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VOICES of Mexico

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100 Hundred Years of Light
The Photography Of
Manuel Álvarez Bravo

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Manuel Álvarez Bravo, *Portrait of the Eternal*, 1935.

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Manuel Álvarez Bravo, *Reverie*, 1931.

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Our Voice

Nothing is possible without men,
but nothing lasts without institutions.

Jean Monnet, 1888-1979

Recently, intense discussions have been taking place in academia —and to a lesser extent also in political circles— in Mexico, Canada and the United States about the North American community. Before centering on how to design concrete political proposals, the debate has first involved, among other issues, the need to define what is understood by "community" and why an initiative of this magnitude should be supported. This is important if we ask ourselves how the integration of a community could be conceived of among three countries that have encountered certain difficulties in defining their bilateral, trilateral and multilateral agendas and priorities. As we have already said in other editorials, Mexico and Canada have put forward some guidelines for beginning the discussion. However, Washington has been unclear about, if not reluctant to accept the feasibility of a community.

The challenge of this kind of a discussion makes it necessary for both academics and politicians to formulate questions before they try to put forward answers about the scope of a project of these dimensions. Above all, it is worthwhile considering that this issue has begun to be discussed in political and academic circles —mainly in Canada and the United States— with the intention of sparking a profound debate in which the different scenarios for building a North American community can be explored. In Mexico, this has been initially put forward in political circles, generating a debate still in its infancy among academics. In political milieus, the issue is beginning to be discussed at the highest level, certainly a new development. The discussion should aim to determine the steps needed to guarantee that if a Community of North America were created, we would have a national and tri-national perspective that would be, if not symmetrical, at least relatively similar.

To this effect, we should keep some historical precedents of our trilateral relations in mind. Even before there was talk of a trade treaty, Mexico began a process of liberalization with its entry into the General Agreement of Tariffs and Trade in 1986, followed by one of integration which crystallized with the coming into effect of NAFTA in 1994. Thus, a trade mechanism began to function de facto before it was formalized; integration began without being covered formally, something that was later implemented unsatisfactorily. The same thing might be happening in the case of the Community of North America: at the same time that the community is being discussed, it may have begun to function de facto. This is why it is important to establish a *moment* in trilateral relations that would prevent an atmosphere wherein the institutional intentions and capabilities to deal with the essence of the matter in a timely, appropriate fashion in the three countries could be overwhelmed.

The following is a list of the central aspects of the discussion that in our opinion should be taken into account in the academic debate and in the application of public policies in Mexico:

1. **The need to define "community."** It is fundamental to define the concept of "community." It is a term and a reality that could have three radically different meanings in each of the three countries. In any case, the construction of the Community of North America should be a gradual process of accords, negotiations and agreements in which the parties define common objectives based on their own interests but that encompass the basic proposal of the community.

2. **When should a community be constituted?** About this, two spaces for reflection are proposed: a) the societal agenda and b) the state agenda. Three moments for negotiation are also proposed: a) the short term: gathering consensuses; b) the medium term: the consensus of institutional construction; c) the long term: the consensus of the construction of the community. In this context, we can propose that four types of relationships are possible: Canada-U.S., Canada-Mexico, U.S.-Mexico or an articulated trilateral relationship that would lead to the establishment of solid bases for the construction of a community.
3. **What kind of community should be set up?** A Confederation of North America or a Consortium of North America (the latter implies the strengthening of existing trilateral institutions or creating new ones. There is certain skepticism in the three countries about this.).
4. **How should a community be set up?**
   - First goal: reformulating the concept of national sovereignty with the aim of defining the bases for the defense of the national interest;
   - Create a high level commission to deal with trilateral issues in a preliminary, preparatory fashion to be able to set the agenda and develop a coherent position about the question of "North America";
   - Discuss among the three countries on an academic and political level what "thinking about the North American Community" means;
   - Give Mexicans even more information about their two partners and about the meaning of integration at all levels;
   - Put forward a strategy for national development through development funds (the so-called social fund);
   - There are six basic issues involved in the community negotiation: trade, energy, borders, the environment, migration and security.
5. **Why a community?**
   - The strategic meaning of community;
   - The political will to create a community;
   - The political and economic viability of a community.
6. **Obstacles to the creation of a community**
   - NAFTA opened up borders to trade and posed the maturation and deepening of the treaty, a task which has not been completely realized;
   - Prior to NAFTA, at the end of the 1980s, the treaty as such was not discussed as "the community" is now being discussed. If we stopped doing so, we would be running a grave risk;
   - The gravest possible of political moments, 9/11, partially postponed the viability of this opening.

Since it is now inevitable that this issue be part of the trilateral agenda, these and other elements will have to be taken into consideration and discussed in coming issues of *Voices of Mexico* to be able to think as clearly as possible about how far our three countries would want and would be able to go. However, we should recognize that at least for Mexico, this will be an arduous exercise considering that Washington has not responded very favorably about many topics on the bilateral agenda that are part of the integration process. This would have to change if we hope to achieve a relationship of true cooperation and reciprocity.

* * *

The topic of the community of North America is anchored in Mexico's bilateral and trilateral relations with the other countries of the region. In this issue of *Voices of Mexico,* we include an interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Jorge G. Castañeda about the fundamental issues of our bilateral agendas with the United States and Canada, such as migration, security, borders, trade and culture. He also deals with more general topics linked to the new strategies of Mexican foreign policy, which has sought —without a doubt, successfully— to play a more active role than in the past, a role that truly has an impact on changes in the international order in light of phenomena like globalization and September 11. A good example of this new

philosophy of Mexico's foreign policy is its favorable performance in the U.N. Security Council, where it has been a member since the beginning of the year, a balance sheet of which Castañeda presents in his interview.

For Mexico, the community of North America also implies thinking about its recent experiences in international trade, the analysis of the advantages and disadvantages, the successes and failures of integration in the region through NAFTA, and about the need and importance of diversifying trade through other treaties like the one signed with the European Union. Alejandro Chanona and Antonio Ortiz Mena, two of Mexico's most widely recognized specialists on these topics, present articles in this issue.

Thinking about a community of North America also implies dealing with the inequalities and asymmetries of the countries that would integrate with each other. In our "Society" section, we present articles about two social problems that have undoubtedly been a hindrance to our development and international competitiveness and that Mexico must overcome in the medium term: poverty and the no less thorny problem of inequality, on this occasion with regard to businesses, their access to credit and growth.

The North American community also presupposes recognizing the growing economic and political importance of the population of Mexican origin in the United States. That is why we present a panorama of the Hispanic market in the U.S. West, with a look at its buying power and specific weight in the region's economy. We also include a contribution about the interaction between Canada's provincial and federal governments in oil exports to the United States in the context of NAFTA.

The centrality of the U.S. economy for Mexico and its resulting dependence is not new, but neither has it been completely constant, as historian Sandra Kuntz Ficker demonstrates in her article about Mexico-U.S. trade from the end of the nineteenth century to 1948.

* * *

This year is the hundredth anniversary of the birth of one of the greatest artistic geniuses of the twentieth century: Mexican photographer Manuel Álvarez Bravo. *Voices of Mexico* could not remain on the sidelines of the national homage that is being paid to him, and therefore we include in this issue a photographic portfolio with some of his best work in order to disseminate it to the U.S. and Canadian public.

We have dedicated "The Splendor of Mexico" to some aspects of the vast historical, cultural and artistic wealth of the state of Veracruz. One article deals with the little-studied but undoubtedly influential civilization of the Huaxtecs; another looks at the cultural and architectural achievements of El Tajín and its Teotihuacan influences; yet another examines the ecological, cultural, economic and nutritional importance of vanilla, a typical Veracruz product. Our "Museums" section presents one of the state's most interesting institutions, the Xalapa Anthropology Museum.

In this issue, we are inaugurating the section "Science and Technology," through which we aim to disseminate some of our university's and our country's important contributions to the world of science. The section's debut article is by UNAM researcher Ricardo Rosales, who has made important discoveries in the quest for a vaccine to treat cervical cancer.

Graciela Martínez Zalce has contributed an article about the rise of literature written by women in Mexico, including the work of Vizania Amezcua and Susana Pagano, fragments of whose novels we have also translated and included in this issue. Lastly, we have dedicated our "In Memoriam" section to remembering another great Mexican photographer, Mariana Yampolsky. From our pages, we wish to thank her for her sensitivity in portraying rural, indigenous Mexico. We are sure her work will endure.

José Luis Valdés-Ugalde

Mexico's New Diplomacy
Interview with Minister of Foreign Affairs Jorge G. Castañeda

Photos courtesy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Press Office

Minister Castañeda at the Monterrey Summit.

VOICES OF MEXICO: In the days prior to September 11, spectacular advances could be foreseen in the negotiations on migration with the then-recently inaugurated Bush administration. Eight months later, what has been done to reactivate those negotiations and what has been achieved?

MINISTER JORGE G. CASTAÑEDA: The terrorist attacks against the United States meant a pause in bilateral negotiations on migration, but certainly not a suspension of our dialogue. What has changed is the pace in reaching our objectives. A little after 9/11, Presidents Fox and Bush recognized that the fundamental conditions that made a broad migratory agreement necessary were still present in both countries, with the important addition of the issue of security as a matter of concern to the United States, particularly regarding its borders and ports of entry.

We understand that our two countries' bilateral agenda must take into account new priorities. Nevertheless, both governments are aware that migration plays a central role in that agenda, as was shown by the rapid resumption of the work of the High Level Group on Migra-

tion after 9/11. Our view of migration has not been fundamentally altered, since the main problem has not changed either. We continue to actively promote a broad migration accord that would include the most generalized regularization possible for Mexican residents in the United States; the issuing of more H2 visas for our workers; the definition and implementation of a temporary workers program; the promotion of increased border safety; and the fostering of development in the Mexican communities that send more migrants to the U.S.

A crucial achievement in the negotiations has been the launching of programs for regional economic development in Mexico, particularly in those states and municipalities that have the highest migration rates. This point is a central component of the Partnership for Prosperity that we established last March in Monterrey, one of the most ambitious initiatives that we have ever undertaken to promote a greater socioeconomic convergence of our peoples.

The new concerns that stem from the attacks and the international campaign against terrorism have been added to the negotiations with the United States more as opportunities than as obstacles. The agreements reached by both countries in Monterrey were made possible by this shared vision, which demonstrate the importance of the border, both as an economic link and a port of entry.

VM: President Fox once said in the United States that with NAFTA we should work toward not only free transit of goods but also of people. But, what measures and policies has the Mexican government developed to protect Mexicans who cross the border illegally?

MJC: Within the framework of the broad negotiations, Mexico introduced the issue of security as a priority on the migration agenda. This allowed Mexico to emphasize the importance of knowing the profile and location of our migrants as a major element in bolstering U.S. internal security, as this would mean greater orderliness and protection of our fellow countrymen who are in the United States to work and make money, not to threaten U.S. national security. We should never lose sight of their great contribution to the American economy.

We have already made significant progress, particularly with regard to bi-national programs for migrant security, efforts to prevent border violence and trafficking in persons, cooperation in cases of emergency in the area, and mechanisms for safe, orderly repatriations. These issues were part of the Plan of Action that Mexico and the United States signed in June 2001. We must not forget that, more than a starting point, these actions go straight to the heart of the matter. Mexicans who cross the border, particularly in

summer, are exposed to grave dangers in desert areas where there is less surveillance and no walls separating the two countries. Many die in the attempt. For the Mexican government, averting more Mexican deaths is a priority and to that end we have put into practice different systems of protection and aid along the border, in coordination with U.S. authorities, such as the INS, the Border Patrol and local police forces. For our part, the authorities of the National Migration Institute, the Beta Groups and the Ministry of Health, among other institutions, have reinforced a variety of safety measures in these remote areas, including surveillance and rescue missions in aid of those who find themselves in situations of danger, distribution of water and easy-to-prepare food and transfer of migrants to safe places where they are given the medical attention they require. As a result, the number of migrants who die in their attempt to cross the border has dropped significantly.

VM: Globalization and its collateral phenomena have placed the concept of sovereignty under discussion. Do you think that our traditional foreign policy principles of non-intervention and self-determination continue to be valid, or is it time to move toward other ways of conceiving and implementing a strategic foreign policy in today's international relations?

MJC: This is one of the issues that sparks the greatest debate in Mexico among those interested in foreign policy, and I believe that it has led to several misunderstandings. The principles of foreign policy incorporated in the Mexican Constitution in 1988 already existed in the United Nations Charter. They are universal and timeless in nature and we do not question their validity. Nevertheless —and here lies the first misunderstanding— they are values, criteria that serve as a guide for decision-making; they are not, in themselves, therefore, a *program* for foreign policy, as many would like to believe. Until recently, these principles —in particular those of non-intervention and self-determination— were used as shields to avert foreign scrutiny, at a time when the country was clearly lagging behind other nations in areas such as democracy and respect for human rights. This abuse of the principles distorted the way they were understood, blurring their relation to other government objectives, such as ensuring full observance of individual rights and protecting human rights in general.

Secondly, it is a recognized fact that several of these principles have undergone profound changes in recent decades. Principles do not disappear; they evolve. States have decided to cede sovereignty in many fields of action, both for the common good and in their own interests. The universal trend of favoring the protection of individuals over the protection of states has in fact reduced the breadth of those principles. This positive evolution has been the result of continuing international negotiations and is rooted in commonly accepted legal norms we would

Both governments are aware that migration plays a central role on the bilateral agenda, as was shown by the rapid resumption of the work of the High Level Group on Migration after 9/11.

With President Vicente Fox.

like to see applied in all states. Today, Mexico's international behavior fully incorporates this evolution. Without falling prey to rhetoric about those principles, we can become front line players in the current international system and active participants in its transformation.

VM: One of the main objectives of *Voices of Mexico* is to contribute to supporting and disseminating Mexican culture, art, history and thinking in the international community. Could you explain to our readers the kinds of activities and policies that have been developed to strengthen cultural policy in the United States to favor the social climate in which communities of Mexican origin live there?

MJC: One priority in Mexico's international strategy today has been transforming people's perceptions of Mexico abroad. At the same time that the government works domestically to fight the evils that have damaged our international image so greatly —like corruption or insecurity— the Ministry of Foreign Relations has promoted a better understanding of our country's political renovation, economic potential and cultural wealth.

Here, I would like to stress that we are promoting Mexico's culture abroad in two main directions. On the one hand, we have undertaken an ambitious strategy to promote Mexico's rich culture abroad, thus fostering an open dialogue between Mexico's arts and humanities community and those of other countries. On the other hand, and independently from the first strategy, the federal government is committed to keep supporting the populations of Mexican origin living in other countries, most particularly in the United States, establishing close ties between them and our country, fostering both individual and community development. Both tasks are government priorities, but I think that to carry them out effectively, it is necessary to make a clear distinction between their objectives and strategies. In one case, we are trying to attract other peoples to Mexico; in the other, the purpose is to support our fellow citizens abroad, particularly in the United States.

Our fellow countrymen are in the United States to work and make money, not to threaten U.S. national security. We should never lose sight of their great contribution to the American economy.

With regard to cultural promotion abroad, we have strengthened the Ministry of Foreign Relations' Office for Cultural Affairs so it can be more effective in disseminating Mexican culture and therefore contribute to the rebranding of Mexico as a modern, plural and democratic nation. As an essential part of this strategy, we decided to create the Institute of Mexico, a new entity within the ministry that will bring under one roof Mexico's cultural centers around the world providing them with a common identity and a single legal framework. Our aim is not only to promote Mexico's culture or cultural products abroad, but also to present our country as an attractive place for foreign tourism and investment.

Regarding the second policy area, the ministry's Program for Mexican Communities Abroad is the instrument that the government has established to bring people of Mexican origin closer to Mexico's culture. But this program goes much further than that, as it carries out many other academic, educational, health, cultural and sports projects that seek both to strengthen their ties with our country and facilitate their own insertion into the communities they live in. To this end, we have carried out intense diplomatic efforts to eliminate the barriers and obstacles most Mexicans face due to their condition as migrants or minorities, or often their cultural and educational background. Additionally, we are also promoting greater personal and group development among Mexican immigrants and their families.

This program has already had important successes in education, health and culture. For example, in education we have increased the coverage and depth of the programs the ministry conducts along with the Ministry of Public Education, as well as other public and private institutions in Mexico and the United States. With regard to health, we have coordinated a series of activities aimed at promoting preventive medicine and health care for the most vulnerable sectors of the Mexican community in the United States, on issues such as addictions, cancer, diabetes, HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and domestic violence. We have also supported cultural activities in these communities through "Spanish-language reading circles" in California, Arizona, Illinois, New York and Texas; children's

drawing contests; touring painting and photography exhibits; courses and lectures; and radio campaigns.

VM: Relations with Canada have become strategic for Mexico, both because we are partners in NAFTA and because we each border on the United States at a time in which U.S. national security has become an issue that has an influence on the dynamics of international politics. Where do relations with Canada fit into the government's foreign policy priorities?

MJC: President Fox has decided that Mexico's new foreign policy should develop along two central guidelines: on the one hand, deepening our strategic relationship with North America, and on the other, achieving a more active participation in the international system. Under this dual conception, the relationship with Canada plays a central role. Since the signing of NAFTA, trade relations between our two countries, as well as their relationship with the United States, have generated a strong economic convergence that not only increased the exchange of goods and services among all three countries, but also revealed the potential for greater integration in other fields. The logical evolution of the treaty and the political and economic maturity of Mexico, which made our democratic change feasible, open up the possibility of moving toward the creation of a new supranational institutional framework in the North American region, designed on the basis of open markets —including the labor market— and a new sense of community. Canada's experience is significant in this regard because of its greater integration to the U.S. economy and, at the same time, because it ultimately offers a different perspective.

This economic convergence and the creation of a trilateral institutional framework are similar to those we have been witnessing in Europe for nearly five decades, although they will of necessity have their own dynamics and characteristics. What is important is that this transition is possible and close at hand, and that it offers advantages for all three countries, not just Mexico. The strategy of integration in North

America promotes our foreign policy interests and at the same time will be an anchor for Mexico's emerging democracy, just like the European Economic Community was for Spain's democracy in the 1980s. The difference is that Spain was able to take advantage of already existing institutions, while Mexico must first promote their creation. This is the ultimate purpose of establishing a new, closer and more profound relationship with the United States and Canada, which will nurture a new international identity of Mexico and a new sense of community in North America.

VM: Beyond the anecdotal, the matter of Fidel Castro and Mexico's vote in the Human Rights Commission in Geneva make for a conceptual transformation of the role Mexican diplomacy must play in the international sphere, a diplomacy that is more active and more committed to democracy, the free market, human rights, the fight against drug trafficking, etc. In that sense, what position will Mexico take, as a firm defender of multilateralism, vis-à-vis the United States' growing unilateralism on such important issues as the International Criminal Court?

MJC: Multilateralism and international law are the foundations of our shared international system. In the last decades we have witnessed a strengthening of multilateralism, as the international community gets involved in new issues such as the environment and sustainable development, international organized crime or the rights of minorities, issues that together form what is known today as the "new international agenda".

Mexico is committed to strengthening the international system and its rules. For that reason we supported and took part in the negotiation of an international convention to protect and promote the rights of the disabled during the Durban Conference Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance in September of 2001. At the United Nations, we also presented a proposal for a convention against corruption that is now being negotiated in Vienna.

As a matter of course, as was the case with the great majority of nations, we have also watched with concern the United States' tendency —it must be said that this is not only attributable to the current administration— to withdraw from or avoid involvement with a great many important international agreements, not only the one creating the International Criminal Court, but also, to mention just a few, the Kyoto Protocol on the environment; the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty; the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Antipersonnel Mines and Their Destruction (or Mine Ban Treaty); and the protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention. We should also remember that the United States withdrew from UNESCO in 1984 and has not made any plans to rejoin this organization. We believe that no power can be a part of the international system without subjecting itself to a minimum set of rules adopted to improve international coexistence. Nevertheless, particularly after the September terrorist attacks, the United States seems to have become aware of the limits of unilateralism and of the support it has received from the global community, which in reciprocity requests its solidarity on many other issues.

We would like this policy of "multilateralism *a la carte*" to move into a terrain of firmer global commitment. We also believe that in the complex world created by 9/11, all nations should resist the grave temptation of reducing policy options to a simple dualist or Manichaean ethic. In any case, this is an argument that Mexico is putting forward today in all international fora.

For the Mexican government, averting more Mexican deaths is a priority and to that end we have put into practice different systems of protection and aid along the border.

VM: In this framework, we have one obligatory question: What is Mexico's position vis-à-vis certain U.S. actions abroad and unilateral foreign policy positions, for example, the certification of other countries' fight against drug trafficking or some of its stances about the recurring and increasingly profound crises in Latin American countries (Argentina, Venezuela, Colombia, Guatemala)?

MJC: Clearly, the United States is today the international system's hegemonic power, possessing a political and economic weight that greatly enhances its capability for action. Its condition as an unrivaled power may lead it to make unilateral decisions that direct-

Castañeda with other U.S. and Mexican cabinet members at the White House.

ly serve its interests and —it should be recognized— may sometimes affect the interests or rights of other nations (I have already referred to some important examples, like the Kyoto Protocol or the Statute of Rome). Additionally, due to the tragic events of September 11, the United States has focused its foreign policy more on regions and issues specifically linked to the fight against terrorism and, as a result, seems to be paying less attention to Latin America. Nevertheless, Mexico and the United States continue to exchange points of view about the situation in the region, as in the cases of Colombia, Venezuela and Argentina. These discussions are very constructive, for they help strengthen mutual cooperation efforts and are part of a bilateral commitment to build a new, broader and more mature relationship, one that does not compromise Mexico's foreign policy principles or actions.

The process of certification in the fight against drugs is an excellent example of what can be achieved through dialogue. As a result of intensive lobbying efforts, Mexico managed to persuade U.S. authorities, particularly in the U.S. Congress, of the fact that certification was a counterproductive and unilateral policy, rightfully achieving its temporary suspension. Those efforts would not have been successful if we had not been able to show that Mexico was committed to continue fighting drug trafficking, and living up to its commitments.

As the recent arrests of important drug traffickers prove, Mexico is keeping its word. Only through commitment and delivery was Mexico able to stop the certification process. It is with concrete actions of this kind that the government of President Fox is strengthening our mutual trust and cooperation, factors that are indispensable for dealing with the common challenges we face.

VM: Could you draw a balance sheet of Mexico's role as the chair of the UN Security Council?

MJC: The record of the first Mexican chair of the Security Council in February is very positive, just as is, in broader terms, that of our participation in the council since January 2002. We are a member who is listened to and respected; we dutifully carried out all our obligations, managing the workload on issues such as international peace keeping operations and problem solving in other areas. We had no difficulty in assuming the chair in February (the post, as you know, is rotated monthly) despite the fact that we had only recently joined the council.

When we chaired the council, we especially advanced two issues highlighted since our 2001 membership campaign: greater transparency in the council's work and greater democratization with the active participation of more members of the international community. At our initiative two public debates were held, one on the situation in Burundi, with the participation of its president, and another on the problem of refugees, with the participation of UN High Commissioner for Refugees Ruud Lubbers. In addition, following its program, the council looked at the situation of more than 10 countries, mainly in Africa and Asia. It also held an emergency meeting about the crisis in the Middle East, with the participation of Secretary General Kofi Annan and delegations from Israel and Palestine. For the first time, at the end of our chair there was a session to review the month's work, which allowed for additional dialogue among council members and other UN member states.

I think we can feel satisfied with Mexico's role in the council, particularly while we chaired it. Moreover, I would like to emphasize that the catastrophic predictions about the supposed problems we were going to face in advancing our positions vis-à-vis the great powers, particularly the United States, were all ill founded.

The strategy of integration in North America will be an anchor for Mexico's emerging democracy, just like the EEC was for Spain's democracy in the 1980s.

VM: Eight years after NAFTA and with the prospect of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas, what policies and strategies have been considered with regard to regionalization and trade diversification?

MJC: Just as the World Trade Organization is the main mechanism for promoting multilateral trade liberalization, bilateral and regional accords allow us to foster our trade relations with other nations and regions. In turn, these accords complement and foster greater multilateral liberalization. That is why we will continue implementing them. For Mexico, signing regional accords does not limit hemispheric integration; rather, it serves as a first step in reaching broader accords.

In fact, the different accords that have been signed are compatible with greater hemispheric integration and, in addition, are consistent with the guidelines already established by the World Trade Organization.

Mexico's membership in NAFTA and in many other commercial treaties places us in a vantage position. Such accords have allowed for an unprecedented expansion of our foreign trade, they have given us considerable experience in the process of trade liberalization, which will continue in coming years, and they have allowed us to deepen our dialogue and relations with other countries and regions, particularly with the countries of North America and the European Union.

One of the aims of creating a free trade area in the hemisphere, as has been proposed, is to contribute to increasing the competitiveness of national economies and, to that extent, induce greater economic growth, job creation and, thereby, a higher standard of living for the hemisphere's population. But we should not lose sight of the other factor that I have pointed out: the deepening of our dialogue and political links with other countries, with the ensuing strengthening of our international position.

VM: Do you have anything more to add?

MJC: I would just like to express my gratitude to *Voices of Mexico*. For more than a decade this publication has done an extraordinary job of disseminating contemporary Mexican thinking beyond our borders. I think that these efforts become even more important during the current period of change in our country, a time for leaving behind old habits and trying to consolidate a new civic and democratic culture in Mexico, while we seek to take on a more active and constructive role in the world. Thank you very much. VM

Political Parties in Mexico Since the Changing of the Guard

César Cansino*

None of the country's three main political forces has read correctly the new role they have been called upon to play in the political-economic scenario that opened up because of alternation in the presidency.

After more than 70 years of domination of a single political party, alternation in the presidency since the 2000 elections has made for enormous challenges for Mexico's main political parties, including the previously "official party." They have had to struggle to remain or turn themselves into viable options for power in a context in which, at the end of the day, the real competition characteristic of a democratic system was imposed. Nevertheless, as I will attempt to show here, neither the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) nor the National Action Party (PAN), today's governing party, nor the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) have been up to the challenges. What is more, none of the country's three main political forces has read correctly the new role they have been called upon to play in the political-economic scenario that opened up because of alternation in the presidency. They all seem to be holding tight to the script from the past that satisfies their particular short-term interests but which in the end eludes all commitment to the big problems and challenges inaugurated by the twenty-first century.

