexico, diminishing the use of marijuana, cocaine and heroin has so far not been a priority and probably should not become one. Should the Mexican government be concerned with the public health consequences of drug abuse, concentrating on the consumption of legal drugs would be more appropriate, and looking for alternative ways of preventing a further increase in the use of illegal drugs would prove more visionary. As for affecting drug use in the United States, analysts agree that drug-producing and -exporting countries can do little to elevate the price of drugs for the final consumer in the United States —an important policy goal for the U.S. government to discourage drug consumption. It is thus not clear why antidrug programs in Mexico should be evaluated in terms of their impact on either drug use or drug prices, which until today have been the most widely accepted measures of success (or rather, of failure). Neither is it obvious why taking drugs out of the market should be considered, in and of itself, a Mexican policy objective.

Thinking about the likely U.S. reactions to any change in Mexican drug policy, I would guess that under the Clinton administration those reactions may be more supportive than in the past, even if starting to downsize the Mexican antidrug law enforcement apparatus led to a short-term growth in the narcotics contraband. First, most sovereignty or jurisdictional conflicts between the United States and Mexico have derived from legal and political changes in U.S. drug policy rather than being directly related to the amount of marijuana, heroin and cocaine entering the United States. Basically, there is little the Mexican government can do to prevent these kinds of conflicts except for formalizing bilateral cooperation and protesting whenever the DEA's activities do not seem to be furthering bilateral collaboration in any meaningful way. Second, the policy of diminishing drug use through antidrug law enforcement has come under increasing attack in the United States over the last years. Different ways of dealing with the drug-consumption problem have been advanced, all of them suggesting the need to reallocate resources away from antidrug law enforcement. Reuter identifies three stands in the U.S. drug debate:[3] the hawks favor tougher enforcement; the doves stress the negative effects of prohibition and favor legalization; and the owls favor a change in spending priorities and less aggressive enforcement. Owls, who also favor prevention and treatment, are likely to have a large say in the near future. By the same token, Mark Kleiman convincingly argues in favor of a new policy of "grudging toleration" to discourage drug abuse in the United States and at the same time avoid the excesses of the war on drugs.[4] A reorientation in U.S. policy that would concentrate on buyers and sellers in the retail market, as well as on educational and rehabilitation programs, as opposed to seizing drugs in transit to the United States and immobilizing traffickers wherever they may be, would significantly contribute to making the advanced proposal work. Certainly, such a move would aid Mexico in pursuing its own drug-policy goals of immobilizing traffickers and securing its territory against U.S. law enforcement incursions.

"Two essential goals have remained constant over time: authority over drug traffickers and autonomy from U.S. enforcement programs"

[3] Peter Reuter, "Hawks Ascendant: The Punitive Trend of American Drug Policy," *Daedalus*, Summer 1992.

[4] Kleiman advances this proposal to discourage drug abuse in the United States without forbidding all drug consumption, a proposal that would be highly beneficial for Mexico and other Latin American countries. See Kleiman, "Neither Prohibition Nor Legalization: Grudging Toleration in Drug Control Policy," *Daedalus*, Summer 1992.

International cooperation in the fight against drugs

*Rafael Estrada Sámano**

It is my pleasure to share with you some thoughts on this highly complex subject, which will doubtless be the biggest challenge societies will face during the end of this century, as well as the century to come.

Today, as never before in our country's recent history, there is an increasingly broad and intense effort to understand this phenomenon of drug trafficking, in all its scope, and to confront it with greater efficiency.

The drug trade issue now makes up part of daily political and academic discourse. The fact that it is a concern shared by important sectors of society may be observed in the mass media, institutional work programs and, of course, in the important albeit insufficient campaigns generated by society, primarily with the aim of preventing and treating drug consumption.

The President of the Republic has made the nation's concern his own, with regard to this issue, noting in a range of different forums that drug trafficking, and all forms of organized crime in general, represent the most serious threat to the physical and moral integrity of youth, society's health, public tranquility and order, the rule of law and national security.

* Assistant Attorney General.

Speech at the seventh panel discussion on "International Cooperation in the Fight Against Drug Trafficking and Money-Laundering," organized by the Chamber of Deputies' Justice Commission, August 28, 1995.

The drug trade presents Mexico with an enormous challenge, as it does to the world as a whole.

It is no secret that the effects of illicit activities involving drugs are convulsing not only Mexico but large regions of the world. Our times demand that we frankly recognize that our entire society is profoundly affected by the growth of criminal activities related to the drug trade. Above and beyond the responsibility I have been given, as a human being I share my grave concern with you.

It is intolerable that our country's children and youth should be exposed to the maelstrom of drug trafficking. We know well that the problem has to do with the capacity of this criminal business to generate huge and rapidly distributed profits; and much more seriously, the sale of drugs is threatening the health of those who represent Mexico's future.

Just as we must frankly and openly recognize the problem, it is crucial that we learn how better to confront it. Despite the bleak outlook, I am happy to share with you the following reflections, and to see the continual opening of forums for discussing this problem, because only by bringing together the creativity of the Mexican people we will be able to develop better ways of combating this problem.

