VOICES of Mexico

CISAN • UNAM

Interviews With Four Mexican Presidential Hopefuls

Twentieth Century U.S. Immigration Policy

Mónica Verea Campos

Interventionism, "Americanism" And Foreign Policy

José Luis Valdés-Ugalde

The Painting of Carlos Torres San Angel. The Garden of the Valley of Mexico

NUMBER 51 APRIL • JUNE 2000 MEXICO $30 USA $6.00 CANADA $7.80

AUDITORIO
NACIONAL
CENTRO DE ARTE Y CULTURA

Paseo de la Reforma No.50, Bosque de Chapultepec, Ciudad de México, 11560, Tel.: (525) 280-9250, Fax: (525) 282-2225

VOICES of Mexico™

ISSN 0186 • 9418

Voices of Mexico is published by
El Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte, CISAN (Center for Research on North America),
of the Office of the Coordinator of Humanities, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, UNAM
(National Autonomous University of Mexico).

Address letters, advertising and subscription correspondence to: **Voices of Mexico**, Miguel Angel de Quevedo 610, Col. Coyoacán, 04000 México, D.F. Tel: 5659-23-49 and 5659-38-21. Fax: 5554-65-73. Electronic mail: voicesmx@servidor.unam.mx. **Voices** Page: http://www.unam.mx/voices. Annual subscription rates: Mexico Mex$110; the Americas, U.S.$22; Europe and other countries, U.S.$45, prepaid in U.S. currency to **UNAM**. Opinions expressed by the authors do not necessarily reflect the views of **Voices of Mexico**. Publicación trimestral, año doce, número 51, abril-junio de 2000. ISSN 0186-9418. Certificado de Contenido No. 2930 y Certificado de Título núm. 3340, expedidos por la Comisión Calificadora de Publicaciones y Revistas Ilustradas. Reserva al uso exclusivo del título Núm. 569-88, expedida por la Dirección General del Derecho de Autor. Correspondencia nacional de segunda clase. Registro 0851292. Características 220261212. Correspondencia internacional de segunda clase. Registro Cri D F 002-92. Revista trimestral producida por Ediciones de Buena Tinta, S.A. de C.V., Insurgentes Sur 1700, 6o. piso, Col. Florida, Álvaro Obregón, 01030 México, D.F. Tels. 5661-66-07, 5662-28-31. Impresa por Editorial Offset, S.A. de C.V., Durazno núm. 1, Col. Las Peritas, Tepepan, Xochimilco, México, D.F.

VOICES of Mexico™

Number 51 April • June 2000



Contents

Cover: Carlos Torres, *Torn Fragment*,
83 x 65 cm, 1997 (mixed technique).

Our Voice

This year both the United States and Mexico will hold presidential elections only four months apart. Undoubtedly, they will be particularly important for the positioning of both countries with regard to our bilateral relations in the twenty-first century. In contrast to previous races, this year's Mexican elections are especially interesting for U.S. political analysts and actors alike because perhaps for the first time the results are not a foregone conclusion. There is no telling who the winner will be; even the most recent opinion polls contradict each other. While uncertainty is one of the characteristics of living in a democracy, it is also relatively new to Mexican political culture. This is the reason for the great expectation and interest in following the campaigns on the part of the public in both Mexico and the United States.

In the United States, the campaigns are now taking shape and centering on the candidates' personalities: Al Gore, the "new Democrat," and George Bush, the "centrist Republican." From the Mexican perspective —and even in the opinion of much of the U.S. public— the two show only slight ideological differences and their proposals tend to overlap. In Mexico, the ideological spectrum is much broader and the candidates do represent different political options: Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas is on the left; Francisco Labastida, in the center; and Vicente Fox, on the right. This makes today's real competition for power much more interesting in terms of the changes that it might bring.

In this context, *Voices of Mexico* interviewed four of Mexico's presidential hopefuls about their views and proposals for relations with the United States and Canada. The idea is to offer our readers a panorama of their positions, so they can see similarities and differences, as well as contrast them with the ideas that President Ernesto Zedillo expressed on the same topic in our last issue.

Supplementing this information, Alejandro Becerra contributes an article analyzing the three main parties' platform positions on relations with the United States. Becerra considers that Vicente Fox emphasizes the importance of diversifying Mexico's foreign relations, while underlining the historic importance of our relations with the United States. By comparison Francisco Labastida takes a more regional view, proposing a strategy of joint regional solutions and projects in lieu of strictly national ones; and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas has a more critical position, going so far as to propose the need to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement, and alerting about the problems that he thinks globalization can bring. The three candidates also agree on some points: for example, they all think it is a priority to find immediate solutions to the problem of the constant violation of the human rights of Mexican migrants to the United States.

Researcher and political scientist César Cansino also writes in our "Politics" section about the coming elections, explaining that he thinks Mexico has not yet completed the transition to democracy. According to Cansino, our political system still combines democratic practices with other, more ambiguous and ambivalent practices left over from authoritarianism.

To round out the topic of Mexican politics and elections, Isidro Cisneros proposes a periodization of the transformations in Mexican politics during the twentieth century. He identifies five political cycles, the last of which has just begun and which he calls "democratic cohabitation," for which he proposes a series of future scenarios, not all of which are particularly promising.

Patricia de los Ríos contributes an article on the U.S. elections in which she underlines the important role that money plays in the campaigns, to the extent that the great majority of the candidates who withdrew from the race did so because of financial difficulties. She also emphasizes the importance of this year's legislative races, given the possibility of the Democrats' recovering a majority in the House of Representatives. Lastly, she looks at the decisive impact the Hispanic vote will have in this year's elections.

This issue's "United States Affairs" section also presents an article by Mónica Verea, a specialist in Mexican migration to the United States. She presents an overview of the different U.S. immigration laws and measures over the twentieth century in a balance sheet that underlines the conservative trends that had the upper hand at the end of the century. In Verea's opinion, nativist positions have dominated these trends, seeking to restrict migration without taking into consideration at all its benefits to the United States.

The section closes with an article by researcher José Luis Valdés dealing with the very current ideology of interventionism disguised in the discourse of Americanism that our neighbor to the north still uses as a strategy for "detente" —very much in the Cold War tradition— to curb social and political movements in what it considers its exclusive area of influence, Latin America.

This issue's "Science, Art and Culture" section presents the work of Carlos Torres, an important Mexican painter whose work excels because of its originality, particularly his geometric handling of empty spaces and his construction of visual proposals in the form of puzzles. Writer Luis González de Alba and art critic and journalist Yuriria Iturriaga both contribute articles about Torres. Mario Pacheco completes the section with an article about the new Mexican cinema, which is now undoubtedly experiencing a boom. Pacheco reviews the work of directors Carlos Bolado, Fernando Sariñana, Antonio Serrano and Alejandro Springall, all winners of national or international film awards.

Rodolfo Tuirán looks at demographic aging in Mexico in our "Society" section, alerting the reader to this phenomenon that, although still insufficiently taken into account, will soon bring political, social and economic changes, like the conversion of industry and the transformation of voter profiles, and which, if not dealt with in time, could have grave consequences. Tuirán points out that the new demands of older adults could surpass society's capability to deal with them if programs and plans are not designed to do so beginning now. All this will imply changes in our institutions to deepen the support given to the aged over the next 30 to 50 years.

Our "History" section boasts an interesting article by writer Alvaro Ruiz Abreu on the Cristero movement, which emerged after the Mexican Revolution, and its impact on the literature of its time. Abreu maintains that many of the most important literary works of the first half of the cen-

tury were inspired in Cristero —and therefore Catholic— ideology, but that they received little recognition because of the ideological and cultural hegemony of the 1910 armed movement and its "literature of the Revolution."

Also in the "History" section is the first of a series of articles about what is today the Mexico City neighborhood of San Angel, previously a provincial town steeped in history and tradition. Jim Fogarty writes about the famous Saint Patrick's Battalion, many of whose members were executed in San Angel. Fogarty's article vindicates the bravery and moral stand taken by this handful of men who deserted the U.S. army to join a cause they considered just, that of defending Mexico against arbitrary foreign intervention. The gesture of the Irishmen of the Saint Patrick's Battalion must be seen not as treason to their invading army, but as an act of following their consciences and taking a stand for justice.

Both the "Splendor of Mexico" and "Museums" sections are dedicated to San Angel. Its history, its architecture, its traditions, its cultural wealth and its social and economic transformations, in sum, the overall fate of this corner of Mexico City, so well known for its beauty, are all brought into sharp relief for us by writers Jaime Abundis and María García Lascuráin. They take us on a walk through the cobblestoned streets and by the majestic monuments and buildings of San Angel at different times in its history. We reserved a special place for the incomparable El Carmen Museum because of its importance and its fine collection.

In "Canadian Issues," specialist Elisa Dávalos analyzes Canada's role in foreign direct investment in Latin America in light of the emergence of globalized production processes. While Canadian FDI has advanced, it still has not made any inroads into U.S. hegemony.

The "Ecology" section presents an article by Edit Antal about climate change, analyzing the reasons behind the contrasting positions of the United States and the European Union countries on one of today's most complex questions. Antal identifies influences behind the official stances, such as different cultural perceptions of the issue; the character of environmental policies; the decision-making processes; and the institutional structure of each of the two actors.

In our "Literature" section, we once again include a sample of the work of two young Mexican poets, whose proposals point the way to a boom in Mexican poetry. Eduardo Hurtado comments on the work of poets Fernando Fernández and Eduardo Vázquez, both part of a promising literary generation.

Voices of Mexico profoundly regrets the death of one of the great symbols of Mexico's twentieth-century intelligentsia, journalist, writer and researcher of Mexican indigenous cultures, Fernando Benítez, to whom we pay homage in our "In Memoriam" section. Lastly, in the name of all the magazine's collaborators and my own, we would like to send our warmest congratulations to Juan Villoro, esteemed friend and contributor to this publication, upon his being awarded the Xavier Villaurrutia Prize for literature.

Paz Consuelo Márquez Padilla
Director of CISAN

Mexico's Relations with the United States and Canada



Octavio Nava/AVE

Vicente Fox, Alliance for Change.

Octavio Nava/AVE

Francisco Labastida, Institutional Revolutionary Party.



Antonio Nava/AVE

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, Alliance for Mexico.

Antonio Nava/AVE

Gilberto Rincón Gallardo, Social Democracy Party.

How Four Presidential Hopefuls Would Improve Them

Voices of Mexico interviewed four presidential candidates, Vicente Fox Quesada, Francisco Labastida Ochoa, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano and Gilberto Rincón Gallardo, about a topic of special interest to our readers: Mexico's relations with the United States and Canada.

It should be noted that although the interviews were done separately, we have merged them here to facilitate comparison of the candidates' positions on the issues. We should also point out that the order in which we print each answer, as well as the photographs and bullets, follows the criteria used by Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute to arrange the parties' emblems and candidates' names on the ballots and electoral documents: in the order they were registered as political parties. This mechanism has the stamp of approval of the parties themselves and aims to maintain impartiality. The party that has had official registration the longest is the National Action Party (PAN), followed by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the Social Democracy Party (PDS).

Two of the candidates are backed by alliances of several parties: Vicente Fox heads up the Alliance for Change, made up of the PAN and the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM); and Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas is supported by the Alliance for Mexico, made up of the PRD, the Labor Party (PT), the Party of the Nationalist Society (PSN), the Party of the Social Alliance (PAS) and the Convergence for Democracy (CD).

Voices of Mexico originally sent a questionnaire to all six presidential candidates. However, neither Manuel Camacho, Party of the Democratic Center hopeful, nor Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution candidate, responded to our repeated invitations.



"On the issue of migration, the main medium-term objective will be coming to an agreement to be able to then negotiate, within a North American common market, free transit of individuals and workers to lessen the gap in living standards on either side of the border."

Voices of Mexico: *What aspects of Mexico-U.S. relations would you include on your agenda as priorities?*

Vicente Fox Quesada: To strengthen dialogue, cooperation and understanding between our two nations on the basis of mutual respect, the recognition of our asymmetries, interdependence and our common interests, the 2000-2006 bilateral agenda will emphasize migration, the protection of the human rights of Mexican men and women, economic and trade integration, drug trafficking, national security, cooperation on border issues and the environment. Now is the time to go from good will and political rhetoric to the instrumentation of the commitments we already have and create mechanisms and programs for mutual collaboration.

For example, on the issue of migration, the main medium-term objective will be coming to an agreement to be able to then negotiate, within a North American common market, free transit of individuals and workers to lessen the gap in living standards on either side of the border.

Taking drug trafficking as a shared problem of security, the strategy aims to fight it more energetically in its different stages (production, distribution and consumption), but with an interdisciplinary, integral focus that would emphasize co-responsibility and the transparency of the instruments for that fight and respect for territorial jurisdiction. Mexico also must do its part by fulfilling the agreements and broadening out the activities of the High Level Contact Group, purging its police forces, raising sentences for drug-related offenses, and in general perfecting pertinent legislation. The United States, for its part, should do the same, substituting effective bilateral and multilateral mechanisms for the current "certification" process and the application of the International Economic Powers Emergency Act.

Francisco Labastida Ochoa: North America is a strategic region for Mexico's national interests and, therefore, relations with the United States and Canada are a foreign relations priority.

The relationship between Mexico and the United States is among the most diversified and intense in the world. We share a very long, dynamic border, with over 280 million crossings a year. Through NAFTA we have become partners in one of the biggest and most successful economic areas of the world. Our bilateral agenda includes a myriad of issues at the domestic, regional and global levels that must be addressed through a respectful and constructive dialogue in order to make the most of the current trends and opportunities that this unique relationship offers.

In this context, I would put a priority on four objectives. First, I will endeavour to strengthen mutual trust, consolidating and improving the institutional mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation we have developed over the past few years. From the Binational Commission to the High Level Contact Group that coordinates our efforts against drug trafficking, Mexico and the U.S. have established an institutional framework that is allowing us to make unprecedented progress toward the management of common challenges with a constructive approach that takes into account the interests of both our countries.

Second, I will strengthen the mechanisms to protect and support Mexicans who migrate to and live in the U.S. Third, I would promote greater comprehensive, unconditional economic and political cooperation with respect for each other's sovereignty to make the most of the opportunities stemming from globalization, while minimizing its negative effects. And, fourth —I would say our most challenging endeavour— I will promote a better understanding of each other's culture and identity among our governments, private and academic sectors and, more importantly, between our peoples. This will be fundamental for reducing the negative stereotypes that affect our relationship.

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano: A priority of the new government will undoubtedly be the strengthening of the traditional ties of friendship between the United States and our country, consolidating and broadening out our economic, social, political and cultural links. However, it should be mentioned that this will be done on the basis of fashioning an agenda for dialogue between our governments that will put a series of negotiating points —or

> "Our consulates will work as never before to give all Mexican men and women residing or working temporarily abroad the attention and support they need to guarantee their civil and political rights. Among these are the ability to exercise their right to vote and to guarantee their safety in the United States and Mexico. We are prepared to denounce any abuses of our fellow Mexicans before the appropriate international bodies."
>
> Vicente Fox

points to be renegotiated— on the table about such vital issues as trade, the environment, migration, etc.

We will seek to strengthen and in some ways reconstruct our relations with the United States on the basis of mutual respect and the framework of a true alliance between nations. Mexico's foreign policy, an indicator of the degree of sovereignty the country enjoys, should be oriented toward egalitarian, democratic international relations, regulated by the criteria of autonomy and national self-determination. No decision, pact or commitment should be carried out if it runs counter to national interests, particularly if it implies greater sacrifices for the population.

Building a better future for Mexicans demands that we work on every level to make sure that integrating, inclusive trends dominate globalization so the country can be part of it in conditions of equity, equal opportunities and with full sovereignty allowing the entire population to enjoy its possible benefits.



"We are proud of the growing political, economic and cultural importance of the Mexican communities in the U.S., and we are committed to protecting their rights and supporting them so that they maintain their ties with our country. In this sense, I would strengthen the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad, which has been very successful."

Gilberto Rincón Gallardo: Social Democracy thinks that, first of all, relations with the United States should take on a broader social and human dimension. It is time to leave behind the strategy of dealing with bilateral issues through a compartmentalized agenda, which should be replaced with an integral agenda that will foster a more symmetrical relationship on both sides of the border. This should promote shared development, social well being, security and complete respect for human rights for people living along the border. The time has also come to say to our neighbors that broad agreements are needed that allow for legal, temporary labor by Mexican migrants.

Our relations with the United States must always maintain the strategic objective of encouraging as much as possible our nation's development, and, of course, it will be imperative that we eliminate nationalist prejudices and accept that we share common goals with the United States, like worldwide democracy, the defense of human rights and, as far as is possible, common tactics for the fight against drug trafficking. However, it should be clear that our opposition to all forms of hegemony or dominance by any power is essential to our foreign policy, just as the defense of the interests of our fellow Mexicans residing in the United States is a priority.

Voices of Mexico: *How do you think Mexican-Canadian relations could be improved?*

Vicente Fox Quesada: In different ways. For example, promoting with the United States and Canada itself the creation of different supranational institutions that would lay the foundation for a common market in 25 years.

Another option would be to create a bilateral parliamentary working group to regularly examine both countries' trade, scientific-technological, educational, migration and environmental policies and propose to their respective governments, the Ministerial Commission, the Mexico-Quebec Working Group and the Mexico-Canada Policy Planning Consultations policies and actions around these and other issues of common interest.

We must take advantage of our agreements to achieve conditions of reciprocity in our dealings with the United States.

In addition, Mexican-Canadian migratory labor agreements should expand to benefit a greater number of Mexican men and women.

Francisco Labastida Ochoa: Over the past five years, the relationship between Mexico and Canada has grown and improved dramatically in every possible area of cooperation. Its potential for expansion is still enormous. We have moved from what was called "respectful neglect" to a strategic partnership. To continue along these lines, in the first place, we must reinforce our political dialogue, while taking greater advantage of NAFTA. Even though we are now Canada's second trade partner, with annual exports of over U.S.$2 billion, our share of Canada's total trade amounts to less than 3 percent. This shows that we still have many opportunities ahead of us in areas such as energy, agriculture, mining and telecommunications.

Second, we must broaden successful bilateral mechanisms like the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program, which currently allows over 7,000 Mexican nationals to work in Canada every year, a success story that I would try to reproduce with the United States. This is a win-win program that benefits both Mexicans and Canadians, and it shows that we can endeavour in similar programs to further cooperate in areas like health, environmental protection, social development and educational and cultural exchanges.

Third, we must work together at the regional, hemispheric, and multilateral levels in order to provide more and better opportunities for the people of the Americas to progress and achieve better living standards. Mexico and Canada have worked closely on issues of global concern such as disarmament. The treaty to ban land mines is an outstanding example of this collaboration. This has also been the case with joint activities toward the creation of a hemispheric mechanism to evaluate efforts against drug trafficking and constructive ways to cooperate in the fight against this scourge. We must continue bilateral cooperation to support positive regional initiatives.

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano: [The candidate did not answer this question. The Editor.]

Gilberto Rincón Gallardo: For some reason, relations between Mexico and Canada have not been developed to their full potential. Six years after NAFTA came into effect, Canadian investment in Mexico and its participation in our foreign trade are still very modest, smaller even than those of European countries like Germany. Mexico must step up its efforts to increase economic, political, trade and cultural relations with Canada, with which we share a clear vocation for peace. We should not forget that Canada is part of the Group of Eight, that it has always worked to deal with the problems of the developing world and that it has demonstrated an enthusiastic willingness to collaborate on the global commitments that the group takes on. We should also not forget that Canada is struggling to maintain its national identity vis-à-vis the growing cultural and economic influence of the United States, something that should be part of our strategic thinking.

"Above all, the significance of NAFTA has been the consolidation of clear and transparent rules to conduct trade relations between our countries and address issues like labor standards and environmental protection. This is fundamental to achieving even better results, and to harnessing the great opportunities that globalization and technological advances offer us for the benefit of our most precious resource: our people."

Francisco Labastida

Voices of Mexico: *What proposals would you make to follow up on the efforts already made by the Mexican government in tightening our links with*

the communities of Mexican origin in the United States and Canada?

Vicente Fox Quesada: Our consulates will work as never before to give all Mexican men and women residing or working temporarily abroad the attention and support they need to guarantee their civil and political rights. Among these are the ability to exercise their right to vote and to guarantee their safety in the United States and Mexico. We are prepared to denounce any abuses of our fellow Mexicans before the appropriate international bodies. In order to do all this, consular budgets will be increased.

In addition, we will foster the creation of the Council of Mexicans Abroad so that the Mexican government and citizens can participate in the design and instrumentation of support policies. Mexican communities abroad will be organized so their efforts to better their families' quality of life can improve the productive potential of their places of origin.



"We are fighting for the current globalization process to include the free international transit of workers and migrants' individual economic, social and political rights in their place of work and residence equal to those of local citizens. This is an issue that must be renegotiated in the North American Free Trade Agreement."

Francisco Labastida Ochoa: We are very proud of the growing political, economic and cultural importance of the Mexican communities in the U.S., and we are committed to protecting their rights and supporting them so that they maintain their ties with our country. In this sense, I would strengthen the Program for Mexican Communities Abroad, which has been very successful in facilitating closer ties with our people abroad.

I would also promote a closer interaction among the private sector, universities and colleges, and between our people on both sides of the border through "traditional" communication channels, like the newspaper and TV show "La Paloma," which is read and seen in every single Latino community in the U.S., and also through "new" media tools like Internet or cultural activities such as In-Site, the binational artistic and performance festival that takes place in the Tijuana-San Diego area.

Finally, I would also promote closer ties with the Mexican-American organizations which have contributed so much to the defense of the rights and the living conditions of our people abroad, like the Mexican-American Legal Defense and Educational Fund, the National Council of La Raza, the National Association of Latino Elected and Appointed Officials and the League of United Latin American Citizens.

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano: An important number of Mexican men and women have emigrated in recent decades to foreign countries, above all the United States. Several million of our fellow citizens are now there having gone with or without migratory documents, spurred by Mexico's unemployment and poverty, seeking better living conditions. While crossing the border and living north of the border, undocumented migrants have been victims of repression, exploitation and racial exclusion, as have legal residents, although to a different degree.

While living abroad, Mexicans contribute work and creativity, but lack the essential individual rights that local citizens enjoy. They send part of what they earn by their sacrifices back to Mexico, benefitting their families and the country, but receive no protection or the support they need from the Mexican government. In these very difficult situa-

tions, official discourse does not correspond to real actions and is usually conditioned by the pragmatism of the relations of dependency. Recently, legislation has made it possible for migrants abroad to retain their Mexican nationality when they adopt that of the country where they reside, but they continue to lack the right to participate in Mexican federal elections.

We are fighting for the current globalization process to include the free international transit of workers and migrants' individual economic, social and political rights in their place of work and residence equal to those of local citizens. This is an issue that must be renegotiated in the North American Free Trade Agreement and must be put on the agenda for treaty negotiations with the European Union.

We are obliged to actively protect the individual rights of Mexicans abroad, above all in the United States, in the framework of respect for its national laws and international agreements, as well as to offer them all the assistance within our power. We must also support their efforts to keep alive their cultural identity and language at the same time that they learn that of their host country. Giving the right to vote in federal elections to those who conserve Mexican citizenship is a demand of democratization and fair, necessary recognition of the conservation of their political rights. In addition, legislative efforts must be made to regulate remittances from U.S. and Canadian residents to their families in Mexico so they cost the least possible.

Gilberto Rincón Gallardo: The Mexican government has still not done enough to defend the interests of people of Mexican origin in the United States. The needs of this important sector of the population, which becomes more important to U.S. political life every day, must be more closely attended to. To do that, the government must have sufficient political determination and moral authority to be able to negotiate better treatment for our fellow citizens, particularly undocumented migrants, with our neighbors. The time has also come to propose broad agreements in the framework of increasingly intense trade and economic relations that will allow for the legal, temporary, regulated presence of Mexican workers in the United States. It will also be essential to improve Mexican consular services in U.S. cities, making them more efficient and increasing their activities in the cultural and social sphere.

Voices of Mexico: *What is your balance sheet of Mexico in economic and political terms after six years of* NAFTA*?*

Vicente Fox Quesada: In general terms, the North American Free Trade Agreement has been positive for Mexico. However, while our exports to Canada and the United States increased considerably after the treaty came into effect in 1994 and it also facilitated U.S. government economic support for dealing with the crisis of that same year, the macroeconomic benefits have not yet been felt by the great majority of Mexicans. Despite this, we think that it would be inappropriate to renegotiate NAFTA as a whole. We do think that it is necessary to promote a greater flow of foreign direct investment in our country and satisfactorily deal with

"We will seek to strengthen and in some ways reconstruct our relations with the United States on the basis of mutual respect and the framework of a true alliance between nations. Mexico's foreign policy, an indicator of the degree of sovereignty the country enjoys, should be oriented toward egalitarian, democratic international relations."

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas

the trade controversies that arise as a result of the trade dynamic itself.

We propose to advance toward a second phase of NAFTA with our trade partners through the creation over the next 25 years of a North American Common Market, in which not only would there continue to be free transit of goods, services, technology and capital, but also of persons. This would tend to gradually equalize wages and technology.

Francisco Labastida Ochoa: Our balance sheet is very positive. Our exports to the U.S. have grown from U.S.$42 billion in 1993 to almost U.S.$110 billion in 1999, and trade with Canada has increased 83 percent during the same period, from U.S.$4 billion to over U.S.$7 billion. Since NAFTA was signed, Mexico has become the United States' number two trading partner in the world, second only to Canada; it has also become Canada's second largest trading partner, following only the U.S.



"It is time to leave behind the strategy of dealing with bilateral issues through a compartmentalized agenda, which should be replaced with an integral agenda that will foster a more symmetrical relationship on both sides of the border. This should promote shared development, social well being, security and complete respect for human rights for people living along the border."

Total trade in North America has grown 75 percent in five years, to almost half a trillion dollars a year, making it one of the most dynamic regions of the world, where jobs and new business opportunities are being generated each day, and, most importantly, where disputes and controversies are settled constructively through institutional mechanisms. Above all, the significance of NAFTA has been the consolidation of clear and transparent rules to conduct trade relations between our countries and address issues like labor standards and environmental protection.

This, of course, has had a deeper impact, one that goes far beyond trade, because it is fostering greater trust and confidence among Mexico, Canada and the U.S., both at the governmental and non-governmental levels. This is fundamental to achieving even better results, and to harnessing the great opportunities that globalization and technological advances offer us for the benefit of our most precious resource: our people.

Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano: NAFTA has opened up a series of important economic opportunities for Mexico, but it has also created some significant problems. The Mexican negotiators who signed it six years ago did not wish to defend trade conditions based on equity and respect for our sovereignty and accepted a commercial opening that on many planes and levels was markedly asymmetrical and abrupt. This has caused, among other negative effects, the disappearance of thousands of small and medium-sized firms and the jobs they provided and, particularly, a significant drop in different areas of agricultural production.

NAFTA did not include articles to protect local production, particularly agricultural production, or compensatory funds to foster economic development in backward regions or areas negatively affected by the opening. In these conditions, only a few Mexican agricultural exporters and U.S. agribusiness have been and continue to be the big beneficiaries of this form of trade liberalization. It also did not include the negotiation of free transit for workers parallel to the free flow of capital, goods and services, nor did it provide for full political and labor rights for migrants. This deficiency is particularly

serious given the size of the flows of Mexican labor to the United States.

In the absence of domestic and international regulations, the free flow of worldwide speculative finance capital —rather than productive investment capital— not only does not benefit the country, but constantly threatens to generate crises like that of 1995 or bring us the effects of the recurring crises in other countries around the globe.

The government justified the inclusion of corn in the free trade agreement with the United States and Canada as part of a strategy to reorganize the agricultural sector, developing the crops that would give Mexico a comparative advantage and lowering the fiscal costs of subsidies to producers and consumers in the corn-tortilla chain. But this strategy implies, among other things, the destruction in the medium term of the base of genetic resources linked to the producers that NAFTA stipulates must stop growing corn. The disappearance of the government grain intermediary company, Conasupo, has led to Mexico's agricultural market being turned over to large multinational corporations, a few of which control more than 70 percent of the international grain market and determine the agricultural and trade policies of many of the world's countries. But not only basic grains have been affected by the economic opening. Other agricultural products, undoubtedly cattle and other animal products, have also been affected by the way NAFTA was negotiated.

The new government will push for the establishment of new international trade rules, rules equitable for all nations, rules that make it possible to regulate the worldwide flow of speculative capital and the global impact of local crises.

Gilberto Rincón Gallardo: More than six years after coming into effect, NAFTA must be evaluated to objectively determine its costs and benefits. On the one hand, it is true that in the last few years the United States has consolidated itself as our main trade partner, and Mexico is now the second most important destination for U.S. exports, representing 7.5 percent of its world trade. However, in my view, NAFTA has five important defects that have begun to create conflicts and could make the treaty flounder if not corrected in time: the absence of a common regimen for dumping and compensatory subsidies and taxes, the fact that no regional industrial policy exists, the lack of a system for mutual recognition of technical norms, the fact that the whole system of the treaty is based on a very weak institutional mechanism and the nonexistence of any system to regulate the real integration now taking place between the labor markets of both countries.

It is urgent we work to correct the defects that threaten NAFTA's future viability. This will require above all great political determination on the part of the three countries involved. The most difficult issue is linked to the creation of supranational bodies to give the treaty institutional strength and make effective controversy resolution possible. In that sense, the reservations the U.S. government has always expressed about submitting to the dictates of multilateral bodies are well known. However, it is essential to exert pressure for NAFTA to have a truly solid institutional basis. VM

"It is urgent we work to correct the defects that threaten NAFTA's future viability. This will require above all great political determination on the part of the three countries involved. The most difficult issue is linked to the creation of supranational bodies to give the treaty institutional strength and make effective controversy resolution possible."

Gilberto Rincón Gallardo

CIENCIAS

FÍSICA
LÓGICA
FILOSOFÍA
ECOLOGÍA
GEOLOGÍA
ANTROPOLOGÍA
MATEMÁTICAS
BIOLOGÍA
MEDICINA
HISTORIA
ASTRONOMÍA
EVOLUCIÓN



revista de difusión

SUSCRIPCIONES Y NÚMEROS ANTERIORES
Cubículos 319, 320 y 321, Departamento de Física
Facultad de Ciencias, UNAM Coyoacán 04510 México, D.F.
Tel. 622 4935 Fax: 616 0326 email: revistac@soledad.astroscu.unam.mx

Mexican-U.S. Relations

A Presidential Campaign Issue

*Alejandro Becerra Gelóver**

The year 2000 will be crucial in Mexico-U.S. relations. Every 12 years, the two country's presidential elections coincide, the last time in 1988 when George Bush won in the United States and Carlos Salinas in Mexico. Though both countries are holding legislative elections as well, clearly this year's presidencial races attract the most attention.

Over the past few years the bilateral agenda has revolved around topics like migration, drug trafficking, trade and investment, energy resources and ecology, frequent topics of heated debate for both countries' governments and societies. Other issues such as human rights, border problems and organized crime have also become important items on the agenda.

In Mexico, six candidates are running for president, but only three have any real possibility of winning.[1] Vicente Fox Quesada heads up the conservative Alliance for Change backed by two parties: the National Action Party (PAN) and the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM). Francisco Labastida Ochoa is the candidate for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), currently in power and considered to be at the center of the ideological spectrum. The center-left Alliance for Mexico, represented by presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Solórzano, is made up of five parties: the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), Convergence for Democracy (CD), the Party of the Nationalist Society (PSN), the Labor Party (PT) and the Party of the Social Alliance (PAS).

Each of these three leading candidates have outlined their proposals in the political platforms[2] their respective parties have registered with the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), the country's highest authority in charge of organizing and acting as arbitrator in the federal elections. The platforms all have foreign policy planks, and more specifically, on Mexico's relations with the United States.

Vicente Fox Quesada

Alliance for Change candidate Vicente Fox Quesada includes ten planks in his electoral platform. The tenth, "An Active Role in the World," refers to foreign policy and emphasizes the influence of globalization in Mexico. Four main courses of action are outlined: a proactive and diversified foreign policy, greater participation in international organizations, broadening out foreign trade and the defense of human rights of Mexicans living abroad.

Mexico's relationship with the United States is one of the most important items on its foreign policy agenda. Therefore, the alliance proposes broadening and diversifying Mexico's relations with the rest of the world by strengthening its ties with Europe, Asia and Africa. According to the alliance, Mexico's unique geopolitical location —a natural "bridge" between North and Latin America— should be used to the country's advantage.

* Professor at the UNAM International Relations Department, Aragón Campus and at the Anahuac University.
Translated by Andrea Martínez.

Fox allows for the unique opportunity offered to Mexico by its proximity to the U.S., and therefore makes it a priority of the country's foreign policy, but at the same time stresses the importance of maintaining a balance in the interests of national sovereignty.