Internal Democracy

The PRI, PAN and PRD, each in its own way, have shared the challenge of being up to the new political zeitgeist and of therefore making the internal institutional and programmatic transformations that these new conditions demand. All this has the aim, in particular, of exorcising the dangers of weakness or political irrelevance or, worse, the threats of internal splits that plague them all to a greater or lesser degree. Another vital issue has been their political, strategic repositioning vis-à-vis the executive branch.

The high point of the internal life of the three parties was reached during each of their respective national assemblies in 2001 and the subsequent election of their main leaders. Of course, the PAN replacing the PRI in office forced the latter and the PRD to carefully review the reasons for their electoral defeat, while demanding that the PAN evaluate the implications of its new situation as governing party. However, none of the national assemblies led to a significant redefinition of positions or countered the inertia of the past.

The PRD, for example, could not change or balance the presence of strong charismatic leaderships or factional groups that not only slow the party's much-needed institutionalization but also present it before public opinion as an organization divided and crisscrossed by factional, patronage and corporatist interests, all highly contradictory with the democratic ideal that is apparently increasingly maturing among ordinary Mexicans. The PRI has also been unable to concretize its efforts and initiatives for structural transformation. Quite to the contrary, its leadership has not been

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
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From left to right: Felipe Bravo Mena, president of the PAN; Rosario Robles, president of the PRD; and Roberto Madrazo, president of the PRI.

The PRI has not been self-critical in its analysis of its 2000 defeat.

self-critical in its analysis of its 2000 defeat nor in introducing corrective measures. There has been, however, a stage of extraordinary repositioning by Roberto Madrazo, one of the party's old guard. Despite the fact that he represents all the vices the party must overcome in a real institutional transformation, in achieving control over the party, to a certain extent Madrazo has solved the irrefutable problem of the lack of an effective party leadership. Finally, the PAN has not managed to define its ideal relationship with President Vicente Fox. Mutual attacks are numerous and range from the president's unacceptable pragmatism to the clear, traumatic marginalization of PAN cadre from senior posts in the administration. To make matters worse, the present and future of the PAN are tied —perhaps tragically— to the charismatic figure of Fox. The correlation is irrefutable: the drop in the president's popularity has been accompanied by a marked decline in the party's electoral results.

Another important moment in the dynamic of the parties after the onset of the PAN administration was reached in October 2001 when, after three months of lobbying and negotiations, the political parties and the administration decided to sign the Political Agreement for National Development, along with other actors in the country's political and economic life.

In practice, however, this agreement gave rise to very poor and only momentary gains since it left out the most pressing issues that would give substance and new horizons to the democratic transition, such as the reform of the state.

Nevertheless, the inability to live up to challenges like this one is not the exclusive responsibility of the parties; it also lies with the federal administration whose political operatives have been ineffective and ambiguous.

In conclusion, the political parties have been intensely active since the 2000 alternation in power. However, in the main, their achievements have been poor. What is more, the changes in each political force are not enough to create the appropriate conditions for advancing in the transformation and/or consolidation of our young democracy. In effect, a profound change in our institutions and norms that would mark a departure from the authoritarian past presupposes the existence of strong, solid, mature parties that can serve as intermediaries with an experienced, efficient executive branch (in contrast with the wavering, imprecise one we have had). In the absence of all of this, it would not be possible to carry forward the still unfinished and desirable task

of giving shape to a reform of the state, the most finished expression of Mexico's democratic transition. Up until now, the process of political change has not encouraged these outcomes, among other reasons because the parties, exhausted by their own internal crises, have not been capable of coming to an agreement among themselves and with the executive branch about the kinds of reforms required, how profound they should be and what direction they should take to concretize the indispensable institutional and normative change that the country's new political situation demands.

A Review of the Damages

How does Mexican society perceive the three main parties' response to the important challenges that the consolidation of democracy requires in our country?

For the PRI, the most significant risk it has run after losing office is a breakup that could precipitate the already advanced process of Balkanization expressed in regional leaderships, local power groups and increasingly disconnected sectors. Insisting on imposing public figures on the rank and file and the organization itself brings with it the repercussions that the PRI has already fallen victim to and that political rationality would advise against. Nevertheless, what seems to have the upper hand is the PRI supposition that a "leader" can, Messiah-like, guarantee the political strength needed given the insufficiency of political resources in the party's formal and institutional structure and the absence of an external source of power (like the presidency and administration constituted until very recently).

From that point of view, perhaps the PRI's main risk is the possibility of such a problematic confrontation that would lead to schisms impossible to heal by institutional means.

The PRD's situation is different. The PRD exemplifies the tortuous road that the Mexican left has taken in its attempt to become an alternative government when faced with an electorate that is increasingly critical and predisposed to splitting and reasoning its vote. However, it has positioned itself before the public as a party with a democratic discourse that it does not apply internally, where it is Balkanized and fraught with fraudulent practices assumed to be exclusive to other parties. This series of inconsistencies noticeably affects the PRD's electoral outcome: in recent local elections, the best it has been able to do is to not succumb to some emerging parties, and it has shown clear symptoms of stagnation, with vote counts lower than those of the PAN and the PRI, maintaining a shaky third place nationwide.

One of the main obstacles to the consolidation of the PRD as a left (or "center-left") electoral alternative is its internal conflicts. It reproduces the Mexican left's endemic proclivity to dispersion and cannibalism. At times, paradoxically, it would seem that the PRD still needs leaders and charismatic strong-men who can coherently mesh the different internal forces and avert greater clashes and dispersion.

It is no exaggeration to say that the PAN's future depends to a great extent on the strategy it adopts vis-à-vis the Fox administration. The PAN has suffered a significant decline in its electoral results under the current administration. At the very least, it has lost many posts that under other circumstances it would have been able to maintain or win. That is why the party leadership has to carry out a serious, objective balance sheet of its activity in recent years and, based on that, renew its political proposal, but above all, assume the full implications of its role as a governing party. A second, equally important, challenge for the PAN in coming years will be taking the active role that it historically has as the architect and promoter of the normative and institutional change the country requires to give the democratic transition that began with the alternation in office in 2000 direction and a new horizon. Until now, the PAN's commitment to the reform of the state has been mainly rhetorical and ambiguous.

The present and future of the PAN are tied, perhaps tragically, to the charismatic figure of Vicente Fox.

In summary, as long as there are no solid advances in creating a democracy, in a new design of our system of norms and the construction of real rule of law, we will be left with the impression that the alternation of power our country has experienced with the PAN, the PRI and the PRD as its main protagonists has not been translated into lasting changes that will make legitimacy and democratic governability feasible. VM

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Growth and Poverty Two Persistent Faces of Mexico

Jesús Francisco Estévez García*

Antonio Nava/AVE Photo

Macroeconomic data shows up the contradictory trends that have affected Latin American countries differently over the last decade. Mexico did not escape the impact of a regional slow-down in economic growth. This, together with well-known specific national developments, had an impact on foreign investment in 1994 and 1995,[1] created volatility in labor markets and escalated the rate and intensity of poverty in the mid-1990s. On the other hand, the state not only maintained, but tendentially increased social spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) in the years 1999-2000, stabilizing the achievements with regard to some indicators linked to the satisfaction of the population's basic needs. However, on-going national economic inequality, expressed in the concentration of income in few hands, continues to hinder higher growth rates that could be beneficial if their results were distributed in a balanced way among the population.

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Developed Mexico

The Mexican economy is growing. Recent evolution of national GDP shows how the country has recovered from the 1995 crisis, achieving its largest increase in 1999-2000 (see table 1).

With the exception of the intermediate period of 1994 to 1996 when it subsided, Mexico's GDP has grown, and in 2000 was 28 percent higher than the 1993 figure. Concretely, per capita GDP

TABLE 1
EVOLUTION OF MEXICO'S GDP AT CONSTANT 1993 PRICES
SERIES: 1993-2000

TOTAL NATIONAL PERIOD	VARIATION GDP*	(BASE YEAR, 1993=1)
1993	1,155,132,188	1.00
1994	1,206,135,039	1.04
1995	1,131,752,762	0.98
1996	1,190,075,547	1.03
1997	1,270,744,066	1.10
1998	1,334,586,475	1.16
1999	1,382,935,488	1.20
2000	1,474,725,467	1.28

* Millions of pesos at constant 1993 prices.

Source: INEGI, *Sistema de cuentas nacionales de México: Producto Interno Bruto por entidad federativa, 1993-2000*.

GRAPH 1
HOURLY WAGE IN MANUFACTURING
U.S. Dollars



Source: Based on data from Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Laboral (ACLAN), *Los mercados de trabajo en América del Norte: un análisis comparativo* (United States: 1997), p. 13.

There is a clear tendency
to improvement with regard to the satisfaction
of basic needs: education,
housing, electricity, drainage and running water.

growth rate between 1999 and 2000 was a respectable 5.4 percent, U.S.$5,080 per capita in absolute terms, maintaining Mexico's status as a country with an upper-middle income according to World Bank classifications.[2]

According to the famous "trickle-down" theories that sustain that benefits will sooner or later be transferred to the less privileged sectors of the population, we must think that in the medium term, growth, even with the tendency to concentrate wealth in a small part of the population, will bring with it an improvement in the quality of life for ordinary citizens. This suggests that Mexico's evolution implies substantial, sustained improvement in the lives of its people in general.

IMPOVERISHED MEXICO AND SOCIAL SPENDING

The truth of the matter is that even when living conditions improve, they are framed in a clear context of economic insecurity; this insecurity characterizes everyone who, even if not considered poor, can only satisfy their immediate basic needs and cannot save or invest in household assets. This means that in periods of growth, certain layers of the population just barely surpass the poverty level, so that in critical economic periods, they fall below the poverty line, catastrophically elevating poverty and marginalization figures. One of the fundamental causes of this is the characteristic volatility of Mexico's labor market. Low open unemployment only masks the high level of employment in the informal sector. In addition, low wages and their scant participation in the national product are traditional char-

acteristics of the functioning of the Mexican economy (see graph 1).[3]

It should be noted that the cost of labor, already cheap compared to Mexico's partners in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), drops despite the increase in worker productivity in the same period (see graph 2). In addition, we should recognize the role to which Mexico might be relegated in the international context of globalization. We should consider whether this is not one of the stable characteristics of Mexico's development that will cause cyclical retreats in the fight against poverty given that the country has inserted itself in the world economy using cheap labor and, consequently, low production costs as its competitive advantage. The words of Ferdinand Piëch, the German president of Volkswagen, leave no room for doubt:

> The workers of Volkswagen's Czech subsidiary, Skoda, discovered that from the advent of the Wolfsburg auto giant, their productivity had risen 30 percent, but their wages had hardly changed at all. "If this continues, we will not reach conditions comparable to Germany's even in 50 years," complained Zdenek Kadlec, spokesman for the Skoda company committee. But Ferdinand Piëch, president of Volkswagen, coldly blocked the satisfaction of the Czech workers' wage demands. The Skoda work force should not interfere with their local advantages, he warned. Otherwise, "undoubtedly we would have to consider if production would not be more advantageous elsewhere like, for example, in Mexico."[4]

Mexico's low wages and volatile job market are associated with and

TABLE 2
POVERTY RATE IN MEXICO

YEAR	% OF HOUSEHOLDS UNDER POVERTY LINE	% OF HOUSEHOLDS UNDER INDIGENCE LINE
1989	39.30	14.00
1994	35.80	11.80
1996	43.40	15.60
1998	38.00	13.20

Source: Data from CEPAL, *Panorama social de América Latina, 2000-2001* (Santiago de Chile: United Nations, 2001).

GRAPH 2
LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN MANUFACTURING
Annual Growth



Source: Based on data from: Secretariado de la Comisión para la Cooperación Laboral (ACLAN), *Los mercados de trabajo en América del Norte: un análisis comparativo* (United States: 1997), p. 13.

After the 1995 economic crisis, poverty increased and, while it did decline somewhat later, it has not returned to 1994 levels.

can explain some of the extreme variations in poverty measurements (see table 2) when economic downturns occur. The increase in the percentage of households under the poverty and indigence lines immediately after the 1995 economic crisis should be noted: almost eight points in the first case and four in the second.[5] The improvement in living conditions in 1998, however, was not very rapid given that only 5 percent and 2 percent of the households, respectively, crossed upwards. In addition, the reader should take into account that the poverty rate is measured here in terms of a percentage of households and not individuals, which would tend to lower the rates because poor households are often the most numerous.

Poverty rates we have measured quarterly show that counter-tendencies exist with regard to the achievements in the fight against poverty. On the one hand, the rates used by the unsatisfied basic needs method are lowered and those linked to the poverty-line method show an increase (see table 3).[6]

The results shown in table 3 are not strictly comparable with the previous figures given that a) the 38 areas analyzed are metropolitan, which tend to have a lower poverty rate than the rest of the country; b) they are applied to the population and not households; c) goods and services have been added to the UBN method; d) the poverty lines are more demanding (they require a higher income); and e) the only income considered is what comes from work, disregarding the total income of household members. However, we should note that there is a clear tendency to an improvement in the country situation with regard to the satisfaction of basic needs that, in addition to education, include the infrastructure associated mainly to public spending, that is: housing, electricity, drainage and running water. Clearly, after the 1995 crisis, whose impact on the satisfaction of basic needs (UBN) can be seen mainly in 1996, there was a rather negligible deterioration (from 57.66 percent to 57.92 percent) with a rapid recovery from 1997 on. Incomes do not follow the same trend, however: the results show that after the crisis, poverty increased and, while it did decline later, the poor population has not been able to return to 1994 levels.

The slow recovery of the PL rates is linked, among other things, to the labor problems we mentioned previously. The systematic drop in poverty levels using the UBN method, on the other hand, can be explained by taking into account the fact that the state did not reduce its social spending from 1990 on (except momentarily and very relatively). Despite this the achievements are overshadowed by the magnitude of the problem, in which economic contingencies make a historically precarious situation more serious. If we examine Mexican government social spending per inhabitant, we will see that it rose from U.S.$250 in 1990-1991, to U.S.$402 in 1998-1999.[7] This is an important increase which is slightly greater than that of Latin America as a whole. We should add, however, that this spending is systematically lower than expenditures by other countries in the region since 1990 if taken in terms of the percentage of national GDP that it represents.

In conclusion, we can say that with greater degrees of disaggregation of the measurements, the rates have not improved in certain areas of the country nor in some sectors of the population. Thus, poverty is not the only problem that Mexico faces. One of the fundamental questions is, in fact, that Mexico continues to be a country of contrasts to the extent that the improvements derived from economic growth are only localized in certain geographical areas and strata of the population. Today, according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), the poorest 10 percent of the population receives 1.6 percent of total income, while the richest 10 percent receives 41.1 percent.[8] We should remember here, just as a footnote, that Mexico is in fifty-first place in the world in terms of its per capita GDP, according to the UNDP itself. However, Carlos Slim, with his U.S.$11.7 billion fortune, occupied seventeenth place on the last *Forbes* list,[9] and he is only one of the 12 billionaires the country has produced: in 2002, their combined fortunes came to U.S.$31.6 billion.

The improvements due to economic growth are localized in certain geographical areas and strata of the population.

Thus, poverty and inequality in Mexico can be seen as two elements of a single socioeconomic phenomenon that makes growth relative as it limits the

Table 3
The Poor and Non-Poor in 38 Metropolitan Areas
UBN* and PL Analyses (1994-1999)**

STRATA OF POPULATION	UBN ESTIMATE %	PL ESTIMATE %
Year 1994		
All Non-Poor	41.88	47.81
All Poor	58.12	52.19
2nd. Quarter 1995		
All Non-Poor	42.34	35.94
All Poor	57.66	64.06
2nd. Quarter 1996		
All Non-Poor	42.08	31.92
All Poor	57.92	68.08
2nd. Quarter 1997		
All Non-Poor	46.38	28.98
All Poor	53.62	71.02
2nd. Quarter 1998		
All Non-Poor	46.40	31.85
All Poor	53.60	68.15
2nd. Quarter 1999		
All Non-Poor	47.54	31.65
All Poor	52.46	68.35

Source: Data from the Encuesta Nacional de Empleo Urbano (INEGI) for the years cited. The results were originally obtained for a project commissioned by the Iberoamerican University (Santa Fe Campus) and developed out by the author of this article.
* Unsatisfied Basic Needs.
** Poverty Line.

access of certain strata of the population in the formal sector to micro-enterprise investment and makes it impossible for them to potentially demand collectively goods and services on a market whose development requires the existence of a middle class with relative economic security. Currently, poverty indicators have improved but greater GDP growth (of about 4.5 percent) is needed to beat poverty and inequality in the medium term. However, this is not enough in and of itself: the state must also maintain its social spending and create redistribution mechanisms that orient growth toward appropriate goals. VM

Notes

[1] The author is referring to the December 1994 economic crisis that occurred a few days after Ernesto Zedillo took office as president and which produced severe social effects, among them skyrocketing unemployment and increased poverty. [Editor's Note.]

[2] World Bank, *Informe sobre el Desarrollo Mundial 2002* (Madrid: Mundiprensa, 2002).

[3] Julio López G., "El empleo durante las reformas económicas," Fernando Clavijo, comp., *Reformas económicas en México 1982-1999* (Mexico City: FCE, 2000).

[4] Hans-Peter Martin and Harold Schumann, *La trampa de la globalización* (Madrid: Taurus, 1998).

[5] The indigence line expresses the income strictly necessary to obtain enough food for survival; the poverty line adds other basic goods and services needed for a decent life.

[6] There are two traditional focuses for the analysis of poverty: the unsatisfied basic needs method (UBN) and the income line method (also known as the "poverty-line" method, or PL). The former is applied by identifying and proving whether the members of households possess a series of goods and services generally associated with a) public spending; b) the investment that households make in infrastructure and equipping their homes; c) the investment that households make in developing their members' human capital. That is, the traditional application of the UBN method allows researchers to observe everything from the existence or lack of a dwelling itself, including its being outfitted with drainage, electricity and running water, to whether the children go to school or not. Thus, those households that lack some of these satisfiers to a varying degree, depending on the number of goods and services not supplied, would be considered poor. The PL method is applied estimating the monetary cost of a basic basket of goods and services generally associated with normal household expenditures, an estimate that is then contrasted with whether the members have sufficient income for food, clothing, shoes, personal hygiene and transportation. Once the figure, which varies over time and according to geographical location, is arrived at, those who do not have the minimum income needed to acquire this basket are considered poor, which means that they cannot satisfy their needs, paying for the satisfiers at current market prices.

[7] Both figures are expressed in constant dollar amounts at 1997 rates. ECLAC, *Panorama Social de América Latina 2000-2001 Síntesis* at http://www.cepal.org.

[8] United Nations Development Program, *Human Development Report 2001* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

[9] In 2001, he occupied twenty-fifth place with U.S.$8 billion, and in 2000, thirty-third place with U.S.$7.9 billion. http://www.forbes.com

Mexican Businesses A World of Inequality

Isabel Rueda Peiro*

Henry Romero/Reuters

Mexico suffers from marked inequality on all economic and social levels, an inequality that has sharpened since the crisis that began in the 1980s. Increased economic inequality can be seen, for example, among regions, sectors and branches of activity, the social classes, families and businesses. Here, I am going to look at businesses, pointing to the distinctions among those of different sizes. First I will examine some data about the evolution of their structure with regard to the number of workers and employees in each of the three sectors (manufacturing, the wholesale and retail trades and services) from 1989 to 1999. Then, I will point to some differences in the way each strata operates and the main problems small businesses face. Finally, I will outline some proposals to mitigate those problems.

Different Strata Of Businesses and Their Evolution

Since March 1999, the then-Ministry of Trade and Industry (today Ministry of the Economy) classifies Mexican companies as micro, small, medium-sized and large according to the number of their employees and the sector in which they operate (see table 1).[1]

In 1989 there were a total of 1,306,254 economic units; this figure rose to 2,184,558 in 1994 and 2,726,366 in 1999. The number of people they employed went from 6,528,643 to 9,257,079 and 11,937,791 respectively. Thus, the number of businesses increased 108 percent over the entire period, while the number of employees only rose 82.9 percent. Both increased more in the first five years than the second: the number of businesses rose 67.2 percent from 1989 to 1994 and 24.8 percent from 1994 to 1999, while the number of employees rose 41.8 percent and 29.0 percent respectively. The variation was different for each sector and each strata of companies (see table 2).

We can see that from 1989 to 1994 the sector where the number of businesses increased the most was manufacturing, followed by services, which then rose the most from 1994 to 1999. In the first five years, micro-enterprises underwent the greatest increase in all three sectors of the economy. This is

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due to self-employment. In the second five years, however, the increase of micro-enterprises was surpassed by that of large companies in all three sectors. This shows the effects of the crisis following the December 1994 peso devaluation on micro-businesses and confirms that large companies were the least adversely affected. The number of small companies shrank over the 10 years, indicating their vulnerability and the difficulty for micro-enterprises to grow.

The number of medium-sized manufacturing companies dropped over the 10-year period while the number of service-providers and wholesalers and retailers dropped in the first five-year period and remained the same in the second. The percentage of companies classified as large dropped in the first period due to the proliferation of micro-enterprises, but did not change in the second period despite the fact that their absolute numbers increased from 3,497 in 1989 to 4,927 in 1994 and 6,775 in 1999 (93.7 percent higher at the end of the period than at the beginning).

Table 3 shows the variation in the number of employees by sector of activity and company size. We can observe how in the first five years, the firms that most increased their number of employees were micro-businesses, followed by small companies. In the second five years, in contrast, it was large companies that most expanded their personnel rosters, while the lowest rise was among small companies, and micro-businesses increased considerably less than in the previous five-year period.

The service sector shows the greatest expansion in the number of employees in both periods, followed by the wholesale and retail trades in the first

TABLE 1
COMPANY SIZE BY NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES

	MANUFACTURING	WHOLESALE AND RETAIL TRADE	SERVICES
Micro	Up to 30	Up to 5	Up to 20
Small	31 to 100	6 to 20	21 to 50
Medium-sized	101 to 500	21 to 100	51 to 100
Large	501 or more	101 or more	101 or more

Source: *Diario Oficial de la Federación*, 30 March 1999, pp. 5-6.

TABLE 2
VARIATION IN NUMBER OF ESTABLISHMENTS AND STRUCTURE BY SECTOR (PERCENT)

SECTOR	VARIATION		PERCENT OF TOTAL NO.		
	1994/1989	1999/1994	1989	1994	1999
Manufacturing	91.2	29.6	100.0	100.0	100.0
Micro	97.7	30.5	91.6	94.8	95.4
Small	20.1	8.7	5.0	3.2	2.7
Medium-sized	20.9	19.6	2.7	1.7	1.6
Large	11.7	45.1	0.6	0.4	0.4
Retail and Wholesale	60.3	19.3	100.0	100.0	100.0
Micro	61.8	19.4	93.9	94.8	94.9
Small	40.9	15.6	5.0	3.2	2.7
Medium-sized	24.3	21.5	2.7	1.7	1.6
Large	57.5	43.1	0.2	0.2	0.2
Services	71.8	32.4	100.0	100.0	100.0
Micro	72.4	32.3	97.6	98.0	97.9
Small	41.6	39.4	1.6	1.3	1.4
Medium-sized	56.1	21.6	0.5	0.4	0.4
Large	57.5	43.1	0.3	0.3	0.3
Total	67.2	24.8	100.0	100.0	100.0
Micro	68.9	25.0	94.8	95.8	96.0
Small	38.0	18.0	3.8	3.1	2.9
Medium-sized	27.7	21.0	1.1	0.9	0.8
Large	40.9	37.5	0.3	0.2	0.2

Source: Based on data from Nacional Financiera, *El mercado de valores*, Year LXI, 10 October 2001, p. 46.

TABLE 3
VARIATION IN NUMBER OF WORKERS AND STRUCTURE BY SECTOR

SECTOR	VARIATION		PERCENT OF TOTAL NO.		
	1994/1989	1999/1994	1989	1994	1999
Manufacturing	22.9	30.4	100.0	100.0	100.0
Micro	68.6	25.4	19.5	26.7	25.7
Small	21.3	9.2	14.4	14.2	11.9
Medium-Sized	19.3	22.6	30.5	29.6	27.8
Large	1.7	53.0	35.6	29.4	34.5
Wholesale and Retail Trade	48.1	17.8	100.0	100.0	100.0
Micro	61.6	14.8	54.6	59.6	58.1
Small	36.1	17.2	16.5	15.1	15.0
Medium-Sized	23.2	21.5	16.2	13.4	13.9
Large	37.2	29.3	12.8	11.8	13.0
Services	62.8	40.1	100.0	100.0	100.0
Micro	64.2	33.4	60.5	61.1	58.2
Small	42.8	36.5	11.6	10.1	9.9
Medium-Sized	57.0	27.1	8.0	7.7	7.0
Large	72.3	65.9	19.9	21.0	25.0
Total	41.8	29.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Micro	63.9	24.0	42.0	48.5	46.6
Small	31.5	18.6	14.3	13.3	12.2
Medium-Sized	24.3	22.9	19.8	17.4	16.6
Large	23.5	52.3	23.9	20.8	24.6

Source: Based on data from Nacional Financiera, *El mercado de valores,* Year LXI, 10 October 2001, p. 46.

Large firms dominate national sales, covering 75 percent, and also effect the immense majority of exports, 80 percent of which are from the manufacturing sector.

five-year period and manufacturing in the second. The figures also indicate that larger companies tended to be strengthened, particularly in services, followed in the second five-year period by manufacturing. From 1989 to 1994 large manufacturing establishments only insignificantly increased their number of employees, diminishing their share of total employment in the first five-year period and raising it in the second. In micro-enterprises, the opposite occurred. Small and medium-sized companies reduced their proportional share of employees over the whole 10 years.

