VOICES of Mexico

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Interview With Federal Electoral Institute President José Woldenberg

Mexican Foreign Policy and the War
Roberto Peña Guerrero

A Review of NAFTA
Articles by José Luis Calva, Edward Chambers, Blanca Rubio And Isabel Studer

Political Participation In Mexico
Articles by Roberto Gutiérrez And Rubén García Clarck

Chihuahua The Desert, Ceramics, Drought and Cave Art

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

Sectur Chihuahua

Cover
Humberto Ponce and Blanca Noelia Almeida,
pot with checkered desings and serpents,
24.1 x 24.1 cm.
Native & Nature Collection.

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

Sectur Chihuahua

Our Voice

The military offensive against Iraq initiated by the coalition headed by the United States March 19 will surely have transcendental implications for the state of the world order. On the one hand, Washington's unilateral decision to act militarily outside the legitimacy the United Nations provides has considerably damaged the climate of negotiations on which, generally, international consensuses are based. It is to be expected that this situation will affect in a still indeterminate way the alliances of the West, the creation of unknown regional alliances, like the Arab front, and, in general, all those aspects upon which the world balance of forces depends, including the even more violent resurgence of the cellular organization of international terrorism, which will now include a generalized *jihad* that irresponsibly has been called by Hussein's regime.

The brutal bombing of Baghdad and other key cities like Basra and Nasiriyah is like in any act of war an act of theoretically unlimited bruising force. In that sense, it is a demonstration of total force without mediations and will, in our opinion, have the following implications:

1) It is a political act the purpose of which is to achieve a geopolitical repositioning of the United States globally. As can already be perceived, a new era of U.S. military technology and power will begin, which will certainly mark the beginning of a U.S. hegemonic paradigm for the twenty-first century. It is a unique hegemonic exercise and in the very wielding of the force that it explicitly shows is its contradiction: it is the paradoxical exercise of a hyper concentrated power that expresses both an important degree of decadence and isolation from those traditional allies that in another time might have been on Washington's side in a crisis like the current one. Just as was demonstrated in the short but torturous process in the UN Security Council, the United States was incapable of convincing important permanent and non-permanent members to accompany it in what is probably the largest wartime adventure —technologically speaking of its entire history. Seemingly, Washington's partners, friends or allies, most of whom agree that the disarmament of Saddam Hussein was the ultimate objective, feared forming alliances that would legitimize acts of absolute power. This, in any case, brings to light a fact that it is not at all clear that many of the countries involved in this new international drama have understood: we are referring to the fact that Washington has proposed conquering and redrawing the borders of its neo-imperial domain; like at the time of the origins of the nation and in line with the ideas of historian F.J. Turner, in the history of the United States, borders will again be the physical and political space from which Washington launches its crusade of domination.
2) This brings with it an important risk that we could summarize in the contradiction between Republic and Neo-Empire. Generalized social mobilization, not only in countries of the Western world, but in many others of the Arab and Asian worlds, makes it clear that a very significant break is occurring inside the very plurality that characterizes the democratic system. The increasing gap between society's feelings and governmental decisions which was certainly already very large even before with regard to issues of democracy, justice and the distribution of income— at this time presents itself as the beginning of a break in the democratic consensus that, one way or another, was achieved in democratic societies. In this sense, the growing protest against the war, both in Europe and the United States, has put the democratic system itself up against an unexpected limitation, and we consider that it will have serious implications for the future of the political structures and understandings in many countries and that it will undoubtedly have an increasing impact on the duration and nature of the conflict begun by the U.S.-led military offensive.
3) While it is correct to assume that the members of the Security Council agreed from the beginning on the common objective, the disarmament of Iraq, there was not only no agreement on the way to achieve it, but it was also understood to be a major risk to let Washington act alone, with the implications already described. Although the United States' unilateral decision certainly damaged international consensus —to what degree, we still do not know— it is noticeable that in contrast with Washington, no other central actor in the global theater (with the

probable exception of France), had clarity about its role and real power in the negotiations carried out in the last three months. We can say, in support of the scenario outlined above, that based on the theaters of war prepared by the United States and its allies, operating full tilt today to defeat the dictator, the importance of many of these actors (including Russia, China and Germany) in the outcome of the events, and therefore, in writing this history, decreased noticeably. This is even more the case for the weakened position of the non-permanent members of the Security Council that will today see their bilateral agendas clearly affected by the U.S. hegemonic display. In effect, the United States is becoming the great ringmaster of the international order, capable of changing and reorganizing it according to its own will thanks to its enormous and paradoxical concentration of economic and military power which, in the long run, will mean the maintenance to a great extent of its political control over the world. Nevertheless, it remains to be seen to what degree the mistrust that breaking the rules of the game of the international system, most importantly multilateralism, will be a definitive or temporary factor for the actors distancing themselves from the United Nations and for the gradual —although we consider it unviable— break with Washington.