What is drug trafficking? To answer this question we must begin by recognizing that it is a multi-dimensional problem. The illicit trade in drugs may be seen primarily as an economic phenomenon or as a health problem with important social consequences.

With regard to the human health perspective, we must recall that the use of substances that alter persons' normal physical and psychological state has occurred throughout the history of humanity. From primitive man down to our times, social groups have permitted or prohibited the consumption of toxic substances. In general terms we have gone from greater to lesser permissiveness. In this respect,

a predominant role has been played by the Western paradigm derived from the values of Western, Christian culture which uphold virtue over vice as well as the perfection of the individual and the community as opposed to their debasement. Thus, in any case, the problem is of a moral nature and its solution becomes extremely difficult since for man moral problems involve will rather than knowledge as such. Ovid expressed this best: *"Video meliora, proboque, sed deteriora sequor"* (I see what is best, and as such I approve of it, but I do what is worst).

The great majority of societies at the end of the 20th century consider drug addiction to be not only a health problem but one of morals and ethics as well. The juridical system of our times, based largely on the fundamental values of the society which created it, has determined —precisely due to those values, beliefs and principles— to prohibit some drugs and allow others.

Like all other societies, Mexican society has made its own norms; alcohol and tobacco are consumed in large quantities, as are some drugs produced in pharmaceutical laboratories, while at the same time, there is an unfortunate increase in such illicit drugs as marijuana, cocaine and heroin. While it is true that consumption levels in Mexico are still not high in comparison with those of some developed countries, it is evident that a priority of prevention strategy must be to prevent consumption from continuing to grow. We cannot get around the fact that the latest addiction surveys show an increase in the consumption of such destructive drugs as inhalants [e.g., glue and solvents].

It is very important to stress that the drug problem has causes, manifestations and consequences that go far beyond a merely juridical viewpoint. It is not enough to transform, update and modernize a juridical system; that is only part of a strategy for combating this problem. Defeating the drug trade requires not only better laws but greater institutional and social will, greater creativity in the fulfillment of public service and, most importantly, the courage and ethics needed to confront the problem.

We must call attention to the fact that in order to improve our government's and society's ability to provide an all-sided response to the drug phenomenon, we must open a deep-going discussion and reflection on the effects of thinking only about juridical-penal prohibition as the best normative option.

Prohibitionism, as the central postulate of many countries' juridical systems, has not had the desired results. Penally prohibiting drug consumption is also a complex problem; people have very diverse reasons for consuming drugs. Neither drug trafficking, in all its stages and manifestations, nor the ingestion of illicit or licit drugs are phenomena which can be answered in one way alone. Other countries have had experience with strategies combining prohibition with regulation involving a certain level of tolerance. I will simply note this, without going into this thorny problem.

It is also essential to talk about the economic aspect of drug trafficking. On August 14, during the opening session of this National Consultation on the Struggle Against Drug Trafficking, the nation's Attorney General noted that the drug trade generates a black market where hundreds of billions of dollars circulate, making it one of the world's five biggest industries.

Drug trafficking is the most important part of the criminal economy; its logic is based on the enormous profits arising from cultivation, harvesting, processing, transport and distribution in the consumer market.

Retail sale in consuming cities means a profit of more than 140 times what is initially invested in the first transaction. This economic chain generates criminal phenomena in the production, distribution and consumption processes.

It also causes associated economic phenomena which distort economies by introducing illicit money which must be invested, leading to the takeover of businesses by organized crime and the corruption of social sectors that want a share in the profits and are indifferent to the damage caused to health, institutions and society as a whole. Since we are dealing with an illicit market, statistics on the drug trade are difficult to define clearly; thus the quantities of drugs produced and the amounts of money involved are not precisely known.

At the international level, the drug trade's economic power provides us with the picture of a truly extraordinary business expansion. The process of economic globalization, which can without a doubt lead to more dynamic markets better able to satisfy the needs of human beings, is now, unfortunately, providing enormous advantages for the circulation of illicit drugs. The fall of boundaries and borders, while still relative, involves the relaxation of norms regulating the circulation of goods and services between nations. The great challenge is that one cannot and should not halt the natural evolution of international politics and economics, but at the same time there must be no lessening of strict control mechanisms making it possible to detect and stop the traffic in illicit drugs.

Internationally, we see a phenomenon regarding drug trafficking that can be illustrated by the case of cocaine. Criminal actions in the cocaine trade involve at least three South American and seven Central American countries, as well as Mexico and several Caribbean nations, and the final destination in the northern part of the Americas. An equally large number of countries are involved in trafficking cocaine to Europe, or heroin from Asia to Europe and North America.

Our country shares an almost 2,000-mile border with the world's largest goods market, a country which also has

one of the planet's highest indices of drug consumption. Thus it is no accident that Mexico is used for access to that market, as Spain is in the case of the European market. Among other elements, this involves cultural, ethnic and linguistic identity with the producer countries. One wishes that identity were used for other purposes of a higher nature. Bolívar's ideal of integrating the Latin American nations was certainly not conceived to serve such a degrading activity as the drug trade.