DIFFERENCES IN COMPANIES' OPERATIONS

Most micro-enterprises operate on a cash basis, without resorting to credit. About 70 percent of their sales are made in the local market and to the final consumer. Therefore, their involvement in productive chains as suppliers to other companies is very low. On an average, this strata has a lower technological level and many micro-enterprises go under very quickly. In fact, almost half these companies have been in business for less than five years; 31 percent for under three years; and only 31 percent for over 10.[2] These companies' vulnerability increased with the abrupt opening to the external market in 1986 when Mexico joined the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Most small companies make their sales on credit; less than half sell to the final consumer; and the markets for their products are local, regional and even national. Many have advanced technology and manage to consolidate and become medium-sized or large businesses.[3]

Medium-sized companies sell more than 60 percent of their products to the national market and less than 35 percent to the final consumer. More than three-quarters of their transactions are done on credit. On the average, they use medium-level technology.[4]

The large firms dominate national sales, representing 75 percent of them,

and also effect the immense majority of exports, 80 percent of which are from the manufacturing sector. Only a few companies sell abroad: in 1996, 20 percent of foreign sales were made by only five companies and 80 percent by 630 businesses.[5]

The enormous inequality among Mexican companies is also reflected in the degree of training their employees have: generally it is higher in larger companies, a circumstance linked to the wages they can pay and the government support they receive, since it is medium-sized and large companies that are able to take better advantage of that support. This is due, for one thing, to their better access to information. Also, government red tape is very complicated, time-consuming and often redundant, harming smaller companies more since they do not have the specialized personnel needed to deal with it, leaving the owners themselves to dedicate an important part of their time to it.

For this reason, the government should carry out a real administrative reform to cut down on red tape and create training programs for its employees that deal with micro- and small companies. Non-subsistence microenterprises also require temporary support from the government to consolidate and grow, as well as fixed-rate, low-interest loans, up-to-date, timely information about how to link up with other companies as suppliers or subcontractors and preferential treatment and training so they can be government suppliers. It is also important to foster a greater link-up between companies and universities. VM

Notes

[1] Before March 30, 1999, companies were classified according to the number of workers and annual sales, regardless of the economic sector to which they belonged.

[2] Gerardo Flores, "Viven menos de cinco años 50% de las microempresas," *El Financiero* (Mexico City) 18 September 1996.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Alejandro Souza Vidal, "El entorno económico y financiero de México y las PYMES," (Mexico City: Confederación Patronal de la República Mexicana [Coparmex]-International Labor Organization [ILO], 1997), p. 12.

Tracing U.S. Predominance In Mexico's Foreign Trade (1870-1948)

Sandra Kuntz Ficker*

UNAM's Manuel Toussaint Photography Archives

The 1880s. The railways facilitated the aqcuisition of capital goods for setting up modern Mexican industry.

The United States' being Mexico's main trade partner is so obvious and familiar a fact that we forget that it is a historic phenomenon. The main aim of this article is to explain the process whereby the United States, despite the striking fluctuations in its participation in Mexican foreign trade up until the end of World War II, became our most important trade partner. It should be said that, more than a steady increase, it took the form of waves of differing intensity.

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Let me begin by explaining the general evolution. Graph 1 illustrates U.S. participation in Mexican imports and exports from 1870 to 1948. To simplify annual fluctuations and look at the basic trends, Graph 2 presents the same data in three-year averages. Several points are worth noting. In the first place, it is little known that in the 1870s, the United States was still only a secondary trade partner for Mexico, particularly in terms of imports. Ahead of the U.S. was Great Britain and at times France, which together represented 60 percent of Mexico's purchases abroad.

In the second place, the United States starts to play a more preponderant role after 1880, although the trade pattern was subject to strong fluctuations that suggest that this was not by any means a linear, irreversible process. In the 1890s, imports from the U.S. dropped somewhat and in the first decade of the twentieth century, so did exports. Both imports and exports dropped consistently from their maximum at the end of the first decade of the twentieth century until the end of the 1930s, rising again during World War II. Regardless of the causes of these fluctuations (to which we will return later),

their very existence seems to contradict the commonly held opinion that the ties of dependency with the United States tightened progressively and that these ties were not only increasingly intense but also practically impossible to override. To the contrary, the data on the graph suggests significant flexibility in the geographic distribution of Mexico's foreign trade. One way or another, our country was capable of reorienting its exchanges and broadening out its clientele and suppliers when domestic or international conditions so demanded.

In the third place, the graphs show that U.S. participation in Mexican imports was much smaller than in exports for quite a prolonged period, at least until the first decade of the last century. There is a gap, then, between the earlier and —as of the 1880s— very high concentration of exports and the later, more moderate concentrations of imports from a single country. This differential suggests that Mexico's making a high percentage of its sales in the United States was not a consideration in its picking its suppliers on the international market. This again contradicts the image of dependency and obligatory reciprocity. This relative autonomy was neither transitory nor brief: it lasted no less than 45 years (between 1870 and 1915), and included a stage in which the concentration of Mexican exports sent to the U.S. market was almost overwhelming (over 70 percent after 1887).

The First Wave: The 1880s

The first important U.S. presence in Mexico's foreign trade began in the 1880s. This coincided with Mexico's first opening to the international economy and is associated with the creation of certain material conditions that made the two countries' geographical proximity concretely significant. In this period, Mexico imported railroad track, machinery, rail equipment and construction tools. By the end of the decade, three important rail lines that linked the northern border with Mexico's interior had been built. These investments soon brought others aimed at mineral deposits close to the U.S. border, which translated into imports of more machinery and production goods. The railways also facilitated the acquisition of capital goods for setting up modern industry, even if it was of modest size and heavily concentrated by region.

It is little known that in the 1870s, the United States was still only a secondary trade partner for Mexico, particularly in terms of imports.

The modification in import patterns not only implied a drastic change in their origin, but also in their composition; the traditional basket of luxury consumer items began to combine with more machinery and inputs for production. The latter went from 26 percent in 1880 to 40 percent in 1882 and 60 percent in 1892, compared to less than 30 percent in the previous 50 years.

The case of exports is different since the United States was traditionally more important for Mexico as a market than as a supplier: by the 1870s, the U.S. was buying 45 percent of Mexican exports for different reasons. On the one hand, an important number of them were precious metals used for making payments abroad. The United States was the main destination for these resources since it was Mexico's financial intermediary with the rest of the world. In terms of trade in goods proper, a large part of Mexican exports were made up of articles produced in coastal areas: hemp, coffee, vanilla and tinctorial woods, all items that could be easily shipped by sea so that the lack of land transportation would not interfere with their commercialization in the United States.

During the 1880s, U.S. participation in Mexican exports rose considerably: from the 45 percent of the 1870s to 60 percent in the 1880s and around 74 percent as of the 1890s. This jump should be associated with the participation of U.S. capital in railway construction and the wave of investments that this produced. The railroads made it possible to mine Central-Northern Mexico's ore deposits and opened vast areas of the country to production for export. Exports by land to the United States went from U.S.$1 million in 1877 to U.S.$12 million in 1890.

Naturally, this process also implied a progressive change in the composition of exports: starting with a modest mix of precious metals and a few agricultural goods, it began to broaden out to include minerals and metals with different degrees of refinement: first lead-silver compounds, then copper and later zinc. Other traditional exports, such as cat-

GRAPH 1
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN MEXICO'S FOREIGN TRADE (1870-1948)
(ANNUAL PERCENTAGES)



Sources: For the years 1870-1929, figures of Mexico's main trade partners reconstructed by the author; for the years 1930-1948, Mexican government trade figures.

tle and animal skins, increased with the availability of rail transport. At a certain point, the diversification of exports made it possible to decrease the importance of the transfer of metals that had traditionally served to cover the trade deficit.

In summary, the proximity of Mexico and the United States and the rise of the railroads were historic phenomena that made it possible for the U.S. to achieve the absolute, insurmountable advantage in trade with Mexico vis-à-vis its traditional European partners.

THE SECOND WAVE: THE TEENS

In the first decade of the twentieth century, U.S. presence in Mexico's foreign trade seemed to stabilize at about 76 percent of all its exports and 60 percent of imports, despite cyclical fluctuations. Nevertheless, in the following decade, World War I caused a severe break in international trade patterns. The war led the European powers to concentrate their production and energies on military objectives, interrupted the circuits of inter-oceanic commercial traffic and reoriented a large part of maritime transport to wartime use. The United States became the great distributor of goods, concentrating an unusually large portion of world trade. This was felt throughout Latin America, although in Mexico, where this had already been happening before the war, the impact led the concentration of trade to extreme levels: in 1917, 91 percent of Mexican exports went to the United States, while 93 percent of its imports came from there.

In the case of Mexico an additional factor contributing to this concentration was the Mexican Revolution, whose most severe stage of civil war took place between 1913 and 1916. It was very difficult for European partners to cover the particular needs of the Mexican market in that context (arms, munitions, horses, explosives and basic consumer items like grain, suet and soap). In addition, the border became more penetrable given the world situation. To obtain these goods, Mexico had to orient a large part of its exports to the U.S. market. In addition to the difficulties of international traffic, the needs created by the Mexican Revolution imposed greater concentration of trade with the United States. As a result, for the first time export patterns matched import patterns and the United States acquired absolute domination over Mexico's trade abroad.

In contrast with the first wave, on this occasion, the factors that explained trade dependence on the U.S. were not economic, but derived from political-military conditions and therefore were transitory: they ceased just as soon as international trade routes reopened in 1919. Mexican imports from the United States plummetted from 90 to 72 percent in only three years and despite certain fluctuations, they continued to drop throughout the decade until they reached 60 percent in 1933. Changes in exports were even more surprising since from being 85 percent of Mexico's total in 1919, they dropped to 63 percent in 1927 and only 48 percent in 1933. This put the U.S. at its lowest share of Mexican exports since 1877.

THE DECLINE: 1920-1938

It is easy to suppose that the end of World War I would signal a return to pre-war trade patterns. However, the first surprising piece of information is that Mexico's dependence on imports from the U.S. between 1915 and 1919 reversed itself to the extent that in the mid-1930s they had only the same

relative importance as in the first decade of the twentieth century. That is, the extreme concentration of Mexican trade (91 percent on the average between 1915 and 1919) did not create lasting dependence on U.S. suppliers since it was a reversible trend in the medium term.

It is even more noteworthy that in the 1920s and 1930s there was an important de-concentration of exports with regard to the main trade partner, which is significant for several reasons. First of all, because it was the first time there was a drop of this magnitude and duration since the appearance of U.S. domination of Mexico's foreign trade. Secondly, because this de-concentration of exports lent a kind of authentic bilateral character to the exchange with the U.S., in which trade in both directions evolved similarly. It was not that Mexico sold the United States the same amounts that it bought from it, but that the proportion of Mexican trade that went to the U.S. was now very similar both in exports and imports.

In the third place, the duration of this phenomenon was very significant. It was a gradual transition consistent with greater geographical diversification of foreign trade. This trend was reinforced by the effect of the international crises of 1921 and 1929 on the U.S. economy but lasted longer than they did, as can be seen in the fact that the drop in U.S. presence in our foreign trade did not stop after 1933. In fact, the lowest participation of the U.S. in a normal year was in 1937 (56 percent) for exports and 1938 (58 percent) for imports. It was, then, a trend that lasted almost 20 years, something unexpected in view of the closeness of previous decades.

We should ask ourselves why this

GRAPH 2
U.S. PARTICIPATION IN MEXICO'S FOREIGN TRADE (1870-1948)
(THREE-YEAR AVERAGES)



Sources: For the years 1870-1929, figures of Mexico's main trade partners reconstructed by the author; for the years 1930-1948, Mexican government trade figures.

descent was so drastic and prolonged. One of the reasons was obviously the reactivation of trade with Europe, the reappearance of traditional partners (Great Britain, France and Germany) and the emergence of new partners, among whom Belgium, Italy, Holland and Sweden took on certain importance. In the second place, the relative importance of the United States diminished as of the 1920s as a result of U.S. trade policy. Between 1922 and 1930, the U.S. government established protectionist trade tariffs and signed different trade agreements and treaties with countries with similar exports to Mexico's. After the 1929 crisis, these restrictive policies accentuated, with the establishment of quotas for copper, oil and other imports that were basic components of Mexico's exports.

In addition, Mexico's revolutionary governments' domestic policies contributed to this result in at least two ways. On the one hand, relations between Mexico and the United States became very tense between 1920 and 1925 mainly because of the former's 1917 legislation about property and labor rights and the continual threat of making the Constitution retroactive. On the other hand, the regimen that came out of the Revolution was nationalistic in its economic orientation and channeled some of its energies into reducing dependence on its dominant trade partner. In fact, in some cases there appears to have been the express purpose of redirecting Mexican exports toward Europe, whether to lessen vulnerability of the given sector with regard to the U.S. economy or to strengthen Mexico's negotiating position with regard to prices and supply. Thus, for example, in 1922 Yucatán hemp growers were given the privilege of exporting a certain amount of their product without paying export duties on it under the condition that it be shipped directly to Europe.

The trends of the 1920s accentuated after the 1929 crisis, so that in the 1930s, until the outbreak of World War II, the United States saw its presence decline even further in Mexican foreign trade. Among other factors are the political variables, like the sharpening of tensions between the Mexican government and foreign companies due to the expropriations of 1936 to 1938 and the semi-embargo on trade that followed. The oil expropriation sparked a strong reaction among corporations, a reaction backed up by the U.S. government, which, among other things, suspended purchases of Mexican oil as well as the negotiations for a trade treaty between the two countries.

The Third Wave: World War II

By the end of the 1930s, trade relations between Mexico and the United States were at a considerably low point compared to the standards established in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth. Bilateral trade represented a bare 60 percent of Mexico's foreign trade, a proportion that had been normal for imports in the first decade of the twentieth century, but which had been surpassed for exports since 1884. What is even more significant is that this situation did not seem to be transitory or extraordinary, but, rather, the result of a deterioration that had lasted 15 years. Given the intensification of trade with Europe and a certain opening with regard to other countries of the world, there was nothing to suggest that the state of bilateral trade with the United States would change radically in the short run. Everything seems to indicate that the factors that brought about the third wave of U.S. presence were again exogenous; more specifically, they were linked to the international situation created by World War II.

This war broke traditional trade links even more radically than had the previous world war. It turned the United States into the only country capable of sustaining trade in the hemisphere. The U.S. actively took on this role and promoted the creation of the Development Commission for Latin America to foster trade both with the United States and among the Latin American nations. In the case of Mexico, other factors favored an increasing U.S. presence. Mexico's declaration of war on the Axis in 1942 severely restricted its trade with Europe. Shortly thereafter, Mexico and the United States signed a cooperation agreement and the first trade agreement in the history of their bilateral relations. As a result, Mexican exports to the United States went from 56 percent of total exports in 1937 to as much as 91 percent in 1941 and 1942. Imports from the U.S. increased from 58 percent of the total in 1938 to 90 percent in 1944.

At the end of World War II, a new decline in U.S. presence in Mexico's foreign trade began, suggested by the trade figures, which began to decline in the last years that this article covers (1948). On the one hand, this was due to the fact that Mexico's trade balance had deteriorated by the end of the war; on the other hand, the Mexican government had embarked on a project of industrialization through import substitution. In order to move ahead with this project, the government began to restrict trade, leading to the joint cancellation of the bilateral trade agreement in the mid-1950s and a protectionist policy that would last several decades.

Conclusions

The United States was a secondary trade partner for Mexico until the last third of the nineteenth century. After that its importance increased until it became Mexico's main partner in the international market. Initially, the factors that brought this about were the construction of railroads and the direct investment of U.S. capital that reoriented part of Mexico's exports to the United States. Despite everything, it is significant that the U.S. was for a long time much more important as a market for Mexican exports than as a supplier of imports. This disparity is noticeable to the extent that it suggests that Mexico maintained a relatively broad spectrum of suppliers and preserved its autonomy in selecting them despite the growing concentration of its exports in the U.S. market.

On the other hand, although the U.S. predominates Mexico's foreign trade from the end of the nineteenth century, historically it was subject to more or less severe fluctuations. This questions the broadly accepted idea that the growing U.S. predominance in Mexico's trade was continuous. Far from it, the evidence shows that in these years, trade patterns were very malleable and adapted to changing conditions on the domestic level, in bilateral relations and in the world's economy. This means that patterns in international trade depend on many different factors, which makes it wrong to attribute their evolution to the simple will of one of the participants, even if that participant is the dominant partner. VM

The Possible World Of Álvarez Bravo

Roberto Tejada*

▲ *Mattress*, 1927.

An interior landscape of desire, haunted by images of statues and mirrors as emblems of the body.

▼ *Angels in Truck*, 1930.

In his photography, Manuel Álvarez Bravo has represented all manners of complexities and contradictions by exploring a set of related differences. Urban and rural realities, or the margins where they become confused or confounded, are linked in his work to the rift between natural arrangement and photographic design, or between formal sobriety and intellectual playfulness; or, finally, between what is potentially representable and what is actually recorded and promised by a photograph. Even as he departed from his early abstract experiments to portray the peculiar nature of Mexico City and its outlying regions —where extraordinary encounters often emerge from workaday phenomena— Álvarez Bravo returned repeatedly to the study of spatial relationships and purified form. Resorting often to personal effects, a negative image of a rolled mattress, *Colchón,* 1927 (Mattress), was first exhibited as a set of light boxes with a positive companion piece, a common practice for the photographer in his abstract compositions. But Álvarez Bravo strove to retain the progressive content of abstracted forms, perhaps in keeping with the concerns of his friend and associate Tina Modotti. Over and over he addresses the metropolis as a monument of modern life and industry, in images that pass as purely formal studies.

An implausible architecture and social progress are suggested in a photograph of steel hardware tools, *Instrumental*, 1931 (Tools). Some of Álvarez Bravo's images from the 1930s are more resolvedly symbolic or literary in meaning. There is an uncertainty that intensifies the power of these pictures insofar as it remains unclear to what degree staging or reenactment was involved between photographer and subject. Death, dreams, solitude and the unconscious were among the themes explored also by the group of Mexican writers known as Los Contemporáneos (The Contemporaries). Like the poetry of this movement, Álvarez Bravo's photographs often emanate from an interior landscape of desire, haunted by images of statues and mirrors as emblems of the body (*Ángeles en camión*, 1930 [Angels in Truck]), or from an intellect in which insomnia and longing are suspended in time (*Escala de escalas*, 1931 [Scale of Scales]).

If rarely shown producing either in the domestic or public realm, women are often portrayed as symbols of an idea, feeling or effect. In a visit to the courtyard of the building where he spent his early childhood, Álvarez Bravo chanced upon an adolescent immersed in her reverie, *El ensueño,* 1931 (Reverie). The sunlight caressing her right shoulder intensifies the pause captured by the camera. Here, daydreaming is symbolized as that interval between sleep and memory, be it personal or collective. The picture captures the pace of the everyday and the often invisible but no less dramatic interludes that confound it. In a related image, from the penumbra of a room, a sitter's face is half-illuminated as she gazes into a looking glass while combing her long tresses *Retrato de lo eterno*, 1935 (Portrait of the Eternal). Dreams and the unconscious were explored by many artists and writers in Mexico. But the picture complicates Freud's model for femininity

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as the passive desire to be desired. The eternal portrait of a figure locked into her mirror image is arrested by viewers, male or female, and by the interpretive process of the viewing.

Devoid of metaphor, however, there is another important strain in Álvarez Bravo's photography that is almost documentary in its concern for working conditions in Mexico. In one image, *Obrero en huelga asesinado*, 1934 (Striking Worker, Murdered), the artist renders the viewer mute as the camera captures the harrowing reality of a violent death. Taking film footage (with Sergei Eisenstein) in the Isthmus of Tehuantepec, and in search of what he thought were fireworks from nearby festivities, Álvarez Bravo discovered that the noises were gunshots fired at a sugar-mill strike and that someone had been murdered. Álvarez Bravo took this image very close to the corpse, and low to the ground, rendering the arm of the murdered worker as if in muralist foreshortening.

From the perspective of a passerby looking up from a city sidewalk, another image —a central one in his work *Parábola Óptica,* 1931 (Optical Parable)— shows an optician's shop with an oval hanging sign, but the picture is reversed. It contains inflections of Eugène Atget's images of Paris storefronts made during the first decade of the twentieth century. With references to the human eye, the "parable" tells about the unreliability of looking, about visual afterthoughts or change in viewpoint and, therefore, about the nature of photography itself. As in *Optical Parable*, where he links scientific optics to photographic practice, Álvarez Bravo also relates pathology to corporeal soundness, and the observable body to the phantom anatomy beneath the skin (*Hospital Juárez*, 1935 [Juárez Hospital]). Another common motif in Álvarez Bravo's photographs, tree trunks and other natural debris become surrogates of the human body, as in this unsettling form discovered by the photographer in a clearing beside a cornfield. Chopped away at the base, side and head, the solitary stump transforms the landscape into a kind of otherworldly place suffused with the "secret terror of foreboding" Diego Rivera claimed the photographer's images inspire.

His work is an extended meditation on the nature of looking and the medium of photographic reproduction itself. Lyric restraint and collective impulses are joined in idiosyncratic documents that engage the difference

Tools, 1931 ▸

An implausible architecture
and social progress are suggested
in a photograph of steel
hardware tools.

between Mexico's social realities and the often nameless transit or long duration of the otherwise uncelebrated. His sensibility is surprisingly contemporary in that his pictures allow fatuous and poignant qualities to coexist in an image. His pictures comment, too, on the disjunction between real figures and their renderings. Álvarez Bravo has stated, "I believe everything is portrayable, depending on how you see it. Everything has social content." Even in his more recent work, an image-environment of Coyoacán, *En un pequeño espacio*, 1997 (In a Small Space), the viewer is asked to choose between at least two possible interpretations. As he stresses the photographer's role in the decision between what an image portrays and what it can mean as per its title, Álvarez Bravo invites the observer to ponder the world as it is —but perhaps more importantly, as it could be. VM

Note

* This article is based on fragments of the book by the same author *In Focus: Manuel Álvarez Bravo*, published by the J. Paul Getty Museum, Los Angeles, 2001.

Mannekins Laughing, 1930. ▲

Extraordinary encounters
often emerge from
workaday phenomena.

The sunlight caressing
her right shoulder intensifies
the pause captured
by the camera.

▼ *Reverie*, 1931.



The artist renders the viewer mute as the camera captures the harrowing reality of a violent death.

◀ *Juárez Hospital*, 1935.

▼ *Striking Worker, Murdered*, 1934.

Good Name, Sleeping, 1938-1939 ▸

Women are often portrayed as symbols of an idea, feeling or effect.

◂ *In a Small Space*, 1997.

His pictures comment, too, on the disjunction between real figures and their renderings.

▲ *Portrait of the Eternal*, 1935.

The eternal portrait of a figure locked into her mirror image is arrested by viewers.

The "parable" tells about the unreliability of looking, about visual afterthoughts.

Optical Parable, 1931 ▼

Álvarez Bravo invites the observer to ponder the world as it is —but perhaps more importantly, as it could be.

▲ *And It Moaned at Night*, 1945.

Mexico, Modern Diplomacy And the European Union

Alejandro Chanona*

Over the last decade the strategy to diversify Mexico's relations with the world has become a priority; this consists of seeking more solid links with different groups of countries through formal institutional mechanisms.

Globalization and the formation of regional blocs have imposed the need for Mexican diplomacy to develop new practices in order to lead the country toward the center of the world dynamic. This goal is embodied in the national development plans of the last two administrations as well in their respective reports.

Mexico's geopolitical situation has been altered by international transformations that demanded a more active, specialized strategy to try to fulfill the main interest of our foreign policy: strengthening national sovereignty and promoting the country's economic and social development through inserting itself better in today's world. In that sense, contacts with all the regions of the globe mounted and political and economic exchanges intensified through an aggressive strategy of signing international instruments, outstanding among which are accords on education, science and technology and, of course, free trade. But the task has merely been outlined and therefore remains unfinished.

The diversification and intensification of external links with a greater number of countries and regions required the design, implementation and follow-up of a series of actions aimed at reaffirming Mexico's presence in Europe, Latin America, the Caribbean and the Pacific Basin countries, as well as in the institutions and groups that promote economic and social development both in developed and developing nations.[1]

The Challenge of Diversification

On the threshold of the twenty-first century, Mexico's foreign policy has gone through significant changes in its design, leadership and implementation. These modifications have occurred parallel to the profound and varied transformations of the structure and dynamic of the international system. The end of bipolarism, the processes of political and economic integration, the growing advance of economic globalization and the importance of the debate about democracy, human rights, the environment, etc., have changed the priorities on the agenda. While the doctrine, principles and objectives of foreign policy have remained firm, it is also true that the speed of world events has forced it to be increasingly pragmatic.

On the other hand, economic reorientation and political changes inside the country have also had an impact on the new dynamic of Mexico's foreign policy. In this context, over the last decade the strategy to diversify Mexico's relations with the world has become a priority;[2] this consists of seek-

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GRAPH 1
DISTRIBUTION OF MEXICO'S TRADE



Source: Secretaría de Economía using BANXICO figures.

While the doctrine, principles and objectives of foreign policy have remained firm, it is also true that the speed of world events has forced it to be increasingly pragmatic.

ing more solid links with different groups of countries through formal institutional mechanisms that attempt to create conditions of certainty and legal security in the relationship with Mexico for the world's leading investing powers and, of course, with the most dynamic markets.

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND DIVERSIFICATION

The European Union (E.U.) as a regional regimen has tended to regroup the most influential nations of Europe in the post-Cold War period. The E.U. is the world's foremost trading power and largest market. Its 15 countries are home to 375 million inhabitants; its joint gross domestic product is U.S.$8.3 trillion, equivalent to that of the United States. In addition, the E.U. concentrates about one fifth of the world's trade.

The Evolution Of Mexico-E.U. Relations

Since the 1975 signing of the first important trade agreement between Mexico and the then-European Economic Community, relations between the two have intensified in the political sphere but diminished in the economic sphere.

Today, the E.U. has great weight and political and economic influence in the dynamics of international relations; it is also Mexico's second trading partner (6.5 percent) and second source of foreign investment (20.3 percent).[3] This means that the potential for our country and the world's main trading bloc complementing each other takes on special significance.

This is the reason for Mexico's strategy of deepening and broadening out links of all kinds mainly with the E.U., without disregarding its relations with the new states that have emerged in Central Europe and the Balkans, at times wrapped up in overcoming their own internal problems.

