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The United States
A Long-Awaited Recession
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The Painting Of
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Repercussions Of
September 11
Articles by Mónica Verea
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

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

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

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Carlos Alcázar

Cover
Gabriel Macotela, *Furniture-Woman*, 158.5 x 65 x 43 cm, 2001 (oil on wood).

Back Cover
Gabriel Macotela, *Lottery*, 74.5 x 44.5 cm, 1995 (etching and aquatint).

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

Margarita Velasco

Our Voice

I. At the close of this issue, we are witnessing what seems to be the end of another stage in the anti-terrorist offensive implemented by the United States, Great Britain and their Western allies. In that stage, Kabul was captured and the precarious power structures of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan dismantled. The search for Osama bin Laden and his most important associates in Al Qaeda continues; and the top Taliban leadership is also undoubtedly a target of the Americans. Nevertheless, their capture does not seem a simple matter in the short term.

Certainly, the destruction of the last redoubt of Taliban resistance means the break-up of what is left of that alliance, today repudiated throughout the world, even in the Arab countries. It also makes for a serious problem of global security and, seen from Washington, represents a threat to the security of the West. That is why we are already seeing and will continue to see an even more diligent adjustment in the United States' international security agenda. During this adjustment, all of Washington's friends and allies will be affected. The global order will more clearly than ever be transformed from its very foundations, in its organization and the definition of its priorities. Undoubtedly, this will have an important impact on the domestic agendas of countries like Mexico. In fact, the U.S. internal security agenda has already felt the impact. The series of "patriotic policies" advanced by President Bush appeals to the majority of Americans to fall into line with and obey the new emergency measures implemented by the Department of Justice. Reactions have not been slow in coming and in different parts of the United States, local authorities have refused to detain and interrogate suspicious foreigners simply because they are foreigners. The Justice Department has announced that foreigners who offer important information about terrorism will have their naturalization papers processed on the fast track. This unprecedented measure in the history of U.S. migratory procedures marks the beginning of a radical willingness by U.S. authorities to achieve their goals at any cost. The idea that the enemy is within seems to predominate (as shown by the fact that the 19 September 11 suicide terrorists had been living in the United States for years) and that therefore the attack should have targets within, using highly sophisticated domestic intelligence. This is the origin of the polemic about the implications that these measures will have for civil liberties.

The conflict has marked the world, world public opinion and political agendas. Its effects will be seen in the different regions of the world, mainly the Middle East, the Islamic world as a whole, Europe, North America and Latin America. Its impact on bilateral agendas with the United States is no exception; in this realm, Mexico's bilateral agenda has felt the impact and its most important goals, like migration and integration, have been put off. As a result of these historic changes, undoubtedly, the pivotal points on the research agenda of scholars of world political and economic issues will have to be reviewed and updated. Security, civil liberties, migration, trade, cultural studies, governance, the environment and other points are some of these issues. Certainly, the Center for Research on North America (CISAN) is facing a new moment in its academic commitment within the National Autonomous University of Mexico and Mexican academia as a whole. The new challenge will encourage it to bring its profile up to date in accordance with the drastic changes in the world today. The CISAN's research agenda will attempt to respond to that challenge and bring its specialized, thematic and area studies into line with the new context. The CISAN also understands that in this new era, it must reformulate its relationship with its Mexican, U.S. and Canadian colleagues through new agreements and by strengthening the already existing ties with the most representa-

tive and prestigious Mexican and North American academic institutions that deal with the same topic. This will allow the CISAN to reposition itself in the academic debate and the dynamic of contributing to knowledge, the most important mission of a university research center like ours.

II. The events of September 11 and their repercussions will, in effect, mark new ways forward for international relations and the global economy. In this issue of *Voices of Mexico*, we publish several articles that look at these changes and seek to point out possible future developments in the economy and society in both North America as a whole and Mexico in particular.

We begin our "Politics" section with an article by national security specialist Raúl Benítez Manaut about Mexico's entry into the UN Security Council at a historic moment in which it will have to face challenges and assume commitments vis-à-vis different nations with regard to the conflict in the Middle East and the war against terrorism. Mexico must continue to transform its traditionally passive stance on international conflicts into an active contribution to deciding hemispheric security policies. In the same section, we present articles about the role that two of the country's most important social and political actors, unions and political parties, have played in the first year of the Fox administration. Fernando Herrera describes the reasons behind the drop in union membership in Mexico and the unions' inability to influence national decisions. Political scientist Ricardo Espinoza considers that, more than capitalizing on the political opportunities that any new regimen can offer, the three main political parties have limited themselves to playing a secondary role in the context of a divided government; in both chambers of Congress, where no one has a majority, they have carried on a debate without consensuses, paralyzing reforms and affecting governance.

After September 11 migration from Mexico to the United States will be linked as never before to the issue of national security. Three important scholars have contributed articles on the effects of the attacks on the bilateral migration agenda. Mónica Verea writes in our "Mexico-U.S. Relations" section about the consequences for the debate among U.S. political players. There are already signs, she warns, of a toughening up of laws and policies with regard to the entry of undocumented migrants. Miguel Ángel Valverde Loya analyzes the possibilities of the migratory accord that was brewing in the days prior to the attacks, warning that today it is more than ever necessary to move forward in precise regulation of migration based on what he calls the "minimum common denominator" in both countries' interests. Lastly, in the "United States Affairs" section, Simone Lucatello contributes an article comparing European and U.S. migratory policies over the last five years, venturing some considerations about their immediate future in light of the new situation.

The medium- and long-term economic effects of the attacks are not yet clear, but they will probably be as profound as the short-term effects. In our "Economy" section, four contributors present their thinking about the current recession and the impact of the attacks on the economy. Elaine Levine shows how the tragic events have spurred a recession that was already underway; the unhappy coincidence makes it difficult to tell which effects are due to the deceleration and which to September 11. What is clear, she says, however, is that those hardest hit in the United States will be, as always in crises, the lowest income groups. Arturo Guillén shows how the current crisis can be explained by the structural contradictions in the U.S. economy and the failure of the so-called "new economy" based on today's flagging technological, capital-intensive industries. This crisis has deepened internationally since the terrorist attacks, constituting the first major setback for the globalizing model. In his article, Pablo Ruiz Nápoles reviews the immediate effects of the attacks for the U.S. economy, as well as the main measures taken to fight them. The three authors agree that the Federal Reserve has implemented mistaken, or at least insufficient, policies to try to shore up the markets by simply lowering interest rates without risking other more decisive measures.

The section concludes with an article by energy expert Rosío Vargas, who analyzes the geopolitics of oil and natural gas, both in the Middle East and other areas, U.S. policies and concerns and the role of Mexico as a strategic supplier of its neighbor to the north before and after September 11.

In this issue of *Voices of Mexico* we have presented initial reflections by different Mexican analysts and researchers. Naturally, the speed of the changing circumstances means that some of the figures and predictions in these articles become dated very quickly. Nevertheless, we think that most of the conclusions and analyses are valid for trying to understand how the new century will unfold and its effect on Mexico.

III. The identity of Quebec as a founding people that shares the histories and policies of the British empire and French immigrants is the matter that occupies Canadian researcher Claude Couture, who, in "Canadian Issues" offers us a review of the academic literature and debates sparked by the dual condition of French Canada, that of being simultaneously a colonized and colonizing people.

In our "Science, Art and Culture" section, we present the art of Gabriel Macotela, a Mexican artist recognized for his controversial proposal of transcending the canons of the visual arts to experiment in merging painting with non-traditional media. Art critic Luis Rius Caso contributes an article about Macotela. The section concludes with an article by Mexican scientists Víctor M. Toledo and Leonor Solís, who demonstrate how science can be practically applied to alleviate social problems. The "Water Forever" program implemented in the Mixteca region, where water has been scarce and expensive, combines advanced technology and traditional water management while fostering community participation to promote sustainable development.

In this issue, we have dedicated our "The Splendor of Mexico," "Museums" and "Ecology" sections to Querétaro, a state whose historic, artistic, cultural and social wealth has not been widely disseminated despite its proximity to Mexico City. Historian David Wright describes both the myth and the historical evidence that points to three separate foundations of the beautiful city of Querétaro in the sixteenth century.

Other articles present Querétaro's Sierra Gorda to us in all its diversity and grandeur. Archaeologist Margarita Velasco describes the pre-Hispanic settlements of Ranas and Toluquilla, with their mining-based civilization which disappeared before the arrival of the Spaniards. Architect Jaime Abundis tells us about the difficulties of the Franciscan friars who left their mark on five missions nestled in the mountains, whose magnificent facades and majestic cloisters are well worth a visit. The "Ecology" section presents the Sierra Gorda Ecological Group's efforts to preserve and maintain the biosphere reserve in the Sierra Gorda mountains, the only reserve to be managed by a non-governmental organization. Lastly, in "Museums" we present a brief article about The Querétaro Art Museum in the state capital, whose permanent collection of colonial paintings is one of the country's most valuable.

Eduardo Vázquez Martín is one of Mexico's young poets who has best expressed the feelings of our contradictory, overwhelming times. The image of the man who threw himself from the Twin Towers inspired him to write an unsettling poem that we publish here in our "Literature" section in both Spanish and English.

"In Memoriam" pays homage to one of the most brilliant jurists that the National University and Mexico have ever produced, Don Andrés Serra Rojas, a professor always admired and loved by generations of Mexican attorneys. In addition, after the close of our edition, one of the most important men of letters and Mexican culture of the last century died. *Voices of Mexico* regrets the death of Juan José Arreola, to whose friends and family we offer our most sincere condolences. In our next issue we will pay him the homage he deserves.

José Luis Valdés Ugalde
Director of CISAN

Mexico in the UN Security Council

Raúl Benítez Manaut*

Mike Segar/Reuters

When Vicente Fox became Mexico's president December 1, 2000, he decided to radically transform the country's foreign policy, turning it away from passive and reactive nationalist diplomacy toward creating a new presence of Mexico in the world. The aim of this radical change is to contribute to the construction of an entirely new architecture of the international system.

The main step in beginning this new form of diplomacy was Mexico's seeking a seat on the United Nations Security Council for two years as a non-permanent member as of January 2002. To get the seat, Mexico had to win out over the Dominican Republic, the other Latin American candidate for the position.

When Mexico decided it aspired to a seat on the Security Council, before the September 11 attacks on the Twin Towers, the international community was already facing important challenges in security matters. However, after September 11, being a member of the Security Council brings with it a great number of risks and commitments.

Mexico will have to face two matters in the Security Council: the U.S. war against Afghanistan, supported militarily by the majority of European countries and backed diplomatically by an even greater number of nations, and the transformation of priorities due to threats to international security. Heading that list of risks and challenges is the fight against terrorism, particularly that of radical Islamic groups.

After the September 11 attacks, Mexico's government came to a crossroads: how could a country with anti-U.S.

* Researcher at CISAN.

and nationalist political forces express support for George Bush's government?

Mexico's press and some political parties immediately charged Vicente Fox with selling out the country and being pro-U.S. On the other hand, in the United States, people accused Mexico of not expressing unconditional support rapidly enough. This is the existential conflict of Mexicans, the political elites and the country's foreign policy. Diplomacy demands having your own character, being anti-U.S.; but at the same time, in moments of strategic definition, Mexico must support the United States.

This same dilemma arose during World War II. Mexico finally declared war on Germany, Italy and Japan in May 1942. On that occasion, the political debates and public opinion were similar to today until Mexican oil tankers were attacked by Nazi submarines in the Gulf of Mexico.

Today, participating in the Security Council will be a challenge since an important part of its work will concentrate on the conflict in Afghanistan and the war against terrorism. Mexico has ratified almost all the United Nations conventions against terrorism. Twelve international commitments have been signed since 1969: four dealing with the hijacking of airplanes and airport security; one to protect diplomats; an agreement about hostage taking; the convention on the protection of nuclear weapons; one to protect maritime navigation; another to safeguard ocean platforms; one condemning terrorist extortion; the convention against terrorist bombings; and one regarding control of financing of terrorist groups. Mexico has ratified 10 of these and the Senate is currently considering the last two.

Among the main challenges that Mexico will face in the next two years are all the debates that will take place about the conflicts in the Middle East and the probable participation of United Nations (UN) military forces in peacekeeping operations, which will create tensions in Mexico's military defense policy; issues related to the environment and security, about which there will certainly be important differences with the United States; and others with global implications like the development of stricter commitments for fighting terrorism, nuclear security and arms of mass destruction like chemical and biological weapons.

Today, participating in the Security Council will be a challenge since an important part of its work will concentrate on the war against terrorism.

In the anti-terrorist coalition against Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda and Afghanistan's Taliban government, the UN and the United States will probably create two fronts: the strictly military front and the diplomatic front, with the participation of those countries not taking part in the military offensive in the humanitarian aid to the seven million Afghan refugees predicted for the end of 2001. Mexico will have to assume some kind of responsibility in these efforts; otherwise it would have no reason to be in the Security Council. This will challenge the country to find a new way of carrying out an active foreign policy.

We should remember that during the Cold War Mexico had very different positions from those of the superpowers on matters of weapons of mass destruction. The Mexican position is based on general, complete disarmament, while that of the countries with nuclear weapons —which, as permanent members, control the Security Council— is that of arms control, not elimination. This will be the first difference between Mexico and the United States, Russia, China, France and Great Britain.

In the war against terrorism, Mexico has edged closer to the United States and is actively cooperating with it, particularly in matters of intelligence, border security, diplomacy, air security and, in general, the control of foreigners who could enter the United States illegally through Mexican territory. Mexico has also put forward the possibility of building a North American security perimeter together with Canada so that the United States does not close its land borders given that the future of the North American Free Trade Agreement is in danger from a reduction in trade in goods along the borders and a drop in migration.

Another factor is Mexico's active participation in the new architecture of hemispheric security. During the Cold War, Mexico kept to the sidelines of the inter-American mechanisms for hemispheric security. However, it did participate in building the framework for global security by promoting the Treaty of Tlatelolco, consolidated in 1967, to create the nuclear arms-free

zone in the hemisphere. Similarly, in the 1980s and 1990s, Mexico sought peaceful solutions to the conflicts in Central America. It was one of the designers of the Contadora Group, which tried between 1983 and 1986 to achieve the signing of an overall peace agreement among the five Central American governments. Later, in 1990-1991, Mexico worked with the UN and the Organization of American States (OAS) to achieve a peace agreement in Nicaragua to attain the demobilization of the counterrevolutionary irregular forces; in 1992, a peace agreement for El Salvador was signed in Mexico City's Chapultepec Castle; and in 1996, the Guatemala peace accords were signed. In the cases of El Salvador and Guatemala, Mexico invested a large amount of diplomatic and logistical resources.

Mexico's experience in peace negotiations, then, makes it recognizable as a mediator in international conflicts. This is the case today in the Colombian conflict in which, despite the enormous difficulties, partial gains have been made in initiating peace talks between the government and guerrilla groups.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, participating in the UN Security Council will be a great diplomatic opportunity, but at the same time an important challenge. The international tension arising out of the September 11 terrorist attacks make all security mechanisms and accords important. A new international security framework is being built and many of its mechanisms and commitments will be designed in the Security Council.

The UN will play a very significant role in the conflict with Afghanistan and fundamentalist terrorist groups. Equally, mechanisms for cooperation against terrorism, organized crime, drug trafficking and illegal traffic of individuals; to protect air, sea and even electronic communications; security against biological, chemical and nuclear weapons; and proposals to support refugees and solve human catastrophes (like that of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan and Iran) will force countries like Mexico to participate more actively in accordance with its new responsibilities in the international system. VM

Unionism The Actor Missing From The Stage of Change in Mexico

Fernando Francisco Herrera Lima*

Courtesy of the President of Mexico's Press Office

Francisco Hernández Juárez, leader of the powerful Telephone Workers Union, with President Fox.

The changes now taking place in Mexico, many related to the June 2, 2000 federal elections, have involved almost all the country's public actors in different ways. Many signs indicate that the nation is experiencing a series of enormous economic, political and social transformations. There is, however, little clarity about where many of these changes are heading, something that will become more problematic after the return to economic stagnation in 2001.

With regard to unionism, particularly, the visible signs seem to be contradictory and make for few certainties. In general, in the sphere of work, unionism's main playing field, the situation is not clear, thus creating increasingly risky conditions for the unions. But, in the sphere of politics, former-

* Professor and researcher at the Postgraduate Studies in Labor Issues Department of the Autonomous Metropolitan University, Iztapalapa campus.

ly a privileged terrain for Mexico's official or corporatist unionism (that still controls the immense majority of the country's slightly more than four million union members)[1] as well as for opposition unionism (a small minority), things do not seem to be going well. It could even be said that Mexican unionism today is playing only a marginal role as a spokesperson vis-à-vis those in power in public-policy-making processes, both in the fields of economic and social policy, which directly affect workers, and more general policy. Even in the discussion about possible reforms to the Federal Labor Law, the positions of businessmen and the government are the two long sides of a not-very-equilateral triangle.

This is the case despite the fact that the corporatist union leaderships have shown enormous willingness to collaborate with President Vicente Fox, who defeated the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the party of which most Mexican unions have historically been a part. It should be remembered that membership in official PRI unions was automatic, a stipulation of their by-laws. This, however, has gradually been changing since some important unions left the official party: the National Educational Workers Union (SNTE), with about a million members; the Telephone Workers Union (STRM), with almost 50,000 members, which also broke with the Congress of Labor (CT);[2] and very recently, in November 2001, the Mexico City Government Employees Union (SUTGDF), with more than 100,000 members.

At the same time that this is happening with corporatist unionism, the possible alternative forces like the National Workers' Union (UNT), with about 450,000 members, called by many the "new unionism," do not look more likely to be able to become a central actor in the current political situation. The UNT, lead in practice by the STRM, includes the unions of the Mexican Social Security Institute (SNTSS), with about 360,000 members; the Volkswagen plant (SITVW), with 12,500; the National Autonomous University of Mexico (STUNAM), with almost 25,000 members; aviation workers (pilots, air traffic controllers and flight attendants); and other, less important sectors.

Now, why has a union structure that had been very powerful in the political system, that had been functional for the import substitution industrialization, that represented the main means whereby the Mexican state channeled its social spending to the working population, that was very efficient for ensuring the workers' vote for the PRI during the long process of simulated democracy and that was useful in maintaining social order among wage earners gone into crisis? And why, given this crisis, has no force appeared on the scene —for example a democratic, pluralist force, or even a neo-corporatist force— to take the place of that out-of-date, authoritarian, extremely corrupt structure? It would be impossible to answer these questions fully in a brief article. It is possible, however, to cite a few figures and ideas, though to do so necessarily implies making brief mention of the historic characteristics and sources of power of the unionism currently in crisis.

Most analysts think that the power of Mexican unions depended on a complex conjunction of economic, political, social and cultural elements at the center of which was the corporatist agreement commanded by the state. Inside their organizations, the corporatist leaders took responsibility for maintaining order in production; but outside the companies, they also took responsibility for keeping their members in line in society and turning them into faithful voters for the official party. Their role was almost irrelevant, however, in the field that is most important for union action: the negotiation of bargaining agreements with management. This has different causes. One is that the big decisions about labor and wage policy were decided on a macropolitical level by the executive branch through consultations with management in the first place and with the top leadership of the unions in the second place. This meant that the real margin for negotiation of wages and benefits was very narrow at a company, sector and regional level. Another reason is that the issues linked to production itself were the exclusive property of management itself, both in the private sector and in the vast para-state sector, and were not really a realm open to union negotiation. In fact, labor relations were basically imposed unilaterally by

From 1982 on, we can say that the corporatist union structure has taken responsibility for unionized workers' accepting the worst consequences of macroeconomic adjustment policies.

management, although local practices and customs always had an important informal weight in the day-to-day operation of the work place. It is important to relate this to the fact that quality and productivity were actually of minor concern to management, due to the existence of an overprotected domestic market where it sent the immense majority of its output.

This corporatist arrangement compensated union leaders in several ways. Outside the realm of labor relations, they constantly occupied elected posts, having run on a PRI ticket for governor, senator and deputy, as well as city hall. Another privilege was their being allowed to run their organizations in a completely discretional, authoritarian way. There was practically no democracy in their organizations in selecting and controlling leaderships; accountability for union dues management did not exist; dissidence was prohibited; anyone in opposition was dealt with under the Mexican version of a closed shop, called "the exclusion clause" whereby someone expelled from the union was fired from the company (this clause is still in effect); union officers were not rotated; the by-laws were usually unknown to the membership; and, in an enormous number of cases, the rank and file did not even know they had a union.

To deal with periodic bouts of unrest, authorities allowed the leaders to use groups of thugs and hired killers. In extreme cases, such as the 1959 railroad workers movement or the 1976 electrical workers movement, to name only two very important ones, government repression was used directly to impose union order again. With regard to legislation, Article 123 of the Constitution (1917) and the Federal Labor Law (passed initially in 1931, amended several times and completely revamped in 1976) were originally conceived as instruments to protect workers. However, over the decades they became the weapons of union corporatism due, among other things, to the broad room for maneuvering that they have always given to union leaderships in the internal management of their organizations. The Constitution and the law also became instruments for government intervention through forced arbitration. And to this, of course, was added the enormous corruption of administrative agencies, particularly the labor conciliation and arbitration boards.

This does not mean that union leaderships stayed in office simply through violence and imposition, although these elements were present. To understand the current erosion of these leaderships' power and that of the organizations themselves, we must keep in mind that they developed important bases of something that could be called non-democratic legitimacy. This was linked to the fact that it was these organizations and their leaderships that channeled all the tangible products of the Mexican state's social spending to the working population: education, health care, consumer support measures, financing for housing and other benefits of this nature that flowed increasingly over the period of import substitution, urbanization and the growth in services that characterized the Mexico of the 1950s, 1960s and part of the 1970s. In addition, within the confines of their own rules, the unions were the guarantors of annual wage hikes, which grew in real terms from the mid-1950s to the 1980s, job security (for those who toed the line) and different social benefits. It should also not be forgotten that those years in general brought sustained economic growth, a rise in real wages and a substantial increase in jobs in industry, particularly in the para-state sector, as well as in services and the very large government bureaucracy.

> The Fox administration has strongly emphasized promoting non-waged employment linked above all to self-employment in small and micro-businesses.

Over the last 20 years, this entire scheme of things has altered profoundly. On the one hand there has been a prolonged period of recurrent crises and restructuring of production, including such measures as the privatization of most of the para-state sector (always accompanied by heavy lay-offs), the relocation of industry from central Mexico to the central north and the north and the imposition of —usually unilateral— flexibility in labor relations. This has happened in the context of a macroeconomic adjustment policy that has meant sharp drops in workers' buying power and important cuts in social spending. On the other hand, in the same period, Mexico has gone through an intense process of political change that many have called a transition to democracy, which has

GRAPH 1. UNIONIZATION RATES



Source: Graph developed by the author based on data from the National Statistics Institute's National Household Income-Expenditures Survey.

brought about the end of the single-party system and opened the door to a diversity of forms of public participation of the citizenry outside the confines of the old official party.

All this has affected the basis for the power of corporatist unionism in several ways. On the one hand, as an effect of the crises and restructuring, the space available to them for action has been considerably reduced. In the few years between 1992 and 2000, union membership in the country dropped in both absolute and relative terms. In absolute terms, it fell from 4,116,919 to 4,025,878 members. In relative terms, the unionization rate dropped from 13.6 percent to 9.81 percent of the total work force; from 17.86 percent to 12.4 percent of the work force in industry and the service sector; and from 24.02 percent to 17.57 percent of the potential union members in industry and services.

On the other hand, the legitimacy that corporatism achieved from channeling government social spending, from increasing real wages and from being the guarantor of job security has been seriously eroded. From 1982 on, we can say that the corporatist union structure has taken responsibility for unionized workers' accepting the worst consequences of macroeconomic adjustment policies (the fall in real wages, jobs being destroyed and the deterioration of state social institutions).

Together with this, the cost of political change to the corporatist union leaderships must also be taken into consideration. One indicator for evaluating this is the important drop in what was called "the workers' representatives" in the Chamber of Deputies. Between 1979 and 1997, the percentage of PRI deputies that came from any of the corporatist unions dropped from 31.4 percent to 17.28 percent.[3] This means that, together with the escalating defeats of the PRI by other parties, the so-called "workers' sector" has been pushed aside when the time has come to select candidates.

Alternative unionism suffers from structural weakness. This unionism, today represented above all by the UNT, has different origins: the militant unionism of the 1970s that was particularly strong in the para-state sector (with its revolutionary nationalist trend represented by the Galván leadership);[4] in multinational-owned industry (auto and electrical appliances, etc.); and educational services, above all the public universities (with its Marxist left current). Another strand of today's alternative unionism comes from break-offs from corporatism itself, including as its most significant members, the Telephone Workers Union and Social Security Workers Union. This unionism's weakness is rooted in its being in sectors which are not very strategic (except for the telephone workers), its small size and its inability to formulate projects that go beyond the demands of its own members to include broader sectors of society.

In the first year of the Vicente Fox administration, his signals to the world of labor have been contradictory. The administration has strongly emphasized promoting non-waged employment linked above all to self-employment in small and micro businesses (popularly called "*changarros*" or holes-in-the-wall) and the encouragement of the maquiladora industry. Both cases are kinds of work that make union action problematic. In the first case, they simply cannot be organized in unions; in the second case, one of the comparative advantages offered to investors is precisely low wages, something that crashes head on with effective union action. In the maquila industry, sweetheart contracts, forms of pseudo-col-

Antonio Nava/AVE

Courtesy of the President of Mexico's Press Office

Alejandra Barrales, leader of the flight attendants union and representative of the new unionism, and Leonardo Rodríguez Alcaine, head of the formerly official corporatist unionism.

lective bargaining that aim precisely at avoiding autonomous union organization, are proliferating.

The Fox administration has also taken it upon itself to write a new Federal Labor Law (LFT). This has turned out to be quite difficult to do and the dismal economic conditions and the wear and tear on Fox's so-called "democratic seal of legitimacy" seem to have meant it must be put off for a later time. In any case, it is useful to note two important elements in the discussion about the LFT. One is the discourse of Minister of Labor Carlos Abascal. The other refers to the mechanisms through which the government has attempted to promote its proposal for legislation.

The minister of labor repeatedly calls for everyone to forget any reference not only to the class struggle, which he thinks permeates current legislation, but any form of conflict at all between workers and employers. On the contrary, Mr. Abascal constantly calls for people to recognize that there are no possible grounds for clashes and that there are not even different interests in the world of production, but that what must be aspired to is a situation wherein everyone is recognized as an equal co-participant in a common project, the company. Since Abascal was a leader of Mexican businessmen during the last administration, he has insisted on promoting these positions under the noteworthy title of "the new labor culture."

To promote new labor legislation the Ministry of Labor decided to create a working group which, according to executive branch plans, would come up with a unified legislative proposal to be presented to Congress. It is very interesting to see that this working group was unilaterally formed by the ministry itself, which invited the traditional representatives of the business community and, on the union side, both the most traditional corporatist leaders and representatives of the so-called "new unionism." But, in addition —and this was a real novelty in Mexico— it also invited the leaders of a different kind of unionism, very small and localized, known in Mexico as "yellow" or company unions, which represent the interests and leadership of the businessmen of the Monterrey Group, the country's most important and powerful industrial group, which in turn agrees with the positions of the ministry itself. An explicit effort has been made to leave the political parties out of these discussions —although, it should be mentioned that they have not shown themselves very interested in the issue— as well as other social sectors. The output of this working group has been very poor and everything seems to indicate that the issue will be postponed.