Migration is the only issue specifically addressed in the platform, concretely the abuse suffered by Mexican migrants in the United States. Three courses of action are suggested: fostering respect for the civil and political rights of Mexicans living abroad; denouncing cases of abuse to the appropriate international authorities; and developing, together with the United States, temporary work programs in order to offer legal protection to immigrants. On the other hand, despite the importance it places on Mexico-U.S. relations, the alliance does not suggest concrete courses of actions on questions of trade and investment, drug trafficking or ecological and border problems.

According to the alliance, Mexico's unique geopolitical location —a natural "bridge" between North and Latin America— should be used to the country's advantage. Fox allows for the unique opportunity offered to Mexico by its proximity to the U.S., and therefore makes it a priority of the country's foreign policy, but at the same time stresses the importance of maintaining a balance in the interests of national sovereignty.

FRANCISCO LABASTIDA OCHOA

Labastida's political platform is divided into six parts. The first, under the heading "A Sovereign Mexico Open to the World" suggests courses of action in foreign policy. In general, the PRI proposal sees Mexico in a changing world context which has gone from bipolar confrontation to relative detente, characterized by a trilateral economic polarization in which the United Nations has been unable to establish and maintain conditions for peace. The PRI recognizes the importance of the United States as the world's great military power, an economic, technological and ideological-political leader with the leverage to pressure and set the rules of the game in the world economy.

The platform also suggests taking advantage of benefits stemming from globalization, pointing out the need to define strategies to secure national interests and sovereignty as well as to foster cooperation, disseminate national culture abroad, predict world financial and economic behavior and reaffirm the principles of Mexico's foreign policy.

Although the PRI's political platform diversifies Mexico's foreign relations, most of its proposals attribute great importance to the United States. They refer to topics on the bilateral agenda, stressing cooperation, ecology, migration, human rights, culture, drug trafficking, organized crime and border problems.

Regarding cooperation, Labastida suggests developing frameworks of trilateral collaboration (including Canada) in which one country would provide financing, another technical knowledge and the recipient country would participate actively in its implementation. The aim of this type of interaction would be to strengthen ties among the three countries in the context of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The question of ecology is only touched upon, mentioning the intention of solving problems affecting both countries, according to the principle of shared and differentiated responsibility, although no specifics are given as to how to accomplish this.

Labastida's platform addresses the need to respect the basic rights of those who for political or economic reasons are residing abroad. Most Mexican migrants head towards the United States, and therefore the PRI proposes that migration be taken into account in both demographics

and the economy on both sides of the border and that migratory flows be considered an important issue on the bilateral agenda. Consequently, this problem cannot be dealt with through unilateral —and much less authoritarian— courses of action. Along the same lines, the Mexican government should strengthen ties with its citizens living north of the border through the development of health and educational and other programs that would link them economically and culturally to Mexico.

The PRI also includes human rights on its political agenda, pointing out the need to recognize their universal nature and establishing a system that would not apply them selectively or for political gain. In order to protect human rights, programs and concrete courses of action should be developed such as disseminating preventive and legal information or logistic support and providing legal counseling to Mexicans facing criminal charges.

Regarding migrant workers, Francisco Labastida suggests establishing a migratory pact with the United States similar to the one signed with Canada where federal authorities can formulate pacts with individual states requiring Mexican labor for their regional and sectorial markets. He also addresses the right of Mexican migrants who have lost their nationality to recover it, thereby strengthening their ties with their homeland and granting them rights under to Mexican law.

The PRI's platform also proposes facilitating the reentry of Mexicans living abroad, particularly in the U.S., by improving infrastructure and simplifying procedures for temporary or permanent reentry, both of people and their belongings, severely punishing corruption or abuse by Mexican authorities in these cases.

On the question of drug trafficking, the PRI aims to intensify the fight against transnational organized crime and corruption. They suggest establishing a legal framework of co-responsibility to deal with it, taking into account each country's priorities and strategies and rejecting any form of interference and extraterritorial implementation of domestic legislation, such as that of the United States.

In the commercial sphere, the PRI proposes taking advantage of NAFTA to increase exports and to promote culture, technological development and the competitiveness of the export sector. They suggest broadening the infrastructure and establishing frameworks of services and support in the fields of design, information, quality control, product promotion and labor training. Along the same line, unfair trade practices would be fought. The PRI's platform proposes fostering foreign direct investment, creating alternative mechanisms of financing, revising legislation regarding the control of financial flows and strengthening legal security, reciprocal protection and investment guarantees.

The PRI proposes that the geopolitical location of Mexico vis-à-vis North and Latin America be taken advantage of by strengthening political, economic, demographic, migratory, social and cultural ties with the United States as well as with Canada. They recognize the importance of this region in terms of gradual, organized economic growth and integration, technological progress and improvement of educational opportunities.

The PRI proposes that the geopolitical location of Mexico vis-à-vis North and Latin America be taken advantage of by strengthening political, economic, demographic, migratory, social and cultural ties with the United States as well as with Canada. They recognize the importance of this region in terms of gradual, organized economic growth and integration, technological progress, improvement of educational opportunities and the fostering of sustainable development.

Labastida believes that Mexico-U.S. relations present challenges, but also opportunities. Thus, an effort must be made to strengthen the legal and di-

Electoral Trends

In a recent survey, the Reforma Group[1] asked 2,397 Mexicans residing in all 31 states and Mexico City, "How interested are you in politics?" Forty percent answered that they were only "slightly interested", while 31 percent said they were totally uninterested; 22 percent that they were "somewhat interested"; and only 6 percent stated they were "very interested." The graph illustrates the answers to the question,

If the presidential elections were held today, who would you vote for?



7-11	11-14	18-21, 25-28	
JANUARY	FEBRUARY	FEBRUARY	
1%	1%	1%	Other
17%	17%	18%	Don't know/None of these

[1] *Reforma* (Mexico City), 15 March 2000. The Reforma Group is one of only four firms that the Federal Electoral Institute has stated fulfills its criteria for trustworthiness in its polling practices. [Editor's Note.]

plomatic framework that supports this relationship in order to resolve issues on the bilateral agenda.

CUAUHTÉMOC CÁRDENAS SOLÓRZANO

The political platform of the Alliance for Mexico headed up by presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas is divided into eight sections. Under the heading "A Sovereign Nation within the Global Context," the last section addresses foreign policy and relations with the United States. However, the bilateral relation is also addressed in the section entitled "Sustainable Economic Development with Equity" which links Mexico to the globalization process, and the economy with rural development, as well as outlining the international trade policy that should be followed.

The platform recognizes a world context where the process of globalization, the weight of the world powers (primarily the U.S.) and pressure from international financial organizations and multinational corporations greatly influence the future of all nations. In general terms, the Alliance

for Mexico addresses the issue of NAFTA and links it with others such as the promotion of industry, migration, the strengthening of the agricultural sector and infrastructure as well as the establishment of a realistic strategy for industrial growth.

Along the same lines, the PRD points out the disadvantages resulting from the process of globalization for developing countries, and specifically for Mexico. They mention the absence in NAFTA of protection for local production, above all in the agricultural sector, that would avoid the bankruptcy and disappearance of thousands of small and medium-sized holdings and firms. Other issues absent from NAFTA are the free transit of labor and political and labor rights of migrant workers in the United States. They point out that reforms to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution adapting its legal framework to the needs of NAFTA have only benefited a few fortunate exporting farmers in Mexico and big farming corporations of the U.S. and have created unfavorable conditions for the country's rural population. For this reason, Cárdenas proposes renegotiating NAFTA to protect strategic productive sectors and to aid those which have already been weakened by NAFTA, such as the agricultural sector; to establish an alternative program to become self sufficient in food production; to recover growth in the agricultural sector; to promote rural farming and non-agricultural employment; to combat extreme poverty and diminish rural poverty and to foster the growth of small and medium-sized companies.

On the question of foreign trade, the alliance believes that Mexico is far too dependent on the United States, which leads to constant acts of intervention —either real or potential— by its northern neighbor. Pointing out that while the U.S. represents 70 percent of Mexico's foreign trade, Mexico represents only 4 percent of U.S. trade, they suggest that Mexico try to diversify its international trade. Although NAFTA has benefited Mexico's trade, it also continues to limit the country's dynamic growth. This is a result of the fact that Mexico's net hard currency reserves still depend on the sale not of manufactured products but of oil.

According to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, NAFTA did not achieve a diversification of industry, primarily because the most attractive thing Mexico has to offer on the international market is cheap labor. Therefore, Cárdenas proposes the establishment of a realistic industrial strategy, diversifying markets and consolidating advantages gained in trade negotiations, seeing trade as the means to an end, that of national development.

Cárdenas proposes that the process of globalization take into account international free transit of workers and equality of individual economic, social and political rights of migrant workers in their place of work and residency. Cárdenas is committed, as well, to defending the right of Mexicans living abroad to vote in federal elections.

The Alliance for Mexico emphasizes the importance of dealing with issues of migration and the protection of human rights of Mexicans living abroad. Cárdenas proposes that the process of globalization take into account international free transit of workers and equality of individual economic, social and political rights of migrant workers in their place of work and residency. Cárdenas is committed, as well, to defending the right of Mexicans living abroad to vote in federal elections. He also proposes passing legislation to regulate remittances from U.S. residents to their families in Mexico.

In sum, all of these issues would require a gradual renegotiation of NAFTA to establish a more just relation between Mexico and the United States. However, despite the emphasis placed on this relationship, the platform leaves other items on the bilateral agenda untouched.

FINAL COMMENTS

The three main presidential candidates for the upcoming federal elections coincide on certain aspects of foreign policy and relations with the United States. Fox, Labastida and Cárdenas all emphasize the importance of the globalization of the world economy, which is manifested very differently in first world and developing nations. The three candidates recognize the important role the United States plays in this process and are aware of Mexico's dependence on its northern neighbor. They agree on the need to diversify Mexico's foreign relations in order to improve its negotiating capability and strengthen national sovereignty. For all three, the most obvious problem on the bilateral agenda is migration which they link to other issues such as human rights, flows of migrant labor and the restructuring of productive sectors, as well as the need to improve courses of action by both governments.

In contrast, there are very evident differences of opinion as to the manner of addressing these problems and whether or not to include other points on the electoral platform. This is most obvious with regard to issues such as drug trafficking, trade policy, the environment and binational cooperation. VM

NOTES

[1] Other candidates running for the presidency are Porfirio Muñoz Ledo for the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM), Manuel Camacho Solís for the Party of the Democratic Center (PCD), and Gilberto Rincón Gallardo for the Social Democracy Party (PDS). They each represent a relatively small fraction of the electorate and therefore have few possibilities of winning.

[2] According to Article 176 of the Federal Code for Institutions and Electoral Procedures (Cofipe), political parties must register their electoral platforms with the IFE.

The 2000 Elections And the Mexican Transition

*César Cansino**

Mexico's 1997 federal elections and the contest for the mayor's seat in the nation's capital substantially changed our understanding of the democratic transition for many reasons. For example, they were the first truly transparent, by-the-book elections in the country's history, a true milestone in the long, difficult road to democracy in Mexico. But questions immediately arise: Have we already made the transition to democracy? Where are we now? Are there clear, definitive signs that we can now speak of a successful democratic transition? What should we expect from the year 2000 federal elections? Do conditions exist for the political forces to accept alternating in office if the official party loses?

The aim of this article is to generate a few hypotheses about these questions in order to contribute to the much needed debate that the coming federal elections demand of us. It should be pointed out that the reading I propose derives essentially from reconsidering the theoretical and empirical texts about democratic transitions being produced by political scientists in recent decades. It is important to make this point because, if up to now the use of these analytical frameworks made it impossible to speak of a real democratic transition in Mexico, the 1997 federal elections demand that we at least make a few corrections or adjustments in that characterization.

* Professor of political theory at the UNAM Political and Social Sciences School and editor of *Metapolítica* magazine.

A Sui Generis Regimen
A Sui Generis Transition

If we limit ourselves to theory, we must agree that Mexico completed its long, difficult road to democracy in 1997. According to specialized texts on the topic, a transition to democracy concludes when the first free, credible —that is equitable, transparent and not top down— elections take place. In addition, the recognition of opposition victories in elections for strategic posts and the new balance

Octavio Nava/AVE

Vicente Fox Quesada, the Alliance for Change.

Antonio Nava/AVE

Francisco Labastida Ochoa, Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI).

of the country's most important political forces present the image of a system of competitive political parties and shared or divided local and state governments. Also, the mechanisms and institutions designed to organize and carry out the elections operated effectively and autonomously. The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) emerged triumphant as the main body responsible for this.

Antonio Naval/AVE

Cuauhtemóc Cárdenas Solórzano, The Alliance for Mexico.

Octavio Naval/AVE

Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution.

Of course, the 1997 elections did present some irregularities in a few very localized areas like Campeche,[1] examples of the inertia of a system that resists disappearing. Nevertheless, these isolated cases do not cast a major shadow over our impression of the elections as a whole. Only the coming 2000 federal elections, however, will confirm if the previous ones represented the beginning of a new democratic set of norms in Mexico or were just an isolated experience that succumbed under the inertia of authoritarianism and ambitions to power of those who have made official politics their way of life and road to riches.

No matter what happens, it is worth asking ourselves if the celebration of the first free, honest elections in Mexico is both necessary and sufficient reason to be able to say that we have successfully walked the road to democracy. For many different reasons, my first answer is no. If those elections marked the beginning of honest elections, we will have been witness to a sui generis transition to democracy, that, as such, leaves much open to ambiguity. Nothing says that these questions cannot be corrected or adapted along the way due to the very impact of greater equilibrium among the political forces. But, for the time being, they suggest an inconclusive process that combines some democratic practices with others which are still ambiguous and ambivalent.

In the first place, we should not forget that the 1997 federal elections —and presumably those of 2000— are, strictly speaking, the result of a gradual, prolonged, limited opening of the Mexican political regimen rather than of a real process of democratization. This marks a significant diference between our country and all those that have successfully made the transition to democracy in other places, whether southern Europe, Latin America or Eastern Europe. In effect, in all the other experiences, democracy was the result of broad, explicit accords or pacts among the main political forces. This lowered the risk of political regression and committed the actors to greater respect for the new democratic norms.

In the case of Mexico, in contrast, the main responsibility in defining timing and forms of opening up the Mexican political regimen has lain with its representatives, the authorities themselves. In this kind of political liberalization, the opposition parties have always been invited to participate, but in the long run, it has been the governing elite that has implemented its own decisions and preferences. We should remember, for example, that in the end, the last political reform (strictly speaking, an electoral reform) implemented in 1996, passed with only the votes of the party in power, overriding several previous multipartisan accords.

The ability to manoeuver should not be confused, however, with political will. The opening in the Mexican political regimen in recent years has not been the result of the governing elite's will to

change, nor a gracious concession to the opposition parties. Quite to the contrary, it has been the result of the democratic forces' long struggle and the real deterioration and natural wearing down of a political order that refuses to die.

No matter how paradoxical it might seem, then, we are witnessing a democratic transition via political liberalization. At one time, with the gradual opening, the regimen won time and some legitimacy that allowed it to maintain continuity. The elections represented no risk to its survival and it had sufficient legal and extralegal mechanisms to avoid big surprises. As the structural crisis of the political regimen accelerated, however, the elections increasingly became the natural institutional arena for competition and for the eventual transformation of the very regimen that the creation of simply a greater democratic image was originally aimed at preserving. In this way, its ability to manipulate the elections was de facto reduced, and the time came when interfering in the election results actually put the continued existence of the governing class at risk. Because of the very crisis of the regimen, the political cost of manipulating the elections to retain positions became higher than the cost of respecting them.

But in this process, because of its sui generis character, several questions remain. For example, the 1996 political reform did not reflect the convictions of all the parties and the partial way it was passed will continue to weigh in the future. If political will to respect the 1997 election results existed, the will to generate basic agreements should also exist. Apparently, in the those elections, the order of the elements did not change the result: credible elections. But this is only apparent. Sooner or later, new democratic norms will have to be drawn up and then, consensus will be imperative.

In brief, the 1997 elections marked a change from all previous experiences. For the first time Mexico had credible elections and the balloting results were respected without major complications. But, what made this possible then and not before, when the risks were greater?

Without going into an exhaustive explanation, it seems to me that factors like some of the following should be taken into account. In the first place, the Ernesto Zedillo administration inherited an accumulated political crisis that forced him to behave more in line with the discourse of the transition, until then merely rhetorical. For the first time, the magnitude of both the economic and political crisis made the cost of not respecting election results higher than the cost of manipulating them, as I have already mentioned. While the Carlos Salinas de Gortari administration's economic performance gave it certain legitimacy, allowing it to indefinitely postpone the democratic transition, the current administration enjoyed no such legitimacy, and therefore was forced to seek it in the field of politics.

The opening in the Mexican political regimen in recent years has not been the result of the governing elite's will to change, nor a gracious concession to the opposition parties. Quite to the contrary, it has been the result of the democratic forces' long struggle and the real deterioration and natural wearing down of a political order that refuses to die.

In the second place, in the long run, the very process of opening up the electoral arena, even though slowly, gradually, in a controlled fashion and with enormous irregularities, generated a dynamic of competition and participation that cannot be underestimated. While the elections were never equitable or credible, at least two opposition parties were able to use this opportunity the regimen opened up to become viable, recognized political options. Today, multipartisan politics is an inescapable reality. We have a more mature electorate, plural in its partisan affinities.

In the third place, we should not forget that the external factor had some weight in the 1997 elections. While in the past —concretely in 1988— the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) received

the "backing" of the United States, which despite the process' enormous irregularities, was one of the first governments in the world to recognize its victory, things were different in 1997. To get the investment and economic backing of the United States and the European Union, the Zedillo administration had to show a decided commitment to democracy. Among the many things at stake in those elections, foreign economic backing occupied a central spot.

The enormous expectations that have existed about this year's elections are due in great part to the fact that, for the first time, there is a real possibility that the governing party's presidential candidate may not come out the victor and that the PRI could even lose its congressional majority. Obviously, these are extreme eventualities that would be of historic consequences: the end of an era for our country.

Nevertheless, all this is not enough to enable us to say that the democratic transition in Mexico has concluded satisfactorily. On the contrary, enormous suspicions still exist due to a great extent to the very ambivalence of the regimen and the sui generis nature of the Mexican transition. Therefore, at the same time that we have the first credible elections, we also can see broad areas of impunity and despotism, repression and the violation of the most elemental human rights, the militarization of the country, crude practices of the patronage system, corruption on a grand scale, etc.

On the other hand, since it is the product of a gradual, top-down opening, it is deficient in several areas. Therefore, the celebration of honest elections is not a sufficient or necessary reason to declare its finalization and/or the entry of the country into a new "democratic normalcy," as the authorities would like. As I already pointed out, broad agreement is still lacking, not only on a consensus about electoral norms, but also about the entire edifice of norms for the democracy we aspire to, that is, the design of a new constitution.

Up to here, I have analyzed the meaning of the 1997 elections in the more general context of the democratic transition. It remains only to advance a few scenarios for the 2000 federal elections suggested by the new conditions.

THE NEW SCENARIOS

For many reasons, the 2000 federal elections will be historic. Today, the gaps among the parties have narrowed visibly, both in terms of their ability to get out the vote and their real positions of power nationwide. In addition, the deterioration of the Mexican political regimen has reached dramatic proportions. Suffice it to mention the low profile of the current administration, whose performance in office has been systematically censured by the public and is perceived as one of the greyest, most mediocre in the country's recent history.

As if that were not enough, the coming federal elections will take place in the context of an economic recession that has not been reversed since this administration took office, despite attempts to use official figures to prove the contrary. The context is also marked by the continued existence of several armed movements, presaging a spiral of instability and increased repression, factors that also feed the non-credibility of the regimen and the elections themselves. What can be expected, then, from the 2000 elections?

Generally speaking, the enormous expectations that have existed for some time about this year's elections are due in great part to the fact that, for the first time, there is a real possibility that the governing party's presidential candidate may not come out the victor and that the PRI could even lose its congressional majority. Obviously, these are extreme eventualities that would be of historic consequences: the end of an era for our country.

In addition to the possible outcome, equally novel is the fact that the July 2 elections present

broad areas of uncertainty. Today, in contrast to the recent past, no one can predict with certainty which party or candidate will come out the winner, in itself a democratic advance not to be scoffed at. Theoretically, electoral uncertainty, that is, the results of electoral competition not being a foregone conclusion, is inherent to any democracy; in that sense, any party running has the formal possibility of winning the elections.

But staying on this level of analysis would be limited. In is not enough that there be a good degree of electoral uncertainty to suppose that this year's elections will be fully credible, that is, clean and unobjectionable. A second condition must be fulfilled for that to be the case: there must be full guarantees so all the competing players accept and recognize the party favored by the balloting. That is, there must also be a degree of institutional certainty so that no matter what the outcome, the elections will not be challenged or repudiated by the contenders.

Obviously, it is here where our transition to democracy is still mired down, and there is good reason to suppose that the 2000 elections will not be a qualitative advance in this respect. It is here, precisely, where the factors of the political moment described initially allow us to support this affirmation.

In the first place, uncertainty as a condition for elections and institutional certainty with regard to the results presuppose a tacit arrangement among all the parties about the rules of competition. As we know, this was disregarded in the negotiations for the 1996 reform when the government and the party in power decided to unilaterally pass the new Federal Code of Electoral Institutions and Procedures without the backing of all the parties. This leaves open the possibility that the elections be challenged for complying to norms that continue to be biased in favor of the governing party.

In the second place, to adhere to democratic principles, electoral uncertainty must refer only to the outcome and in no way to the reactions of the political actors. The 2000 elections do not live up to this condition either. What is more, everything points to a close presidential race encouraging expressions of discontent and challenges on the part of the losing candidates and parties, which would create high risks for the country's political stability.

Antonio Nava/AVE

Manuel Camacho Solís, Party of the Democratic Center.

Antonio Nava/AVE

Gilberto Rincón Gallardo, Social Democracy Party.

Evidently, the fact that this kind of uncertainty still exists for the 2000 elections speaks badly of our "transition." Actually, it reveals that the political opening has not been accompanied by an effective agreement among all the actors that guarantees confidence in the process. As long as no real democratic pact exists to commit and hold all political actors for the democratic change, its success is by no means guaranteed. In brief, it is no use saying that electoral uncertainty exists if the basis has not been established for electoral institutional certainty, an endeavor almost completely yet to be undertaken. VM

NOTES

[1] The author is referring to the 1997 Campeche gubernatorial elections which were not held under the aegis of the IFE, but of the State Electoral Institute. [Editor's Note.]

Mexican Political Cycles
And Complex Cohabitation

*Isidro H. Cisneros**

Political rally in early twentieth-century Mexico.

The object of this brief essay is the study of the nature of political change in Mexico and how it has evolved over recent decades. The institutional physiognomy of the political regimen formed after 1917 has gone through profound transformations of varying intensities and dynamics during this century. A historic reconstruction is needed to analyze its evolution, identifying the different cycles of political change in Mexico. With that in mind, four great political cycles can be identified during the twentieth century, with a fifth now emerging.

The first cycle, from 1910 to 1940, was characterized by popular revolt and political instability, as well as economic reconstruction in a context of a "deficit of institutionalization," in which the caudillos, or political strongmen, continued to impose political order. The second cycle, from 1940 to 1977, was characterized by a very stable system of political monopoly founded on consistent economic growth leading to civilian political institutionalization with an excusionary electoral system and the absence of any significant political opposition. The third cycle, from 1977 to 1988, was a period of economic crisis and political liberalization in the framework of important social confrontations. The fourth cycle, from 1988 to 2000 has been characterized by apparent ungovernability and economic recovery. Today, we can see an emerging fifth cycle, one of "democratic cohabitation." Political transformation has been at its height in the fourth cycle, which continues today, when institutionalization has withstood the test of alternating in office in a context of the opposition's organizational growth and the formation of divid-

* Research coordinator of the Mexican campus of the Latin American Social Sciences Center (Flacso).

ed governments, giving rise to "complex cohabitation." The inauguration of democratic pluralism is an important fact in the great political and ideological mosaic that represents the Mexican nation at the end of the twentieth century. An examination of these political cycles will shed light on the new processes identifiable in recent years that have changed traditional equilibria in Mexico.

The First Cycle: 1910-1940

This period began with a new political order arising out of the end of the continual armed revolts against unstable authorities. With time, institutions began to achieve a political identity of their own, with unified structures for coercion as well as the delimitation of a territory with defined borders and the development of an initial phase of economic growth. The process of consolidation of a modern state in Mexico that occurred between 1876 and 1910 was interrupted by the revolutionary civil war of 1910-1917. The country's political history in this period was characterized by a long succession of divisions, conflicts and insurrections of different types that reflected the profound political instability of the time, explained to a great degree by the chronic weakness of the state and its institutions. During this first cycle, a new political hegemony emerged under the command of a series of military caudillos who perpetuated their influence through the process of the definitive establishment of the postrevolutionary regimen.

The Institutionalization of Political Monopoly: 1940-1977

If the founding of the National Revolutionary Party (PNR) in 1929 can be described as the transition "from fragmentation to unification," its subsequent corporativist transformation into the Party of the Mexican Revolution (PRM) in 1938 corresponds to "from caudillos to institutions." The modern regimen was consolidated in this second political cycle, producing new structures to congregate and represent different interests. The hegemonic party would become the privileged actor on the national scene during this second cycle. In subsequent years, an interconnection would emerge among economic benefits, moderate improvement in the quality of life, control of participation and the exclusion of political opposition. This second cycle can be characterized as one of "social peace for economic development and the consolidation of the political regimen at any cost." The centralization of power that accompanied this moment hinged mainly on the formation of the modern mass party in Mexico.[1] It functioned as a mechanism to control centrifugal tendencies in the governing elite and as an organizational space for the political representation of different sectors of society. The new political hegemony that came with modernization took on board the demand for the application of the social program of the revolution, which would be an important factor in legitimizing the political regimen in ensuing years.

The formation of divided governments has given rise to "complex cohabitation." The inauguration of democratic pluralism is an important fact in the great political and ideological mosaic that represents the Mexican nation at the end of the twentieth century.

From Liberalization to Political Crisis: 1977-1988

The dynamic of political liberalization begun in the late 1970s made it possible for different forces to alternate in office on a local level, opening up the road to peaceful, agreed-upon political change on a state level by the mid-1980s. The third political cycle is a turning point in the analysis of the nature

of political transformation in Mexico. This cycle is characterized by a constant deterioration of the economy and the resulting negative impact on the legitimacy of the political regimen, as well as by active electoral reformism to guarantee governability. Opposition groups considered these reforms changes in a legal framework within which legally recognized parties already acted. The consequences of the lack of political alternatives came to the fore very clearly during the 1976 presidential elections when no legally registered political party except the PRI ran a candidate. For the first time in the history of modern Mexico, the system of political relations could no longer hide what was clear to the majority of the foremost political actors: the lack of competition among the parties and the absolute control over politics of the hegemonic party.

For the first time in contemporary Mexico, the possibility exists of political cohabitation among different political elites and parties that represent both federal and local governments, as well as new relations between the executive branch and the different legislatures.

FROM POLITICAL CRISIS TO COMPLEX COHABITATION: 1988-2000

The fourth cycle can be divided into two moments: the years from 1988 to 1996, years of the recomposition of the regimen's legitimacy in a context of trade integration with the United States and Canada, expectations for an improved economy, the emergence of a strategy for renegotiation of the foreign debt, the reprivatization of the public sector and increased emphasis on social policy.

In the second moment, from 1997 to 2000, citizenship has been extended to other sectors of society. These are years characterized by greater political liberalization as a plausible response to the problems stemming from the economic and social crises. Electoral reforms have contributed to guaranteeing individuals and groups the right to politically express and organize themselves autonomously. The fundamental distinguishing factor of this liberalization has been the recognition of a legitimate political opposition, thus favoring the recomposition of the political system. On this basis, citizens' rights have expanded parallel to the evolution of the economic crisis; this has become a distinctive factor of the new democratic political way of life initiated with this last, fourth political cycle. For the first time in contemporary Mexico, the possibility exists of political cohabitation among different political elites and parties that represent both federal and local governments, as well as new relations between the executive branch and the different legislatures. Political cohabitation appears on the scene as an institutional agreement based on the need to come to general commitments to supercede special interests. The problems Mexico faces are of such magnitude that no matter what the ideology or political orientation of the group in power, it cannot assume sole responsibility for creating the democratic normalcy and economic and social viability the country so needs. Mexico's ongoing process of political transformations also requires a new, inclusive political culture that acknowledges the temporary nature of any given administration. Alternating in office is the recognition that many options are competing for power in Mexico at the end of the century and also a reflection of the formation of new —and temporary— majorities and minorities.

FUTURE POLITICAL VARIABLES: 2000-2006

A new political cycle has appeared on the horizon bringing with it risks of ungovernability that should not be underestimated. To conclude, I will sketch out some of the possible scenarios for this fifth cycle. The first could be dubbed one of political

innovation and inclusive democratization, wherein the autonomy of politics would play a preponderant role, above all expressed through the democratization of the political parties and an increased number of agreements and pacts for governability. Democratization would be consolidated, and it would be possible to govern through a renovation of legitimacy. The PRI would recover its political space and lead the way to an inclusive and peaceful change decided by consensus, in which tolerance and respect for diversity would be the norm. Political practices and leadership groups and elites would be overhauled and the political culture would be renewed democratically. This would be a sort of "third road, Mexican style."

A second scenario could be called one of polarized pluralism and political fragmentation, whose main characteristic would be a political life pulverized due to the clash of major interests. Opposition coalitions would be more frequent, as would new majorities forged through alliances. This variable includes the possible formation of co-governments of many ideological and political currents and groups, co-governments fraught with clashes over the distribution of power. Pragmatism and short-term solutions would proliferate, as well as recurring crises due to the absence of a political class capable of efficiently identifying national priorities and effective decision making.

The third scenario would be one of ungovernability and sharpened contradictions, in which the primacy of "realism in politics" would take the lead. Expressed another way, politics would become more pragmatic and would put immediate interests front and center, leaving to one side principles, proposals and programs. This scenario represents the appearance of a modern "disease of politics," characterized by a society based on spectacle and political clashes. This would be the harbinger of the emergence of radical actors (like the Zapatista National Liberation Army [EZLN] and other armed groups), second generation populists, whether on the right (like Vicente Fox, the National Action Party [PAN] presidential candidate) or the left (like Party of the Democratic Revolution [PRD] presidential candidate Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas). These new populist leaderships combine traditional practices, such as religious or historical heritages, and are guided by pragmatism rather than realistic proposals. Ungovernability would derive from the political extremism of the new populism. The absence of forward-looking proposals is rooted in the central actors' communicating with the public through backward-looking, traditional stereotypes. In the era of globalization it can be said that this scenario would project the emergence of two right wings in Mexican politics: an elitist, technocratic one represented by the PAN and a traditionalist, populist one represented by the PRD.

The problems Mexico faces are of such magnitude that no matter what the ideology or political orientation of the group in power, it cannot assume sole responsibility for creating the democratic normalcy and economic and social viability the country so needs.

The fourth scenario could be called "All that glitters is not gold," a scenario of imperfect democratization, whose most important characteristic would be the ineffectiveness of politics. Here, democratic politics loses its moral strength when faced with the challenges of external factors. Despite the democratic normalcy and transparency in electoral processes now accepted by all actors, the continuing existence of social injustice would make Mexican democratization much more vulnerable. The negative effects of globalization may be obstacles to Mexico's effectively eliminating inequality, which it must do to improve the quality of democratic life. In this scenario social exclusion would continue, as would many vulnerable groups living in extreme poverty, new minorities and political identities that would demand a place in the public sphere.

Which of these scenarios comes into being will depend on how much the parties and different political actors understand that democracy in Mexico, with all its imperfections, is already an irreversible process. VM

NOTES

[1] In 1946, the PRM transformed itself into what is currently the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). [Editor's Note.]

FURTHER READING

Aguilar Camín, Héctor and Lorenzo Meyer, *A la sombra de la revolución mexicana* (Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 1990).

Bartra, Roger, *La democracia ausente* (Mexico City: Grijalbo, 1986).

Cisneros, Isidro H., "La transizione messicana alla democrazia," *Latinoamerica* no. 37-38 (Rome)(January-June, 1990), pp. 51-57.

_____"Los diferentes momentos del cambio político de tipo democrático: hacia una propuesta clasificatoria," *Perfiles Latinoamericanos* 3, no. 4 (Flacso, Mexico City)(June 1994), pp. 143-168.

_____ "México: ciudadanía, espacio público y democracia," *Cuestión de Estado* 20 (Lima, Peru) (April 1997), pp. 61-62.

_____ "Messico: una transizione di velluto," *America Latina* 9 (Centro Europeo di Studi sulla Democratizzazione, Bolonia, Italy) (1997).

Córdova, Arnaldo, *La ideología de la revolución mexicana. La formación del nuevo régimen* (Mexico City: IIS/UNAM-Era, 1973).

Cosío Villegas, Daniel, ed., *Historia moderna de México* (Mexico City: Hermes, 1955-1972).

De la Torre Villar, Enrique, "Estudio preliminar y notas," *El triunfo de la república liberal (1857-1860)*, De la Torre, comp. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1960), pp. 9-54.