On May 2, 1995, Mexico and the European Union announced the decision to broaden and deepen their bilateral relations creating a new framework that would make it possible to bolster political dialogue, establish a free trade area and intensify cooperation with the aim of contributing in the long term to the promotion of the fundamental values of respect for human rights, the rule of law, democracy and security. In this same vein, on December 8, 1997, another of the most significant steps in the strengthening of bilateral relations between Mexico and the E.U. was taken: the negotiations for the E.U.-Mexico Economic Partnership, Political Coordination and Cooperation Agreement, also known as the "Global Accord," began. This instrument, which entered into force very recently, pulls together in a single text political, trade and cooperation issues, making it the most com-

plete and ambitious one Mexico has ever signed and the only one of this type that the E.U. has negotiated with a non-European nation.[4] Also signed were the "Interim Accord on Trade and Matters Related to Trade" and a joint declaration, which ratifies the mandate to negotiate a free trade zone. The process leading up to these signings began in 1998 and culminated successfully November 24, 1999.

Negotiating The Free Trade Agreement

The signing of the "Global Accord" was the step that preceded the signing of the Mexico-European Union Free Trade Agreement (Mexico-E.U. FTA) in March 2000 by then-President Ernesto Zedillo in Lisbon, giving Mexican products access to a 375-million-person market.

With this agreement, the Mexican economy is expected to benefit from the high potential for European investment as well as from its advanced technology. At the same time, the European Union benefits by being able to compete in equal conditions with the countries with which Mexico already has free trade agreements. This will allow the E.U. to recover and extend its presence in the Mexican market, which, despite its continuing to be Mexico's second trade partner, in the last decade had dropped 43 percent, sinking from 11.4 percent of all of Mexico's foreign trade in 1990 to 6.6 percent in 2001 (see graphs 1 and 2).

The European Union is also our second source of foreign direct investment (FDI), with 20.2 percent of the total (U.S.$74 billion) that entered the country between 1994 and June 2001 (see graph 3). In June 2001, the 5,066 companies with European capital made up 23 percent of the 22,002 firms in Mexico with FDI, with U.S.$15.1 million in investment.

The results of the negotiations were approved March 20, 2000 by Mexico's Senate —together with the "Global Agreement"— and by the European Council of Ministers of Member States; and July 1, 2000, the part of the Free Trade Agreement with the European Union corresponding to goods entered into effect.

Finally, in his last European tour from May 14 to 18, 2002, President Zedillo inaugurated a program to accelerate tariff reduction between Mexico and the European Union which included trade for U.S.$1.7 billion. Firm commitments for almost U.S.$300 million in investments from Spain were achieved and high expectations centered on European firms' investing in Mexican telecommunications, electricity and petrochemicals. However, this is still subject to the arrival at consensuses among the different branches of government to create the legislative framework that would allow it.

The North American Free Trade Agreement

As a result of Mexico's decades-long strategy abroad, and after signing several different trade instruments with the United States, relations with our neighbor to the north are constantly

With the Mexico-E.U. FTA the Mexican economy is expected to benefit from the high potential for European investment as well as from its advanced technology.

GRAPH 2
MEXICO'S TOTAL TRADE (2001) (MILLIONS OF DOLLARS)



Source: SECOFI, using BANXICO figures.

GRAPH 3
SOURCES OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN MEXICO (1994-JUNE 2001)



Source: Dirección General de Inversión Extranjera, Secretaría de Economía.

improving. The profound changes that Mexico has been undergoing have given our bilateral economic relations greater affinity than ever before in history. Through new trade instruments like the framework agreements of the 1980s, as well as others regarding investment, tourism, agricultural cooperation, etc., the first steps were taken toward a new course for relations between our two countries. However, these instruments still excluded some basic trade issues like the application of tariffs or the abuses of legislation about unfair trade practices, and retained their protectionist approaches. These matters were overcome.

The North American Free Trade Agreement, negotiated from 1990 on with the United States and Canada, came into effect in 1994 with the following explicit aims:

a) Promoting better and more secure access for Mexican products to the United States;
b) Reducing the vulnerability of Mexico's exports vis-à-vis unilateral and discretionary measures;
c) Allowing Mexico to deepen the structural change of its economy, strengthening domestic industry through a solid export sector and with more competitiveness; and
d) Contributing to the creation of more productive jobs and increasing the well-being of the population.

MAIN RESULTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS

NAFTA, in addition to establishing a program to reduce tariffs among its members, includes stipulations about eliminating non-tariff barriers; states specific rules of origin for products from the region; opens up a significant portion of government purchasing to its members; has a specific chapter that sets bilateral commitments between Mexico and the United States and between Mexico and Canada about agricultural products that include domestic supports and subsidies to exports; and contains a special program to lower tariffs for auto products with a rule of origin of an average 60 percent.

With regard to energy, Mexico has been released from the application of the disciplines agreed on by the other signers; for textile products, it has been stipulated that the treaty will prevail over the Multi-fiber Accord and other international conventions on the issue. NAFTA also includes norms about safeguards and unfair trade practices and

a chapter about trade in services, which deals not only in general principles but involves specific areas like financial services, insurance, land transportation and telecommunications, among others.

Final Considerations

The differences between NAFTA and the Mexico-E.U. FTA are not to be found in the instruments negotiated since both are mechanisms dealing with similar issues and with norms that fall within the framework of the World Trade Organization. What marks the differences between these two treaties are the circumstances and premises that gave rise to their negotiation and the expectations about the results.

When negotiations began with the United States and Canada, 72.4 percent of all of Mexico's trade was with the United States. When the process began with the European Union in 1998, Mexico's total trade with it was only 6.4 percent (and this percentage is a matter of greater concern if we consider that at the end of 2001, Mexico's trade worldwide had tripled vis-à-vis the beginning of the 1990s, and had reached U.S.$326 billion).

For these reasons, we can conclude that while NAFTA was negotiated in the light of the need to create a normative, formal framework for already existing trade flows with the United States, Mexico-E.U. FTA was signed based on the premise of diversifying the prevailing concentration of Mexico's trade flows and attracting investment from the world's largest market. VM

Notes

[1] Andrés Rozental, *La política exterior de México en la era de la modernización* (Mexico City: FCE, 1993), p. 55.

[2] Poder Ejecutivo Federal, *Plan Nacional de Desarrollo, 1995-2000* (Mexico City: Poder Ejecutivo Federal, 1995), p. 12.

[3] "La diversificación de las relaciones, prioridad de la política exterior," *Enlace mexicano*, March-April 2000, (Mexico City), p. 1.

[4] Ibid, p. 2.

Main Accords in the Mexico-E.U. Free Trade Agreement

I. Market Access

- Gradual, reciprocal elimination of import tariffs.
- The asymmetry between Mexico and the European Union is recognized through differentiated time limits for tariff elimination.
- Europe will eliminate tariffs in 2003, Mexico in 2007.
- Preferential access for Mexican exports in the general system of preferences.
- Establishment of a 10-year, linear elimination of tariffs for agricultural and agro-industrial products, import quotas and a waiting list for products protected by the European Union.
- 95 percent of Mexico's agricultural exports to the European Union will have preferential access.
- Quantitative restrictions and prohibitions (import or export permits) will be eliminated, but the right to adopt measures needed to protect human, animal or vegetable life and health and public morality will be preserved.

II. Rules of Origin

- Rules of origin were negotiated guaranteeing that the benefits from the agreement remain in the region.
- Among the most important rules of origin are those for textiles, transportation, auto parts, electrical appliances, footwear and plastics.

III. Technical Norms

- It was agreed that the right to adopt and apply norms will be preserved as long as they do not become unnecessary obstacles to trade.
- A special committee will be created to foster cooperation in information exchange about systems of normalization and the solution of problems of access related to technical norms.

IV. Sanitary and Phytosanitary Norms

- A specialized sub-committee will be formed and will meet yearly to exchange information, identify and facilitate the solutions of problems of access, promote equivalent norms in Mexico and the European Union and foster the recognition of areas free of disease.

V. Safeguards

- Safeguards can be adopted for a maximum of three years to provide temporary relief to a sector that might face serious damage or the threat of damage due to substantial increases in imports.
- In all cases, the application of a safeguard will require compensation. If an agreement cannot be reached about the amount of the compensation, a measure with equivalent effects can be adopted to compensate for the damage to trade.

VI. Investment and Related Payments

- The current opening will be consolidated in national legislation.
- For Mexico, this will not imply additional opening to FDI in any sector.
- International commitments with regard to investment will be reiterated.
- The right to adopt safeguards because of problems related to exchange rate, monetary or balance of payment policies will be preserved.

- A mechanism will be instituted to promote reciprocal investment through information exchange for identifying business and corresponding legislative opportunities.
- The commitment to reciprocally promote investment and design ways to carry out joint investments will be established.

VII. Trade in Services

- Mexican service providers will have access to the E.U. service market without restrictions on the number of operations or providers and will enjoy national treatment and most-favored-nation status.
- The current degree of economic opening stipulated in national laws will be consolidated to guarantee that none of the countries pass more restrictive legislation.

VIII. Public Procurement

- Mexican exporters of goods and services to the E.U.'s 10,000 public sector institutions and companies that make more than U.S.$400 million in purchases a year will be given better access than other E.U. trade partners; in addition, they will enjoy national treatment.
- The aforementioned measure will include purchasing by Mexican federal government institutions and companies as well as the entities of the central governments and para-state companies of the member states and the executive body of the E.U.
- This measure will be applied on acquisitions of goods and services including those for construction, whose value exceeds certain amounts.
- Mexico will have a transitional reserve for seven years for purchases by PEMEX, the Federal Electricity Commission, non-energy sector construction and the acquisition of non-patent medicines.
- These measures will not enter into force until the E.U. presents detailed, disaggregated statistics for the purchases of at least 150 public companies.

IX. Competition

- To guarantee an environment conducive to entrepreneurial activity, competition will be promoted and monopolistic practices combatted.
- A working group will be established to promote technical cooperation and information exchange; to coordinate general studies on the matter as well as specific consultations; and to consider issues linked to the relationship between policies and the laws of competition and trade, to avoid the application of restrictive trade measures.

X. Intellectual Property

- According to respective legislations, obligations will be established about the acquisition, conservation and exercise of intellectual property rights.
- A special consulting committee will be established to deal with issues and disagreements in matters of intellectual property, while the right to resort to the dispute settlement mechanism established in the agreement will be preserved.
- The rights and obligations established in signed international treaties and conventions are confirmed.

XI. Dispute Settlement

- A consultation and dispute settlement mechanism is established with clear, expedite procedures.
- Priority will be given to conciliation for settling disputes.
- The right to appeal to the World Trade Organization's dispute settlement mechanism is preserved.
- Arbitral procedures will be agile and transparent.
- In case of non-compliance, equivalent agreed-upon benefits may be temporarily suspended until such time as the decision of the arbitral panel is carried out.

Ten Years of NAFTA
A Mexican Perspective

Antonio Ortiz Mena*

It was 10 years ago, in August 1992, that the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) negotiations concluded after a final push during a marathon session at the Watergate Hotel.

At the time, some commentators in Mexico feared that the trade agreement would be a "sellout" of Mexico (much as Canadian critics did, when their country negotiated its free trade agreement with the U.S.), especially regarding the sacrosanct oil sector, and that it would wipe out vast segments of Mexican industry. U.S. critics, most notably Ross Perot, expected to hear a "giant sucking sound" as thousands of U.S. jobs moved south of the border.

NAFTA supporters in both the U.S. and Mexico expected a significant number of jobs to be created in both countries and more generally envisaged NAFTA as the driving force of North American economic dynamism, which would allow the three countries to become more competitive in world trade.

Ten years after NAFTA's signing, and almost eight years after its coming into force, it is fair to say that, not surprisingly, it has turned out to be neither a disaster nor a panacea. By some yardsticks, it has performed very well, and by others it has fallen short of expectations; what actually happened could be likened to Sir Arthur Conan Doyle's famous dog that did not bark. And, some of its greatest challenges are still to come.

> Large increases in trade and investment flows have translated into a greater reliance on the U.S. economy.

Some Successes

Two recent Mexican books provide an assessment of NAFTA. *¿Socios naturales?* (Natural Partners?), edited by ITAM scholars, and *Para evaluar al TLCAN*, edited by CIDE-ITESM scholars, both conclude that, overall, NAFTA has been a success.[1]

Looking at "the big picture" presents NAFTA in the best light. Take trade flows, for instance. From 1993 to 2000, bilateral trade between Mexico and the U.S. went from U.S.$85 billion to U.S.$263 billion, an increase of 209 percent. Mexico is now the U.S.'s second trading partner, surpassed only by Canada. If the latest available projections are correct, Mexico should become the U.S.'s main trade partner during the current decade.

Thanks in large measure to the impressive growth in Mexico's trade with the U.S. since the onset of NAFTA, it is now, by far, Latin America's main exporter. In fact, for the last several years Mexico's exports have exceeded those of all other Latin American countries combined. As graph 1 shows, in 2000, Mexico's exports easily surpassed those of the other three main exporters in Latin America: Argentina, Chile and Brazil.

The situation regarding foreign direct investment (FDI) is akin to that of trade. The total FDI received by Mexico from 1994 to 2000 was U.S.$466 billion, which translates into an annual inflow of U.S.$7.8 billion, whereas annual inflows from 1989 to 1993 were only U.S.$2.9 billion. The U.S. has accounted for 64 percent of total FDI flows since the NAFTA entered into effect.

Turning from trade and investment flows to institutional questions, NAFTA has also chalked up some noteworthy successes. It represents an institutionalization of economic relations among countries whose economies had become increasingly intertwined and where

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GRAPH 1
TOTAL TRADE: ARGENTINA, BRAZIL, CHILE AND MEXICO
(millions of U.S. dollars)



Source: World Bank, *World Development Indicators 2001* (Washington, D. C.: World Bank, 2001).

the large partner always had the upper hand over the smaller ones when solving disputes unilaterally. NAFTA has bred certainty and facilitated the impressive growth in trade and investment mentioned above.

A key element in providing certainty has been the dispute settlement mechanisms. For instance, between 1994 and 2001, 79 disputes arose regarding the politically volatile issues of dumping and subsidies, and arbitral panels set up under NAFTA rules have solved the great majority of these cases effectively and fairly. All other Latin American countries would be more than pleased to have access to this dispute settlement mechanism, but so far Mexico is the only Latin American country to have this privilege.

NAFTA has also meant that wide-ranging economic policy swings, which had been prevalent in Mexico and proved devastating (one need only recall the 1982 bank nationalization), have been greatly curtailed. After the December 1994 peso devaluation strong pressure was brought to turn back from trade liberalization, but the costs of doing so under NAFTA would have been very high. Instead, the devaluation, coupled with privileged access to a booming U.S. market, allowed Mexico to turn back from the brink in a relatively short time.

Most critics now take NAFTA for granted, and talk about improving it or modifying it, instead of ditching it altogether. Jorge G. Castañeda, Mexico's current foreign minister, and Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, Mexico's representative in the United Nations Security Council, were two of NAFTA's most vociferous opponents and during its negotiations testified before the U.S. Congress, advising against its approval. Now they no longer question its fundamental principles.

NAFTA is thus a central element in Mexico's economic policy. The country has greatly benefited from privileged access to the world's largest market. It has also helped to attain some continuity in economic policy, which is a prerequisite for sustained economic growth and poverty reduction.

SHORTCOMINGS

The obverse sides of some NAFTA successes are also its shortcomings. The large increases in trade and investment flows have also translated into a greater reliance on the U.S. economy. Some commentators see nothing new in this. The usual retort is that Mexican trade has been closely linked to the U.S. market for decades; in the early 1980s approximately 70 percent of Mexico's total trade was with its northern neighbor, and NAFTA merely increased it to 80 percent. This view misses a major transformation: even during the oil boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s,

only slightly over 20 percent of the Mexican economy depended on trade, whereas the figure is now close to 70 percent (see graph 2).

Mexican and Canadian trade increased by 199 percent from 1993 to 2000 (just shy of the 209 percent increase in Mexico-U.S. trade), but given the extremely low levels of trade between Mexico and Canada when NAFTA entered into effect, this figure is somewhat misleading. In fact, 95 percent of Mexico's North American trade in 2000 was with the U.S. The fact that only 5 percent of its North American trade was with Canada cannot be fully accounted for by the fact that Canada's economy is smaller than that of the U.S., nor by geographical considerations. What this also shows is that NAFTA is really comprised of two strong bilateral relations (Canada and Mexico with the U.S.) rather than a truly North American one. Mexico now has one of the world's most open economies, and the vast majority of its trade is with the U.S. As the U.S. goes so does Mexico, as became all too painfully evident since the latter entered into a recession in 2001.

NAFTA did not wipe out many Mexican industries, as had been feared. The fact of the matter is that the brunt of trade liberalization was felt during the 1980s, before NAFTA was negotiated. During that decade Mexico undertook a series of far-reaching economic policy reforms as part of macroeconomic stabilization and structural reform efforts, and trade liberalization played a major part.

What is the case is that the benefits of NAFTA have not been shared equally. The Mexican Southeast is one of the country's poorest regions, and it has seen few —-if any— benefits from NAFTA. In fact, those regions may be hard hit as the liberalization of corn imports from the U.S. proceeds apace until full liberalization of trade in corn takes place 15 years after NAFTA's entering into force.

Severe regional disparities are coupled with scant possibilities of participation for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). SMEs account for less than 7 percent of Mexico's exports, while large companies contribute about 50 percent. The rest of exports are accounted for by *maquiladoras* (in-bond processing plants), and of the late it seems that they are more footloose than previously thought. Many of the plants that were in Mexico have moved to Central America and other places and may not return even after a resumption of growth in the U.S. economy and a more competitive Mexican exchange rate, which has appreciated considerably since 2000.

Ten years after NAFTA's signing, it is fair to say that it has turned out to be neither a disaster nor a panacea.

We thus see some islands of prosperity amidst vast regions that have not prospered and are not connected to the north. How much these regions (and SMEs) can prosper through increased economic interaction with the U.S. (and hopefully also Canada) is open to question. Given that Mexico may soon become the U.S.'s main trade partner, it is not clear how much trade can continue to grow.

There are also some institutional shortcomings. Just as dispute settlement for subsidies and dumping issues has worked quite well, disputes in other areas have not been addressed effectively. Mexico-U.S. disputes over sugar and trucking have festered for years, and the de facto situation is coming perilously close to the bad old days of unilateral solutions.

NAFTA is of course not a development strategy: it is merely a very important economic policy instrument that, coupled with a myriad of other measures, may contribute to the reduction of poverty in Mexico via sustained high rates of economic growth. Mexico's developmental problems are not the result of NAFTA, but neither can NAFTA alleviate them. The danger now is that, given that poverty has not decreased notably and income concentration seems to be growing, some groups become desperate and press for radical economic policy changes, doing away with some very positive aspects derived from trade liberalization in general, and NAFTA in particular. Significant challenges still lie ahead if Mexico is to make the most of the opportunities NAFTA offers.

The Challenges Ahead

NAFTA is facing challenges from within and from without.[2] External developments, such as the establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the launching of a new round of multilateral trade negotiations in November 2001, mean that NAFTA has to keep abreast of multilateral developments if it is to remain relevant. What is more, the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) negotiations, slated for

GRAPH 2

MEXICO: EXPORTS + IMPORTS/GDP



Source: International Monetary Fund *International Financial Statistics* (Washington, D.C., 2001)

completion by 2004, will also pose a challenge for NAFTA members, and especially for Mexico. The country cannot continue to rely on its privileged and exclusive access to the U.S. market as the main source of economic growth. Once those privileges start to erode, it will face stiff competition in that market.

Another challenge for all three countries, especially salient after the terrorist attacks of September 11, is how to keep fully open borders for legal flows of goods and capital, while closing them off for all illegal flows. Minor adjustments in this regard will not suffice, and the interaction between economic and security needs will have to be addressed head-on, lest focusing on one translates into detrimental effects upon the other.

Internally, Mexico needs to ensure that the benefits from free trade are shared more fairly. This means it will have to implement a series of policies aimed at "making openness work."[3] The Mexican economy must be made less vulnerable to external shocks, for instance, by seriously striving to diversify trade relations and avoid such a high degree of reliance upon the U.S. economy and by providing for a safety net for workers that are displaced by foreign competition, so they can adapt to new circumstances instead of merely trying to survive and pushing for the erection of new trade barriers, which will hurt everyone in the long term.

Achieving all this will not be easy. These measures include, among many others, a resumption of financing for SMEs, radical deregulation and simplifications aimed at fostering new businesses and bolstering the social security and educational systems. If these measures are not carried out, in the long term Mexico will bear only the costs of free trade without the many potential benefits it can yield. VM

NOTES

[1] Beatriz Leycegui and Rafael Fernández de Castro, eds., *¿Socios Naturales? Cinco años del Tratado de Libre Comercio de América del Norte* (Mexico City: ITAM-Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2000) and Arturo Borja, comp., *Para evaluar al TLCAN* (México City: ITESM-Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2001). The ITAM and CIDE are two of the most prestigious in economics theory and analysis in Mexico. [Editor's Note.]

[2] Academics from the three North American countries address these issues in Edward J. Chambers and Peter H. Smith, eds., *NAFTA in the New Millennium* (Edmonton and La Jolla: University of Alberta Press and Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 2002).

[3] This expression is borrowed from Dani Rodrik, *The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work* (Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council, 1999).

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The Hispanic Market in The Western United States

Erika González*
Esther González**

Courtesy of *Cambio* magazine

Mexico Town is the first shopping center dedicated to promoting Mexican culture ever built in the United States. It is in Lynwood, near Los Angeles, which has the largest number of Mexican residents of any city in the country. Nine out of 10 Lynwood inhabitants are of Mexican origin, the vast majority born in Mexico. Arturo Reyes and Luis Valenzuela, both of Mexican origin, and Donald Shea, of Korean descent, decided to take advantage of this niche in a burgeoning market, Latino consumers, to set up the most important ethnic development project in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.[1]

Mexico Town is just one example of the dynamism of the Hispanic market. In the United States today, Hispanics are the largest ethnic minority, numbering 35.3 million,[2] 23.6 million of whom are of Mexican descent. This community constitutes a powerful consumer market with about U.S.452.4 billion in purchasing power annually,[3] an amount almost comparable to the size of the entire Mexican economy.

Hispanics, particularly Mexican-Americans and Mexicans, have maintained their cultural patterns, customs, traditions and language. These are all kept alive by continual migration to the United States and give this population specific characteristics, needs and consumption habits of its own that

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** Technical assistant director of the Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation.

Table 1
Hispanic and Mexican Population in the West (2000)

State	Total Population	Hispanic Population		Mexican Population		% of Mexicans in Hispanic Population
		Number	%	Number	%	
California	33,871,648	10,966,556	32.4	8,455,926	25.0	77.1
Arizona	5,130,632	1,295,617	25.3	1,065,578	20.8	82.2
New Mexico	1,819,046	765,386	42.1	330,049	18.1	43.1
Colorado	4,301,261	735,601	17.1	450,760	10.5	61.3
Washington	5,894,121	441,509	7.5	329,934	5.6	74.7
Nevada	1,998,257	393,970	19.7	285,764	14.3	72.5
Oregon	3,421,399	275,314	8.0	214,662	6.3	78.0
Utah	2,233,169	201,559	9.0	136,416	6.1	67.7
Idaho	1,293,953	101,690	7.9	79,324	6.1	78.0
Hawaii	1,211,537	87,699	7.2	19,820	1.6	22.6
Wyoming	493,782	31,669	6.4	19,963	4.0	63.0
Alaska	626,932	25,852	4.1	13,334	2.1	51.6
Montana	902,195	18,081	2.0	11,735	1.3	64.9
Western Region	63,197,932	15,340,503	24.3	11,413,265	18.1	74.4

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000, "Table DP-1. Profile of General Demographics Characteristics: 2000". (The author consulted the same table for each state.)

spur phenomena like Mexico Town. At this shopping center, Latino buyers, especially Mexicans, will not only now have a place to acquire products made in their country of origin, but also the chance to be in direct contact with colors, textures and sounds that will make them feel at home.

To deepen our understanding of this natural market niche for our country, the Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation has decided to develop the Studies on the Hispanic Market in the United States Series in the nation's four regions: West, Northeast, Midwest and South. This article presents some of the demographic and economic characteristics found in the study on the West.

Demographics

The region is comprised of 13 states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming. It has the largest number of Hispanics of all the regions of the United States. According to the 2000 census, of the 35.3 million Hispanics in the U.S., 43.5 percent, or 15.3 million, live in this region.[4]

Hispanics make up 24.3 percent of the total population of the region, the only one of the four where Hispanics are more numerous than the national ratio of 12.5 percent. Although there are Hispanics in all 13 states, the vast majority live in California (10.9 million), Arizona (1.3 million), New Mexico (765,000), Colorado (735,000) and Washington (441,000). The other eight states combined only have a 1.1 million Latino population.[5]

It is not necessarily the case that in those states where there is the greatest number of Hispanics, they represent proportionally the largest percentage compared to the total population. For example, almost half the inhabitants of New Mexico (42.1 percent) are of Latino origin, while in California, they represent only 32.4 percent of the population.[6]

To have a clear idea of Hispanics' dynamic development and growing im-

portance in the region, it is worth looking back 10 years. According to census data, 50 percent of the total population growth in the region is attributable to Latinos. In the last decade (1990-2000), in 12 of the 13 western states, the Hispanic population grew at a significantly higher rate that the overall population. The highest growth rates were found in the states where the Latino community is not very large, such as Oregon, Utah and Washington, which doubled their number of Hispanic residents. In Nevada, they tripled in number. In Idaho, Arizona and Colorado, the Latino population grew more than 50 percent, while six states had growth rates of under 50 percent. It is interesting to note that two of the latter, California and New Mexico, are states that have traditionally concentrated Hispanics. This short overview of the states shows us how Latinos are relocating and emigrating to areas where they did not previously live in significant numbers.

Hispanics are a diverse group made up of people from different nations. However, Mexicans are by far the largest group on a regional and national level.[7] This means that there is a potential market niche for Mexican or Mexican-origin businesspersons. Of the 20.6 million people that the census classifies as Mexicans, 55.3 percent, or 11.4 million, live in the West. The total Hispanic population in the region is distributed as follows:

- 74.4 percent of Mexican origin
- 1.6 percent Puerto Rican
- 23.3 percent "other Hispanics"[8]
- 0.7 percent Cuban.