* * *

Precisely on the issue of the war and Mexico's foreign policy, its role in the Security Council and its position on the conflict, specialist Roberto Peña contributes an analysis of the Mexican government's reactions to U.S. pressure to vote in favor of the war. Peña affirms that Mexico's option for peace is not only morally correct, but is the only reasonable alternative in terms of pragmatic politics. This issue is of extreme importance now that Mexico has assumed the presidency of the Security Council.

Also in our "United States Affairs" section, we include the last article in the series about the Latino market in the United States. Salvador Ramírez sketches the panorama of Latino buying power in the Midwest, including that traditional magnet for Mexican emigration, Chicago.

Cognizant of the coming July 6 federal elections, we present our readers with an exclusive interview with one of the most important and politically prestigious actors of the Mexican transition to democracy, the president councilor of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) General Council, José Woldenberg, who talks with us about issues particularly relevant to our country's future and political life, among them, Mexicans' voting abroad, a question of special interest to our U.S. readers.

In this pre-electoral context, our "Politics" section also includes two articles about political participation in Mexico. Political culture specialist Roberto Gutiérrez maintains that two trends can be seen in Mexico: hyperactivism by a few small, over-ideologized groups who do not hesitate to break the law for their own political benefit, and the apathy of most of the population. In both cases, Gutiérrez sees risks for the consolidation of democracy. Political philosopher Rubén García Clarck offers us an analysis of the political parties' most important proposals for the coming elections. At the same time, he questions the usefulness of a system that allows the proliferation of parties that, while having the positive effect of expressing the country's real pluralism, also are often not very representative, or express only very specific interests.

Undoubtedly, an issue that has been up for debate nationwide since the beginning of the year is the lifting of tariffs under the agricultural chapter of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). An important part of Mexico's peasantry is seriously concerned and has even organized a protest movement demanding this chapter be reviewed. Our "Society" section includes two articles on this issue from experts on the Mexican countryside. José Luis Calva looks into the reasons for the abysmal agricultural technological and productivity differences among the United States, Canada and Mexico, and Blanca Rubio shows how the United States has imposed a neoliberal agricultural model on the rest of the world while simultaneously providing subsidies and protectionism to its own farmers and growers.

Specialist Isabel Studer also writes about NAFTA, offering a general balance sheet about its effects on our country. Studer finds more benefits than disadvantages and therefore maintains that renegotiating any of the treaty's chapters would be counterproductive for Mexico's national interests. Also in our "Economy" section, we have a contribution from María Cristina Rosas about Mexican foreign trade policy in which she main-

tains that Mexico should take advantage of its position as host of future international trade summits to try to exert influence in favor of its own trade policies and interests. According to Rosas, to this end, Mexico needs to design an industrial policy that jibes with its foreign trade policy.

To facilitate comparative analyses, in our "Canadian Issues" section, we offer an article by expert Edward Chambers about NAFTA's effects in Canada 10 years after it came into effect. Chambers, while accepting that the treaty has brought benefits, also says that its results are nothing to write home about, and among its disadvantages is the undeniable fact that Canada's dependence on the U.S. economy has grown.

* * *

Chihuahua, Mexico's largest state, is once again the subject of our "Art and Culture", "History", "The Splendor of Mexico", "Museums" and "Ecology" sections.

Chihuahua's art and culture are magnificently represented in the exquisite ceramics produced in the town of Mata Ortiz, a real feast for clay lovers. Enrique Servín, for his part, contributes a reflection about the Chihuahua desert, one of the largest in the Americas, in a dialogue with the magic and mystery of the images captured by Ignacio Guerrero's lens.

Francisco Villa and Luis Terrazas, two of Chihuahua's emblematic figures, fill the pages of our "History" section. From opposing sides, these two men played central roles in the history of the state. María Luisa Reyes Landa writes about Villa, a revolutionary general known for his successes on the battlefield, his interest in the poor, his love of women and his contradictory personality. Jaime Abundis describes the career of Luis Terrazas, who knew how to take advantage of the opportunities offered by power for accumulating an immense fortune in land, and who legend has it once said, "I am not from Chihuahua; Chihuahua is mine."

"The Splendor of Mexico" continues this voyage with an article by Arturo Guevara about the state's cave art, which reflects the cultural transformations that the indigenous tribes who inhabited these lands went through from pre-Hispanic until colonial times. The Copper Canyons, in some places deeper than the Grand Canyon, are traversed by explorer Carlos Rangel, who assures us that the majesty of their natural scenery can only be discovered completely when we enter into contact with the spirit and dignity of the men who inhabit its out-of-the-way corners. Lastly, we come to the city of the desert, Chihuahua. Carlos Lascano briefly tells us its history, linked to our development as a nation, illustrated by images of its past and present.