García Orozco, Antonio, "Legislación electoral mexicana 1812-1977," *Gaceta Informativa de la Comisión Federal Electoral* (Mexico City: Talleres Gráficos de la Nación, 1978).

González y González, Luis, "El periodo formativo," *Historia mínima de México*, Daniel Cosío Villegas, et al. (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1974), pp. 73-114.

Hale, Charles, "La transformación del liberalismo en México a fines del siglo XIX," *Vuelta* (Mexico City, 1991).

Hamilton, Nora, *México: los límites de la autonomía del Estado* (Mexico City: Era, 1985).

Krauze, Enrique, *Siglo de caudillos* (Mexico City: Tusquets, 1994), pp. 19-20.

Paoli Bolio, Francisco, *Las elecciones en México* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI Editores, 1985).

Reyes Heroles, Jesús, *El liberalismo mexicano* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1958).

Zaid, Gabriel, "La economía presidencial," *Vuelta* (Mexico City, 1987).

Carlos Torres
Autobiography

Unless otherwise specified photos by Lourdes Almeida

Translation, 400 x 600 cm, 1999 (acrylic on aluminium), mural, Children's Hospital.

I was born in 1949 in a Chihuahua mountain town, a place of light, long shadows and golden autumns. An open, imaginative, lovable family. At the age of ten, the revelation of having, if not talent, at least the ability to see and transcribe the forms around me.

From 1962 to 1968, I studied English in a Mormon school, whose neatness and discipline may well have influenced my life. The most important thing, the discovery of photography, of the timeless magic of the darkroom and the key to my life: light.

1969-1974, attempts to study film direction. Fate decided that it be painting instead. Formal education at the La Esmeralda National School of Painting. Classical training, initially good, and confused and imprecise later; I encountered bad professors and worse artists. Like every other student at the time, I dream of Paris.

1974. Fifteen days after finishing my schooling, I leave for Brussels. I arrive in Paris by train, at night, in mid-summer. There's a feeling of almost alarm at seeing the city for the first time as I leave the Gare du Nord train station. Chance, once again, introduces me to Carlos Cruz-

Poliptych no. 8, 100 x 100 cm, 1999 (mixed technique).

Diez, a Venezuelan artist who asks me to help him with a project for two weeks. The two weeks would turn into 10 years of learning and friendly collaboration. The need to be myself, to try the adventure alone, becomes imperative and I leave his workshop in 1984.

I think about all my exhibits and am surprised that I remember each one and the circumstances in which they took place.[1] The first time was very moving, both in the case of the 1971 collective exhibition in Mexico City's Palace of Fine Arts when I was still studying and my first one-man show, that included photography, in 1979 after a difficult first year in Paris, at the San Angel Gallery.

Salons like "Young and Old of Today" in 1977 in Paris and others in later years were starting points for many projects and invitations, the real door to professional painting, both Parisian and international.

The 1986 individual showing in Costa Rica's National Contemporary Art Gallery is memorable for several reasons: it was the first I did after ending my period as an assistant; the crates the paintings were shipped in were lost for four days; and, finally, I remember an old woman who, after looking at my work, took me by the hands and said, "Thank you very much," and then disappeared.

Contact with Germany and the United States has been pleasant for me because of their peoples' straightforward, practical ways; showing in New York has always been exciting. In 1987, I participated in a collective exhibition of artists of different nationalities in the Salpetriere Chapel, interesting both because of the quality of the work presented and the imposing venue itself. The experience was unforgettable. Through Cruz-Diez, I went to Venezuela in 1978 and since then my links with Caracas and its inhabitants

Daniel Pype

Vertical Slide,
120 x 75 cm, 1997
(acrylic on paper on
wood).

have gotten stronger. My collectors have become my friends.

I have always taken care to maintain contact with Mexico, both my native Chihuahua and Mexico City's galleries and institutions, from the Carrillo Gil Museum in 1981 to the Oscar Román Gallery in autumn 1999.

I don't even want to try to talk about the doubts, influences, initiation rites, suffering, small achievements, doubts again, etc., that we all encounter along the way. Evoking them would be a different matter altogether. VM

Notes

[1] From 1971 to the present, Carlos Torres has exhibited his work individually and collectively in salons, galleries, cultural centers and museums of Mexico, Europe, the United States and South America. [Editor's Note].

Carlos Torres
A Lesson in Humility

*Yuriria Iturriaga**



Photos by Lourdes Almeida

Torn Fragment, 83 x 65 cm, 1997 (mixed technique).

The pictorial universe of Mexican artist Carlos Torres is populated with objects and movement, superimposed planes, of sparkling or deep colors, of falsely disparate and heterogenous elements. But above all, it is a universe where relations internal and external to the work bring it into close affinity to the gnoseological universe.

That is, just as life is not defined by its elements —cells or persons— but by the complex relations established between one and the other, in Torres' art, it is the relationships between the objects of his

* Anthropologist, journalist and diplomat.

Burned Panels, 65 x 25 cm each, 1999 (mixed technique).

themes that give meaning to each whole, balances it visually and gives continuity and coherence to the colors and lines. In other words, each of his pieces is, above all, an expression of internal relations.

But, in addition, each painting or sculpture —even more so as a whole in an exhibition— establishes with the viewer the kind of external relations that are specific to this artist and that he unleashes, voluntarily or not, through that solid shadow that always (or almost always) traverses his work.

Be it a solid cement cube in which the fragile, colorful canvas of a painting is submerged or the distance produced

Translation, 100 x 200 cm, 1999 (mixed technique).

by the gradual enclosure of the margins of a luminous window; be it a grey ellipse that half conceals an abstract landscape so the hidden part reappears exactly on the opposite grey surface; or be it a black painting that moves over the colors and forms imprisoned within the borders of a frame, or a shutter, or two or three, that open and shut now on their black faces, now on the multicolored hues: all his work invites us to compose and recompose as many paintings again. Exactly as life is a constant invitation to look at it from many points of view, in perspectives whose main quality is their impossible simultaneity.

This is how Carlos Torres also forces us to ask ourselves about the trust we place in our gaze and our memory, situ-



Reconstruction, 76 x 57 cm, 1998 (mixed technique).

ating us before the evidence of the eye's inability to offer us a totalizing vision of the whole and before the mistakes the memory makes a few moments after seeing part of a painting, hidden immediately and replaced by its counterpart.

As we wander through his work, Torres forces us, then, to repeatedly tell ourselves how limited we are before the phenomenon of knowledge that originates in the gaze, which we consider more objective and understanding than it really is. VM

The Only Guest

*Luis González de Alba**



Tryptych no.190, 65 x 125 cm, 1999 (mixed technique).

Photos by Lourdes Almeida

Carlos Torres is not concerned with contemporary physics or cosmology. He paints, shades, outlines, smears, suffers when he does not like it, refines. He paints.

On the other hand, critics who borrow concepts from the exact sciences to manufacture overrefined, unintelligible, concocted paragraphs to impress their readers with gems of wisdom that no one —it goes without saying— will ever verify are always loathsome and pedantic.

However, we science enthusiasts cannot help but be surprised by Carlos Torres' painting. These matte, pure blacks that half cover all the patiently harmonized, perfected bursts of color; subtleties worked to end up under a smoke-colored blotch, or partially submerged in cement before it sets or, lastly and irremissibly, burned with a blowtorch. It is like gazing at a starry night, at blue mornings. But then, I don't want to continue down that road because I have seen abominable paintings that look like interplanetary spaces, cheap trash by bad, astronomer illustrators. No. Carlos Torres manufactures abstractions, always without titles, in which some of us can see what is very large and what is very small, some of us can reflect on the use of space as a part of the painting when a piece of it is taken out and a hole left that will forever await its imminent and impossible reassembly.

Oh, what chatter between tequilas and cocktails that this lends itself to! A piece of painting cut out and set apart: an impossible love, says one; simple, full

* Mexican writer.

Tryptych no.1, 100 x 130 cm, 1997 (mixed technique on paper/wood).

We cannot help but be surprised by Carlos Torres' painting. These matte, pure blacks that half cover all the patiently harmonized, perfected bursts of color; subtleties worked to end up under a smoke-colored blotch. It is like gazing at a starry night, at blue mornings.

Translation, 100 x 100 cm, 1999 (mixed technique on paper/wood).

love because you never know your beloved, says another, a little drunker; the hole is unsatisfied waiting; no, says the guitar player, it is the chord with a suspended third that seeks resolution in the tonic chord that never comes. It's that — oh, the inevitable cliches— the viewer recreates the work, says the sociologist in passing, drink in hand.

When they have all left the living room, their reflections and interpretations will stop. A single objective fact will remain, a single guest: the great beauty of the paintings of Carlos Torres. Because beauty has no geography, no era; it eludes interpretation. It is ineffable. It is platonic. You have it or you don't. Today, or a thousand years from now. VM

The New Mexican Cinema

Four Directors Put Their Vision of the Country on Camera

*Mario Pacheco Székely**

Mexico is a country worth looking at from different angles. You need the imagination of the artists of the movie camera, observers, witnesses and narrators of the marvelous complexity of the imagination that comes from living under an Aztec sky.

Directors Carlos Bolado, Fernando Sariñana, Antonio Serrano and Alejandro Springall are artists of the big screen who go out hunting for the many existing Mexicos: in the countryside, the mountains, byways and grottos, in the streets and even in skyscrapers.

Audiences have welcomed the premiers of these film makers' movies with smiles.

How could they not be pleased when a film becomes a mirror; the stories are their own, a reflection of the feelings of a people rich in characters and customs, and at the same time tremendously universal.

I will say a little something about these four visions and how each sees in the cinema a vehicle for their Mexican stories.

---

* Film critic.



Fernando Sariñana. Director of the polemical film *All Power*.

A Simple But Profound Trip With Carlos Bolado

The goal of the hero's
trip down to the jewel point
is to find those levels in the psyche
that open, open, open, and finally open
to the mystery of your self.
That's the journey.

Joseph Campbell[1]

For 35-year-old director Carlos Bolado, born in Veracruz, traveling means knowing when to stop and listen to your soul, delve inward to try to cover your defects and heal the evils caused by your stumbling through life.

This is what he shows us in *Under California: The Edge of Time* a film that has gotten rave reviews from Mexican critics and international viewing audiences alike. In France, for example, it has won prizes and festivals, like the Golden Unicorn for the best full-length feature at the Amiens International Film Festival.

The movie is the story of Damián, a man who hits a pregnant woman on a California highway and then decides to cross the border to take refuge in the desert of Baja California, Mexico, in an area called San Francisco de las Cruces.

Damián hears that there is a cave covered with prehistoric paintings whose red brush strokes testify to the fact that ancient people felt the need, just like he does, of seeking a new direction in their lives.

"Bolado's movie is wonderfully acted by Damián Alcázar (*Two Murders*) and Jesús Ochoa (*No Return Address*), both of whom won Ariels[2] for their efforts. It is a real lesson in simplicity, subtlety and sensitivity seldom achieved by our cinematography," said critic Rafael Aviña, after its screening at the Fourteenth Guadalajara Film Festival in 1999.[3] Aviña had already described it as one of the biggest stretches attempted by the Mexican film industry in the last 30 years.[4]

Reprinted courtesy of Columbia Pictures

Under California: The Edge of Time won several awards at the October 1999 Ariel ceremonies, including Best Picture and Best First Film.



Reprinted courtesy of Nunivision

All Power cost two million dollars to make.

"Before being a film maker, I am a traveler. I have traveled almost the whole world over and there's some of that in *Under California: The Edge of Time*. The character Damián Alcázar —more or less my alter ego— [is] a traveler who comes to Baja California searching for himself," says Bolado to explain why he picked a story outside the usual commercial paradigm.[5]

His experience as editor of the successful Mexican film *Like Water for Chocolate*, and of *A Bride Who Might See You*, *Married Life* and *Unto Death* made Bolado a passionate lover of supple, meaningful visual language, which is reflected in *Under California*, a film full of still-to-be-discovered treasures.

Fernando Sariñana With an Urban Look

The police get money outta you/
but they live on what you give them/
and if they treat you like a criminal/
it's not your fault/
thank Mexico City's mayor...

Molotov[6]

Setting up his camera in the streets of Tijuana and Mexico City has been an absolute need for Fernando Sariñana. He wants to deal with today's issues, those that concern him, which makes his cinema a rich, up-to-date, modern experience.

"My new movie, *All Power* is to a certain extent a denunciation, but without being just verbiage or didactic. It simply tries to show with no tricks the corruption of the police, public officials and even ourselves," says Sariñana. His film premiered in January 2000.[7]

After a success at the 1994 Toronto Film Festival of his first film, *Unto Death*, that portrays the lives of two young rebels, Sariñana's comedy *All Power* illustrates police corruption and how one of their victims (Demián Bichir) urges a group of people to take justice into their own hands.

Sariñana underlines his intention of making his film a collective experience by interviewing his actors who tell stories about real robberies that show the police in a less than favorable light.

His way of dealing with this issue that worries 20 million Mexico City residents as well as people from other unsafe cities throughout Mexico ensures Sariñana a positive audience reaction from a public anxious for catharses. And what is better than movies for that?

Reprinted courtesy Columbia Pictures

Under California: The Edge of Time shared Best Picture with *Little Saints* at the 1999 Los Angeles Latino Film Festival.

Reprinted courtesy of 20th Century Fox

Serrano's *Sex, Shame and Tears* became Mexico's biggest box-office hit of all time.

ANTONIO SERRANO
PSYCHOANALYZING MEXICAN COUPLES

I don't deny it. I'm a fanatic of the orgasm, that little explosion that holds the meaning of everything.

Ana (a character in the play and film *Sex, Shame and Tears*)[8]

Antonio Serrano is another film maker interested in being up to date and speaking intimately to his audience about always-attractive topics like love relationships, infidelity and what it takes to make a relationship work in an overpopulated city. His first movie, *Sex, Shame and Tears* (1999) passed the test of audience acceptance when it raked in the biggest box-office revenues in Mexican history. More than five million people saw it between its premier in May and when it left the big screen in November 1999.

The story, written and directed by Serrano for the theater in the early 1990s, where also had a successful run, is about two middle class, thirty-something couples and their friends. The war of the sexes breaks out when infidelity is uncovered: the men take refuge in one apartment and the women in another. They spy on each other through the windows as each group thinks out loud about the obstacles to finding love.

"*Sex, Shame and Tears* is the comedy of errors of six characters who by cheating on each other and fooling themselves emotionally and sexually end up knowing and forgiving themselves," says Serrano.[9] The director's main concern was making comedy a narrative vehicle for getting the audience to think about how they view the crisis of modern couples, trapped in the noise of the cities

Reprinted courtesy of Nunivision

Little Saints won the Best Latin American Picture Award at the Sundance Film Festival.

Reprinted courtesy of 20th Century Fox

Sex, Shame and Tears, a testimony to how Mexico's generation X understands love.

and the war between women's liberation and machismo.

But, far from being just another movie about personal relationships, Serrano's film will be visual testimony to the concerns and ways of understanding love of Mexico's Generation X, for the most part ignored in domestic films, but who, curiously enough, are the ones filling movie theaters today.

The Celestial Vision Of Alejandro Springall

Little Saints *is a compassionate work about a woman who struggles against her own faith and emerges victorious.*

John Sayles[10]

Faith is without a doubt still important for Mexicans, and María Amparo Escandón's novel, *Santitos* (Little Saints) (1997), and the movie of the same name directed by Alejandro Springall, depict a country where God's little ambassadors rush in whenever they are asked to help anyone with a problem.

One day, the patron saint of desperate cases, San Judas Tadeo, appears to the main character, Esperanza (which in Spanish means "hope") (Dolores Heredia), in her oven, and tells her that her dead daughter is really alive, and she must go out in the world to find her.

In a kind of a road movie, Springall takes Esperanza from Veracruz to Tijuana, where she follows the supposed clues about her daughter's whereabouts. On the way, Esperanza is forced into prostitution and into crossing the Rio Grande as a "wetback," all the time with an innocence of spirit and the firm intention of carrying out the mission God has given her.

Santitos is so faithful to the Mexican spirit that when it was given the Best Picture award at the Third Los Angeles Latino Film Festival, the emcee, actor Edward James Olmos, said, "This movie is being honored for having understood the values and intentions of our destiny as a people, identifying with all its values, and because its plot and characters fully realize the Latino experience."[11]

Springall uses humor to make Esperanza's trip a mythical experience; she runs into archetypal characters who symbolize government, Church and business intervention into the lives of ordinary Mexicans.

The work of these four film makers gives us a look at Mexico's different faces. Through them, film certainly is ratified as a medium that goes beyond entertainment and invites the whole audience —just out of curiosity or because they want to understand the country— to look through the window that Bolado, Sariñana, Serrano and Springall have opened for us. VM

Notes

[1] Joseph Campbell, *A Joseph Campbell Companion* (New York: Harper Perennial, 1991), p. 23.

[2] The Ariel is Mexico's equivalent of the Oscars.

[3] *Reforma* (Mexico City), 3 October 1999.

[4] *Reforma* (Mexico City), 16 November 1998.

[5] *Reforma* (Mexico City), 28 August 1999.

[6] Fragment of the song *Gimme the Power* by Mexican rock group Molotov.

[7] *Reforma* (Mexico City), 23 April 1999.

[8] Antonio Serrano, *Sexo, pudor y lágrimas* (Mexico City: Ediciones el Milagro, 1993), p. 83.

[9] Interview with the author, Mexico City, March 1998.

[10] Dust cover of the book by María Amparo Escandón, *Santitos* (Mexico City: Plaza & Janés, 1997).

[11] Interview with the author, Los Angeles, October 1999.

CISAN

publications

Las mujeres al fin del milenio en América del Norte

Women in North America, Towards the End of Millenium

Mónica Verea and Graciela Hierro, compilers

A pioneering concept, this book is a collective look by Canadian, U.S. and Mexican women academics, officials and artists at the work of today's women and the role they have played in North American societies.





Los sistemas políticos de América del Norte en los noventa. Desafíos y convergencias

(North American Political Systems in the nineties. Challenges and Convergence)

Julián Castro Rea, Robert J. Jackson and Gregory S. Mahler, compilers

This book takes a comparative approach to the Mexican, U.S. and Canadian legal systems, constitutions, federalism, government institutions, domestic and foreign policies.

Estados Unidos y Canadá ¿Signos conservadores hacia el siglo XXI?

(U.S. and Canada. Signs Towards a Conservative XXI century?

Mónica Verea C. and Silvia Núñez G., compilers

An exploration of conservatism in both countries. It points to the questions the North American societies are going to have to answer in the next century.





Nueva agenda bilateral en la relación México-Estados Unidos

(A New Agenda for Bilateral Mexico-U.S. Relations)

Mónica Verea C., Rafael Fernández de Castro and Sidney Weintraub, compilers

A presentation from different angles of the most important items on the new bilateral agenda for the two neighboring countries.

Forthcoming: *Los procesos electorales en América del Norte en 1994.* (Elections in North America in 1994)

For further information contact: CISAN: Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Torre de Humanidades 2, piso 9, Ciudad Universitaria 04510, México, D.F. Tel. 56 23 00 15; fax 56 23 00 14; e-mail: cisan@servidor.unam.mx

CISAN

publications

California: Problemas económicos, políticos y sociales

Rosa Cusminski (coord.), 291 pp.

Despite its recent crisis, California is still one of the strongest economies in the world. Specialists from Mexico and the United States examine different aspects of its social, legal, historical, economic and political life.



Elecciones en Canadá. Cambio y continuidad

Julián Castro Rea (coord.) 152 pp.

A review of one of the most complex and controversial elections in Canadian history. These studies probe the outcome of the 1993 elections called in a questioned, divided Canada.

Dilemas estadunidenses en los noventa. Impactos sobre México

Silvia Núñez and Ana Luz Ruelas (coords.), 155 pp.

Reflections on the inevitable integration offers the reader a more horizontal look at ocurrent U.S. problems and their impact on Mexico: among others, the crisis of the welfare state, antiimmigrant paranoia, the changeover from a war economy to a more competitive civilian economy.



El conservadurismo en Estados Unidos y Canadá. Tendencias y perspectivas hacia el fin del milenio.

Mónica Verea C. and Silvia Núñez G., compilers. 342 pp.

Different analytical approaches and scholarly perspectives to characterize what is generally called "conservatism". The authors start from a recognition of multiple theoretical, conceptual frameworks in their endeavor to overcome stereotypes.

Canadá en Transición

Teresa Gutiérrez H., Mónica Verea C. (coords.). 683 pp.

An overview of Canada today offering essays aiming to define the nature of the Canadian situation so as to be able to better understand the previously unknown, recently discovered northern Mexico's trade partner.



Arte chicano como cultura de protesta

Sylvia Gorodezky, 169 pp.

An analysis of the paradoxes of Chicano art based on an overview of Chicano artists and their situation vis-à-vis Mexico and the United States. Includes color prints.

Me voy pa' Pensilvania por no andar en la vagancia. Los ferrocarrileros mexicanos en Estados Unidos durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial

Bárbara Driscoll, 278 pp.

A look at the little known story of nonagricultural Mexican migrant workers in the United States under the Railroad Bracero Program instituted during the Second World War by both the Mexican and U.S. governments.





¿Sentenciados al aburrimiento? Tópicos de cultura canadiense

Graciela Martínez-Zalce (editor). 212 pp.

This work brings together different approaches and opinions about Canadian culture and identity. With a look at music, painting, film, literature, television, theater and history, cultural manifestations inherent in Canadian society, it questions the existence of a national identity and culture.

La gestión de la basura en las grandes ciudades

Pamela Severini. Avances de investigación Series. 61 pp.

This book compares Canadian and Mexican programs on the treatment of solid wastes in Mexico City and Montreal. Severini states that the problem can only be explained by institutional, demographical and economic reasons and could soon result in some serious conflicts.



La administración Clinton

Bárbara Driscoll, Mónica Verea (coords.) 404 pp.

An analysis of the beginnings of the Clinton administration. A basic sourcebook to explain the transition to a Democratic Administration and to evaluate current political events.

The Challenges of Demographic Aging in Mexico

*Rodolfo Tuirán**

Photos by Antonio Nava/AVE

One of the emerging phenomena that the world must face today is the rapid growth of its elderly population.[1] Sooner or later, it will affect all the nations of the world. In fact, demographers predict that in the next half century the number of elderly adults (people 65 and older) will increase 3.5 times, going from 418 million to 1.461 billion, and that their relative weight in the total population will jump from 6.9 percent to 16.4 percent. These estimates make not only debate on this issue, but also the adoption of measures to deal with its current and future consequences, imperative.

We can say with total certainty that Mexico will also "go grey and get old."[2] The average age of the Mexican population will increase from 27 to 30 years in this decade, and later, between 2030 and 2050, it will go from 38 to 45. Simultaneously, the population 65 and over will increase from 4.8 million to 17 million between 2000 and 2030, reaching about 32.5 million in the year 2050. This means that while today one out of every 20 Mexicans is an older adult, in 2030, one out of every eight will be and in 2050, one out of every four.

These changes will tend to undermine the way many of our institutions operate, and social actors will organize and exert pressure for new institutional arrangements to more closely reflect the new patterns of demands and needs. Let us look at it more graphically. In the sphere of politics, demographic aging will mean a profound recomposition of the electorate. While today, over-65-year-old adults make up around 8 percent of the population of voting age, in 2030, they will be more than 17 percent; and in the year 2050, 30 percent. As a result, the agenda of the executive and legislative branches, as well as the social organizations' and political parties' platforms will seek to adapt themselves to this new demographic reality and care for the aged will become increasingly important politically.

The impact will soon be felt in manufacturing: not as many toy and children's wear factories will be needed, but many

* General secretary of Mexico's National Population Council.

Around 8 out of every 10 senior citizens have no pension.

more plants that make items for older adults' domestic, nutritional and mobility needs will be. The service sector will require fewer day care facilities, schools for elementary education and obstetrical and pediatric establishments, and more hospitals, homes, shelters and recreational services as well as specialists in geriatrics and care for the aged. Suffice it to say that now there are 11 senior citizens for every 100 people in the work force, whereas by the years 2030 and 2050, that ratio will rise to 24 and 45 per hundred, respectively.

Many other aspects of our daily life will change. Life styles, consumption and nutritional patterns will be different; organizations and groups for the protection and defense of the rights of over-65-year-old adults will proliferate; the cities will change and neighborhoods with large concentrations of the elderly will spring up; the interior of dwellings will transform to adapt to the needs of old people; urban transportation will change; ramps on street corners will abound; and more attention will be paid to equipping our cities to facilitate the mobility of this segment of the population.

Aging will also spur profound changes in our way of life and our thinking: men and women of all ages will have to adapt themselves to new rhythms of life in society, changing perceptions of life's course and the emerging norms and expectations related to age. It will also change residential and domestic arrangements and undoubtedly have diverse ramifications and multiple consequences for social, family, gender and intergenerational relations.[3]

The transformation of old age into a social problem stems not only from the growing number of individuals who reach it, but mainly from the institutional rigidity in responding to their needs and demands. Aging becomes a social problem when it is accompanied by poverty, illness, being physically challenged and social isolation. The different dimensions of inequality like social class, ethnicity and gender intersect and reinforce each other in old age, trapping people in the web of multiple disadvantages from which it is very difficult to escape today.

Retirement or definitive withdrawal from economic activity, as a social transition that leads the way to old age, is in the best of cases only partially institutionalized in Mexico. For a minority, retirement from work with the protection of a pension is an aspiration and a possibility, while for the great majority, given their need of income to subsist, the only option is to continue working to the limits of their strength and ability. The confluence of these experiences explains the high rates of participation in the work force after the age of 65 and establishes late and highly disperse retirement age in Mexico, with a median age of 69.4 and an interquartile range of approximately 20 years.

Sooner or later, unless people die, old age forces them to stop working, making older adults totally dependent on payment transfer systems. Every society has mechanisms to redistribute resources that determine the opportunities and scenarios for the lives of older adults. They may live on state stipends, resources from their homes and social and family support networks, on their savings or public charity. These options are not exclusionary and are frequently combined.

Given the insufficiencies and inequalities of our development, the great majority of senior citizens, around 8 out of every 10, have no pension, and almost two-thirds of those who do have one do not receive enough to cover their basic needs. The inescapable process of demographic aging demands that we make considerable efforts to provide older adults with decent, adequate pensions, broaden out the coverage of social security systems and ensure their viability and financial stability.

Given current insufficiencies in the social security system, a substantial part of the responsibility for protecting dependent senior citizens has fallen to their families and social and family support networks. Socioeconomic, institutional

and demographic changes have altered the basis upon which cultural values regarding intergenerational solidarity and family support to the aged were originally developed. Some of these changes tend to become growing sources of tension for the family.[4] This could contribute to the deterioration of the role of the family as sole source of support for aged adults, just as it could suggest the need to design mechanisms and strategies for attention to poor multi-generational households.

The Mexican population's changing epidemiological profile, dominated increasingly by chronic-degenerative conditions like cancer and heart and circulatory disease, will determine that illness and death will continue to concentrate increasingly among older age groups in coming decades. As a result, the problems of incapacitation of elderly adults will be increasingly intense and visible to the whole society. It is estimated that the number of persons with some risk of functional deterioration in old age will grow from 2 million in 2000 to 7.3 million in 2030 and 15.1 million in 2050. The new demographic and epidemiological realities will exert strong pressure on health infrastructure; they will impel a considerable reassignation of resources to meet their demands and will demand profound reforms in the strategies, scope, functioning and organization of this sector. In that process, actions to promote health and the prevention of an ailment-filled old age must play an increasingly preponderant role and be implemented long before people become elderly, something which would undoubtedly bring about radical changes in life styles.

Each society and culture has its own model of old age and judges aged adults accordingly. Perpetually ambivalent, our culture tends to disseminate contradictory images of old age and the elderly. It pays homage to them, encourages compassionate discourses, pities them, resigns itself to their existence or simply despises them, with the obvious individual, family and social repercussions. Given this, we need policies for the elderly that would propitiate a profound cultural revolution to contribute to eradicating the values that promote a pejorative image of old age, strengthen intergenerational solidarity, encourage social revaluing of aged adults and their full insertion into family, social and community life and avoid at all costs that social death precede biological death.

All of this suggests that to make human and civil rights for senior citizens a reality and guarantee their ability to fully exercise them, profound cultural transformations are needed and changes must be introduced into laws, public policy priorities and the coverage, characteristics and reach of social programs. In summary, we must aspire as a people and as individuals to age well. To do that we need not only to add more years to our lives, but to put more life into the years. The depth of cultural, institutional, economic and social change will determine whether in the future we will be capable of forging a new social ethic and a new moral economy of the life cycle and aging. VM

While today one out of every 20 Mexicans is an older adult, in 2030, one out of every eight will be.

Notes

[1] In the long term, the decrease of mortality and fertility causes the base of the population pyramid to become smaller and its top to broaden out. On the one hand, the decline in mortality makes for a progressive increase in life expectancy; therefore, an increasing number of people live longer. At the same time, the drop in fertility means both a lower number of births and the systematic reduction in the proportion of children and young people in the total population. The combination of both these trends leads to demographic aging.

[2] Federico Reyes Heroles, *Reforma* (Mexico City), 13 July 1999.

[3] The predicted increase between 2000 and 2050 in life expectancy of the Mexican population from 75 to 84 years will contribute to increasing the "time of family life" and will make the interaction of four or even five generations of persons related to each other commonplace.

[4] For example, as members of more recent generations, who are less numerous because of decreased fertility, become involved in forming their own families, they will be obliged to deal with simultaneously caring for children and parents, and for a longer and longer time. In addition, there will be fewer brothers and sisters to share that responsibility with: for some, this will mean supporting both minors and the aged, and for others, it will mean taking care of their parents as they themselves approach retirement.

The Cristero Collective Imagination[1]

*Alvaro Ruiz Abreu**

It seems like a law of nature that all wars spawn their own literature, which turn the heroes and caudillos that led them into myths. The Cristera War (1926-1929), however, created something more important: a mythology of those fallen in battle whom the popular collective imagination based on faith and Catholicism rapidly turned into martyrs of the crusade. Cristera literature created its own myths, its own vision of the history of Mexico and has built upon the ruins of war its own apostles and martyrs, its victims and villains. Undoubtedly, it has filled many spaces in Mexico's cultural life in the recent and more distant past, and it continues to do so at this century's end.

Cristera literature created its own myths, its own vision of the history of Mexico and has built upon the ruins of war its own apostles and martyrs, its victims and villains.

All revolutions are based on the principle of cleansing their programs and objectives of the past and the Mexican Revolution (1910-1917) was no exception: one of its first actions was to try to shake off all vestiges of the country's history and eliminate the influence of the Catholic Church from Mexico's moral and social geography. The revolutionaries retained the nineteenth-century Liberal ideal of creating a new Man, free from religious ties, a goal that had simply been postponed. José Vasconcelos, one of the intellectuals who maintained a close relationship with the revolutionaries from the very beginning, thought, "Liberalism had been the best period," because of its egalitarianism and progressivism.

The eternal dispute between the church and the state was at its most critical in the nineteenth century, but the Liberals, enemies of religion by definition, were simultaneously indulgent of the ecclesiastic hierarchy. Ignacio Manuel Altamirano (1834-1893), after a skeptical and anticlerical youth, was reconciled as an adult to Our Lady of Guadalupe, Mexico's patron saint. He saw in the virgin the unequivocal sign of national unity; for him, the worship due her was a symbol of Mexican nationality. The Liberal project was ardently defended by the caudillos of the Mexican Revolution, particularly Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles, who did not perceive the difference between that nineteenth-century project and their own. As writer Héctor Aguilar Camín says,

> The Liberals dreamed of a modern republic, productive and industrious, made up of illustrated small property owners in a land for the most part adverse to the notions of accumulation and progress. And a democratic political system, with balance of powers and active citizens, for a community that was emerging from 300 years of a patrimonial regime based on prerogative and privilege.[2]

From 1914 to 1926, this modernizing project clashed with the real Mexico, Catholic and peasant, clinging desperately to its fiestas and celebrations, who did not want to separate from their only mother, the land, that had seen them be born and grow. The caudillos of the North did not want or were unable to understand this "old" Mexico that to them was unknown, distant. They saw it as an ecclesiastic holdout that should be destroyed. They raised their voices, their laws and their reasoning, and they fired their weapons against faith and the church in the central-western re-

* Professor of literature and journalism in the Autonomous Metropolitan University, Xochimilco campus.

gion of Mexico, where Catholicism was the strongest. The religious war known as the Cristiada had begun, leaving in its wake, like all people's armed uprisings, its novels, stories, songs (*corridos*), tales and memories.

II

A review of Mexican history brings to light the idea that the Cristera War had many causes: the revolutionaries' anticlerical ideology, the errors of the Catholic Church, the vulnerability of a religious people to the church hierarchs' dispositions. But these circumstances do not seem to explain the origins of an armed conflict that went beyond the social and political sphere and became part of the popular collective imagination, its roots, faith and tradition. From the sixteenth century on, the Catholic Church was more than a religious proposal; it was the basis for the founding of New Spain's main institutions since it played the roles of school and university, center of all culture and the arts and political and ideological movement that made stable social organization possible.