Clearly, Mexicans make up the vast majority. They are concentrated mainly in California, where three out of every four, or 74.1 percent, live. This is why there are cities like Lynwood, where 90 percent of the inhabitants are of Mexican origin (see table 1 and graph 1).[9] Compared to the entire Hispanic population, Mexicans make up 82.2 percent in Arizona, 78 percent in Idaho and Montana and 77.1 percent in California.

These indicators allow us to locate the states where the diversity of the Hispanic population is a significant factor for marketing, particularly when dealing with the Mexican population, one of the most loyal to products from its country of origin.

Some Economic Indicators Of The Hispanic Community

The demographics of the Hispanic population in the West are not enough to determine the importance of the market. We also have to discuss some economic indicators: income, buying power and number of businesses, which increased significantly in number in the last 10 years. Most analysts think that one of the factors that led to this trend was the expansion of the U.S. economy after the 1990-1991 recession.

The positive trend of these indicators clearly illustrated that Latinos make up a consumer market with growing influence in the U.S. economy, despite constituting only 12.5 percent of the U.S. population and that, as a group, together with Afro-Americans, they occupy the country's lowest socio-economic levels.

Generally speaking, in the 1990s earnings among the Hispanic population increased consistently. U.S. Census Bureau estimates put the mean annual income for Hispanic households at U.S.$33,447, a historic high for that office's records.[10] Hispanics' income is higher than that of Afro-Americans, although considerably lower than that of Anglos or the population of Asian origin. The mean income of Hispanic households in the West was 1.11

Graph 1
Distribution of the Mexican Population in the West



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 "Table DP-1. Profile of General Demographic Characteristics: 2000". (The author consulted the same table for each state.)

GRAPH 2
HISPANICS' BUYING POWER IN THE WEST: VALUE AND DISTRIBUTION



Source: "Buying Power of the Beginning of a New Century: Projections for 2000 and 2001", *Georgia Business and Economic Conditions*, Terry College of Business, 60:4, July-August 2000.

percent higher than the mean nationwide.

Increased earnings and consequently greater purchasing power has turned the Hispanic community into a focal point for Anglo-American companies such as Macy's, AT&T and AOL Time Warner, just to mention a few of those that are already forcefully penetrating the U.S. Latino market with their goods and services through publicity and products designed especially for the sector.[11]

There are different estimates of Latino buying power. Nevertheless, in thi article we are using the University of Georgia Selig Center for Economic Growth study, which put the Hispanic community's 2001 purchasing power at U.S.$452.4 billion.[12] This figure is 118 percent higher than the one for 1990, compared to a 67.9 percent growth in the non-Hispanic population's buying power for the some period.

Regionally, Latinos' purchasing power increased by 111 percent in the last decade, soaring from U.S.$89 billion to U.S.$188 billion, only 8 percent below the national estimate. In the 10 states nationwide in which the Hispanic community has the greatest buying power:

- California is in first place, with U.S.$137.6 billion;
- Arizona, Colorado and New Mexico are in seventh, eighth and ninth place.

And, in the ten states nationwide in which their purchasing power grew the most:

- Nevada is in second place (with 272.5 percent growth);
- Utah is in eighth place (198.7 percent)
- Oregon is in ninth place (193.7 percent).

Overall, California concentrates 73.3 percent of total purchasing power for this community, followed in descending order by Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Washington, Nevada and Oregon (see graph 2).

One of the reasons for the rise in the Hispanic community's purchasing power has been the considerable increase in the number of Hispanic businessmen who create jobs and produce goods and services. According to the last economic census done in 1997,[13] the United States had 1.2 million Hispanic-owned businesses, 5.8 percent of all businesses in the U.S. economy.[14] The West has four of the 10 states nationwide with the largest number of Hispanic firms. California is once again the leader with 28.8 percent and Arizona, New Mexico and Colorado are in seventh, eighth and ninth place respectively. If we compare the percentage of Hispanic businesses to the total number of businesses in these states, we find that New Mexico is the state with the most Latino companies proportionally speaking (21.5 percent), although California concentrates 74.4 percent of all the region's Hispanic businesses.

If we look at the distribution of Hispanic businesses in the West by country of origin, the largest group is that of those owned by Mexicans, Mexican-Americans and Chicanos,[15] which together represent 54.9 percent of the Latino firms in the region (see graph 3). In California, this group represents 57 percent of the Hispanic companies and their sales come to 57.6 percent of the Latino sales volume statewide.

Despite California's regional leadership, other states have registered an increase in the number of companies owned by Mexicans and their sales:

- in Arizona, they represent 67.5 percent of firms and 80.4 percent of sales of all Hispanic companies;
- in Wyoming, Washington, Nevada, Oregon, Idaho and Alaska, they represent over 40 percent;
- in Montana, they represent 74 percent of sales of Hispanic firms.

Clearly, California is a consolidated market in terms of the number of Hispanic and Mexican companies and their sales. Nevertheless, other markets are growing rapidly and are attractive to Mexican investors interested in linking up with these firms to do business.

Metropolitan Areas with The Largest Hispanic Population

To get a better idea of more specific consumer markets, it is useful to look briefly at the metropolitan areas with the largest Hispanic population in the West, those with 100,000 or more according to the Census Bureau.[16] It is important to point out that we consider metropolitan areas specific markets given that the economic census itself defines a metropolitan statistical area (MSA) as an economic and social unit composed of at least 50,000 inhabitants.

The West includes 18 of the 38 metropolitan areas with the largest Hispanic populations in the United States. Of the West's 15.3 million Hispanic consumers, 13 million, or 85 percent, live in these metropolitan areas. These 18 areas are distributed as follows: 11 in California; 2 in Arizona; 2 in New Mexico; 1 in Nevada; 1 in Washington; 1 in Oregon and 1 in Colorado.

Outstanding among all these is the Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange Counties area which contains not only the largest Hispanic market in the West, but in the entire United States, with 6.5 million Latinos, 5 million of whom are of Mexican origin. Other metropolitan areas where Latinos represent 40 percent or more of the population are Fresno, California; Albuquerque, New Mexico; Salinas, California; and Visalia-Tulare-Porterville, California.

It should be mentioned that a larger number of Hispanics does not necessarily correlate with a larger number of Latino-owned businesses. This is only the case for the Los Angeles-Riverside-Orange, San Francisco and Modesto, California metropolitan areas. This trend is not repeated in the remaining areas. The most illustrative case is Phoenix, Arizona, which has the lowest number of Hispanic-owned businesses in the West's 18 metropolitan areas despite having the third largest Latino population.

Final Considerations

The figures presented in this article show some demographic and economic characteristics that illustrate the dynamism of the Hispanic market in the western United States. However, in recent years, it is Anglo firms that have begun to penetrate it, not primarily Latin American and particularly Mexican businessmen. In that sense, *Mexico Town* is a tangible example, among many others, that shows the business opportunities that the Hispanic community offers in this region.

In terms of market importance by state, California is at the head of the list of indicators in terms of the number of consumers, buying power and Latino-owned businesses. Nevertheless, in other states the indicators have grown enough to make them potential market niches; this is the case of Arizona, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada, Oregon, Washington and Utah.

GRAPH 3
DISTRIBUTION OF HISPANIC BUSINESSES IN THE WEST BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Hispanic. 1997 Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises, Company Statistics Series.

In coming issues of *Voices of Mexico*, we will examine the Hispanic market in the other three regions of the United States: the South, Northeast and Midwest.[17] VM

NOTES

[1] Dante Parma, "Bienvenidos a Mexico Town," *Cambio* (March 31-April 6, 2002) Mexico City, pp. 9-18.

[2] Betsy Guzmán, *The Hispanic Population. Census 2000 Brief* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau and U.S. Department of Commerce, Economics and Statistics Administration, at http://www.census.gov, May 2001).

[3] Jeffrey M. Humphreys, "Buying Power at the Beginning of a New Century: Projections for 2000 and 2001," *Georgia Business and Economic Conditions*, published by Terry College of Business at http://www.selig.uga.edu/forecast/GBEC/GBEC, consulted October 2001.

[4] Guzmán, op. cit.

[5] U.S. Census Bureau, "Table DP-1. Profile of General Characteristics for Alaska: 2000," at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2000/dp1/2kh06.pdf, consulted August 2001. Note: The same source was consulted for Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington and Wyoming.

[6] Ibid.

[7] By "Mexicans" we mean the population of Mexican origin living in the United States, including both Mexican-Americans and Mexicans.

[8] In this category, the 2000 census includes persons of Central and South American and Spanish origin.

[9] Parma, op. cit.

[10] Carmen De Navas-Walt, Robert W. Cleveland and Marc O. Roemer, "Money Income in the United States: 2000," *Current Population Report*. (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2001), pp. 60-213, at http://www. census.gov, consulted in October 2001.

[11] See Pedro Pulgar, "Dólares latinos," *La Opinión*, 11 December 2001.

[12] Humphreys, op. cit.

[13] The next economic census will be taken in 2003.

[14] The census figures are derived from the Survey of Minority-Owned Business Enterprises, which does not include agricultural businesses.

[15] The Census uses the category: "Mexican, Mexican-American and Chicano businesses" when referring to Mexican-origin related companies.

[16] U.S. Census Bureau, "45 Metropolitan Areas with Large Numbers of Selected Racial Groups and of Hispanic Origin Population: 1997," *Section 1: Population, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1999* at http://www.census.gov/prod/99pubs/99statab/sec01.pdf, consulted in October 2001.

[17] If any reader wants more information about the four geographic regions, he or she can consult the Studies on the Hispanic Market in the United States Series on sale at the Fundación Solidaridad Mexicano-Americana, A.C. (Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation).

Oil, the State and NAFTA
Is Canadian Oil Up for Grabs?

Aaron Roth*

Andrew Winning/Reuters

Oil is the lifeblood of any modern state, and Canada is no exception. It is limited in quantity and, once taken, can never be put back. The same, of course, is true of other fossil fuels such as natural gas and coal. However, the fuels that drive most industrial economies today are gasoline or diesel. Coal usage is minimal at best; and, while natural gas can be used as fuel for heating and cooking, as well as the making of certain products in its dry form, modern society is dependent on and, in some cases, built around, the extraction and production of oil.[1]

As oil is such an important resource and source of wealth, great conflicts have arisen over controlling it. In the Canadian case, Westerners, particularly Albertans, still brood over the National Energy Program (NEP) 15 years after it ended, and they continue to guard crude like a mother protecting her child. Oil has made the province of Alberta, in particular, rich, and as a result has made other Canadian provinces envious.

Background

In the Canadian federation the division of powers is clearly set out in Sections 91 and 92 of the original Constitution Act of 1867. Section 91 gave the federal government certain powers, and Section 92 gave the provincial governments another set. While these powers were designated solely for the jurisdiction they are included under, of course some practical overlaps occur (for example, the creation of criminal law is a federal jurisdiction, but its enforcement is provincial).

However, four areas of concurrent or shared jurisdiction are explicitly spelled out in the Constitution.[2] The one we are concerned with in this article is Section 92A: Non-Renewable Natural Resources, Forestry Resources and Electrical Energy. Essentially, what this says is that the provinces own and can make decisions as to the exploration and extraction of natural resources, including oil. Additionally, according to Section

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92A(4), the provinces can collect monies from resource developers and extractors by any mode or system they deem fit. This is the only jurisdiction of the Constitution in which provinces can raise monies by any mode or system of taxation.

Federal jurisdictional concurrency comes into this section with regard to exports. Essentially Canada's parliament can make laws about the inter-provincial trade of natural resources. In addition, under Section 91(2) the federal government is responsible for "The Regulation of Trade and Commerce."[3] This includes, as we will see, the export of resources, including oil. In short, the provinces own and extract the resource and, if it is to be exported, the federal government is responsible.

Despite this jurisdictional division, there have been agreements between provinces and extra-Canadian territories about the trade of products. These trade agreements are worked out either through special relationships or multi-sectoral partnerships, trans-boundary partnerships, or economic memoranda of understanding.[4] In these relationships, agreements on trade, joint regulation or joint concerns over specific fields are dealt with. Provinces like Alberta have now established trade agreements through economic memoranda of understanding on items such as agricultural and food products with Kangwon, South Korea for example, although it is admitted that "trade between Alberta and Kangwon is still limited and indirect."[5] Due to the "unofficial" nature of these agreements, they are not enforceable by law but are mutual understandings, the political equivalent of a handshake.

It is the economic memoranda of understanding that we will be discussing, particularly the possibility of direct provincial "unofficial" trading arrangements with the United States about oil, thereby skirting the federal government's constitutional role in establishing formal trading arrangements. This raises some additional questions we will be looking at, for instance: How would these types of relations strain federal-provincial relations? And to what degree can or will NAFTA have an effect on either prohibiting or expanding these types of informal agreements? The hypothesis that we will explore in this article is that in the coming years, "unofficial" agreements of the type suggested above on oil trading and exports may become a reality. This would result in the increasing exclusion of the federal government from its role in the export of oil. Further, in this case, NAFTA may hinder the federal government, not help it. As a result, relations between the provinces and Ottawa may be strained.

Oil has made the province of Alberta rich and, as a result, has made other Canadian provinces envious.

Only one province —Alberta— will be looked at in this article because Alberta is by far Canada's largest oil producer.

The Existing Process

The existing process for extraction of and exporting oil is, as mentioned, a responsibility shared by both levels of government. On a provincial level, the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (EUB) is responsible for issuing permits to companies who wish to extract oil. It is important to know that much of Alberta's reserves are located on government land.[6] According to an official I spoke to at the Department of International and Intergovernmental Relations (IIR), in such cases, in order to drill on government land for resources, a company must sign an agreement with the province for land lease. To obtain the lease however, the extractor must participate in an auction of the land rights. This process creates a free market option for lease and in some cases the sale of the land.[7]

At this point the operator (company) must make an application to the EUB for drilling or the establishment of an energy project.[8] Once the application has all the "i's dotted and the t's crossed," the board approves or denies the company permission to extract the resource.[9] If conflicts arise with area residents or other land owners, the EUB holds a hearing and makes a decision.[10]

Essentially, once a permit is granted or denied, the process ends. According to the EUB official, from their point of view as soon as the oil leaves the ground they have no restrictions.[11] Transportation within the province can go one of two ways: "pipelines within the provinces are regulated by provincial authorities…Transport of crude oil by truck where no gathering pipelines exist is subject to provincial [transportation] legislation."[12] In essence once it is out of the ground, with the exception of pipeline and road safety of transport trucks, the province's involvement is at an end. If the oil is

destined outside the province, interprovincial trade agreements apply. However, if the oil is destined outside the country, the National Energy Board (NEB) steps in.

Before we address NEB involvement in exports, there is one vital area of provincial jurisdiction left to discuss: that is, of course, how the province collects the oil royalties from the company. Royalties from oil companies are given "in kind" to the province. Officials from both the IIR and the Department of Energy proper stated that the province receives a percentage of the profits from oil sold.[13] Marketers determine the amounts of oil sold, by pipelines for example, and then the province receives a portion of the profits thereof.[14]

As mentioned, the export of oil —or any other resource for that matter— comes under the jurisdiction of the federal government. The Federal Department of Natural Resources has the mandate in this case, exercised through the National Energy Board.

In discussions with a member of the National Energy board, the process was described quite clearly. In essence, an operator would apply for not just an export license or permit but also an import license or permit from the NEB.[15] The application would then be analyzed by the NEB and sent to the full board or a 2-member panel for consideration.[16] In evaluating the application, one of the main tests for determining if oil can be exported is that of "sufficient surplus." Essentially this test involves the condition that there be sufficient surplus oil to meet Canadian needs. If the NEB conditions are met then a permit or license can be issued (although licenses require a hearing before they are granted).

Challenges to Federal Government Intervention

Several reasons exist —some more likely than others— for the provinces or perhaps even extra-Canadian sources to wish to leave the federal government out of the oil export equation. One simplistic, and perhaps insignificant, reason was mentioned above. The provinces, especially oil-rich Alberta, see the resources as theirs. Indeed, it can be truthfully said that they are theirs. The experience of the National Energy Program (NEP) in the early 1980's left a bitter taste in Albertans' mouths with regard to the federal government's role in energy policy. According to Archer et al., "[t]he NEP was designed to control the increase in oil prices; to provide greater oil tax revenues for the federal government; to Canadianize ownership of the oil industry; and to shift exploration from provincial lands to 'Canada Lands' in the North and offshore."[17]

The export of oil —or any other resource for that matter— comes under the jurisdiction of the federal government.

The analogy of the parent-child relationship between the province, its people and the oil resources of Alberta may have been exaggerated, but not by much. It may perhaps be better analogized by a person's relationship with his or her bank account. The reaction to the prime minister's summer 2001 comments was evidence enough that this sentiment has not died out. The suggestion was made the day after a federal caucus meeting in Edmonton that Alberta's neighbors were jealous of the province's wealth, and that perhaps Alberta should "share." Albertans' response was spectacular: a hue and cry rang throughout the province that a second NEP was on the way. At the time I was an assistant in the Leader of the Official Opposition of Alberta's office in Lethbridge, and it will not be easy to forget that the phone rang off the hook with concerns from Albertans railing against the prime minister for even daring to speculate where our oil revenues should be going. The point is that Albertans generally guard their oil and the revenues from it very jealously and want no intrusion by the federal government in the area.

The second reason the provinces might wish to sell directly to the United States without intervention by the federal government has two parts. The first deals with the United States' increasing need for oil to fuel its gargantuan industrial and societal needs. Any businessperson will tell you that if there is a market demand to be filled, you can make money by filling it. If the United States has a thirst for "black gold," those who can fulfill the desire can also get rich. Since Alberta's oil revenues are a percentage of the profits of the oil sold, it seems logical to this writer that the more oil sold means more profits for the provincial coffers, and thus the province itself has a vested interest in satisfying the demand. This may be a rather crude model (no pun intended), perhaps simplistic in the sense that it is also logical to conserve and save oil reserves over the long term; however to some

politicians and companies, this may be a potential avenue to explore. Indeed, Duquette argues that "the provinces invariably favor maximum resource extraction in the shortest possible time and on the largest possible scale, without particular concern for the nationality of the interests to whom these resources are conceded."[18] In that event, federal control over oil exports may become a nuisance.

Thirdly, some scholars have speculated that NAFTA could assist the provinces and companies in the export of oil to the United States. Robert McRae argues that the federal government could be constrained in terms of its role. "The North American Free Trade Agreement…makes it difficult for the federal government to regulate the Canadian energy industry under nationalistic principles, such as forcing Canadian energy prices to be lower than those in the United States, and/or to withhold supplies from the US market."[19] Further, the IEA's document states that NAFTA "ensure[s] that that energy trade will be based on market principles and subject to fewer trade restrictions."[20] It could be inferred that NAFTA is possibly a tool to be used against federal government intervention in oil exports.

Finally, Gilles Paquet discusses the increasing powerlessness of states, their institutions and their increasing inability to deal with the demands of "sub-national" groups. He argues that what he calls the "Gulliver Effect" is weakening these institutions. "The joint impact of information dominance, accelerated change, and of a more distributed governance has made the socio-economy both more volatile and more malleable. But it has also put immense strain on the 'national institutions.' "[21] Further he states that, "The nation state, when confronted with the global adjustment processes and the demands of sub-national groups, is not unlike Gulliver: unable to deal effectively either with the dwarfs of Lilliput or the giants of Brobdingnag."[22]

The long and the short of it is that "globalization" and "glocalization" are affecting institutions' ability to work in the arenas they were intended to. Decentralization is the order of the day, as is the clearing of traditional barriers to the outside world. Now, of course, Paquet is speaking here with regard to the evolution of the information age, but his statements could have the ring of applicability to other areas, including federal government institutions involved in trade.

NAFTA makes it difficult for the federal government to regulate the Canadian energy industry under nationalistic principles.

Findings

Despite all the challenges Canada's federal government faces when it comes to regulating international oil trade, it must be concluded that the hypothesis of this article is essentially disproved. As we shall see, the likelihood of the provinces going it alone in the international community in terms of oil exports and skirting federal authority to issue licenses or permits for these exports is very minimal, indeed, practically non-existent.

One of the questions asked directly to an official at the Department of International and Intergovernmental Relations dealt with the possibility of using economic memoranda of understanding (MOUs) in a manner suggested in the hypothesis. The answer was simply that it is theoretically possible that such an agreement could be signed, however the possibility is extremely remote.[23] In her opinion, the province was primarily concerned with the extraction of the resources.[24] Further, the only real role for MOUs in the field being discussed would be in the form of research efforts with individual provinces or states, and how, for example, the resources could be extracted more easily and efficiently.[25]

The response when the same question was asked of the member of the National Energy Board was abundantly clear: the provinces have no authority to work out agreements with other countries without the federal government.[26] Leaving constitutionality aside, the National Energy Board Act further clarifies the answer. It states that "except as otherwise authorized by or under the regulations, no person shall export or import any oil or gas except under and in accordance with a license issued."[27] By act of parliament, the NEB is the authority that grants permits for the export and import of oil and gas. Indeed, a company which acted under a hypothetical MOU agreement between the Province of Alberta and a foreign territory would face several barriers to its success.

The first is of course a deterrent which comes with any law. According to the National Energy Board Act, anyone found guilty of contravening the export and import division of the act

can be fined, imprisoned, or both.[28] Secondly, and more surprisingly, in the case of pipelines especially, my discussions with the member of the National Energy Board showed that two other deterrents can arise for failure to possess NEB approval for oil exports to the U.S. The first is that marketers in the United States can halt construction or the flow of oil in pipelines from Canada into the United States without NEB permits or licenses. Secondly, a company exporting oil without NEB approval can be sued by its competitors for unfair trading practices.[29] As we can see, enforcement and deterrent measures are in place. However one of the main questions and points in the hypothesis was that NAFTA could change the scope and ability of the federal powers, and perhaps even prevent provincial powers from operating effectively.

While it is the case, as mentioned by McRae, that governments cannot impose non-market price levels for oil or withhold exports just because they feel like it, NAFTA still allows the federal government to perform its role. According to the member of the National Energy Board interviewed, NAFTA does not impose restraints on the NEB. NAFTA's only effect is that the board can never refuse an export license, unless there is an order by the governor general in council showing that the "surplus for Canadian's needs" test has not been met, or that the granting of such a license would not be in the public interest.[30] In support of this answer, the text of NAFTA itself states that "The Parties confirm their full respect for their Constitutions."[31] In Canada's case, this means that the federal government's constitutional and legal role in issuing permits and licenses for oil exports is not annulled.

With respect to NAFTA curtailing the Alberta provincial government's role as owner and regulator of oil extraction, what is good for the goose is good for the gander. In other words, the provinces' constitutional role is also intact. Officials from the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board stated that NAFTA has had no real effect on the rules and regulations of oil extraction.[32] As officials from the Department of International and Intergovernmental Affairs stated, NAFTA focuses on exports, not on extraction. There are, of course, obligations about treatment of companies involved in the oil business in Alberta; however that is the extent of NAFTA's influence over the province's control of resources.[33]

Because it focuses on exports, NAFTA has had no real effect on the rules and regulations of oil extraction.

Conclusions

According to the member of the National Energy Board interviewed, since its founding in 1952, the NEB has never had to deal with a province trying to skirt the federal jurisdiction over oil exports abroad.[34] Indeed, after speaking with officials at the Departments of Energy, International and Governmental Affairs and the EUB, I have concluded that there is currently no desire to try. NAFTA has maintained the federal government's role in authorizing oil exports, however it has also reduced its power to pursue nationalistic endeavors or withhold oil exports. The NEB must now demonstrate that an export license should not be granted because it will leave Canada in a shortfall position in terms of its oil needs.

What does this all say about Canadian federalism? Federalism, as Ronald Watts states, involves "combining strong constituent units and a strong general government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people through a constitution."[35] In essence it involves autonomous control over certain aspects of society. Natural resource ownership and export abroad provide an example of the two levels sharing autonomy over a jurisdiction in a clear cut fashion that allows each to exercise its rights without friction (by and large). Indeed, agreements such as NAFTA may actually enhance the federal principle in some respects, at least where oil is concerned. The provinces cannot willfully step on federal toes by facilitating the export of oil without federal approval. Neither can the federal government impose price restrictions on oil which would affect companies and the province as a secondary beneficiary of oil development. It might be fair to say that while the federal government remains a part of NAFTA, National Energy Program 2 will never occur. A balance has been achieved; both levels seem content or at least accepting of the powers they have, something rarely seen or achieved in the larger scope of Canadian federalism.

Notes

[1] "Fossil Fuels," *Microsoft Encarta Encyclopedia* (Microsoft Corporation, 1993-1999).

[2] Douglas Brown, David Cameron, Peter Meekison and Ronald Watts, "Federalism in Canada: Structures and Practices," (paper presented to the colloquium "The Road to

Federalism in Mexico," San Juan del Río, Mexico, June 1996), p. 9.

[3] Ibid., p. 404.

[4] http://www.iir.gov.ab.ca/iir/inter_rel/pages/twinning.htm Alberta Department of International and Intergovernmental Relations.

[5] Ibid.

[6] Author's discussion with officials at the Department of International and Intergovernmental Relations, Government of Alberta (November 16, 2001).

[7] Ibid.

[8] Author's discussion with officials at the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (November 16, 2001).

[9] Ibid.

[10] Ibid.

[11] Ibid.

[12] International Energy Agency, *The Role of IEA Governments in Energy: 1996 Update* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 1996), p. 100.

[13] Author's discussion with officials at the Department of International and Intergovernmental Relations and Department of Energy (November 16, 2001).

[14] Author's discussion with officials at the Department of Energy (November 16, 2001).

[15] Author's discussion with a member of the National Energy Board (November 19, 2001).

[16] Ibid.

[17] Keith Archer, Roger Gibbins, Rainer Knopff, Leslie A. Pal, *Parameters of Power: Canada's Political Institutions* (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1995), p. 120.

[18] Michel Duquette, "Domestic and International Factors Affecting Energy Trade," Stephen J. Randall and Herman Konrad, NAFTA *in Transition* (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1995), p. 297.

[19] Robert McRae, "The Emergence of North American Energy Trade Without Barriers," Stephen J. Randall and Herman Konrad, op. cit., p. 91.

[20] International Energy Agency, *The Role of IEA Governments in Energy: 1996 Update* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 1996), p. 98.

[21] Gilles Paquet, "Institutional Evolution in an Information Age," Thomas Courchene, *Technology, Information, and Public Policy* (Kingston: John Deutsch Institute for the Study of Economic Policy, 1995), p. 207.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Ibid.