Once again we find clear contradictions in labor officials' actions in worker-management clashes during this

first year of the administration. On the one hand, during some conflicts such as the movements of two UNT organizations that led to strikes (the Volkswagen workers and the flight attendants), the government did not declare the strikes legally non-existent. However, it has made some rather legally shaky interventions such as denying miners and airline pilots their right to belong to the union of their choice, or refusing soccer players the right to legally register their union, in the grand tradition of PRI government control over union activity.

In addition to all these problems, Mexican unionism must face other challenges in the immediate future, very serious, structural challenges, among which are those related to employment and for which none of the union currents seem to have answers. One of the most important is a product of the course the Mexican economy has taken since the early 1980s: the mushrooming of a never-ending list of kinds of activities including self-employment and non-paid family work totally divorced from formalized, regulated, stable, long-term, protected wage labor, the traditional basis for Mexican unionism. This increase has meant the spread of short-term, part-time, unstable, non-waged work with no regulation at all; of many kinds of dependent jobs dressed up like a market relationship among equals (child vendors on the streets or in the subways, for example); of unstable jobs in long chains of sub-contracting and in segments of the maquila industry that only show part —sometimes the smallest part— of their activities in the light of day. In addition to all of this, borderline illegal activities like prostitution and frankly criminal activities like drug sales, trafficking in individuals and robbery have increased considerably.

We also have to look at the conditions of the workers who have remained inside the unionized sector in Mexico. After a prolonged period of recurring crises, restructuring of production (which has emphasized flexibility on the job more than technological or organizational innovation),[5] closings and privatizations, lay-offs in the public sector, declines in public spending, the trade opening and a drop in the domestic market, unionized workers have watched their wages' buying power shrink significantly, their benefits dwindle, public services decline in number and quality and the room for negotiation decrease considerably.

The question that must be asked is extremely important for the future of unionism: What is it people do today in Mexico to earn their living? The answer is that employment has diversified and become flexible in the context of intense social polarization so that the possible room for action for unions is shrinking both inside and outside the work place and union actors are not showing interest and ability to respond to this grave challenge.[6]As a study of employment in Mexico has shown, the problem is not one of open unemployment, but of the low quality, short duration and paltry wage levels of the jobs available.[7] It is not surprising, then, that millions of people are emigrating to the United States, despite the growing risks they have to face, particularly since September 11.

As can be appreciated, unionism's prospects leave little room for optimism. Belying the expectations of the combative 1970s, the prolonged crisis of corporatism has not led to the rise of a democratic, active unionism capable of designing proposals that go beyond narrow work-place limits. On the contrary, from the remains of this corporatism and the incapacity of the alternative forces to offer a broad, unified way out comes a scenario in which workers' lack of protection vis-à-vis the sharpening effects of the economic deceleration seems to dominate. VM

Notes

1 They are members mainly of the Congress of Labor (CT), the Workers' Confederation of Mexico (CTM), the Revolutionary Workers and Peasants Confederation (CROC) and the Regional Confederation of Workers.

2 The CT was the main umbrella organization for the corporatist unions, created in 1966 by government decision in order to solve the dissension in the ranks of different union currents close to the state.

3 Graciela Bensusán and Arturo Alcalde, "Estructura sindical y agremiación," Arturo Alcalde et al., *Trabajo y trabajadores en el México contemporáneo* (Mexico City: Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2000), p. 170.

4 Rafael Galván was the leader of the democratic electrical workers of the SUTERM.

5 See Enrique de la Garza et al., *Modelos de industrialización en México* (Mexico City: UAM-I, 1998), the research results from a broad project in 14 of the country's industrial areas.

6 One important exception is the Telephone Workers Union which, within the limits of the bilateral relations with the Telephone Company of Mexico, has been able to negotiate the process of modernization.

7 Carlos Salas, "Otra faceta de la actualidad económica: trabajo y empleo precario en el México actual," *Trabajo* 3 (Mexico City: UAM-UNAM-CAT), pp. 119-134.

Mexico's Political Parties in 2001
Between Dispersion and Recomposition

Ricardo Espinoza Toledo*

Courtesy of the President of Mexico's Press Office

The president with Congressional and party leaders at the signing of the Political Agreement for National Development.

Democracies can only function if they have a consolidated system of competitive parties. The PRI, PAN and PRD made possible that feat of political engineering, the electoral legality and institutionality currently in place, thanks to which electoral processes in Mexico are essentially trustworthy. The transition from a system of a hegemonic party to one of a competitive, pluralist, tripartite or moderate party system was achieved thanks to these parties.

In a recent study about the party system during the 2000 federal elections, I pointed out one of the central problems for Mexico's budding democracy: the fragility of the party system.[1] After recognizing the determinant importance of the three main political parties (the Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI], the National Action Party [PAN] and the Party of the Democratic Revolution [PRD]) in making the 1996 constitutional electoral reform possible, I showed how this transcendental change in the legal set-up was designed to fit these three parties' momentary interests, thus explaining its limitations. Without underestimating its undeniable merits,[2] one of the reform's central thrusts was to forbid access to "interlopers." Whether by political calculation or pure coincidence, in 2000 only the "big three" counted, but with devastating consequences: the cost was their own identity.[3]

The groundwork for this was laid before the 2000 federal elections, which put Alliance for Mexico candidate Vicente Fox in the president's seat, inaugurating alternation in office. The decisive moment came when the presidential candidates were chosen, when —to put it bluntly— the parties were placed at the mercy of their prominent figures. The PAN, until then the most solid of the entire party system, could not deal with the offensive by the network of sympathizers of the then-aspiring presidential candidate, Vicente Fox, a group known as "The Friends of Fox." The PRD, which has been defined by both its insoluble internal conflict among groups and the strong moral leadership of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, aligned itself once more behind his decision to bid for the presidency. The PRI, torn and divided after an internal process for picking its candidate, expected to be rescued in the traditional manner and swept to victory by then-President Ernesto Zedillo; that victory never came. Our parties went to the polls and came out of the electoral process seriously damaged with both their ability to express themselves and to moderate the personalist propensities of their respective candidates curtailed.[4]

The president is faced with an extremely complicated political panorama that has resulted from different concurrent phenomena: he is the first president in modern history to be elected with under 50 percent of the vote; he does not have a majority in either of the chambers of Congress; an immense majority of the governors, municipal governments and local congresses are in the hands of parties opposed to the coalition that put him into office; and the country is crisscrossed with enormous social inequalities and in the midst of an economic recession.[5]

Under these circumstances, on February 5, 2001, President Fox proposed reviewing the Constitution with an eye to bringing it into line with a new historic stage. He maintains that on July 2, 2000, Mexico entered a new period which is the culmination of a long history of hopes and sacrifices and marks the beginning of a historic task: concretizing the political transition in a profound reform of the state that would bring the country's legal instruments up to date, legal instruments that were designed for a political situation that has now been superceded. To begin work, the president's office commissioned the Ministry of the Interior and in particular the Institute for Studies of the Mexican Revolution. The aim was to create the mechanisms that would make it possible to hear the different opinions and proposals for reforming the Constitution, proposals and opinions to later be sent to Congress.

There has been a basic —if not necessarily explicit— consensus about the need to carry out a political reform of the state to bring the structure of power into line with the country's political and social pluralism.

Mexican presidents began to talk about a reform of the state and take it on as a commitment in the beginning of the 1980s. The idea began with Miguel de la Madrid (1982-1988), but was most elaborate under Carlos Salinas (1988-1994) who proposed it in the framework of a National Accord for Broadening Our Democracy. Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), for his part, came to a consensus with the country's political forces on an Agenda for the Political Reform of the State, which, just like those before it, failed to achieve its objective, the reform of the state. With the alternation of parties in the presidency (2000), the issue resurfaced,

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but now with the explicit objective of bringing the constitutional framework up to date.

Like at the beginning of the 1980s, we are again faced with a presidential proposal to redefine the general guidelines currently in operation that make sense out of the exercise of political power. A line of continuity can be drawn between President Fox's call and that of the three previous presidents. But there are also differences: the first calls were less explicit and more limited. Fox proposed fostering a profound reform of the state that would be concretized in bringing the Constitution up to date.

on February 2, 2001 President Fox called "a profound reform of the state that would update the legal framework conceived for a political situation that was very different from the one that exists in Mexico today." The idea is to create a legal framework for the country's new political situation and overcome legislative deficiencies: political structure and functioning and the power relations vis-à-vis society have to change, he said. According to his analysis, we have a democratic society with many authoritarian institutions, a contradiction that can only be resolved with an updated legal system. To this end, he called on all political actors,

Vicente Fox is faced with an extremely complicated political panorama: he is the first president in modern history to be elected with under 50 percent of the vote, and he does not have a majority in either of the chambers of Congress.

There has been a basic —if not necessarily explicit— consensus about the need to carry out a political reform of the state to bring the structure of power into line with the country's political and social pluralism. In this context, issues such as the functions of the state and its social commitments, the relationship between the executive and legislative branches and their respective attributes, the justice system, federalism and forms of public participation continue to motivate debates among the different political actors.

The alternation in the presidency that came out of July 2, 2000, was accompanied by the idea of change, and in particular, the idea of fostering what currents of public opinion and branches of government to rebuild national consensuses around a refurbished Constitution, around a shared view of the country's constitutional architecture and the great aims of the Mexican nation.

Because the spaces for representation of society have broadened out, giving rise to a diversified mosaic of parties in existing institutions, and because this diversity means that no political party has a majority by itself, a greater understanding between the executive and legislative branches becomes indispensable. On this basis, the federal executive and the national political parties decided to sign the Political Agreement for National Development (APDN) to foster advances on the social, economic, political and international levels. Its 34-point agenda includes immediate actions and procedures for reaching its goals. Although this is not the place to reproduce the entire agenda or the immediate actions, I should say something about the procedure laid out in the accord, which commits the federal executive and party leaders to invite the presidents of both chambers and the party caucuses of the 58th Congress to sign the accord. The agenda is not limited and is open to the possibility that the legislature, the executive and political parties encourage proposals different from those already enumerated.[6]

But for both PRI and PRD members, the accord was stillborn. In the first place, neither Dulce María Sauri (PRI) nor Amalia García (PRD) had the backing of their organizations. Secondly, leaders and legislators of both parties disavowed the signing of the accord as an act of presidential spotlight-seeking and the agenda as a "catalogue of good intentions" in the best of cases.[7]

As organizations specialized in expressing opinions and allowing citizen participation in public affairs and decisions, the political parties came out of the electoral process more fragile than when they went in. With the advent of a new team in the president's office, our parties now face the enormous challenge of redefining their places in the political concert. The PRI lost its "natural leader," the president: the point of cohesion, creator of programs and the most fervent defender of the interests of the many groups that make it up. The PRD, the most harshly treated by voters, has not been able to respond to the call of its "moral leader" to rebuild

the party. The PAN, flushed with success, is in just as difficult a position as the losers: it has strategic support from the victorious presidential candidate, but does not want to repeat the PRI's history of subordination of the party to the president, and yet it is not an opposition party. Therefore, in the future, the PRI must turn itself into an authentic political party; the PRD needs to get past the factions, groups and leaders that are strangling it; and the PAN will have to learn to be a governing party, express solidarity with the president's actions and be capable of representing the desires of society at the same time that it monitors the actions of the executive branch.

Democracies can only function if they have a consolidated system of competitive parties. The PRI, PAN and PRD made possible that feat of political engineering, the electoral legality and institutionality currently in place, thanks to which electoral processes in Mexico are essentially trustworthy. The transition from a system of a hegemonic party to one of a competitive, pluralist, tripartite or moderate party system was achieved thanks to these parties, even though some issues are still unresolved.[8] Since 2000, Mexico has a party system made up of very fragile institutions with little cohesion and a fragmented federal Congress in which no party has an absolute majority in either chamber.[9]

From my point of view, the greatest problem under these circumstances stems from the fragility of our political parties which do not seem to be in any condition to carry out the functions of being counterweights to, regulate or provide balance for the actions of the president. However, at the same time, the president is compelled to interact with disperse, divided, conflictive actors who contribute very little to making democratic functioning a routine matter.

If, as most theoreticians agree, regular functioning of democratic political systems is based on the solidity of their parties and, therefore, on their party systems, it is probable that Mexico after the 2000 electoral process —that is this system of fragile parties— is far from being the necessary —indispensable, I would say— vector of the oft-postponed, unrealized reform of the state. It is truly difficult to recognize in our parties, and particularly in their leaderships —the sole bodies responsible, by the way, for the enormous deficiencies in their organizations' functioning— merits that they do not have: subjected to the rule of strong individual public figures during the elections, the question is how they can walk point for Mexican democracy. For democracy to become a routine way of behaving for both those who govern and the governed, parties with a minimum degree of cohesion among its leading group and a certain institutional strength, as well as an original project (whether it is realizable in practice or not) are needed. Our "big three" are far from displaying these qualities. As necessary as they are, they begin to seem superfluous in the eyes of the public. This is a terrible blow to an incipient democracy and the notion of governing in pluralism. VM

NOTES

[1] Ricardo Espinoza Toledo, "Un intento fallido de reconfiguración del sistema de partidos," Y. Meyenberg, comp., *El dos de julio. Reflexiones posteriores* (Mexico City: Flacso/IIS/UAM-I, 2001).

[2] This reform, the first in modern political history agreed on by the "big three" political parties, crowned the cycle of adjustments in electoral legislation with, among other things, full autonomy for the Federal Electoral Institute and the creation of the Electoral Tribunal of the Federal Judiciary.

[3] Jesús Rodríguez Z., "Alternancia presidencial y crisis partidista," Y. Meyenberg, op. cit.

[4] For some thinking on this matter, I remit the reader to my article, "Los partidos y la selección de los candidatos presidenciales," Luis Salazar, comp., México 2000. *Alternancia y transición a la democracia* (Mexico City: Cal y Arena, 2001).

[5] He also lacks a cabinet or group of collaborators who share a common horizon and are able to form a real governing team.

[6] The APDN was signed October 7, 2001, by President Vicente Fox Quesada; Luis Felipe Bravo Mena, for the PAN; Senator Dulce María Sauri, for the PRI; Amalia García, for the PRD; Deputy Alberto Anaya for the Labor Party (PT); Jorge González, for the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM); Dante Delgado, for the Convergence for Democracy (CD); Deputy Gustavo Riojas, for the Party of the Nationalist Society (PSN); and Guillermo Calderón, for the Party of the Social Alliance (PAS).

[7] See Mexico's national press after October 8, 2001.

[8] I take the concept of hegemonic party from Giovanni Sartori.

[9] The PAN, the party that swept Vicente Fox into the president's seat, is the second minority in Congress, with 207 deputies out of 500 and 45 senators out of 128, and in the country. The largest minority is the PRI, with 211 deputies and 60 senators.

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NÚMEROS ANTERIORES

September 11 A Watershed in the U.S. Migratory Debate[1]

Mónica Verea Campos*

Daniel Aguilar/Reuters

Surveillance on the border has increased as never before since September 11.

On September 11 we awoke to one of the cruelest terrorist offensives in contemporary U.S. history, a watershed in the history of international relations. Undoubtedly, the United States has already felt its repercussions both domestically and in its foreign policy. Probably there will also be important changes in its migratory policy and legislation, given the domestic debate about immigration that has changed radically since the attacks. The public's perception of immigrants, its attitude about what is "foreign" or "external" may change, negatively affecting Mexican immigrants. Clearly U.S. foreign policy with regard to national security will toughen, taking on an even more defensive position to fight terrorism, a tendency that will definitely have an impact on the U.S.-Mexican border and, therefore, a negative impact on bilateral relations.

We know that about 6,500 people died or disappeared in the Twin Towers, of whom about 2,600 supposedly came from 65 different countries, and many of whom were Mex-

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ican. In some cases, their migratory status meant that not even their own family members knew of their tragic fate. This allows us to think about the many ties that unite us with Americans, ties that do not jibe with many Mexicans' only grudging recognition of the depth of the tragedy. While many European countries showed their solidarity by holding three minutes of silence, our government representatives responded in a slow, lukewarm and fearful manner, getting caught up in domestic discussions that had nothing to do with a simple expression of solidarity with our friends, neighbors, regional partners and —whether we like it or not— allies. Many Mexicans both in the United States and here continue to be confused, fearful and sad not only because of the death of our fellow Mexicans but because of the possible outbreaks of violence and aggression that will make us even more vulnerable.

Americans have awakened vehemently to an awareness of their immense "vulnerability" and today are questioning the effectiveness of their national security. The effects of this unease can be felt only weeks after the events: their borders have become increasingly militarized to control their now fragile national security and they are carrying out investigations to block the entry of new terrorists.

Since five of the 19 hijackers entered the United States through the long, scarcely guarded border with Canada, attitudes have changed about it.[2] While the southern U.S. border is super-militarized, patrolled by 9,000 guards to cover 41 ports of entry, the northern border (3,987 miles long, with 115 ports of entry) is patrolled by only 340 officers, despite its being twice as long as the one shared with Mexico.[3] Now, the government has decided to reinforce surveillance there and authorized the transfer of 100 agents from the southern to the northern border.[4] There is no room for doubt: controlling the 500 million people who cross both borders every year —180 million from the Canadian side— is a complex task.

On the other hand, many terrorist groups have been discovered in different Canadian provinces, constituting a potential threat not only for Canada, but also for the United States. President Bush ordered his cabinet members, including Attorney General John Ashcroft, to work more closely with their Canadian counterparts and there has even been a proposal of establishing a North American perimeter to harmonize migratory policies, border security and customs norms between both countries.[5] For its part, the Chrétien administration fears that this proposal implies extraordinary cooperation in the European style. That is, to come into one of the "Schengen Area" countries, it is necessary to present a passport, but once inside, the visitor may cross borders as he or she needs.

Until September 11, the U.S. debate about migratory reforms both in the administration and in Congress centered on the impact of immigrants on the country's economy, particularly of unemployed and unschooled workers in the agricultural and service sectors that employ temporary immigrants whether documented or not. There was also discussion about the impact on the environment, among other issues, in addition to the airing of the traditional, recurring xenophobic arguments expressed by some individuals and sectors of U.S. society. After the attacks, the debate has focused on the need to control the borders more as a measure of national security and to ensure that fewer immigrants enter.

> An important segment of the U.S. public, which in recent years had flirted with the idea of opening up the borders to more immigrants, has changed its mind today.

Unfortunately for us, the trend toward a more open border between Mexico and the United States is going to reverse. Residents on both sides of the border could not have received a worse piece of news than September 11. Today, the scrupulous inspection of goods on the Mexico-U.S. border has already caused loses in tourism and bilateral trade. Many Americans who make their living from Mexican consumers have watched their sales drop more than 60 percent and, in areas very near to Mexico, up to 90 percent. To temporarily solve this problem, representatives from different sectors on both sides of the border held meetings and agreed on a process to get the border declared an "emergency area"; to do that they solicited tax breaks and immediate loans from the governments of both Mexico and the United States.[6] The situation was worsened by the

fact that it coincided with the time limit for replacing the *mica*, or border area visa, with new laser visas at a cost of U.S.$45 each, which has hindered even more the traditional large flow of people in the region. The State Department and the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) began the process of renovating the visas in 1998 and by January 2001 almost four million laser visas impossible to counterfeit, valid for 10 years each, had been approved.[7] Since a similar number of border passes are still left to be renewed, members of both houses of the U.S. Congress have introduced a bill to extend the time limit until October 2002 to alleviate tensions in the area.

There is no doubt that Mexicans who live in the United States will suffer from more aggressive persecution and will now perhaps be seen as suspicious and dangerous and not just as people looking for work. It is to be expected that the already heavy border surveillance —over the last seven years the number of agents patrolling the border has risen from 4,000 to about 9,000— will increase and focus not only on the hunt for terrorists, but for undocumented migrants, drug traffickers, etc. In the short term, our fellow citizens on the Mexican side will suffer the immediate repercussions of the drop in transborder trade and tourism, a product also of the economic deceleration and/or recession which, if it becomes sharper, will have even graver consequences.

I am convinced that the U.S. debate on immigration will be linked from now on to the issue of terrorism. An important segment of the U.S. public, which in recent years had flirted with the idea of opening up the borders to more immigrants, has changed its mind today. Recent polls show that this sector of the public now feels it lacks control over its borders; it thinks that terrorists have easily entered into the U.S. and that, therefore, more severe border controls are needed, along with a profound reform of immigration laws. This makes it possible for conservative and extremist voices to resurface, the voices we heard at the beginning of the 1990s with nativist, xenophobic and racist attitudes, and for these opinions to be translated into local and national measures in the tradition of California's Proposition 187.

Unfortunately the trend toward a more open border between Mexico and the U.S. will reverse. Residents on both sides of the border could not have received a worse piece of news than September 11.

A few months ago, President Bush was open to the possibility of establishing a guest workers program and the "normalization" of the status of undocumented Mexican migrants. However, his priorities seem to have changed drastically, and he has asked Congress to review immigration policy in order to put in place the mechanisms he needs to fight terrorism. He intends to restrict and review the assignation of temporary visas issued annually; to do that he recently created the Foreign Terrorist Tracking Task Force.[8] He gave orders for this group, together with the Mexican and Canadian governments, to coordinate the necessary preventive measures to hinder the possible entry of suspected terrorists through their territories. He has even issued instructions to limit the entry of members of 46 terrorist groups scattered around the world. He has also proposed working jointly to share data bases in order to speed up the detection of possible foreign terrorists.

U.S. congresspersons, for their part, have shown concern and opened a lively debate around the question of amending immigration legislation and finding new solutions to the problem of the security of the Mexican border and, now, the Canadian one. Some have blamed the government for not adequately living up to its function of keeping the borders safe, saying that the terrorist attacks revealed how easily people can enter the United States. Others are concerned about the possible impact on the U.S. economy if many migrant workers —with or without documents— have greater difficulties in entering the U.S. because of stepped-up border surveillance. In general, they are alarmed about the economic depression because it is possible that it may come on more quickly than originally foreseen, particularly in border areas.

Congresspersons will have to find a balance between restrictive initiatives to reduce and control immigration and other more permissive ones to allow for the entry of new immigrants with a

border semi-open to workers at the same time that they implement more effective security measures and greater border controls. Meanwhile, the two houses of Congress are discussing highly restrictive bills that would:

- Reinforce national security, mainly on land borders, increasing the number of border patrols. The Office of Management and the Budget authorized a special apportionment of U.S. $114 million to improve security both in airports and at high-risk border points.
- Use the National Guard to reinforce the border and/or militarily train the border patrol.
- Declare a moratorium on the entry of immigrants and/or substantially reduce the number admitted annually.
- Computerize visa records for tourists and students through a data base.
- Issue a standard identification card or "intelligent card" for foreigners who enter the U.S.
- Set up measures that facilitate the deportation of immigrant criminals. An automated system has been proposed to detect foreigners who are potential terrorists and criminals so that the State Department and the INS can have electronic access to Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency files. There has even been a proposal to share information with intelligence services of other countries.
- Restrict the admission of students and prohibit the entry of people from the seven countries that, according to the United States, support terrorism.

Meanwhile, liberal congresspersons who have traditionally defended open-door immigration policies are facing a very hostile environment and are having difficulties in getting pending bills discussed like the amnesty program for millions of undocumented immigrants (a bill many consider "dead" because it threatens national security) and the approval of the guest workers program proposed by Mexico, which many in Congress oppose. Despite the heated debate, little by little, the members of Congress will realize that they have to draw a line between immigrants who go seeking work and those who use their temporary visas to carry out terrorist acts.[9]

There is no doubt that Mexicans who live in the United States will suffer from more aggressive persecution and will now perhaps be seen as suspicious and dangerous and not just as people looking for work.

Repercussions for Mexico

I think it is important to remember that only a few weeks ago we were celebrating Fox's successful visit to Washington and on the horizon was a possible migratory agreement between the two countries that would include border security, regularization of undocumented migrants' status, a guest workers program, regional development and an increase in the quota of visas, a project that, if approved would constitute an important achievement for the Fox administration. Despite the fact that President Bush and the U.S. Congress would probably not grant all of President Fox's requests, today it is even less probable that the Bush administration will approve a program to regularize or normalize the migratory status of some undocumented Mexican migrants, much less the utopian Fox proposal of gradually opening up the borders to turn our countries into a community in the European style, where workers move without restrictions.

Mexico's ambiguous response to the terrorist acts has brought into doubt the "depth" of our friendship with the Americans that Fox had publicized during his last visit to Washington. The extemporaneous visit to the U.S. three weeks after the attacks seemed a clear attempt to smooth over possible rough spots that might have arisen. The approach is important, but timing is also a determining factor for making it clear that there is good communication.[10] Nevertheless, it was recently announced that discussions on migration would be renewed, although now they will surely have a different focus.

It is important for the Mexican government to continue to try to formulate a well defined "emigration policy," clearly coordinated among all the many visible actors involved, with specific long-term projects and a clear delineation of functions.[11] It is exceedingly clear that our government will be pres-

sured to cooperate and earmark more economic resources to better control both our southern and northern borders if it expects to be committed as a partner and hopes to receive "special treatment" as a neighbor. We must be prepared to weigh the costs and benefits of a bill that is still floating in the U.S. Congress that would create a North American National Security Perimeter through collaborative efforts by Mexico and Canada. Perhaps this would be our cooperation in the field of antiterrorism, and it should be given in exchange for an eventual approval of a guest workers program, a goal that the Fox administration should pursue as long as it does not counter our sovereign interests.

I think the time has come when Mexicans should resolve our ancestral identity conflict with regard to the United States; we have to think about whether we want to be one of the three members of the North American Community with the costs and benefits that this implies, or we simply want to continue as an important trade partner, a sometimes friendly, sometimes distant and not always committed neighbor. To do this, we must examine the European experience.

The reformulation and redefinition of our borders are imminent in light of recent events. The "deborderization" begun during the 1990s, a product of globalization and regionalization to welcome goods and services, will be less visible because at the same time there will be a policy of "reborderization" that has been implemented for some time now to reject foreigners without documents.[12]

For many years we have fought against impositions by our neighbors to the north that have affected bilateral relations. We have insisted that unilateralism should be replaced by regional and/or bilateral initiatives with mutual commitments and responsibilities. Let us think about whether we find ourselves at that turning point. Meanwhile, it is urgent to emphasize the need to create a regional migratory system that would be managed in an ordered, legal and safe way to guarantee respect for workers' human and labor rights so that we create a shared border that does not encourage the division foreseeable today. VM

Notes

[1] Summary of the paper presented at the colloquium "Globality and Conflict: The United States and the Crisis of September," held September 27 and 28 by the UNAM's Center for Research on North America, School of Political and Social Sciences and Institute for Legal Research. Send comments to mverea@servidor.unam.mx

[2] Thirteen of the 19 terrorists entered the U.S. on tourist visas and in only three cases had the visa run out; that is, only three of them had become "visa abusers."

[3] "Canadá no cederá soberanía para mejorar su relación con Washington," *El Financiero* (Mexico City), 12 October 2001, p. 37.

[4] Gregory Alan Gross, "100 border agents going north. Canadian crossings a growing concern," *The San Diego Union Tribune*, 25 October 2001. http://www.uniontrib/com/news/uniontrib/thu/news/news_ln25bpnorth.html

[5] Mark Clayton and Gail Russell Chaddock, "Terrorists Aided by a Leaky U.S.-Canada Line," *The Christian Science Monitor*, 19 September 2001, http://www.csmonitor.com/2001/0919/p3sl-woam.html

[6] Olga Ojeda, "Emergencia económica en la frontera norte," *El Financiero* (Mexico City), 15 October 2001, p. 24.