Spain was in decline —under Carlos II it seemed hollow— while New Spain rediscovered culture and art. The indigenous, orphaned as they were since the banishment of their gods, found in Our Lady of Guadalupe-Tonantzin a substitute capable of filling the void in their faith and religion. For them, the question would always be the same: What are the Mexicans' real gods? The old deities or Christ? The now classic Chamula character Juan Pérez Jolote from one of the most representative of Mexican *criollista* novels points the way to an approximation of an answer:

> This one that is "encajonado" (in a box) is Our Lord Saint Emmanuel; he is also named Saint Salvador, or Our Lord San Mathew; he is the one who watches over people and children. He is the one you have to ask to watch over you at home, on the roads, on the land. This other who is on the cross is also Our Lord Saint Mathew; he is teaching, showing how to die on the cross, to teach us respect....Before Saint Emmanuel was born, the Sun was cold just like the Moon. The Sun began to warm up when the Christ Child was born, the son of the Virgin, Our Lord Saint Salvador.[3]

Editorial Clio Photo Archive

Cristera little girls from Jalisco, 1930.

The superimposition of Christian gods and gods from the Aztec firmament is clear. Sincretism is not simply a phenomenon typical of a certain period, but something more basic, and the indigenous consciousness, the Mexican consciousness, incorporated it over the centuries. Whether in the independence movement (1810-1824), the Wars of the Reform (1857-1867) or the august peace of Don Porfirio Díaz (1875-1909), sincretism is a reality in the image the indigenous had of religion and God. The Mexican Revolution attempted to destroy the religious will of the people, going to dangerous extremes after 1914, when the political "war" against the cassocks began.

The Cristiada is intertwined with Christian and Aztec mythology, which is why it evokes the sixteenth century, the period when the Gospel was spread in Mexico, when the missionaries found fertile ground for building their utopia:[4] the dream of a perfect Christianity, as was attempted in the Middle Ages according to the proposal of Joaquín de Fiore (1130-1202). The sixteenth-century missionaries initiated the formation of religious consciousness in Mexico; but from the beginning the disparity between the new religion and that of the subjected people, the Aztecs, was apparent. No missionary accepted the Aztec religion as similar in its rites and sacraments to Christianity. Quite to the contrary, they considered it a manifestation of the Devil. The idea persisted that Mexicans were beings governed morally and spiritually by Satan, prisoners of the darkness who had to be brought into the light of Christianity and the Catholic Church.

III

Plutarco Elías Calles and Alvaro Obregón were frankly hostile toward the Catholic Church. The immediate cause was their ideology and the changes they wanted to impose on the country. This was not by

chance; it was due, in part, to the project of the Revolution: a movement to reconquer the past and assimilate it. As Octavio Paz says, "And that will to return, fruit of solitude and desperation, is one of the phases of that dialectic of solitude and communion, of reuniting and separation, that seem to preside over our entire history."[5] In ideological terms, the revolution is in the nature of a redemption; it is a time for dressing the moral and religious wounds opened during the colonial period, a dark time for the soul of Mexicans. It brought with it, therefore, a sense of internal, spiritual reunification that spread through the masses and revived them from a history considered an offense.

Editorial Clio Photo Archive

A group of Cristero Huicholes from Nayarit.

But this does not mean that all the revolutionaries were anticlerical. Zapata did not persecute the Catholic Church in his area of influence, the South of Mexico. In the state of Morelos, the churches remained open; mass was said, confessions heard, baptisms and weddings held as usual. The Zapatistas, whose revolution was a fervent desire for the land, a return to their origins, were Catholics. Nothing explains this deep-rooted feeling like the first sentence of *Zapata y la revolución mexicana* (Zapata and the Mexican Revolution), "This is a book about peasants who did not want to change and, so, made a revolution."[6] Other revolutionary groups led by Venustiano Carranza became wary of them when they entered Mexico City wearing scapulars around their necks and allowed the cathedral bells to be rung. Villa was not particularly anticlerical either; he accepted Catholics in his ranks, as is clearly the case of Villista General Delgadillo's secretary in 1914, Anacleto González Flores, later a leader of the Cristiada in Jalisco. Madero gave total freedom to the Catholic Church, but when he was assassinated by the traitor Victoriano Huerta in 1913, it became expeditious to be wary of the church hierarchy.

In the years 1913-1914, the constitutionalists took over church buildings and property, persecuted priests, particularly foreign ones, and took religious and nuns prisoner. Ezequiel Mendoza Barragán, a rancher in Coalcomán, Michoacán, would remember this as a banning of Catholic rites and worship if the church "did not submit to the whim of the government of the Antichrist."[7] Popular imagination had to have seen in these revolutionary actions from the North not a Jacobin civilizing project that wanted to imitate the development and progress in the United States, but a sacrilege, the annunciation of the Apocalypse.

The literature that emerged from the bloody battleground of the Cristeros is the paradoxical result of this history. More like a wheel of fortune than the will of the men who made it, it is the history of a crisis and doubt: that of twentieth-century Man without his God. Like the synthesis of Mexico's recent and distant past and expression of its paradoxes, the Cristera War became a legend, full of strange components, that a few writers who saw in it a narrative subject worthy of being told drew close to. It was a multifaceted conflict, as we have seen, but at its center pulsed the confrontation between the Catholic Church and Liberal thinking, the dramatization of the most polemical myths in Mexican history, of its memory and its symbols. VM

NOTES

[1] This article is part of a research work *La Cristiada en su literatura, 1928-1992*, that will be published by Cal y Arena publishing house.

[2] Héctor Aguilar Camín, "Los jefes sonorenses de la revolución mexicana," *Saldos de la revolución. Cultura y política de México, 1910-1980* (Mexico City: Nueva Imagen, 1982), p. 16.

[3] Ricardo Pozas, *Juan Pérez Jolote. Autobiografía de un tzotzil* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1965).

[4] This utopia corresponding to the Renaissance has been lucidly analyzed by Alfonso Reyes in his *Visión de Anáhuac y otros ensayos* (México City: SEP-Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1983) and by Octavio Paz in *El laberinto de la soledad* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1978).

[5] Octavio Paz, op. cit., pp. 178-179.

[6] John Womack, *Zapata y la Revolución Mexicana*, Francisco González Aramburo, trad. (Mexico City: SEP/Siglo XXI Editores, 1985).

[7] Ezequiel Mendoza Barragán, *Testimonio cristero. Memorias del autor,* introduction by Jean Meyer (Mexico City: Jus, 1990), p. 16.

The St. Patrick's Battalion
The Irish Soldiers of Mexico

*Jaime Fogarty**

Carlos Nebel, *The Battle of Churubusco,* 1851 (color lithograph).

On September 12, 1997, the Mexican government paid special tribute to the soldiers of the San Patricio Battalion who were tortured and hanged at the San Jacinto Plaza, San Angel, in 1847.

Mexican President Ernesto Zedillo presided at the ceremonies marking the sesquicentennial of that tragic event and declared, "One hundred and fifty years ago, here in San Angel,...members of the St. Patrick's Battalion were executed for following their consciences. They were martyred for adhering to the highest ideals, and today we honor their memory. In the name of the people of Mexico, I salute today the people of Ireland and express my eternal gratitude."[1] The president concluded, saying, "While we honor the memory of the Irish who gave their lives for Mexico and for human dignity, we also honor our own commitment to cherish their ideals, and to always defend the values for which they occupy a place of honor in our history."[2]

Irish Ambassador to Mexico Seán O'Huighinn emphasized the bonds of friendship that the "San Patricios" have forged between the two countries, and which continue to grow and prosper. He noted that Ireland and Mexico shared a common history of struggle to preserve their cultural identities and political liberties, often threatened by powerful and aggressive neighbors.

He also paid tribute to the humanitarian insights of the San Patricios who, "despite the confusion and animosities of war, were able to discern the admirable qualities of the Mexican people, unclouded by preconceived notions of racial prejudice." In this context, he quoted the leader of the San Patricios, John O'Reilly (also written Riley) who wrote: "Do not be deceived by the prejudice of a nation at war with Mexico, because you will not find in all the world a people more frienly and hospitable than the Mexicans."[3]

* Séamus Jaime O'Fógartaigh, Irish freelance writer living in Mexico, author of *Liberation and Development, A Latin American Perspective*.

Photos: Editorial Clío Photo Archive. Carlos Nebel's litograph reprinted by permission of the National Institute of Anthropology and History/ Conaculta-INAH-MEX. Sam Chamberlain's water color reprinted by permission of The San Jacinto Museum of History, Houston.

HISTORICAL REVIEW

Following the U.S. declaration of war against Mexico in 1846, an Irish-born deserter from the U.S. army, John O'Reilly, organized a company of soldiers at Matamoros to fight on the side of Mexico against the invading U.S. forces. These foreign volunteers became known as "Las Compañías de San Patricio," and were renowned for their skill as artillerists as well as their bravery in battle for the duration of the war (1846-1848). Not all the San Patricios were deserters from the U.S. army. Their number also included Irish and other Europeans already settled in Mexico, and some historians use Mexican army records as a basis to state that the majority were not deserters. The San Patricios did, however, have a distinctly Irish identity since their namesake, St. Patrick, is the patron saint of the Irish people. The group's banner displayed an Irish harp surrounded by the Mexican coat-of-arms with a scroll reading, "Freedom for the Mexican Republic," and underneath the harp was the motto in Gaelic *"Erin go Brágh"* (Ireland for Ever). On the other side of the banner Saint Patrick was depicted holding a pastoral staff resting on a serpent.

A U.S. soldier described it as "a beautiful green silk banner [that] waved over their heads; on it glittered a silver cross and a golden harp, embroidered by the hands of the fair nuns of San Luis Potosí."[4]

Historian Robert Miller also cites another reference to the San Patricio banner by an American observer: "Among the mighty host we passed was O'Reilly and his company of deserters bearing aloft in high disgrace the holy banner of St. Patrick."[5]

Sam Chamberlain's rendition of the execution of legionnaires near Chapultepec Castle, ca. 1867 (water colors, pencil and gouache).

FROM MATAMOROS TO CHURUBUSCO

The San Patricios took part in the fighting at Matamoros and Monterrey where they earned a reputation for their expertise in handling heavy weaponry. Following the U.S. victory at Monterrey, the Mexican army retreated to San Luis Potosí, where General Antonio López de Santa Anna reorganized the Mexican forces in late 1846. Liberating Army of the North, as well as a special artillery unit manned by the San Patricios. This unit was commanded by Colonel Francisco Rosendo Moreno and played and important role in the Mexican victory at the Battle of Angostura in February 1847. According to Miller, "Two six-pounder cannon of the U.S. Fourth Artillery were captured by the enemy due to intense fire from the San Patricio cannoneers, aided by support troops."[6]

General Francisco Mejía cited the San Patricios in his report as "worthy of the most consummate praise because the men fought with daring bravery."[7]

As a result of their heroism in battle, O'Reilly, among others, was promoted to the rank of captain and was given the Angostura Cross of Honor.

Despite the apparent victory of the Mexican forces at Angostura, Santa Anna decided to abandon the field of battle and retreated to San Luis Potosí. According to Miller, about a third of the San Patricios were killed or wounded at Angostura.[8]

Only two weeks after the battle of Angostura, the main focus of the war shifted to the Mexican Gulf Coast with the arrival of General Winfield Scott at Veracruz with 9,000 troops.

The San Patricios were transferred from San Luis Potosí to Jalapa and took part in the Battle of Cerro Gordo which ended in defeat for the Mexican forces.

THE FOREIGN LEGION OF SAINT PATRICK

In June 1847, Santa Anna created a foreign legion as part of the Mexican army, and the San Patricios were transferred from the artillery branch to the infantry and merged into the Foreign Legion. They

then became known as the First and Second Militia Infantry Companies of San Patricio. Colonel Francisco R. Moreno was made commander, with Captain John O'Reilly in charge of the First Company and Captain Santiago O'Leary of the Second. The companies were also referred to as "The Foreign Legion of San Patricio."

The Battle of Churubusco

Dr. Michael Hogan, the Irish-American author of *The Irish Soldiers of Mexico*, provides a detailed, well documented account of the heroic defense of the "convento" (monastery) at Churubusco when it was attacked by the invading U.S. forces on August 20, 1847. The monastery, surrounded by huge, thick stone walls, provided a natural fortress for the defending Mexican forces. The San Patricio Companies together with the Los Bravos Battalion occupied the parapets of the building which was to become the scene of one of the bloodiest battles of the war.

Though hopelessly outnumbered, the defenders repelled the attacking U.S. forces with heavy losses until their ammunition ran out, and a Mexican officer, realizing the hopelessness of the situation, raised the white flag of surrender.

According to Hogan, Captain Patrick Dalton of the San Patricios tore the white flag down, and General Pedro Anaya ordered his men to fight on with their bare hands if necessary.

Mexican historian, Heriberto Frías described the heroic last stand of the San Patricios:

> Only the soldiers of St. Patrick, brave Irishmen who spontaneously defended our standard, passing to our ranks out of sympathy for our ideals and religion, were able to use the munitions; and they continued their spirited volleys, until the enemy's rain of fire brought death to those valiant marksmen.[9]

History records that following the surrender, when U.S. General Twiggs asked General Anaya where his ammunition was stored, he replied bitterly, "If I had ammunition, you would not be here."[10]

Undoubtedly, the tenacity and skill of the San Patricio companies at Churubusco earned them the everlasting esteem and affection of the Mexican people; and their willingness to fight to the death for their commitment to Mexico forged an indelible seal of honor on that commitment. Mexicans are also justly proud of the heroic stand of their national guardsmen, "green civilian recruits, fighting to the death against Scott's well-equipped veterans."[11]

> Not all the San Patricios were deserters from the U.S. army. Their number also included Irish and other Europeans already settled in Mexico, and some historians use Mexican army records as a basis to state that the majority were not deserters.

According to General Anaya's written report, 35 San Patricios were killed in action, O'Leary and O'Reilly were wounded and Francis O'Connor lost both legs as a result of his heroic stand against the invaders.

Eighty-five of the San Patricios were taken prisoner, while the other survivors (about 85) managed to escape, and apparently were later able to rejoin the retreating Mexican forces.

Seventy-two were charged with desertion from the U.S. army, and General Scott ordered that two courts-martial be convened to try them.

Lashing, Branding and Hanging

A court-martial at San Angel September 8, 1847, upheld the death sentence for 20 of the 29 San Patricios tried there, while a similar court at Tacubaya ordered the death penalty for 30 more. The others, including O'Reilly, escaped the death penalty since they had deserted before war was declared. They, however, were condemned to "receive 50 lashes on their bare backs, to be branded with the letter 'D' for deserter, and to wear iron yokes around their necks for the duration of the war."[12]

Two Mexican muleteers were forced to administer the lashes, according to Hogan.

On September 10, 1847, 16 of the condemned San Patricios were hanged at the San Jacinto Plaza, San Angel, and 14 others received 59 lashes on their bare backs until, according to an American eyewitness, "Their backs had the appearance of a pounded piece of raw beef, the blood oozing from every stripe."[13]

After the flogging, the prisoners were branded the letter "D" with red-hot branding irons. Some were branded on the hip, while others were branded on the cheek, and O'Reilly was branded on both cheeks for good measure. San Jacinto Plaza thus became the scene of bloody and mangled bodies, mingled with the repulsive odor of the burning flesh of the tortured San Patricios.

According to Hogan, five Mexican priests who sought to give spiritual assistance to the victims were forced to witness the whippings and brandings and ordered to withdraw to the gallows to witness the final act of this "gruesome and carefully orchestrated spectacle."

Eight mule-drawn wagons were brought up, and two prisoners were placed on each wagon. Sixteen nooses hanging from the crossbeam were placed around their necks, and the priests were brought forward to administer the last rites of the Catholic Church. Then, "the whips cracked, and the wagons drove off leaving the 16 victims dangling from their nooses."[14]

Some, like Captain Patrick Dalton, had asked to be buried in consecrated ground, and were interred in nearby Tlacopac. The others were buried beneath the gallows, and O'Reilly and his tortured companions were forced to dig their fallen comrades' graves. On September 2, four more convicted San Patricios were hanged at the nearby village of Mixcoac.

The final scene of this macabre and somewhat sadistic "hanging spree" took place near Tacubaya on September 13, when the remaining 30 convicted San Patricios were hanged. Francis O'Connor, who had lost his legs at Churubusco and was dying from his wounds, was nonetheless dragged from the hospital tent and propped up on a wagon with a noose around his neck. When the American flag was raised over Chapultepec Castle, the San Patricios were "launched into eternity as the wagons pulled away, and the nooses tightened on their necks."[15]

Mexicans were shocked and outraged by this cruel and barbaric treatment of the San Patricios. *El Diario del Gobierno* expressed its indignation, writing, "This day, in cold blood, these [American] Caribs from an impulse of superstition, and after the manner of savages as practiced in the days of Homer, have hanged these men as a holocaust."[16]

IN MEMORIAM

1997 marked the sesquicentennial of a bitter and traumatic chapter in the history of the Irish and Mexican peoples. Mexico remembered the tragic loss of almost half its territory, "ceded" to the United States; and Ireland remembered the tragic loss of almost half its total population due to starvation and emigration brought about by the Great Famine of 1847. It has been wisely said that those who ignore the lessons of history are destined to repeat it, and that we do not need to savor the bitterness of the past in order to understand its lesson for the present and the future.

It has been wisely said that those who ignore the lessons of history are destined to repeat it, and that we do not need to savor the bitterness of the past in order to understand its lesson for the present and the future.

Each year, on September 12, Mexico pays tribute to the San Patricios at San Jacinto Plaza. The commemorative plaque on the wall facing the plaza was designed by Lorenzo Rafael, son of Patricio Cox, who wrote the first book —a novel— in Spanish about the San Patricios.

The escutcheon at the top of the plaque depicts a Celtic cross protected by the outstretched wings of the Aztec eagle. The inscription on the plaque reads: "In memory of the Irish soldiers of the heroic San Patricio Battalion, martyrs who gave their lives for the cause of Mexico during the unjust U.S. invasion of 1847."

At the bottom of the plaque another inscription reads, "With the gratitude of Mexico, 112 years after their holocaust."

The plaque was placed in 1959 and continues to remind visitors to the peaceful, tree-shaded plaza, of the tragic events that took place there on September 10, 1847. VM

NOTES

[1] *The News* (Mexico City), 13 September 1997.

[2] Ibid.

[3] *Novedades* (Mexico City), 13 September 1997, Michael Hogan, *The Irish Soldiers of Mexico* (Guadalajara: Fondo Editorial Universitario, 1997), p. 244.

[4] Robert Ryal Miller, *Shamrock and Sword, The Saint Patrick's Battalion in the U.S.-Mexican War* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1989), p. 38.

[5] Ibid., p. 52.

[6] Ibid., p. 55.

[7] Ibid., p. 57.

[8] Ibid., p. 55.

[9] Heriberto Frías, *La guerra contra los gringos* (Mexico City: Ediciones Leega/Jucar, 1984).

[10] Hogan, op. cit., p. 80.

[11] Ibid., p. 80.

[12] Ibid., p. 173.

[13] Ibid., p. 176.

[14] Ibid., p. 178.

[15] Ibid., pp. 184-187.

[16] Miller, op. cit., p. 111.

Reflections on Twentieth-Century U.S. Immigration Policy[1]

*Mónica Verea Campos**

Unless otherwise specified, photos by Elsa Medina

It is well known that the United States is one of the world's most generous nations in receiving immigrants, and we are continually reminded of the fact that today it is the nation it is thanks to the strong backs and intellects of immigrant men, women and children who risked their lives to achieve the mythical American Dream. During the twentieth century, it welcomed an important number of immigrants from different regions of the world, not exclusively from Western Europe as had been the tradition in former centuries. In this way, a society was forged in which a great diversity of races, ethnic groups and cultures converged and interacted, a society which became increasingly multicultural and multiethnic.

It would be difficult, or almost impossible, to deny that the United States has been enriched with the important legacy of almost 70 million immigrants over the last two centuries. However, while the economic costs of immigrants has been much debated and questioned, very seldom have the benefits they brought been recognized. These debates and discussions —carried out at different times in the history of the last century, in different tones and with different biases— have had an impact on the decisions of policy makers both in the U.S. Congress and the executive, who have decided on their courses of action in response to the demands of their constituents or following the party or philosophical orientation they represented.

This has undoubtedly caused the creation and continual reformulation of immigration policy through the enactment of new laws and the amendment of existing ones. We could define immigration policy, then, as the fundamental right of a sovereign state to control its own borders, setting certain rules to be

* Researcher and first director of CISAN (1989-1997).

applied to foreign individuals who wish to enter the country for a myriad of reasons. This selective policy is inherently discriminatory, since the state chooses among different foreign individuals and later accepts those to be allowed to legally enter the country.[2] It rejects those who do not fulfill the prerequisites that it has established precisely because it is a sovereign state.

Undocumented or non-authorized immigration would not exist if no migratory policy had been created to restrict the entrance of certain individuals. Any foreigner is considered an illegal immigrant and subject to deportation if he/she violates U.S. immigration law. During the twentieth century, more and more unauthorized foreigners have entered the country both by land and by sea.[3] Given this, great energy and resources have been used to control and fight undocumented immigration, mainly on the border with Mexico, and this has had an impact on the national debate, exacerbating xenophobic feelings.

SETTING LIMITS

Limits, both formal and informal, on the entrance of certain races and/or ethnic groups were established in accordance with U.S. preferences for certain kinds of foreigners. This trend has been a constant in U.S. immigration policy.

At the end of the nineteenth century, large numbers of immigrants from Southern and Eastern Europe began arriving to U.S. shores, most of them poorer and less skilled than their predecessors. Approximately 26 million immigrants arrived between 1880 and 1924, significantly more than the nearly 10 million who had entered between 1820 and 1880. They brought new cultures, religious beliefs and languages that little by little differentiated them from the rest of the population, bolstering prejudices and discrimination toward them.

This significant increase in immigrants led the U.S. public to change its view and demand new restrictions on immigration. Quotas were fixed to limit the number of foreigners, closing the door to the unfettered immigration that had existed until then. Congress voted the Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882 and years later it established more restrictions on immigration from some Asian countries, as well as on illiterates, psychopaths and alcoholics, not to mention indigents and the unemployed.[4] The 1921 Immigration Act or Emergency Quota Act was amended by other, very restrictive, bills passed in 1924 —the Johnson Reed Act— and 1929, establishing quotas using a very complex, artful mechanism that actually aimed at maintaining a flow of immigrants from Northern Europe.

Limits, both formal and informal, on the entrance of certain races and/or ethnic groups were established in accordance with U.S. preferences for certain kinds of foreigners. This trend has been a constant in U.S. immigration policy.

After the Depression began in 1929, not only did the flow of immigrants drop significantly, but many of them were actually repatriated or they returned voluntarily to their places of origin. This trend continued during the entire 1930s until the outbreak of World War II. The Border Patrol was created in 1924 to watch and manage the borders and coastlines, but particularly to stop the illegal entry of immigrants. It was not until 1929, however, that entry into the United States without a visa was made illegal, thus beginning the tragic history of uncounted apprehensions and deportations.

Discontent mounted during the 1950s and 1960s and many groups were organized in different communities to react to nativist and racist attitudes and other oppressive social conditions. Particularly important were the protests organized by Afroamericans and Latinos. The most important result of the 1960s civil rights movement was increased institutional participation of the Afroamerican minority in U.S. society.

One answer to the discontent and a result of the civil rights movement was the 1965 amendment to the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, also known as the McCarren Walter Act. This legislation —previously amended in 1924— had changed the distribution of visas to foster the entry of more highly skilled immigrants and, thus, those from Western Europe.

The 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments restructured the legal framework for admitting immigrants. For the first time it abolished the system of restrictive quotas based on national origin and increased and encouraged a global

number of visas: 170,000 visas for people from non-Western Hemisphere countries, limited to 20,000 per country.

At the same time a system of preferences was established in accordance with which the immigrant's closest relatives would also be admitted.

This law had important implications because it allowed access to thousands of people from Asia and Latin America. Some conservative ideologues think this part of the legislation was disastrous because it did not take into account nationality in its prerequisites for acceptance. They think that this is responsible for the nationalist, racist feelings of the 1990s, given that immigrants have difficulty in assimilating or are even rejected by their communities.

Toward a Multicultural Society

The 1965 legislation is a watershed in U.S. immigration policy because it marked a change in migrant's origins. The generous formulators of this legislation showed their concern for humanitarian issues involved in immigration like family reunification, which could be considered an excellent form of integration into any society.

Evidently, the legislation was approved with the idea that it would lead to a more open, plural society. It meant the explicit and implicit willingness to become an increasingly multiracial and multiethnic society. It could be called an antiracist gesture since until 1965, immigration legislation was explicitly designed to keep the majority of the U.S. population fundamentally white.

Conservatives think that the diversity promoted in 1965 and thought of as attractive is now catastrophic given the perspectives implicit in the composition of the population, which has changed significantly since then. Projections derived from the last census indicate that the white population will be a minority in the mid-twenty-first century, something unthinkable in 1965.



Migrant workers wait to be hired for temporary jobs, Broadway, downtown Los Angeles, 1997.

This significant metamorphosis in the make-up of the U.S. population has changed the face of the nation. For some nativists, this is dramatic: while in the 1950s, about 75 percent of immigrants came from Europe and only 25 percent from Latin America, half a century later, only 10 percent come from Europe and the rest from Asia and Latin America.

During the 1970s, immigrants from other ethnic groups, different from the traditional ones, began arriving in greater numbers, easy prey to discrimination, and with that, prejudice emerged and racial polarization grew. By the 1980s, the atmosphere of domestic crisis —at that time, both inflation and unemployment were high— plus the many guerrilla movements and unrest abroad (revolution in Iran, Haiti, Cambodia, Vietnam, among others) prompted President James Carter to sign the 1980 Refugee Act providing for residency and generous government benefits.

Despite the fact that liberals and conservatives did not seriously disagree over the entry of refugees, a significant debate did arise over the lax controls of the increasing flow of undocumented immigrants given the international political and economic crises. While the number of detentions at the border cannot be taken as valid indicators, they did increase substantially, bringing with them an increase in sensitivity and hostility among the public.

The role that Congressman Peter Rodino played in the House was also central for the discussion and passage of restrictive bills to solve some migratory problems. He had already presented a bill in 1971 that aimed to impose sanctions on employers of undocumented

workers. Others presented variations of this bill, the most noteworthy of which was the Simpson-Mazolli Bill which almost passed. However, the basis was established for what would later be one of the most important laws, the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (IRCA), better known as the Simpson-Rodino Act after its promoters. Sanctions to employers, increased border surveillance and the important amnesty program thanks to which around two million undocumented workers legalized their status in different ways were the main aspects of this law.[5]

The end of the Cold War brought new flows of immigrants and refugees. It was then that Congress debated the possibility of increasing the annual admissions quota, changing the parameters of the preference system, particularly with regard to family members (brothers and sisters) and establishing new controls like knowledge of the English language, in order to ensure more skilled, better prepared immigrants since some studies showed that nine out of every 10 immigrants entered the United States sponsored by either a U.S. citizen or resident.[6]

By the end of the 1980s, the issue of international competitiveness had taken on great importance in the debate in the framework of globalization. At the same time that the economic role that immigrants played in an increasingly technological, competitive economy was being discussed, some studies predicted the possibility of a scarcity of labor which, together with the low U.S. birth rate, would lead to the need to admit new flows of migrants to balance the slow population growth and the increasing demand for labor in some sectors of the economy. However, concern about the quality of the immigrant —in educational terms— was a determining factor in proposing the admission of more qualified immigrants. By the early 1990s, only 10 percent of immigrants came from Europe, while 50 percent came from Asia and 40 percent from Latin American and other countries.

Reprinted courtesy of Migrant Education San Diego, Paulina Boutris/Celia Ramirez

Mexican farm workers in California.

For these reasons, the 1990 Immigration Act was passed, which aimed at propitiating a better educated, more skilled immigration flow. Limits were placed on the categories of family reunification using complex formulas, putting a priority on the most immediate family. The proportion of visas based on job offers increased 70 percent, from 54,000 to 140,000, and the new law specified that all visas not used for family reunification would accrue to this category.

THE NEW NATIVIST ERA

The decade of the 1990s could be characterized by important changes in terms of immigration policy. The Republican victory in the 1994 elections was a determining factor since, for the first time in 40 years, the GOP gained control of both houses of Congress. Its new strength created a new equilibrium between conservative and liberal political thinking. The conservatives were able to capitalize on the discontent caused by the economic crisis of the early 1990s. Its spokespersons embraced nativist ideologies and even presented paranoid visions directly related with racial nationalism based, once again, on white supremacy.

Since then the conservatives have promoted a highly anti-immigrant debate (given their growing ranks and greater visibility), making immigrants the scapegoats for all the country's problems.[7] This debate has centered its attention on the negative aspects of immigrants and their effects on the economy. As a result, proposals, bills and amendments to laws have been presented that affect immigrants' interests and safety. One example

is California's unconstitutional Proposition 187, which attempted to deny undocumented immigrants access to public education and free medical attention except in case of emergency. While this was being debated, California became the battlefield where extremely sensitive issues were hotly and irresponsibly debated and proposals were approved that fostered discrimination and segregation.

This situation has created a landscape of great hostility for minorities and had an important impact in Washington on the intolerant discussion about the new immigration bills, even more restrictive than in the past, which resulted in the passage of one of the harshest and most rigid bills of the twentieth century, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), the principle aim of which is to control illegal immigration and reduce access to social welfare programs even to legal immigrants. Among the most polemical clauses in the law are: the strengthening of controls to monitor the border; increased penalties for immigrant trafficking and document forgery; the inspection, apprehension, arrest and deportation of inadmissible foreigners; and new restrictions for employers.[8] The IIRIRA is definitely more rigid than IRCA, particularly in its harsher dealing with undocumented immigration.

It is a fact that Republican positions in Congress regarding immigration policy became significantly more hard line during the 1990s. They see the government as the last body that should be looked to for aid to immigrants, given that they think the government's main obligation is to its own citizens. That is, today their radical position about the government having a very low profile in the protection of immigrant welfare is clearer than ever. They think immigrants must understand their situation as their own personal responsibility or, if they are without the necessary economic resources, they should seek a sponsor, thus propitiating greater participation of the private sector in the protection of their welfare.

The immigration issue has always divided public opinion along partisan, ideological and socio-economic lines. The main factors that have fed the controversy have been the constant fear of a possible loss of security and economic well being.

Prospects for the Twenty-First Century

The immigration issue has always divided public opinion along partisan, ideological and socio-economic lines. Generally speaking, the main factors that have fed the controversy have been the constant fear of a possible loss of security and economic well being, fears that become sharper in times of recession such as the one in the early 1990s, as well as when migratory flows increase, whether legal or undocumented.

There is no doubt that the 1996 immigration and welfare laws had serious consequences not only for undocumented but also for legal immigrants. However, it must be recognized that although the antiimmigrant ethos generated over the last decade has stimulated the creation of powerful forces and networks that continue to struggle to restrict growing migration, it has also sparked the creation of important organizations that seek to reestablish what has been lost and have come out in favor of offering certain social benefits to immigrants. They have even sought to lobby Congress to do this. Some unions and legislators have put forward the utopian possibility of offering amnesty for a very large number of undocumented immigrants who continue to work in the United States and to establish some kind of program for guest workers.

Recent declarations by both Federal Reserve President Alan Greenspan and John Sweeney, head of the most powerful union organization in the United States, are undoubtedly unprecedented in that they propose freeing up the borders to allow foreign workers to enter. They argued that regulated immigration is better than illegal, non-regulated immigration and classified the employers' need to hire as legitimate, even if the workers come from abroad.[9] This position may stem from the current low unemployment rate, down to 4 percent in some states, which is obviously what frightens someone like Greenspan: since his main responsibility is to control inflation, he is concerned by the significant increase in wages and prices that would accompany any scarcity of labor. This should be taken into consideration in Mexico, not only so it can be discussed and openly included on the bilateral agenda, but also to evaluate the creation of a new ad hoc guest workers program.

Lastly, it is difficult to predict what

attitudes the people of the United States will adopt about immigrants in the near future, but probably the debates on immigration policy will continue to be the center of attention of increasing numbers of organizations and individuals in the first decades of the twenty-first century given that, for many, the debate has not concluded. It is also possible that official policy will continue to be restrictive, and that new nativist positions will emerge, particularly during periods of economic crisis, giving rise unfortunately to an increasingly segregated and divided society. VM

NOTES

[1] This article is an abbreviated version of a paper presented at the First International Congress of Latin American Specialists on U.S. and Canada Studies, CISAN-FLACSO, held in Mexico City, November 25 and 26, 1999.

[2] James P. Gimpel and James R. Edwards, Jr., *The Congressional Politics of Immigration Reform* (Needham, Maryland: Allyn and Bacon, 1999), p. 5.