[24] Ibid.

[25] Ibid.

[26] Discussion with a Member at the National Energy Board (November 19, 2001)

[27] The National Energy Board Act, Part VI. Exports and Imports, Division I, Oil and Gas, 116, http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/pubs/ nebactp6.htm

[28] The National Energy Board Act, Part VI. Exports and Imports, Division iv Offenses, Punishment and Enforcement, 121, http://www.neb-one.gc.ca/pubs/ nebactp6.htm

[29] Author's discussion with a member of the National Energy Board (November 19, 2001).

[30] Ibid.

[31] North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 6, Energy and Basic Petrochemicals, Article 601.01, http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/nafta-alena/chap6-e.asp

[32] Author's discussion with officials at the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board (November 16, 2001).

[33] Author's discussion with officials at the Department of International and Intergovernmental Relations (November 16, 2001).

[34] Author's discussion with a member of the National Energy Board (November 19, 2001).

[35] Ronald Watts, *Comparing Federal Systems*

La Huaxteca in Time and Space

Lorenzo Ochoa*

▲ God of Death on the back of a sculpure from Ozuluama, Veracruz. Xalapa Anthopology Museum.

Language and Territory

The Huaxtecs are related to the Maya without doubt. However, this group branched off from of the main macro-Mayan linguistic group about 3,500 years ago, at that time located at Cuchumatanes on the border of what are now Guatemala and Mexico. That is where the Mayan languages diverge. Therefore, the material and ideological culture of the people we now know as Huaxtecs have nothing in common with those of the Mayan culture that flowered in the first centuries of our era.

Rather, all the data tends to indicate that by the last centuries of the second millennium before Christ, the Huaxtecs had already reached the northern part of what is today the state of Veracruz and the south of Tamaulipas. For several centuries before the Spaniards arrived, they shared a vast territory with Nahua, Tepehua and Otomí speakers, a territory that extended through the north of what is today Puebla, eastern Hidalgo, the southeast of San Luis Potosí, the south of Tamaulipas and the north of Veracruz.

The environmental mix of coast, coastal plains and mountains varies the climate from rainy tropical to

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The importance of the Huaxteca for the Mexicas can be seen both in ideology and the economy.

Lorenzo Ochoa

semi-dry with temperatures ranging from 18 to 40 degrees Celsius. Agriculture was just as important economically —the main crops were cotton, several types of chili peppers and corn— as hunting and gathering. The exploitation of other natural resources led to the creation of a network of roads that linked the coast and the coastal plain to the mountains and highlands; salt was particularly important. Rivers, streams, lagoons and even the sea were very important for trade of raw materials and luxury items that spread throughout the extensive water network, for communication and cultural exchange and because of the flora and fauna they offered the inhabitants.

The Huaxtec Culture In the Post-Classical Period

Before the eighth century, Huaxtec culture was different from that of other peoples of pre-Hispanic Mexico. In the eighth and ninth centuries, it began to feel the influence of Mesoamerican ideology and contribute to enrich that of many peoples of that broader area. A century later, its integration into the Mesoamerican cultural sphere was clear. It is in this period that important changes took place which can be seen in archaeological data and later in historical sources. The presence of aspects of the culture from central Veracruz and the Huaxteca area in the tenth to the twelfth centuries in El Tajín is clear. Very little has been researched about the relations between the Huaxteca and central Veracruz in the eighth to the ninth centuries, or the discovery of, for example, yokes and traces of central Veracruz iconography in the Huaxteca. By the tenth to twelfth centuries, the Toltec presence, and later the Mexica presence in the Huaxteca, as well as the Huaxtec presence in central Mex-

Lorenzo Ochoa

▲ View of the gateway to the Hidalgo Mountains.
◀ Quetzalcóatl priest on a stela from Castillo de Teayo, Veracruz.

ico, are clear, both in written traditions or codices and in archaeological evidence.

The story of the nude *tohueyo*, a seller of chili peppers in the Tula market, with whom the daughter of Huémac, the Lord of Tula, fell in love, is only a metaphor included in Friar Bernardino de Sahagún's book *La Historia general de las cosas de Nueva España* (General History of the Things of New Spain) to emphasize the economic importance that the Huaxteca area had for the Toltecs and the rivalry that existed because of the relationship. The sixteenth-century *Anales de Cuauhtitlán* (Annals of Cuauhtitlán) explains how the Ixcuinanme,[1] the goddesses of the Huaxteca, introduced sacrifice by arrow shot in the Central Highland through Tula. According to Don Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxóchitl, when the Toltec capital was in ruins, Xólotl, "Lord of the Chichimecs," and his wife Tomiyauh, "Lady of the Huaxtecs," the founders of the great Texcocan line, passed by.[2]

By the fifteenth century, the Mexicas had conquered different parts of the Huaxteca: Teayo, Tuxpan, Tzicóac, Temapache, Huejutla, Tamuín, Tempatal and Oxitipa, among others. The importance of the Huaxteca for the Mexicas can be seen both in ideology and economy. Several Huaxtec deities, among them Tlazoltéotl and Mixcóatl, adopted by the Toltecs would in turn be embraced by the Mexica and later returned to the Huaxteca with different characteristics. For the Mexicas, Tlazoltéotl was a goddess of carnal pleasures and the devourer of filth, while for the Huaxtecs, under the generic name "Teem," she was the goddess of women in childbirth who whisked away evil vapors. Mixcóatl, god of the hunt, was the namesake of the Huaxtecs, who considered themselves "the people of the deer" or "the people descendent of Mixcóatl." *Tenek*, the

The Huaxtecs, considered themselves "the people of the deer", descendents of Mixcóatl.

Lorenzo Ochoa

▲ The Otontepec Mountains in Citlaltépetl, Veracruz.

César Fernández

Zacamixtle stela depicting the God of Death. Tancoco, Veracruz (drawing). ▶

Lorenzo Ochoa

▲ Quetzalcóatl on a tablet from Castillo de Teayo, Veracruz. Xalapa Anthropology Museum.

Javier Hinojosa

▲ Scene of the cosmos on a shell pectoral. Tamaulipas. National Museum of Anthropology and History.

first part of the term *tenek bichim*, meaning deer, is the name the Huaxtecs call themselves today.

But these were not the only deities. The god of death ruled the Tamzemlab, or the underworld; for the Huaxtecs, this god is associated with evil and putrefaction. Mam, an important god of this culture, was depicted as a stooped old man leaning on a cane used for planting; he is linked to the cult of fertility. Ehécatl, whose original name in the Huaxtec language is unknown, was the god of the wind who was originally represented as a cross-section of a conch shell, and later as a human body with a large beak. In central Mexico, written and pictorial sources depict him as a representation of Quetzalcóatl, god of the wind, who is described or depicted in Huaxtecan clothing: a cone-shaped cap with a semicircular fan at the base of the neck, hook-shaped ear jewelry and a necklace in the shape of a cross-section of a conch shell or *eheilacacózcatl*.

Like all the Mesoamerican cultures, their material goods were closely linked to religion. The representation of the planes of the universe have been found in some pectoral made of shell, one of the most refined forms of aesthetic expression of this culture. Some of their customs, known through chronicles, were depicted in murals and their main deities have been sculpted with great majesty. According to Friar Bernardino de Sahagún, they were recognized as great artisans for their cotton weaving; this can be seen in the codex of the Register of Tributes. They also achieved great technical capacity in the manufacture of funeral ceramics, figurine modeling, bone carving and goldsmithing.

Their architecture, sometimes monumental, was very specific: public structures often had curved lines or circles or forms that included them, as well as rectangular floors with rounded corners as the foundations for temples like Tamtok in San Luis Potosí or Tabuco in Veracruz. The buildings had thin beams to delimit stairways, and they used stucco as finishing that was then sometimes decorated with murals, such as in Tamuín, in San Luis Potosí. They constructed houses of considerable dimensions on low platforms for the most important lords. On occasion, they built ball courts, like in El Águila Zacamiztle and Tepetzintla, Veracruz. Artesian wells have been found at some sites and for security, they erected fortifications or walled their cities, like in Yahualica, Hidalgo, or Metlaltoyuca, Puebla.

The lay-out and distribution of the political-religious centers do not seem to follow the norms of Mesoamerican urban organization, which generally reproduced their understanding of the structure of the cosmos, or *Tehuaycalal* for the Huaxtecs. They understood it to be organized in four parts: the east or *Elelquí*, the west or *Ozalquí*, the north or *Tzaylelquí* and the south or *Quahtalquí*. This conception led them to an understanding of the changing seasons and to register the passage of time by a 365-day calendar (the *tamub*) and another, 260-day calendar (the *tzobnalquí*). They imagined the universe to be divided into three horizontal planes: the celestial plane, the earthly plane and the underworld. These concepts are reproduced in some of their ceremonies to pray for rain.

Social and Political Organization

When the Spaniards came, the Huaxteca was organized in dominions des-

cribed as small independent provinces headed up by a governor or lord called *tzalleinic* in Huaxtec. Heir by paternal line to all the land, he would rent or distribute it to those who needed it, free peasants. The lord resided in the main center, called *bichou*, divided into neighborhoods called *quachmal*. The lord could be accompanied in the *bichou* by certain nobles —although this was not always the case— like the doctor or *zitom*; the wise man or *huytom*; and the *zobnax*, in charge of divination and reading the calendar. Traders and prominent artisans also resided there, while the rest of the population was distributed over a relatively wide area. It is certain that there were two clearly differentiated social classes: nobles and commoners. But it is also possible that there was a third class: slaves in the service of the lord to plow his fields or serve in his home. Both lords and commoners practiced polygyny, although it was limited by the expense of supporting one or more wives. The *tzalleinic* supported the nobility, his relatives, some of whom lived in smaller hamlets called *quamchalab*, where one of his close relatives ruled and might be given the title *ahjatic*, meaning "master" or "lord of the area." Evidence of this form of organization can be gleaned from archaeological remains.



The Economy

The area's political organization is a reflection of its economic development, based mainly in agriculture, fishing, cotton weaving, goldsmithing, ceramics and trade in different raw materials. Agriculture was extensive. In the eighteenth century, Don Carlos de Tapia Zenteno wrote, "The men [had] three and even four harvests a year, although cultivation did not benefit from any but the aid of the elements or instruments other than rough stakes."[3] Until now there has been no evidence of intensive agricultural techniques, but they were outstanding producers of corn, cotton, beans, squash and a broad variety of chili peppers. They caught many species —dry fish, shrimp and skate eggs— in the lagoons and rivers that they salted and sun dried. They used salt not only as a condiment, but also for medicinal purposes. In the sixteenth century, Richard Hakluyt emphasized the importance the Huaxtecs gave it, writing,


Casa de la Cultura SLP

▲ Cut shell pectoral showing Eheilacacoxcatl, the symbol of Ehécatl, the God of the Wind.

> In those countreys they take neither golde nor silver for exchange of any thing, but onely Salt, which they greatly esteeme, and use it for a principall medicine for certaine wormes which breed in their lips and in their gummes.[4]

From the Huaxteca came honey, hens, fine feathers, ceramics, copper bells, carved shells, raw cotton, small blankets called *quachtli*, used by the Mexicas as coin, and beautifully embroidered textiles that they distributed in local and regional markets. They used the rivers and lagoons as waterways for this trade. On land they blazed real trails and improvised paths. Several of those roads were kept up until the colonial period and, with some modifications, were later even used to build new highways. The impact of colonization transformed the old order. The rhythm of commercial traffic changed and the ideological structures permeated by Western thought are still preserved in customs, fiestas and ceremonies. VM

Notes

[1] "Ixcuinanme" is the plural of Ixcuina, one of the names of the goddess Tlazoltéotl, mother goddess par excellence, who originated with the Huaxtecs.

[2] Fernando de Alva Ixtlilxóchitl, *Obras históricas* (Mexico City: UNAM, 1975).

[3] Don Carlos de Tapia Zenteno, *Paradigma Apologético y noticia de la lengua huasteca* (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Filológicas, 1985), p. 22.

[4] Richard Hakluyt, *The principal navigations, voyages, traffiques and discoveries of the English Nation*, vol. 6 (London: n.p., 1927), p. 273.

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▲ Mam, God of Fertility with a planting stick.

Lorenzo Ochoa

▲ The Huaxtec Mountains, San Luis Potosí.

El Tajín
First Approximations Of a Civilization

Arturo Pascual Soto*

Base for a cylindrical trivet cup.

The Proto-Classical period (A.D. 0-350) began in the first century of our era on the coasts of what is now Veracruz. At that time, a culture inherited from the Late Formative period was still prevalent. The known world had not changed a great deal; ceramic traditions were still practically the same and the thick, black sets of dishes were still used in celebration of local religious rites.

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However, those same potters would soon recreate the very early forms of Teotihuacan ceramics. Although no more than crude imitations of the vessels from Central Mexico, they could not hide a different, unprecedented origin from the northern coast of the Gulf of Mexico. The Teotihuacan cultural style would permeate the arts of the first elites of El Tajín, Cerro Grande and Morgadal Grande, located in the flood plains of the Cazones and Tecolutla Rivers. In the mid-Proto-Classical period, the transformations that took place in the Early Classical period, the Cacahuatal phase (A.D. 350-600) were about to manifest themselves,



The Teotihuacan cultural style would permeate the arts of the first elites of El Tajín.

Gerardo Vázquez/IIE

Relief from the Pyramid of the Niches.

transformations that would serve as the basis for a vigorous regional culture that preceded the El Tajín civilization's greatest flowering by a couple of centuries.

Everything took time. Almost the entire Proto-Classical period, the Tecolutla phase, had to go by before there was a real integration of the ceramic forms that point to the participation of the Teotihuacan cultural sphere and whose cultural model could have been disseminated by the neighboring city of El Pital. Perhaps the clearest and earliest of these changes was the abandonment of several Formative period settlements. The kind of links that existed among them does not seem to be known, giving first place to a different group of small hamlets that developed on the tops of the hills at the expense of the abandonment of the oldest settlements. The failure —if it can be called that— of the Pre-Classical world could only have been plotted in the nearby Nautla River basin.

El Pital, skirted by the waters of the Nautla River, was the great metropolis of the Proto-Classical and had certainly not gone unnoticed by its neighbors. During the second half of the Tecolutla phase a series of cultural elements were added to the new kind of settlements that show traces of their antecedents in the Nautla River basin. All evidence seems to point to an accentuated process of rearrangement of the populations as well as the introduction of a new kind of pottery of Teotihuacan inspiration, made certainly for the local elites. These were manifestations of a complex process of assimilation and cultural definition. Even though many details are still not clear, it is not unlikely that El Pital had promoted the entire transformation. The Tlahuanapa Stream, one of the main tributaries of the Tecolutla River, had become a trade route

Javier Hinojosa

near the Cazones River, where El Tajín is located. On the stream traveled *floreros*, cylindrical trivets with rectangular bases, and individual candleholders, all of which were part of the Teotihuacan cultural sphere and in the trading of which El Pital surely participated. The stream ended up carrying most of the region's trade. The elites of the early El Tajín, Cerro Grande and Morgadal Grande settlements not only must have based themselves on the new economic status of the Proto-Classical, but also promoted the development of craftsmen inspired in Teotihuacan and based on their own technological experience of the local pottery of the Late Formative period.

The taste for all things from Teotihuacan, for the cultural manifestations of Central Mexico, would not indiscriminately change the form of the objects required by these very early elites. The creation of a new ceramic repertory would be linked to the transformation of the elite's ritual behavior. At that time (about A.D. 280), many things were changing.[1] The emphasis placed on the reproduction of those vessels, very different from the oldest pottery traditions of the coastal plain, points to an elite that had opted for recreating a cultural model of Teotihuacan extraction that placed it on the threshold of the Teotihuacan "modernity."

It is not unlikely that the demographic readjustments of the Proto-Classical period were stimulated by the incorporation of an as yet unprecedented economic model that emphasized long-distance trade and probably emanated from the neighboring Nautla basin. These new kinds of trade links that also included the distribution of the obsidian from the far-away Pachuca, Altotonga and Zaragoza deposits,[2] may well have influenced the change in the location of settlements and the emergence of an elite based

The elites of the El Tajín region turned the ball game into the very center of their rituals.

Gerardo Vázquez/IIE

Tlaloc (detail) from Arroyo del Arco.

on control of trade. The increase in the population that seems to characterize Morgadal Grande in the Proto-Classical and the Early Classical may well be explained by a new hierarchy among the settlements. On the Tlahuanapa stream travelled the material goods of other cultural models. On the eve of the Late Classical, the pottery included in trading activities may have been mainly Teotihuacan in origin.

The commercial dominance that El Pital seems to have exercised over the flood plains of the Tecolutla and Cazones Rivers stimulated the development of a vigorous regional culture that we now understand as the direct predecessor of the classical culture of El Tajín. The Morgadal Grande elites' rites and their material expression ended up by irreconcilably distancing themselves from a cultural sub-strata inherited from the Late Formative. The "refined" culture of the elite must have used different vehicles for expression, so different that only among themselves, the early El Tajín and Cerro Grande elites, could the image of the Teotihuacan Tláloc have found a place. The iconographic signs that served to express it can be found on the surface of a group of cups destined for the elite's exclusive consumption and on the stone of the oldest ball game courts, the most eloquent of the buildings destined for the exaltation of the political power of these ancient rulers.

Everything seems to indicate that the elites of the El Tajín region, who participated in the Teotihuacan cultural model during the Cacahuatal phase, turned the ball game into the very center of their rituals. By definition, rulers were considered players. Their stone images emphasize their players' clothing that constituted the symbol of the institution they represented. In fact, this association would last —although with changes in symbols— until the year A.D. 1100, when the last reliefs were carved in El Tajín. These elites had chosen a cultural model that separated them irremediably from their origins and favored the unprecedented concentration of power probably based on the control of trade. The formalization of new trade routes fostered an entire strategy to control roads, particularly at major river crossings, which could only with great difficulty be forded anywhere else. The settlements grew rich and before the middle of the Cacahuatal phase had an administrative area in the highest part of the ancient cities where —if I am not mistaken— there were buildings dedicated to the cult and the stone images of the elites themselves. Everything points to the idea that the proliferation of elites that dominated only a part of the trade routes led to a certain instability in the political definition of the territory. Borders had to be set and reset periodically. However, they all recognized the same cultural model and a single artistic style, none other than that of the classical El Tajín culture. VM

The commercial dominance of El Pital stimulated the development of a vigorous regional culture that was the direct predecessor of El Tajín.

Notes

[1] The radiocarbon dating has been done in the BETA ANALYTIC, INC. laboratory in Miami, Florida, with the participation of Dr. Darden Hood and Dr. David Miller.

[2] The neutron activation studies of the obsidian deposits from which the archeological pieces from Morgadal Grande originally came were done by Dr. Dolores Tenorio and Melania Jiménez with the participation of archaeologist Ricardo Leonel Cruz Jiménez in the laboratories of the National Institute for Nuclear Research. They currently continue in the University of Tokyo under the supervision of Dr. Motoyuki Matsuo and Dr. Akihito Kuno.

José Luis Cruz Romero/IIE

Individual candleholder from the Cacahuatal Phase.

History and Ecology of Vanilla

Mariana Hernández Apolinar*

Mariana Hernández

Along with cacao, amaranth, chili peppers and tomatoes, vanilla is considered one of Mexico's main contributions to the world. Its delicious flavor and delicate aroma are obtained from the mature fruit of an orchid known as vanilla, *caxixinath* ("hidden flower" in Totonac) or *tlilxochitl* ("black flower" in Nahuatl). Its scientific name is *Vanilla planifolia* Andrews ex Jackson.

Just like today, in pre-Columbian Mexico, vanilla's flavor and aroma were appreciated and valued. However, in contrast with our time, it was reserved for a select few, restricted to the nobility. They drank a beverage of vanilla mixed with chocolate, which was the way Hernán Cortés first tasted it, during an audience with Moctezuma.

Throughout history, vanilla gathering and production have been associated with a few towns in Mexico's southeast and more generally with the Totonac culture, located in the Papantla, Veracruz area. Totonac documents testify to the fact that they gathered vanilla fruit in their tropical forests and offered it as tribute to the Aztecs. In these forests, vanilla grew on vines that climbed the trees seeking sunlight. Once the orchid vine reached the tops of their hosts they began to produce flowers and green fruit in spring. The young fruit, which looked like a bean pod or green bean, hung from the top of the trees, watery and without scent or flavor. But,

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when they ripened in winter, they took on their characteristic flavor and smell: they turned a very dark brown, almost black, and some opened to form a kind of fan that looked like a flower. The ripe fruit was offered as tribute.

We know that the vanilla harvest was not very large; all the more reason why it was considered rare and precious. One of the reasons for the paucity of the crop was that the flowers depended for their fertilization on the abundance of metallic green bees, known scientifically as *Euglosa viridissima*. Another reason that has been cited as a cause of low vanilla production has been the fruit's lack of nectar and fragrance, the function of which is to attract pollinating insects.

Some controversy exists about the moment when vanilla began to be cultivated in our country. Some authors think it began among the Totonacs before the arrival of the Spaniards, while others say that it started in the mid-eighteenth or even the early nineteenth century. Regardless of the date, we know that today's traditional cultivation method is almost identical to that used in the past in the tropical forest: the orchid spreads through stakes or pieces of stem planted at the base of a tree or host. Once the plant takes root, it begins to grow and creep up the host; when it is over three meters long, the vanilla begins to produce flowers and fruit. In communities where traditional forms of planting continue to be used (for example, Papantla, Veracruz; Sierra Norte de Puebla and Chinantla Baja, Oaxaca), trees under five meters high are chosen as hosts, while the taller ones are used for the shade the crop needs.

After the conquest, because of the enthusiasm for the spice in Europe, several attempts were made to extend production to other parts of the world. Based on the Totonac experience, it was introduced into Java, Réunion, Mauritius and Madagascar, where the plants developed well, but when the orchids flowered, fruit production was nil or almost nil. This was due to the absence of pollinating insects, a serious limitation for expansion of cultivation. Thus, for more than two centuries, Mexico was the world's only supplier of vanilla, bringing the country considerable profit. In the mid-nineteenth century it was discovered that vanilla flowers could be fertilized manually. This made it possible to produce the fruit on plantations outside its natural area (southeastern Mexico and Central America) and led to intensive vanilla cultivation in different tropical regions, making its production intensely commercial.

Manual pollination is a common practice on all the world's vanilla plantations now, though it is the activity that consumes the most time, money and effort. This is because the flowers

Miguel Ángel Soto

Young, unripe vanilla plants.

Miguel Ángel Soto

Manual pollination is a common practice all around the world.

do not all open at the same time. For each raceme with two to 25 buds, usually only one flower opens a day and lives only six hours. This is why pollination is carried out during morning hours; in a productive vanillery more than 500 flowers may be pollinated in one day. In the Papantla region, manual pollination is known as "the marriage of the vanilla" and is carried out mainly by women and children.

Today, vanilla is one of the most profitable products of the humid tropics; this is why producers pollinate the largest possible number of flowers per plant, to get large harvests. However, this practice has negative consequences, particularly in plants with a large number of racemes (over 20). A plant can be weakened if it is heavily laden with fruit and can lose much of the fruit formed. In addition, the following year a weak plant will yield a low number of flowers and fruit, or none at all; and some of the orchids can even die or develop diseases. To avoid these negative results, indigenous Totonac planters recommend pollinating five flowers per raceme and maintaining the same number of fruits. However, growers increase or decrease the number they recommend according to their experience and the plant's vitality.

Miguel Ángel Soto

Manual pollination is carried out during morning hours.

Ricardo Garibay

When the fruit is ripe and almost black in color, it yields its characteristic flavor and smell.

With the permanent aim of achieving high productivity, vanilla cultivation techniques have changed over time to adapt to the area where the vanilleries have been planted. Unfortunately, the most successful experiences have been in areas outside the species' place of origin. This means that current vanilla production is concentrated in countries where it was artificially introduced, like Indonesia, Réunion, the Comoros Islands and, above all, the Malagasy Republic, which has been the world's leading producer of vanilla for the last five decades, with an output of 1,000 tons a year. Mexico has been left behind with its 12 to 30 tons a year because a large part of cultivation is done with traditional systems, with, unfortunately, low productivity. However, if we take into account the rapid deforestation of the Mexican tropics, this agroforestry system has the advantage of preserving the fauna and a large number of species of the original vegetation.

A recent development has shown another advantage of Mexico's vanilleries: their genetic variation. This means that although the plants look similar, they are actually different, like the difference between a father and his children. When this difference is very small, the plants are genetically very similar or identical: this is the case of the twins or clones that share the same genetic information, making them less resistent to disease. Mexico's vanilleries have greater genetic variety than those of other countries, which means that the latter suffer from low resistance

Mariana Hernández

Today, vanilla production is concentrated in countries where it was artificially introduced.

to disease and that all the plants in the vanillery are in the same precarious situation. Therefore, if a plant is infected with a certain disease, such as the fungus that causes the root to rot (*Fusarium batatatis*, *vanillae* variety), it is very likely that all the orchids will be infected, thus turning it into blight that will destroy the crop (this has happened, for example, in Madagascar), while the outcome would not necessarily be the same in our country.

One advantage of genetic variety is that it makes it possible to select strong vanilla plants, both on plantations and in their natural environment, that could be laden with a high number of fruits or with fruit resistent to drought and disease, among other things, which would bolster vanilla production in Mexico.

Finally, Mexico's vanilla production does not seem very encouraging, but there are several options for improving it, among them: 1) continuing with traditional cultivation, and, with a few modifications, supporting it so the crop can be introduced into the alternative market of organic products; 2) supporting the transformation and establishment of modern cultivation techniques; and 3) creating genetic improvement programs.

Vanilla production is a good option for Mexico, particularly if we take into account that the world's yearly production covers only 50 percent of demand for natural vanilla. We should take advantage of this opportunity. VM

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Science and Art at the Xalapa Anthropology Museum

Rubén B. Morante López*



Leticia Arriaga

All museums have something that makes them unique. The Xalapa Anthropology Museum is no exception: it is the only large archaeology museum in Mexico not managed by the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH), the institution that possesses most of Mexico's archaeological riches; it is located outside of Mexico City; and it is managed by a university, the Veracruz University. It is a university archaeological museum in the provinces with collections of inestimable value placed in an outstanding setting.