As can be appreciated, the capacities of the criminal organizations devoted to the drug trade go beyond any border and therefore threaten the order and security not of one nation alone, but of all the nations in which they carry out their activities. Above and beyond studies and discussions of which countries produce drugs, through which countries they are transported and where they are consumed, the nations affected by this problem must clearly understand that we share an equal responsibility to confront it decisively and effectively.

During the opening session of this conference, Attorney General Antonio Lozano Gracia illustrated this point as follows: "Let us put aside the geography of blame. Let us not waste time and energy trying to find out who is more and less guilty. On the contrary, let us continue to strengthen the mechanisms for international cooperation which today are beginning to bear better fruit." In the final analysis, the results of collaborative actions will be reflected both within each participating nation as well as abroad. It is then that we will be able to speak of genuine shared efforts and achievements.

We have repeatedly stressed that drug trafficking is a threat to national security, because it attacks the state's most important values, weakens institutions and damages the rule of law, and because the extraordinary resources which traffickers control undermine the authorities' ability to deal with the problem. But it is also indispensable that the procedures and mechanisms of international collaboration respect the sovereignty of nations.

In several different forums the nation's Attorney General has pointed out that only through the formulation of all-sided policies, strategies and actions, accepted at the international level, will greater efficiency and effectiveness be achieved in the struggle against drug trafficking.

Now I will speak about the Mexican government's anti-drug policy; the actions undertaken, their results, as well as bilateral and multilateral cooperation with other nations.

The Mexican government believes that the struggle against the drug trade represents the main challenge to national justice and security. Thus, Mexico's policy against illicit drugs is based on three fundamental premises:

1. The drug trade is a problem of national security, since it threatens institutions, leads to corruption and promotes other illicit activities such as arms-trafficking and money-laundering.
2. Drug trafficking is a public health problem.
3. International cooperation is indispensable.

While the drug trafficking problem does not originate within our country's territory, in light of the characteristics and international dimensions this criminal activity has acquired, and its penetration into various regions of Mexico, the government considers it to be a problem affecting the security of the nation and the health of its citizens. Thus, Mexico must fight this problem on the basis of an all-round policy which takes into account all the aspects of the issue —production, transport, sale, distribution and consumption— and includes the resources necessary for its implementation.

In this context, the Mexican government has defined a policy of "Mexicanization" of the struggle against drug trafficking. This policy states that, within the framework of national jurisdiction, only the Mexican authorities can take action against the drug trade, and it is therefore solely up to these authorities to define the principles and carry out the programs and actions this struggle requires.

The Mexican government will continue to fight drug trafficking within the framework established by the Constitution and applicable laws. In light of the political risks involved in accepting funds and equipment for the struggle against drugs which are offered or provided with considerable conditions and limitations, it will be necessary to channel additional resources of our own into this struggle.

With the aim of avoiding the political costs and risks implicit in the process of certification by the United States government, the Mexican government has stressed the need to find mechanisms for financial support and equipment transfer which do not involve that process, such as credits or the leasing or sale of equipment at government prices.

Moreover, the activities that foreign agents carry out within our country's territory occur within the framework of the international cooperation activities that Mexico engages in together with other countries. Mexico does not accept that any foreign agent may carry out activities within our territory that, by their nature, correspond solely to the domestic authorities. For this reason, foreign agents' activities are limited to exchanging information, training Mexican personnel, and coordinating simultaneous but never joint activities along the border, with the authorities of each country acting within their own territory.

In this framework, the Mexican government is determined to increase bilateral cooperation with the government of the United States through formulae which avoid the risks of certification and other measures that might undermine the policy of Mexicanization. Among other steps, Mexico will promote cooperation mechanisms that will complement the national effort in such areas as personnel training, the acquisition and purchase of equipment without political conditions or unacceptable supervision schemas, and the exchange of information.

In line with these definitions, Mexico's policy against the drug trade has the following objectives: a) dismantling international criminal organizations, by means of international cooperation; b) establishing strict controls for preventing illicit arms-trafficking; c) establishing effective mechanisms against money-laundering; and d) increasing levels of control and interception of drugs at the nation's borders, in its territorial waters and airspace.

President Zedillo's administration has carried out a series of actions aimed at dismantling organizations devoted to the drug trade, improving interception operations, fighting corruption, reducing illicit demand and promoting the rehabilitation of addicts, eradicating illicit crops, combating money-laundering, preventing and combating the diversion of chemicals used in drug-processing, strengthening bilateral accords and multilateral cooperation, through the Mexico-Guatemala-Belize triangular operation and operation "Short Term," carried out between Mexico and Central American nations within the framework of the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD).

The drug trade presents Mexico with an enormous challenge, as it does to the world as a whole. The first stage of the effort —the recognition of the seriousness of the problem, as well as open reflection on the ways in which we can better confront it— is under way. The drug trafficking problem is not a conjunctural one. It is a historical problem which manifests itself in new ways today and which, if not halted, will have unimaginable consequences in terms of social decomposition and the weakening of institutions.