[3] The term "undocumented" is also applied to "visa abusers," those who entered the country with a valid visa but who remained after its validity runs out. See Mónica Verea Campos, *Entre México y Estados Unidos: los indocumentados* (Mexico City: El Caballito, 1983), p. 45.

[4] It should be pointed out that the Department of Labor used a loophole in this law to allow the temporary entry of thousands of Mexicans and Canadians and their families, a flow which has been dubbed the "first bracero program," but was actually quite distinct from the Bracero Convention signed with Mexico in 1942.

[5] Mónica Verea C., "Contradicciones de la Ley Simpson-Rodino," Manuel García y Griego and Mónica Verea, *México y Estados Unidos frente a la migración de los indocumentados*, Social Sciences Collection (Mexico City: Coordinación de Humanidades-UNAM/Miguel Angel Porrúa Eds., 1988), p. 13.

[6] Demetrius G. Papademetriou and Kimberly A. Hamilton, "Managing Uncertainty: Regulating Immigration Flows in Advanced Industrial Countries" (International Migration Policy Program and Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., 1995, mimeographed), p. 19.

[7] For more information, see Mónica Verea, "Las nuevas tendencias conservadoras en las políticas migratorias de Estados Unidos," Mónica Verea Campos and Silvia Núñez, eds., *Estados Unidos y Canadá ¿Signos conservadores hacia el siglo XXI?* (Mexico City: CISAN-UNAM, 1999).

[8] Mónica Verea and Manuel García y Griego, "Colaboración sin concordancia: La migración en la Nueva Agenda Bilateral México-Estados Unidos," Mónica Verea, Rafael Fernández de Castro and Sidney Weintraub, comps., *Nueva Agenda Bilateral en la relaciónx México-Estados Unidos* (Mexico City: CISAN-UNAM/ITAM/FCE, 1998), pp. 107-134.

[9] "Piden aumentar en Estados Unidos empleo para migrantes," *Reforma* (Mexico City), 18 February 2000, p. 1A.

The Interventionist Deterrent "Americanism" and Foreign Policy

*José Luis Valdés-Ugalde**

Did the United States succeed in nation-building and in forcible nation-restoration because it was virtuous, or because it had Canadians and Mexicans as its neighbours rather than Russians and Germans?

C.S. GRAY[1]

INTRODUCTION

The argument this paper presents is that interventions disrupt the international system, that they have generally prompted a partial or total dysfunction of world and regional order and that their appearance in world politics responds to a great extent to the functional requirements of power politics. It seems appropriate, then, to refer to Wight's views on the problem of power in the world order: he examines it by looking at the "balance of power" and shows the importance of studying the key difference between "balance of power" and "pattern of power" to situate the characteristics explaining the interludes of international politics, for,

> At the shallower level, it is the rule that neighbouring states are usually enemies, that common frontiers are usually disputed, and that your natural ally is the Power in the rear of your neighbour. Let us call this for want of a better term, the conception of the *pattern of power*.[2]

This enables us to generalize about international politics in relation to their geographical framework. On the other hand, says Wight

> The idea of the *balance of power* involves a higher degree of abstraction. It means thinking of the powers less as pieces in a chessboard than as weights in a pair of scales....The *pattern of power* leads to considerations of strategy; the *balance of power* leads to considerations of military potential, diplomatic initiative and economic strength....To balance is to compare weights....The word "balance" has entirely lost its meaning of "equilibrium." There is less notion of stability, more of perpetual change about it than in sense 1 [an even distribution of power].[3]

In this vein, I will elaborate on a framework that is likely to be of use for the study of intervention in general and U.S. intervention in Latin America in particular.

Let me say that it is a historical fact that U.S. policies and behaviour have been consistent with a sense of mission to be pursued through interventions using the pretext of revolutions.[4] Nonetheless, the accomplishment of this pursuit of supremacy required convincing tools for the latter to be carried out. Hence, the sig-

* Researcher in the CISAN Area of U.S. Studies.

nificance of the following general argument on the association between: a) an important geopolitical position; b) the strong weight of "Americanism"[5] as an innovative tradition in the foreign-policy making process; c) using revolutions as the main argument —in the context of the bipolar U.S.-USSR confrontation— for alertness insofar as the defence of national interests was concerned; and d) the use of interventions as deterrents against revolutions or political changes in other countries which have been considered, particularly in the Interamerican context, the main threat to national security.[6]

It is a historical fact that U.S. policies and behaviour have been consistent with a sense of mission to be pursued through interventions using the pretext of revolutions. Nonetheless, the accomplishment of this pursuit of supremacy required convincing tools for the latter to be carried out.

Intervention as a Universal Occurrence

Intervention is universal. It has happened for centuries. When studying the different approaches to intervention as a phenomenon of the international system, it should be understood that the theoretical framework for these theories corresponds mainly to the dominant principles of realism, which has permeated international relations in the second half of the twentieth century.[7]

Intervention is a component of a dynamic movement linked primarily to the existence of nation-states ideally organized on the basis of understanding and peaceful coexistence. It is also an international phenomenon intrinsically linked to the arrangements whereby the shares of power and domination are disposed of in a particular fashion by the fittest and, in addition, most representative actors of the international political system.

Although intervention has particular historical features, it has always been related to the *spatial* allocation that both geographical territories and human conglomerates have had, hence the importance of considering the configuration of national boundaries in the understanding of intervention as a political phenomenon.

Notably, however, interventions have been the response to the need to establish the basis for certain directives used in the process of arrangements made in international politics. In this light, interventions must be understood as levellers in the long and sometimes laborious process of the constitution of the world order. Interventions in their various forms may precede different types of military and political confrontations or may be the result of disputes in certain regions of the globe.

And yet, the complex deployment necessary for interventions covers different types of diplomatic, material or human capabilities, the components of an elaborate rationale directing intervention to a specific aim. However, an intervention is also a process that helps to explain the generally arbitrary configuration of the world map, as well as the state of affairs in which the different actors become involved.

Intervention and The International System

To understand interventions in the context of the modern international system, it seems appropriate to inquire into the nature of the latter. In this respect, there seem to be three dominant issues to consider first: a) the international system puts a priority on the separation of the "domestic" and the "international";[8] b) interventions take on importance because the choice in international affairs has never been

> between intervening and observing the sacred principle of non-intervention. The choice has always been between individual intervention and collective intervention, or else between the establishment of conditions in which interventions will become less likely, and living in conditions in which intervention is more likely,[9]

and; c) the problem with intervention and the key variable is, as Hoffmann states, in the "nature of the international system."[10]

U.S. Intervention and American National Interest

Richard Nixon once said,

> Mr. Khrushchev predicted that our grandchildren would live under Communism ....

> And this is my answer to him. I do not say that our grandchildren will live under capitalism. We prefer our system. But the very essence of our belief is that we do not and will not try to impose our system on anybody else. We believe that you and all other people on this earth should have the right to choose the kind of economic or political system which best fits your particular problems without *any foreign intervention*.[11]

This might have easily been uttered by an average progressive-liberal member of the late 1950s U.S. foreign policy establishment. These were indeed the thoughts of a powerful member of the American political system, himself an essentially conservative, fervently anticommunist political figure, and, in 1968, candidate for the presidency of the United States. Richard Nixon's words offer a clear example of the many peculiarities (and in some respects and contexts, contradictions) that explain some of the routes taken by U.S. foreign policy. At the same time they offer a "situational" context of analysis on the extent to which the U.S. has historically exhibited its contradictions in the making of foreign policy decisions. Thus, they can be taken as an appropriate tool and the ideal empirical platform for continuing discussion of intervention in an area of influence.[12]

In exploring the features of U.S. foreign policy, particularly when to a great extent characterized by intervention, it inevitably becomes important (given also the relevance of drawing the proper distinctions in the Latin American case) to resort to testimonies of this kind before such a complex discussion can begin. As shown in the Guatemalan intervention in 1954, the U.S. interventionist impetus has been a key feature of its foreign policy philosophy. This has been the case whatever the country's partial responsibility for the subsequent relative decline of most of the nations concerned and whatever the many contradictory explanations offered by leading figures in the foreign policy decision making process.

The historical record acknowledges that U.S. interventionism has led in most cases to various kinds of authoritarian forms of government. To a certain extent the United States enjoyed the fortune of being an extraordinary great power next to a collectivity of weak neighbours to the south.

The historical record acknowledges that U.S. interventionism has led in most cases to various kinds of authoritarian forms of government. Moreover, these interventions have resulted in a high degree of structural pressure and rigidity upon both the polity and state actors and institutions, quite apart from the pressure on the economies of the countries involved.

This feature has been remarkable, playing an important role in the long-term crises that some countries in Latin America have faced. Though the United States has performed a relatively influential role in this process, U.S. interventionism has inflicted severe pressure upon the target countries' long-standing difficulties in achieving political progress and economic development. It is not the purpose here to take the U.S. indiscriminately to task as the single actor responsible for all the misery in Latin America. The problem is much more complex than that. Accordingly, one of the main concerns is to make a case of a country, such as the U.S., which was clever enough to utilize the existing contradictions inherited from colonial times, such as despotism, anti-democratic structures and economic weakness, to the benefit of its very particular strategic pursuits. To a certain extent the United States enjoyed the fortune of being an extraordinary great power next to a collectivity of weak neighbours to the south.[13]

Political Features And Foreign Policy The Inevitability of Deterrence?

It is my argument in this study that (over and above the specific international realities and constraints that explain foreign policy and which I try to discuss here) there is always a cultural-political element which explains why U.S. foreign policy resorts to deterrence for its legitimatization. In this light, it is my assumption that the foreign policy of a great power always needs to ensure that the national interest in a continental area of influence is reinforced by means of deterrence.[14] Furthermore, a foreign policy of deterrence represents the best way to establish from the very outset the conditions and the extent to which certain

partne's behaviour may be tolerated. Typically such policy results in interventions of the most diverse types, the most important of which are those in which force is used to settle disagreements and disputes, whatever their nature.

Beyond examining both the theoretical and systemic characteristics of intervention, particularly in the case of Latin America, it is important to elaborate further on the number of arguments concerning the relationship between the historical national character and the political behaviour of the United States in foreign affairs.[15] I argue that the most salient feature of U.S. geopolitics and ideology and, hence, of its political behaviour in foreign policy, has been intolerance. This feature of the U.S. character was best promoted by Attorney General Tom Clark, who in his 1948 address to the Cathedral Club of Brooklyn, New York, stated that "those who do not believe in the ideology of the United States shall not be allowed to stay in the United States."[16]

For his part Walter Lippmann claimed that, "a nation, divided irreconcilably on 'principle,' each party believing itself pure white and the other pitch black, cannot govern itself."[17]

This is only one part of the social complexity of the United States, which is often still expressed in U.S. domestic politics. Although it is not the purpose of this work to measure the degree of social polarization of the country's political foundations, Lippmann's remarks nevertheless should be stressed when talking about the United States' political heritage.

The ideological blessing that U.S. foreign policy needed from the main domestic ideological input of the U.S., "Americanism", was decisive in that it developed strong shields of protective principles around the foreign policy making process. From 1945 onward, U.S. foreign policy could be portrayed and seen as strong and legitimate in that —and only in that— it reflected "American values," each of which would require a whole gamut of policy were foreign policy to be coherent. Does any nation's foreign policy reflect national values? Whatever the case, what I want to emphasise here is, in the first place, the importance of the very creation of a *national tradition* in foreign affairs: from 1945 onward, the U.S. was able to impose its interests in the name of the defence of all the values which represented and were represented by the "American tradition"; and, secondly, "American interests" were imposed on other actors' foreign policy traditions. "Americanism" as a national tradition became, both in Europe and in the so-called Western Hemisphere the doctrinary fabric that would become the dominant (and paternalistic) feature in world affairs. This came to reflect on the rules imposed upon the Western world as a result of bipolarity. Moreover, this tradition would appear as a unique and compelling avenue by means of which the U.S.'s hegemonic position could and would be achieved. In some respects, the Western tradition has been marked since the mid-1940s by such a climate, and it seems likely to remain so until the end of this century. As Beloff has said, "The United States ... intervened or attempted to intervene in the internal affairs of other states under the guise of the slogan, 'making the world safe for democracy'."[18]

"Americanism" as a national tradition became, both in Europe and in the so-called Western Hemisphere the doctrinary fabric that would become the dominant (and paternalistic) feature in world affairs. This came to reflect on the rules imposed upon the Western world as a result of bipolarity.

Simultaneously, to some extent these values, unlike those in some other developed nations, have been the reason for the injection of intolerance into the U.S. political tradition. It is with this in mind that Lipset states,

> The historical evidence ... indicates that, as compared to the citizens of a number of other countries, especially Great Britain and Scandinavia, Americans are not a tolerant people....One important factor affecting this lack of tolerance in American life is the basic strain of Protestant puritanical morality which has always existed in this country. Americans believe that there is a fundamental difference between right and wrong, that right must be supported, and that wrong must be suppressed, that error and evil have no rights against the truth. This propensity to see life in terms of all black and all white is most evident, perhaps most disastrous, in the area of foreign policy, where allies and enemies cannot be grey, but must be black or white.[19]

In light of this view, I suggest that, as a political creed, "Americanism" has turned, quite conveniently, into an essential ideological component of the U.S. political consciousness, "much like Socialism, Communism or Fascism."[20]

However, it must be stressed that, for better or for worse for the foreign policy framework of this nation, Americanism has been the backbone of the U.S. foreign policy project. Consequently it has been an essential feature in the overall definition of U.S. national interest, whose main expression is found in the international system, most particularly the Interamerican system.

Given, then, the struggle to produce a national foreign policy, it is essential to consider the cultural and political circumstances that precede foreign policy decisions. According to Bell,

> There has been little evidence that American foreign policy is guided by a sense of historical time and an accurate assessment of social forces....Foreign policy has foundered because every administration has had difficulty in defining a national interest, morally rooted, whose policies can be realistically tailored to the capacities and constraints imposed by the actualities of world power.... Americans have rarely known how to sweat it out, to wait, to calculate in historical terms, to learn that "action" cannot easily reverse social drifts whose courses were charted long ago.[21] VM

Notes

[1] Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Superpower* (Lexington, Kentucky: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988), p. 39

.[2] Martin Wight, "The Balance of Power," Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, eds., *Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Relations* (London: George Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1966), p. 149.

[3] Ibid., pp. 149, 150, 155.

[4] Terms such as "exceptionalism" and "mission," apart from being native cultural features, were direct antecedents of the United States' current position of power on the world map in general and on that of the continent in particular. It is therefore extremely important to pay attention to the material realities that made much of the content of these principles possible, as well as the means that existed to express them. In light of this, an understanding of the geopolitical content of the policy is essential to understanding U.S. geopolitical proclivities.

[5] Martí once wrote, *"Ni de Rousseau ni de Washington viene nuestra América, sino de sí misma"* (Our America springs neither from Rousseau nor Washington, but from itself.) José Martí, *Our America: Writings on Latin America and the Struggle for Cuban Independence*, Elinor Randall, with Juan de Onís and R. Held Foner, trans., P.S. Foner, ed. (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1977), p. 102. Another interesting book by Martí on the subject of both *"América"* and "America," is *Inside the Monster: Writings on the United States and American Imperialism* (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1975). Note that I will refer here to *"América"* (with an accent) when explaining Iberian-América and to *"America"* (without an accent) when considering the Anglo-American geopolitical category of the U.S. as dominant power.

[6] Gray, op. cit., Chapter 6, "The American Way."

[7] Further, I will use the term "realism" to mean a guideline of foreign policy. I do not focus on any of its specific sub-patterns. I accept the importance of the various schools embraced by realism. However, I believe that, for the purposes of an empirical study such as this, the differentiation among the various branches of realism need not concern us since they do not modify in any considerable way our understanding of the workings —as well as the general and specific objectives— of U.S. foreign policy in the early stages of the Cold War.

[8] This is one of the maxims explaining international society. Ultimately it is an axiom boosted by realism. In order to explore this approach to international relations I will use Martin's rephrasing of Vásquez in the following terms: "Realism had three central assumptions: that nation states are the most important actors; that there is a sharp distinction between domestic and international politics; and that the focus of International Relations is the study of power and peace." See Steve Martin "Paradigm Dominance in International Relations: The Development of International Relations as a Social Science," *Millennium* 16, no. 2 (summer 1987), pp. 192-193 and 199.

[9] Stanley Hoffmann, "The Problem of Intervention," Hedley Bull, ed., *Intervention in World Politics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984) p. 11.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Nixon's radio-television address from Moscow (August 1, 1959) (my emphasis). Richard Nixon, *Six Crises* (London: W.H. Allen, 1962), p. 439. The contradictions of U.S. foreign policy basically lie in the permanent dividing line between the norm and the natural needs of the great power. This is reflected interestingly in Henry Kissinger's jocular remarks: "The illegal we do immediately, the unconstitutional takes a little longer." Gary Allen, *Kissinger: The Secret Side of the Secretary of State* (Seal Beach, California: '76 Press, 1976), p. 13. It must be noted nevertheless that from the time of George Kennan onward, not one member of the U.S. establishment (with the exception of a small number of progressive liberals) offered any serious systemic opposition whatsoever to intervention. It is understood that logical disagreements have taken place within the inner circle of state decisions. Nevertheless, and confining this observation to the discursive and political outcomes of foreign policy decisions, there have not been ultimately, functional contradictions in the nature of the decisions to intervene and to defend the foreign policy principles of "Americanism."

[12] Even though Nixon was by no means a foreign policy theoretician, he was, first as Eisenhower's vice president, then as a permanent contender for the presidency, and later as president, a key figure in foreign policy decision making in the 1950s and the 1970s. Hence his importance as a foreign policy maker. Again, I refer to Nixon's words on the subject, this time in the case of Cuba, to offer some preliminary evidence on the contradictions always present in the demarcation of foreign policy priorities, especially when referring to the need to draw a line between an evil policy (the Soviet or the Communist) and a virtuous one (the U.S.). Nixon declared: "While we should not underestimate the danger, we also must not resort to Communist methods to fight Communism. We would then become *little better* than the Communists themselves —playing their game by their rules. We must not be so blinded by the threat of Communism that we can no longer see the principles of freedom....I had been urging a stronger policy, within Administration councils, against Castro....Early in 1960, the position I had been advocating for nine months finally prevailed, and the CIA was given instructions to provide arms, ammunition, and training for Cubans who had fled the Castro regime....This program had been in operation for six months before the 1960 campaign got under way. It was a program, however, that I could not say one word about. The operation was covert." (my emphasis), Nixon, op. cit., pp. 65, 351-352.

[13] For more on this subject see Lewis Hanke, *Do the Americans Have a Common History? A Critique of the Bolton Theory* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1964).

[14] The modern U.S. geopolitical view turned the country into one that clearly defined the boundaries of the actions of other members of the international community (i.e. the Holy Alliance confronted by the Monroe Doctrine at the end of the nineteenth century) particularly in Latin America. See Alfred T. Mahan, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783* (London: Sampson Low & Co., 1890); Nicolas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942); Geoffrey R. Sloan, *Geopolitics in United States Strategic Policy, 1890-1987* (Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1988).

[15] Here I refer both to the broad socio-cultural, political features of the United States as well as their influence upon the conformation of certain forms of state. Nonetheless, I would like to suggest that such features have been deeply influential at the level of governmental decisions in foreign policy which constitutes the bottom line in this approach. I argue that this aspect of U.S. politics will allow us to grasp why it is that a foreign policy of deterrence was needed.

[16] David Caute, *The Great Fear: The Anticommunist Purge Under Truman and Eisenhower* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1978), p. 15.

[17] Daniel Bell, *The End of Ideology* (New York: The Free Press, 1965), p. 121.

[18] See Max Beloff, "Reflections on Intervention," *Journal of International Affairs* vol. 22, no. 2 (1968), p. 201. A recent case of this enduring tradition can be found in the following words by the U.S. Secretary of State Madelaine Albright referring to the right of Washington to attack Iraq: "If we have to use force it is because *we are America*. We are the indispensable nation. We stand tall. We see further into the future." See Hugo Young, "So, we are not going to war. Good: that's what the people wanted,"*The Guardian*, 25 February 1998 (my emphasis).

[19] Seymour Martin Lipset, "The Sources of the Radical Right," in Daniel Bell, ed., *The Radical Right* (Garden City, New York, 1964), pp. 316-317. Lipset elaborates further: "I still believe that viewed cross-culturally, Americans are more likely to view politics in moralistic terms than most Europeans. No American politician would say of an ally, as did Churchill of Russia, that I will ally with the 'devil himself,' for the sake of victory. The American alliance with Russia (sic) had to be an alliance with a 'democrat' even if the ally did not know he was democratic." See Lipset, ibid.

[20] Lipset, op. cit., p. 321. Lipset adds that "Americanism has become a compulsive ideology rather than a simply nationalist term. Americanism is a creed in a way that 'Britishism' is not. If foreigners can become Americans, Americans may become 'un-American'.... An American political leader could not say, as W. Churchill did in 1940, that the English Communist party was composed of Englishmen, and he did not fear an Englishman." Ibid., pp. 320-321.

[21] Daniel Bell, "The Dispossessed," in Daniel Bell, ed., ibid., p. 20.

The 2000 U.S. Elections

*Patricia de los Ríos**

Several things are at stake in the U.S. 2000 elections: which party will occupy the White House after eight years of Clinton's Democratic administration; what chances the Democrats have of recovering the majority in the House of Representatives; and how they will do in a close race for the Senate, though it does not look like the Republicans will lose their current majority.

The Presidential Election

This year's presidential election is important both because the president cannot be reelected and, above all, because the new administration will draw up the policies for dealing with the challenges of the new century, taking into account the rapid changes over the last few decades, particularly the end of the Cold War. At the same time, given that the United States is at peace and still experiencing unprecedented economic prosperity, there are no profoundly controversial issues. This means that the campaign's outcome is expected to hinge on the candidates' images and the amount of money invested more than on any substantive debate.

> In addition to certain domestic factors, the way in which Mexico-related issues will be dealt with in the autumn campaigns will also depend on the political events in our own country, considering that when the U.S. campaigns begin, the name of the next president of Mexico will already be decided.

Since the Republicans do not occupy the White House, they began generating a long list of presidential hopefuls in 1999, among them: Elizabeth Dole, former secretary of transportation under President Reagan; Dan Quayle, former vice president; John R. Kasich, congressman from Ohio; Lammar Alexander, former governor of Tennessee; Steve Forbes, the owner of *Forbes* business magazine; Orrin Hatch, senator for Utah; Patrick Buchanan, ultraconservative commentator and politician; Gary Bauer and Allan Keyes, former Reagan administration officials; John McCain, senator for Arizona; and lastly, George W. Bush, current governor of Texas.

However, the enormous cost of the campaigns and the lack of political support led Dole, Quayle, Kasich and Alexander to abandon their attempts even before the primaries began. In February, Gary Bauer and Steve Forbes announced they were also withdrawing from the race. Patrick Buchanan, for his part, resigned from the Republican Party to join the Reform Party, founded by millionaire Ross Perot, which millionaire Donald Trump also announced he would join to seek its presidential nomination.

From the very beginning Texas Governor George W. Bush, was the front runner for the Republican nomination. He based his political hopes on having raised almost U.S.$60 million, the support of his party leadership and on poll results that pointed to him as a possible victor over Vice President Gore. His personal political history, however, is extraordinarily mediocre (an average student at elite schools, a bad oil businessman, the owner of a baseball team and finally, the incumbent governor of Texas), unlike his family ties, which have allowed him to rise to the position he currently holds.

From the ideological point of view, Bush is considered relative moderate, compared to the other more conservative currents dominating his party; he is an inter-

* Professor and researcher at the Social and Political Sciences Department of the Iberoamerican University.

nationalist like his father, although without the latter's knowledge and exprience, and open to ethnic minorities.

While Bush's victory was a foregone conclusion, Arizona Senator John McCain, a Vietnam war veteran who spent five years as a POW there, managed to turn himself into a real contender for the nomination after winning the New Hampshire primary. McCain was a conservative candidate, but his being a war hero and a fighter who has come up through the ranks despite the party elite allowed him to attract not only Republican voters, but also independents and Democrats unsatisfied with the current state of things, particularly with regard to the undue influence of money in U.S. politics. The other hopefuls, particularly the ultraconservatives, did not really have a chance at the nomination, but they could have an impact on the debate so that certain demands are included in the platform and to force the ones really in the running to politically commit to the more radical groups of the ideological right.

The Democratic Party nominated Vice President Albert Gore who has long political experience thanks to his eight years in the administration's second post and his previous tenure as senator, plus the visibility associated with his current position. Nevertheless, former New Jersey senator, plus basketball star Bill Bradley managed to organize a campaign to vie for the Democratic nomination calling for politics based on the fundamental issues —health, race relations, campaign spending reform— and not on the media. Supertuesday marked the end of both McCain's and Bradley's aspirations.

Despite his distinct style and the hindrance that being close to President Clinton —highly rated as a president but not as a person— is for Al Gore, the fact of the matter is that there are practically no profound political differences between him and Bradley. Both are new Democrats, a sector of the party that defends strong liberalism on some social and cultural questions but has taken some Republican issues on board like fiscal responsibility, the reform of the welfare state and the defense of family values.



AFP

From the ideological point of view, Bush is considered relative moderate, compared to the other more conservative currents dominating his party.

ELECTIONS FOR THE HOUSE

Although the 2000 presidential elections command the spotlight, the congressional elections, particularly for the House, are crucial because they offer the Democratic Party the chance to regain the majority it lost to the Republicans in 1994. It should be remembered here that whoever has the majority has political control of the House, heads the congressional committees and subcommittees and, therefore, decides a fundamental part of the U.S. political agenda.

Although the representatives are tested at the polls every two years, one of the characteristics of congressional elections is the high rate of reelection of incumbent members. For that reason, the future of the majority is actually played out in the so-called "open" seats, the ones in which the incumbent representative decides not to seek reelection. This year, the Republicans, with a slim five-seat majority, have 19 "open" seats and the Democrats only five.

The fact that the number of really hotly contested seats is small allows the parties to concentrate their political and material resources on those races. From 1994 to date, the Republican majority has gradually been eroded because the public perceives them as ideologically radical and even irresponsible after, for example, they allowed the U.S. government to come to a standstill when the budget had not been approved in time, and particularly because of the impression that they impeached President Clinton out of revenge.

The Senate Races

The Republican Senate majority —55 to 45— is larger than in the House of Representatives, making it unlikely that they lose it. However, the possibility cannot be discarded out of hand since of the third of the Senate's 100 seats up for election this year, the Republicans hold 19 and the Democrats 14. Although both parties consider their seats safe, either could be in store for a surprise.

Of all the Senate races, the most publicized is the one for the seat vacated by Patrick Moynihan, legendary Democratic senator and prominent intellectual, and disputed by First Lady Hillary Rodham Clinton and Republican New York City Mayor Rudolf Giuliani.

The Governors' Seats

The Republicans hold 30, the majority, of the country's governors' seats today, while the Democrats occupy 18. One state elected an independent and the Reform Party put ex-wrestler Jesse Ventura into the Minnesota state house, although he has now resigned from the party. This year only 11 governorships are up for election, so an important change in the Republican majority is not probable.

The Hispanic Vote

One of the novelties of the 2000 electoral process is the importance of the Hispanic electorate. Since the 1996 elections in which they made up 5 percent of the total vote, the specific weight of Hispanic voters has been a determining factor in places like California, Texas and Florida, and important in other states like Arizona, New Mexico and even New Jersey and Illinois.

The new Hispanic activism arises from different causes. On the one hand, some estimates put the demographic weight of the population of Latin American origin at 30 million people. It also results from the community's anger over California's Proposition 187, the changes in federal immigration and social security legislation, affecting legal Hispanic migrants, and the community's own process of political coming of age, which has created an awareness of the need to vote and support Hispanic candidacies for different elected positions.

AFP

Albert Gore has long political experience thanks to his eight years in the administration's second post and his previous tenure as senator, plus the visibility associated with his current position.

This increased influence has not gone unnoticed by the politicians in either party, although until now Hispanics have in the main voted for the Democrats. In 1996, the Hispanic vote for Clinton was higher than 70 percent. The Republican Party, for its part, has mounted a national ad campaign in Spanish emphasizing issues such as education, tax cuts, facilities for setting up small businesses and family values, messages that potentially may resonate in this sector of the electorate.

George W. Bush, who was reelected in Texas with the support of the population of Mexican origin, places great importance on the Hispanic electorate. He has a bilingual Web site and speaks in Spanish to that sector of voters reminding them of his Texan origin and presenting himself as a new leader.

The Democratic Party is not counting blindly on its predominance among Hispanics. Vice President Gore also has a Web site in Spanish and the Democratic National Committee is basing its campaign on the party's history favoring Hispanics.

In any case, clearly U.S. political parties are increasingly giving more space to the specific demands of Hispanic voters and will try to back Latino candidates. This is an important new development in U.S. politics and should be followed with great attention since it could in the

long run have an impact on U.S. policy toward Mexico.

MEXICAN ISSUES

It is to be expected that in a year in which both Mexico and the United States hold elections, Mexico-related issues will be part of U.S. campaign debates. Something interesting happened in 1996. Mexico-related questions had more impact during the primary races than during the post-nomination campaigns themselves mainly because of the presence of conservative populist commentator Pat Buchanan and Ross Perot, obsessed with the issues of migration, drug trafficking and NAFTA. However, during the race between President Clinton and Senator Dole, these questions were put on the back burner both because other, more important domestic issues came to the fore and because both the U.S. and the Mexican governments made an effort for their bilateral relations to not be held hostage in electoral debates.

Things could be different this year, however, both because the electoral processes coincide and because the Reform Party may run Patrick Buchanan or another conservative populist for the presidency. This would imply spending money to maintain media presence and Mexico-related issues perhaps becoming important in a negative way.

It should not be forgotten that Buchanan's positions include the idea of cutting legal immigration by half; carrying out a national assimilation campaign among immigrants, which would include making learning English obligatory; denying social services to undocumented —obviously Mexican— immigrants; and building barriers all along the border. With regard to trade, Buchanan has stated he favors tariffs and opposes all international institutions that promote free trade, starting with NAFTA.



AFP

Of all the Senate races, the most publicized is the one disputed by Hillary Rodham Clinton and New York City Republican Mayor Rudolf Giuliani.

While the proposals of all those who have entered the U.S. electoral races are still a bit vague, they have already made some interesting statements on some issues potentially related to Mexico. For example, Governor Bush has declared his support for upping the number of visas issued to highly skilled workers, as well as the creation of a temporary guest workers' program to cover the demand in agriculture and services.

Bradley, for example, classified Mexico, together with Japan, China, Russia and Germany, as priority countries for U.S. foreign policy. With regard to migration, he proposed legislation that would toughen up current policies. Vice President Gore considers migration something that enriches the country and favors protection of the rights of legal immigrants.

In addition to certain domestic factors, the way in which Mexico-related issues will be dealt with in the autumn campaigns will also depend on the political events in our own country, considering that when the U.S. campaigns begin, the name of the next president of Mexico will already be decided. If he is from the opposition, it is very probable that policy toward Mexico will be part of the electoral debate.

In conclusion, we can say that while the U.S. electoral campaign will probably be relatively sedate given the U.S.'s favorable economic and international conditions, the enthusiasm that McCain and Bradley sparked and the possibility that Ross Perot's party could be a player have been a reflection of the disquiet among significant sectors of the U.S. electorate. On the other hand, a change in the party in the White House or in the House majority and greater public scrutiny of Mexico-related issues could have an important impact on Mexico-U.S. bilateral relations that should be observed closely. VM

Canada and Foreign Direct Investment in North America

*Elisa Dávalos**

Foreign direct investment has been a very dynamic, strategic mechanism in processes of international capital restructuring, as reflected in the great importance that corporate acquisitions and mergers have had since the 1980s, particularly in developed countries.[1] We must also remember that, today, worldwide foreign direct investment implicitly includes global trade because of the close ties between the two. This is not only because of the increasing weight of multinational corporations in international trade flows, but also because of globalized production processes, international subcontracting and the new forms of organization of production with a world division of labor and intrafirm and interfirm trade on a world scale that increasingly connect investment and trade.

The United States has played a fundamental role in the world economy as a provider of foreign direct investment (FDI). In fact, during the post-war boom that brought U.S. economic predominance, its direct investment abroad became a central instrument for consolidating its hegemony and establishing its leadership.

Canada and Mexico have both been closely tied to the United States, not only geographically, but because they tended to gravitate around the U.S. economy for much of the twentieth century, and nothing seems to indicate that the twenty-first century will be much different. The participation of both Canada and Mexico in the North American bloc has been asymmetrical with regard to the enormous U.S. economy.

Foreign trade statistics are particularly revealing, since both Canada and Mexico make more than 80 percent of their inter-

GRAPH 1
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT FLOWS IN NORTH AMERICA (1998)
(Percentages)





Charts developed using data from the UN *World Investment Report* (1999).

* Researcher in the CISAN Area of Canadian Studies.

GRAPH 2
FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT OUTWARD STOCK BY INDUSTRY, CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES
(Percentages)



Charts made using data from the UN *World Investment Report* (1999).

national sales to the United States and the lion's share of their foreign investment comes from the United States. In addition, the U.S. economic cycle is increasingly a determining factor in the evolution of the economies of the United States' neighbors both to the north and the south.