Brief History

Anthropological and archaeological studies on the Gulf of Mexico coast have gone through three stages. During the first, from the early eighteenth cen-

* Director of the Xalapa Anthropology Museum.

Photos reproduced by permission of the Xalapa Anthopology Museum.

Leticia Arriaga

Cihuateo. Figures like this represent women who died in childbirth.

The museum's collections
were gathered over decades of archaeological research
between 1951 and 1973.

tury to the beginning of the twentieth, similarly to the study of archaeology nationwide, they concentrated on scientific inquiry mixed with a romantic vision of the past. In the second stage, from 1936 to 1970, once the profession of anthropologist had been consolidated in Mexico, regional work developed, like that in Oaxaca and Michoacan, followed by Xalapa, Guadalajara and San Luis Potosí. The third stage began when the federal government began decentralizing nationally in the early 1970s, including the decentralization of the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH).

This policy came to Veracruz in 1979, but had contradictory effects because our cultural and archaeological patrimony had already been decentralized and administered by the Veracruz University for three decades. The establishment of the INAH's Regional Center actually centralized the patrimony again.

The story begins in the 1930s under the influence of the ideas current under President Lázaro Cárdenas, after the Mexican Revolution. These ideas included changing the vision of indigenous people from that of objects to be exhibited and seeking through archaeology a sincere —though ephemeral— valuing of the dignity of indigenous people as a first step toward the much-longed-for social justice which would lead to emphasizing the glories of the past. The founders of anthropology in Veracruz, Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán and José Luis Melgarejo Vivanco, worked under the influence of these ideas.

In 1942, the Veracruz government Office of Indigenous Affairs began to transfer its collection of archaeological pieces to the city of Xalapa, exhi-

biting them in the General Offices of Education headquarters starting in 1943. The following year the Veracruz University was founded. The dominant archaeological ideas of the time were concretized in a museum, inaugurated in the early 1940s, which the Veracruz government said had the aim of "strengthening the nationality," and being "luminous like Veracruz and joyful like its people."

In 1957, Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán, dean of Veracruz University, came to an agreement with the INAH to make it possible to "carry out archaeological exploration and create the museum's archaeology section."

In 1986, after operating almost three decades, the Veracruz University inaugurated its new site for the Anthropology Museum, built on six hectares of land with 16,000 square meters of construction for the exhibition of about 2,500 pieces of different sizes, some of which weigh more than 20 tons. The rest of the almost 30,000 objects in the collection are properly stored in three air-conditioned warehouses.

A Space Worthy Of Our Cultural Patrimony

The museum's collections were gathered over decades of archaeological research between 1951 and 1973. They have been augmented by donations from individuals, among them several entire collections received in the first half of the 1980s. Iker Larrauri and Fernando Gamboa stand out among the many gifted museographers who participated in creating the museum. The works of pre-Hispanic art were distributed in a vestibule, six rooms,

Javier Hinojosa

Ritual palm, part of a symbolic group of objects linked to the ball game.

Fernando Gamboa stands out among the many gifted museographers who participated in creating the museum.

Perhaps one of the museum's most significant features is its collection of Olmec works.

18 galleries and three patios or pergolas that lead to four hectares of gardens, where visitors can admire everything from tropical plants to those that grow in milder climes.

In addition to warehouses, the area of restricted access includes 15 cubicles for researchers from Veracruz University and other Mexican and foreign institutions who are working on projects related to the museum's collection. Other activities are the preservation of the museum's patrimony and research to update and attractively present information for the public through the temporary and permanent exhibits. For all this work, the museum has warehouses and a computer center, as well as rooms used for liaison with other museums and institutions. All these areas operate with volunteers from different institutions, mainly archaeologists, visual artists, restorers, historians and architects.

Perhaps one of the museum's most significant features is the collection of Olmec works that are the most representative examples of the artistic splendor of the southern part of Veracruz state during the Early Pre-Classical Period (1200-900 B.C.). From this same culture, the museum also exhibits

Leticia Arriaga

The museum exhibits about 2,500 pieces of different size and weight.

Leticia Arriaga

The pieces are displayed in an outstanding setting.

masks and figurines encrusted with semi-precious stones. This is perhaps the world's most important collection of Olmec monumental art. Suffice it to mention the famous *Lord of the Lime Trees*, or the seven oldest and most aesthetically perfect colossal heads. Recently, the collection has been supplemented with the sculpture *The Twins of Azuzul*.

The cultures of central Veracruz flourished during the early and middle Classical Period (A.D. 300-650); the museum has a rich stock of murals from the Las Higueras area, excellently fashioned clay figures, as well as the best collection of the so-called "smiling figures." Also of note are the life-sized terra-cotta sculptures from El Zapotal representing women who died in childbirth, or *cihuateos*. Lastly, in this part of the museum, we can see beautiful stone sculptures, both reliefs from El Tajín and full-bodied pieces that are part of a symbolic group of objects linked to the ritual ball game: yokes, palms, votive axes, protective mitts and padlocks.

From the Post-Classical (A.D. 950-1521), the museum has an abundant collection of sculptures from the Huaxteca region in the far northern part

The museum's nearly 30,000-piece collection is stored in three air-conditioned warehouses.



The Olmecs' monumental art is well represented. Left: one of the seven oldest colossal heads; right: the Lord of the Lime Trees.

The museum exhibits some of the most beautiful, representative works from the southeast region of Mexico.

of the state, among them the *Corn Stone*, the *Tlazolteotl* and the *Lord of Ozuluama*, the representation of one of the dead crossing into the underworld. The Huaxtecs were incomparable potters and expertly worked shell and metals like copper and gold. The museum exhibits some of the most beautiful, representative works from the Huaxteca this region of Mexico.

Other sections of the museum exhibit objects from the Post-Classical period from sites in central Veracruz like Cempoala, Quiahuixtlan and Quauhtochco. And, lastly, we must not forget to go through the thematic sections of the museum organized to show stones, jewelry, instruments, items related to the ball game, bones and codices.

In the last four years, the museum has curated and organized almost 20 local exhibitions and participated in others presented in Finland, Canada, France, Spain, Portugal, Mexico City, Monterrey, Macao, the United States and the People's Republic of China.

The gardens, the building, the collection and the harmonious whole in the temperate climate of the city of Xalapa make of the museum a place worthy of a visit both by local tourists and those from far away. None of them will regret it. VM

INFORMATION
Av. Jalapa y Acueducto s/n
Xalapa, Ver.
Open Tuesday to Sunday
From 9:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.

Strategies for Developing A Cervical Cancer Vaccine

Ricardo Rosales*

Introduction

Human papillomavirus (HPV) infection is associated with cervical cancer. Papillomaviruses can cause diseases, from warts and condylomas, to lesions which can progress to malignant neoplasias. Cervical cancer is a serious problem in developing countries because the disease is usually not detected early. In Mexico, several campaigns have been implemented since 1975 to detect the early stages of HPV infections in women. However, these campaigns have not been very successful, as indicated by the increasing number of patients with cervical cancer. In 1992 alone, 4,348 women died from cervical cancer, and this number has increased to a 5,000 average in recent years.

Many factors are associated with the development of cervical cancer: socioeconomic status, being over 45 years of age, multiple sexual partners, early sexual activity, first pregnancy at an early age, multiple pregnancies and smoking.

Usually human papillomavirus infects and replicates in epithilium cells, like the ones covering the vagina. These viruses produce proteins, including the E2 protein, that functions as a regulator for the production of two papillomavirus proteins, E6 and E7. After in-

Cervical cancer is a serious problem in developing countries because the disease is usually not detected early.

Ricardo Rosales working with mice.

* Researcher at the Institute for Biomedical Research (IIB), UNAM.



A) Tumor before treatment; B) Quadriceps' muscle area after treatment with MVA E2.

fection with the virus —for example, a year or two later— the E2 protein is destroyed, thus allowing E6 and E7 to reproduce in great quantities. Proteins E6 and E7 are responsible for changing a normal cell to a cancerous one. Thus, the E6 and E7 proteins are responsible for creating a cancerous tumor in a patient who has been infected with papillomavirus.

Because cervical cancer is a serious health problem, many approaches have been tried in an effort to develop a successful therapy. Surgery, radiation therapy and chemotherapy have, of course been used to reduce papillomas and cancerous tumors. Unfortunately, these methods only work efficiently during the first stages of tumor development. In later stages, it becomes very difficult to treat cervical tumors because of their size and the side effects that anti-cancer drugs may have.

Because cervical cancer has a close correlation to HPV infection, it is thought that inducing a protective stage against papillomaviruses would help in preventing cervical tumors.

Based on this idea, different strategies aimed at controlling papillomavirus have been tried.

Viral vectors (viruses used to manufacture vaccines), like, for example, the vaccinia virus, have been used for the design and manufacture of both therapeutic and preventive vaccines against cervical cancer. Using genetic engineering techniques, it has been possible to introduce genes into the vaccinia virus capable of producing proteins that have specific effects against other viruses or cancerous cells. Naturally, these proteins are recognized by the patient's immune system, which generates antibodies and specific cells capable of destroying viruses or tumor cells that contain the virus. The main strategy is making the vaccinia virus capable of producing proteins recognizable by the immune system and that generate a protective immunological response against viruses or cancer cells.

Another novel approach to controlling HPV infection and cervical cancer is based on the properties of the E2 protein of papillomavirus. This protein is capable of arresting cell growth and stopping cell proliferation by inducing apoptosis (or cell death) of human cancer cells. The E2 protein is also capable of inducing tumor regression and decreasing the number of new papilloma foci formed in animals immunized with the recombinant E2 protein (a protein that has been genetically modified to fulfill other purposes). Thus, the delivery of the E2 protein directly into HPV tumor cells should help arrest tumor growth. One of the most efficient ways to deliver a protein into cells is to place the E2 gene into vaccinia virus vectors (Poxvirus family).

Inserting an antigen in a vaccinia virus (poxvirus) increases the amount of these molecules in the infected cell, thus stimulating the immune system more efficiently. The purpose of using different antigens expressed in vaccinia virus is to try to enhance the immune response against these specific antigens. For these reasons it is thought that recombinant vaccinia viruses are excellent candidates for new types of vaccines as therapeutic agents. In addition, the vaccinia virus has been used to vaccinate millions of people worldwide in the campaign to eradicate smallpox.

An attenuated vaccinia virus known as Modified Vaccinia Ankara (MVA), has been developed and tested as a safe smallpox vaccine. This virus was found to be virulent for normal or immuno-suppressed animals and without side effects in 120,000 humans inoculated for the first time. One thing

In Mexico, several campaigns have been implemented since 1975 to detect the early stages of HPV infections in women. However, they have not been very successful.

that makes the MVA very safe is that viral expression and recombinant mechanisms are impaired in this virus. This MVA vaccinia virus has other advantages. It is an excellent vector for expressing foreign genes, such as the *Escherichia coli* Lac Z or the page T7 polymerase in infected cells, and, moreover, MVA is capable of infecting most, if not all, the human cell lines tested up to now. Based on these characteristics, the use of vaccinia virus vectors is the most successful strategy for vaccine development today. Also, several other vaccines using the MVA virus against HIV, melanomas, measles, influenza, para-influenza, dengue virus, herpes virus and malaria have been successfully tested in animal models.

Ricardo Rosales at his microscope.

In our laboratory, we have tested the recombinant virus MVA E2 against HPV tumors. This recombinant MVA E2 virus contains the E2 gene of papillomavirus. When MVA E2 was injected directly into human HPV tumors in nude mice (mice without immune systems), tumor growth was arrested. In addition, when rabbits carrying the VX2 transplantable cottontail rabbit papillomavirus carcinoma were treated with the MVA E2 recombinant virus, their tumors stopped growing, and in 80 percent of the animals complete tumor regression was observed. These rabbits remained tumor-free for more than a year. They also presented specific antibodies that were capable of stimulating macrophages for efficiently killing tumor cells in vitro. In addition, passive transfer of these antibodies to new tumor-bearing rabbits resulted in tumor-growth arrest. This data strongly suggests that the MVA E2 recombinant virus is a promising anti-papilloma therapeutic agent. The findings described above work, and together with others, underscore the safety and effectiveness of using the MVA E2 recombinant vaccinia virus against cervical cancer, thus warranting further studies to investigate the therapeutic potential of MVA E2 in cervical cancer patients.

In our laboratory, we have tested the recombinant virus MVA E2 against HPV tumors. When it was injected directly into human HPV tumors in nude mice, tumor growth was arrested.

A phase I clinical trial designed to test the safety of the MVA E2 recombinant virus was performed in 200 female patients having only papillomavirus infection but no lesions. The MVA E2 recombinant virus did not cause side effects in the patients, except in a few who experienced only a small increase in body temperature after application of the second dose.

No HPV DNA was detected in 50 percent of the patients treated with MVA E2 (using the hybrid capture method) after treatment. In contrast, in a parallel group only 20 percent of patients treated with cryosurgery did not have HPV DNA. A follow-up of MVA E2-treated-patients over a period of four years showed no recurrence of HPV infection in 35 percent of all patients as determined by colposcopy and Papanicolau tests. This showed that treatment with MVA E2 can eliminate the papillomavirus present in infected patients and also prevent new HPV infection. VM

CISAN

publications

La globalización y sus manifestaciones en América del Norte

Mónica Gambrill, comp.

In light of the importance of globalization today, scholars from different countries have contributed articles to this book about issues that it affects: the economy, political power, NAFTA, the labor market, drug trafficking, the environment, the judicial branch of government and cultural industries.





El nuevo norteamericano: integración continental, cultura e identidad nacional

Lawrence Douglas Taylor

This book examines the implications of NAFTA and hemispheric integration for the cultural interaction among Canada, the United States and Mexico. It also ponders the demands and effects on these three countries whose future holds similar or greater challenges in the field of cultural unification.

Las relaciones de México con Estados Unidos y Canadá: una mirada al nuevo milenio

Rosío Vargas Suárez, Remedios Gómez Arnau and Julián Castro Rea, compilers

This work seeks to answer some of the most frequently asked questions about the future of the three countries' relations by delving into both current and historical issues: trade integration, drug trafficking and migration, as well as other topics more recently included on the agenda like human rights, democracy and national security.



Desde el Sur. Visiones de Estados Unidos y Canadá desde América Latina a principios del siglo XXI, vol. 1

Paz Consuelo Márquez Padilla, Germán Pérez Fernández del Castillo and Remedios Gómez Arnau, compilers

In this volume, Latin American specialists bring their own perspective to a broad spectrum of theoretical, political, social, economic and cultural issues in the United States, including federalism, foreign policy, national defense and security, the environment and the impact of globalization.

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publications

Los nuevos pobres de Estados Unidos: los hispanos

Elaine Levine

Since the 1980s, Hispanics in the United States, compared with other groups, have dropped back socio-economically in three overall areas: the labor market, the educational system and social security. This book looks at and analyzes this deterioration and its underlying causes.





El color de la tierra. Las minorías en México y Estados Unidos

Barbara Driscoll de Alvarado and Paz Consuelo Márquez-Padilla, compilers.

This work looks at diversity from different perspectives: in particular, it deals with the construction of the Afro-American identity and the struggles of this group, the implementation of public policies in support of minority groups and the obstacles to their equal integration into all facets of life in Mexico and the U.S.

Límites sociopolíticos y fronteras culturales en América del Norte

Barbara A. Driscoll, Claire Joysmith, Elaine Levine, Antonio Rivera and Mónica Verea, compilers.

A multidisciplinary group of Mexican and foreign specialists study the growing presence of the Latino community in the economic, political, social and cultural life of the United States.





El nuevo federalismo en América del Norte

Paz Consuelo Márquez Padilla and Julián Castro Rea, compilers.

This book explores the origins, successes and contemporary dilemmas of the federal system in Mexico, Canada and the United States. In brief, the book looks at the factors that have an impact on federalism in North America today and recent trends in its transformation.

Forthcoming:

Globalidad y conflicto, Estados Unidos y la crisis de septiembre.
Las políticas exteriores de Estados Unidos, Canadá y México en el umbral del siglo XXI.
Desde el sur. Visiones sobre Estados Unidos y Canadá desde América Latina, vols. 2 y 3.

Writers of Tierra Adentro Publishers Two Mexican Women Novelists of the 1990s[1]

Graciela Martínez Zalce*

Surviving several administrations, budget cuts, innumerable crises of the publishing industry, a dearth of readers, disastrous distribution and the other evils that plague the books published by cultural institutions, the Fondo Editorial Tierra Adentro (Inland Publishing Fund) had its tenth anniversary in 2000. The fund is part of an editorial program of the same name whose aim is to disseminate the work of young writers and artists as well as the most important cultural and artistic products and activities in different regions of Mexico. The program's other projects are a bi-monthly magazine of the same name,[2] a weekly radio show and the co-organization of the Edmundo Valadés Contest to Support Independent Magazines and the Elías Nandino National Young People's Poetry Prize.

The publishing house was created in 1990 as an addition to the dissemination that the magazine had been doing up until then, when it began its second period. It publishes anthologies by genre and individually and collectively written books to make new voices known and stimulate literary creation. The books have also been vehicles for disseminating the work of young visual artists, which appears on their covers, giving them a defined, distinctive image. In addition to having beautiful cover designs, they are carefully edited.

The publishing house's catalogue boasts more than 200 titles in different genres: poetry, short stories, novels, plays and essays.

Poetry is the collection's most favored genre for a very simple reason: almost no publishing house that survives based

*Researcher at CISAN.

only on its sales will risk publishing books of poetry today, so competition among poets, both men and women, is very stiff.[3] Tierra Adentro could dedicate itself exclusively to poetry given the number of manuscripts received.

Second comes narrative: more short-story writers than novelists are printed because it is easier to get a manuscript of a novel accepted at a commercial house. In addition, younger authors produce more collections of short stories than novels.

Tierra Adentro tries not to publish miscellaneous collections of essays because that could lead to its books being groups of articles published previously elsewhere. Its view is that monographic essays are more interesting for the reader and have a more lasting effect. The origin of the author studied is not important: there are essays about Ermilo Abreu Gómez, Malcolm Lowry, Efraín Huerta, Bruno Traven, Inés Arredondo and others. Several of these are prize-winning essays.

The playwrights are the smallest group for a logical reason: their work is produced to be performed and rarely to be published as a book.

Basically, the collection is made up of young men and women authors. The editors have made an effort to establish a balance between those from Mexico City and from the rest of the country. Many are fellowship recipients from national and state funds to promote young artists; the winners of regional prizes like the Juan Rulfo prize for a first novel, the San Luis Potosí short story prize or Tabasco's Enriqueta Ochoa de Torreón and Josefina Vicens prizes; or national prizes like the one for narrative given by the National Fine Arts Institute.

In the last five years, since Tierra Adentro has been a sponsor of the Elías Nandino Poetry Prize, in addition to its consisting of a sum of money, it guarantees publication of the book, which is printed in less than a month so it can be awarded together with the prize money. This has created greater expectations and every time the prize is to be given, about 200 collections of poetry compete for it.[4]

Former Tierra Adentro editor Juan Domingo Argüelles says that in recent years the number of manuscripts received from women has increased. He thinks that this is linked to the fad of women's literature which he says, regardless of theme and quality, has been a springboard for young women writers to make their work known. I do not completely agree with him. I think that ascribing greater participation of women to a fad and not to a broadening out of possibilities is, even if involuntarily, to a certain point pejorative.

Let's look at the figures. In all, Tierra Adentro has published 205 volumes:

- in 1990, it published six books, none by a woman;
- in 1991, there were 20 books, six by women (two books of poetry, two of short stories and two of essays);
- in 1992, of 26 books, only three were by women (two books of poetry, one of essays);
- in 1993, of 33 books, seven were by women (six of poetry, one of short stories);
- in 1994, of 16 books, only two were by women writers (both of short stories), although an anthology of children's literature was also published, compiled by Silvia Molina;
- in 1995, the number of books dropped to seven, only one by a woman poet;
- in 1996, production increased to 22 books, five by women in different genres (two of poetry, one of essays, one of short stories and one of plays);
- in 1997, of the 24 books published, again five were by women writers (two books of poetry, three of short stories) and Thelma Nava edited a poetry anthology;
- in 1998, the number of volumes published went up to 30, of which

nine were by women (one of plays, one of short stories and six of poetry);
- in 1999, although the number of books published dropped to 19, eight were by women (three of short stories, two of poetry, two of plays and one novel).

Some of the books by women, says Argüelles, are among the best and most interesting that Tierra Adentro has ever published.

It is not a question of a fad, then, but of the authors' maturity, as can be seen when reviewing the titles. Of the many books of short stories, some are noticeably the product of a workshop; most of them are fresh, but the desire to surprise the reader subtracts from their effectiveness. Nevertheless, several are of high quality, like *Prefiero los funerales* (I Prefer Funerals) (no. 120, 1996) by Yucatan-born Carolina Luna. Humor is an outstanding characteristic of this book and in the long story, we encounter an homage to her fellow Yucatecan, Juan García Ponce. Other books include the collection by Elizabeth Vivero, *Con los ojos perdidos* (With a Lost Look) (no. 197, 1999), and Alejandra Camposeco, *El bilé y otras ensoñaciones* (Lipstick and Other Fancies) (no. 198, 1999), undoubtedly two of the most interesting examples of the work of the youngest women writers in Mexico. Among the collections of poetry, one exceptional book is *La más mía* (The Most Mine) (no. 173, 1998) by Cristina Rivera Garza, an intense narrative poem about the relations between mothers and daughters, illness and the impossibility of expressing love.

And in the whole series, two rarities: the only two novels by women writers. In this issue of *Voices of Mexico*, we offer a fragment of each of them.

* * *

Una manera de morir (A Way of Dying) by Vizania Amezcua is like a symphony. Written in first person like an autobiography, like in any self-respecting postmodern game the protagonist has written a novel called *Una manera de morir* and on the cover is a reference to the mystery that the narrator tries to reveal: the statue of a young girl with a wrinkled neck and her head thrown back in pleasure, called *The Tongue*.

Covering 1951 to the end of the century, with a tone of nostalgia that invades the novel like the rain in the city where it is set, the text is a recounting of the memory of the protagonist that in every chapter moves back and forth through her past and present.

Antonia, the narrator, near death, remembers the details of her life in a grey city of the provinces, her vocation as a writer almost lost in the catalogue cards of a library, the details of her relationship with Vicente, the only man in her life, the only spiritual and physical love, the game in which they borrowed the names of the sculptor and sculptress J.W. Fiske and Eva Roy, the long and apparently fruitless wait.

* * *

When you are a reader by vocation, you spend your life in search of that desirable object that absorbs us in its rectangular black and white space that is a window to other spaces open and full of shades of color. This seems to have happened to Susana Pagano with Juan Rulfo's *Pedro Páramo*. Of course, even the least knowledgeable reader of Mexican literature could now ask, "And who did it not happen to?" But Pagano's case is special. In her, the reader's enthusiasm became an intertextual game so that, in turn, her readers could unwind it.

Y si yo fuera Susana San Juan... (And If I Were Susana San Juan...) is a feminine genealogy. In contrast with Susana San Juan, who lives with her father and grieves for her husband, physically —not spiritually— at the side of Pedro Páramo, Susana, the narrator, lives with her mother, who was abandoned by her father, and her mad grandmother. VM

Notes

[1] A version of this article appeared for the first time in Ana Rosa Domenella, comp., *Territorio de leonas. Cartografía de narradoras mexicanas de los noventa* (Mexico City: UAM-Juan Pablos, 2000).

[2] The magazine includes literature, graphics, painting, photography and articles about music, dance, theater, architecture, regional history, culture and folk art. It was created in 1974 and its main objective is the projection of young creators throughout the country. It is now in its second period.

[3] Interview with Juan Domingo Argüelles, chief editor of the magazine and the publishing house until 2001, 20 January 2000.

[4] Tierra Adentro receives between 60 and 70 manuscripts a year, of which 30 are published, budget allowing. The manuscripts are first reviewed inside the program and then sent to panels of judges organized by genre.

And If I Were Susana San Juan...
(Fragment*)

Susana Pagano

It's no accident that Susana San Juan and I have the same name; I myself was the inspiration for the character. Nor is it a coincidence that his name is Juan. He came to my house one day dragging those melancholic eyes behind him like a soul in Purgatory dragging its sins. "I brought you a present," he said. He left a hardback book on the dining room table, a book that was unopened, a new one. He knows I like new books; old books are full of odors from a past that has nothing to do with me. Juan's gift was like a penetration into my own reality, an infiltration into the raw ingredients of my flesh and my soul. He left without a word, leaving me alone with his creation and my memories, memories that I was not yet aware of. I read the novel for the first time in a state of something like hypnosis, where the person holding the book in her hands was not me but her, Susana San Juan. A Susana San Juan in ecstasy as she read her reflection in me, Susana, the character whose power over the man who idolizes her goes far beyond limits, frontiers and material goods. A power she does not know she possesses.

I wept more than my eyes would allow and I possessed it. I made each word, each character and each situation mine. Juan only looked at me with a smile every time I reread his book. He didn't say a word; he just observed me and stroked my hair. Susana San Juan, melancholic and obsessed with memories, could only be me: the reflection of myself in the mirror of a printed book.

* * *

Ask the living, because the dead no longer respond, they become deaf fools; ask the living Susana, even if they don't answer you either, but never ask the dead; they're idiots, with their pale blue stares that only those who love the cold

have, with their mouths stretched by iron rods to simulate a smile, a smile they never wore when they were alive.

You were born in a town in the Bajio region; then you came here, to the capital, where everyone rushes around, and nobody has time to stop and look at your wood-coloured eyes. But no one ever told you why you ended up in a world half in ruins, empty of souls and plagued with noisy people.

Ask them to tell you who your grandmother is, that octogenarian relic whose eyes observe you afraid to ask who you are and what you're doing in her house eating her chocolates. Sitting in the same armchair smoking a long, reeking pipe, that's how you remember her ever since you were a child. She doesn't appear in your parents' wedding photos; somebody said she spent a quarter of a century in a lunatic asylum, where your grandfather sent her to be locked up. But you've no idea why; you never ask too many questions; maybe you're not really interested in finding out too much and you don't believe your grandfather could have been so bad. After all, he bought you sweets and watched the cartoons with you.

Ask them how your mother and father met, when their first kiss was and if they ever loved each other. But, above all, ask why you were born and who said you'd be happy in your life and with them.