Social inequality, the fact that millions upon millions of human beings do not have access to the minimum required for social well-being, provides a highly favorable environment for the expansion of criminal businesses with the ability to distribute easy money. We find ourselves in a time of historic definitions regarding this problem.

In some countries organized crime has set itself up as a power parallel to that of the state, influencing the political, economic and social order of entire nations. We still have time to gradually inhibit drug consumption and to fight organized crime head-on. The overwhelming majority of Mexican citizens share the conviction that the illegal activity of powerful groups will not overcome our will to be a peaceful society in which freedoms are exercised in an orderly way.

In addition to being an obligation, the fight against drug trafficking is a prerequisite for fulfilling the greatest commitment of our generation of Mexicans: fashioning a form of political organization which will lead to effective and general well-being for our people. VM

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

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

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Arguments
National Dialogue

The "miracle" of the East Asian "tigers": a development model for Mexico?

*Thomas Legler**

A number of experts have expressed the need for Latin American countries to emulate the experience of the East Asian "tigers" in order to overcome the sustained economic crises of the region. It is often contended that if countries like Mexico were able to construct a state more along the lines of South Korea or Taiwan, the future would look very different. The concrete implications of adopting such a model in the Mexican context are less frequently pondered.

Latin American policy makers have long been exposed to a popularized version of the East Asian development model. According to this version, at least five factors underpin the model.

First, a "capitalist developmental state" that successfully orchestrated development. Among its attributes were a well-educated, highly proficient economic bureaucracy that enjoyed considerable autonomy in decision-making from local business, labor, and foreign capital. Policy was exercised in a highly flexible fashion, with bureaucrats demonstrating remarkable entrepreneurship in fostering successful firms and industries. They were also highly skilled at controlling foreign investment, while at the same time extracting crucial foreign technology and skills from export-assembly plants controlled by multinational corporations.

Moreover, the capitalist developmental state was remarkably adept at channeling domestic energies into profitable growth-stimulating pursuits rather than stagnant rent-seeking activities. Finally, the state played the role of a catalyst, rather than assuming direct ownership of the means of production.

The capitalist developmental state contrasts dramatically with the type of state which arose in Mexico and other large Latin American economies. In the Latin American cases, *políticos*, far more than well-trained, highly skilled technocrats, dominated economy policy formulation for most of the post-war period.

In addition, Latin American policy-makers did not enjoy the same degree of insulation from political pressures as their Korean or Taiwanese counterparts. Consequently, many policy decisions were influenced more by immediate political exigencies than by the requirements for successful economic growth.

As for the nature of state intervention, while East Asian bureaucracies played a far more indicative role in economic affairs, Latin American states assumed direct ownership of many leading sectors of the economy. Consequently, whereas in Taiwan and South Korea domestic firms assumed the leading economic role, in Mexico, *paraestatales* and foreign multinational corporations were at the forefront of the country's industrial profile.

Second, both Taiwan and South Korea implemented comprehensive agrarian reforms in the 1950s and 1960s, respectively. Large estates were abolished in order to create a uniform class of small producers. In this fashion, not only was the reactionary class of rural elites eliminated, but the

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new system of small land plots quickly absorbed surplus labor and generated a relatively equitable distribution of productive assets and income.

In comparison, in the Mexican case, the Cárdenas land reform of the 1930s did not radically alter existing class relations in the countryside. Thus many large agricultural producers continued to wield substantial political and economic power, in spite of the distribution of substantial terrain by Cárdenas.

Third, the East Asian model is well known for the importance placed on investment in human capital. In Taiwan, for instance, "manpower development plans" were developed by the Ministry of Education, placing top priority on vocational education and thereby meeting the structural demands of the growing economy rather than social demand for higher education.

With regard to higher education, only top students gained entry to public universities. The vast majority of students would enter programs in engineering or the physical and natural sciences. Public servants are predominantly engineers by training. This contrasts starkly with Mexico, where most leading bureaucrats tend to have backgrounds in law, public administration or economics.

Fourth, Taiwan and South Korea benefitted from favorable international conditions, including substantial U.S. military and economic aid, demand for nascent industries created by the Vietnam war, preferential trading status with the United States, and location within a dynamic economic sub-region led by Japan. With regard to the latter, South Korea and Taiwan both enjoyed incorporation into a regionally-based product life cycle elaborated by Japan.

Fifth, whereas Mexico and other Latin American countries persevered with the model of import-substitution industrialization, Taiwan and South Korea began a strategy of export-oriented industrialization back in the late 1950s and early 1960s, respectively.

Export promotion, however, did not mean free trade or economic liberalization. Substantial subsidies were awarded by the state to successful exporters, and fledgling industries and the agricultural sector were given considerable protection from foreign competition.

What distinguishes the East Asian cases most from their Latin American counterparts are the rigorous performance criteria exercised in allotting subsidies to export firms and the high degree of selectivity that has characterized protectionism.

There is a "dark side" to the East Asian development model which all too frequently is ignored or dismissed. East Asian dynamism is as much a product of these countries' social and political foundations as it is of sound economic policies.