The cultures of Mexico's North have been little studied by scholars and researchers, more bewitched by archaeological sites in the central and southern parts of the country. For that reason, our "Museums" section is dedicated to the Museum of the Cultures of the North, which displays the surprising constructions and main archaeological finds of the Paquimé and Casas Grandes sites.

Héctor Gadsden and a group of researchers look at one of the main economic and social problems that the state of Chihuahua repeatedly faces: drought. Using precision monitoring methods, scientists have developed different strategies for appropriately managing it.

In the "Literature" section, Bruce Novoa, writer and literary critic, continues his examination of the new Chicano literature. In this issue, he introduces us to Lorraine López, a writer whose refinement and masterful use of ellipsis weaves stories in which irony and a sense of humor enhance the drama of daily life, as shown by the story "To Control a Rabid Rodent," included in this issue.

Our "In Memoriam" section pays homage to two colossuses of twentieth-century Mexican culture: Michoacán-born painter Alfredo Zalce, recognized by many as the last of Mexican muralists and Guatemala-born writer Augusto Monterroso, adopted by Mexico, the undisputed master of brevity in literature and possessor of a style recognized as one of the most innovative in the Latin American short story. Undoubtedly, two major losses for Mexican culture.

José Luis Valdés-Ugalde

The Mexican Transition to Democracy
An Interview with Federal Electoral Institute President José Woldenberg*



Pedro Mera/Cuartoscuro

VOICES OF MEXICO: As seen from your posts first as an electoral councilor and then as president of the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) General Council, what have the most difficult moments of Mexico's transition to democracy been?

JOSÉ WOLDENBERG: The period of successive electoral reforms of the Mexican transition has been so long that it is not easy to distinguish any moment more difficult than others. Undoubtedly, 1994 was a year of significant political changes in the country that had an impact on electoral processes and the IFE. In that year I was part of the General Council with other citizen councilors. Despite the grave political events that were taking place, the institute showed itself to be stable and was able to carry out a successful election.[1] That was possi-

* President Councilor of the General Council of Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute (IFE).

ble because the prior agreements among the political forces were solid.

VM: In your opinion, what is the role the IFE has played in that transition?

JW: The IFE was created as a result of a series of pacts among the political parties that aimed to establish a trustworthy electoral institution that would satisfy the persistent democratic demand for clean elections and could guarantee the legitimacy of electoral processes. I think that the IFE's fundamental achievement has been guaranteeing both citizens and parties that, today, without any doubt, elected posts are filled by those who get the majority of the vote through rigorously legal means and after reasonably equitable competition. No more than that, but also no less.

VM: Who have the other main political actors of the transition been and what role have they played, pro or con?

JW: Strictly speaking the IFE is not an actor in the transition, but rather an electoral institution resulting from it and providing channels for it. The Mexican democratic transition is a very complex, prolonged process of reforms that produced political changes which, in turn, required new reforms. From that perspective, the political actors were many. Undoubtedly, the different administrations, parties and their congressional caucuses have played a central role in building the institutions of democracy because they all contributed to developing the new rules of the electoral game and they all agreed to submit to them. At the same time, the parties' actions cannot be explained without taking into account the transformation that the public's political culture has experienced. The media opened up a new era for the exercise of freedom of expression, which is an indispensable prerequisite —like oxygen— for democracy. The many diverse organizations of civil society that have emerged in recent years also decisively contributed to expanding and reinforcing a context of pluralism, tolerance and respect for citizens' rights that would have been unthinkable a couple of decades ago.



Pedro Mera/Cuartoscuro

José Woldenberg during a session of the IFE General Council.

VM: How have the political parties defined their responsibilities and acted vis-à-vis the process of national democratization?

JW: The political parties have been the central protagonists in the different stages of the electoral reforms. Since 1977, when the Mexican Communist Party, the Socialist Workers Party and the Mexican Democratic Party were legalized, thus guaranteeing the right of parties to effectively participate in local elections, the political, electoral scene began to change. The 1986 constitutional and legislative electoral reforms were the result of a public call by the government for which the debate among the parties was fundamental. That reform instituted —among the positive changes— the new composition of the Chamber of Deputies, making it the current 300 deputies elected by majority vote and 200 deputies elected by proportional representation, and created the Mexico City Assembly of Representatives and the first autonomous court for solving electoral disputes. The 1986 reform also included unfortunate changes. For example, it established a formula for setting up the Federal Electoral Commission, the electoral authority of the time, that gave a majority of votes to the party in office and a procedure for a top-down decision making process to name polling officials. The application of that new legislation, the increase in parties' electoral

Germán Romero/Cuartoscuro

Vicente Fox registering as the PAN presidential candidate.

weight and, above all, the experience of the conflictive 1988 elections, prompted yet again party debate between 1989 and 1990, which led to another cycle of reforms, making possible, among other things, the creation of the IFE. In 1993, accords were negotiated about party financing. In 1994, a new constitutional reform made the Federal Electoral Institute more independent: the parties' right to vote in the council was eliminated, the post of citizen councilor was created for all collective bodies and other legal measures were taken to make elections more transparent. In 1996, the rules for ensuring greater equality in political competition and the IFE's total autonomy were reviewed. To sum up, in such a short space, it is impossible to go into great detail about this very intricate process, but undoubtedly the parties were the ones who, acting in the electoral campaigns and negotiating the rules of the game, were the decisive actors in the transition.