* * *

You're burning me up Juan; you're draping me with your flames, and there's nothing I can do to stop it. Do you really think I'm so insensitive? It's hurting me and killing me, can't you see? You were here watching me; you didn't say anything but the silent words that came out of your eyes. Then you left and I felt angry; I felt angry because you'd left like you always do, without saying a word. But you're still here; I can still feel your eyes watching me, and I can still touch your smell as it floats through the air. You can't get away from me, even if you leave me every day. I kept your essence but you stole mine, and that's why I'm just half of myself. I've got you but I haven't got myself.

That's why I spent a whole week in bed. The seven nights with fever seemed never-ending, with cold sweats all over my body and my throat so dry I could hardly breathe. I thought of Susana San Juan a lot. It's a shame you couldn't come to pay me a visit, I'd have felt better if I'd only seen you…

My mother is a strange woman too, she never stops telling me I'm in the way and I'm nothing but a nuisance in her life. I think she says those things because I'm not married. But when I'm ill she never leaves my side. Maybe that's why I fall ill so often. Sometimes I tell her to go away, to leave me alone, but she never does. She spent the entire week in a rocking chair that creaks and reminds me of horror films. She told me things or read me the newspaper every day. Then I asked her to read me your

novel out loud, very loud so I could hear it properly and not miss a thing. She didn't mind doing it, but she didn't understand a word. She thought it was funny that Susana San Juan was called Susana like me, but she didn't like the character. She said she was crazy, but I don't agree….

All my mother remembers about my grandmother was when she got told off for eating chocolates behind other people's backs. She was seven when a strange man and a strange woman dressed in white arrived. That's why my mother has never dressed in white, not even the day she got married.

They were the ones who took my grandmother away. I was a little girl when she came back home, a small pile of rags and a gaze more in the past than in the present.

"She wasn't really crazy, but your grandfather hated her and that was the only way he could get rid of her and have all the lovers he wanted."

"My grandfather was a good man, he bought me sweets and took me to the park."

"He loved you. I don't know why."

"I loved him too. He was a good man."

"You've always been stupid, Susana."

"Uncle Jaime says my grandmother banged her head against the wall and wet her pants. I think she really must have been crazy."

"Don't be crude, Susana."

"And she got drunk just about every day. What does delirium tremens mean?"

"Jaime just talks rubbish. He's stupid."

"Yes, everyone's stupid. Am I stupid, too, Mother?"

My temperature went down instead of up. I wanted to stay ill so that I could sleep forever like Susana San Juan and so that my mother would be there telling me stories and reading your book and your stories to me. But I felt better each day. All I wanted was to keep on dreaming of you and my grandfather and the character you created, the character that's really me.

The last night I was ill my grandmother entered the room. I felt the smell of her pipe wedged into my nose. I hate the smell of her pipe because it reminds me of my grandfather. My grandfather smoked a pipe too, and my grandfather's dead.

"Are you sick again, Susana?"

"Yes."

"Temperature?"

"Yes, can't you see?"

"You need a man, Susana."

"I've already got one, grandmother. His name's Juan."

"He'll leave you for another. They all leave for another, or others." I was enveloped in the smell of her pipe and then a vacuum. I felt calmer and thought that I should have smashed the clay sun over her head.

The next day my temperature was back to normal. VM

Translation: *Michael Charles Smith*

Note

* Fragments taken from Susana Pagano's novel *Si yo fuera Susana San Juan*... (Mexico City: Conaculta/Fondo Editorial Tierra Adentro, 1998).

A Way of Dying
(Fragment*)

Vizania Amezcua

I won't die. Not yet. I'm still missing some pieces, indications of what happened. I won't die. Nobody can die when she has slices missing out of her past, or rather, out of a part of her past that's spotty and that she's trying to piece back together. I won't die. If I'm writing these notes it's to figure out what happened. One day... but I'm getting ahead of myself. Now I'm here, watching the rain fall. I'm looking at the woman I was. Right now I'm getting ready to tell the story, and I say any story usually begins with a situation or actions that unleash a series of other events, repercussions that become the body of the story itself. Now I'm not in the middle of anything that's particularly surprising, moving or noteworthy; I'm not carrying out any kind of heroic, desperate or extravagant activity. I'm limiting myself to observing, from an armchair from which lately I've been watching the days go by, a small statue that's before me.

It's set on a tall cube made specially to be topped with the statue to show it off like for an exhibit. The figure that I'm observing is of a woman's nude body, lying on its side and arched as though an invisible lover was making love to her at the very moment in which the artist decided to sculpt her.

There are two unusual details about the statue, though: first, despite the woman's smooth young skin, her neck is noticeably wrinkled, and the other is that in contrast to the name that you might expect it to have —the name of a woman or something like that— the statue is entitled *The Tongue*.

So many details to talk about a small statue is, of course, not happenstance. This sculpted, dark-skinned figure has a history that sums up the totality of my own. Or the inverse: my entire history is concretized in the appearance of that image, its meaning and in the day that Vicente gave it to me, making it, unfortunately, the gift I would have preferred never to have received at all, despite the value it has now —and not only for me.

I say I won't die. Not yet. And the rain is falling here. VM

NOTE

* Fragment taken from Vizania Amezcua's novel, *Una manera de morir*, published by Conaculta/ Fondo Editorial Tierra Adentro, Mexico City, 1999, pp. 13-14.

Mariana Yampolsky's Profound Mexico

Antonio Nava / AVE Photo

Photographer Mariana Yampolsky was born in the United States, but lived in Mexico, a country she liked so much that she made it her own. She took out Mexican citizenship regardless of the fact that she was leaving behind "a First World country", as someone told her when she made her application. Her traveling lens journeyed throughout Mexico tirelessly to portray it with the depth of an eye that knew how to see.

Yampolsky was born in 1925 in Chicago and lived there until 1945 when she graduated in arts and humanities from the University of Chicago. That same year she traveled to Mexico, which would capture her heart. She first decided to reside here and then to take out Mexican citizenship, which she was awarded in 1954. She studied at the La Esmeralda School of Painting, Sculpture and Engraving and became part of the movement that founded the Popular Graphics Workshop, where she worked with artists like Alfredo Zalce, Pablo O'Higgins and Leopoldo Méndez, among others. Yampolsky worked as an engraver and organized collective exhibitions of the workshop's production in different countries until 1958.

But sketching and engraving, in which she worked for the first few years of her professional career, would give way to photography. The camera that she initially carried with her as a back-up in her sketching outings soon became the basic tool with which she would capture images of locales, towns, indigenous groups, folk art, dances, ceremonies, architecture and anything else she came across that stirred her emotions. Because Yampolsky accepted herself as an emotional photographer, something which never turned her into a banal artist. She said, "I don't arrange anything or expect anything. I use my camera as an extension of my heart and not of logic."[1] In an interview months before her death, she said, "When a photograph is taken with knowledge of the facts, it clarifies things;

it makes a gift to us of emotions....The eye that knows how to see is more than all the profound feelings evoked by seeing certain things. A photographer can be in love with trees or can photograph things made by hand or by children, and he is not necessarily a romantic. All these things are important, but you have to differentiate between a banal photograph and one that searches, inquires or even reinvents."[2] Emotion and rigorousness were always the two maxims of her camera.

In 1948 she made her first inroads into photography with the images in the book *Lo efímero y lo eterno del arte popular mexicano* (The Ephemeral and the Eternal in Mexican Folk Art), to be followed by many others. From then on, she would roam through the country on whatever means of transportation was available, bus, car, bicycle and even on foot, to photograph mainly indigenous and rural Mexico. Her pictures of fields of magueys, indigenous faces and folk ways often led her to be classified as a photographer of indigenous peoples, something she accepted as part of her love for this country and its people.

In 1950, she collaborated in editing the film *Memories of a Mexican*, and a year later, with other artists, she founded the Salon of Mexican Visual Arts. In 1960, she had her first one-woman show, the first of many exhibitions of photographs and engravings that traveled the world over. Works of hers are part of the collections at the Modern Art Museums of New York, San Francisco and Mexico City, The Portrait Gallery in Washington, D.C., the San Diego Photography Museum and the Saint Petersburg Art Museum, to mention just a few.

To her colleagues, students and friends, Mariana Yampolsky was generous and warm and had a great sense of humor; she chaffed at injustice and liked to fight for justice. A concern for fame and public recognition did not keep her awake at night, since they are ephemeral, though she did admit that "in the heart of hearts of any artist is a disproportionate desire to be recognized."[3]

One of Yampolsky's concerns was that her work remain in Mexico after her death. "They want all my work in the United States, but I'm very clear on this point: I'm Mexican and my work stays here."[4] To that end, she gave her more than 60,000-negative archive to one of her best friends, photographer Alicia Ahumada, to keep until a Mexican institution could be found to preserve them and give them the dissemination they deserve. One possibility is the Pachuca Photo Archives, in the city where Ahumada lives, as the most appropriate place for the collection, but the members of the Mariana Yampolsky Cultural Foundation, formed precisely to protect her legacy, say that it is too soon to make a decision. First, they say, the archives should be classified since there are many unknown works in it and the copyright should be protected.

During her lifetime, Yampolsky received many different prizes and distinctions; she was an editor, professor and contributor to several national dailies. When she died last May, she was working on an inventory of her own work and left an unfinished book she was preparing for the National Ecology Institute.

Photographers speak through images. More than 14 publications —like *Tlacotalpan*, *La raíz y el camino* (The Root and the Road), *Lo efímero y lo eterno* (The Ephemeral and the Eternal), *Mazahua*, *Haciendas Poblanas* (The Haciendas of Puebla) and two English-language books published in the 1990s, *The Edge of Time: Photographs of Mexico by Mariana Yampolsky* and *The Traditional Architecture of Mexico*— testify to what was in Mariana Yampolsky's heart. Mexico was fortunate in having had a woman who knew how to portray it with love and elegance and who left a legacy of thousands of images to illustrate its memory.

Elsie Montiel
Editor

NOTES

[1] *Reforma* (Mexico City), 4 May 2002.
[2] *La Jornada* (Mexico City), 8 May 2002.
[3] *Reforma* (Mexico City), 4 May 2002.
[4] Ibid.

Reviews

La pintura mural prehispánica en México
Área maya, vol. II, tomos III y IV,
(Pre-Hispanic Mural Painting in Mexico
Maya Area, vol. 2, Books 3 and 4)
UNAM, Instituto de Investigaciones Estéticas
Mexico City, 2001, Book 3, 336 pp.; Book 4, 262 pp.

These books are the continuation of the review and study of Mayan paintings through the pre-Hispanic Mural Painting in Mexico Project, headed by Beatriz de la Fuente since 1990.

Among the different arts of the pre-Hispanic peoples, mural painting was an important means of communication. Their buildings were covered with stucco and usually painted hematite red. Scenes covered different parts of the buildings but most of the time were found in the interiors. The Mayan culture, just like the other Mesoamerican cultures, used this form of expression to transmit its concepts of the universe and the power of the dynasties and gods.

The historic content and the manufacture of the murals themselves is so important that the project aims to register this universe of color through photography and computers given that, because of its fragility, it is in permanent danger of being lost. Another aim of the project is to study them with multi-disciplinary focuses.

These two books contain 26 articles by researchers who have analyzed the meanings of the scenes depicted from the different perspectives and methodologies of each of the disciplines; the common object is a commitment to recover from the images everything that can render more knowledge about the Mayas.

The studies were done during different periods of field work in archaeological sites in Campeche, Yucatán, Quintana Roo and Chiapas. Each of the researchers gathered the data he or she needed to carry out his/her work, took photographs, observed each image, scrutinized the surroundings, measured the paintings and the buildings, took astronomical measurements and acquired samples of pigments for chemical analysis.

The articles describe in detail the results of these studies, both by members of the project and by specialists from other institutions invited to participate.

In Book 3, then, Jorge Angulo, in his article "Conceptos generales y aspectos controversiales sobre la cultura maya" (General Concepts and Controversial Matters Regarding Mayan Culture), gives an overview of the cultural, economic and natural milieu of the Maya, their cultivation techniques, settlements and architecture, using examples from the murals. Ricardo Bueno, in his "Arqueología de la región Río Bec, Xpuhil, Campeche" (Archaeology of the Rio Bec, Xpuhil, Campeche Region), presents a complete study of the emergence of the cities in the Bec River region, with emphasis on the architecture. Lorraine A. Williams-Beck, in "La arquitectura cromática del horizonte clásico en la región de los Chenes, Campeche" (Chromatic Architecture of the Classical Horizon in the Chenes, Campeche Region), refers to sculpture and painting at Chenes-style sites in the northern part of the state of Campeche. Rubén Maldonado, in "Los mayas del norte de la península de Yucatán" (The Mayas of the Northern Yucatán Peninsula), uses an archaeological focus to analyze different aspects of the development of the northern area and its pictorial remains. Sonia Lombardo identifies "Los estilos en la pintura mural maya" (Styles in Mayan Mural Painting) that structure this amorphous universe of color. Diana Magaloni, in "Materiales y técnicas de la pintura mural maya" (Materials and Techniques of Mayan Mural Painting), makes a thorough, interesting study of the pigments and the use of lime by the Mayas in their murals. In "El patrimonio arqueológico de Campeche: estudio de las pinturas murales de Ichmac, Xuelén y Chelemi" (Campeche's Archaeological Patrimony: A Study of the Murals of Ichmac, Xuelén and Chelemi), using chemistry and physics, Tatiana Falcón suggests solutions to a very urgent problem: the dramatic deterioration of three murals. José Francisco Villaseñor presents "Reflexiones en torno al espacio compositivo en la pintura mural maya" (Reflections on the Space Used for Composition in Mayan Mural Painting), looking at paintings at the Tulum site. María de Lourdes Navarijo Ornelas develops a unique study about the birds depicted in the murals by doing research into Yucatán Peninsula ecosystems in her article "Las aves en el mundo maya prehispánico" (Birds in the pre-Hispanic Mayan World). María Elena Ruiz Gallut, Jesús Galindo and Daniel Flores authored archaeo-astronomical studies, jointly and individually developing different work that looks at the Mayan cosmic view of architecture and painting. In seven articles that deal with the murals of Chichén Itzá, Mayapán, Tulum, Tancah, Xelhá, Rancho Ina, Xuelén and Palenque, they explore the heavens.

> The historic content and the manufacture of the murals themselves is so important that the project aims to register this universe of color through photography and computers given that it is in permanent danger of being lost.

In Book 4, the articles deal with other themes. Alfonso Arellano Hernández, in "Textos y contextos: epigrafía y pintura mural" (Texts and Contexts: Epigraphy and Mural Painting), translates dates and important events related to the governing authorities and gods from the painted inscriptions. Leticia Staines Cicero analyzes the images painted on vault covers found in different sites of the Yucatán Peninsula. The book contains several monographs dealing with archaeological data, the architecture and studies of important murals: "La pintura mural en Yaxchilán, Chiapas" (Mural Painting in Yaxchilán, Chiapas) by Roberto García Moll; "La cromatía de Toniná, Chiapas" (The Chromatics of Toniná, Chiapas) by Maricela Ayala; "Los murales de la tumba del Templo XX Sub de Palenque" (The Murals of Palenque's Sub 20 Temple) by Merle Green Robertson; "La pintura mural prehispánica en Ek'Balam, Yucatán" (Pre-Hispanic Mural Painting in Ek'Balam, Yucatán) by Leticia Vargas and Víctor Castillo; "La pintura mural de Mayapán" (The Mural Painting of Mayapán) by Alfredo Barrera Rubio and Carlos Peraza; "Cuentas y avatares: un calendario de Venus en Chacchoben, Quintana Roo" (Accounts and the Unforeseen: A Venus Calendar at Chacchoben, Quintana Roo) by María Eugenia Romero, Jesús Mora-Echeverría and Daniel Flores; "La pintura mural en Rancho Ina, Quintana Roo" (Mural Painting in Rancho Ina, Quintana Roo) by Luis Alberto Martos; and "La pintura mural de Xcaret, Quintana Roo" (Mural Painting at Xcaret, Quintana Roo) by María José Con. At the back of this book there is a bibliography of all existing publications about Mayan mural painting.

Each article is illustrated with color photographs, most taken by Ernesto Peñaloza and Javier Hinojosa, sketches, some by Arturo Reséndiz, and artist's renderings by José

Francisco Villaseñor, as well as some digital work by Ricardo Alvarado. A large part of the photographic material is part of the project's archives, which consist of more than 16,000 photographs in different formats, the registry to date of pre-Hispanic mural painting.

These two books, 3 and 4, come after Books 1 and 2, dealing with Bonampak. This volume will conclude with Book 5, *Catalogue*, currently at press, which includes the registry of the murals still preserved at more than 130 archaeological sites in the Maya area. Volume 1 is dedicated to Teotihuacán. Books 3 and 4 were published with the support of the UNAM's General Office of Academic Personnel Affairs, the National Council of Science and Technology and the state governments of Campeche, Chiapas and Quintana Roo.

Leticia Staines Cicero
Institute for Aesthetic Research



Territorio de leonas. Cartografía de narradoras mexicanas en los noventa
(Land of Lionesses. Cartography of Mexican Women Writers in the 1990s)
Ana Rosa Domenella, comp.
Casa Juan Pablos Centro Cultural/UAM-Iztapalapa
Mexico City, 2001, 382 pp.

The Diana Morán-Coyoacán Literary Theory and Criticism Workshop, which has dedicated several collective books to the literary production of Mexican and Latin American women writers, now publishes a new collection of literary criticism under the title *Territorio de leonas. Cartografía de narradoras mexicanas en los noventa* (Land of Lionesses. Cartography of Mexican Women Writers in the 1990s).

The epigraph that opens the book makes it clear that, "There are lions here," was a warning of fifteenth-century cartographers about unexplored territories. The title of the book implies, then, "Beware!" The subtitle is more reassuring, informing us that the essays are a map of what the writers published in the final decade of the last century.

The book's name inevitably brings to mind a fragment of the poem "A Gloria" (To Gloria) that Salvador Díaz Mirón published in *El Diario del Hogar* (The Home Daily) in 1884:

Reconcile yourself, woman! We have come
To this overwhelming vale of tears,
You, as the dove for the nest,
And I, as the lion for the wars![1]

The poet's perspective is undoubtedly male, but women's point of view was not very different, as can be seen in the classic *Antología de Poetisas Mexicanas* (Anthology of Mexican Poetesses) compiled by José María Vigil in 1893, published by the National Autonomous University of Mexico in a facsimile edition in 1977. Here, for example, in a poem called "A mi hija" (To My Daughter), Mrs. Mateana Murguía de Aveleyra resorts to images like the following:

Bright butterfly of a thousand colors
That lives in the cavern of my loves...

Your sweet accent always reaches my ear
Like the tender sigh of the gentle wind
Like the cooing of a warbling turtle-dove.[2]

A better known author, Josefa Murilla, begins her poem "A Emma Hernández" (To Emma Hernández) with the lines, "You are the swallow that takes flight/through the flowered field when the sky is/clear and blue."[3]

Birds and butterflies are the recurring images nineteenth-century women poets use in the anthology. So, when the authors of the Diana Morán-Coyoacán Workshop think about the writers they have analyzed, implicitly looking at themselves as lionesses, they make the change in sensibility from the end of the nineteenth century to the end of the twentieth very clear. The advance of women's awareness toward independence is tangible.

Our guide through these unknown territories is Ana Rosa Domenella, the collection's editor. She quotes the collective's declaration of principles, in the words of Hélène Cixous: "Women must write themselves, write about women and make women write." Domenella introduces the book's contents, pointing to the changes in Latin American literature in the 1980s. While literary production was headed up by white male writers from what Ángel Rama called "the lettered city," the 1980s saw extensive production of political novels, and women writers were emerging as protagonists. Other groups, like homosexuals and ethnic minorities, marginalized from the dominant culture and the halls of power also began to make their work known.

Common threads of thought can be discerned in the articles: an interest in exploring women's writing and a free assimilation of the tenets of feminist literary criticism.

The editor explains women's writing in the light of the end-of-century atmosphere defined by postmodernism, the unfolding of technology and "lite" literature. She comments on the work of some of the authors not included in the volume and summarizes the history of the group of scholars who wrote the essays.

Thirteen authors wrote the book's 26 essays: in alphabetical order, they are Enid Álvarez, Blanca L. Ansoleaga, María de la Luz Becerra Zamora, Maricruz Castro Ricalde, Laura Cázares H., Ana Rosa Domenella, Luzelena Gutiérrez de Velasco, Graciela Martínez-Zalce, Nora Pasternac, Gloria Prado G., Berenice Romano Hurtado, Ute Seydel and Luz Elena Zamudio Rodríguez.

This is not a compilation of articles written willy-nilly, but a book conceived as collective from its inception: the researchers shared the whole process of producing the book; they met regularly, discussed the topics, came to agreements on theoretical perspectives, refined thinking and reviewed final drafts. This means that within the context of different studies, common threads of thought can be discerned in the articles: an interest in exploring women's writing, a free assimilation of the tenets of feminist literary criticism, translated into the search for the marks of gender on each work, as well as those of so-called cultural studies.

After the introduction, the book is divided into five parts organized by the dates of birth of the authors analyzed, each coordinated by one of the scholars.

The first part includes essays on two writers born in the Roaring Twenties, Elena Garro and Carmen Rosenweig, who wrote, respectively, the short novel *Inés* and *Volanteo* (Leafletting).

The second part deals with authors born in the arid 1930s. The book of short stories *Alta costura* (Haute Couture), by Beatriz Espejo; the novel *Apariciones* (Apparitions), by Margo Glantz; *Fuimos es mucha gente* ("We Were" Is Too Many People), by María Luisa Mendoza; the novel *La noche de las hormigas* (The Night of the Ants), by Aline Petterson, are all analyzed. Three essays deal with important works by Angelina Muñiz-Huberman: *Castillos en la tierra* (Castles in the Earth), *El mercader de Tudela* (The Merchant of Tudela) and *Las confidentes* (The Confidants). The section closes with a comparison of autobiographical works by Petterson and Espejo.

Writers who came into the world in the 1940s —Brianda Domecq, Ángeles Mastretta, María Luisa Puga and Silvia Molina— occupy the following section. It offers a study on *La insólita historia de la Santa de Cábora* (The Unusual Story of the Saint of Cábora) by Domecq, and another on *Mal de amores* (Lovers' Malaise) by Mastretta. The section closes with an essay comparing Puga's *Inventar ciudades* (Inventing Cities) with Molina's *El amor que me juraste* (The Love You Swore to Me).

Longer, with seven essays, suggesting more literary production by women, the fourth group includes five writers and a cinematographer born in the 1950s. Three of Sabina Berman's novels are analyzed (*La bobe* [Granny], *Un grano de arroz* [A Grain of Rice] and *Amante de lo ajeno* [The Crook], and two of Carmen Boullosa's (*Duerme* [Go to Sleep] and *Cielos de la tierra* [Heavens of the Earth]). Other articles look at Mónica Lavín's *Cambio de vías* (Change of Track) and Beatriz Novaro's *Cecilia todavía* (Still Cecilia), as well as Beatriz and María Novaro's script of the film *Lola*. The section closes with a study of Paloma Villegas's *La luz oblicua* (The Slanting Light).

The last section deals with authors born in the 1960s and 1970s. It includes articles about the novels *La corte de los ilusos* (The Court of the Deluded), by Rosa Beltrán; *Una manera de morir* (A Way of Dying), by Vizania Amezcua; *Y si yo fuera Susana San Juan...* (And If I Were Susana San Juan...) by Susana Pagano; and *Púrpura* (Purple) by Ana García Bergua. Others deal with the books of stories *El imaginador* (The Imaginer), also by Ana García Bergua; *Cuentos para ciclistas y jinetes* (Stories for Cyclists and Horsemen) by Adriana González Mateos; *Técnicamente humanos, Invenciones enfermas* (Technically Human, Sick Inventions) by Cecilia Eudave; and *Antología de miradas* (Anthology of Glances) by Berenice Romano.

> This is not a compilation of articles written willy-nilly, but a book conceived as collective from its inception: the researchers shared the whole process.

Seen as a whole, the number and variety of topics dealt with by the authors is enormously rich: they range from the material reality of bodies and detectable geographical areas to worlds of fantasy; from history to magic; from the boundless font of autobiography to the labyrinths of writing. They touch on birth, identity, memory and death in a kaleidoscope that reinvents itself again and again.

The essayists are interested in presenting, describing and understanding each text, looking into the intertextualities, describing legacies and establishing thematic or generational parameters. Almost all the essays —and to a lesser extent the introduction— display a kind of renunciation of placing a qualitative value on the texts analyzed or situating them in a hierarchy of comparison. Perhaps this renunciation is due to the fact that established literary criticism has almost always been highly ideological. This desire to identify with the texts, to understand them more than to judge them, allows us to speak in terms of anti-authoritarian criticism. I think, however, that later on, it will be necessary to develop criteria for evaluating and refining certain value judgments that have barely been sketched here, and judging the place of the different writers in the overall scheme of Mexican literature, perhaps trying to resituate them.

Lands of Lionesses is a contribution to the study of contemporary Mexican literature. Today, we can learn something about what women and men writers published in the 1990s, and even in the 1980s, through newspaper articles, particularly reviews, essays in specialized journals and university theses, but there are still no systematic, panoramic studies. The usefulness, then, of a book like this is clear, since it offers a mosaic of articles about over 20 writers, ranging from the well-established to others who are more or less marginal, providing an overview.

The essayists' empathy with the texts they analyze and the studies' anti-authoritarianism imply the intent to communicate with the novelists and short story writers themselves. I think that the whole makes it possible to appreciate the recurring themes —as well as those left out— in the writing of women in the 1990s and will be of great interest to the writers producing today. It also opens up a dialogue, of course, with readers, both specialists and everyone interested in literature written by women, as well as in the development of end-of-century Mexican narrative in general.

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Notes

[1] Salvador Díaz Mirón, "A Gloria," *Poesía Completa*, Manuel Sol, ed. (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica), p. 314.

[2] José Ma. Vigil, ed., *Poetisas mexicanas, siglos XVI, XVII, XVIII y XIX* facsimile edition (Mexico City: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1977), pp. 137-138.

[3] José Ma. Vigil, op. cit., p. 191.

Manuel Álvarez Bravo