[7] Jennifer González, "Cinco millones y medio de mexicanos no podrán cruzar la frontera norte: SIN," *El Financiero* (Mexico City), 1 October 2001, p. 56.

[8] "President tightens U.S. access," United Press International, 29 October 2001.

[9] Immigrants of Arab descent will probably be the ones to suffer the worst consequences of September 11 after temporary legal entry for study or work is frozen. See "Freeze U.S. admissions of foreign students from Arab countries. Lawmakers want tighter border," *The San Antonio Express News*, 19 September 2001.

[10] Raúl Izaguirre, president of the National Council of La Raza, wrote a letter to President Fox suggesting that his "total, unequivocal visible support" was indispensable since it would not only counter the negative atmosphere reigning after the terrorist attacks, but also the tensions that could be foreseen in the complex bilateral relationship. Gregory Rodriguez, *Opinion*, 14 October 2001. http://www.lats.com/ rights/register.htm

[11] For more information, see Mónica Verea, "Mexican Migration to the U.S. Is Regularization Possible?", *Voices of Mexico* 53, October-December 2000; and Mónica Verea, "¿Hacia la administracion bilateral de la migración entre México y Estados Unidos en el siglo XXI?", Rosío Vargas, Remedios Gómez Arnau and Julián Castro, comps., *Las relaciones de México con Estados Unidos y Canadá: Una mirada al nuevo milenio* (Mexico City: CISAN-UNAM, 2001), pp. 95-127.

[12] Mónica Verea, "Los inmigrantes ante los procesos de desfronterización vs. la refronterización en la frontera México-Estados Unidos," Elizabeth Gutiérrez and Alejandro Mercado, comps., *Fronteras y comunidad latina en América del Norte* (Mexico City: CISAN-UNAM, at press).

The Prospects For An Immigration Agreement

Miguel Ángel Valverde Loya*

Marco A. Cruz/Imagenlatina

September 11 should favor rather than hinder a migratory accord.

The terrible events of September 11 in New York and Washington will have important repercussions in U.S. foreign policy. Probably, one will be interest in including Mexico in a security plan for North America and any hemisphere-wide proposal that may emerge. U.S. borders with its main trade partners must be efficient, orderly and secure. The need for greater regulation and control (not free transit) could favor instead of block negotiations of a migration agreement.

Changes in U.S. priorities on the international level may affect the speed and form of an agreement, but will probably not change the need to solve the problem. President Fox's audacity in exerting pressure to come to an understanding by the end of this year sought to politically commit the Bush administration to not leaving the matter on the back burner, even given the complications it implies.

Contributions and Suspicions

Even though a great many research results exist, analysts generally accept the notion that immigrants to industrial-

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ized countries contribute significantly to their economies. The benefits, of course, are not distributed evenly and some sectors of the local population do compete with the recent arrivals. On the other hand, it has been found that the demand for immigrant labor in some regions of the United States has become "structural," that is, considerably independent of "expelling" and "attracting" factors linked to economic cycles.

Evidence also exists of "cultural" patterns, including family and community networks that combine with the main stimulus for migration, the wage differential. It has been suggested that the key to solving the problem is a flexible migratory policy that would one way or another make it possible to regulate the flow in response to the needs of the labor market, anticipating its possible demographic effects. In the case of receiving countries, we should also consider the demand for public services in order to calculate appropriate responses.[1] In the long run, of course, the answer is a much smaller gap in development between Mexico and the United States; but in the short and medium term, perhaps the political and social reactions that generate migration are more delicate and difficult to assuage.

On the Mexican side, the consequences of U.S. efforts to reinforce border surveillance are matters for concern since they increase the —often fatal— hardships that potential illegal immigrants have to go through. There is also concern about protecting civil rights. In addition to the potential competition on the labor market, the Hispanic community worries that negative stereotypes about immigrants will foment discrimination and the violation of their own rights. It is difficult for U.S. society to appraise the economic benefits of Mexican immigration, above all when they perceive slow sociocultural assimilation, particularly due to the widespread use of the Spanish language, and the abrupt arrival to small and medium-sized communities unused to the presence of immigrants.[2] A recent study shows that the U.S. public opposes an increase in both legal and illegal immigration (although much more decidedly the latter), even in times of economic bonanza.[3]

The Actors On the Winding Road Ahead

So, the difficulties for a migratory agreement are considerable. Mexico is already the main source of immigrants in the United States, both documented and undocumented. Mexican American congresspersons (part of the Hispanic caucus) are not united nor do they have political clout or the conviction to pressure for a large quota for legal immigration. On the other hand, the argument that an important reason for the Republicans and President Bush to commit themselves to an immigration agreement would be the possibility of increasing their share of the Hispanic vote is questionable and tricky. As former President Bush discovered when he tried to use the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a point in his favor, the Hispanic electorate is very diverse in composition and interests. Just like with NAFTA, immigration causes curious, complex alliances, such as that of pro-business Republicans, who emphasize the economic benefits particularly of temporary migrant workers, and the large unions, who, in a surprising turn-about, see in legalization a potential increase in membership.

Of course, the Mexican government has hired new lobbyists in Washington and is willing to assume its responsibility as a country of transit. It is also stepping up efforts to smash gangs engaged in migrant trafficking nationwide and is seeking to improve the infrastructure and efficiency of its own migratory agencies. For example, through its "South Plan," it hopes to achieve control over the border with Central America. And, in accordance with the idea of promoting development to mitigate migration, it has launched the Puebla-Panama Plan with ambitious aims, though modest means.

The challenge is to avoid repeating the problems and abuses that occur on the northern border. Mexico will be subject to the same criticisms leveled at the U.S. border patrol, other authorities and some private citizens about the treatment inflicted on Mexicans who want to be immigrants. All of these changes are taking place, of course, in the new democratic context of our country, which implies questioning the government and the need to come to agreements among different Mexican political actors.

Mexican and U.S. negotiators will have to find a way to come up with a first agreement based on the "lowest common denominator" that is politically acceptable. It seems improbable that they will be able to cover all the Mexican proposals on a first attempt (legalization of undocumented immigrants, the acceptance of temporary workers, more visas, putting an end to fatalities on the border, promoting

development in communities of origin, etc.). The new priorities for U.S. foreign policy, as well as the U.S. legislative calendar of domestic issues will determine the rhythm and breadth of the accords. The NAFTA negotiations took more than three years covering the terms of two U.S. presidents and stood in the background of the Gulf War.

We must continue to pay attention to the subtleties in language (the Bush administration talks of "regularization" not "legalization"; the Mexican government emphasizes not calling undocumented migrants "criminals"), seek out allies with similar interests and systematically build coalitions, probably step by step. We must inform and court U.S. legislators, particularly those with political weight, and convince a good number of them that the economic benefits for their constituents are great enough to try to gradually overcome the reticence among sectors of their population to accept a greater and more evident ethnic and cultural diversity in their country.

The good will of the United States on this bilateral level, particularly about a priority pointed out by the Mexican government, will require political reciprocity internationally. Mexico will have to be consistent and assume its role as both partner and ally, without this necessarily meaning it will not continue to try to have manoeuvering room, even if only a little. When requested, Mexican support should be explicit though circumspect. Differences —as is only prudent— will have to be diluted in collective positions. The window of opportunity for migration is open; it must be protected lest it be closed by a passing storm. VM

NOTES

[1] Demetrios G. Papademetriou, "Migration," *Foreign Policy* 109 (winter, 1997-1998), pp. 20-22.

[2] These concerns are clear in work like that of James Goldsborough, "Out-of-Control Immigration," *Foreign Affairs* vol. 79, no. 5 (September-October 2000), pp. 89-101.

[3] Thomas J. Espenshade and Mariann Belager, "Immigration and Public Opinion," Marcelo Suárez-Orozco, comp., *Crossings: Mexican Immigration in Interdisciplinary Perspective* (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 366-367.



A Proposal for U.S.-EU Immigration Policy Harmonization

Simone Lucatello*



Monica Do-Allo/Reuters

The European Union today receives migrants from different parts of the globe: Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia.

A year ago the BBC broadcasted a program called "Desperately Seeking EU-topia," depicting the drama of illegal immigration from Eastern Europe countries to Western Europe. In the program, Austrian border patrol agents on the frontier with Hungary were interviewed during an action against illegal immigrants. One officer proudly said, "We've learned how the United States deals with the Mexicans. We hunt them down and catch them as soon as they cross the border!" Although a little more developed semantically, the relationship between the European Union and the United States in immigration matters can sadly be summed up as an issue of border police; terms like "prevention" and "the fight against immigration" are the only ones used in the plans developed by both parties to deal with immigration.

In this article, I will look at the possibility of strengthening a dialogue on immigration between the United States

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and the European Union (EU); I will also propose arguments for greater harmonization of transatlantic immigration policy. Since September 11, it has become imperative that the two parties consider the creation of a working group to formulate a coordinated immigration policy. The U.S. and Europe have to move carefully and closely at this particular moment of international relations. International collaboration against terrorism could become the basis for a future transatlantic dialogue that would be much more effective in the field of immigration.

Right now the main risk is that restrictive policies, xenophobia and racism —always present on both sides of the Atlantic— could dangerously affect the internal equilibrium of civil society in both regions with incalculable consequences. Europe, with its 20 million Muslims,[1] and the United States, with 6 or 7 million, cannot run the risk of adopting incorrect, one-sided policies if they want to avoid seeing a real bomb of political and social instability go off in their back yards.[2]

Until now, the dialogue between the United States and Europe about immigration has been based on the 1995 Joint EU-U.S. Action Plan (reviewed every two years at the EU-U.S. summits).[3] The plan has a brief, highly defensive accord aimed only at control and the fight against illegal immigration, without concretizing constructive, positive measures focusing on recognizing immigration's intrinsic importance.

Even though immigration has had a positive impact both on the United States and Europe, the policy makers, the opinion leaders, the representatives of the business world and unions in both regions:

a) have not been able to propose definitive solutions to issues of common interest;
b) have proposed sporadic migratory policies in answer to momentary crises without suggesting an effective common strategy in immigration matters;
c) have created the conditions for confronting illegal immigration without recognizing the advantages in its eventually being transformed into legal immigration.

The relationship between the European Union and the United States in immigration matters can sadly be summed up as an issue of border police.

In an unprecedented period of labor mobility, the economic competition between the world's two colossuses —very often based on the presence of skilled labor not available in one's own country, such as in the cases of Germany, France, England, Italy and the United States— has led them to establish policies that permit uncontrolled, irregular migratory flows.

Therefore, the lack of a clear, organized development strategy for immigration policy has caused a kind of political paralysis that, among other things, has sent out an ambiguous message to immigrants' countries of origin; these governments' inaction has sometimes been interpreted as a green light for a continuing flow of immigrants.[4] The case of immigration from the Balkans toward Western Europe is a clear example.

We can also add that the lack of an organized, planned strategy leaves immigrants —especially undocumented ones, who equally participate in the economic, social and cultural life of their destination country, like the Hispanics in the United States—completely defenseless legally and vulnerable with regard to their social and political rights.

The United States and the European Union have admitted millions of immigrants in recent decades, thus acquiring, therefore, the moral obligation to promote the long-term economic, social and civil integration of these new residents who have contributed a great deal to their development. However, the joint efforts of Europe and the United States have concentrated to a great extent on the fight against illegal immigration which, despite everything is very important for the economic stability of both regions. Among other things, this fight against illegal immigration tends to restrict the residency rights of all immigrants, both legal and illegal, who already live within the respective territories.

Therefore, the fundamental problem is understanding why on both sides of the Atlantic, where there are common immigration policies and similar institutional restrictions with results that are, in the best of cases, doubtful, they continue to manage the matter of migration in this counterproductive, uncoordinated fashion.

According to different scholars, like, for example, Wayne A. Cornelius and Philip Martin, both regions are typical of industrialized countries that import part of their work force in the sense of:

1) Using similar political instruments to control illegal immigration and the flow of refugees, as well as achieving like results in the fight against this kind of immigration.
2) The adoption of similar policies with regard to the social, economic and political integration of immigrants (measures taken to favor those immigrants who in the long run will be residents) with dubious results.
3) Xenophobic and racist reactions to immigration by the local population.
4) The systematic application of immediate rules to restrict immigration and control the border in the case of national crises.
5) The lack of recognition and commitment to sustained economic development in immigrants' regions of origin in most cases.

Something has changed in the last two years: Europe, for example, has begun to delineate a common immigration policy in terms of border controls, asylum, the rights of nationals of third countries, admissions policies, etc., through the precepts of the Treaty of Amsterdam, the resolutions of the 1999 Tampere Council and the application of the Schengen Accord.[5] In similar fashion, the United States has proposed bilateral agreements to partially solve the problem of illegal immigration, above all that of Mexicans.

A review of current legislation, multilateral and bilateral cooperation among receiving and sending countries and the definition of an agenda on immigration for the next 10 years are some of the measures that the United States and Europe have to take to be able to efficiently manage the issue of international immigration.

The differences and similarities between the two parties do not end here: for example, the origin of the foreign population in the United States and the European Union is certainly very different. The largest foreign minority in the United States comes from Latin America, particularly Mexico. This population increased five times more than the native U.S. population between 1990 and 2000. The political, social and economic transformation that this has brought is significantly changing the panorama in the United States.

In the United States, interest in a dialogue with Mexico about immigration has declined while border controls have increased, slowing the flow of undocumented workers.

By contrast, the European Union today has migration from different geographical areas: Eastern Europe, the Middle East, Africa and Asia. In addition, many of these undocumented immigrants are not there temporarily, as are many Mexicans in the United States. Other minorities, such as the Kurds in Germany or the Kosovars and other groups from the former Yugoslavia, the victims of ethnic conflicts, enjoy refugee status.

In the last 10 years the fundamental differences between the regions can be found in the initial objectives for which the European Union and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) were created.

In the first place, while the European Union seeks political, social and economic cohesion among its member countries, including that of the 12 countries currently seeking entrance, the United States only seeks the trade (economic) integration and the promotion of free trade.

In addition, European integration involves a strong social component, markedly the free circulation of individuals under the Schengen Accord. This fundamental freedom is expressly excluded from NAFTA, whose greatest social achievement was the inclusion of two parallel agreements on labor standards and the environment.

In the second place, the European Union and the area included under NAFTA represent the development of policies that emphasize regions despite the fact that the world trend seems to lead to globalization. Achieving regional economic objectives implies that both parties must strengthen their economies (above all in the European case, giving rise to the expression "Fortress Europe"), which could have serious repercussions for immigration. The dynamic of contraction and opening has been a constant factor in the political and economic development of what is now called the European Union.

Nevertheless, the events of September 11 will have drastic effects on

migratory policy in both Europe and the United States. The two regions' reactions to the terrorist attacks with regard to immigration have had different focuses: in the United States, interest in a dialogue with Mexico about immigration has declined while border controls have increased, slowing the flow of undocumented workers. In addition, the U.S. has concentrated most of its efforts on fighting terrorist organizations (note Attorney General John Ashcroft's statement prohibiting entry to the U.S. of presumed members or sympathizers of terrorist organizations).[6]

In contrast, the European Union reacted by centering on the question of Afghan refugees and displaced persons who might eventually leave their country as a consequence of the bombings, a position they share with the United Nations. After September 11, for example, the European Commission met to seek a common interpretation of the 1951 Geneva Convention on Refugees and recommend to union member states that they broaden out the interpretation of the term "persecution" to include actions by non-state agents for granting refugee status (this was to accommodate people persecuted by the Taliban, which was not officially recognized as the head of state by most of the international community).[7] However, France and Germany took a different position, arguing that the convention protects only those persecuted by the state. Under this interpretation, the two countries considered that because the Taliban government was not recognized internationally, the Afghans did not come under the protection of the convention. In other words, if an Afghan citizen fled his or her country because of persecution by the Taliban and requested asylum in France or Germany, he or she would not have been considered a refugee, but an illegal immigrant, with all the consequences that this implies. Italy and England took a more liberal position, recognizing the Afghans as refugees under certain circumstances, although until the arrival of the first refugees, it was not clear how the measures would be applied and under what circumstances.[8]

Another important consequence of September 11 that could be reflected in the immigration policy of both regions is that the Bush administration and, to a lesser degree, the countries of the European Union are giving the same importance to the physical security of both the territory and individuals as to trade security when they ask other governments to join in a coalition against terrorism. To ensure international support for the offensive, they are using trade instruments. The United States, in particularly, followed by Europe, will try to promote a sense of solidarity with the aim of achieving its goals during the world trade talks.

This attitude brings out contradictory situations: free trade implies permeable borders and fewer restrictions on visas for businessmen and transportation workers, guest workers and immigrants in general. However, ensuring anti-terrorist security demands exactly the opposite.

Once again, the administration in Washington and the European governments will have to seek a balance between free trade, security and protection for their citizens' and minorities' civil liberties. In light of this, it seems evident that now more than ever there is a need to establish a transatlantic dialogue with regard to immigration to come up with a coherent, lasting, balanced and fair policy for both immigrants and receiving countries. VM

Notes

[1] According to a recent article on the www.webislam.com website, most of Europe's Muslims are in France (4 million).

[2] Suffice it to remember the international debate sparked by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's unfortunate remark about the supposed superiority of Western culture vis-à-vis Islamic culture.

[3] The last review took place in June 2001 in Gothenburg, since Sweden occupied the presidency at the time.

[4] This helps to explain, for example, why the laws and measures taken by Europe and the United States against illegal immigration have failed completely to contain it.

[5] These initiatives were obligatory: after the Cold War, Europe attracted 19 percent of the world's immigration and the United States, 20 percent. According to the European Commission, the difference will be completely eliminated in the next two years.

[6] Associated Press, 31 October 2001.

[7] It should be remembered that the European Commission does not have the ability to impose decisions on member states with regard to immigration, which is still a matter for cooperation and not a binding community matter.

[8] In the case of Italy, the question was complicated by the fact that it is the only country in the European Union which does not have legislation about political asylum.

The Painting of Gabriel Macotela

Luis Rius Caso*

Photos by Carlos Alcázar

Self-Portrait on the Roof, 70 x 56 cm, 1989 (sand and acrylic).

Untitled, 110 x 40.5 cm, 2001 (etching and aquatint).

Gabriel Macotela's recent painting is a vindication of the genre in today's art world. Its importance is based, like that of all great contemporary painting, on a permanent dialogue with the media and ideas that have brought about its crisis —and even denied it— and with the different cultural codices that have legitimated that crisis. This dialogue has been a constant in the history of great modern painting, of course, and can therefore be taken as an active legacy today, even when there is an attempt to negate it. However, even given this association with the "tradition of the break," its substantiation in the current debate corresponds to very diverse questionings of a radicalism probably previously unknown, in line with the new period that Lipovetzky sees being woven in the vacuum left behind by the end of the age of duty, or that others consider engulfed in a perpetual dynamic of construction, without stable reference points, without final interpreters.

Characterizing this artist as a painter is undoubtedly inadequate given his surprising versatility and talent for experimenting in different media. This can be seen in both his graphic production and his sculpture; his magnificent set designs; his multi-disciplinary proposals with new technologies; his art books, furniture, lamps, models, pieces of jewelry and clothing design, just to mention part of the repertory that his personal poetic has spanned. However, after my experience of Gabriel's new pictorial series, I would like to emphasize here this aspect of his work given the importance it has in the contemporary debate I referred to above and that one of its clearest expressions questions the *raison d'être* of the so-called traditional art forms (painting, sculpture, sketching, prints) given the consolidation of new trends arising out of globalization in the 1990s: neo-conceptualisms, neo-minimalisms, ephemeral non-object art, process art, productions with applied technologies, etc.

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The ability to dialogue has been a constant in Gabriel's work since he began to become known in Mexico at the end of the 1970s. With a very solid academic background, he soon had sufficient resources to build his own, undeniable territory (a personal poetic), whose originality allowed him to interact with the artistic discourses of the time and propositions in vogue without being lost in them. His work was consolidated, as was a pictorial proposal that summarized and surpassed the complex discussion that criticism of the 1970s and 1980s outlined as a polarized conflict between abstraction and figurativeness given his ability to deal with problems of composition, form and color and to redefine, at the same time, a particular relationship with the world of visual reality, free from "mimetic" commitments and expressions legitimized by "neo-figurative" artists of the previous generation.

This dialogue defined the artist's relationship with the history of art, his teachers (particularly with Gilberto Aceves Navarro), his present context and also with the models. His signs became objects treated with rigor and affection, or, as John Berger says, with that sympathy with which the great painter always relates to his model, a sympathy that both are caught up in. Berger explains:

> The impulse to paint is not born of observation or the soul (which is probably blind), but of an encounter: the encounter between the painter and the model, even if it is a mountain or a shelf of medicine...When a painting lacks life it is because the painter has not had the courage to get close enough to begin a collaboration. He stays at a distance of "copying." Or, as happens in mannerist periods like today, he stays at a historical-artistic distance, doing some stylistic tricks that the model knows nothing about....All authentic painting shows a collaboration.[1]

This collaboration, this ancient magical impulse associated with *sympathy*, is the great absence in a large part of contemporary artis-

Auditorium of Shadows, 53.3 x 73.4 cm, 2001 (etching and aquatint).

Untitled, 44.5 x 29.3, 2001 (oil on paper).

The Boat, 57.2 x 123.6 cm, 1999 (etching).

tic and visual communication discourses associated with the culture of simulation; that is a visual and verbal culture which, in its anxiousness to produce without the concert of the object (which can be reduced to a spot or a simple stroke of the brush), has propitiated this kind of a culture of the vacuum, where signs have become dynamic and ephemeral objects. For that reason, and again in Berger's words, painting today is an "act of resistance that satisfies a generalized need and can create hopes." [2]

While Gabriel's painting has been nourished by this continual "creating a crisis" in the genre, caused by the different media that broadened out the limits of art in the last decades of the twentieth century, it is also true that the artist himself has generated feedback for his painting from the extension of his codes toward other creative possibilities. A dialogue without and within, in an uninterrupted process of intelligent updating, whose stimulus is the response to the challenges and needs inherent to the living, acting nature of the poetic itself and not the imperatives of mere updating that questions the artist's autonomy today.

Exhibitions in Mexico and abroad abound in Gabriel's development, exhibitions that constitute both a culmination and at the same time a new, unpredictable chapter. I remember, for example, the exhibit called "Coin-Mint-Currency Drain [Exchange Value]" at Mexico City's Carrillo Gil Art Museum between 1997 and 1998 in which he abandoned the conventional format of the canvas. I thought at the time of a definitive transfer of his artistic interests because it seemed that his relationship with bi-dimensionality had concluded. About this exhibit, Lelia Driben wrote:

> The result of this encounter of visualities is composed of different-sized flat objects made in plaster and paper, including miniatures, a very *sui generis* gloss of these coins. Organized as an installation that takes up floors and walls, it includes a fantastic mint covered in gold paint reminiscent of some of the stage sets the artist has done, as well as the integration of his own photographs and musical effects....With this work, Macotela again carries out a practice he has never abandoned, despite being one of the most representative painters of his generation.[3]

Now I encounter a series of small and medium-sized canvases that imply a return and a new dedication to painting. I recognize their codes and at the same time, I am surprised by the variation of their chromatic discourse, their themes and the rhythms that distribute their

forms, stemming from a long, impeccable exercise of purification. Everything is familiar, but there are many changes. "There is nothing new under the sun, but everything is new under the sun." It is the same with *Piece of Furniture-Woman*, a splendid work that with a delicious cadence and freshness dialogues with Gabriel's background and with a present built from painting. But, above all, it talks to us, possessed by the self-sufficiency of its own beauty, that it knows will elicit our surprise.

In the contemporary chapter of our story, Macotela is one of the first Mexican artists to achieve international prestige without any debts to the well-known folklore "nationalist" tone that was current in the 1980s. In that sense, his work has been understood as a universal proposal, if I may be permitted to use a word that has fallen into disuse. Now his future offers other guarantees: that of settling with true value, not anything invented in market strategies or curatorships for export and, on the other hand, of offering himself from his own territoriality, from which the painter, and what is more, the autonomous artist, is championed. VM

Notes

[1] John Berger, *Algunos pasos hacia una pequeña teoría de lo visible* (Madrid: Ardora Ediciones, 1997), pp. 40-41.

[2] Op. cit., p. 42.

[3] Lelia Driben, "Moneda Coladera o la oscilación de la utopía," in *Gabriel Macotela. Moneda-Coladera [valores de cambio]*, catalogue for the exhibition in the Carrillo Gil Art Museum, Mexico City, 1997, p. 12.

Nocturnal Landscape, 38 x 58 cm, 1999 (oil on canvas).

Gabriel Macotela in Brief

Gabriel Macotela is sparing of words when talking about himself; painting and, in a certain way, music, and not words, are his means of expression. That is why he has given us this brief sketch of his life, without dates and precise data, where he is revealed as studious and a traveler, doing everything hand in hand with his art.

Macotela was born in Guadalajara, Jalisco, in 1953, where he did his first schooling. Later, his family migrated like many others to Mexico City. When he discovered his vocation for art, he entered the La Esmeralda Art School, where he studied for two years, and then the San Carlos Academy, where he enrolled in the workshop of Gilberto Aceves Navarro's, who he considers his teacher and tutor. A passionate lover of jazz and rock music, before opting for painting and sculpture, Gabriel wanted to be a musician, so he also studied two years at Mexico's National Conservatory. Even though he did not make it his profession, after painting, music is his second spiritual nourishment. In general, he confesses, he is not much of a reader, except for poetry: besides his personal enjoyment of poetry, Macotela has combined his art with the work of poets like David Huerta, Francisco Serrano and José Joaquín Blanco.

Among his meanderings around the world is a two-year stay in Barcelona, where he both studied art and worked in Polígrafa, one of Spain's most outstanding graphic art workshops. In New Mexico, he participated in another graphic arts workshop, Tamarind. And, three years ago, Macotela moved to New York City for several months to work; after his stay in the Big Apple, he dubbed it "a jungle for artists."

He remembers his first collective exhibition in 1977 in the Pecanins Gallery and his first one-man show in an important venue in



Interior Jungle II, 72.5 x 32.5 cm, 2000 (oil on paper).

Mexico City's Modern Art Museum, followed by three more in the Carrillo Gil Art Museum. He has also had more than 12 one-man shows in prestigious venues like the Juan Martín and the Ramón López Quiroga Galleries. In the 1990s, his work was exhibited in Paris's Mexican Cultural Center and the Frankfurt Book Fair dedicated to Mexico. Currently, his work is included in the collective exhibit of contemporary graphics being presented in the Mexico House in Madrid.

Macotela received the Young Artist Prize from the city of Aguascalientes when he was still a student. Later he was given Mexico's National Painting Salon prize and the Cuenca Biennial in Ecuador.

As part of a project to involve and commit Mexican society in the creation of new spaces for making art available to all kinds of people, Gabriel Macotela participated in the founding of the Faro de Oriente School of Arts and Trades where he designed and gives the sculpture workshop to the inhabitants of one of Mexico City's poorest areas.

He is currently preparing an exhibit with his most recent work scheduled to open in 2002 at the López Quiroga Gallery, which is currently managing his work.

Macotela spends his time in Mexico City working in a study with a window that opens out onto the traditional Mexico Park, accompanied by his music, surrounded by all kinds of objects that he holds dear: series of drawings of his daughter, his own ceramics and those of others, furniture and lamps of his own design and all sorts of items that as a whole reflect a creative spirit that has not limited itself only to painting, graphic art or sculpture. VM

Elsie Montiel
Editor

Untitled, 80.3 x 100.3 cm, 2000 (oil on canvas).