A number of very negative factors characterized Korean and Taiwanese growth: an alliance between state and business elites; the political exclusion of labor and the peasantry; the long-term denial of basic civil and political rights; an extremely restrictive labor code coupled with severe labor repression; the militarization of society; the super-exploitation of female workers; environmental degradation; and the destruction and abuse of traditional cultural values in pursuit of narrow materialism and chauvinistic nationalism.

For would-be Latin American imitators, the underside of the popularized version of East Asian economic success is equally important to take into consideration.

A highly paternalistic development policy was oriented almost exclusively towards the needs of the domestic industrial elite. Popular sentiments were almost completely ignored and excluded from consideration by a very narrowly-constituted decision-making elite.

One of the most important causes of Korean and Taiwanese economic growth was cheap labor —which was kept cheap by the state. As late as 1980, manufacturing wages in the East Asian countries were considerably lower than in their Latin American counterparts. To the extent that unions existed —such as those affiliated to the Federation of Korean Trade Unions or the Taiwanese Chinese Federation of Labor— they usually served as agents of management and the government.

Recently, both South Korea and Taiwan underwent relatively successful transitions to political democracy, with both countries celebrating national elections in 1992. This fact is often used to further champion the East Asian development model. Economic growth supposedly laid the foundations for a maturation process that eventually led to democracy. In other words, civil society had to "grow up" first under state tutelage before being able to responsibly participate in the democratic process.

Of course, what this really meant is that citizens were forced to sacrifice their civil, political, and even economic rights in the short and medium term in order to supposedly benefit in the long term. Unfortunately, all too often the people obliged to make sacrifices —low-paid industrial workers, peasants and women— were those least capable of making them.

In short, for countries like Mexico, it is unlikely that the piecemeal adoption of select attributes of the East Asian model —on the one hand— would yield the desired results. Emulating the East Asian "miracle" in its entirety —on the other hand— would mean adopting its more unpleasant aspects as well. Thus the direct relevance of the East Asian development experience for Mexico remains highly suspect.



Reviews

Los niños de colores
(The Children of Color)
Eugenio Aguirre
Grupo Editorial Siete
Mexico, 1993, 189 pp.

As a member of Mexico's '40s generation —the generation of writers who came into their own during the mid-to-late sixties and early seventies— Eugenio Aguirre has penned more than twenty novels, spanning a great variety of themes and styles. His topics range from the historical through the romantic and supernatural, and his techniques from the traditional through the experimental.

One strand that runs consistently through his work, especially his more recent books, is social criticism. This appears in different guises: historical censure in *Gonzalo Guerrero* (1980), where the legitimacy of the Spanish Conquest is questioned; criticism of mores in *La suerte de la fea* (The Ugly Woman's Luck, 1986), which takes on society's excessive emphasis on external beauty; and political denunciation in *Pasos de sangre* (Steps of Blood, 1989), which decries the plight of Indian peasants at the hands of a corrupt governmental system. In *Los niños de colores* (Children of Color, 1993) Aguirre's social criticism acquires an added, international dimension.

His subject is the clandestine trade in children's organs carried on between "developed" and "developing" nations for the purposes of medical transplants, a practice which has been documented in the international press. The novel focuses on the United States and Guatemala, tracing the experiences of Andrés, a pre-pubescent Indian boy, who is sold by his destitute parents to unscrupulous Americans. Andrés is smuggled stateside, and, together with children from other Third World countries, is kept in a holding facility where he is to be selected by an affluent U.S. family for a transplant, when the need arises.

We are introduced to two such families —those of a Los Angeles stockbroker and a prominent businessman from Kansas City— whose children are in need of kidneys and a heart respectively. When no other remedy seems possible, these respected citizens are presented by a greedy medical establishment with the possibility of black market organ transplants, for the right price. One of the families readily agrees to the proposal, while the other rejects it at first but is ultimately manipulated into acceptance. This means the death of two of the child-donors in the holding camp— one of them Andrés, the young Guatemalan Indian. All these events occur with the tacit approval and support of Washington authorities.

Several types of social criticism form part of the fabric of this story. One of them is naturalism-determinism. The protagonist, Andrés, lives with his family in a squalid hut; the father has no means of income and the children are hungry and sick. They are reduced to an animal state. In the words of one character, "They don't have enough for food and have no means of subsistence, but they sure do fornicate. Each time they do it, that means another child, and the more children they have the more they do it. And there they are! Like pigs, surrounded by dozens of sick kids, starving to death!" The only way out of this desperate situation is to accept the gringos' offer for the healthy Andrés. This causes the parents unbearable pain; nonetheless, circumstances force them to go along with the deal.

Another theme is *indigenismo* (Indian issues). Andrés and his family are Guatemalan Indians. They consult with the *mayordomo*, or village head, who strongly disapproves of the decision to sell Andrés and recriminates the father severely. The old man represents the roots and collective conscience of his race. He also represents divine wrath. That's why "they're afraid of foreigners; they're also afraid of those men and women who come from their land but

break their customs and violate traditions," such as the tradition of keeping the family together. More than anything, the old man is a spokesman who expresses outrage over the exploitation to which his race is exposed.