Nevertheless, Canada's and Mexico's relationships to the world economy are different, which can be seen if we analyze the role each plays in investment in the rest of the world.

Graph 1 shows incoming FDI in North America in 1998 as well as investment made abroad by Canada, the United States and Mexico, including intraregional FDI in both cases.

It is immediately clear that the U.S. role is overwhelming, both in terms of incoming and outgoing FDI. If we look at the role played by Canada and Mexico as targets for world investment, we see that for the same year, 1998, Canada received 7 percent of the FDI in North America and Mexico, 5 percent.

While this difference is not considerable, the panorama changes when we examine the role played by both countries as providers of FDI. Mexico provided 1 percent of all FDI originating in North America, while Canada contributed 17 percent. Canada has an increasingly important role as an international investor. Thus, we can see that Canada and Mexico receive a similar amount of FDI, but there is a very important difference in the investment each makes abroad.[2]

One important factor that explains these differences is the degree of development of each country's multinational corporations. Canada has very large multinationals like Northern Telecom, Noranda, Bombardier, Alcan and Seagram. In fact, the United Nations *World Investment Report* for 1997 puts Seagram first in the world's top transnational corporations list in terms of degree of transnationality.[3] The Canadian company Thomson Corporation rates third on the same list.[4]

Along these same lines, in an interesting work about FDI in Canada, Alan

Macpherson says, "Major Canadian manufacturers such as Northern Telecom continue to employ more production workers in the United States than in Canada, domestically owned resource companies such as Alcan and Noranda have become familiar names in southeast Asia, and such retailers as Safeway and People's Jewelers now earn significantly more from their foreign operations than from indigenous sources."[5]

In contrast, Mexico's multinationals are less developed: it has only a few notable multinationals, among them Cemex, a cement producer, and Televisa, which has managed to place its television programming internationally.[6]

It is interesting to note that Canada rates high on the United Nations' Transnationality Index of Host Countries.[7] The following table shows that Canada is in second place, surpassed only by Great Britain, among the world's seven most industrialized countries.

TRANSNATIONALITY INDEX OF HOST COUNTRIES

Country	Percent
Great Britain	16
Canada	14
France	9
United States	6
Germany	5
Italy	5
Japan	1

Source: United Nations, *World Investment Report* (1999).

Graph 2 shows foreign direct investment by the United States and Canada by industry. It is important to note that in both countries, investment is dropping in manufacturing and increasing in services, although to differing degrees, given that the change is greater for both in the United States.

Another salient point is that Canada has invested a considerable amount in natural resources abroad. From 1988 to 1997, this kind of investment only dropped one percentage point, to 33 percent, while only 7 percent of U.S. direct investment abroad was in the primary sector in 1997.

Canadian interest in this sector is not surprising since Canada is rich in raw materials itself and is an important raw material processor and exporter. Nevertheless, the situation has changed to the extent that Canadian corporations have made important foreign direct investment in companies representing a great variety of other kinds of productive activities.

Canadian capital has actively participated in these processes of world concentration and centralization of capital, which has made for changes in property patterns and traditional forms of business organization. In 1998 alone, the following Canadian companies were involved in major acquisitions worldwide: Northern Telecom, Ltd. acquired Bay Networks, Inc., in the United States; Teleglobe, Inc. bought out Excel Communications, Inc., of the United States; Canadian National Railway Co. secured Illinois Central Corporation, of the United States; Epic Energy, Inc. purchased Dampier Bunbury of Australia; and Placer Dome, Inc. acquired Getchell Gold Corporation of the United States.

However, the purchase of Canadian companies like Connaught Laboratories, Leigh Instruments, Lumonics and Mitel by foreign firms has caused some concern because they are all technology innovators. In recent decades, the development of technology has been a central concern of the Canadian government, aware of its importance in maintaining standards in international competition. VM

NOTES

[1] The author would like to thank Marcela Osnaya for her help in developing the graphs for this article.

[2] It is important to point out that Canada has traditionally received much more foreign investment than Mexico. This is clear if we compare the overall stock of FDI, which gives us a more long term understanding than just looking at flows. In 1980, for example, the accumulated FDI in Canada came to U.S.$54.149 billion, while Mexico's was U.S. $8.105 billion. To the extent that globalization has deepened world economic links and Mexico has begun to occupy a more important place in the international economy —largely because of its entrance into NAFTA— investment flows to Mexico have increased noticeably. For more details about the overall stock of investment, see the United Nations *World Investment Report* for 1999.

[3] This corporate transnationality index is developed on the basis of three ratios: foreign assets/total assets; foreign sales/total sales; and foreign employment/total employment.

[4] United Nations, *World Investment Report* (1999), p. 83.

[5] Alan D. Macpherson, "Shifts in Canadian Direct Investment Abroad and Foreign Direct Investment in Canada," John N.H. Britton, ed., *Canada and the Global Economy* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1996), p. 69.

[6] Edgar Ortiz, "NAFTA and Foreign Investment in Mexico," Alan Rugman, ed., *Foreign Investment and NAFTA* (Columbia, South Carolina: University of South Carolina, 1994), p. 163.

[7] The Transnationality Index of Host Countries is the average of the following four items: FDI inflows as a percentage of gross fixed capital formation for the last three years; FDI inward stock as a percentage of GDP; value added of foreign affiliates as a percentage of GDP; and employment of foreign affiliates as a percentage of total employment. United Nations, *World Investment Report* (1999), p. 17.

Universidades

Revista de la Unión de Universidades de América Latina

18

julio-diciembre



Suscripciones: Circuito Norponiente de Ciudad Universitaria, México, D.F., 04510. Teléfono 5622-0096, Fax: 5616-2383. E-mail: udual1@servidor.unam.mx http://www.unam.mx/udual.
De venta en librerías universitarias, del Fondo de Cultura Económica y Gandhi.

Diseño: Blanca Pérez G.

San Angel

The Garden of the Valley of Mexico

*Jaime Abundis**

"Have you been in San Angel? Have you seen it from somewhere high up, from a tower? Is it not a paradise? Its orchards, its gardens, its tuneful little fountains; on its network of crystal-clear waters a blanket of flowers unfolds, flowers of every color, of every kind, like a multi-colored knitted shawl thrown over a mirror. Have you seen its village, its bell towers peeping over the balcony onto the Valley of Mexico among the trees? And there in the background, where the double chain of mountains that circle the valley, the ring in whose setting sparkle the Popocatépetl and the 'White Woman' like two diamonds, are lost from view, disappearing in the milky distance of the

* Mexican architect. Researcher at the National Institute of Anthopology and History, INAH.

Panoramic view of the towers and domes of the El Carmen Monastery and church.

Carlos Nebel lithograph of the Battle of Padierna, which culminated in the occupation of San Angel by U.S. troops.

The Valley of Mexico in the nineteenth century, as painted by José María Velasco.

horizon, there, very far away, on a background striped with the blue transparency of the lakes, have you seen the yellowish outline of the city that a reverent Alexander von Humboldt called the City of Palaces? Forgive these descriptions. I am overwhelmed by the spectacle, it was so beautiful...!"[1]

These little known words were written by a visitor to nineteenth-century San Angel, Don Justo Sierra, to describe the pleasing emotions evoked by a place that today survives only in literature, in the faded photos and the memories of the few people who had the good fortune to enjoy it as it was. Now, it is a just another part of the city, but it used to be a town with a visage of its own, the product of specific history and geography.

About 12 kilometers from downtown Mexico City, central San Angel is in the foothills of what eventually to the south and west becomes the Ajusco Mountains topped with Ajusco Peak and, at its feet, the Xitle volcano that a little more than two millennia ago formed the San Angel Pedregal, or "stony crags". The hills' many glens nurtured innumerable streams and brooks, the most important of which are the Magdalena or Coyoacán. Crisscrossing each other, they fertilized San Angel and its surrounding land. Thick oak, fir and pine forests covered not only the mountains, but the foothills, enriching the area with resources. The Pedregal lava malpais that physically separates Tlalpan from San Angel was the only jarring note in the landscape, but it also meant more resources.

It was these resources that in the remote past attracted men to the Mexico basin. The archeological remains at Cuicuilco and Copilco el Bajo testify to the degree of development achieved by the ancient inhabitants before the Xitle erupted.

The lack of systematic archeological exploration and the growth of the urban area limit our knowledge of San Angel's pre-Hispanic past. Historic sources, on the other hand, do allow us to know more about the post-classical period. With the Nahua invasions, the Tepanecs became lords of the western river bank of the Mexico Lake in the twelfth or thirteenth century. They set up their capital in Azcapotzalco and occupied Tacuba, Tacubaya, Mixcoac and Coyoacán. And so it remained until the reign of Maxtla, defeated by the Mexicas around 1428, who then became the new masters of the riverbank and, soon thereafter, the valley itself.

Coyoacán was made up of several hamlets, two of which were Tenanitla (meaning "next to the stone walls") and Chimalistac ("white shield"); this dominion came under the tutelage of Tenochtitlan after the

Chapel door, San Jacinto Church.

Patio of the San Jacinto Tenanitla cloister, founded by the Dominicans in the late sixteenth century.

Tepanec defeat at the hands of the Mexicas.

In contrast with Coyoacán, the seat of the dominion, which boasted a ceremonial center with tall pyramids and temples and more than 6,000 houses, half on the land and half in the water —known as *chinampas*, or floating gardens— as described by Bernal Díaz del Castillo, Tenanitla and Chimalistac were full of orchards and gardens, sprinkled with huts and a house or two, to the west, where what is now San Angel lies. Its resources had made them important hamlets since they contributed agricultural products, animals, wood, charcoal, basaltic rock and, of course, water in abundance. When the Spanish took Tenochtitlan and made Coyoacán their temporary headquarters in 1521, many of them unleashed their greed on these rich lands.

In 1529, Hernán Cortés became the marquis of the Valley of Oaxaca and was granted the tribute of the indigenous peoples of many towns in New Spain. He decided to place the capital of his marquisate in Coyoacán, that included towns and hamlets like Mixcoac, La Magdalena, Coajimalpa, Tacubaya, Los Remedios, Tenanitla and Chimalistac. Their abundant resources attracted the Spaniards and the congenial surroundings favored the building of an incipient settlement that began to be called Tenanitla, still a part of Coyoacán.

The missionary friars were a central part of the appropriation process and cultural transformation in this initial stage of the colonial period. In 1524 the Younger Brothers arrived to Coyoacán and shortly thereafter a small Franciscan monastery was set up in the town. However, in 1529, the Dominicans arrived and founded their convent dedicated to Saint John the Baptist. For 40 years, the two religious orders shared the Coyoacán area, establishing small chapels in the towns and hamlets. The Dominicans set up two chapels, dedicated to Saint Sebastian in Chimalistac and to Our Lady of the Rosary in Tenanitla, among others. From 1569 on, only the friars of Santo Domingo de Guzmán remained to cover Coyoacán and its environs. They used its bounty to turn Tenanitla into a place of rest and convalescence for the sick and the aged in the sixteenth century. The fame of Tenanitla as somewhere healthy began there, rooted in its wonderful natural conditions.

In 1596 in Mexico City, the Dominicans loudly celebrated the canonization of the Saint Hyacinth, the missionary of Poland and Northeastern Europe. As part of their festivities, they agreed to dedicate a house to the canonization, founding it in Tenanitla. Soon, the house began to be called Tenanitla de San Jacinto (Spanish for Hyacinth) or San Jacinto Tenanitla, and the original Marianist origins of the name, Our Lady of the Rosary, were forgotten. A short time later they turned this small monastery into the Hospice for Missionaries of the East, where the friars who came and went from the Philippines recovered from the hardships of their ocean voyage; the church

Oil of Saint Teresa of Avila, El Carmen Museum.

Facade of the San Jacinto Church, one of the first places of worship built by the Dominicans in San Angel.

also served as a parish church. The town was given a new name that would not last, but not for any reason the Dominicans could control.

Meanwhile, San Jacinto Tenanitla continued to grow and its visage changed slowly but profoundly. The great flowing Magdalena River, the most important in the southwest of the Mexico basin, was perfect for wheat mills, textile workshops and fulling mills, where wool and other cloth was shrunken and smoothed. Ranches, haciendas, gardens and seed plantations also used its waters to irrigate their crops. The peasants began to add their numbers to the workshop and mill laborers, as did a few city dwellers who enjoyed the benefits of such a magnificently well provided-for natural wilderness.

The barefoot Carmelites, founded by two such outstanding mystics as Saint Teresa de Jesús and Saint John of the Cross in the second half of the sixteenth century, had arrived in New Spain in 1585 to become part of the evangelizing efforts of the new lands that were being discovered and colonized, at the same time that they maintained their original contemplative goals. Although they were not destined to evangelize, their religiosity and spiritual values led them to found 16 houses during the colonial period, that formed the Saint Albert Province. The seventh of these was the San Angel College for which they received a land grant in Tenanitla and Chimalistac in 1597.

In 1614, the barefoot Carmelites decided to move their provincial college. This time they paid no heed to the obstacles put

Chimalistac Chapel, built by the Dominicans in the mid-sixteenth century in honor of Saint Sebastian.

Saint John of the Cross, El Carmen Museum.

in their path by the Dominicans and founded an ecclesiastic hospice in Tenanitla to prepare for the definitive establishment of the college. Most of the college's facilities were built between 1615 and 1617. Their lands were so vast that they reached from the college to the Magdalena River and even included part of the Pedregal. Soon they began to turn part of their lands into a model fruit and vegetable garden, surrounded by a high stone wall. Cart loads of mulch and manure to fertilize the ground, dikes and dams to store water, *apantles* (open water ditches) and aqueducts, a selection of apple, pear and peach trees, as well as vegetables, plus enormous amounts of labor by the local population brought forth a garden and orchard that produced good yields for them in that very century. The famous fruit of the San Angel orchard sold easily in Mexico City and elsewhere.

The Carmelites were already established in San Jacinto Tenanitla; their college functioned very well; and the orchard and garden produced enough to support them. The local population benefited from the employment offered by the Carmelites and, in imitation, they also covered the town with gardens and orchards. The boom was beginning and was soon reflected in continual visits by viceroys, archbishops, bishops and other civic and ecclesiastic dignitaries to the college. The number of summer houses owned by city dwellers increased as the town gradually became a favorite resting place.

The Dominicans, on the other hand, were in decline: the local populace took more to the Carmelites; the zeal of the

The former Goicoechea hacienda was converted into one of San Angel's most exclusive restaurants.

San Angel and Contreras in a nineteenth-century oil painting by José María Velasco.

Eastern missions declined; they had less property; and, to top off all their difficulties, their parish was secularized in 1754, leaving them only the hospice for the missionaries of the East and no contact with the population. A gradual but irresistable change was taking place in the town's name; slowly the name "San Jacinto Tenanitla" was forgotten and "San Angel" came into use. At the same time, the economic boom that came with the Carmelites meant that the hamlet stopped being considered a neighborhood of Coyoacán and began to be considered a town in its own right. The recognized border was an accident of nature, the Magdalena River. San Angel was emerging as a town made prosperous by its vegetable fields and orchards, with its summer houses surrounded by spacious gardens, encircled by other hamlets, haciendas and the Pedregal. This prosperity was characteristic of the eighteenth century.

Liberalism emerged at the end of the eighteenth century as a result of the Enlightenment. Carlos IV's royal decree of 1804 deprived the clergy of much of its economic wealth and influence, but this was only the first indication of the whirlwinds that were to come. Independence brought significant changes. With the federal Constitution of 1824, San Angel became a municipality of the State of Mexico, ending all political links to Coyoacán. When in 1828 the law was passed expelling the Spanish, the Carmelites realized their future was uncertain. The few religious who remained in San Angel were those born in Mexico and a few ill or incapacitated Spaniards.

During the first attempted reform under Valentín Gómez Farías in 1833, the San Angel Carmelites sold some property to avoid a debacle in their entire province. The vegetable fields and orchards were saved, but their income dropped significantly, and with it, the livelihoods of many of those who depended on them. Other problems came that checked the town's prosperity: the continual coup d'états and the political changes they brought with them, the foreign wars of 1836 and 1838, the shifts resulting from political division and the chronic scarcity of public funds to name just a few. The main stage of the final phase of the war against the United States (1846-1848) was the Valley of Mexico. The battle at the Padierna Ranch and its continuation, the assault on Churubusco August 19 and 20, 1847, were two further defeats for the Mexicans, in addition to the occupation of San Angel for several months. This period did a lot of damage to the population; the invading troops sacked and destroyed property and abused the inhabitants. The college was a favorite target, while the little San Jacinto monastery was used to jail the foreign soldiers of the Saint Patrick's Battalion and then to carry out their sentences.[2]

Amazingly enough, sunsets like this one can still be enjoyed in San Angel.

The Liberal reform brought other calamities. In 1856, Friar Rafael del Sagrado Corazón Checa, the last rector of the Carmelite college, divided up and sold part of the vegetable garden and orchard to private buyers; these lots were used for new houses that changed the appearance of the heart of San Angel. Finally, as a result of the laws of 1859 the San Angel College no longer belonged to the friars and their garden and orchard were sold to a private individual. The church remained open for worship; the college was managed by the local authorities and the garden and orchard continued to be worked. Things would not stay like that for long, however.

The college began to fall into disrepair: one part of it was used to house troops and police, another as a municipal jail. Still other parts were torn down to put in new streets, or divided up into lots and sold off. This turbulent period was harmful to the town that one way or another was linked to the Carmelites.

Some peace and progress did exist, however. Although the deplorable state of the roads made using it a torment, stage service between Mexico City and San Angel was established in the second half of the nineteenth century, with a house in the Carmen Plaza as its terminal. When in 1865 it became known that the Valley of Mexico Circle Railroad Line would extend to San Angel, people hoped for better transportation service. The day the railroad line from Tacubaya to San Angel was inaugurated in July 1866 was the only time Emperor Maximilian and Empress Carlota ever visited San Angel. The steam locomotive sped urbanization of the area, and it became possible to travel comfortably from the city.

The railroad also facilitated the area's industrialization. In the nineteenth century, the old workshops and fulling mills from the colonial period gave way to new textile factories that continued to use the River Magdalena's waters. Although it only reached Tizapán, the project of continuing the Valley Railway to Contreras was undertaken, demolishing part of the old Carmelite buildings in its wake.

The dawn of the twentieth century brought more changes to the town. Electric streetcars came in 1901, making passenger and freight transportation cheaper and easier. The streetcar lines were flanked on both sides by corn fields, flowering hillsides and vegetable gardens and orchards, but soon, the new settlements began to fill with people. The Goicoechea hacienda, as well as the Guadalupe hacienda and San José Ranch, were divided up to make way for the new San Angel Inn neighborhood. The old Carmelite vegetable garden and orchard finally gave way to the push of progress when it was divided and sold off to private buyers beginning in 1906. And then, suddenly, automobiles made their appearance.

The incipient industrial transformation of the nineteenth century sped up with the new means of transportation. One of the textile factories, the Our Lady of Loreto Plant, was refitted to produce paper instead of fabric, thanks to the enterprising Don Alberto Lenz. Tizapán became an offshoot of San Angel, but with a difference: its inhabitants depended more on manufacturing than on agriculture. Workers flooded Tizapán and San Angel, changing the local social structure.

Despite the transformations, San Angel stuck tenaciously to its tradition of being a summering place. The new century brought with it a rather different ambiance to San Angel due to the factories, the streetcars, the automobiles and the new neighborhoods, but the flavor of a provincial town and a place for spiritual and physical renovation remained.

And just when everything was peaceful came the Revolution. This period had no important direct repercussions in San Angel until the clash between Zapata and Carranza. Zapatista forces beleaguered the south and west ends of the valley and at one point took San Angel in 1916. But despite the overall remoteness of the armed conflict, the general political situation gravely affected normal life in the town.

Culminating the revolutionary period was the 1917 Constitution and the later attempts by Presidents Alvaro Obregón and Plutarco Elías Calles to implement it to the letter. The result was the breakout of the religious conflict that led to the closing of the churches between 1926 and 1929.

Finally, something unexpected happened in San Angel's Bombilla Restaurant: Alvaro Obregón, president-elect for a second term, was assassinated there by José León Toral. León was taken to the local jail, situated on part of what had been the Carmelite college, where he was imprisoned together with the nun, Concepción de la Llata, or Mother Conchita, also charged with the assassination, and they were tried in the local municipal building. The affair put the old town in the national spotlight and sparked rapid changes.[3]

San Angel was a town in the environs of Mexico City. Today, it is part of it, and, as such, shares both its defects and its virtues. It has this process of assimilation in common with many other parts of the city that used to be individual towns: Coyoacán, Tlalpan, Tacuba, Tacubaya, Mixcoac, Xochimilco, Azcapotzalco and others. Despite their similarities, however, it had its own traits that made it unique. The purpose of this article has been precisely to give the reader an overview of how those traits have developed from the remote past to the twentieth century. No one can appreciate what he or she is not familiar with.

Now, when you return from southwest Mexico City, remember the words of Justo Sierra, "Imagine! I've just been to San Angel!" VM

Photography: *Luis A. Aguilar*

NOTES

[1] Justo Sierra, *Obras completas. Prosa literaria*, vol. 2 (Mexico City: UNAM, 1977), p. 394.

[2] See the article by Jim Fogarty about the battalion in the "History" section of this issue of *Voices of Mexico*.

[3] María García Lascuráin deals with this process in her article in this issue.

FURTHER READING

Abundis Canales, Jaime, *Antiguo colegio carmelita de San Angel. Museo de El Carmen* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia/Museo de El Carmen, 1992).

_____ "El Colegio de San Angel: árbol fructífero y ejemplar del Carmelo mexicano," *Historia de un huerto. Historia de la colonia Huerta del Carmen, San Angel, D.F.* (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios de Historia de México Condumex/Delegación Alvaro Obregón, 1992), pp. 31-55.

Correa Duró, Ethel and Roberto Zavala Ruiz, *Recuento mínimo del Carmen descalzo en México. De la antigüedad a nuestros días* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Antropología e Historia, 1988).

Fernández del Castillo, Francisco, *Apuntes para la historia de San Angel y sus alrededores (San Jacinto Tenanitla); tradiciones, historia y leyendas* (Mexico City: Editores Porrúa, 1987).

Contemporary San Angel
From the Twentieth to the Twenty-first Century

*María García Lascuráin**

In memory of Patricia O'Gorman, my childhood neighbor and friend in San Angel.

The Beginning of the Twentieth Century

The first 25 years of the twentieth century were coming to an end. Mexico City was growing rapidly with new residential areas developing in the empty properties between the city and surrounding towns. La Gran Calzada, today South Insurgentes Avenue, was inaugurated September 16, 1924. Also known as the "New Avenue," this public works project was 8 kilometers long and reached the recently developed neighborhood, Guadalupe Inn. At the time, to preserve the pavement, only vehicles with rubber tires were allowed to use the road.[1]

Almost a year later, in August 1925, the merchants of the area decided to form the San Angel Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Businesses, including those set up on the eastern side of San Jacinto Plaza, Francisco I. Madero Street, Del Carmen Plaza and Dr. Gálvez Street were registered in the founding document. These businesses would soon make up the commercial core of San Angel and included clothing stores, bakeries, public baths, *nixtamal* mills to make corn dough for tortillas, *pulquerías* (bars specializing in *pulque*, a traditional drink made from maguey) and small shops. Teachers and doctors were also registered including Alberto Lenz, owner of the Loreto y Peña Pobre paper mill.[2]

This was a first step in San Angel's transformation. In a few years time, other

* Social researcher who has lived in San Angel all her life.
Translated by Andrea Martínez.

Fagoaga House.

San Jacinto Plaza, one of San Angel's most traditional parks.

The house on San Jacinto Plaza where the weekly Saturday Bazar is held.

circumstances were to change the way of life in this once tranquil village. The first of these was the assassination of Mexican general and president, Alvaro Obregón, July 17, 1928 in La Bombilla, a very popular restaurant of the time.

On December 31, 1928, the Federal District and Territories Law created the Federal District (D.F.) comprised of Mexico City, divided into 13 *delegaciones,* or wards, and a consulting committee. San Angel went overnight from having a municipal form of government, in which the community was very active, to a ward structure, dependent on the state, which by nature placed a distance between the citizens and their government. A new future was in store for the capital which required major changes in its political and social organization as well as in its economy and commerce. By 1933, Mexico City was expanding so fast that soon it went beyond its own boundaries. In a short time, San Angel would cease to be a small town on the outskirts of the city. With drastic changes in its urban layout and local administration, daily life for its inhabitants was changing quickly. The once popular La Bombilla restaurant was torn down and a monument erected in its place honoring the fallen General Obregón.

San Angel was still the seat of the ward,[3] but the changes in its form of government were having social implications on day-to-day life. With secularization, the church stopped having a say in educational and cultural matters. Churches and other places of worship and/or religious education were either temporarily closed or placed in the hands of the state. The El Carmen Church would remain closed for 12 years, from 1927 to 1939. At the same time, the social endeavors carried out by the Salesian Order were halted. This group supported institutions such as the María Auxiliadora School[4] and the Count Mario Fani Workers' Circle which benefited both wealthy San Angel residents and the craftsmen and factory workers of nearby Tizapán.

THE 1940'S TO THE 1960'S
THREE DECADES OF PUBLIC WORKS

During the next three decades various public works in San Angel and its surrounding areas would have a definitive impact on the geographical layout of the area and on the small town flavor it had managed to

Amargura (Bitterness) Street. San Angel residents have fought to preserve the tranquility and beauty of its streets.

preserve up until then. Residents witnessed how majestic walls lining old alleyways were torn down. Small shops, haberdasheries, *pulquerías*, *cantinas* and movie theatres disappeared, stilling the voices of conversations held from one side of the street to the other between shopkeepers discussing their day-to-day successes and disappointments. These changes took place in the context of a surge in industrial activity and administrative services and amidst a tremendous increase in the city's population due to a wave of immigration. The public works were an answer to the needs of a rapidly growing population and to the decentralization of businesses and educational and health services. But they would leave an undeniable mark on San Angel, not only on its geography but also on the life of its inhabitants.

During this time, the project to extend Insurgentes Avenue to the highway to Cuernavaca was completed and the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) University City campus was built. The residential area known as Pedregal de San Angel[5] was also developed. In 1952 the inauguration of what today is known as Revolución Avenue would break up the area's territorial unity affecting its "historic and picturesque" character.[6] Given this disturbing scenario, Don Luis Montes de Oca invited his neighbors to a meeting in his home in Los Licenciados Plaza # 3, April 27:

Dear Sir,

As you know, the picturesque and typical nature of the town of San Angel, our neighborhood, is protected by a September 1934 federal decree. One can easily conclude that this law should be enforced to preserve San Angel as a living testament of an era gone by. As San Angel residents, many of us feel the need to exchange views on this matter and to discuss ways to enforce this law in such way as to preserve the unique qualities of our neighborhood.

The San Angel Market, famous in the 1940s for its quality merchandise.

The Porfirio Parra School on the San Jacinto Plaza. The building belonged to the Silesians until the 1930s.

In order to conserve the cultural and architectural patrimony of San Angel it would be necessary to, first, delimit the "historic area" and determine that any new thoroughfares leading to other parts of the city will have to pass around this area, with the exception of Insurgentes Avenue. Second, promote the planting of large trees in houses, plazas and streets (ash trees, laurels, cedars, etc.) and ensure a water supply for the maintenance of these gardens. Next, declare tall buildings undesirable and define the criteria which new constructions must meet in order to fit in and not interfere with the architectural beauty of older buildings and monuments.[7]

Concern grew among the residents of San Angel. A citizens' association was formed called Friends of San Angel with the aim of "discussing what actions are being taken with respect to the possible mutilation of Del Carmen Plaza if Revolución Avenue is extended up to San Angel Avenue which leads to the university stadium."[8] But the decision had already been made: on September 2, 1952, a secretary in a downtown office left the following note:

> 17:15. Sir, your mother called saying that by order of the city government, work will begin today to tear down the house next door. They said your house will be next.

In this way, the once narrow and quaint lane known as Ferrocarril del Valle was widened and extended to the university grounds and transformed into what is today Revolución Avenue.[9]

An outdoor market, which every Sunday ran up and down Dr. Gálvez Street, had already disappeared a few years before. The street vendors had moved from the northern end of this street to where they are located today, between Ferrocarril del Valle —today Revolución Avenue— and Arteaga and Dr. Elguero Streets, where the La Chispa *pulquería* and a coal outlet were located. At first, the majority of the 30 to 40 merchants resisted the change because they felt this new market was too big and far away from the commercial district. But with time, the Melchor Múzquiz market —better known as the San Angel market— would be well known for the quality of its products and would become the most popular of the city's markets.[10]

Archangels Plaza, another charming public space in San Angel.

The wealthiest women of the area —housewives, wives of public officials and foreigners with exquisite tastes— flocked to the market to do their shopping. Women who worked as cooks in wealthy homes, who knew their métier better than anyone, also enjoyed the market, discovering the best the season had to offer and on the way exchanging bits of news with neighbors.

In the 1960's, events would take place that would put a definitive end to the tranquility of old San Angel. La Alpina, a wool factory established at the end of the nineteenth century, closed its doors in Tizapán, a neighborhood very close to San Angel.[11] The San Jacinto Parish was broken up and its space reduced[12] and the traditional crafts market known as the Saturday Bazar was moved from Dr. Gálvez Street to an old mansion in the San Jacinto Plaza, drastically changing the nature of this beautiful park.

Meanwhile, nearby towns such as Coyoacán, Tlalpan and Contreras and community farmlands had already been overtaken by the constantly growing city. San Angel became a stopover for thousands of people commuting from one end of the city to the other and consequently a massive and unorganized wave of street vendors flocked to sell their goods on the sidewalks of this once quiet town.

From Quaint Neighborhood to Area of Controlled Development

At the end of the twentieth century, the streets of San Angel saw new sights, sounds and problems. The change in zoning from residential to commercial use allowed for the remodeling and subdivision of old mansions, destroying many of

the gardens which had always been typical of San Angel. An increase in tourist and commercial services brought with it an enormous rise in the flow of people and traffic. All of this contributed to disrupting the once peaceful plazas of San Jacinto and Del Carmen and today threatens to invade even the cobblestone lanes leading to residential areas. Garbage, noise and night-roaming rodents have become everyday problems and public areas have been saturated with an endless array of newcomers: street vendors and people looking for work,[13] as well as an endless flow of tourists who flock every weekend to the Saturday Bazar. This scenario has overwhelmed many San Angel residents who have founded new organizations of longstanding residents and merchants.[14] Interest has even been sparked in surrounding neighborhoods. More than 50 years of history are in danger of being forgotten.

At the end of the twentieth century, the San Angel downtown area and the San Angel Inn and Tlacopac neighborhoods were declared "Designated Areas of Controlled Development" (Zedec) in order to conserve, improve and rescue them.[15] In 1998, 800 street vendors on public thoroughfares were relocated. The residents, although not indifferent to the vendors' complaints and hardships, at the same time felt relieved at having recovered the area. It was decided that some of these vendors would be temporarily relocated in Las Palmas Plaza located at the intersection of Dr. Gálvez Street, Insurgentes and Revolución, which is also a bus stop. Currently, the residents of San Angel are working to conserve and promote local culture and Mexican culture in general, not only by celebrating local traditions but also by organizing festivals and artistic activities such as concerts, painting and sculpture exhibitions and lectures in the San Angel Cultural Center, the Isidro Fabela Library, museums and other charming public areas.

THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

It seems that a new will is flourishing in San Angel to recover the memories and dreams that for so long had been drowning under the weight of its own overwhelming development. The fighting spirit of its inhabitants, passed on from generation to generation, will most certainly be kept alive for years to come. Gone are the tiny shops, the *cantinas* and small grocery stores. Only faint echoes can be heard of an era gone by: the whistle of a nearby factory, the train passing on its way to Cuernavaca, the call of roosters in back yards. Even church bells and the whispered prayers announcing mass or the commencement of festivities honoring the patron saint seem to be fading not only in San Angel but also in nearby Tizapán, Copilco, Chimalistac and Tlacopac. However, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, San Angel breathes new life with the ever present, enthusiastic participation of its community. Meanwhile, every day at their accustomed hour, one can still hear the chimes of the bells of San Jacinto and Del Carmen. VM

Photography: *Luis A. Aguilar*

NOTES

[1] *San Angel Pintoresco,* vol. 1, no. 3 (June 1924).

[2] Minutes from the meeting held in August 1925 and charter of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of San Angel, Villa Obregón, Mexico City, 1932. Information provided by the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry in Villa Obregón, Mexico City.

[3] In 1932, San Angel's name changed to Obregón Villa (or City), however this was never assimilated by the population.

[4] The same building later housed the Porfirio Parra public elementary school .

[5] The unique geography of the area presented great challenges. Its development is truly to the credit of talented engineers and architects, remembered well by residents of San Angel and the university community alike.

[6] A decree passed by President Abelardo L. Rodríguez, September 27, 1934.