One-Man Shows



Sun Coin, 100.5 x 76.5 cm, 1997 (etching and aguatint).

Untitled, detail, 128 x 162 cm, 2001 (oil on canvas).

1976 Casa del Lago, Mexico City; Calderón Theater, University of Zacatecas.

1978 "Painting and Sketches," Pecanins Gallery, Mexico City; House of Culture, Monterrey; House of Culture, Guadalajara.

1979 "Minutes," Pecanins Gallery, Mexico City.

1980 "Urban Landscape," Pecanins Gallery, Mexico City.

1981 "Journey Through the Mirror," Pecanins Gallery, Mexico City.

1982 "Crossing: Fabric, Pastels, Objects," Pecanins Gallery, Mexico City.

1983 "Daily Horizon," Carrillo Gil Art Museum, Mexico City; Miró Gallery, Monterrey.

1984 "Labyrinth, Door, Lock," Pecanins Gallery, Mexico City.

1985 "Landscape, House Blueprints," Today's Art Gallery, Monterrey; San Jose Institute of Contemporary Art, San Jose, California; Metropolitan Gallery, Mexico City.

1986 "Broken City. Recent Work," Modern Art Museum, Mexico City.
"Ten Years at the Pecanins Gallery," Pecanins Gallery, Mexico City.
"Journey Through the Etceteras," Traveling exhibit, Mexico City subway stations.

1987 "Skies and Characters of Immersion. Ceramics, Engravings, Pastels," Pecanins Gallery, Mexico City.

1988 "Smokestacks, Painting, Sculpture, Sketching," Pecanins Gallery, Mexico City.
"Industrial Orchestra," Rufino Tamayo Museum, Mexico City.

1989 "Characters and Their Shadows," Mexican Consulate in Barcelona.

1990 "Characters and Their Shadows," Mexican Cultural Center, Paris.
"Buildings, Characters and Their Shadows," Juan Martín Gallery, Mexico City.

1993 "Review of a Little Time in Painting and Sculpture," ITESM Campus, State of Mexico.

1995 "Jungle, Recent Work," Juan Martín Gallery, Mexico City.

1997 "Coin-Mint-Currency Drain [Exchange Value]," Carrillo Gil Art Museum, Mexico City.

Note: This list was prepared by the Ramón López Quiroga Gallery, which currently manages Gabriel Macotela's work.

Science for the Poor
The Mixteca Region's "Water Forever" Program[1]

Víctor M. Toledo*
Leonor Solís*

Fulvio Eccardi

Science is not neutral, no matter how hard those who defend the idea of a politically and ideologically immaculate science try to convince us otherwise. All we have to do is look around us without blinkers at the environmental and social reality of the world today to see that recent scientific contributions have been profoundly influenced by the customs, values and interests of the dominant sectors of society.

In an increasingly polarized world, dominated by market forces, scientific activity benefitting one of the two poles has given rise to a socially absurd paradox: today, the full material satisfaction of all human beings' needs is practically impossible under the current scientific and technological setup because it would lead to the destruction of the planet's ecosystem.

Since Mexico has no clear scientific policy, a good many of the country's research centers have gradually imposed a criteria of "academic science" in which the fundamental object is no longer the generation of knowledge to solve the problems of Mexican society and of the world. This has been replaced by a dehumanized practice that only makes sense to certain individuals and the academic elites. One way or another, this has meant the application of the principles of neoliberal economic policy to the country's scientific and technological research, a phenomenon that has had an impact equally on researchers, research institutions and state, regional and national policies.

This trend, which some want to make hegemonic, has been questioned by different sectors. One example is a scientific-technological experience that aimed to provide water and food to one of the most marginalized sectors in the country, showing how it is possible to develop and successfully carry out science oriented to solving the problems of rural poverty, that is, doing science for the poor.

Courtesy of Alternativas y Procesos de Participación Social, A. C.

Community participation is essential for effective science.

Using field work and popular organization, Alternatives provides basic support and training to peasant communities so they can solve the main problems themselves.

A Poor, Thirsty Region

The Mixteca region, covering parts of the states of Puebla, Oaxaca and Guerrero, is 40,000 square kilometers of irregular, mountainous terrain with low, unevenly distributed precipitation (300 to 700 millimeters a year).

Covered by typically semiarid vegetation, dominated by brambles and cacti, the area has been inhabited for about 10,000 years; it is thought that in this inhospitable terrain, plants like maize were domesticated and agriculture was born in Mesoamerica, using the available water. Today, it is inhabited by mainly indigenous peoples from at least seven different ethnic groups: the Nahuas, Mixtecs, Popolocs, Ixcatecs, Mazatecs, Cuicatecs and Chinantecs. It is one of Mexico's poorest agricultural regions, with high levels of marginalization, and, therefore, a considerable

* Researchers at the UNAM Ecology Institute, Department of Ecology of Natural Resources, Morelia campus.

Courtesy of Alternativas y Procesos de Participación Social, A. C.

Using different kinds of technology improves the chances for success.

The program considered the history of water management in the region focusing on the urgent need to create not only short-term but medium and long-term solutions.

number of its inhabitants are forced to migrate.

Undoubtedly, the Mixteca's most serious problem is water. The World Health Organization has established an international standard stipulating that each individual needs 150 liters of potable water a day, while the World Bank puts the figure at 50 liters a day. Average water consumption in Mexico City, for example, is 335 liters per person per day, rising to around 1,000 liters in wealthier neighborhoods and dropping to only 28 in the poorest areas. In the Mixteca, many families survive with only 7 liters a day, that is, one-fourth of the consumption of the poorest of the poor in Mexico City. This contrasts, paradoxically, with a long history of water management and use in the region: evidence of the first water management techniques date from 2,800 years ago! And today, the population still has hydro-geological and hydro-agricultural knowledge of inestimable value.

The technological option that the "modern world" offers for obtaining abundant water is drilling deep wells, which has serious geological, ecological and economic limitations given the nature of the geological substrata (for example, volcanic or metamorphic rock) in many parts of the Mixteca region with a low potential for accumulated underground moisture. On the other hand, the combined action of deforestation and over-grazing has made the layer of natural vegetation that covered the sides of hills and mountains disappear, which has in turn meant that rainwater does not filter down to the subsoil to feed underground water; rather, it runs over the surface, carrying soil with it, causing erosion. But the main limitation is economic: drilling a deep well costs between U.S.$25,000 and U.S.$40,000, a sum completely out of the reach of the Mixteca's peasant population.

Given this, a project called "Water Forever" was created by a civil group called Alternativas y Procesos de Participación Social, A.C. (Social Participation Alternatives and Processes) in 1988. Limiting its work to the northernmost area of the Mixteca, on the borders of the states of Puebla and Oaxaca and including a large part of the Tehuacán Valley, Alternatives focused its efforts on a group of about 200,000 inhabitants in approximately 100 rural communities.

The program considered the history of water management in the region essential to its activities, focusing on the urgent need to create solutions not only for the short term, but also taking into account the environmental problems implicit in the loss of underground water supplies and the soil erosion that made the regional situation increasingly critical.

This project considered that water scarcity is influenced by population increase, inappropriate use of natural resources and unequal access to available water, unjustly concentrated in the hands of a few individuals and power groups. In this way, the project recog-



Drawing by Hugo S. Herrerías

Everybody Pitch In!

To regenerate the basins, specific treatments are applied on the hills, knolls, valleys and ravines using different technologies. The work begins on the hills with retaining devices that include ditches and trenches (1), water harvesting rings (2), reforestation (3) and contour lines with vegetation (4). On rises where the slope is less than on hills, borders, terraces (5), earthen dikes (17) and watering holes (6) can be built, making it possible to water cattle and other animals or irrigate crops. If we take into account that ravines have been formed where water has most easily eroded the soil, it can be regenerated by building rock seeping dams (7) or gabion seeping dams (8). These works slow the speed and force of the initial flow with provisional water stagnation and soil retention, thus achieving control over the two natural resources involved, soil and water. The water obtained from building dams can be utilized by building shallow wells (16), seeping galleries and diversion dams (9) that channel part of the flow of water to agricultural land. In addition, the water in the high parts of the basin replenishes existing springs (10). Once water has been gathered, irrigation systems (11) are designed, as well as water storage systems that prevent its filtering and evaporating and make it available to distribute to the communities. The water can be transported to where it is used by earth-filled canals (12), unlined or lined with cement or stone. Nevertheless, the transportation of piped water (14) is the most efficient way to avoid both filtration and evaporation. Before laying the pipes, it is necessary to construct a tank (15) where the different particles in the water will settle to avoid clogging. For this work, operating costs can be cut by using alternative energy, like windmills (13) or manual pumps that will finally distribute the water to the population.

nized that the root of the problem did not lie only in obtaining water to satisfy different needs, but also in both ensuring that the extraction of water not deplete underground supplies and that access to it be fair to the different groups of society.

With this focus, the project has developed 508 hydraulic works in 98 communities in the region, benefitting between 77,000 and 134,000 inhabitants. Its activities have received significant support both from Mexican government agencies and private organizations and foundations, notably the Ford and Hilton Foundations. It has also designed, tested and perfected an applied research model that has turned out to be useful, new, original and very important.

Four Challenges for Science

For 20 years, Alternatives has worked —perhaps without knowing it— with four of the most important challenges facing contemporary science in solving rural poverty: the recognition of the ecological or biological region (bio-regionalism); participatory research; an interdisciplinary focus; and, finally, technological diversity. Both Alternatives' organizational structure and its research and technical team are a reflection of this four-sided theoretical and methodological thrust.

The Bio-regional Focus

The borders of a bio-region are not defined by political lines, but by the geographical limits of human communities and ecological systems. It contains biological communities, habitats and ecosystems that maintain ecological processes and the human settlements involved in the management, use and knowledge of its natural resources. All of this means that the way of life and interests of local communities, in addition to their surroundings, must be the starting points and the basic criteria for regional development and conservation.

Basing itself on a perspective that seeks to regenerate basins, Alternatives has managed to integrate a bio-regional focus. The main management unit are not locales, but basins, which are delimited thanks to the use of a geographic informational system generated by its personnel, with water as the crosscutting issue. Its research, social field work and development of works is based on this bio-regional unity.

Participatory Research

Alternatives' strategy has been to generate processes of self-development among the marginalized peasant families and communities that it deals with using field work and popular organization rooted in an essentially participatory methodology, giving basic support and training and organizing the peasant communities so they can solve the main problems themselves and maintain a self-organizing dynamic. This work is based on consultations, training and the transfer of technology.

To get people to perceive bio-regional unity, Alternatives fosters participatory research that leads to a micro-regional topological view and which favors collaboration among locales and families.

With this focus, the hydraulic works requested in each locale begin to be implemented. Different sectors are involved in carrying out this work, including the peasant communities themselves, nongovernmental organizations, educational institutions and certain government agencies.

Since the largest investment is in labor, carrying out the projects requires significant community participation; this means that the resources invested in construction create jobs for people in the communities and reduce migration.

With this methodology, also known as participatory natural resource management, the works proposed are based on the history of the region itself. Therefore, in addition to recuperating traditions, the work enriches them by applying new techniques and equipment to make them more efficient, with the advantage that it makes them more easily accepted. In practice, it is a process of recovering the collective memory of water management and use, something left out of the "normal" forms of doing science today, and one of its most serious limitations.

Fulvio Eccardi

Interdisciplinary Work

Since the mid-twentieth century a new focus that seeks to integrate the natural sciences with the social sciences and the humanities has grown and spread.

If the problem of water in the Mixteca were looked at as an isolated phenomenon, the final result would be reduced to simply building a few dams or drilling some deep wells, a matter restricted to geologists and engineers.

Courtesy of Alternativas y Procesos de Participación Social, A. C.

Access to water resources has made all the difference to the Mixteca region.

The focus used in these projects, however, considers the hydrological problem part of a bio-region (the basin) and takes into account the hydro-geological experience accumulated for centuries by the local cultures, thus demanding the integration of the different disciplines and the creation of multidisciplinary teams of professionals.

This convergence of knowledge around a concrete, specific problem generates, therefore, an important process of theoretical, methodological, conceptual and terminological exchanges among all the professionals and prompts the reformulation of many scientific principles and paradigms.

The efficacy of interdisciplinary practice depends on two processes: the inter-subjective communication among specialists brought together by a project and the organization of scientific and technical knowledge that each of the disciplines bring to the solution of the problem. Both these processes become a reality using the strategy adopted by Alternatives.

During the field work done in each locale and basin, the field workers or promoters act as liaison between the scientific knowledge being generated and the community, translating it and transmitting it to the local population and acting as spokespersons for the communities' proposals about the viability of the works proposed.

Technological Diversity

The final expression of the three processes described above takes on meaning in technological diversity; that is, in the implementation of a broad spectrum of designs to supply water to the communities (see box, p. 44). This leads to a redefinition of the very concept of technology, which ends up being framed in the historically determined cultural values of the communities and by the ecological conditions of the different regions (basins).

The technological system thus conceived is open to the combination of many options that stem from the ecological knowledge of the region with the aim of regenerating the basins, and the work with the community that recovers and places value on local water management knowledge. For this reason, the technological solutions adopted include pre-Hispanic, colonial and modern technologies, or a

Courtesy of Alternativas y Procesos de Participación Social, A. C.

"Academic science" could never have found such a variety of solutions to water scarcity.

mix of the three (creating hybrid technology).

Toward a Committed Science

Over the last decade, a hopeful proposal known as "sustainable development," a "sustainable society" or simply "sustainability" has taken on weight both in academic debate and in social movements.

Essentially, it is a proposal that seeks to regenerate or restore the natural and social framework so affected by the expansion of the industrial, materialist, technocratic, capitalist model of civilization that dominates today's world, a model increasingly in social and ecological crisis.

Without a doubt, the "Water Forever" project is part of this new current of sustainable development. First of all, it deals with the problems of a concrete region in an integral, holistic way, recognizing the regional situation in all its socio-ecological complexity. In the second place, it places the problem of water in the perspective that implies the restoration of the equilibrium of the regional ecosystems represented by the system of basins. That is, it makes restoration of nature a fundamental objective, the only way to maintain a constant, guaranteed flow of water. Finally, its central task is to seek social well-being for the communities involved (overcoming poverty) by encouraging local management of the water by reinforcing community and family self-organization, the revaluing of culture, their knowledge and memory and the affirmation of participatory democracy during decision making, all of which are actions that aspire to regenerating the community framework in the region.

Alternatives' experience shows that it is possible to successfully practice ecologically and socially committed science, and that more than complex theoretical discussions or big budgets, what is needed is a change of attitudes by those who practice it. All that is needed is for scientists to transcend the individualistic, neutral, mercantilist ethos that prevails today and adopt an attitude rooted in the consciousness that comes from the non-selfish identification with the world. This is what many thinkers have called an ethics of solidarity with others, of human dignity, of the survival of the planet and our species. VM

Notes

[1] This is an abbreviated version of the article by the same name published in the magazine *Ciencias* (Science) 60 (Mexico City), October-December 2001, pp. 33-39. This essay is the result of the authors' observations about the "Water Forever" project garnered during their participation in a research team coordinated by Víctor M. Toledo that evaluated it from November 2000 to January 2001.

CISAN

publications

El nuevo norteamericano: integración continental, cultura e identidad nacional

Lawrence Douglas Taylor

This book examines the implications of NAFTA and hemispheric integration for the cultural interaction among Canada, the United States and Mexico. It also ponders the demands and effects on these three countries whose future holds similar or greater challenges in the field of cultural unification.





Las relaciones de México con Estados Unidos y Canadá: una mirada al nuevo milenio.

Rosío Vargas Suárez, Remedios Gómez Arnau and Julián Castro Rea, compilers

This work seeks to answer some of the most frequently asked questions about the future of the three countries' relations by delving into both current and historical issues: trade integration, drug trafficking and migration, as well as other topics more recently included on the agenda like human rights, democracy and national security.

Desde el Sur. Visiones de Estados Unidos y Canadá desde América Latina a principios del siglo XXI, vol. 1.

Paz Consuelo Márquez Padilla, Germán Pérez Fernández del Castillo and Remedios Gómez Arnau, compilers

In this volume, Latin American specialists bring their own perspective to a broad spectrum of theoretical, political, social, economic and cultural issues in the United States, including federalism, foreign policy, national defense and security, the environment and the impact of globalization.





Los nuevos pobres de Estados Unidos: los hispanos

Elaine Levine

Since the 1980s, Hispanics in the United States, compared with other groups, have dropped back socio-economically in three overall areas: the labor market, the educational system and social security. This book looks at and analyzes this deterioration and its underlying causes.

For further information contact:
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Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Torre de Humanidades II, piso 9, Ciudad Universitaria, 04510,
México, D.F. Tel. 5623-0015; fax: 5623-0014; e-mail: cisan@servidor.unam.mx

CISAN publications

El color de la tierra. Las minorías en México y Estados Unidos

Barbara Driscoll de Alvarado and Paz Consuelo Márquez-Padilla, compilers.

This work looks at diversity from different perspectives: in particular, it deals with the construction of the Afro-American identity and the struggles of this group, the implementation of public policies in support of minority groups and the obstacles to their equal integration into all facets of life in Mexico and the U.S.



Límites sociopolíticos y fronteras culturales en América del Norte

Barbara A. Driscoll, Claire Joysmith, Elaine Levine, Antonio Rivera and Mónica Verea, compilers.

A multidisciplinary group of Mexican and foreign specialists study the growing presence of the Latino community in the economic, political, social and cultural life of the United States.

El nuevo federalismo en América del Norte

Paz Consuelo Márquez Padilla and Julián Castro Rea, compilers.

This book explores the origins, successes and contemporary dilemmas of the federal system in Mexico, Canada and the United States. In brief, the book looks at the factors that have an impact on federalism in North America today and recent trends in its transformation.





Los sistemas políticos de América del Norte en los noventa. Desafíos y convergencias

Julián Castro Rea, Robert J. Jackson and Gregory S. Mahler, compilers.

This book takes a comparative approach to the Mexican, U.S. and Canadian legal systems, constitutions, federalism, government institutions, domestic and foreign policies.

Forthcoming:

La globalización y sus manifestaciones en América del Norte.
Las políticas exteriores de Estados Unidos, Canadá y México en el umbral del siglo XXI.
Desde el sur. Visiones sobre Estados Unidos y Canadá desde América Latina, vols. 2 y 3.

September 11 Sparks A Long-Awaited Recession[1]

Elaine Levine*

Brad Rickerby/Reuters

Even before the September 11 terrorist attacks, the prognosis for economic growth in the United States was not very encouraging. A little more than a year ago, a few brave souls prophesied the end of economic cycles. But despite end-of-term statements by the Clinton administration about the health of what had been dubbed the U.S.'s "New Economy," by mid-2000 it was already showing signs of weakness and of the prospect of a recession before the end of 2001. The attack on two of the United States' most important symbols of its economic and military power was a death blow to the consumer confidence that had already begun to wane before the fatal events that devastated New York's World Trade Center, damaged the Pentagon and marked the end of the longest economic expansion that the country had ever seen. Now it will be practically impossible to distinguish between the long-awaited recessive trend and the negative impact that the attack inevitably had on the main macroeconomic indicators.

Precisely because we are dealing with such a long expansion —it began in the second quarter of 1991— some optimists thought it could last indefinitely, while pessimists predicted a slump at the turn of every corner. But, in gener-

* Researcher at CISAN.

al, one way or another the negative effects of the previous recession, which lasted for a very long time after the upturn in general economic growth, were overshadowed by the advances made in the second half of the 1990s. Despite the political and personal scandals in which former President Clinton was involved and his not infrequent defeats in Congress, his administration can take credit for certain important economic achievements: the drop in unemployment, low inflation rates, recovered productivity and the elimination of the fiscal deficit together with continual growth of the gross domestic product (GDP).

The Clinton administration attributed the favorable simultaneity of the low unemployment and inflation rates to the interaction of 1) recent innovations in computer and information technology and telecommunications, which in turn had a positive impact on many other sectors; 2) changes in the organization and functioning of corporations —in other words, flexibility, cutbacks and restructuring— and, naturally, 3) public policies that created a favorable climate for innovation and investment, particularly the fiscal discipline that turned the deficit into a surplus, thus stimulating the drop in interest rates that spurred and facilitated private investment.[2]

The Beginning of the End Of Expansion

Between 1996 and 1998 gross private investment registered significant growth unusual at that stage of a period of expansion. This increase in investment is associated with advances in the computer and information technology that seem to be related in turn to recent years' overall increase in productivity. Today, about 35 percent of companies' capital spending goes for information technology.[3] From the mid-1990s to mid-2000, productivity increased an average of 2.5 percent a year, its best performance in almost 30 years. Since then, it seems to have returned to its previous level of about 1.5 percent a year.

It remains to be seen which of these growth rates will prevail in the medium term. This depends in turn on the vigor and profundity of recent technological innovations. "If the current technological wave does represent a third Industrial Revolution, the upturn in productivity growth could last for a couple of decades or more."[4] Alan Greenspan, for example, is among those who consider, "We are only part way through a technological expansion."[5] In accordance with this opinion, it is to be supposed that the medium-term prospects for productivity growth, and therefore of the GDP, are good.

Despite his optimism about the future in the medium term, the head of the Federal Reserve had already lowered the discount rate six times between January 3 and September 11, 2001, in a rather unsuccessful attempt at countering immediate negative trends. In fact, Mr. Greenspan is considered one of the main architects of the extraordinary economic expansion that lasted more than 10 years. However, by September 2001, not even the prime rate, at its lowest since April 1994, could prop up ebbing industrial production, which in August registered its eleventh consecutive monthly decline, dropping 5 percent below its level at the same time of the previous year. Only 77 percent of capacity was being used, the lowest level since July 1983.[6]

When the labor market is tight and productive activity low, companies generally prefer to shorten the work day instead of laying off workers. Despite this, the unemployment rate rose from 3.9 percent in October 2000 to 4.9 percent in August 2001. Manufacturing was the hardest hit, with 1.1 million jobs lost between July 2000 and September 2001, a drop of 6.6 percent. These decreases coincide with dwindling investment in new facilities, equipment and technology in this sector. From August to September, a total of 199,000 jobs were eliminated, the greatest monthly number reported since February 1991 when there was a recession. In recent months, there were lay-offs not only in manufacturing, but also in the service sector which employs 80 percent of the work force. "Supermarkets, restaurants, clothing stores, movie theatres and temporary-help agencies all cut thousands of jobs in late August and early September."[7]

This means that precisely when the lowest income sectors of the pop-

Precisely when the lowest income sectors of the U.S. population began to feel some improvement for the first time in many years, the economic expansion, which was finally favoring them a little, stopped.

ulation began to feel some improvement for the first time in many years, the economic expansion, which was finally favoring them a little, stopped. The deceleration had repercussions on demand among low skilled workers and, from the end of last year when the unemployment rate began to rise, wage hikes for this group have been practically nil.[8] "Unless unemployment returns to the 4 percent level, those at the bottom may not see such good times again anytime soon."[9]

What Lasted the Longest Of the Expansion

The question inevitably arises: Why did low income groups begin to feel this great bonanza in the U.S. economy so late? It was only in 1996, after six years of uninterrupted growth, that the relative deterioration of the lowest income groups began to be pushed back. In terms of an equitable distribution of the fruits of economic growth, the 1990s compares favorably to the 1980s. But despite the high growth rates over most of the last 20 years, the comparison is less favorable vis-à-vis the advances of the more overall economic well-being achieved during the first three decades after World War II.

Undeniably, recent U.S. performance has been surprising and very favorable in terms of the main macroeconomic indicators. However, the levels of equality that existed some 30 years before have not been reestablished. In 1965, a CEO earned 20.3 times what an average worker earned, while in 1999, he earned 106.9 times more. It should be pointed out that U.S. CEOs earn about 2.5 times more than their counterparts in other countries.[10] On the other hand, although they have dropped gradually since 1993, general poverty indices and that of minor children are higher than those of any other industrialized country and are still above the historic U.S. low points of 1973.

The strong economic growth of the last two decades was accompanied by growing inequality in the distribution of family and household incomes. The slight recovery in wage levels during the second half of the 1990s is rather insignificant when compared with the growing accumulated profits during the unprecedented stock market bonanza.

> It is difficult to separate out the effects of the attacks and the previously existing negative trends in the U.S. economy. This unhappy coincidence makes it more difficult to predict the depth and duration of the downturn in economic activity.

Despite this, wages represent approximately three-fourths of total family income and even more for broad middle layers of the population. Therefore, wage inequality is the determining factor in the growing inequality in the distribution of income. This has been amply documented and debated in both government and nongovernmental publications.[11] At the same time, the most frequent explanations say that wage inequality is due to a growing demand for workers with high educational levels, the increase of women and immigrants in the work force, the absolute and relative increase in jobs in the service sector, the expansion of international trade, the drop in union membership and the decrease in the real value of the minimum wage, among other factors.[12]

In addition, the new practices and strategies associated with industrial restructuring in the last two decades have generated more job instability and insecurity for most workers, cutting back their negotiating power. The labor market has become increasingly segmented and stratified. The new job niches for immigrants that offer working conditions and wages unacceptable for most Americans grow at the same rate as the apparently inexhaustible supply of recent arrivals who are willing to take what for them is a much higher wage than they could earn in their countries of origin. Families of professionals, workers and skilled employees who responded to the vicissitudes of the 1970s and 1980s with the growing incorporation of women into the work force are dealing with the new demands of the market by working longer hours. They therefore demand more consumer goods and personal services provided by lesser skilled workers whose pay has dropped markedly in relative terms with regard to the rest of the population.

Despite high per capita income and the accelerated growth of GDP, the United States displays greater inequalities and fewer prospects for socioeconomic mobility than the other industrialized countries. The most prosperous households tend to have high-

er incomes while those with lower incomes tend to be worse off than their counterparts in other rich countries.[13] As has already been mentioned, there is more poverty in the United States, particularly among children under 18, than in any other highly industrialized country. In addition, these disadvantages are especially notable in the case of ethnic and racial minorities.

The New Course Of Bush's Budget

Since before the September terrorist attacks, a spirited debate was expected in the Congress about the federal budget. Generally speaking, the Republicans proposed more tax cuts and the Democrats wanted to use the surplus for social spending. But President Bush, at the same time that he wanted to limit the growth of annually funded programs to 4 percent, had promised a plan to pay for retirees' medications and reforms to the educational system. He had also requested an increase in the defense budget that implied the use of part of the payroll tax earmarked for social security, formerly considered untouchable.

The fact that these funds, now a surplus due to turn into a large deficit in a few years because of the increasing number of retirees, can be used for other ends as long as they last, might not have been permitted under other conditions. The decision to even break into this lockbox was criticized by some members of both parties, although the debate has been overwhelmed by the emergency.[14]

For his part, Alan Greenspan, among others, would have liked to use the federal surplus to reduce the U.S.$3.3 trillion national debt over the next 10 years. However, any plan to do so has been left on the drawing board for the moment. Before there was a budget surplus for the next fiscal year (previously projected at about U.S.$300 billion for the fiscal year of 2002 that began October 1), it in fact disappeared. The most optimistic projections are predicting a more or less balanced budget, but most members of Congress think that a deficit will be inevitable for 2002. Democrats on the House Budget Committee estimated that the federal spending budget of about U.S.$2 trillion will have a deficit of about U.S.$8 billion in the best-case scenario and that under the least favorable conditions could come to U.S.$70 billion.[15] Despite this, there is consensus that the additional spending will have to be significant. "Members of both parties said it was entirely appropriate for the government to run a deficit for a year or two under the circumstances. There are no higher priorities, they said, than national security and reestablishing economic growth."[16] There also seems to be agreement between both parties and between the executive and the legislative branch that the package approved must be short-term and sufficiently large to stimulate the economy, but without causing future fiscal problems.