Also present is some satire of manners. Focusing on the American stockbroker's wife, for example, Aguirre ridicules the superficiality of affluent First World women, to whom visits to the beauty parlor or the aerobics gym are more important than their children's health and welfare, and who make character judgements on the basis of skin color.

But by far the most important type of social criticism in *Los niños de colores* is anti-imperialist protest, a theme in Latin American letters that goes all the way back to Manuel Ugarte, Rufino Blanco Fombona and Enrique Rodó.

However, in those early 20th-century writers this was restricted to the relationship between Spanish America and the U.S., while Aguirre gives it a new global scope covering all "developed" and "developing" countries. In *Los niños de colores* the U.S. stands for the former in their entirety, while the Guatemalan boy, together with children abducted from other parts, represent the latter.

At the heart of this story is a denunciation of the moral fabric of the "first" world, whose societies will unscrupulously sacrifice the members of other nations to insure the survival of their own, their motto being *"¡Los débiles por los fuertes!"* (the weak for the benefit of the strong). It is the same predatory, exploitative attitude that has characterized the relationship between the dominant and the powerless throughout history.

What lends special intensity to Aguirre's message is the powerful symbolism inherent in his story. Just as the "developed" nations rob their "developing" cousins of their healthy children's organs in order to replace those of their own diseased offspring, so they might be said to be "gutting" those other countries of their vitality in general, in order to regenerate their own decaying core.

They strip them of their natural and human resources and let them slide toward collapse. Seen in this light, *Los niños de colores* becomes a profound metaphor for the relationship between the "developed" and "developing" world, as perceived by the latter. This metaphor reaches deep down to a visceral level, tapping primordial survival fears, symbolizing these nations' worst forebodings.

The nightmarish metaphor is supported by certain stylistic trappings of the novel, reminiscent of gothic or horror fiction. The plot reminds us of Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein* and the classic human-experiment formula, where science tampers with human life in disregard of its sanctity. The "evil scientists" are the doctors who run the holding facilities where the children are collected: Simpson and Mailer, who view the children as objects, forcing them to undergo endless medical laboratory tests and preparing them for the transplants to come.

There are also those elite medical specialists who, in American society, target potential clients for transplants and effect the sales of organs —like the unscrupulous Doctor Morris. These master-villains, in true gothic-horror fashion, come with their henchmen: the notorious Captain North, who is responsible for smuggling the children stateside by ocean vessel and doubles as a brutal enforcer when on dry land; and the indescribably ugly Smart, a guard in one of the facilities, who, underneath his repulsive exterior —like Victor Hugo's Quasimodo— conceals tender human feelings, which he evidences in a futile attempt to save the protagonist.

There is a host of other supporting villains threatening the children's welfare, such as the child-merchants who are responsible for the initial purchase, flying into remote areas by small plane, acquiring the children from their parents and then selling them to an American firm for a profit. They are degenerate misfits, outcasts from their own society: Benjamin, an unbalanced Vietnam veteran who suffers from post-traumatic stress syndrome; John, a doctor who has been stripped of his license; and Steel, a soldier of fortune with an unsavory past. Motivated solely by greed and the indulgence of their baser instincts, they are grotesque and scary examples of the "ugly American." Topping them all is the organization which runs the entire operation, the "Company," an impersonal entity, created by anonymous shareholders, which manipulates its employees in an Orwellian fashion, projecting menace and inspiring terror.

In contrast with these villains stand the children themselves, guinea-pigs in the medical experiment —ingenue victims filled with hope and enthusiasm, unaware of their captors' evil designs. One of them is Andrés, who, motivated by the desire to help his family, goes

along with his abductors willingly, believing he is to be taken to the U.S. in order to learn English.

Another is Tomás, from Honduras, picked up from the streets by the child-merchants, inspired by the dream of becoming a major-league baseball player —a fantasy fed by his keepers in order to secure his cooperation. Then there is Corazón García, the Filipino girl, who thinks she'll be sent to language school in Canada, and Minu Chaudry from Bangladesh, who believes he is destined to become a waiter in London. And there are others still, from Cuba, Poland, Nicaragua, Colombia —from all around the globe, all of them unaware of their keepers' plans.

If the plot and characters of *Los niños de colores* do much to create a gothic atmosphere, the latter is heightened by the element of dreams, in particular guilt-ridden and fear-inspired nightmares. There are several of these interspersed throughout the novel. Andrés, the protagonist, dreams of violence at the hands of the *gringos* and of grotesquely threatening dogs, reflecting his fears.

Tomás, the Honduran boy, dreams of hard times back in his home town, where he lived in the streets, a victim of hunger and exploitation by others. Bety (sic), the nurse who looks after the children, has tortured dreams of divine retribution for her sin of collaborating with the villains.

In addition there are waking references by the characters themselves to the fact that their situation seems a nightmare. "I no longer know if all this makes any sense, or if it's nothing but a weird nightmare," exclaims the father of one of the American children destined to receive an organ.

A further touch of horror is added by surreal settings such as the steamy, untamed jungle and the impersonal environment of the medical laboratories the children pass through for examination. These laboratories are particularly impressive, with their dehumanizing procedures, which the author portrays with admirable realism.