[7] Taken from the first draft of the letter written by Javier García Lascuráin Calderón dated April 24, 1952 addressed to Montes de Oca in response to his invitation.

[8] Letter addressed to Javier García Lascuráin by Luís Montes de Oca and Pedro Aspe, president and secretary of the association.

[9] For years the stretch of this avenue in San Angel was used very little; students and teachers on their way to the university campus would turn left at the corner of Dr. Gálvez and drive one block to Insurgentes Avenue.

[10] The new Melchor Múzquiz market was established in 1943 and was reinaugurated by President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines and the city mayor, November 12, 1958. The market's success during this time made many consider it the best, second only to the very popular and renowned San Juan Market downtown.

[11] Ernesto Vázquez Lugo, *Sucedió en San Angel. Viñetas históricas* (Mexico City: Edamex, 1986).

[12] The San Sebastián Chimalistac Parrish formed part of San Jacinto until November 20, 1964.

[13] Including sex workers.

[14] One example is the Tenanitlan San Jacinto Organization. Although formed in 1996, this group has been working since 1978 on a solution to the urban organization and rescue of San Angel's historic downtown, a solution that would get to the heart of the matter, favoring no one and respecting the rights of everyone involved.

[15] This agreement would take effect on August 6, 1993, when published in the Mexico City's Official Gazette and will last 20 years.

A Walk by Summer Chalets And Cultural Venues

*Jaime Abundis**

While the Dominican and Carmelite friars were the first to benefit from the privileged conditions of San Angel in the sixteenth century, others soon discovered the advantages of this little town so close to the city. With the bustle of the

* Mexican architect, researcher at the National Museum of Anthropology and History.



The White House, San Angel.

Photography: *Luis A. Aguilar*

town's Carmelite college in the seventeenth century, the number of visitors increased. A few well-off gentlefolk acquired land there to build summer houses surrounded by large gardens and orchards.

The area's attractions were myriad: mountains covered with thick forests, glens crossed by crystalline streams, waterfalls and cascades everywhere, more refreshing temperatures than in the city, no pools of water to bring mosquitos; trees, flowers and the majestic scenery of the Valley of Mexico with the city on one side and the volcanoes on the other, sprinkled with a multitude of hamlets in the most transparent air imaginable.

The English Dominican Friar Thomas Gage and the Carmelite Friar Isidoro de la Asunción, resident in the San Angel College, left us their impressions from the seventeenth century. However, the best descriptions of these promenades and clearings are found in the romantic writings of people who lived in the nineteenth century like Frances Erskine Calderón de la Barca,[1] Manuel Payno[2] and Justo Sierra.[3] The short junkets from San Angel to nearby towns, the religious and popular fiestas with their processions, *jaripeos* or Mexican rodeos and dances these writers describe give us an idea of the charms that attracted outsiders to the town. These customs were witnessed and described by Hans Lenz Hauser,[4] probably the last of San Angel's illustrious chroniclers.

The yearly arrival of the city folk to San Angel as summer neared was quite an occasion. They made all the preparations for the move from their homes in the city: the journey in the local stage and carts included servants, furniture, victuals and animals; and the fiestas, social evenings and walks or horseback rides in the environs were eagerly awaited. The Cabrío waterfall on the Magdalena River next to the La Hormiga factory was a "must" meeting place for all the summer visitors.

Oil painting of the Cabrío Falls on the Magdalena River, as painted by José María Velasco.

The San Angel Cultural Center.

Let us take a look at the most important houses that remain to us, a testimony to a gentler time.

On the street that goes up to the west from the Licenciados Plaza is the building called the White House, considered the oldest in San Angel, said to date from

The summer house of the marquises of Selva Nevada.

Many of these houses have niches on the outside.

The Licenciados Plaza, named after the lawyers who lived in the area.

The entrance to the White House.

the seventeenth century. In the eighteenth century it belonged to an infantry colonel, Don Diego de Arce y Chacón, count of the Valley of Oploca. Above the main entrance, in fact, is a slightly worn coat-of-arms said to be his family crest. Surrounding the house were vast gardens and orchards that bordered on the Goicoechea hacienda.

On the corner of what are now Hidalgo and Reyna Streets is another summer house of a noble family, the marquises of Selva Nevada. Don Manuel Rodríguez de Pinillos, the first marquis of his line, managed the interests of the marquisate of the Valley of Oaxaca in Coyoacán at some time during the eighteenth century. It should be remembered that when he died, his wife decided to retire to the Regina Coeli nunnery in Mexico City, where she asked no less a personage than Manuel

House of Bishop Madrid y Canal.

The Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo Studio-House Museum.

Corner Niche, house of Bishop Madrid.

The Archangels Plaza.

The House of the Bishop, first owned by Joaquín Fernández Madrid y Canal,
canon of the Mexico City cathedral and later bishop of Tanagra, has a beautiful central patio.
Its facade is fortunate in its mortar coats-of-arms and monograms,
the ironwork of its windows, the railings' inverted arches and pinnacles
and the corner niche with the sculpture of Our Lady of Guadalupe.

The exquisite Porfirian architecture of the home of the Misses Coudurier captivate the observer.

The home of the Misses Coudurier.

Tolsá to design her cell.[5] The baroque niche with its sculpture of Saint Anne and the Child Virgin in her arms on the house's exterior corner is of note.

Another house was built on the land that was part of the San Jacinto Dominicans' orchard and vegetable garden until the eighteenth century, though no construction was erected on the corner itself, leaving room for the little Licenciados Plaza, named after the lawyers who lived in the area. One of the lawyers was Rafael Martínez de la Torre, who owned the house in the nineteenth century and became notorious for his unfortunate defense of Emperor Maximilian in Querétaro. In the twentieth century, the house was bought by Luis Montes de Oca, a cabinet minister under Lázaro Cárdenas, who added to its main entrance the primitive portal to the chapel of the Saint Joseph of the Natural Hospital, retrieved from the building when it was demolished in the 1930s.

Where Juárez, Aureliano Rivera and Amargura Streets cross is a triangular lot where the so-called House of the Bishop stands, first owned by Joaquín Fernández Madrid y Canal, canon of the Mexico City cathedral and later bishop of Tanagra. This one-story building has a beautiful central patio. Its facade is fortunate in its mortar coats of arms and monograms, the ironwork of its windows, the railings' inverted arches and pinnacles and the corner niche with the sculpture of Our Lady of Guadalupe topped with a flower-festooned stone cross.

Few visitors really look at the house that hosts the famous Saturday Bazaar at one corner of the San Jacinto Plaza. Some say it was owned by Don Antonio López de Santa Anna during the nineteenth century,[6] although this should be taken with a grain of salt. What is not in question, however, is the house's eighteenth-century origins, as testified to by its window jambs, extended to the cornice over the lintels.

A few steps from this house, also on the San Jacinto Plaza, is the Risco House, dating from the seventeenth century, with modifications from a century later. Outstanding features of this building are its door with the baroque niche ornamented with a stone sculpture of Our Lady of Loreto; the look-out used by officers in both the Mexican and U.S. armies during the events of 1847; the patio; and most of all the crag-shaped fountain made of New Spain Majolica, Asian and European porcelain and sea shells topped with a sculpture of Hercules or Sampson fighting a lion. The Agreda family owned this house in the nineteenth century; it passed to the Payró family in the twentieth century and was then bought by Isidro Fabela[7] to live in. He filled it with great works of art and antiques that he later donated to the people of Mexico.

Another important house in San Angel was that of Don Francisco Fagoaga, the marquis of Apartado. This house has had many owners, some of whom used it as a station for the stages that ran the regular

The house of lawyer Rafael Martínez de la Torre who became notorious for his unfortunate defense of Emperor Maximilian in Querétaro.

route between Mexico City and San Angel before the advent of the steam engine and the railroad. The house had ample grounds where, when sold, five houses fit comfortably, in addition to the picturesque Amargura Alleyway. The house seems to date from the eighteenth century, although it was remodeled in the nineteenth century with balustrades and clay urns.

At the Amargura Street corner of Plaza del Carmen stands the house that belonged to the descendants of Tristán de Luna y Arellano who undertook the conquest of Florida in 1565, embarking from San Juan de Ulúa, Veracruz, for whose services the Crown gave him the title of Marshall of Castile. The house's main points of interest are the facade's lace-like plaster relief and the gargoyles on cherubim brackets.

To the left is another magnificent house, for many years inhabited by the Misses Coudurier, sisters known for their close friendship with Porfirio Díaz. Despite its current state of disrepair, it still catches the eye: the fine design and careful proportions, and the alabaster capitals that top the portico columns.

Unfortunately, many houses were torn down to make way for what people thought was modernity; among them, the so-called House of Dynamite and the home of Don Ignacio Cumplido.[8]

But not everything in San Angel is nostalgia for things past; it has other, more than alive, up-to-date attractions, particularly cultural venues.

You just have to cross Revolution Avenue from the El Carmen Museum to enjoy lectures, exhibitions, concerts, courses and more in the San Angel Cultural Center.

Facade of the Risco House, built in the seventeenth century.

The house's fountain, made of Majolica, porcelain and shells.

A few steps away is the Jaime Sabines House, which also offers cultural activities. It is a shame that the old Carmelite cistern has been defaced, but just west of it is the portico built for the Carmelites' spiritual conversations, for years used as the concert hall of pianist Pedro Luis Ogazón and today the dining room of a day care center. In the San Jacinto Plaza, besides the Risco House, is the Isidro Fabela Cultural Center with its library specialized in international law.

On the corner of Revolution Avenue and Altavista is a modern building that houses the Alvar and Teresa Carrillo Gil Art Museum, whose painting and sculpture exhibitions make it well worth a visit. On Altavista itself, across from what was the main house of the other Goicoechea hacienda, today used as a restaurant, is the house Juan O'Gorman[9] built for Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo, now dubbed the Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo Studio-House Museum,[10] with its excellent permanent collection and temporary exhibits.

In what was once the Loreto paper mill, at the corner of Revolution and Magdalena River Avenues is a shopping mall that houses the Soumaya Museum, with outstanding pieces in its permanent collection, including sculptures by Auguste Rodin. We cannot leave out the Mexico Condumex Historical Studies Center on the Federico Gamboa Plaza (also known as Chimalistac Plaza), that boasts one of the best specialized libraries in the country and offers history lectures to the public. But we must not leave San Angel before wandering though and enjoying its tree-filled corners like the Archangels and Licenciados Plazas, the River Walk with its bridges built by the Carmelites, the little winding streets of Chimalistac with its "Secret Chamber," its La Fonte Plaza and its modified open chapel. And we must make time to walk through the Tagle, Bombilla, San Jacinto and Art Garden Parks. The San Angel of remembrance and evocation still appeals to the visitors of today who know how to discover what is not always visible at first glance. VM

Notes

[1] Scots wife of the first Spanish ambassador to Mexico, who wrote *Life in Mexico*, in which she describes the country's nineteenth-century landscape and customs.

[2] Mexican politician and intellectual who loved San Angel, where he died.

[3] Founder of the National University and a cabinet minister to Porfirio Díaz, Justo Sierra was an assiduous visitor to San Angel.

[4] Hauser was the last owner of the Loreto paper factory before it was converted to a shopping mall.

[5] Tolsá was the director of sculpture of the San Carlos Royal Academy, the sculptor of the equestrian statue of Carlos IV, known in Mexico as *El Caballito*, and designer of the Royal College of Mines building, masterpieces of the New Spain neoclassical period.

[6] Santa Anna was president of Mexico 11 times between 1833 and 1854 and is infamous for being responsible for the loss of a vast stretch of Mexican territory (Texas, Arizona, Colorado and California) to the United States.

[7] Politician and diplomat from the first half of the twentieth century.

[8] The first editor of the most famous newspaper of the time, *El siglo XIX*.

[9] Juan O'Gorman was also an internationally recognized painter.

[10] Read about the Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo Studio-House Museum in *Voices of Mexico*, no. 39.

Lots More than Mummies in El Carmen Museum

*Jaime Abundis**

For decades, the El Carmen Museum has been a place of interest and reference point for San Angel. Its main attraction may once have been the crypt with its 12 mummies dug out of a peaceful grave by Zapatista

* Mexican architect, researcher at the National Institute of Anthropology and History.



Photography: *Jaime Chalita y Luis A. Aguilar*

troops in 1916, but this strange display has been superceded by the cultural attractions the museum now offers.

The museum itself is the main historical monument in the entire southwestern part of Mexico City: the old barefoot Carmelite San Angel College of San Alberto Province, popularly known as the El Carmen Convent (monastery).

The now famous mummies have been a must for visitors to the crypts since the Zapatistas dug them up, as was the adjacent church with the Chapel of Our Lord of Contreras' three golden baroque altars.[1]

In 1929, the college was turned into a historical museum following the old museological guidelines. The few pieces of furniture, paintings, sculptures, household goods and ornaments left from the religious order after the pillage of the college were used. Gradually, objects from other monasteries and museums were added, making for a heterogeneous collection that turned the venue into a religious art museum.

In 1996, the old museum was renovated to include a permanent exhibition dedicated to the barefoot Carmelites. The idea was to bear witness to the rise and evolution of this religious order and its important contribution to our cultural heritage.

The old museum was renovated and now includes a permanent exhibition dedicated to the barefoot Carmelitas, bearing witness to the order's rise and evolution and its important contribution to its cultural heritage.

A Brief Walk through the Museum

The visitor enters through the college's old portal after crossing the atrium of the adjacent church. Here, he/she can see the remains of eighteenth century murals depicting an allegory of Mount Carmel, with Elias flanked by Saint Teresa de Jesús and Saint Alberto of Sicily. Passing

In addition to the decorative art covering many of its walls, cupboards and caisson and vaulted ceilings, the museum boasts oil paintings by some of New Spain's most distinguished artists.



through the porter's hall, he/she will find him/herself in the first room dedicated to the order, which includes important pieces like the Gabriel Canales oil painting *Saint Peter Thomas with Our Lady of Carmen* (1752); *Our Lady of Balbanera* by Manuel de Arburu (1781); the allegory of *Saint Alberto's Province*, showing the monasteries founded by the order, painted by Friar Miguel de San José (1723); a European engraving of an allegory of Mount Carmel, depicting distinguished Carmelites and their benefactors; as well as fine oils of saints and defenders of the order.

The college's lower cloister is a splendid example of seventeenth-century Carmelite architecture embodying the vocation for poverty and austerity preached by Saint Teresa. From there, the visitor has a good view of the tile-covered dome over the transept and monumental belfry. On its east corridor is the door that leads to the primitive sacristy anteroom with its multicolored, Mudéjar-influenced caisson ceiling and a canvas by Cristóbal de Villalpando depicting the presentation of the Child Virgin at the Temple of Jerusalem.[2]

To the south is the sacristy with its golden caisson ceiling, its cupboards, its drawers of incrusted wood and the famous five Villalpando oil paintings: *King of Mockery*, *Saint Teresa Castigating Herself*, *Our Lord of the Column*, *Saint John of the Cross Castigating Himself* and *Prayer in the Orchard*. Other oils by the same painter can be seen on the walls: *The Betrothal of the Virgin* and *Saint Joseph with the Child*.

East of the sacristy anteroom is the lavatorium with its majolica ware-covered basins and its unique geometrical vault. From there, stairs lead down to one of the



Among the museum's main attractions are the crypts.

most attractive parts of the museum: the crypts. The space itself is extraordinary, with an altar and majolica-ware covered wainscots, walls and vaults decorated with paintings, alabaster fonts and an altar with an oil painting attributed to Pedro de Campaña:[3] *Our Lord of the Column with Saint Peter*. Next door is the crypt of the monks and the mummified remains of some benefactors.

Upstairs from the lavatorium, on the second floor, the visitor comes to the east corridor of the higher cloister and the rector's cell with its anonymous nineteenth-century oil portrait of Friar Antonio de San Fermín, one of the colleges most illustrious rectors. Other spots to see are the cells, the anteroom to the choir-loft, the platform with a view of the church, the library and the corridors filled with paintings, sculptures and objects of daily use that give us an idea of the life of contemplation, study and prayer that the friars led in another time.

But all these parts of the top floor are surpassed by the household chapel or oratory, which holds the only surviving original altar, decorated with oil paintings by Francisco Martínez, a reliquary at the center and an exceptional sculpture in majolica of Our Lady of El Carmen. The walls are hung with eighteenth-century paintings by Acosta of passages from the life of *Saint Teresa of Avila*, Juan Correa's *Saint Teresa the Pilgrim* and Juan Bezerra's *Saint John of the Cross*. On the west side of the building is the sacristy which holds more objects and a cornstalk paste Christ from Michoacán.

A new section next to the aqueduct was opened to the public in January 2000 with a temporary exhibit, "Time and Millenarianism: Myths about a Reality." Soon, this section will also show pieces from the Franz Mayer permanent collection about New Spain's craft guilds.

The El Carmen Museum's future is bright, fortunately for both San Angel's inhabitants and visitors. VM

Notes

[1] These altars were lost in a fire in August 1936.

[2] Cristóbal de Villalpando, together with Juan Correa, were the most distinguished late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century painters in New Spain.

[3] This Flemish painter never actually came to New Spain.

The European-U.S. Dispute On Climate Change

*Edit Antal**

The comparison between the U.S. and European Union positions on climate change may illustrate two different conceptions of how to solve global problems in the future. During the benchmark international ozone negotiations, the United States was still the leader.[1] Today, it has radically changed its position and become the most important opponent of the December 1997 Kyoto accords, to the point that it holds the very fate of the accords themselves in its hands. In contrast, the European Union, whose position has evolved in the opposite direction, today heads up the defense of the original spirit of the agreements.

In accordance with the 1992 Rio de Janeiro agreements, the Kyoto Protocol established different commitments for different countries: 35 industrialized countries would reduce their emissions an average of 5.2 percent, among them the United States, with a 7 percent drop and the European Union, with 8 percent. The vast majority of nations has still not ratified the agreement, mainly because of strong U.S. opposition to two points: the protocol establishes that only some nations lower emissions, leaving out the developing countries, and that at least part of the emission reductions be non-negotiable, regulated and obligatory. The final meeting where the fate of the protocol will be decided is slated for this year in The Hague.

The U.S. rejects the reduction of greenhouse effect gas emissions under the Kyoto Protocol conditions and demands increased commitment from

* Researcher in the CISAN Area of U.S. Studies.

Photos by Dante Barrera

developing countries since, if they reduce their emissions, it could create a flood of permits for the emissions trading proposal the U.S. supports.[2] The European Union (EU), in contrast, accepts the reductions agreed upon in Kyoto and proposes a mixed mechanism that would combine both direct regulation and market mechanisms. It does not think that developing countries should have to reduce their emissions for the moment and also proposes limiting permit trading to only half the emissions while the other half would be controlled by regulated domestic reductions.

One of the keys for understanding this shift in the European Union's position is the process of integration of its member countries, bringing to the fore all the policy areas which strengthen it and the power of common decision making bodies. In the case of the United States, the concrete decision making process in environmental matters tends to block taking on bigger commitments in a global policy.

This divergence is linked to several different factors, the first being the objective situation of the energy issue in each country. But the cultural perception of the problem of climate change, the nature of environmental policy, the decision making process itself and the institutional structure also have an impact. In the U.S. view, climate change and the concrete commitments stipulated in the Kyoto convention constitute loss of sovereignty and economic competitiveness. In contrast, for the EU, with its mixed identity emanating from its member states and the European Commission (understood as a supranational body), they mean the strengthening of its collective authority. This is basically because, over recent decades, the countries have already handed over part of their sovereignty to be able to integrate and because they have managed to set up mechanisms to thrash out differences among member countries, sectors and different policy levels.

The Energy Situation

In 1991, the United States was responsible for 26 percent of the world's carbon dioxide (CO_2) emissions and the European Union, 16 percent. This made for a per capita rate of 18.6 percent in the United States and 7.8 percent in Europe, with a 3.7 percent world average.[3] The greenhouse effect index to measure pollution used by the World Resources Institute puts the U.S. rate at 19.1 percent, while in Germany it is only 3.8 percent and in France, 1.6 percent.[4]

The U.S. position is based first of all on its historic access to an abundance of cheap fossil fuels, which explains why the costs of reducing CO_2 emissions is perceived as very high compared to the potential impact of climate change, considered uncertain and moderate. The United States is the world's second oil and natural gas producer and first coal producer. In fact, the U.S. is both the main producer, consumer and importer of energy in the world, which is why it is a determining factor in the world equilibrium between supply and demand.[5] It has achieved all this thanks to the existence of an ample supply of low cost energy, which, in turn, created a culture of squandering relatively dirty and cheap energy. This culture has historically marked U.S. industrial development and made it common for the public to see any restriction in energy consumption as a sensitive matter for the U.S. economy. In line with this, Rayner thinks the U.S. economy depends just as much on fossil fuels as heroin addicts depend on needles.[6]

In general, the energy situation in Europe is the opposite of that of the United States. Its dependence on external sources and the use of different kinds of energy (nuclear, hydroelectric, natural gas, oil and coal) make it less dependent on fossil fuels than the United States. This means that the Kyoto accords have a much more limited impact on its growth. In fact, the overall carbon dioxide emissions in the largest EU countries has dropped since the 1970s, although in recent years it has increased.[7] In France, 85 percent of electricity is generated by nuclear power; in Great Britain, 35 percent and in Germany, 25 percent.

So Europe is characterized by high energy costs, the export of dirty industry and an energy-saving culture and life style. Undoubtedly, the reductions achieved until now are due not only to the economic factor, but also to concerted government policies.

Comparing energy prices is particularly interesting. While in the United States, electricity costs the average person U.S.$84 and industry U.S.$47, in Europe the costs are U.S.$137 and U.S.$79 respectively. In the most developed European countries, like Germany, for example, the differential is even greater: U.S.$204 and U.S.$101, respectively.[8]

The United States estimates that to live up to the Kyoto commitments it would have to reduce its emissions by one-third,

incurring a greater cost than, for example, Japan's or most of the European countries'.[9] Studies by Alan Manne and Richard Richels maintain that a 20 percent reduction could cost the U.S. economy between U.S.$800 billion and U.S.$3.6 trillion.[10]

CULTURAL CONCEPTIONS

The U.S. view of global warming can be categorized as pragmatic and political, compared to the German perspective, which tends to be principled, or the British idea, which is fundamentally skeptical.[11] The pragmatism is visible in the basically commercial and cost-effective orientation to the search for a solution to the problem, while its political nature is clear in the consideration that the issue is a political battleground where interest groups, Congress, the administration, isolationist and internationalist forces and supporters of regulation and of a free market all enter the fray. As a result, the scientific uncertainty that actually does exist, of course, about such a complex issue as climate change tends to be interpreted in political terms. That is, the different scientific views seem to be simply products manipulated by particular actors.

The U.S. elite's view of climate change is characterized by a profound faith in the strength of its country expressed in the notion of U.S. world leadership and the international responsibilities derived from it. Nevertheless, there is also another way of perceiving the issue: isolationism, a kind of counter-reaction to the internationalist view, with a tendency to reductionism by only taking into account domestic needs. In the United States, environmental beliefs and consciousness are inspired clearly in an anthropocentric view of the world and conceive of nature somewhat religiously. Not only does this mean that nature tends to be considered something relatively stable and human interference not very decisive, but also that in general

TABLE 1. ENVIRONMENTAL TRADITIONS, DOMINANT VIEWS AND POLITICAL POSITIONS ON CLIMATE CHANGE

	United States	**Germany**	**United Kingdom**
Basic cultural characteristics	Universal-analytical	Result-centered Profound thinking	Individualistic and analytical
Conception of nature	Anthropocentric "Wilderness"	Global unity Unstable *"Wald"* (forest) Countryside	Local Divisible entities Stable
Environmental consciousness	Religious Anthropocentric Political Modernist	Principled Threat/risk Global orientation Technological change	Skeptical-scientific Modern rationalist Local nature
Climate change	Political issue Not very dangerous Lacks overall consensus	Global Ecological challenge Overstated	Costs Uncertainty Energy issue
Political position	Soft goals Joint implementation Voluntary Cost-benefit analysis	Hard goals Structural focus Technological innovation Regulationist policy	International forum Commitments Market policy and energy market

technology and science are assigned positive values and the notion of risk is linked preeminently to the risk to human life. On the other hand, nature is assigned a great deal of value and undoubtedly considered one of the most important conditions for human life.

Taken as a whole, these characteristics mean that the concern for the environment is less pronounced, for example, than in most developed European countries, particularly with regard to specifics and above all global environmental issues.

U.S. culture's main characteristics —such as being extremely analytical, severely individualistic and inward-looking, fact- and personality-centered, with individual interests viewed as an elemental social category— are also manifested in its people's vision of the environment, in which quantitative elements and pragmatism come to the fore and the country's individual interests as well as those of its corporations tend to be constantly mentioned and highly regarded.

Studies on the topic generally underline the agreement between tradition or environmental awareness (long-term concern, anthropocentrism, conservationism and the obligatory framework situated on the domestic level) and the confused nature of U.S. environment policies, particularly when dealing with a recent global environmental issue. The perception of climate change is a very limited concern[12] and is seen as a point of contention among different domestic and external actors who, in attempting to maximize their profits, use the issue as an argument in political debates, mainly in the battles between supporters of regulation and supporters of the market.

Environmental Policies

The great difference between both international actors has been the object of many studies. In a recent working paper,

Imtiaz Hussain summarizes the main differences: a) Europe prefers multilateral action on agreements and reasonable principles while the United States favors selective criteria and dealing with each issue and country case by case; b) In Europe, regional action is as or more important than national action, while for the U.S., regional actions are clearly subordinated to domestic priorities; c) In Europe, the principle of subsidiarity allows member states to carry out independent actions while in the U.S. the question of sovereignty makes cooperation difficult; d) In Europe, the environment is included on each of the points of the union's and the international agenda, while in the United States it is dealt with exclusively and directly by specific institutions; f) In Europe, environmental policy is carried out in four- or five-year programs that show a permanent concern, while U.S. policy is institutionalized and only reviewed once a year, which weakens its impact; f) In Europe, the environmental issue runs through all the others thanks to the guarantee of principles and norms, in contrast to the United States, where environmental policy tends to be selective, discussed in bilateral relations as specific problems; g) In Europe, the impact of environmental policy is distributed symmetrically through direct taxation; in the United States indirect measures, like for example, the permit market, make for an uneven distribution among the different sectors.[13]

> The U.S. view of global warming can be categorized as pragmatic and political, compared to the German perspective, which tends to be principled, or the British idea, which is fundamentally skeptical.

The Decision Making Process

The main factor that led the EU to become a real actor on the international playing field was the pre- and post-negotiation decision making process component, something absent in the United

States. Before comparing them, it should be said that environmental policy, linked to commerce in the United States, basically comes under the jurisdiction of the executive branch and, in the EU, of the Brussels Commission.

Although the European Commission is considered a dispersed, ambiguous actor internationally, its ability to negotiate the so-called mixed competence issues (such as climate change, in which both national and community interests are implicated) is increasing.[14] A long, complicated process took place before and after the negotiation of the international treaties involving the commission, which represents the community interest, the Council of Ministers, formed by representatives of the member governments, and the societies at large in each of the member states. To a great degree, this facilitates the effectiveness of both the decision making and the implementation of the policies agreed upon.[15]

In contrast, in the United States, the organized energy lobbies, that are pro-market and represent the most powerful corporations, particularly in oil and coal, have historically occupied a privileged place in the decision making process and de facto permeate the formulation of public policy. The power of these lobbies is so huge that, with the help of the Department of Energy, they were able to block the action of the Environmental Protection Agency under the Carter administration, which clearly agreed with EPA policies. Today, something unheard-of is happening: the EPA is the object of a serious accusation from the legislature questioning its ability to regulate carbon dioxide emissions.[16]

The structure of its institutions, particularly the sharp separation between executive and legislation branches, puts the United States in a very difficult position for negotiating a treaty about climate change. The U.S. position on the Kyoto Accords is limited by the adminis-

TABLE 2. POLITICAL MECHANISMS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE POLICY

	United States	**European Union**
Government Involvement	Traditionally low	Traditionally high
How Policy Is Developed	Dealing case by case	Dealing with it as a package
Political Style	Clash between executive and legislature	Mixed diffused mechanism and division of powers for creating consensus
Energy policy	Private	Public-Community
Regulatory Means	Indirect Asymmetrical impact	Direct Symmetrical impact
Link among Sectorial Policies	Weak	Strong
Link between Domestic and International Policy	Not differentiated; the second is the continuation of the first	Areas of mixed competence favor international policy
Ability to cooperate	The domestic level is the absolute priority	The regional level is just as important, if not more important, than the national level

tration's social base and the territorial political strength that being the majority in Congress gives the Republican Party since it is the Congress that ratifies and applies all international treaties. Congress has a growing faction that sees a clear tendency to lose sovereignty and for that reason puts the onus on the developing countries for their lack of commitment in reducing emissions.

Under these circumstances, the U.S. Congress is not likely to accept the domestic consequences of the existing international treaties. After the experience of the Uruguay Round, and more notably NAFTA, both parties in Congress feel they are losing control over trade matters, which used to be considered international questions and are therefore dealt with by the executive. They are now demanding a change. Thus, sectorial conflicts in the United States noticeably diminish the executive's ability to exercise leadership globally.

By contrast, what the EU calls mixed competence issues favor the commission's ability to negotiate in the international arena. Unlike the United States, the loss of sovereignty is no hindrance given that environmental accords are forged within the process of broad European integration and in the framework of a common philosophy, the values of which are broadly shared by all member states. Europe's mixed structure is more appropriate for accepting a restrictive global set of norms regarding climate change given that the sectorial-, subnational-, national- and community-level actors all actively intervene simultaneously in forging policy from the preparatory stages to the international negotiations themselves. In this way they build a consensus that is an advantage when the time comes to implement the agreement.

In fact, a common policy is designed in the Brussels Commission where each member country intervenes simultaneously. The proposal is also made in the

commission but first it goes through a broad consultation on member-nation level through the ministries and social sectors. Finally, the decision is made in the ministerial council, which also consults with the private and public sectors.

In the United States, the simple fact that the legislature must ratify the accords without having participated in the proposal's design tends to create hostility, but only in the phase that follows the agreement negotiations themselves, when interest groups, miners, oil workers and farmers usually show their resistance. Congress is not really committed to the international negotiation, but it does try to avoid negative consequences for domestic politics. These circumstances produce perfect conditions for the infamous environmental gridlock, a result of a basic disagreement among key interest groups.[17]

Not until consumption and production patterns based on a non-dense habitat, the use of automobiles, intensive resource utilization and high waste production change will it be possible to think about truly sustainable development.

Conclusions

On climate change, the United States favors no regrets and bottom-up politics that make for measures beneficial in and of themselves, although they continue to ignore the effects on the environment. It also rejects the European perspective based on prevention, considering it premature and idealistic. It also does not implement policies that demand a definitive change in user behavior to save energy, which in the experts' opinion would be the only really effective measure in a society accustomed to abundant, cheap energy. Not until consumption and production patterns based on a non-dense habitat, the use of automobiles, intensive resource utilization and high waste production change will it be possible to think about truly sustainable development.

The environment is already one of the factors in designing U.S. foreign policy.

However, climate change as a prototype of a global environmental problem is intimately linked with domestic U.S. politics given its relationship to a broad gamut of economic activities vital to the country. This is particularly the case in the energy sector, where consumption and production patterns are determined not only by politics, but also by the general cultural model.

This makes it enormously difficult for the United States to maintain its traditional leadership in the world on environmental issues because its foreign policy goals clash with the priorities and traditional mechanisms for building consensuses domestically. Climate change would seem to suggest that foreign policy is simply an extension of domestic politics, and in the case of a country like the United States, the only surviving superpower, this is too narrow a reference point for it to be able to live up to its global role.

In the international sphere, the U.S. position on climate change clashes with the more inclusive, diversified view of the European Union, which today has the initiative worldwide. This is explained in part by its lesser dependence on dirty energy sources, but also because its cultural model is more energy-saving and above all because its political mechanisms aim more at creating consensus among different countries and interests —local, national and supranational— than at pursuing sectorial ends.

Nevertheless, Europe is also showing signs of weakness. On the one hand, its traditional decision making mechanisms are changing due to U.S.-like lobbying around new problems like the privatization of the energy sector and other changes that have come about to increase global economic competitiveness. On the other hand, its communal institutions are also showing signs of crisis and authoritarianism which are becoming more and more visible with the broadening out of the union. But making its processes democratic or transparent could put its ability to create consensuses around environmental issues at risk.

Europe can only maintain leadership on the environmental question and offer a different, more generous and efficient solution if it is able to deal with its increasing internal conflicts in the framework of European politics and stay away from the U.S. way of doing politics. VM

NOTES

[1] The ozone layer accords, known as the Montreal Protocol, date from 1987; they were so successful that they are still considered an example to follow in international negotiations.