Beyond that there is no agreement. In general terms the Democrats favor an increase in certain social spending and measures that would reinforce consumer purchasing power, particularly among low-income groups, while Republicans propose measures to support and create incentives for investors.

In any case, the bailout package cannot prevent the inevitable. Everything points to the recession as a reality. Given the conjunction of this long-awaited recession with the tragic events of September 11, it is difficult to separate out the effects of the attacks and the previously existing negative trends in the U.S. economy. This unhappy coincidence also makes it more difficult to predict the depth and duration of the downturn in economic activity. The Bush administration will be forced to implement an economic bailout and increase the federal budget to the point of deficit spending that it would have liked to avoid.

Regardless of the measures adopted to deal with the recession suddenly set off by the terrorist attacks, the most probable scenario is that, as always, the most seriously affected part of the population will be those with low incomes.

Economic policy in the last two decades has emphasized growth over equality. This new recession comes just when the lower socioeconomic layers of the population were beginning to be benefitted by so many years of economic boom. In times of crisis, they are always the hardest hit.

Regardless of the measures adopted to deal with the recession suddenly set off by the terrorist attack —thus thwarting any attempt at a "soft landing" for the economy— the most probable scenario is that, as always, the most seri-

ously affected part of the population will be those with low incomes and that the already enormous —and shameful— inequalities that exist in the world's richest country will grow. VM

NOTES

[1] A longer version of this article will be published in Spanish in a collection of papers presented at the colloquium "Globalidad y conflicto: Estados Unidos y la crisis de septiembre" (Globality and Conflict: The United States and the Crisis of September), held September 27 and 28 by the UNAM's Center for Research on North America, School of Political and Social Sciences and Institute for Legal Research.

[2] Council of Economic Advisers, Economic Report of the President 2001 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2001).

[3] Peter Coy, "The Real Economy, How Real Is It?" *BusinessWeek*, 27 August 2001, pp. 80-85.

[4] Darren Williams and Richard Reid of Schroeder Salomon Smith Barney in their new report, *Back to the Future*, quoted in Coy, op. cit., p. 84.

[5] Coy, op. cit., p. 85.

[6] Robert J. Samuelson, "Economic Shockwaves," *Newsweek*, 25 September 2001, p. 60; and Coy, op. cit., p. 83.

[7] David Leonhardt, "Job Cuts Increased Even Before Sept. 11," *The New York Times*, 6 October 2001, http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/06/business/06ECON.html

[8] Economic Policy Institute, quoted in Aaron Bernstein, "The Human Factor," *BusinessWeek*, 27 August 2001, p. 120.

[9] Bernstein, op. cit., p. 120.

[10] Lawrence Mishel, Jared Bernstein and John Schmitt, *The State of Working America 2000-2001* (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), p. 113.

[11] See, for example, *The Economic Report of the President 1997* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1997), chapter 5; and Lawrence Mishel and Jared Bernstein, "Income Deterioration and Inequality in the United States" and "America's Continuing Wage Problems: Deteriorating Real Wages for Most and Growing Inequality," *Beware the U.S. Model* (Washington, D.C.: The Economic Policy Institute, 1995), pp. 101-196.

[12] Ibid.

[13] Mishel, Bernstein and Schmitt, op. cit., Chapter 7.

[14] Glen Kessler and Juliet Eilperin, "Deal Reached on 8% Spending Boost," *The Washington Post*, 3 October 2001, p. A1.

[15] Richard W. Stevenson, "Budget Surplus Is Expected to Turn into Deficits," *The New York Times*, wysingw://65http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/01/politics/01BUDG.html

[16] Ibid.

The U.S. Recession And the Global Crisis

Arturo Guillén*

Peter Morgan/Reuters

The End of Uninterrupted Expansion

Economic recession hit the United States together with anthrax and quickly spread to the rest of the world, threatening to turn into a global crisis of huge proportions. The destabilizing effect of the September 11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington and their impact on the economy and levels of confidence reinforced recessionary trends that had been incubating for months beforehand. The "new economy," the name given to the technological transformations associated with telecommunications, computer sciences and the Internet which would supposedly ensure the uninterrupted expansion of the economy, employment and income, turned out to be —as has always happened with long periods of expansion in capitalism— a new ideology that attempted to mask the growing contradictions of the system in the era of financial globalization.[1] Equally unfounded was the thesis held by the U.S. Federal Reserve (commonly called "the Fed") that prudent handling of monetary policy would allow a soft landing of the economy and avert a recession.

The deceleration of the U.S. economy began in the third quarter of 2000 when GDP growth dropped abruptly from an annualized 7 percent in the second quarter to 2.7 percent in the third. Production weakened sharply in the last quarter of 2000, continuing in the same range during the first two quarters of 2001 (see graph 1). In the third quarter, it contracted by 0.4 percent, a figure that does not yet include the impact of the terrorist attacks.

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Graph 1
U.S. GDP Growth (2000-3rd. quarter of 2001)



Source: www.bea.doc.gov.

The warning that the boom was coming to an end came from Wall Street when the Dow Jones Index stagnated in mid-1999 (see graph 2). During the Asian crisis, the New York Stock Exchange had registered a spectacular rise when it became the refuge from the instability of emerging markets. A similar phenomenon occurred in the European stock markets, whose indices rose like soap bubbles. Between July 1997, when the Asian crisis began, and August 2000 when the Dow Jones reached its zenith, the Dow Jones increased 36.3 percent, going from 8,523 to 11,215 points. The NASDAQ index, for its part, fed by the myth of the unlimited growth of the "new economy," soared from 1,594 points to 4,573 points from July 1997 to March 2000, an amazing 186 percent.

Stock market speculation was bolstered in this period by Fed monetary policy which, despite its concern over the eventual return of inflationary pressures and the "irrational exuberance of financial markets," began to be less restrictive, lowering interest rates to avert a systemic crisis of the international financial system due to the impact of the Asian crisis.

In April 2000 the NASDAQ began a free fall after reports of drops in dividends from stocks in the "new economy" sector. Although in August of last year it made a slight recovery, since then it has not been able to revert its nosedive. Between March 2000 and November 1, 2001, it has plummeted spectacularly, dropping 62.9 percent from 4,573 points to 1,696. The technological market has not exactly suffered a crack —a drop of more than 10 percent in a single day— but rather a persistent decrease over a period of more than a year and a half. Although the Dow Jones has not yet registered a similar drop —since to a certain extent it has been the refuge for repositioning investors' portfolios after they shed high-tech stocks— it has fallen 16.6 percent, from 11,215 points to 9,348 points from August 2000 to November 1, 2001.

As the deceleration continued and spread to other countries, the stock markets of other developed and emerging economies were significantly weakened, not to mention the Tokyo stock exchange, which, in the framework of the stagnation and deflation that Japan's economy has faced since the 1990s, is now at its lowest level since 1984.

The simple magnitude of the plunge in technological stocks would be a sufficient indicator to infer that behind the deceleration there were important structural problems. Just as the speculative boom was due to the increase in profit margins, the deceleration of production and the change in the trends in the stock markets coincided with a significant reduction in profits particularly in the companies of the "new economy."[2] The drop in profit margins caused an adjustment in corporate investment programs, starting with the high-tech firms. Capital spending diminished abruptly, thus changing expectations and causing the collapse of NASDAQ. To eliminate surplus inventory, the corporations are going to have to reduce their capital spending by approximately 16 percent between 2001 and 2002.

The deceleration, then, was caused by a drop in effective profits and, above all, in expected profits, in a context of uncertainty created by the stock market plunge and the abrupt drop in investments. The "new economy" turned out to be just as dynamic in contraction as it had been before, in expansion. In a context of uncertainty, companies of both the "new" and the "old" economy reduced capital spending and postponed plans to increase plant size —including their computer science

platform— with the same intensity that they had tended to increase them during the upturn. The new economy turned out to be markedly cyclical: that is, it grows faster than the economy as a whole during upturns, but more slowly during downturns. To remain competitive in a tight market, the corporations have increased their programs for cutting back on personnel; more than one million workers are expected to be laid off in 2001.

Until the second quarter of 2001, private consumption, which represents two-thirds of total spending in the U.S. economy, looked solid, holding back the recession. However, symptoms of weakness began to show during the third quarter, with lower growth in retail sales in important sectors like the automotive industry. Even before the attacks on the Twin Towers, it was predictable that private consumption would contract for two reasons:

1. The so-called "wealth effect" on consumption, that is a drop in the demand for consumer goods derived from a depreciation in financial assets that consumers were increasingly involved with; and
2. The impact of growing unemployment on the aggregate demand, as a result of the deceleration itself and lay-offs. Total lay-offs since the beginning of the deceleration come to one million workers, a figure close to the 1.2 million jobs lost during the 1990-1991 recession and not very far from the two million registered during the 1974-1975 and 1980-1982 recessions. Of more concern is that 43 percent of workers laid off are white collar employees, a great many of whom were management and whose consumption levels and indebtedness are higher than those of average workers.[3]

Graph 2
Performance of the Dow Jones and NASDAQ



Source: www.marketdata.nasdaq.com.

A few days before the attacks, the consumer confidence index dropped to its lowest point since 1993. With the attacks, uncertainty overtook Americans. Consumer spending plummeted 1.8 percent in September, its greatest drop in 40 years. In that framework, consumers will tend to curtail spending, pushing the economy more clearly toward recession.

In recent years the Fed has applied a contradictory monetary policy. When the Asian crisis broke out, it applied a policy that mixed its domestic responsibilities with its growing but unrecognized role of world banker. It relaxed its monetary policy and lowered interest rates to promote liquidity in the international financial system and avert a systemic crisis. This policy, by the way, increased stock market speculation in the central countries and encouraged consumer and corporate indebtedness.

At the end of the Asian crisis, the Fed began to apply a restrictive monetary policy to deal with a phantom of inflation that nobody could see and more than anything worried by stock market speculation.[4] Despite the fact that a relaxation in monetary policy has checked a sharper drop in the stock market and injected liquidity into the financial system, the Fed has been incapable of reverting the recessive trends in the economy until now. The Bush administration's tax-cut program has shared the same fate. In addition, the cuts approved for the current year are quite modest, representing only 0.4 percent of GDP.

The Causes of the Recession

For U.S. officials, the economic slowdown was merely an adjustment pro-

Table 1. Real GDP Growth (%)

Country	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001e	2002e
World total	4.2	2.5	3.4	4.8	1.3	1.6
Country	2.9	2.2	3.2	4.1	0.9	1.1
Developed Countries						
European Union			2.6	3.4	1.8	
United States	3.9	3.9	4.2	5.0	1.3	
Germany	1.8	2.3	1.6	3.0	0.8	
Japan	-2.8	1.0	0.2	1.7	-0.5	
France	2.3	3.2	2.9	3.2	2.0	
United Kingdom	3.5	2.2	2.1	3.0	2.0	
Italy		1.5	1.4	2.9	1.8	
Turkey					-3.0	
Canada		3.3	4.5	4.7	2.0	
Developing Countries		3.5	3.8	5.8	2.9	1.1
Asia	6.6	4.1	5.9	6.7	5.1	
Thailand	-1.3	-9.4	4.2	5.0	2.0	
Indonesia	4.7	-13.7	0.8	4.8	3.0	
South Korea	5.0	-5.9	10.7	8.8	2.5	
Malaysia	7.7	-6.7	5.8	8.5	1.0	
China	8.8	7.8	7.1	8.0	7.5	
Taiwan	6.8	4.9	5.4	6.0	-1.0	
Hong Kong	5.3	-5.1	3.1	10.5	0.6	
India	5.5	5.8	6.6	6.4	4.5	
Pakistan		2.6	4.3	5.1	3.9	
Phillippines	5.2	-0.5	3.3	3.9	2.5	
Singapore	9.0	0.3	5.9	9.9	-3.0	
Australia			4.7	3.7	2.3	
New Zealand			3.9	3.5	1.8	
Russia	0.9	-4.6	3.2	7.5	4.0	
Latin America	5.3	2.2	0.2	4.1	1.7	
Brazil	3.7	0.1	0.8	4.2	2.2	
Chile	7.6	3.4	-1.1	5.4	4.0	
Argentina	8.1	3.9	-3.4	-0.5	-1.4	
Venezuela	5.9	-0.7	-7.2	3.2	3.3	
Mexico	7.0	4.6	3.5	6.9	0.0	
Colombia	2.8	0.6	-4.3	2.8	2.1	
Ecuador	3.5	0.4	-7.3	2.3	4.0	
Peru		0.3	1.4	3.6	0.5	
Uruguay		4.6	-3.2	-1.0	1.0	

Source: IMF, World Bank and other sources.
e: estimate.

cess, a pause to correct some imbalances created during the long period of expansion, particularly the accumulation of excess inventory of consumer and capital goods.[5]

In contrast with this optimistic view, I think the recession expresses profound contradictions arising out of the long expansionist phase. The recession was caused by a drop in corporate profit margins, particularly among those firms that operate in the "new economy." This drop is linked to the kind of production techniques used in this new wave of technological transformations. There is growing evidence that it favored the use of capital-deepening or capital-absorbing techniques. If, as occurred during the previous expansion, the capital stock grew at a faster rate than the work force and productivity, then the production process becomes more and more a capital intensive process, thus lowering the rate of profit.[6]

The new economy rests on the growth of capital spending, driven by permanent technological transformation, although this increase in the density of capital is not accompanied by a proportional increase in the efficiency of the productive sector (whether industrial or primary). This is because, as I pointed out in another article, the use of new technologies is concentrated in the tertiary sector (trade, banking, finances, services); that is, the increase

in productivity is restricted to non-productive sectors that do not enter into workers' consumption.[7]

When the rate of profit drops and expected profits decline because of uncertainty, the process of autonomous investment in the branches that led the expansion stops, just as is happening. This means that at the end of the cycle of expansion, just when investment should continue growing in both absolute and relative terms to be able to absorb growing savings, it contracts because of a decline in expected profits. Induced investments —that is, all those that depend on a growth in income— also contract. Under these conditions, a considerable part of savings is not absorbed by an increase in the aggregate demand, which means that the process of expansion increasingly weakens and a recession starts.

The drop in expected earnings would not be of such concern if it were not associated with a fragile financial framework, but it is. The upturn was associated with a sharp process of liberalization, deregulation and financial globalization; a stock market frenzy comparable only to the one that preceded the Great Depression of the 1930s; accelerated consumer and corporate indebtedness to banks and non-bank banks; the diversification of financial products, particularly the derivative market and other high-risk instruments.

With the deceleration in production and the plunge of the NASDAQ, this complex financial superstructure that commands the capital accumulation process became fragile. With the recession in full flower, the possibilities of a financial crisis multiply. The weak chains of the pyramid of indebtedness are:

- consumers;
- corporations, mainly in the high-tech sector;
- non-banking financial intermediaries.

Consumers got into debt because they believed that the stock market would continue its upward spiral and that their real wages would increase. However, as the market began to weaken, consumers saw their incomes drop and increased their debt to keep up with their payments. As a recent UNCTAD report recognizes, "If families and the business sector simultaneously limited their spending to the current income, there could be a considerable drop in GDP."[8]

Corporations of the new economy and many of the old economy are facing serious financial problems. Venture capital operations and initial public offerings that were important sources of financing for technological firms during the boom have dropped to practically nothing. As a result, these companies face grave difficulties in refinancing their debt in bonds and commercial paper. The banks are restricting and increasing the selectiveness of their loans, which affects not only corporations but also non-banking financial intermediaries who substantially increased their indebtedness to the banks based on the unrelenting rise in the stock market. But now that the roulette wheel has stopped, the mechanism itself is brought into question. The drop in short-term interest rates has facilitated refinancing, but does not solve the problems of excessive leveraging by consumers, corporations and financial organizations. The spread between short-term and long-term interest rates has increased significantly, which means that general financial conditions are very restrictive despite the relaxation in Fed monetary policy.

Given these problems, different analysts have drawn a parallel between the current situation in the United States and that of Japan, whose financial bubble broke in the early 1990s. And, although there are still differences with Japan, the dangers of a financial crisis with a deflationary aftermath for the entire world are a real threat.

Global Crisis, A Real Threat

As mentioned above, the U.S. economic recession is determined by a drop in effective and expected profit margins in a context of uncertainty provoked by the stock market plunge and a drop in investment. The drop in expected profits is associated with fragile financial surroundings, characterized by stock market speculation; sharp increases in household, corporate and financial institution indebtedness; and a proliferation of financial derivatives and other high-risk instruments.

The terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon strengthened the recessive tendencies in the U.S. economy, which were already operating before September 11, and broaden out the probability that the U.S. ultra-right, the main beneficiary of the terrorist actions, will try to impose a military solution on the crisis and management of the world's problems.

The weakness of the U.S. economy has increased the risks of a global crisis. In the last three decades, the neoliberal financial globalization has internationalized the circuits of capital, but at the cost of intensifying, generalizing and synchronizing crises.

Friedrich Engels' 1894 observation about the internationalization of the economy at the end of the nineteenth century is pertinent here:

> The colossal expansion of the means of transportation —ocean-going steamships, railroads, telegraphs, the Suez Canal— have really established a world market....Given all this, most of the old focuses of crisis and occasions for creating a crisis have been eliminated or immensely weakened....In this way, each of the elements that tends to counter the repetition of the old kinds of crisis contain the germ of a much more formidable future crisis.[9]

It is estimated that world GDP growth will diminish drastically this year, plummeting from 4.8 percent in 2000 to 1.3 percent in 2001, a drop of 3.5 percentage points, a much higher loss than the two points of growth in output lost during the Asian crisis (see table 1). Japan's economy is increasingly caught in deflation with no sign of a road to recovery. With a real interest rate of zero, a very large bank overdue loan portfolio and a fiscal policy unable to reactivate growth, Japan is sliding into a new recession. Meanwhile, Europe and particularly its driving force, Germany, that also seems to be entering into a recessive phase, has significantly lowered its growth rates, just when it must face uncertainty deriving from the introduction of the Euro and the disappearance of national currencies.

The prospects for the economies of the periphery are somber. Institutions like the Interamerican Development Bank are now talking about the possibility of a new "lost decade" for development, similar to the 1980s. The flow of private capital toward the emerging economies has practically stopped. The recovery of the Southeast Asian economies has been stymied by the U.S. recession. The economies most integrated into the United States (Singapore, Taiwan, Canada, Mexico) have entered into recession. Several of the so-called emerging economies (Argentina, Brazil and Turkey) are performing on the edge of financial crisis and bankruptcy. Argentina is falling apart economically and politically. It is a dying patient, declared terminal some time ago, that wants to expire tightening the noose of the Currency Board (the monetary system tied to incoming hard currency) that oppresses it and depending on charity from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and foreign financial capital. Brazil, although in a more comfortable position due, among other things, to its having maintained greater monetary autonomy, accompanies its neighbor and partner in decline. And even Mexico, once again the star pupil of the IMF and Washington, is taking advantage of its "less bad" situation to attract capital from abroad, but creating the conditions for a future financial and exchange rate crisis with an overvalued peso and the recession. Like in Argentina, its loyalty to neoliberalism threatens to hinder the democratic transition.

The global crisis is not the end of the world because sooner or later recovery will bring a higher concentration and centralization of capital, but it may have a devastating effect on the economies of the world and on the millions of poor and wretched who have sprung up like mushrooms thanks to neoliberal globalization. The precarious world peace of the unipolar era is also seriously at risk. The fight against terrorism is tearing at the flesh of globalization itself and trade and financial flows, inhibited by the search for greater security inside the borders of each nation. The U.S. military budget is rising to the levels of the Cold War and war is bleeding Afghanistan while areas of conflict like the Middle East, Kashmir and others are becoming a powder keg. VM

NOTES

[1] About the economic reach and effect of the technological revolution associated with the "new economy," see my "La nueva economía y la recesión estadounidense," in issue 7 of *Trayectorias*, the social sciences magazine of the Autonomous University of Nuevo León, currently at press.

[2] In the second quarter of 2001, profits among the companies on the Standard and Poors stock index registered a drop of 17.3 percent.

[3] Stephen Roach, "Global Economy: No Breathing Room," Global Economic Forum, New York, Morgan Stanley, 10 September 2001.

[4] In May 2000, it decided a half point increase in the federal funds rate. The rest of that year, the Fed remained on the alert and applied a neutral policy despite the multiplication of signs of weakness in the economy. On January 3, given the plunge in the NASDAQ, it decided to change its policy and suddenly lower interest rates a half a point. Since that time, it has lowered the federal funds rate another four points to its current 2 percent. [On Dec. 10 the Fed lowered the benchmark rate dropped to 1.75 percent. Editor's Note.]

[5] Alan Greenspan, *Federal Reserve Board's Semiannual Monetary Policy Report to the Congress* (Washington, D.C., The Federal Reserve Board, 2001), p. 7.

[6] In a study published in 2000, Stephen Oliner and Daniel Sichel concluded that almost half the growth in productivity in the previous decade was due to the use of capital intensive techniques, which meant that a decline in the investment in computer technology would have serious implications for the future growth of productivity. See "What's left?", *The Economist*, 10 May 2001.

[7] Arturo Guillén, op. cit.

[8] UNCTAD, *Informe sobre el comercio y el desarrollo* (New York: United Nations, 2001), p. 3.

[9] Friedrich Engels, in Karl Marx, *El capital*, book III, vol. 7 (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1977), p. 630.

Some Economic Repercussions Of September 11

Pablo Ruiz Nápoles*

Ray Stubblebine/Reuters

The September 11 attacks have had important economic and political effects on the entire world, beginning, of course, with the United States itself. Only a few days after the attacks, the UNAM Center for Research on North America organized a colloquium bringing together specialists from several institutions to analyze the situation and the social and political outlook for the United States from different points of view. This article was originally written for that colloquium to contribute to the analysis of the economic consequences of the attack, based on my profession and specialty (international economics) and on my having been an eyewitness to the New York events. Being there was not of enormous use, however, because, like many others on that day on the streets of Lower Manhattan, I could not immediately grasp the real magnitude of the damage nor the transcendence of what had happened; and an objective "reading" of what was going on was impossible. Therefore, the analysis and predictions that I have been able to present *a posteriori* is not based on that personal experience.

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Economic Repercussions

Although the attack was mainly symbolic (its objectives were the most important icons of U.S. economic, political and military power), it was undoubtedly the greatest damage ever caused by terrorists in terms of the loss of both human life and property.

Among the immediate repercussions were the virtual bankruptcy of the two airlines involved, which meant the lay-off of 100,000 employees; and the plunge in both domestic and international tourism, with the corresponding effects on other airlines and the hotel and entertainment industries, particularly in New York. In the rest of the country there has been a clear drop in the use of commercial aviation out of the fear of further attacks. With this, several other airlines have encountered difficulties and have had to slash ticket prices, in some cases up to 80 percent.

Another more general repercussion has been the sharpening of the crisis in the U.S. economy because of the stock market decline. Stock market losses have been large and this has negative effects on the whole economy. It has meant a greater decrease than expected in production growth and economic activity in general for this year and will make for difficulties in activating the economy next year.

U.S. gross domestic product (GDP), which had grown 4.1 percent annually in recent years including 2000, only grew 1.3 percent in the first quarter and 0.3 percent in the second quarter. A negative growth rate is expected for the third quarter and the rest of this year. As a result, the U.S. economy could not grow at all or even report a negative growth rate for 2001 as a whole. This will have important consequences in other economies like Mexico's, tightly bound to the U.S. economy, but also in those of many other countries.

As a domestic expression of the heightened crisis, probably unemployment will rise, fiscal revenues will drop and the foreign deficit will increase, although inflation will most likely not be higher than predicted. In fact, the first impact was seen in the wave of lay-offs in sectors related mainly to air transportation and tourism. Tourism, so important to the United States, is among the hardest hit sectors. Both because of the drop in economic activity and fear among the population stemming from the attacks, the volume of domestic tourism and Americans traveling abroad has decreased significantly.

For the same reasons, income from tourism services abroad has also dropped significantly. This will be noted in the U.S. trade and services balance of payments, which had been positive in recent years, particularly in the tertiary sector. The trade deficit for goods is important and growing; even before the attacks, slower economic activity had caused a drop in the import of goods. This has meant that exporting countries with strong ties to the U.S. economy, like Mexico, have also suffered a drop in their economic activity and therefore demand fewer products of U.S. origin. The decline in trade was already being felt in the first quarter, but it sharpened after the attacks. For all these reasons, very probably the foreign trade balance will be negative for the year 2001 as a whole.

Recovery Policies

Apparently contrary to the dictates of free market policy, the U.S. government, the undoubted leader in globalization, immediately increased federal spending to deal with the effects of the attacks. Its first measure was a U.S.$15 billion federal subsidy to United Airlines and American Airlines to stave off bankruptcy. Another important measure was a U.S.$20 billion increase in federal subsidies to New York City. Federal military spending also climbed U.S.$40 billion, in addition to different kinds and amounts of spending on other items.

Increased military spending may stimulate demand in some specific branches of industry like arms and security-related electronic equipment production, but it has little general impact on the rest of the economy. The total additional sums spent come to less than one percent of GDP.

Another policy already being applied, though not very successfully, before the attacks was a reduction in interest rates. The Federal Reserve announced a few days after the attack that it was going to significantly lower the benchmark rate an additional two and a half points;[1] they hope this will be a greater stimulus to reactivating the economy than increased spending. The central idea is that when there is an inverse relationship between the interest rate and productive investment, a decrease in the former will stimulate an increase in the latter.

Additional measures to stimulate spending include a probable tax cut. Other economic policies such as greater restrictions on imports, especially from countries not recognized as friends during this stage of the conflict, are also to be expected.

Nevertheless, the most important damage has been to confidence. Just at the end of one of the United States'

greatest periods of bonanza, a time of undoubted foreign policy successes, when the American way of life seemed to be the model for the world to follow, at the beginning of the year, signs of economic crisis appeared that were gravely accentuated by the effects of the terrorist attacks, with the loss of the public's trust in its institutions, given the insecurity people feel because they now realize their own vulnerability. It is not a matter of the specific damage done —which was very great and very painful— but of the loss of security and the feeling of invulnerability.

This makes for a political response to an economic crisis, a response that includes watching the borders more closely and restricting access, reducing imports for political reasons and, in general, closing what had already been a fairly closed economy (goods exports come to less than 10 percent of GDP). This makes it possible to predict that if there is a recovery by the second half of next year, as has been predicted, it will be based mainly on the domestic market if Americans can be brought to trust their institutions and particularly their economy again.

However, this will not be easy because investment and spending have not reacted favorably since the beginning of the year to reactivation policies via interest rates, and there is nothing to make us suppose that the situation has changed. The crisis may force economic policy makers to adopt more decided measures to stimulate the domestic market and avoid more lay-offs.

On a visit I made to New York's Twin Towers in the late 1970s, in the windows next to the souvenir shop on the top floor, I saw a picture of Keynes with a caption that read something like, "To the memory of John Maynard Keynes, the man who saved capitalism."

There is no doubt that it was the policies inspired in Keynes' work that made the recovery of the U.S. economy possible in the 1930s, when it was buried in the greatest crisis of its history. And with it, many other economies also came out of their depressions. It would be a good thing for the U.S. economy and others like our own if the memory of Keynes has not been lost with the Twin Towers. If it has been, there is something more, something very valuable, to be mourned, and recovery seems much more difficult without it. VM

Notes

[1] The prime rate has dropped several times since then; at the close of this edition it was at 1.75%. [Editor's Note.]