Aguirre's language is functional and intense. Most of the novel is written in the present; dialogue and narration are frequently blended without the benefit of quotation marks; verbs are omitted in many passages. The result is a story that frequently has the immediacy and hectic, compulsive quality of a bad dream.

The broader significance of Aguirre's *Los niños de colores* consists of several aspects. In a world where overt imperialism has been replaced by what is frequently only a pseudo-equality among nations, based on sweeping international trade and political agreements, the book points up the deep-seated fears and insecurities of "developing" countries, which suspect that in a clandestine fashion —like the child-organ trade— the old exploitative relationships may persist and that they will continue to be the victims.

At the same time the novel brings back a traditional theme of Spanish-American letters —anti-imperialist protest— and dresses it in a contemporary garb, infusing it with new life and giving it an expanded and deeper meaning. That this is achieved by a member of the '40s generation —that group of writers which, besides touting its open-mindedness and liberalism, has always prided itself on being in tune with the times— seems only fitting.

Reinhard Teichmann

Imágenes de un encuentro
(Images of an Encounter)
Edited by Jehudit Bokser de Liwerant
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México,
Tribuna Israelita, Comité Central Israelita de México and Multibanco Mercantil-Grupo Financiero Probursa
Mexico City, 1992, 383 pages.

One tends to think of history books as boring, and beautiful coffee-table books as ones "to look at," not read. This book is an exception to both stereotypes. *Imágenes de un encuentro* is a well-designed graphic presentation of the history of the encounter between the Jewish people and Mexico. The story unfolds through images of people, places and documents. It is complemented by concise analytical commentary and well-chosen quotations from published sources and oral histories.

Jehudit Bokser de Liwerant was born in Argentina and moved to Mexico, where she earned her doctoral degree in political science at the National University of Mexico (UNAM). She currently teaches at UNAM and also serves as the Director of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem's joint Adult Education Program with the Universidad Iberoamericana in Mexico City. Her focus in editing this book was to raise consciousness about the long-neglected origins of the Jewish community in this country. Her mission also included strengthening Mexican Jews' sense of identity,

counteracting a traditional tendency to invisibility.

Roots

The first Jews known to have come to Mexico were those who fled Spain in 1492 when King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella expelled the Jewish people. The Jews practiced the traditions and customs of their faith both openly and secretly, the latter especially after the Inquisition established its own courts in Mexico. Jews who were identified were tried as heretics and publicly burned at the stake.

Mexico, like many Spanish colonies, did not accept non-Catholic immigrants until after Independence from Spain, when President Benito Juárez instituted his constitutional reforms. Among the most important were the expropriation of church property, barring the church from owning land and opening the doors of immigration without religious prerequisites. Thus, Jews began immigrating in the middle and latter part of the nineteenth century. Some came from Europe, others from the Ottoman Empire.

The earliest arrivals during this period were enterprising and independent people who immigrated as individuals, not in groups. They brought economic resources with them and successfully established banks and other commercial concerns. They identified with their country of origin and settled in cities, where they participated in the cultural scene.

Pogroms in East Europe prompted emigration to Palestine, the United States and Mexico. Another important wave of immigration took place after World War I. Jews in Poland were caught in the struggle between the Bolsheviks and independent Poland. Those in the Austro-Hungarian Empire suffered from the contradictory dynamics of socialism, nationalism and anti-Semitism. Middle Eastern Jews were expelled from the Ottoman Empire along with all other non-Muslims.

Immigration to the United States was curtailed and the doors closed tightly in 1924 with Johnson's Law. Mexico was in the process of establishing a new *modus vivendi* after the armed phase of the revolution. The Mexican government opened the doors to Jewish immigrants, and in spite of the controversy over immigration among U.S. Jewish organizations, they helped settle the newcomers.

The literature on this controversy contributes significantly to understanding lifestyles and conditions in Mexico in the mid-1920s. Anita Brenner, born in Mexico of Jewish Latvian parents, published a series of articles in the *Jewish Morning Journal*, the *Vanguard* and the *Menorah Journal*, depicting the culture and traditions of Mexico objectively, and effectively swaying public opinion.

The flow of immigrants grew once again during the Holocaust, in spite of Mexican fascist pro-Nazi groups which endeavored to influence the government to reject such immigration.

Extensive research and quality information

Although I have presented chronological highlights of Jewish immigration to Mexico, *Imágenes de un encuentro* is not a linear historical narrative. While the analytical text flows easily from page to page, each page can also stand as an independent presentation. Such an achievement is easier to describe than to accomplish!

The material covered includes both positive and negative aspects of the relationship between the Jewish community and Mexico. Ample documentation supports the text, which is especially valuable when dealing with anti-Semitic outbreaks led by the right wing. This straightforward presentation also includes tracing the history of different communities, such as the Ashkenazi or Sephardic groups.

The book includes a detailed chronology juxtaposing world history and Jewish history, which is especially valuable for scholars and academics. Thus, a clear and logical relation is shown between immigration and its historical causes.