[2] In an emissions trading program, sources of a particular pollutant are given permits to release a specified number of tons of the pollutant. Governments issue only a limited number of permits consistent with the desired level of emissions. Permit owners may keep them and release the pollutants or reduce their emissions and sell the permits. The fact that the permits have value as an item to be sold or traded gives the owner an incentive to reduce their emissions. *http://www.weathervane.rff.org/glossary/-index.htm.*

[3] IPCC, *Climate Change: The* IPCC *Response Strategies* (IPCC, 1991), p. xxxiii. *http://www.unep.ch/ipcc/syntrep.wp*5.

[4] Marvin S. Soroos, *The Endangered Atmosphere: Preserving a Global Commons* (Columbia: University of South Carolina, 1997), pp. 201-202. The index is an aggregate of the main gases that create the greenhouse effect, weighted according to the potential effect that each has in global warming.

[5] Víctor Rodríguez Padilla and Rosío Vargas Suárez, "Políticas energéticas en América del Norte: desafíos y convergencias," Julián Castro, Robert J. Jackson and Gregory S. Mahler, comps., *Los sistemas políticos de América del Norte en los años noventa* (Mexico City: CISAN/UNAM, 1999), pp. 415-430.

[6] Matthew Paterson, *Global Warming and Global Politics* (London/New York: Routledge, 1996), p. 80.

[7] Steven Hales, "The CO_2 Gap: Europe vs. the U.S. - Showdown in Kyoto," 18 September 1999. *http://www.weathervane.rff.org*.

[8] Richard Lawson, "Climate, The Kyoto Protocol and Cape Bojador," *Vital Speeches* 65, no. 23 (Pleasant, City News Publishing Co. Inc.) (15 September 1999), pp. 718-722.

[9] Raymund Kopp et al., "Políticas sobre cambio climático posteriores a Kioto," *Cuestiones Mundiales* (Internet magazine) vol. 3, no. 1 (April 1998), pp. 1-8.

[10] Alan Manne and Richard Richels, "The Greenhouse Debate: Economic Efficiency, Burden Sharing and Hedging Strategies," *The Energy Journal* 16, no. 4 (1990), pp. 1-37.

[11] This is the conclusion of Richard van der Wurff's work, "International Climate Change Politics. Interests and Perceptions" (Ph.D. diss., University of Wetenschappen, Netherlands, 1997), p. 334.

[12] Willett Kempton, James S. Boster and Jennifer A. Hartley, *Environmental Values in American Culture* (Cambridge, Mass., London: The MIT Press, 1995).

[13] Imtiaz Hussain, *Environmental Protectionism and Comparative Observations in West Europe and in North America*, Documentos de Trabajo no. 38 (Mexico City: CIDE, 1998), pp. 1-33.

[14] A. M. Sbragia and C. Damro, "The Changing Role of the European Union in International Environmental Politics: Institution Building and the Politics of Climate Change," *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy* 17 (February 1999), pp. 53-67.

[15] E. Antal, "Políticas globales del medio ambiente. Perspectiva comparativa entre Estados Unidos y la Unión Europea," *El Cotidiano* (July-August 1999), pp. 32-41.

[16] U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Science, Hearing Charter for Joint Hearing of the Committee on Government Reform, Subcommittee on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources and Regulatory Affairs and Committee on Science, Subcommittee on Energy and Environment, *Is CO_2 a Pollutant and Does* EPA *Have the Power to Regulate It?* (Washington, D.C.: 6 October 1999), pp. 1-3.

[17] M. Kraft, "Environmental Gridlock: Searching for Consensus in Congress," N. Vig and M. Kraft, *Environmental Policy in the 1990s. Toward a New Agenda* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1993), pp. 97-119.

Mexico's New Poetry
Fernando Fernández and Eduardo Vázquez

*Eduardo Hurtado**

In his most recent publication, *Ora la pluma* (This Time the Pen) (Mexico City: El Tucán de Virginia, 1999), Fernando Fernández shows himself to be a proud descendent of Ramón López Velarde, "the single father of Mexican literature." The fact that an author barely 35 years old assumes so openly the heritage of a poet who died at the age of 33 more than eight decades ago is particularly significant. López Velarde was the first among us to bring the language of conversation into poetry. To do it, he used the cardinal recourse of the latest in modernism (noticeable in Leopoldo Lugones of *Lunario sentimental* [Sentimental Lunar-y]): the clash of the colloquial language of cities with an entirely personal "literary" language. In some of the poems of his *Zozobra* (Anguish), López Velarde wields language that masterfully combines the humdrum and the unexpected, grace and irony. Of all of Mexico's poets —with their penchant for elaborate discourse— only a few have learned López Velarde's lesson: Novo, Lizalde, Pellicer in part, Zaid, Deniz, and, among the young poets, Fernando Fernández, all challenge the idea that López Velarde is a reference point but not a path to follow.

Ora la pluma is part of a current that counterposes a shrewd, mocking voice to rhetorical eloquence. Far from any edifying purpose, Fernández invents a stuttering speech that mixes sentimentalism and sarcasm, melancholy and levity. The strength of this language lies in the unity of discordant notes. Along with Julio Torri, Fernando Fernández discovers melancholy as the complementary tension of irony. Out of this discovery, he attains moments of luminous corrosiveness:

> Eloína wasn't an eyesore.
> From her unmolded
> body, her torso unexercised,
> flowed a nimbus of
> disdain, and a detached beauty
> —concept of the erotic
> framed by unreachable or postponed possession.[1]

In his desire to resist the bondage of time, Fernández clings to the aesthetic of disappearance: what has been lived dissolves in the virtuality of the future and conditional tenses ("will have..." and "would have...") or in an "if he had...", that multiplies the final results of the most memorable experiences. This grammar uses work-a-day words, and yet each new phrase convinces us that no one talks like that. Fernández works from the bottom of the language: he proposes speech rooted in the commonplace to then grow toward the intermittent, the discontinuous, but also toward the conjectural and the ominous. The two epigraphs by Garcilaso used in the book reveal the baroque sediment that nourishes this young poet's syntax, a sediment that in the poetry of our language has often been the starting point for breaking with paralyzed discourses.

By giving the nation feminine attributes, López Velarde fled from civic enthusiasm. Fernando Fernández underlines the abyss separating poetic

* Director of Mexico City's House of the Poet.
Illustrations by Adriana Bravo.

language from political discourse. In "Soliloquio con héroe en Churubusco" (Soliloquy with Hero in Churubusco), a man visits the ex-monastery of Churubusco planning to pray while waiting for the debates to begin in the Publishers Chamber of Commerce. Finding the chapel closed, he decides to direct his plaint to the statue of one of Mexico's war heroes. And the statue responds, "If we had any ammunition, you wouldn't be here..." Then, the suspicious visitor thinks:

> But *parque*,[2] park, in the sense of garden,
> was right outside,
> even if we ignore the filthy dog
> who was licking the bronze plaque
> and a couple of vehement couples,
> out there,
> next to the church, wasn't it a park?[3]

In the best written poem in the book, "Raya" (Line), Fernando Fernández deals with the theme of love that succumbs to the rigors of time. Like in the work of López Velarde, here the woman plays a dual, contradictory role: it is she who summons and reconciles the most divergent realities, and she is also the one who is scattered and scatters us in infinite presences. Fernando Fernández brings these tensions into play and resolves them in images in which the clarity of consciousness is manifested in the joyful turbulence of the words:

(I'd like to have Belisarda
—I told you once, when we played at telling
each other, in determined
but tremulous words,
our desires in reference to others—
have her here like an apparition which would
sweeten the fall,
downy and tame among us,
licking salt from your outstretched hand.)[4]

Knowledge of tradition once again becomes a road to self-knowledge. Without a project for the future, continuity with the past is one of the possible roads toward a different poetry. Although revolutionary action and the poetic endeavor seem more and more incompatible, there is a heritage that some young authors do not disdain: the ability to say no. Eduardo Vázquez, born in Mexico City in 1962, has learned from those who not so very long ago sought in the poem a place to refound ordinary life. Given the loss of the image of the world and the crisis of signifiers on the threshold of the twenty-first century, Vázquez assumes his subversive vocation. Gambles like his, rarer and rarer today, are a true update of attitudes and feelings as essential as hospitality, the vocation for freedom, the cultivation of memory, community feeling, brotherhood and even hope. For

Vázquez all these things reappear as alternatives to the evils plaguing us: growing relativism and its inevitable counterpart, nationalist and religious fanaticism.

Given the progressive standardization of poetic languages, the attempt that Vázquez brings into play in his most recent book, *Naturaleza y hechos* (Nature and Events) (Mexico City: Era, 1999), revives the yearning to speak in the singular in frequenting life's most compelling experiences. Venezuelan Eugenio Montejo says that for the poet of today, uprootedness begins in the loss of the city as the expression of a common project. With the gradual disappearance of cities, we begin to see the importance of their presence in the work of the great poets: Baudelaire and Paris, Cavafy and Alexandria and the four Pessoas and Lisbon.

A poet of today, even if he/she spends his/her entire life in the same place, is condemned to being uprooted: he/she lives with the certainty that cities have been abolished. Whether he knows it or not, every poet confronts the challenge of tracing in the air the spiritual geometry of a possible city. Today, memory is the pilar of that attempt, "the atmosphere of his imagination," as Malanos said about Cavafy's work. Vázquez manages to restore to us a vital space in the liveliest recollection of the revoked cities:

> The city that sinks up to its knees in the sand, the city of "the men and women who wait on the coast/ for the afternoon to renew the turn of the stars."[5] The city of rooftops, where a legion of young girls builds towns that repair the view of the hills (the villagers have left the town, and in their airy capital they relive the atmospheres of a subverted Eden).
>
> The city that we leave to go to the beaches where contemplation becomes possible again. The city that we return to by isolated paths, only to reencounter the stooping walls, the cat and the timetable.
>
> The city of concrete life, where "those who arrive build their neighborhood/ and found the market and the chapel."[6] A universe of names more faultless than the august names of history; of actions nobler and more long-lasting than official heroism: Nicanora serves breakfast, Pedro shines shoes, Jesús buys marijuana at the workshop door. Here the epics have unexpected champions: the young boxer with cauliflower ears; swaggering, dirty-mouthed kids, who watch life go by from the corner with a beer in their hands and chicken out at the last minute (on the radio, a few minstrel bands narrate the epic poem of the dispossessed).
>
> The city of simultaneous apparitions: a young man "rehearses a pass at an imaginary bull in the air,"[7] while a woman is absorbed in the sacrifice of nothing; the air swirls in a subway car, and the newspaper centerfold displays a nude Nordic beauty on some Pacific beach; all together in a toy shop passageway, an old man arranging books on overflowing shelves, a mason singing as he works, the dreams of the thousands and thousands living next to the walls that will be their graves are a representation of the Passion.
>
> The old city, reserved and public, abhorred and loved like an old whore who shows all the signs of worn-out passion: the decadent Don Juan; old people's get-togethers; the bits of a dug-up pyramid; the twisted columns of a church. "Something in it is consumed/and is ash./Something is recent among the ruins."[8]

There is no city like the one desired. There is no place for the order we dream of. We are the masters of our absences. In "La primera persona del verbo" (The First Person of the Verb), Vázquez makes a list of his holdings: a trunk of anecdotes, the lack of faith, a decimated sky, the love of women's names and Sundays, the memory of a family who

crossed the sea (Vázquez is the son and grandson of exiles) and who, in exchange for a ruined dream, made the discovery of brotherhood. And here, the origins of that poetic place that Eduardo Vázquez intuits are revealed to us: the tribe scattered by ubiquitous war, a homeland founded on shipboard, the republic of the shipwrecked.

In the cities of exile, says Octavio Paz, men sanctify a brotherhood older than that of religions: we experience loneliness not only in the face of the cosmos, but also in the face of our neighbors; but in our changing space, we guess at the presence of a same rift: "brotherhood over the vacuum," Paz calls it. An absolute child of his time, Vázquez understands we are experiencing a universal, permanent war. In his poem about Sarajevo, he permits the closest examples of devastation and struggle to converge: the Spanish Civil War and the struggle the Chiapas indigenous people are carrying out in Mexico's Southwest. "All wars have similar histories."[9] Among the dead, next to the rubble left by the violence, life continues like tenacious Nature. After the most tragic events, little old ladies sweep stoops, children play hide-and-seek. Who wins wars and who loses them? War is eternal, "a history sown with fatuous flare-ups."[10] The war of '36, the war of our parents and grandparents, was not won by Franco or by the Republic, but by a pair of institutions that have encouraged Spain's rebirth: democracy and the constitutional monarchy. Perhaps it is worth resisting, just as it is worth reinventing everything: "Just out of the shelter little girl breasts/dreamed of a dance floor for the first time."[11] VM

NOTES

[1] "Eloína," *Ora la pluma* (Mexico City: Ediciones El Tucán de Virginia, 1999), p. 14. Translated by John Oliver Simon.

[2] In Spanish "parque" means "ammunition" as well as "park." [Editor's Note.]

[3] "Soliloquio con héroe en Churubusco," *Ora la pluma,* p. 76. Translated by John Oliver Simon.

[4] Ibid., p. 58-59. Translated by John Oliver Simon.

[5] "Naturaleza y hechos," *Naturaleza y hechos* (Mexico City: Ediciones Era, 1999), p. 11.

[6] "D.F.," ibid., p. 65.

[7] Ibid., p. 66.

[8] Ibid., p. 70.

[9] "La sombra de los árboles," ibid., p. 101.

[10] Ibid., p. 102.

[11] Ibid., p. 105.

Two Poems by Fernando Fernández

Alicia among the Asps

She came on the saint's day of Hipólito, on the arm of María
—that daughter-in-law of hers
from Nayarit
who stayed in the house for centuries after that
(and who is always associated in my mind
with the smell of moth-balls).

I recall her exactly, in the doorway, under a lightbulb,
where I saw her
for the first time: she already was dyeing
her lank hair gleaming black.

Alicia scrutinized everything with a distant gaze,
inquiring of each
apparition that passed before her eyes
from behind her bottle-bottom lenses.

She piled up a votive offering of saints and candles
and flasks on the sideboard of the servant's room.

In payment for prodigies rendered,
for years she bestowed pesos on a bust of San Judas
—which kept
watch over the garage— shuffling in the dark
at the saint's feet naked under her dressing robe.

Alicia lifted her face like a magnanimous toad, her bleary eyes
immobile,
drowned in the television screen.

With filthy fingernails she dismantled
tangerines,
disemboweled biscuits, attacked the senile
rust bedeviling wicker furniture.

She liked to crunch the peels and seeds or nutshells using her right
index finger
to make her mouth reverberate,
and then she would chomp with her mouth empty,
as if she were chewing
nonexistent food.

(Sometimes she let her hair
down loose,
which added a dramatic note to her twisted silhouette
and contrasted with the faded gray of the iris of her eyes).

Benighted and beautiful old
woman,
she told me my destiny was written in heaven, clearly
propitious and indelible.

I drifted away into inclement fictions inspired by her
situation:
"Little master," Alicia might tell me, "this here is Minga,"
and she would go on to display with veracious pride the secret
marvels of her fondest granddaughter.

The very same year my parents separated,
with the oncome of the rainy
season,
Alicia became ill —the pain gave her skin a pallid
hue and she raged in demented humors.

Badly informed and at the last minute,
we visited her house to find her in a deranged bed, potbellied
with liver cancer... (I had my first true portent of death
in that bedroom).

Among feverish icy rags and frigid embers
her soul struggled like a blackbird in a basket of asps.

When she glimpsed my father, oh Alicia flung herself to kiss
the palms
of his hands, while she pleaded with hushed cries,
and explicit gestures, his pardon
barely comprehensibly.

The pious Magnificat and an ancient
scapulary peered out from between her breasts
fallen
under her agonizing bed-shirt.

A few meters from the ancestral cornfield
which her relatives were already arguing over, surrounded
by obsequious daughters and avid
sons-in-law,
she died in that spot, right there, under an undistinguished
gray roof.

Translated by John Oliver Simon

The Hero's Soliloquoy at Churubusco

I came early, my heart in sad commotion,
to Tuesday's meeting in the Chamber.

A certain, let's say, spiritual necessity
made me direct my footsteps
toward a nearby church
with the idea of saying an Our Father.

The atrium was locked and so it was
impossible to pray in the chapel;
I wandered through the garden
and decided,
under the liquidamber trees of 10 to 5,
to lift my voice to heaven in search of consolation.

I didn't let that absurd incident
stop me;
raising my glance on high,
I sought some least attention.

But my eyes encountered only
a lone hero
—in between the two remaining
out of the actual seven cannon—,
under a canopy of eucalyptus.
Even he, I thought,
might listen to my painful
sighs, and maybe his bronze forehead
might possibly give me some notion.

Not appreciating the spontaneity
of my visit,
the military man looked down his nose
intent on ignoring whatever brought me there
—the meeting, after all, was in Holland.

Promptly,
however, with a clearly
mechanical accent
—as if said for the umpteenth time—,
in the inspired light of evening
and with some birds for audience
who were probably used to this speech,
I made out that he was mumbling
over and over:
"*Si tuviéramos parque, ustedes no estarían aquí.*"[1]

But *parque*,[2] park, in the sense of garden,
was right outside,
even if we ignore the filthy dog
who was licking the bronze plaque
and a couple of vehement couples,
out there,
next to the church, wasn't it a park?

Wrapped up in my coat, insufficient
against the January cold,
I returned to the Chamber building,
not before vowing,
that once the chapel was open, I'd say,
a little for me,
a little for his soul,
a rosary on my next visit.

Translated by John Oliver Simon

[1] The ex-convent of Churubusco, in Coyoacán, in the southern suburbs of Mexico city, was the scene of an important battle during the U.S. invasion of Mexico in 1846-1848. After a fierce struggle, General Anaya, second in command of the Mexican forces, ran out of ammunition, and was forced to surrender. The U.S. officers, impressed by the Mexicans' courage, saluted him with respect and asked where the ammunition was, he then answered "Si tuviéramos parque, ustedes no estarían aquí": "If we had any ammunition left, you wouldn't be here."

[2] In Spanish "parque" means both "ammunition" and "park."

Two Poems by Eduardo Vázquez Martín

First Person of the Verb

I inherited a trunk full of anecdotes
and the absence of God, among other things.
Orphaned by faith, I find a wasted afternoon sky,
and in my darkness I'm an alley-cat.

I like to flow like time in summer;
drunk with cold beer, sliding
from notion to notion till it gets dark.

Sometimes I don't wake up alone
and I love the shapes of a disheveled bed
and the names of women and Sundays.

I've got a few old books
that chance passed from hand to hand to mine.
Every day I think about the ocean,
the one my parents crossed
on boats that always burned on the far shore.

I have a few great friends.
Notebooks to write in and empty suitcases.
Time for shadows to come stalking,
to sleep next to the complicit stones
in dark paradises moribund by day.

By pronouncing their own names of rare birds
those who have gone before come to mind;
taste of the fruit ripped from the tree,
dry brush kindled by nostalgia.

Translated by John Oliver Simon

Foggy Road

Going in a car down a narrow road
I roll down the window: the cloud
encounters objects travelling with us.
The fog looks like a god: present and intangible.
I'm a kid on the back seat
of a '70 Ford Maverick
cruising along near Cumbres de Maltrata.[1]
My dad is driving and Mama sings Spanish songs.
What I can add to these few traces:
the scarf I was sharing with my sister,
the way you make a spark with two stones
the tiny image of the child in the eye
of the mother who's now, like the rest of these things,
part of the fog that comes in when I roll down the window
of the car going down the road.

Translated by John Oliver Simon

[1] Cumbres de Maltrata is the highest point on the Puebla-Veracruz highway; regardless of the time of year, temperatures are inevitably lower there and the mountains are wreathed in fog.

Fernando Benítez

Journalist and Man of Letters

They say he carried the word in his hand and his friends in his heart and that on his long odyssey on the byways of culture in Mexico, he managed to eliminate the gap between journalism and literature. Fernando Benítez was born in 1910, the same year that the Mexican Revolution broke out. Above all a writer and journalist, he was the pioneer of cultural journalism in our country, a discoverer and champion of talents, editor, teacher to several generations of journalists, a novelist, and a self-taught historian and anthropologist.



Antonio Nava/AVE

He began his career in 1934 as a contributor to *Revista de revistas* (The Magazine of Magazines). Two years later he joined *El Nacional* (The National), a daily founded by then-president Lázaro Cárdenas. His interest in cultural supplements was born when he discovered among the publications that the paper received the Sunday supplements of the Argentine dailies *La Nación* (The Nation) and *La Prensa* (The Press) that regularly printed articles by important figures of Latin American literature. Ten years later, when he became director of *El Nacional*, he launched its supplement, *La revista mexicana de cultura* (The Mexican Magazine of Culture). The venture was not very fortunate, however: it stopped coming out because he was fired for political reasons only a short time later. But Benítez did not give up. In 1949, *México en la cultura* (Mexico in Culture), a supplement of the national daily *Novedades* (News), was born, the country's only cultural supplement, realizing his dream of seeing culture on the streets. His great achievement was surrounding himself with experienced collaborators like Vicente Rojo and José Emilio Pacheco; he would keep up this tradition in all the supplements he later edited.

For more than 10 years, Mexico's great talents and the promising young pens of literature and art paraded through the pages of *México en la cultura*, an interminable list headed up by Alfonso Reyes, Paul Westhein, Alí Chumacero, Octavio Paz, José Luis Cuevas, Luis Cardoza y Aragón and Carlos Fuentes, to mention only a few, as well as several Spanish refugees exiled in Mexico.

His byword was a commitment to excellence and truth. Benítez and the supplement survived two clashes over censorship, the first when he published an Octavio Paz translation of a poem called *Going to Bed*, and the second when he printed Rubens'painting *The Three Graces*. But neither Benítez nor the supplement could survive their defense of the Cuban revolution: in 1961 he was fired. Thirty of his collaborators resigned in solidarity.

Almost immediately, the entire team found a home at the magazine *Siempre!* (Always!), edited by José Pagés Llergo, where they gave birth to the magazine *La cultura en México* (Culture in Mexico). An entire new generation would enrich its pages, including Carlos Monsiváis, Gabriel Zaid, Leopol-

do Zea, Emilio García Riera, Elena Poniatowska, and many more. Benítez would remain there for almost 10 years, despite the confrontation with the federal government over the 1962 coverage by Benítez, Carlos Fuentes, Víctor Flores Olea and León Roberto García of the assassination of peasant leader Rubén Jaramillo and his pregnant wife.

By that time, Benítez had not only given many writers access to the general public, but he had also vindicated the value of journalism in literature. As he said, "I don't set up those arbitrary borders that exist between journalism and literature in Mexico. I believe that journalism is literature,lit-erature under pressure, the pressure of time and being up to date."[1]

After leaving *Siempre!* and taking a few years off from journalism, he again accepted the job as editor of the supplement *Sábado* (Saturday), at the recently founded *Unomásuno* (Oneplusone), where he worked from 1977 to 1986. Then he moved on to the *La Jornada Semanal* (The Weekly *La Jornada*), put out by the paper of the same name, where he worked two years and then retired in the hopes of founding a new daily, a dream he never saw realized.

Benítez was a professor of journalism at the UNAM, coming punctually to class for 30 years. Clarity, simplicity and brevity are the key to any piece of journalism, he would repeat untiringly. He never gave exams because, he said, "That, I leave to their city editors," but he allowed no one in his class who had brought nothing in writing because he thought that a journalist had to write something every day without fail. At the end of the semester, he would remind his students, "You will write literature for future historians, so don't forget the most important rule of writing, the one that the Red Queen told Alice, 'Start at the beginning, continue until the end and stop there.' "[2]

Benítez wrote extensively: a book of stories *Caballo y Dios* (Horse and God) (1945) and a play *Cristóbal Colón* (Christopher Columbus) (1953), both of which he considered undistinguished; two novels, *El rey viejo* (The Old King) (1959) and *El agua envenenada* (Poisoned Water) (1961) and innumerable journalistic books and biographies that ventured into history and anthropology, like *La ruta de Hernán Cortés* (The Route of Hernán Cortés), *Viaje a la tarahumara* (Voyage to the Tarahumara), *En la tierra mágica del peyote* (In the Magic Land of Peyote), *Lázaro Cárdenas y la revolución mexicana* (Lázaro Cárdenas and the Mexican Revolution) and the three-volume *La ciudad de México* (The City of Mexico), among others. The four volumes of *Los indios de México* (The Indians of Mexico) deserve special mention. Written after traveling extensively through Mexico by burro and on foot, this work would change the public's perception nationwide of Mexico's indigenous peoples. From his experience with the Indians, Benítez learned a lesson of humility. "I thought I was pretty snazzy stuff, a wise and elegant man....The Indians taught me an unforgettable lesson; they taught me not to think myself important."[3] And he was a faithful defender of the indigenous cause until the end.

Fernando Benítez was also an advisor to the UNESCO on matters of journalism from 1947 to 1967; he was president of the Pen Club (1969) and Mexican ambassador to the Dominican Republic (1991). He received many honors and awards, such as the Mazatlán Prize, the National Award for Literature and Philology, the Manuel Gamio Medal for Indigenist Merit and the National Anthropology and National Journalism Awards.

His human side was never hidden away from those he worked with. He was intense; he placed great value on friendship, sartorial elegance and a sense of humor, and above all, on women. "I owe my education to women because up until I was 30 or 35, I lived in their bedrooms....[They] are men's irreplaceable teachers."[4]

Fernando Benítez died last February at the age of 90. His legacy will be vital for understanding much of twentieth-century Mexican culture. Faithful to his principles to the end, he left nothing undone. He started at the beginning, continued to the end and stopped there. VM

Elsie Montiel
Editor

NOTES

[1] Raquel Peguero and Patricia Vega, "Fernando Benítez: un torrente de alegría," *La Jornada* (Mexico City), 22 February 2000.

[2] Mónica Mateos, "En el aula puntual," *La Jornada* (Mexico City), 22 February 2000.

[3] Peguero and Vega, op. cit.

[4] Peguero and Vega, op. cit.

Reviews

Anita Brenner. A Mind of Her Own
Susannah Joel Glusker
Foreword by Carlos Monsiváis
University of Texas Press
Austin, Texas, 1998, 298 pp.



The last 50 years of the twentieth century saw a boom in women's biographies in Mexico. These stories, almost always written by journalists or people of letters, have revealed the particularly intense lives of figures like Antonieta Rivas Mercado, Machila Armida, Frida Kahlo, Lupe Vélez, Tina Modotti, Isabel Villaseñor and Lupe Marín. Not all have been written by women, however: we have Tomás Zurián and his works on painters Nahui Ollin and Rosario Cabrera, or César Delgado Martínez and Julio Villalba Jiménez, who wrote about "the dancer of legend," Yol-Izma. Seemingly, the recovery of these women's lives has also fallen more to writers than to historians or social scientists.

We should note that in Mexico —except for a few specialists like Sara Sefchovich, Julia Tuñón or Carmen Gómez del Campo— in this genre, writers seldom base themselves on rigorous documentation or follow an academic plan. They usually tend to emphasize the literary dimension of history, just as Fabienne Bradu does as she seems to share the views of Guillermo Cabrera Infante when she quotes him:

> Gossip —essential, of course, in literature, where it is dubbed anecdote, event or data— must be central to that other literary genre, history. You see, the historian, both now and in the past, is nothing more than a writer with hindsight.[1]

Anita Brenner. A Mind of Her Own occupies the exact place where tension exists between the academic and the testimonial, between what can be proved using positive documentation and what comes out of personal experience. In her attempt to draw an overall portrait of her mother, incorporating not only her intense personality and the times and places she lived in, but also her petty faults and contradictions, Susannah Joel Glusker tries to go back to the roller coaster whirlwind that was Mexico from the 1920s to the 1940s through the eyes of Anita Brenner. She then attempts to take a distance and rethink what it meant to be a Jewess committed to the noblest causes of her time, like the Spanish Civil War or the National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners.

Since it aspires to being an intellectual biography, the book reviews what is underlying Anita Brenner's three most important works, *Idols Behind Altars*, *Your Mexican Holiday* and *The Wind that Swept Mexico*. But above all, she seeks in both Brenner's diaries and the testimony of many of her contemporaries, the motives and obstacles faced at a time when everything seemed possible except remaining motionless. And even though many judgments and assertions seem to point to a justification of the most important work and celebrities of "official Mexican art," undoubtedly this book's central merit is the recovery of the personality and work of Anita Brenner in Mexico and the United States from the 1920s to the 1940s, but above all the particularly important look it takes at the construction of many of the myths that have populated and continue to populate the history of twentieth-century Mexican culture.

Ricardo Pérez Montfort
Researcher at CIESAS and UNAM professor

NOTES

[1] Fabienne Bradu, *Damas de corazón* (México City: FCE, 1994), p.12.

Album de zoología
(Zoological Album)
José Emilio Pacheco (poetry)
Francisco Toledo (illustrations)
Jorge Esquinca, ed.
El Colegio Nacional/Ediciones Era
Mexico City, 1998, 128 pp.



The most recent edition of *Album de zoología* brings together literary and pictorial elements that surpass those of previous editions. Like all good art books, it is also a delight to read and own.

The editor of this compendium, Jorge Esquinca, took the poems and vignettes for this bestiary[1] from eight other books by José Emilio Pacheco: *No me preguntes cómo pasa el tiempo* (Don't Ask Me How Time Passes) (1969), *Irás y no volverás* (You'll Go and Not Come Back) (1973), *Islas a la deriva* (Islands Adrift) (1976), *Desde entonces* (Since Then) (1980), *Los trabajos del mar* (The Work of the Sea) (1983), *Miro la tierra* (I Look at the Earth (1986), *Ciudad de la memoria* (City of Memory) (1989) and *El silencio de la luna* (The Silence of the Moon) (1994). He divided and arranged them according to the four elements: water, air, earth and fire animals. Each section boasts both real animals and those that have been part of the mythical tradition since time immemorial.

Album de zoología was first published in Mexico in 1985, and a second Mexican edition appeared in 1990; the University of Texas Press published a bilingual edition translated by Margaret Sayers Peden in 1993, making it available to English-speaking readers. The third, revised Mexican edition came out in 1998, augmented by 28 attractive illustrations in a sober format.

The illustrations for the first two editions were done by Alberto Blanco, while well known Oaxacan painter Francisco Toledo did the ones for the bilingual and fourth editions.

Etymologically, "album" comes from the Latin word for "white", "*albus*," and was the original name of the tablet on which edicts were written in ancient Rome. The word eventually came to refer to any book with blank pages filled with compositions, illustrations or other items.

In Pacheco's album, the blank pages are dressed with texts that are samples of the animals that share their surroundings with us; but they are also a reminder to that great public known as humanity that the planet does not belong solely to that aberrant animal known as Man.

Both Pacheco's real and mythological fauna has the particularity of offering us a sketch of human behavior —not always benign— toward these "inferior beings" down through history.

The pictorial element of the book is essential: Francisco Toledo's unadorned black ink lines complement perfectly the metaphorical description of the animals the poet presents.

We should remember that this is not the only bestiary illustrated by the Oaxacan painter, who also did the drawings for one of the many editions of Jorge Luis Borges' *Manual de zoología fantástica* (Manual of Fantastic Zoology) to bring to life the mythological beings that exist only in writing.

Pablo Neruda used to say that zoological and botanical books were always his passion because they represented a continuity with his childhood and restored to him "the infinite world, the unending labyrinth of nature."[2] Pacheco's bestiary is also a prolongation of that childhood in which our dealings with animals could be ruled by the familiarity toward those we knew or by the fantasies prompted by the ones we did not know.

To paraphrase Neruda, the *Album de zoología* is the conjunction of nature, Man and art in a book that enables us to board an ark to sail in the company of other species in the new millennium.

Hugo A. Espinoza Rubio
Staff writer

NOTES

[1] The concept of a bestiary goes back to the Middle Ages when scholars compiled stories in prose or verse about real and fabled animals as an allegory for human beings. For an overall interpretation of this book, see María Rosa Olivera-Williams, "Sobre *An Ark for the Next Millennium*: un bestiario de José Emilio Pacheco," *Literatura Mexicana* 9, no. 1 (1998), pp. 139-154.

[2] Pablo Neruda, "El poeta no es una piedra perdida," Juan Domingo Argüelles, comp., *El poeta y la crítica. Grandes poetas hispanoamericanos del siglo XX como críticos* (Mexico City: Coordinación de Humanidades, UNAM, 1998), p. 139.



Pabellón Altavista
Calzada Desierto de los Leones
No. 52 D-6 Sn. Angel
C.P. 01000, México, D.F.
Tel: (5) 6 16 31 15
Fax: (5) 6 16 31 19
altavista@uriartetalavera.com.mx

Alejandro Dumas 77
Polanco C.P. 11510
México, D.F.
Tel: (5) 2 82 28 49
Fax: (5) 2 82 26 99
polanco@uriartetalavera.com.mx

4 Poniente 911
C.P. 72000
Puebla, Pue. México
Tel: (22) 32 15 98
Fax: (22) 42 29 43
puebla@uriartetalavera.com.mx

Alma de Barro
41 Pte. 2120-2
Ex Hda. La Noria
Puebla, Pue. México
C.P. 72140
Tel/ Fax: (22) 11 00 82