The Geopolitics of Oil and Gas After September 11
The Case of Mexico

Rosío Vargas*

Despite oil prices being under U.S.$20 per barrel due to the world economic recession that has made demand drop, in the United States people think they are more vulnerable than during the Gulf War when prices soared as high as U.S.$40 a barrel. An important factor in this perception is surplus production capacity hovering at only 2.5 million barrels a day while in 1991 it was 5 million.[1] Analysts also think that both Saudi Arabia and other Mid-East producers could deteriorate into processes of destabilization as a result of U.S. military intervention, given the rise of Islamic fundamentalism promoting a "Holy War." After September 11 it was clear that the risk of destabilization in the Middle East is high, at least in the foreseeable future.

While for industrialized nations hydrocarbons are only one of the strategic factors in the Middle East, they are the requisite —although not sufficient— element needed to explain both the region's importance and its conflicts. The United States depends on the Organization of Oil Producing Countries (OPEC), which provides 51 percent of all its oil imports. Another factor making the Middle East pivotal is the level of its hydrocarbon reserves and its current and future supply of cheap crude oil to the West. The strategic nature of hydrocarbons has made it necessary for U.S. foreign policy to strengthen and prolong its control over the region's resources. Until 1989, that control was exercised in the framework of the Cold War and the confrontation with the former Soviet Union. Different U.S. administrations have considered the Persian Gulf, and in particular oil, key considerations to their national security. This is clear in the Carter Doctrine (1980), outlined after the Iranian revolution, which said that any attempt by any external force to achieve control over the Persian Gulf region would be considered an attack against the vital interests of the United States and responded to via any necessary means, including military force. Former Presidents George Bush and William Clinton based themselves on this doctrine to, respectively, launch Desert Storm in 1991 and expand U.S. military presence in the gulf for eight years.[2] This is understandable when we take into account that 65 percent of the world's oil reserves are located in this region.

The Middle East is second only to the former Soviet Union in its natural gas resources, with a total of 33 percent of the world's supply. A recent Energy Department report even says that Afghanistan has important reserves of natural gas and some oil and coal.[3] The bombings in Afghanistan has brought this information to light, but it is not found in books or specialized publications.

The region is also crisscrossed by oil and gas pipelines which supply Europe to the west and Japan to the east and they are expected to play an important role in supplying the great Chinese market. This same Energy Department report points to the importance that Afghanistan would acquire both because of the potential of its own resources and, above all, because of its geographical location on the transportation route for oil and natural gas exports from Central Asia to the Arabian Sea. The country's very location may constitute a threat to the stability of neighboring countries.

The importance of Central Asia's gas resources lies in the fact that Turkmenistan is third on the list of the world's gas reserves and both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have oil fields.[4]

Not only the solidarity and alignment of Russia since the September 11 attacks, but also its willingness to supply more oil to its former enemy, the United States, if it needs it have both been surprising. Given the sig-

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nificant increase in its oil production this year (7 million barrels a day), Russia considers that it could help reduce the risk for the United States and Western Europe if Middle Eastern shipments were cut off. Russian oil is considered a standby reserve.[5]

The current importance of the Middle East will increase in the future due to the magnitude of its oil reserves vis-à-vis those located in other parts of the world and the fact that the U.S. economy's oil supply will come mainly from the Persian Gulf. By the middle of the twenty-first century, there will not yet be a fuel that can replace oil, particularly for transportation. The future scenario will depend on the strategic moves and alliances that are now being prepared in the Middle East. Given the United States' oil situation, it cannot allow its control over the region to be challenged.

Because of this, even before the September 11 attacks, President Bush made it clear in his Energy Plan that he was interested in diversifying future sources of supply to include producers in the region: Canada, Mexico and Venezuela.[6]

Of these three countries, Canada is the leader in the U.S. market, supplying 15.2 percent of total oil imports and 97 percent of natural gas imports. The U.S. government considers that these supplies are safe because Canadian and U.S. energy sector business interests converge.

While Venezuela is one of the United States' most important oil suppliers (in third place), the general perception is that "the future of Venezuela is a bit uncertain because of the uncertainty regarding President Chávez."[7] The specialized press thinks that Venezuela is purposely allowing its capa-

GRAPH 1. PROVEN RESERVES OF CRUDE OIL (end of 2000) (%)



Source: BP, *Global Statistical Review of World Energy,* British Petroleum, June 2001.

GRAPH 2. PROVEN RESERVES OF NATURAL GAS (end of 2000) (%)



Source: BP, *Global Statistical Review of World Energy,* British Petroleum, June 2001.

Existing and Potential Oil and Gas Export Routes From the Caspian Basin

www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/caspfull.html

city to produce crude to seriously decline at the same time that it is offending private capital, mainly foreign companies, because of Venezuela's alignment with OPEC, which affects its national production strategy.[8]

Mexico, like Canada, is a central part of U.S. energy security, and it will seek to develop a policy with both countries that includes an increase in oil, gas and electricity production.

While its neighbor to the north perceives Mexico as a secure, trustworthy supplier, and there seem to be signs of progress regarding the opening of the energy sector, the U.S. also thinks the changes are slow. That is why it has suggested giving its support to finance projects that the Fox administration has not been able to develop because of lack of funds.[9]

What exactly does the United States want from Mexico for President Bush's current strategy?

1) A trade and investment opening, with Mexico liberalizing the activities of the energy chains in the broadest possible way in the shortest time possible.
2) Guaranteed supply, if possible in the way Canada has committed its oil production, granting national treatment in times of energy scarcity.
3) Lining up with U.S. oil diplomacy vis-à-vis OPEC producers.

Mexico's official position on U.S. requirements shows a spirit of ample collaboration. First, we see energy matters included on the overall bilateral agenda in exchange for Mexican demands on migration.

There is also clear evidence of Mexico's willingness to cooperate in upstream activities (exploration and pumping) to overcome U.S. energy difficulties both in structural and momentary terms; this situates Mexico with a main role in the medium term for U.S. energy security.

In accordance with the demands of domestic and foreign business sectors, the official strategy is to open up exploration and exploitation of natural gas not associated with oil production in the Burgos and Sabinas basins (in the states of Tamaulipas and Nuevo León) to private investment. At the same time, policy guidelines point to a substantial increase in the volume of oil production to 4 million barrels a day in the next five years.[10] These objectives will be achieved by using a new legal category, multiple-service contracts, in exploration and development both for oil and natural gas and not the risk contracts (in which payment may be made in kind, in crude oil) prohibited by the Constitution. Seemingly, multiple-service contracts are an alternative to risk contracts.[11] Private companies, then, will carry out similar activities to those stipulated in risk contracts without their having to be approved by Congress.

While U.S. strategy in the Middle East seeks to guarantee it and its allies



access to oil resources, in Mexico, it is creating the basis for opening up areas previously prohibited by the Constitution and not negotiated in NAFTA in order for foreign oil companies to have access to oil profits and broaden out gas and oil supply to the United States. The problem for the future will be the increasing difficulties in satisfying the demand of a market like that of the U.S. which consumes 20 million barrels a day. Conflicts over natural resources loom large in the future. VM

NOTES

[1] Anna Raff, et al., "What to Do About Oil?" *BusinessWeek*, 29 October 2001, p. 40.

[2] Michel Klare, "Preguntándose por qué," *La Jornada* (Mexico City), 22 September 2001.

[3] "Afganistán tiene sustantivas reservas de gas natural y recursos petroleros: EU," *La Jornada* (Mexico City), 3 October 2001.

[4] According to the most recent British Petroleum Report, the former Soviet Union as a whole has 37.8 percent of the world's gas reserves and only 6.4 percent of the world's oil reserves. Therefore its importance lies more in the former than in the latter.

[5] "Russia: How Much of a Reserve Tank?" *BusinessWeek*, 29 October 2001, p. 42.

[6] National Energy Policy Development Group, The White House, "National Energy Policy. Reliable, Affordable and Environmentally Sound for America's Future" (Washington D.C.), May 2001.

[7] Guy Caruso, "The Geopolitics of Energy into the 21st Century," Congressional Testimony (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 21 March 2001), p. 7.

[8] "The capacity drop results from a natural depletion of oil fields averaging about 10 percent and hitting 25 percent in some cases —a cutback in production to meet an OPEC quota of 2.72 million barrels per day, and most importantly, the strategy of the one-year-old government of Hugo Chávez to curtail production in favor of high oil prices." Today the companies are unhappy about the decreasing prospects for exploration, climbing costs, uncertainty about the current political climate and strangled confidence in the financial community. *Petroleum Intelligence Weekly*, 31 January 2000, p. 2.

[9] "Reacomodo de productores de petróleo en el mercado mundial. México, Venezuela y Canadá aumentarán sus ventas a EU: George Baker," *El Financiero* (Mexico City), 20 September 2001.

[10] Information about production levels is a bit confused since some sources put future production at 4 million barrels a day while others say it will increase by that amount. See Pemex Director Raúl Muñoz Leos' testimony before Mexico's Congress on September 24, 2001. "En *stand-by* proyectos petroleros," *El Financiero* (Mexico City), 5 October 2001.

[11] Comisión Binacional, "New Horizons in US-Mexico Relations. Recommendations for Policymakers. A Report of the US-Mexico Binational Council," September 2001.

Nationalism and Identities In Quebec and Canada

Claude Couture*

Tourisme Québec

"If we accept the definition of modernity that makes it a multidimensional reality, Quebec is, like its neighbors, a modern society."

Perhaps it is the effect of multiple controversies, but the fact is that the last decade saw the production of literature on nationalism and identities in Quebec of considerable note. Nevertheless, regardless of the wealth and diversity of the perspectives on the national question —whether it be the socio-political nation (Michel Seymour), the expression of repressed American-ness (Gérard Bouchard)[1] or the denunciation of "false consciousness" (Serge Cantin)— the look of the Other is always present, even obsessively so. This reference to the Other has also been at the center of a recent debate between Gérard Bouchard and John Ralston Saul about the latter's book *Reflections of a Siamese Twin. Canada at the End of the Twentieth Century*.

On the one hand, Gérard Bouchard opposes John Ralston Saul's "Canadian" nationalism with a more finely shaded vision of Quebec nationalism that would not contradict that humanitarian, Socratic "grand ideal" that the vice-governor general gives to Canadian nationalism.[2] On the other hand, Saul accuses Bouchard of not having read his book

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correctly, saying he is not referring to the 1867 Confederation, but to the year 1847 and the collaboration between reformist leaders Robert Baldwin and Louis H. Lafontaine.[3] This alliance was to be the cornerstone of the grand Socratic ideal described by Saul. Above all, it should be underlined that this opening toward the Other symbolized by the collaboration between reformist Anglophones and reformist Francophones in the Canadian tradition is far from being an original idea. The abundant political literature of the 1990s often deals with this issue which seems to be an obsession with English Canada. However, Bouchard reproaches Saul —also the author of *Voltaire's Bastards*— his omitting important aspects of Anglo-Canadian nationalism which are not very compatible with the Socratic humanism that he appreciates so. The Durham report and the project of assimilating Franco-Canadians, Canada's racist immigration policy from the 1870s to the 1960s, Orangism,[4] the treatment of indigenous peoples, and so many examples that show that "Canadian history" is full of episodes that contradict the theory of Socratic humanism. To this "Canadian" essentialism, Bouchard opposes a more dynamic vision of Canada and Quebec. Because of Bouchard —at least in his critique of Saul— we know that ultramontanism was defeated in Quebec around 1900 and that signs of modernity appeared before 1960.[5] This is surprising because in his most recent work, which won him the governor general's prize, Gérard Bouchard did not seem to agree with the theses of revisionist historiography.

In effect, in another book, Bouchard affirms that French Canadian nationalism is a continuation of, and not a break with, the French tradition of the *ancien régime* of 1840 to 1960 and in fact is the antithesis of a progressive nationalism. In this way, seemingly two important contemporary Canadian authors, both recent recipients of the governor general's prize, either omit essential elements of English Canadian history or contradict each other, as is the case of Bouchard, about the progressive or reactionary nature of Quebec before 1960 and the political reforms of the period of the Quiet Revolution between 1960 and 1996. To explain these omissions and contradictions, we must remember the key concepts used in the twentieth century to interpret Quebec.

The Social Sciences And "Folk Society"

It is no doubt unnecessary to refer again to prior discussions about the fundamentally reductionist and even colonialist nature of some concepts used to describe French Canada before the Quiet Revolution,[6] concepts like "folk society," "the mentality of the *ancien régime*" and "feudal ideological stronghold." Originating in sociology (Redfield, Hughes and Miner), history (Creighton and Ouellet) and political science (Hartz and McRae), these concepts created the image of the "dark ages" and "the long winter" of Quebec, from 1760, after the British conquest, until 1960.[7] From that point of view, the strictly Quebec identity would coincide in time with the late advent of modernity in 1960. As an example, we can say simply that today the Anglophone media and different social sciences departments use ad nauseam the categories "folk society" and the anti-modern "dark ages" not only to allude to French Canada before 1960 but also to contemporary Quebec. In this context, only four years ago the psychological profile of First Minister Lucien Bouchard, as done by a Toronto psychiatrist at the request of Lawrence Martin, rapidly degenerated into a collective portrait of today's French-speaking Quebec, a society which then and forever would turn its back on modernity.

This is another interesting paradox of contemporary Canada, but there does not seem to be a fundamental difference between this age-old simplistic view of French Canada and today's Quebec held by certain federalists and the equally reductionist view of French Canada defended by certain separatists. Perhaps the only difference between the two is simply the place they occupy on the scale of colonialism. So, using as a basis the same reductionist perception, two projects, one federalist and the other separatist, face each other down and are tempered by a reductionist vision of French Canada and Quebec.

The Other Look

In effect, some see Quebec as a positive element in the modern Canadian political tradition, while, for others, Quebec, in as much as it is a "founding people," is nothing less than a dominant colonizer. Some works published in the 1990s illustrate perfectly these two positions which, though different, have not reduced the Quebec of before the Quiet Revolution to absolute reductionism and have contributed elements for understanding the Quebec of 1760 to 1960 that were not

included by Bouchard and Saul in their general analysis of Quebec.

Political scientist Ken McRoberts has definitely used the idea that the current impasse in the Canada-Quebec relationship dates from the 1960s when Pierre Elliot Trudeau imposed the vision of Canada that broke with the traditional dualist image of the country. McRoberts underlines that since the period of New France and after the conquest, Canadian identity was very strong among America's Francophones. That identity alludes to a North American society which contrasted greatly with the metropolis. Canadians of British origin, on the contrary, maintained links with the British Empire and therefore with a vast complex that transcended Canada's geographical and political borders.

The duality described by McRoberts was essentially Franco-Canadian and British, which causes a certain confusion. While Franco-Canadians, particularly after 1867, thought they were contributing to the building of a dual nation, many British Canadians understood it strictly as promoting the British Empire. Even after imperialist ardor quieted down a bit after 1919, the symbols of British identity continued to have considerable influence in British Canada, at least until 1940. Beginning in the 1950s, British identity has gradually given way to "Canadian" nationalism. According to McRoberts, however, the idea of duality was preserved at least for a time, particularly by Canada's prime minister in the 1960s, Lester B. Pearson. Years later, Trudeau confronted this principle of Canadian duality by imposing procedural liberalism[8] based on strict protection of individuals, which aggravated political unease between formerly British Canada and formerly Canadian Quebec.[9]

Obviously, McRoberts' positions could make for long debates. Stéphane Kelly, for example, maintains that Trudeau's political thinking is deeply rooted in the past. It has also been shown that Trudeau's prejudices and theoretical suppositions in his view of French Canada were one of the main ambiguities of his political institutions. However, what should be remembered is the image of a French Canada that actively participates in its political destiny. On the other hand, the issue of an unequal duality in which Franco-Canadians nevertheless do not play a passive role appears in the work of many current Anglophone writers, particularly that of John Conway, Daniel Francis, Ray Conlogue, Charles Taylor and James Tully. The work of relatively lesser known authors from Francophone Quebec like Ian Angus and Samuel LaSelva should be added to this list.

Some see Quebec as a positive element in the modern Canadian political tradition, while, for others, Quebec, in as much as it is a "founding people," is nothing less than a dominant colonizer.

In *The Moral Foundation of Canadian Federalism*, Samuel LaSelva defends the idea that the recognition of a difference in the Constitution of 1867 was imposed by the then-leader of Franco-Canadians and right hand of John A. Macdonald,[10] George-Étienne Cartier. According to LaSelva, the tendency to form a homogeneous society, understood as British and Protestant, was stifled by this defense of difference carried out in French Canada. This would put the roots of the Canadian federalist tradition in the moral conception of a nation constituted by many identities and loyalties that can co-exist in a common political space. LaSelva goes even further by defending the idea that the initial dualism might be the origin of other fundamental conceptions of the Canadian federal tradition like justice, fraternity and democracy. Obviously, this thesis, like that of McRoberts, can be countered by many examples in Canadian history that eloquently show how the very idea of duality was constantly reduced by pressure from harmonizing tendencies of a society under British domination. According to LaSelva, all of this speaks to the importance given to Cartier showing to what point certain Anglo-Canadian authors seem to be fascinated by the Francophone French Canada/Quebec at the moment in which they define their own difference (that of English Canada) and of exorcising their own colonialist, conservative demons.

This issue of difference is also dealt with by Ian Angus, who sees in the work of Harold Innis and George Grant elements of a critique of harmonization and therefore a logic of recognizing difference inside the Anglo-Canadian identity itself. Thus, the idea of an identity based on the relationships established within the nation —according

to Innis— and the critique of technology —according to Grant— implied a project of society in which "what was plural" was recognized and valued. Angus strongly criticizes the recovery of Innis's thesis and the attacks on French Canada made by historian Donald Creighton. In the same fashion, he remembers the ferocious criticisms leveled by Grant at the stereotype of French Canada presented by Trudeau. All this leads Angus to recognize Quebec's unrestricted right to independence, a position defended at the end of the book that deserves to be reread in today's context.

Nevertheless, if this literature shows true respect for Quebec in the Anglophone Canada of the 1990s, on the left there was a real overflow of this same "literature of duality," an overflow that was simultaneously feminist, postcolonial and postmodern. In a text widely read in Anglo-Canadian universities, Daiva Stasilius and Rhada Jhappan, articulating the notions of sexual gender, race-ethnicity and social classes, passionately rejected the idea that Quebec had been colonized. As a "founding people," Quebec participated like the Canada of British origin in excluding the first nations and immigrants, particularly women immigrants. Also, despite its feelings of relative inferiority with regard to the dominant British world, this interpretation grants Quebec moral legitimacy. It is a racist white society, a product of European colonialism. Now, given that in British Canada the British are today a minority, we would be making a mistake if we ignored this literature. Increasingly, Quebec is seen as the weaker of the two colonial ancestors and therefore inspires little sympathy.

Which Other?

In brief, for French Canada and for Quebec, today like yesterday, that Other, close and obsession-inspiring, has been Canada —until recently British— and, to a small degree, the United States.

Now, until recently, British Canada had been included in the project of the British Empire, that is, in a vast worldwide system of both exploitation and marginalization of groups defined as outside "progress" and science, groups linked to "tradition." We must remember that the British Empire was also a system of ethnic segregation inside the British Isles themselves and an intense slave trade that, while abolished in 1834, was replaced immediately by other forms of exploitation, particularly in China (suffice it to remember that the Opium War began in 1839) and India.

Whether it be the U.S. or British case, we should not forget certain characteristics of the contexts in which the discourse on French Canada and Quebec was generated. This discourse was conceived in a context of colonial rivalry and not even the progressive literature about French Canada and Quebec has spoken sufficiently about the topic. The "false consciousness" of contemporary Quebec can also be interpreted as a refusal to recognize the complexity of a society and its past; in the case in question, the complexity of French Canada before 1960. Therefore, rejecting the image of the "water boy" can lead to a deconstruction of the image and the discourse of the Other that has frequently created it.[11] Rejecting this "water boy" image can also mean questioning once again a discourse that closely associates the French-Canadian identity with the "dark ages" and the Quebec identity with the benefits —passing though they may be— of the Quiet Revolution. Rejecting the "water boy" status may also mean situating the analysis of the discourse precisely in the terrain of the Other.

While some still perceive Quebec as a backward, colonized province because it does not have the status of a politically recognized nation, the Other increasingly perceives it as a dominant colonizer.

Quebec in Suspense

Unfortunately, Quebec does not seem to be moving along this road. In 1998, during the fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the non-conformist manifesto of young Quebec artists, the *Refus global* (Overall Refusal), the Quebec media once again sang the praises of Quebec's entry into modernity —needless to say, a tardy entrance. The *Refus global* had shaken up a whole society and had been the prelude to that transition from tradition to modernity that was the Quiet Revolution. Thus, 20 years of "revisionist" historiography had not achieved any kind of break-up of the increasingly canon-like interpretation of the Quiet Revolution. While some still perceive Quebec as a backward, colonized pro-

vince because it does not have the status of a politically recognized nation, the Other —which has changed quite a bit in the last 20 years— increasingly perceives it as a dominant colonizer. The fragility of this situation is striking.

On this point, analyst Daniel Jacques said, "Reconsidering the *Refus global*, we could have understood that there are different ways to be modern besides radical individualism." This idea of a pluralistic modernity opens up new and interesting avenues, as long as —it seems to me— the debate is increasingly situated in the terrain of the Other. Perhaps remaining static and continuing to reflect on the perceptions of the Other that refer us to the nineteenth century is another form of "false consciousness." It is possible that these perceptions that belong more properly to the imperialist Belle Epoque are still duplicitously encouraged, but for this to come out into the light, we have to become aware that there are new perceptions.

Conclusion

If we accept the definition of modernity that makes it a multidimensional reality, a complex time-space characterized by the constant renovation of strategies developed by individuals who react to new contexts, sometimes using values considered old-fashioned, Quebec, even before 1960 (or 1948), is, like its neighbors, a modern society. Neither Quebec, as of 1960, nor French Canada since before 1960, are simple "essences", one modern and the other traditional. They are, on the contrary, complex scenarios of struggles and the definition of strategies. This principle holds true for English Canada also, and it is exactly what bothers the reader about John Ralston Saul's book: the impression of an essentially progressive —albeit sophisticated— nationalism.

This having been said, the reductionist representations of one and the other are increasingly ill-fated since they may be tying Quebec to a colonized image of itself just when, paradoxically, it is being perceived —rightly or wrongly— as an ancient colonial power. The timing is not good and Jocelyn Létourneau is definitely right when she wants to restore the complexity to Quebecois ambiguity. Nevertheless, this ambiguity consists of having been and continuing to be a society that is simultaneously colonial and colonized. The different points of view summarized in this article, despite their contradictions, refer us fundamentally to this ambiguity. VM

Notes

All the Editor's Notes for this article were written by Julián Castro Rea, CISAN researcher and current guest professor at the University of Alberta.

[1] For a long time, Quebec tried to build its identity with reference to its French, European roots, underestimating or negating its belonging to this hemisphere. This is known as *américanité refoulée*, or repressed Americanness. [Editor's Note.]

[2] This is an ironic observation by the author since John R. Saul is the husband of the real governor general. [Editor's Note.]

[3] According to Saul, Baldwin and Lafontaine created the "Siamese twins" syndrome in Canada because in 1847 they made the first alliance between French and English Canadians to govern jointly. [Editor's Note.]

[4] Orangism is named after a fraternity formed in 1795 in Ireland to commemorate the consolidation of British domination in 1690 at the hands of the Protestant King William of Orange. The fraternity fought for the imposition of the English language and the Anglican religion and loyalty to the British Crown and was organized similarly to the Masonic lodges. Established in Canada in 1830, the movement supported the Conservative (Tory) Party and was a source of intolerance to ethnic and linguistic diversity, particularly during the nineteenth century. [Editor's Note.]

[5] Ultramontanism was a movement created during the French Revolution to defend the supremacy of Catholicism over civil society and the belief in the infallibility of the Pope and to reject any compromise with modern thought. Established in Quebec during the 1820s, it exerted enormous influence on French Canadians' social thought and organization until the advent of the Quiet Revolution in 1960. [Editor's Note.]

[6] The Quiet Revolution refers to the swift process of economic, social and institutional modernization of Quebec from 1960 to 1967. [Editor's Note.]

[7] The *grande noirceur*, or "dark ages," was a period in which official Quebec ideology was built upon traditionalist reference points (religion, the glorification of rural existence, traditional social and gender roles, submission to authority, etc.). [Editor's Note.]

[8] This ideology considers that formal competition among interest groups is sufficient to guarantee democracy, even if the final result is totally skewed by disparities in the different groups' power and resources. [Editor's Note.]

[9] The irony is that the first people to use the term "Canadian" were the Quebecois; Anglophones simply considered themselves British-born or Britishers living in Canada. [Editor's Note.]

[10] John A. Macdonald (1815-1891), leader of the Conservative Party and promotor of the union of the British provinces for the creation of the Dominion of Canada in 1867, is generally considered "the father of the Canadian Confederation." He was the first prime minister of modern Canada. [Editor's Note.]

[11] The "water boy" refers to the image of the unskilled laborer, the stereotype of French-speaking Quebecois, typically believed to be fit for no other work. [Editor's Note.]

Andämaxëi
The Three Foundations Of Querétaro in the Sixteenth Century

David Charles Wright*

Photos by Daniel Mungula

The modern city of Santiago de Querétaro had its beginnings shortly after the fall of the Aztec empire. It is hard to point to a specific moment as *the* "foundation," in spite of many people's acceptance over the years of the baroque myth which tells of a battle between unarmed Christian Otomí Indian warriors and local Chichimec nomads, highlighted by the miraculous apparition of the apostle James and a glowing cross. This symbolic battle is said to have taken place in 1531, according to the erroneous calculations of Friar Isidro Félix de Espinosa, published in his chronicle of the Franciscan *Colegios de Propaganda Fide* in 1746.

Documents from the sixteenth century tell another story. There are three separate moments in the early years of Querétaro's existence that can be called "foundations." The

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

The San Francisco Church (left) and a detail of its facade that pictures the Apostle Santiago (James) whose miraculous appearance, according to myth, aided in the conquest.

first is when Otomí settlers, fleeing Spanish dominion, arrived in the valley, which had been occupied for centuries by semi-nomadic Pame. The second took place a decade or two later, when these Otomí refugees were forced to pay tribute to the European invaders and embrace the Christian faith. The third involves the relocation of the settlement and the arrival of a wave of Spaniards and indigenous from central Mexico. Each "foundation" is part of a distinct phase in the conquest of this region.

The Eastern Bajío Before the Conquest

The valleys of the Eastern Bajío, home to the modern cities of Querétaro, Apaseo, Celaya and San Miguel de Allende, were part of a fluctuating frontier region during the millennia preceding the Spanish invasion. Beginning around 500 B.C. town-dwelling farmers from the south, participants in the Chupícuaro cultural tradition, colonized this region, which participated in Mesoamerican civilization for the next 15 centuries. The remains of monumental architecture and refined ceramics in a distinctive regional style attest to this fact. Several centers of political power flourished in the Eastern Bajío during the Classic period (A.D. 200-900). Many of these sites appear to have been abandoned in the tenth century, in the context of migrations from northwestern Mexico to the central valleys. In the valley of Querétaro lie the ruins of El Cerrito, which unlike most other Bajío sites enjoyed a second flowering in the Early Postclassic (A.D. 900-1200), when it participated in the Toltec culture and rivaled Tula in monumental splendor.