The combination of images, quotations and analysis offers the reader a choice of delving into each detail or simply enjoying images and fragments of poetry or text. The research supporting the end product is phenomenal. Sources include the National Archives of Mexico, libraries abroad and private collections. The material is ably introduced by UNAM Rector José Sarukhán, as well as by the editor, with an in-depth preface to the material. *Imágenes de un encuentro*, which went almost immediately to a second edition, is destined to become a classic. VM

Susannah Glusker
Doctoral candidate in "Relationships Among Intellectuals in Mexico and the United States" at Union Institute.

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





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

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

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

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PAPALOTE CHILDREN'S MUSEUM. MUCH MORE THAN A MUSEUM.

In November of 1993 a new space opened its doors to enrich the cultural life of Mexico City: Papalote Children's Museum.

The cultural space is a private institution, constituted as a non-profit Civil Association.

The modern construction of this innovative museum, was designed by Ricardo Legorreta. It's located in the second section of Chapultepec Park.

The museum operates under the principle of "Do Touch".

Papalote is different from other museums, because it is an interactive place, which means that both children and adults can grasp why things happen by making them happen.

Every day, 4,000 people visit the museum, touching, playing and learning from the 340 interactive exhibitions that can be found there, divided into five sections: The Human Body, Communications, Our World, Expressions, and Science.

There is a vast universe to explore in Papalote, and the museum has a wing for temporary exhibits to house such diversity. Through interchanges and cooperation with similar institutions, there are always new frontiers to explore in high quality exibitions that reinforce the main themes of the museum.

Like permanent exhibits, the temporary ones are also interactive and their purpose is to promote learning and training through play and experimentation, ranging from scientific knowledge to enviromental consciousness, from renewal of our traditions to forces underlying economic life.

Through these temporary exhibits in Papalote, Mexican children have witnessed the miracle of survival of the Monarch Butterfly, Beyond Frontiers and the fantastic beauty of Alebrijes, the Wings of Dreams; they have relived the breakthrough of the Moonwalk, on its 25th anniversary, and the centuries-long voyage, from Barter to Checks, which is the first moving exhibit fully conceived and produced in the museum. Another of the museum's key attractions is the Megascreen, the only Imax theater in Mexico City.It has 56-foot-high, 82-foot-long screen and six channels of digital audio. Thanks to the quality of the image and sound you feel that you are part of the sequence, because this is a place where images come alive.

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Acueducto de Matlala

de Eugenio Landesio (Altessano, Italia 1810-París 1879)

La obra **Acueducto de Matlala**, de Eugenio Landesio, no es sólo un hermoso paisaje de corte romántico. Es mucho más; una obra maestra que puede ser admirada en el Museo Amparo de la ciudad de Puebla.

Eugenio Landesio escogió el acueducto de Matlala como tema y recreó la luminosidad celeste, un riachuelo, lomas de distinta altura, escenas campiranas y, por supuesto, la estructura del acueducto en diferentes planos.

Es en el extremo derecho de la obra en donde Landesio hace de un retrato de época una filigrana regional. Para ello, recurre a la vegetación de Puebla y así ante nosotros vemos cactus, nopales, biznagas. Con técnica magistral, el autor representa un espectacular "candelabro" de los llamados "órganos". Al fondo, podemos ver el Popocatépetl nevado, símbolo vigilante de nuestra nacionalidad. Todos los anteriores son temas que recreará posteriormente su discípulo José María Velasco en quien Landesio dejó profunda huella.

En el mismo extremo de la obra, y con extraordinarias dotes de observación, el artista retrata a la familia de La Hidalga con el magnífico ropaje que servirá para enriquecer el folclor mexicano. Así, la obra es un retrato de los usos y costumbres de la época.

En la obra hay diversos personajes. Haremos referencia a algunos de ellos:

Recostado, en una manta que parece sarape, un jovencito acaricia a su mascota. De pie, un adulto luce pantalones con botonadura a los lados y podemos apreciar sus espuelas de plata. Más allá vemos a una pareja de muchachas: una lleva un vistoso mantón rojo y larga falda; tras ella, una jovencita, de tez blanca y cabello castaño, viste una blusa alba, de largas y holgadas mangas, de tela fresca. Esta muchacha gesticula para señalar lo que está sucediendo frente a ella: Landesio pintando su autorretrato.

Eugenio Landesio elige esta rica, variada y luminosa atmósfera para pintarse a sí mismo. Lo vemos con el cabello ondulado, entrecano, sosteniendo en su mano izquierda la paleta con diversos colores y podemos ver que en la bolsa de su chaqueta lleva un trapo para limpiar sus pinceles.

Acueducto de Matlala es una obra ambiciosa, de belleza incuestionable.

Eugenio Landesio fue un artista italiano que vivió en México desde 1855 hasta 1877 y que cedió a la humanidad este legado como testimonio de su original percepción del paisaje poblano y de los personajes de su época.

Acueducto de Matlala es una breve y seductora lección de la vida mexicana en el siglo XIX y forma parte de una de las colecciones del Museo Amparo, ubicado en el centro histórico de Puebla de los Angeles.

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