With the collapse of Tula in the twelfth century and the final abandonment of northern Mexico by Mesoamerican populations, the urban centers of the Eastern Bajío fell into decay. The region was dominated for the next four centuries by the rustic, semi-nomadic Pame and fully nomadic hunters and gatherers such as the Jonaz, Guamar and Guachichil, generically called Chichimecs. When Cortés arrived in Tenochtitlan in 1519, the northern frontier of Mesoamerican civilization was south of the valley of Querétaro; the present states of Michoacán, Mexico and Hidalgo were occupied by urban dwellers and farmers, while the entire state of Querétaro and all but

The third and definitive "foundation" of Querétaro took place between 1542 and 1550 on the western slope of a hill in an ample valley, to the south of the Querétaro River.

the southern edge of Guanajuato were Chichimec territory.

The Clandestine Settlement Of Andämaxëi (ca. 1521-1538)

After the fall of the Aztec empire, Cortés' soldiers were granted the right to collect the tribute that had previously been enjoyed by the imperial cities of the Triple Alliance, Tenochtitlan, Tetzcoco and Tlacopan. The grantees, called *encomenderos*, had the obligation to attend to the religious indoctrination of the natives, although in practice friars of the Franciscan, Dominican, and Augustinian orders carried out this task. The combined impact of the *encomenderos* and the friars was traumatic for many natives. As epidemics of an apocalyptic scale ravaged the Indian populations, the *encomenderos* pressured the survivors to pay their towns' taxes, while the mendicants, imagining themselves as protagonists in a holy struggle against the forces of darkness, persecuted those who dared to worship the gods of their ancestors.

In this context several small groups of Otomí abandoned their homes and quietly crossed the northern frontier of Mesoamerica, which had previously coincided with the boundary of the Aztec empire and at that time marked the limit of Spanish control. The Otomí refugees established agricultural settlements in Chichimec country, near the present cities of Querétaro, San Juan del Río, San Miguel de Allende and probably Apaseo el Grande. An Otomí trader named C'ohni, who had made his living before the conquest by trading with the Pame, was the founder of both San Miguel and Querétaro, according to his own testimony recorded shortly before his death in 1571.

Querétaro was first established in a canyon east of the present city. The Otomí inhabited caves next to a perennial stream and called the place *Andämaxëi*, "place of the large ball court," probably a reference to the topography of the canyon. The settlement was later called *Tlachco* by speakers of Nahuatl, the language of the Aztec, and *Querétaro* by the Tarascans; both names mean "place of the ball court". For some reason the latter name stuck, in spite of the fact that Tarascans were never a majority there. The Otomí still use their own word for the city, in two shortened regional variants: *Ndämxei* and *Maxëi*. Initially some 200 refu-

The San Francisco de Asís church in La Cañada, the place where the first Spanish settlements were established.

gees lived there, growing corn, beans, squash and chili peppers, cultivating friendly relations with their Pame neighbors and practicing their ancestral rites.

The Integration of Andämaxëi Into the Spanish Empire (ca. 1538-1542)

Meanwhile the Spaniards realized that the virgin grasslands to the northwest of Mexico City could support thriving herds of cattle. Land grants were handed out to members of the colonial elite. One grantee was Hernán Pérez de Bocanegra, *encomendero* of Acámbaro and Apaseo since 1538. The latter town was just 24 miles from Andämaxëi. Around 1540 Pérez discovered the refugee settlement and made them pay tribute in the form of chili peppers, cotton, and wheat; he provided the seed for the latter. This turn of events outraged the Pame inhabitants of the valley, but C'ohni soothed them with his artful diplomacy.

Shortly after the initial contact Pérez brought a Franciscan friar from Acámbaro to initiate the refugees in the mysteries of the Christian faith. C'ohni was baptized as Hernando de Tapia. A shortage of friars and the small size of the settlement precluded the founding of a monastery, but an employee of Pérez named Juan Sánchez de Alanis helped to teach the Otomí the essential aspects of the new religion, with the aid of the neophyte Don Hernando. Friars from Acámbaro and San Miguel visited regularly to administer the sacraments. Around this time Spanish colonists established cattle ranches near Querétaro and San Miguel.

Relocation and Laying Out the City (ca. 1542-1550)

The third and definitive "foundation" of Querétaro took place between 1542 and 1550; the settlement was moved from the canyon to its present location, on the western slope of a hill in an ample valley, to the south of the Río de Querétaro, which flows out of the canyon. The date of the move is unknown. It may have been around 1550, coinciding with the creation of a cart road connecting the recently discovered silver mines in Zacatecas with the capital of New Spain. Querétaro became a strategic point on the royal silver road, which ran north and south through the heart of the new town. Perpendicular to this road was another, extending eastward into the fertile Bajío in the present state of Guanajuato. At the junction a Franciscan monastery was erected, dedicated to the Apostle James (*Santiago* in Spanish), with church, cloister, walled atrium, chapels and orchard.

Hernando de Tapia, now the officially sanctioned governor of the indigenous town coun-

cil, supervised the creation of a network of irrigation canals to water orchards in the town and fields around it. Many indigenous from the south, speaking Otomí, Nahuatl and Tarascan, migrated to the new settlement, attracted by the opportunity to cultivate the fertile soil of the valley of Querétaro. Local Pame were also integrated into the expanding town. In 1551 and 1552 the viceroy granted house plots in Querétaro and cattle ranches in the surrounding countryside to Spaniards, initiating a century-long transition from indigenous town to multiethnic urban center dominated by a Spanish elite.

The nomadic tribes along the silver road reacted violently to the invasion of their ancestral territory. The Chichimec war broke out in 1550. Small groups of Spanish soldiers, accompanied by numerous Otomí, Nahua and Tarascan warriors, fought the nomads. This tragic conflict was not contained until 1590, when it was realized that military force alone was only escalating the spiral of violence. A policy was adopted whereby the Chichimecs were coaxed into living as Christians in agricultural settlements, together with immigrants from agricultural towns in the south, in return for gifts and privileges.

Thus by the end of the sixteenth century the stage was set for Querétaro's future growth and prosperity. A century later the city was the third most populous in New Spain, fragrant with gardens and orchards and boasting seven monumental churches. The refugee settlement in the canyon was all but forgotten, as native oral tradition blended with clerical rhetoric to create a foundation myth that reflected the social dynamics of the multiethnic city of the baroque era. VM

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El Cerrito, like other pre-Hispanic urban centers of the Eastern Bajío, fell into decay in the twelfth century.

By the seventeenth century, Querétaro was the third most populous city in New Spain.

The San Fernando College's Sierra Gorda Missions

Jaime Abundis*

A multitude of small, ancient buildings lie like minuscule stones at the bottom of glens, surrounded by majestic mountains, next to streams that sometimes pierce the rock itself to form deep cavities, amidst fabulous scenery. Whether it be on the leeward side, with meager rainfall and more arid landscape, or on the windward side or in the depths of the valleys, humid and full of waterfalls and vegetation, the Sierra Gorda mountains are one of the treasures that still exist in Mexico, thanks to their isolation and difficult access.

Few areas in Mexico have remained as secluded as this part of the Western Sierra Madre with its ill-defined limits, named the Sierra Gorda by the first European colonizers in the sixteenth century. Located in the northeastern part of what is today the state of Querétaro, its mountainous terrain facilitated indigenous resistance to European colonization until well into the eighteenth century. Pames, Ximpecs and Jonaces resisted attempts by the first Spaniards to subdue them and change their way of

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Modeled after sixteenth-century convents, the atrium of San Francisco Tilaco is fenced in and has two *posa* chapels in the corners.

life. These groups, whose cultures were not very developed, were generically called Chichimecs by Nahuatl speakers.

Spanish domination of the region to the north of the Zimapán and Pachuca royal mining roads was imposed following the course of the rivers that led the conquistadors to a large hill that they called the *cerro gordo* (fat hill) or *sierra gorda* (fat mountain range) according to documents dating from 1579.[1] The first *encomenderos* tried to subdue the indigenous inhabitants into a work force, but they met with fierce opposition that required other means: together with the sword, they used the cross. Soon, friars began to preach to the indigenous population. The first to do this were the Franciscans, followed by the Augustinians in the second half of the sixteenth century. Although not very effective, they did manage to establish the first fragile missions in the Sierra Gorda.

Well into the seventeenth century the Franciscan Friar Antonio de Jesús María Linaz promoted a reform in his order to renovate its missionary work. He proposed the foundation of apostolic colleges, destined to give a second spiritual, academic and practical course of training to friars who wanted to work as missionaries for a minimum of 10 years; they would be independent of the provinces and only obey the prior general and the *Propaganda Fide* Sacred Congregation. His idea came to fruition in the foundation of the first Apostolic College for the Propagation of the Faith of the Holy Cross in Querétaro in 1683. The aim of the college was to spread the Gospel in the nearby mountains, but it had to concentrate on other areas because other religious were there first. Inspired by the Franciscans' example, the Dominican Friar Felipe Galindo obtained authorization to found a college for missionaries in Querétaro, making it possible to establish two more missions in 1686. The Franciscans of the Holy Cross made two expeditions into the mountains in 1683 and 1686, but they had to withdraw because royal decree gave priority to the Dominicans. The Dominican missions continued to be established in the eighteenth century while the Franciscans built two more colleges in Guatemala and Zacatecas.

By 1739, the San Fernando de México Franciscan College, founded by royal decree in October 1733, and the Apostolic College of San Francisco de Pachuca, turned into a missionary college by the Descalced Franciscans (or *dieguinos*, as they are known in Mexico), turned the Sierra Gorda into the center of their attention; both had a royal decree that allowed them to do missionary work in it.

The fragility of the establishments in the Sierra Gorda was clear given the resistance of the indigenous people. José Escandón y Helguera (1700-1770), a colonel of the Querétaro mili-

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The mountainous terrain facilitated indigenous resistance to European colonization until the eighteenth century. Atrium and detail of the Tilaco doorway.

Daniel Mungula

Daniel Mungula

The Jalpan doorway was designed by an architect who knew of the golden section, but executed in stucco by unkown craftsmen.

tia, made one expedition in 1743 in which he saw the lamentable state of the missions, particularly the Augustinian ones. His report to the viceroy was the basis for the decision to establish five missions on the left side of the Moctezuma River under the aegis of the San Fernando College and three on the right hand side, under the aegis of the San Francisco College, between April and May 1744. Escandón, accompanied by Friar Pedro Pérez de Mezquía, proceeded to establish the missions that were to come under the authority of the San Fernando College: Santiago Apóstol (Saint James the Apostle) in Jalpan, San Miguel (Saint Michael) in Concá, La Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora del Agua de Landa (the Immaculate Conception of Our Lady of the Water of Landa), San Francisco (Saint Francis) in Tilaco and Nuestra Señora de la Luz (Our Lady of the Light) in Tancoyol, in which 10 friars had 3,840 natives under their care. The friars of the San Francisco College, for their part, established the missions of San Juan Bautista de Pacula (Saint John the Baptist of Pacula), San José de Fuenclara (Saint Joseph of Fuenclara) and Nuestra Señora de Guadalupe de Cerro Prieto (Our Lady of Guadalupe of Cerro Prieto), in addition to having received a short time before the mission of Tolimán from the Augustinians.

This new stage for the missions was by no means easy at first. Of the 10 original Franciscans, four died and three soon became ill; the missions survived with support from the friars from the Querétaro and Zacatecas colleges during the first few years. In addition, the indigenous people revolted in Vizarrón and Tolimán between 1744 and 1745; Escandón put down the rebellion; the repression culminated at the Media Luna Hill on October 22 and 23, 1748 when he practically exterminated the Jonaces in battle. He was rewarded for his efforts with the titles of Count of Sierra Gorda and Viscount of the Casa Escandón in 1749, in addition to being named a knight of the Order of Santiago.[2]

The consolidation and prosperity of the San Fernando missions were the work of another missionary, Friar Junípero Serra. When he became a Franciscan friar in 1731, Miquel Joseph Serra y Ferrer (1713-1784) took the name of Junípero, the most patient and humble of Saint Francis of Assisi's followers. He arrived in New Spain in December 1749; in June 1750,

Friar Junípero entered the mission of Jalpan, the most important of all. A short time later, he was joined by more missionaries. These friars' work radically transformed the settlements. In addition to instructing the indigenous in the Christian faith, they imparted to them intellectual, practical and even artistic knowledge. The fields produced as never before; the women learned manual skills whose products were sold in several cities; there were singers and musicians; and they built wonderful churches with baroque facades full of stucco reliefs and interiors with golden altars and multicolored walls.

Using as a model the convents of the sixteenth century and based on plans by still-unknown architects, the San Fernando missions in the Sierra Gorda were built in the time of Friar Junípero. Next to churches with a Latin cross floor plan covered with vaults and a dome in the transept, they built the mission's rooms around the cloisters on a single floor; in the front they organized the atria decorated with crosses and *posa* chapels[3] surrounded by a wall. Access to the missions reminds us of the open chapels already in disuse by Junípero's time. The well-thought-out proportions of the floor plans and facades denote the specialized knowledge reminiscent of designs by expert architects, not amateur friars.

Santiago Jalpan

The mission of Santiago Jalpan was built under the direction of Serra and probably Friar Francisco Palóu from 1751 to 1758. The church includes a side chapel and furnishings which no longer exist: golden altarpieces, oil paintings, multicolored carved wooden pieces, vestments and silver ornaments. The doorway still has most of its original carvings except the relief of Saint James that has been replaced by a clock; the sculptures of Our Lady of Guadalupe and Our Lady of Pilar, as well as reliefs with two-headed eagles holding serpents in their beaks are details worth noting.

San Miguel Concá

Friars José Antonio Murguía and Joaquín Fernández de Osorio were in charge of the San Miguel Concá Mission between 1750 and 1754.

Jaime Abundis

Jaime Abundis

The Concá Mission is the smallest and the only one with a representation of King Fernando of Spain, later made a saint.

Daniel Mungula

Daniel Mungula

Specialists agree that the doorway of the Landa Mission is the most iconographically complete.

It is the smallest of the missions, but not the least attractive. It had a golden altarpiece, as well as wooden carvings, rich ornaments and beautiful decorations on the walls. It retains an exquisite baptismal font in multicolored clay. The top of the church's doorway has an innocent but beautiful effigy of San Miguel (Saint Michael) defeating Satan; it is the only one that dedicates a place to the patron of the founding college, San Fernando, among many other sculptures and images.

Nuestra Señora Del Agua de Landa

In contrast with these missions, the mission of La Purísima Concepción de Nuestra Señora del Agua de Landa was built in a spot where there had not been a previously existing Augustinian mission. No one is certain who built what turned out to have the most carefully done and elaborate of all the facades. It may have been built after Serra's departure, between 1760 and 1768, with Friar Miguel de la Campa y Cos' involvement. The doorway boasts sculptures or reliefs of the immaculate conception, flanked by incense-bearing angels, two different types of Franciscan coats-of-arms, Saint Francis, Saint Dominic, Saint Peter, Saint Paul, Saint Lorenzo, Saint Vincent, Saint Steven, Saint Michael the Archangel with a dragon, Saint Jacob de la Marca, Saint Bernardino of Siena, Saint John of Capistrano, the blessed Alberto de Sarzana, Juan Duns Escoto and the blessed María de Jesús de Ágreda, in addition to the Descent, the Flagellation and several mermaids. The church vaults are also decorated with reliefs of four archangels and Saint Buenaventura.

San Francisco de Tilaco

In a beautiful valley with a previous Augustinian presence, Friar Juan Crespí supervised the building of the San Francisco de Tilaco mission between 1754 and 1758. The atrium was built on two levels to conform to the disposition of the land and it has two *posa* chapels. The church has a very slender tower and a most capricious doorway; it originally had a golden

altarpiece with multicolored sculptures, an organ, oil paintings and good silver ornaments, all of which have disappeared. The sculpture of Saint Francis, flanked by angel musicians, and little sirens on the entablature at the level of the first floor are outstanding features of the doorway. Today, this is the only one of the missions still inhabited by a Franciscan, Friar Francisco Miracle from Tarragona, Spain, who has lived there since 1963.

Nuestra Señora de la Luz Tancoyol

The last of the San Fernando missions was Nuestra Señora de la Luz Tancoyol. Friar Juan Ramos de Lora resided there between 1761 and 1767 and probably took part in its construction. Friar Junípero went through Tancoyol in 1766 before leaving for Baja California and may have participated in the church dedication. The old furnishings included an organ and a lectern that no longer exist. Though the relief that represented Our Lady of the Light has been obliterated, the doorway retains others of merit like the central naked cross flanked by incense-bearing angels, the Franciscan and Dominican coats-of-arms or the reliefs of little angels with symbols of the Passion on the sides in addition to full sculpted figures. The atrium has the remains of two *posa* chapels and a wall set off by a cordon and singular twisted torch-holders.

In the eight years that Serra lived in the Sierra Gorda, he learned the Pame language and garnered great experience for the next missionary tasks in the Northwest. In September 1758 he left Jalpan. After wandering through several regions of New Spain, he was commissioned to attend to the missions of Baja California that had just been left by the Jesuits, expelled in 1767. So, he left for the peninsula and shortly thereafter began the colonization of California accompanied by Don Gaspar de Portolá.[4] The 21 Californian missions plus their visits or "assistants," established between 1769 and 1823, were the result of the work begun in Querétaro's Sierra Gorda. Nevertheless, none of these northern establishments ever equaled the architecture of the ones in Querétaro.

Jaime Abundis

Jaime Abundis

The clay baptismal font at the Tancoyol mission (left). The atrium wall at Tancoyol flanked by twisted torch-holders (right).


Daniel Mungula


Jaime Abundis

The Franciscan shield with the crossed arms of Christ and St. Francis adorn the doorway of the Jalpan Mission (left). Detail of the doorway of Landa with the Immaculate Conception in the niche (right).

The five missions were handed over to the secular clergy in 1770, putting an end to the bonanza. The indigenous people now had to pay tributes, support the designated priests and cover the cost of all religious services. The immediate result was their indignant protests, followed by the gradual abandonment of the parishes. The missions under the aegis of Pachuca were not secularized until 1777. Centuries later, when the paved road that crossed the Sierra Gorda was being finished in 1961, the indigenous population was smaller than in the time of Friar Junípero.

All these missions look like small pebbles nestled in the extraordinary surrounding scenery, but they symbolize the strength of will and dedication of little recognized individuals. VM

Notes

[1] This Cerro Gordo is known today by the name Cerro del Doctor and is perfectly visible from the western heights of the Toluquilla archeological zone. Its enormous base explains its name, which was then applied to the entire mountain range.

[2] Escandón is buried alongside his wife in the side chapel of the church dedicated to the Five Lords in the state of Tamaulipas, in the town of Santander de Jiménez. This town also boasts a building called the House of the Count, used today as the city hall, originally the home of Don José and his family.

[3] *Posa* chapels were small chapels built into the corners of the atrium (usually four), which were used to "pose" (hence the name *posa* chapel) the consecrated Host in monstrances during special processions on Corpus Christi.

[4] Friar Junípero established the presidency of the California missions at the San Carlos Borromeo del Carmelo (Saint Charles Borromeo del Carmelo) Mission which he founded in June 1770, after founding the San Fernando Velicatá and the San Diego Missions the year before. He died there August 28, 1784, and is buried at the foot of the chancel of the current, renovated church next to the remains of Friars Juan Crespí and Fermín Francisco de Lasuén, his illustrious companions.

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Two Archaeological Sites In Querétaro's Sierra Gorda

Margarita Velasco Mireles*



The Sierra Gorda is the part of the Sierra Madre Oriental covering northwestern Hidalgo, northern Querétaro, the eastern part of Guanajuato and south-central San Luis Potosí. Typical of the region are its difficult topography and its contrasting scenery, with dense pine and holm oak forests growing in the humidity that comes from the Gulf of Mexico coast and areas with less rainfall where only thorny thickets and xerophytic vegetation adhered to rocks grow.

Man came to these mountains in early times as nomadic hunter-gatherers to take advantage of the variety of natural resources that the mountains offered for their survival. However, around the beginning of our era the first groups to practice agriculture made their appearance as they gradually settled the mountains. These first waves of sedentary farmers seemed to come from the lowlands of the coastal gulf plain and filtered into the Sierra Madre Oriental by different routes.

One of the economic attractions that may have motivated this colonization was the existence of rich mineral deposits, including mercury. Cinnabar, or mercuric sulphide, mercury's only important ore, was valued in ancient Mexico for the same reason that other men at other times and in other places in the world have used it: as a pigment, with magical-religious connotations arising from its beautiful shades of red, associated with blood and life.

From that time on, then, the cultural and economic development of the mountain towns was closely linked to mining. In the 1970s, the

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One example of the high development achieved by the mountain peoples are the cities of Ranas and Toluquilla, located in the southwest Sierra Gorda.

These semi-circular stairways associated with religious and administrative buildings are unique in Mesoamerica.

Structure 16, along an east-west axis, was the highest point in Ranas with a view of the whole city and environs.

Photos by Margarita Velasco

first major study of pre-Hispanic mining in the Sierra Gorda was carried out, yielding interesting information about progress made in mining engineering during the Late Classical and Early Post-Classical Periods (A.D. 650-1200). The research indicated that the miners in the Soyotal region, in what is today the municipality of Pinal de Amoles, Querétaro, hand dug tunnels more than 80 meters deep that followed the vein of ore; they bored ventilation shafts to evacuate dust and smoke, installing support beams to avert cave-ins and preparing special work areas for collecting, selecting and cleaning the cinnabar. The precious red dust was collected in small receptacles to be stored and later distributed through trade networks far away in Mesoamerica.

Specialists have been able to identify some of the mining processes by looking at the tools and utensils used for the work, like hammers, puncheons, hatchets, receptacles, shells, small brushes, nets, palm-mats, cording, sandals, torches, etc.

The region's efficient mining and agricultural production resulted in a spectacular flowering of the Sierra Gorda. Important settlements rose up: large cities with a social, political, economic and religious life and many different-sized settlements sprinkled through the mountains.

One example of the high development achieved by the mountain peoples are the cities of Ranas and Toluquilla, located in the southwest Sierra Gorda. Both are strategically placed on high plateaus, with a view of all the surrounding land and restricted access —since each had only one road leading to the city— guarded by sentinels. From this position they controlled the springs that provided their water supply and some of the cultivated land. The long, narrow plateaus where the cities were founded were

One of the economic attractions that may have motivated colonization was the existence of rich mineral deposits, including mercury.

The ball game was the axis around which the main settlements were built.

The ball game courts in mountain settlements were open on both ends and had no markings on the walls.

The Sierra Gorda's spectacular cultural development was interrupted in the Early Post-classical period (A.D.900-1200) because of climatic changes that caused long droughts that destabilized the economy.

adapted for construction by cutting down the forest and changing the natural topography by leveling the ground. When they needed more space, they broadened out the construction by building great retaining walls to create platforms and terraces that would hold up the new structures. For building, they used local materials: earth and rocks for the foundations, clay and flag-stones carefully placed in horizontal rows without stucco covering for the facades and wood for ceilings, posts and doors.

The urban lay-out of Ranas and Toluquilla was similar, both mixing aspects of civil and ceremonial life, putting temples, administrative buildings and dwellings in the same area. The bases of the pyramids on which temples for worshiping their deities were built are noteworthy for their size and the presence of large taludes flanked by protuding cornices, with integrated or superimposed stairways, some of which were semicircular, a typical element of mountain architecture.

In Toluquilla and section II of Ranas, the ball game structures mark the building style, lined up along the central axis of the plateau. The ball game courts have rectangular fields open on both ends instead of the later I-shaped fields, and they all have a pyramid base at one end. Next to the ball court walls are administrative buildings, dwellings for the elite, circular or semicircular structures and ceremonial platforms, all lining the streets that allowed for foot traffic parallel to the ball courts.

Ranas' three and Toluquilla's four ball game structures not only defined the lay-out of the settlements and others of smaller size, but they also must have marked the social and religious lives of the Sierra towns, given the profound symbolic and ritual significance they had for the peoples of ancient Mexico.

The Sierra Gorda's spectacular cultural development was interrupted in the Early Post-classical period (A.D.900-1200) among other reasons because of climatic changes that caused long droughts that destabilized the economy, forcing the population to abandon their towns, their fields and their mines over a relatively short period. The region then was once again occupied by nomadic hunter-gatherers, who the history books call Pames and Jonaces, peoples related to the Otomí, later grouped under the generic name Chichimecs after the arrival of the Spanish conquistadors. VM



While searching for cinnabar, pre-Hispanic miners left tools and domestic and ceremonial objects behind in the tunnels.

The Querétaro Art Museum

Yolanda Cano*
Guadalupe Zárate **

Photos by Daniel Mungula

The Museo de Arte de Querétaro (The Querétaro Art Museum), housed in the former San Agustín Monastery, one of Querétaro's most admirable baroque buildings, was inaugurated in 1988. In this article we will focus on its architecture and collection, the museum's most striking attributes.

The Architecture

The museum is part of the San Agustín Church complex, whose facades are baroque, the main one with mannerist influence. Its unique dome

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The San Agustín Church dome with musician angels is a remarkable piece of baroque art (left). The heads of some herms have Corinthian capitals (right).

with musician angels holding different instruments is also of note, as is the sacristy, with its important examples of viceregal art.

The two-story cloister has two facades: the main one, built in the early twentieth century, faces Allende Street; the side one, very possibly the original, in the baroque style, faces the church's atrium.

The cloister's architectural layout is organized through a central patio with a portico and wide surrounding corridors. As in most monasteries, the ground floor holds the porter's hall, the refectory, the kitchen, the chapter house, the library, the stables and the warehouses, and the upper floor, the cells. Given the different uses the building has had since the Augustinians were expelled in the mid-nineteenth century, it is difficult to identify the original spaces, but the essential structure is intact.

The museum's shop was originally the vestibule. The square patio has a portico formed by four semi-circular arches on fascicular pillars with molding. It has a mezzanine with an arris vault and a rose-window in the center. The east portico holds the access to the stairs leading to the upper floor through a semi-circular arch; the arch keystone is decorated with the Augustinian heart inside a scallop shell.

At the center of the main patio is a fountain with a multi-leveled base growing out of a dodecahedron, dedicated to the monastery's benefactor, Don Julián de la Peña. The upper floor portico is formed by semi-circular arches and pillars in line with those on the ground floor.

The most important thing about the building are the facades of the upper and lower porticos, formed by four semi-circular arches on each side with the same structure on both floors. The arches grow out of pillars with molding and their keystones are decorated with scallops holding symbols and Augustinian saints framed with decorative plant carvings. On both levels the spandrels are decorated with carvings of plants and animals like pelicans, pegasuses and grotesques. Each pillar has back-to-back herms made up of parts of the human body and geometric and plant forms. The heads of the herms on the first level have Corinthian capitals and their necks have large spiral scrolls with a tassel hanging from the center. The herms of the top floor are shaped like human bodies above the waist with the arms uplifted to the sides of their heads, making symbolic signals with their fingers; from the waist upwards they have foliage that turns into fluting and finally an enormous spiral scroll. In addition to being

decorative, the top-floor herms are gargoyles that double as drains for rainwater.

In 1935, the building was declared a historic monument and has been designated by the UNESCO as a World Heritage Treasure.

The Museum

The museum has 13 rooms for permanent exhibitions, which fundamentally hold works of Mexican art from the viceregal period to the nineteenth century. The collection began to be gathered during the *porfiriato* when the San Carlos Academy donated a large number of works on religious themes by the most outstanding artists from the colonial period and nineteenth-century paintings by, among others, the Pelegrín Clavé school. Don Germán Patiño, an illustrious favorite son of Querétaro, was responsible for this first collection. It was replenished years later when the political instability of the Revolution endangered the security of valuable works of art from churches and monasteries, and they were stored in the Fine Arts Academy.

After decades of Don Germán's determined efforts, the Regional Museum was established in 1936. A good part of the collection exhibited there was later loaned to the Art Museum, where it is currently housed.

Our visit begins on the top floor with rooms 3 and 4, where the mannerist works of both Baltasar de Echaves and Luis Juárez are shown, among those of other artists. In rooms 5 and 6 is *Saint John the Evangelist*, one of a series of paintings of "The Apostolate" by Cristóbal de Villalpando.

Rooms 7 to 10 are filled with outstanding examples of baroque art, among them works by the brothers Juan and Nicolás Rodríguez Juárez, the *Ecce Homo* by José de Ibarra and others by Miguel Cabrera.

Room 11 is dedicated to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European painting, with engravings of the Flemish school and copies of paintings by outstanding painters, like *The Rape of Europe*. The San Carlos College collection of nineteenth-century painting is housed in rooms 12 and 13, with works by Juan Urrechi, like *Lot and His Daughters Escaping from Sodom*, or by Primitivo Miranda, like *The Death of Abel*, and Luis Coto, among others.

Museo de Arte de Querétaro
Allende 14 Sur
Centro Histórico
Querétaro, Querétaro
Phone: 212-23-57 and 212-35-23
www.qromex.org/museo-arte

Room 9 (left) has extraordinary examples of baroque art. Room 11 (right) is dedicated to sixteenth- and seventeenth-century European painting and engraving.

The Sierra Gorda Biosphere Reserve

Elsie Montiel

Mexico is one of the world's 12 megadiverse countries, which concentrate 60 percent of the planet's species of flora and fauna. The country's varied topography holds important natural treasures of incalculable beauty and biological wealth. From the high perennial humid jungles of the Southeast to the hot deserts of the North and from the mangroves of the gulf coast to the mountain cloud forests of the highlands, most of the world's most attractive ecosystems can be found in the almost two million square kilometers of Mexico's territory.

To protect its natural patrimony, Mexico has decreed the existence of 127 natural protected areas divided into six different categories. The most important is the biosphere reserve. These spaces for life are the Earth's last natural sanctuaries, places where human activities have not significantly changed the natural surroundings. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) program "Man and the Biosphere" (MaB) recognizes these reserves whose importance to nature makes them a hope for channeling human activities in harmony with the

A Natural Sanctuary in the Heart of Mexico

Elsie Montiel

conservation of natural resources. Biosphere reserves are designated by national governments and must comply with three basic functions to be classified as MaB reserves:

1) *Conservation*. Contributing to the conservation of the landscape, ecosystems and genetic diversity.
2) *Development*. Fostering socially, culturally and economically sustainable economic and human development.
3) *Research*. Providing support for research, monitoring, education and information about local, national and international matters related to conservation and development.

The Sierra Gorda Reserve has uniquely combined well preserved, important and varied biological wealth in large tracts of land and a rank-and-file, community level civic movement dedicated to the protection and sustainable use of the region's natural resources. Fourteen years of efforts by local inhabitants and authorities and the Sierra Gorda Ecological Group bore fruit in 1997 when the Sierra Gorda was declared a biosphere reserve, making it the first natural

protected area in the country that issued from public pressure to conserve natural resources.

Located in the heart of Mexico, in northern Querétaro, the Sierra Gorda Biosphere Reserve covers 383,567 hectares, with 100,000 inhabitants in 698 communities. Two areas were established in the reserve: the buffer zone, covering 358,764 hectares, where the communities and economic activities are located, and 11 areas called "nuclei," that cover 24,803 hectares, or

The Sierra Gorda Biosphere Reserve has been considered the forerunner of the implementation and execution of a participatory model of operating Mexico's natural protected areas, bringing together community participation, organized civil society through the Sierra Gorda Ecological Group, local authorities, support from the federal government through the Reserve Office and the active collaboration of national and international organizations.

Daniel Mungula

Daniel Mungula

The Sierra Gorda's ecosystems and life forms are practically unexplored.

6 percent of the total surface. These are the most important areas for conservation due to their biological wealth, because they are home to endemic, endangered species of flora and fauna and even ecosystems that are rapidly disappearing in the rest of the country, like the mountain cloud forests. In these areas, the only human activities permitted are the preservation of ecosystems and their elements, scientific research and environmental education, and any use of the ecosystems that might alter them is limited or forbidden.

An Ecologically Diverse Refuge

In March 2001, these efforts to promote conservation and sustainable social development were recognized by the UNESCO, which included the reserve in the World Network of MaB-UNESCO Reserves, making it Mexico's most recent MaB reserve. The region is situated in the transition area of two bio-regions: the neartic and the neo-tropical. Its scenically beautiful, irregular topography makes for craggy mountains 3,300 meters high and deep valleys only

300 meters above sea level. The humid winds blowing from the Gulf of Mexico hit the high mountains, causing wide variations in precipitation, which ranges from 1,500 millimeters to 313 millimeters a year. For all these reasons, the Sierra Gorda is an important biological corridor. Such diverse animal species as the black bear (*Ursus americanus*), a neartic breed, and the military macaw (*Ara militaris*), a clearly neo-tropical species, may live in the same forest.

This is truly an outstanding feature because few people imagine that in Central Mexico it is still possible to find such pristine tranquility on land where Man has not significantly altered the environment, land that is now protected.

Among the protected nuclei are some unique areas such as the Sótano del Barro nucleus, which protects a geological formation in which the carstic formations and the process of collapse has created one of the great natural wonders of the Americas. This sink hole has one of the deepest vertical shafts in the world measuring 410 meters straight down. It is also the nesting and resting place for the last flock of 60 to 80 military macaws who make their home in a very broad region in the center of the country.


Daniel Mungula


Daniel Mungula


Daniel Mungula


Daniel Mungula

When Nature feels confident, its exhuberance knows no bounds. "The Jewel of Ice," part of a nucleus area.

The broad ecological diversity of the Sierra Gorda puts it at the head of the list of all the country's natural protected areas, with 14 different kinds of vegetation: xerophytic thickets in semideserts, temperate coniferous and holm oak forests, the last mountain cloud forests in its most humid areas, gallery forests on river banks and tropical forests with plants that go from caduceus and sub-caduceus to evergreen. The only ecosystems missing are those of the coastal regions and the high mountains.

It also has the largest caduceus low forests of all the country's natural protected areas, covering almost 145,000 hectares. This ecosystem exists only in Mexico and Central America, where it has been senselessly reduced due

Daniel Mungula

Daniel Mungula

Querétaro's Sierra Gorda contains one of Mexico's last mountain cloud forests.

to the spread of agriculture. It contains several endangered species like the jaguar, the wild boar (*Pecari tajacu*), the pheasant (*Crax rubra*), the white-tailed deer and the *tigrillo* (*Leopardus pardalis*). Large parts of this ecosystem are protected in the nuclei of the Santa María and Ayutla Rivers.

The Sierra Gorda Biosphere Reserve is one of the few places in the country where Mexico's six species of felines can all be found: the powerful jaguar, the mountain lion and four smaller species, the coveted ocelot, the bobcat, the *jaguarundi* (*Felis yagouaroundi*) and the *tigrillo*. Only two of the six species are not officially classified as endangered, despite the fact that they, too, are intensely hunted: the mountain lion and the bobcat.

Among the 1,800 species of flora registered at the reserve, 27 are endangered, some of which are real treasures: two species of magnolia, seven species of *cícadas* (*Ceratozamia mexicana*), red and white ceders, the *granadillo* (*Taxus globosa*), the *guayamé* (*Abies guatemalensis*) and the *aguacatillo* (*Litsea glaucescens*), in addition to cacti like peyote and the giant barrel cactus. All these species and more are endangered because of the pressure of human activities that cause the loss or change in their habitat, the irrational extraction of some species and overgrazing by goats and cattle.

Nature has been generous in the mountains of Querétaro's Sierra Gorda and, today, its inhabitants and government officials, aware of the value of keeping their streams and rivers clean, their forests and deserts healthy and their flora and fauna abundant, join together in a project to conserve the country's greatest biodiversity and at the same time establish the basis for the sustainable development of the Sierra Gorda Bio-region, that small green corner of the planet that the local people work to protect. VM

The Man Falling from the Tower

A poem by Eduardo Vázquez Martín

Drawings by Héctor Ponce de León

After the attacks in New York, young Mexican poet Eduardo Vázquez Martín wrote a poem not originally intended for publication. A friend of his sent him an e-mail with a few fragments of poetry about the turmoil everyone was experiencing, and Eduardo responded with his own poem, which was sent out to the entire mailing list his friend had originally targeted. Several messages later, Eduardo's poem was eventually read on the radio, and he gave his permission for it to be published in English and Spanish here to pay homage in verse to the fallen.

The Man Falling from the Tower

The man falling
Had the choice of dying by fire
Or flying toward death
Feeling, one more time, the breeze off the Hudson
Before losing himself forever in oblivion.

I have seen the jubilation of the children of the Orient,
I have seen many clean lips smiling,
I have seen my own cannibal dentures laughing
in the mirror of others
And I know that the man hurtling down
Is not redeemed by the world's pedagogy.

I have gone out to celebrate in Palestine,
I have prayed with dry tears of terror,
I have wept in a garden of my own city
For the streets of Manhattan covered by ash,
I sat down to read the Koran in a Baghdad plaza,
And just as the captain of the airplane told me,
I fastened my seat-belt
In order to die in my assigned place.

Long ago I saw the Palacio de Moneda in Santiago de
Chile
Wounded on another September 11:
Salvador Allende died there.
Surely I will die in Kabul tomorrow
By the old rule of tooth for tooth
And eye for eye.
Whosever may be the mouth or glance.

Meantime I am the negative sum as the stock market
closes
And the multiplication of drops of blood
On the mutilated verses of Lorca's *Poeta en Nueva York*:
The dead are absorbed, devouring their own hands.
While the others dance...
Cold men, drunk on silver...
Those who believe in hard flames...
Those who drink the tears of dead little girls in the bank...
Flesh incinerated in the sacrificial rite
Which nobody will find in the rubble.

I cannot sip coffee in the same old cafe,
Nor listen to my daughter say "cat"
Because I am falling
Out of the arm of the empire where I live
And to he to whom the holy light of war has been
revealed
Does not care that I would have preferred that nothing
happen today,
Nothing that might provoke the uncontainable verborrhea
of the news,
Nor the Koranic inspiration of suicide pilots,
Nor the Pavlovian reaction of couch potatoes
Demanding that some place in the world must burn
To assuage the impotence that keeps them sitting there.

I didn't understand what they said —my own
tongue is foreign,
And those who follow their God speak no language which
is not theirs—,
But all I can say is that I am a man who got up early,
Dealt with all the morning's necessities,
Arrived to work where I work
And between dying by fire in the oven of the office
And leaping, decided to fly:

The pigeons of the harbor voyage on with me.

Translated by John Oliver Simon

El que cae de la torre

El que cae
tuvo la opción de morir por fuego
o volar hacia la muerte
y sentir, una vez más, la fresca brisa del río Hudson
antes de perderse para siempre en el olvido.

He visto celebrar a los niños del Oriente,
he visto la sonrisa en muchos labios limpios,
he mirado reírse mi dentadura de caníbal
en el espejo de los otros
y sé que al hombre que se precipita
no lo redime la pedagogía del mundo.

He salido a festejar en Palestina,
he rezado con lágrimas secas de espanto,
he llorado en un jardín de mi ciudad
por las calles de Manhattan cubiertas de ceniza,
me senté a leer el Corán en una plaza de Bagdad
y tal como me lo ordenó el capitán del avión
me abroché el cinturón de seguridad
para morir en el lugar que me asignaron.

Antes vi el palacio de la Moneda
herido otro 11 de septiembre:
ahí murió el doctor Allende.
seguramente moriré en Kabul mañana
por aquello del diente por diente
y el ojo por ojo.
no importa de quién sea la boca o la mirada.

Por lo pronto soy la cifra negativa en el cierre de la bolsa
y la multiplicación de las gotas de sangre
en los versos mutilados del *Poeta en Nueva York*:

Los muertos están embebidos, devorando
sus propias manos.
Son los otros los que bailan...
Los borrachos de plata, los hombres fríos...
Los que creen en las llamas duras...
Los que beben en el banco lágrimas de niña muerta...

carne incinerada en el ritual del sacrificio
que nadie encontrará en los escombros.

No puedo tomar café en el café de siempre,
ni oír a mi hija decirme gato,
porque voy cayendo
desde un brazo del imperio donde vivo
y a quien se le reveló la luz santa de la guerra
no le importó que yo hubiese preferido que hoy no pasara
nada,
nada que provocase la incontenible verborrea
de las noticias,
ni la inspiración coránica de los pilotos suicidas,
ni la reacción pavloviana de los televidentes mansos
que piden ardan todavía más, en cualquier parte
del mundo,
para consolar la impotencia que los tiene sentados ahí.

No entendí lo que dijeron —mi lengua es extranjera,
y los que siguen a su Dios no hablan otra que no sea
la suya—,
pero lo que yo digo es que soy un hombre que se levantó
temprano,
cumplió con los hábitos que la mañana exige,
llegó a trabajar donde trabaja
y entre morir por fuego en el horno de la oficina
y saltar, mejor salí volando:

Las palomas del puerto viajan conmigo.

Remembering Andrés Serra Rojas A Moral Duty

Armando Alfonzo Jiménez*



Photos courtesy of Dirección General de Comunicación Social de la UNAM

"To quote Addison: 'What a pity that we can die for our country but once.'"[1]

Andrés Serra Rojas was born October 13, 1904, in Pichucalco, Chiapas, and died last September 24, only 20 days before his ninety-seventh birthday.

There are many reasons why we should remember him: his contributions to the political and legal sciences are invaluable. Among his dozens of books are *Ciencia Política* (Political Science), *Teoría general del Estado* (General Theory of the State), *Derecho administrativo* (Administrative Law), *Derecho económico* (Economic Law), *Historia de las ideas e instituciones políticas* (History of Political Ideas and Institutions), *Antología política* (Political Anthology), *Hagamos lo imposible* (Let Us Do the Impossible) and *Mexica-*

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nidad: proyección de la nación mexicana hacia el siglo XXI (Mexican-ness: A Projection of the Mexican Nation into the Twenty-First Century).

He was professor emeritus and received an honorable doctorate degree from the National Autonomous University of Mexico, the highest honors a professor and researcher can achieve in that house of learning.

Andrés Serra Rojas referred without hesitation to the past. He knew like the Roman philosopher Cicero that "time does not pass uselessly and life ends by revealing to us the meaning of history."[2]

He very often delved into our country's history —which he undoubtedly adored— and managed to give it the most objective interpretation possible.

I remember that when I was in my third semester of law, on one of my frequent, pleasant visits to the library of the Institute for Legal Research, motivated by curiosity, I encountered the book *Los caudillos de la revolución de Ayutla; una de las etapas más interesantes y agitadas de la vida institucional de México* (The Caudillos of the Revolution of Ayutla; One of the Most Interesting and Agitated Stages in the Institutional Life of Mexico), the third in the series "Mexican Political Institutions," published in 1962, written by Don Andrés. I reread this historical piece for this article; among other issues, Serra sought to revalue the political role and moral situation of Ignacio Comonfort, about whom he writes:

> The history of that period confirmed the lasting experience of Comonfort: you govern with all or against all. Democracy is either the norm of government or there is no road but dictatorship. A people will never be happy when a faction or a privileged minority takes over the sources of wealth in the face of the immense majority, defenseless and mainly agricultural. He ... did not want to be the maker of poverty because the people always have to put up with it.[3]

Words replete with experience, and so needed as a reality in the Mexico of today, since Don Andrés not only knew the world of ideas, but participated actively in politics, taking on important responsibilities both in the executive and the legislative branches of government. As a man concerned with the welfare of the Mexican people, he always sought solutions in the realm of government and had the opportunity of serving his country from different parts of the public administration and in the Chambers of Deputies and Senators. From that perspective, he reasoned and described the problems generated in the different branches of government and designed formulas for solving many of the problems that plague Mexico's public administration, published in his *Tratado de derecho administrativo* (Treatise on Administrative Law) and other texts.

Andrés Serra Rojas passionately loved our university's School of Law. He always referred to it as "the school." It may have been one of the things he loved most, since he dedicated to it not only many hours of work but also a great part of his writings. He never undervalued the importance of the young, who in each generation represented the possibility of forging new ranks of attorneys. Mexico's youth was the main object of his concerns and reflections. Thus, in his work on the Ayutla revolution, we read:

> A young people like ours must care for the memory of its great men who raised high the banner of truth when infamy attempts to tarnish their merits.[4]

Without a doubt, we are carrying out our moral duty by paying homage to a great man who raised high the banner of truth and sought a way for many of us to feel appropriate admiration for the illustrious personages of whom he spoke in his writings. Sometimes, History (with a capital "H") and history (with a small "h") coincide and reach an undeniable congruence when we evoke a person of the stature of Andrés Serra Rojas, who contributed with his life and work to the construction of many of the pillars of the legal and political life of our country and, personally, of the construction of those of us who had the privilege of knowing him; in addition to wonderful memories, his legacy to us is his admirable example of study, dedication and, above all, generosity. VM

Notes

[1] Andrés Serra Rojas, *Los caudillos de la revolución de Ayutla; una de las etapas más interesantes y agitadas de la vida institucional de México* (Mexico City: Instituciones Políticas Nacionales, 1962), pp. 9-10.

[2] Ibid., p. 4.

[3] Ibid., p. 22.

[4] Ibid., p. 6.

Reviews

Dreaming with His Eyes Open. A Life of Diego Rivera
Patrick Marnham
Alfred A. Knopf Publisher
New York City, 1998, 350 pp.

Patrick Marnham highlights here the masterful personality of Diego Rivera, the Mexican painter of international repute, as a revolutionary muralist of the twentieth century.

In this biography of the controversial artist, the author gives us not only a well-researched testimony of Rivera's life, but also a comprehensive approach to explore modern Mexico's cultural and political struggles. Furthermore a true story that reads like an inspired novel.

The book depicts Rivera's emotional, elusive character since he was a child and the dramatic influence of both reason and imagination in his art. In a context full of action, our painter's life was affected by a peculiar family history that combined a father of liberal ascent with a traditional, thus very conservative, mother he always stood in opposition to. Having started his artistic education at the unusual age of 11, Rivera gradually developed a restless spirit that trapped him forever between his country, rural Indian past and the challenges of industrial capitalism. Paradoxically —as Marnham demonstrates—, Diego was to become a model member and promoter of the Mexican Communist Party in 1922, after having been awarded a government grant to study in Europe during the dictatorship of General Porfirio Díaz, whose rule restored slave labor in Mexico.

Marnham details the relevance of Diego's 15-year stay in the Old World since it was when he consolidated his search for authenticity in painting and also because it broadened Rivera's worldview, personal connections and passionate rivalries. There, he deepened his theoretical skills, moving toward Cubism, and he was touched by El Greco, Cézanne and the masters of Italian Renaissance, among others.

The author shows us a man whose attitudes toward life ranged from indifference to commitment, and explains how this affected his performance as a painter and as a leftist militant. In a persuasive manner, the reader is able to follow the development of Rivera's particularly complex and selfish behavior towards women, especially the core relationship that linked him to Frida Kahlo's dramatic destiny and striking art.

Diligent attention was paid to Mexico, a country of turmoil and beauty, used as a framework within which Marnham gives us a skillful description of Rivera's most remarkable murals in Mexico City, Cuernavaca and Chapingo; a decorous tribute to the genius.

The biography shows Rivera's progressive conversion to the cause of social justice and underlines the explosive impact the popular artisan have; he is seen as a symbol of a forthcoming era where freedom of expression would lead to both civil and human rights. According to the author, if something everlasting characterized this artist's life it was contradiction and change.

In *Dreaming with His Eyes Open* Marnham indeed seems to have captured, from the title onwards, the meaning of Rivera's journey from birth to death. Surrounded by magic, color and diversity, common and critical readers of this volume will approach Diego Rivera as a product of history, a paradigmatic artist but mainly as a maker of history departing from Marnham's sound judgements.

Silvia Núñez García
Academic Secretary of CISAN

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

La revolución espiritual de Madero.
Documentos inéditos y poco conocidos
(Madero's Spiritual Revolution. Unpublished and Little Known Documents)
Manuel Arellano Zavaleta, compiler
Gobierno del Estado de Quintana Roo
Mexico City, 2000, 486 pp.

"Your triumph will be brilliant," a spirit said to Francisco I. Madero, December 5, 1908, "And it will have incalculable consequences for our dear Mexico....We have already told you that General Díaz will be tremendously impressed. It will cause him real panic and his panic will paralyze or subvert all his efforts." Madero had become a medium in late October 1900. He was the organizer and president of the San Pedro Spiritualist Circle and its most advanced and constant medium. Many historians or history aficionados will already know that the "Apostle of Democracy," the architect of the Mexican Revolution of 1910, spoke to spirits, a distinguished spiritualist, seriously interested in theosophy and parapsychology, who fostered his mystical, philosophical beliefs above all through the publication of his and others' books. Few of us, however, had had access to the spirits' communications, written in the hand of Madero himself. The book *La revolución espiritual de Madero* (Madero's Spiritual Revolution) is revealing in that it transforms —if not radically, substantially— our ideas about the "Mystic of Freedom" and therefore about the Maderista Revolution, that was, as the reader knows, the first of a series of revolutions and revolts that occurred between 1910 and 1929.

With this annotated, commented compilation of unpublished or little known documents, Professor Manuel Arellano Zavaleta has contributed not only to the enrichment of Mexican history, changing our vision of a social and political movement that explains the twentieth century, but also to the appreciation of the figure of Francisco I. Madero from another, totally heterodox angle.

This is a book that unmasks Madero and definitively destroys the "political prudery" that kept his theological, philosophical concepts and spiritualist experiences hidden away. All prudery is dirty, but political prudery —in contrast with other kinds— contributes to the falsification of history or omitting facts. For example, a curious fact is that at the age of 30 (at the end of 1903), Madero made contact with Guadalajara's "Travelers of the Earth Circle" in which some members of the future Youth Athenaeum group like Luis Castillo Ledón, Marcelino Dávalos and Jorge Enciso, already participated. This enriches our image of these three members of the Athenaeum.

But the central part of the book is made up of Madero's ideals, democratic ideals that emerge amidst the wave of adversities arising from the suffocating Porfirio Díaz regime: the absence of a rule of law, terror, a press sold to the regime, the situation Turner describes in his *Barbarous Mexico*. If Madero's key work, *La sucesión presidencial de 1910* (The Presidential Succession of 1910), changed the course of Mexican history, the previously unpublished documents in *Madero's Spiritual Revolution* shows without subterfuges the gradual metamorphosis of Madero himself as an ideologue and as a man, a man who grew spiritually, just as his communications with the spirits also became more and more political to the point of gestating the democratic ideals of someone who belonged, paradoxically, to one of the richest landowning families of the *porfiriato*. This is a book that reminds us that the so-called "transition to democracy" was fostered by Madero in his time, under José Vasconcelos' slogan, "Effective suffrage; no reelection," a motto that implied democracy as a principle of political legitimation.

The book's introduction, written by Jaime Muñoz, is a brief description of the history of democracy, from the Greeks' unjust slave regime in which only free males participated, to

the modern idea of liberal democracy, the true focus to explain the emergence of an ideologue like Madero. Almost 100 years later, and in the profound ideological crisis we are experiencing, it is only just that we remember that one of the men to whom Mexico owes most in matters of democracy was the idealist spiritualist Madero.

The book is divided into three parts, all commented by Professor Arellano: the "spiritualist communications" (from 1901 to 1908), the "spiritualist manual" and the commentaries on the sixth-century-B.C. Indian philosophical poem, the *Bhagavad-Gita*. These commentaries were, in fact, published by Madero in the magazine *Espírita Helios* in 1912 and early 1913. Madero was a reader of the theosophist Helena Blavatsky (*Isis Unveiled* and *The Secret Doctrine*) but he also turned the *Bhagavad-Gita* into his spiritual guide, among other reasons, because in this ancient poem, Krishna

This annotated, commented compilation of unpublished or little known documents has contributed to the appreciation of the figure of Francisco I. Madero from another, totally heterodox angle.

(one of the names in Hinduism for "universal soul") gives the hero Arjuna the courage to fight the war against the enemy, despite the fact that among them are his relatives and friends, because that is his duty (his *dharma*) as a soldier.

Madero's Spiritual Revolution includes most of his communications with the spirits, contained originally in several notebooks: the only ones missing are from 1905 and 1906. Madero's brother Raúl, who died in childhood, is the spiritual protector and guide of the future revolutionary. Later, in 1906, another spirit, named José, makes his appearance. José is more reflexive and energetic: "Arm yourself with unbreakable determination," he tells Madero on one occasion. "Not for a single moment must you stop thinking about the grievous consequences that any weakness will bring you." It was this spirit who prepared him to launch the political struggle since, as Professor Arellano writes, "His participation was determined by a divine plan in which he was told he must struggle to transform the injustice and inequality Mexicans suffered that originated in the tyranny of the dictatorial government of General Díaz." In other words, our revolution was fostered by a spirit of one José, who, as a guide, encouraged Madero to fight. And it was that spirit who urged him to write *The Presidential Succession of 1910*, as is evidenced by the communications from 1907 to 1909. It is understandable, then, that Madero launched the political struggle for democracy with the total security and assurance of victory, since Providence itself had picked him for the mission. It is interesting to note how the spirit reproached him for not having written a protest with more data and more "fire": "We will be at your side when you do the deed...The result of this protest will not seem so great, but in reality it will cause a profound impression throughout the Republic and will prepare the way very well for your planned book [*The Presidential Succession*] and in general for the campaign you are preparing." Later, it concludes, "However, it will produce a great deal of to-do; the vast majority of the newspapers will publish it; there will be other similar protests; General Díaz will be furious with you; but all those who surround him will be delighted and will respect you increasingly."

Was it weakness that made Madero invent "protecting" spirits? Was it an excess of idealism that made him feel "predestined" to change history? Was his personality —dedicated to a great extent to spiritualist sessions— the most appropriate for carrying forward the revolutionary quest? Was it an excess of idealism and hope in the future or perhaps deep fear that made him resign the presidency a few days before being assassinated by Victoriano Huerta's thugs in 1913? Jalisco-born ex-Athenian Luis Castillo published an article in 1942 entitled "Madero previó y aceptó su sacrificio" (Madero Foresaw and Accepted His Sacrifice). Why, then, did he resign the presidency, which meant that his assassination was not the murder of a head of state?

Madero the revolutionary —a hero for official history; a coward to others; weak and idealistic for still others— is one of the most controversial figures in Mexican history. Without a doubt, *Madero's Spiritual Revolution* contributes to revealing an almost unknown facet of Madero that we have never been taught about, a Madero hidden by filthy political prudishness: the spiritual Madero.

Juan Antonio Rosado
Writer and UNAM professor


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LE IMPRESOR
M
LA MAQUINA
LA CAFETERA
EL VASO
V
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LOS TORNILLOS
A
LOS CUBIERTOS
R
EL RETRATO
C
LA COMIDA
O
LA OREJA DE A
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LA OLLA
E
LA FABRICA