VM: For the readers of *Voices of Mexico*, the majority of whom live in the United States and are of Mexican descent, it is important to know what the first citizen president of the IFE thinks about voting abroad.

JW: The important thing about this issue is that the 1996 constitutional reform opened up the legal possibility that all voting-age Mexicans can vote regardless of where they are. What was left pending was the development of the legal formulas so this right can actually be put into practice. The IFE was mandated to carry out a study about the legal conditions and the technical and logistical ways though which Mexicans abroad could eventually vote. In November 1998 the institute fulfilled that mandate and gave Congress the results of the study done by a group of the country's best specialists. Everyone interested in this issue should read this study, which concludes that it is technically possible to organize voting abroad in different ways. Congress is analyzing the necessary reforms that —and we should not sidestep this— have to take into account the solution of important legal, logistical, budgetary and even diplomatic problems. The political parties and the government itself have both made the specific commitment to establish mechanisms that would allow Mexicans abroad to participate in the 2006 presidential elections.

VM: What are the main risks for the consolidation of democracy in Mexico —if there are any and, in your opinion, is there any real possibility of going back to a non-democratic regime?

JW: I have said on several occasions that, in the long run, the consolidation of democracy requires the country to start down the road to solving the problem of the growing economic and social inequality among Mexicans. That is the main long-term condition for democracy to be solid. In the shorter term, we need dialogue and negotiation among the parties, particularly in Congress, to come to agreements that will effectively deal with the issues on the national agenda. In my view, the political issues that must be addressed today are problems inherent to all democracies, with their national particularities of course.

VM: Do you think that elections in Mexico are already reasonably equitable, taking into consideration factors like the differentiated funding given to the parties, media access, the use of public resources and the prestige of public office in party activities? If you think not, how far have things advanced toward this goal?

JW: The question answers itself. Thirty percent of public funding for the parties is divided equally among them, while the other 70 percent is distributed proportionately according to the number of votes each received in the previous election. Private contributions are limited and all party finances are subject to legal regulation and oversight by electoral authorities. Legal mechanisms exist to ensure that all the parties have access to the media. This means that, as you say, elections are reasonably equitable.

VM: Do you think that the party system has already been consolidated in Mexico, with three strong parties and several small not-very-representative ones? Or do you foresee changes in this? What kind of party system do you think would be best for the country?

JW: The last word has never been said about the number of large and small parties, nor do I think anyone can say it. Our electoral system guarantees access for those who want to register new parties and also has a rule about those who lose their registration because they fail to get 2 percent of the vote. Based on that, it is the citizenry who decides the future of the party system at the polls. Ours is a very heterogeneous and diverse country and the best thing for it is that conditions for that plural citizenry to be politically represented be guaranteed through the ballot.

VM: What reforms are needed to strengthen the electoral system, and therefore the party system, in Mexico?

JW: I think that the layout of the electoral system is basically completed and well designed. This is shown in the successful results of all the federal elections the IFE has organized. The experience of the last few years has prompted proposals to be made to fine tune some specific aspects, for example, the matter of voting abroad. It has also been proposed that not all the IFE's electoral councilors be changed simultaneously in order to ensure continuity in the council's work. More recently, since the IFE has carried out its task of monitoring party finances, weaknesses in the design of its instruments to do so have become clear and this will undoubtedly soon lead to certain adjustments by the legislature. For anyone interested in the details, in July 2001, *Nexos* magazine published an article I wrote to summarize these reform proposals and their motivations.

In the long run, the consolidation of democracy requires the country to start solving the growing economic and social inequality among Mexicans.

VM: How would you explain the high cost of public funding to political parties and national political groups,[2] as well as of the maintenance and operation of the IFE itself?

JW: We should not lose sight of the fact that all judgments about the cost of any electoral system are relative. No system is the same as any other. Let me give you an example: in Mexico the electoral body is in charge of keeping the voters' registration rolls permanently up to date. In addition to their being an indispensable tool for elections, they have also become the most trustworthy instrument for personal identification. All banks and public offices require individuals to present their voter registration card to carry out any business. Well, managing the voters' registration rolls and issuing voter IDs accounts for almost 40 percent of the IFE's operating expenses. In most countries, these instruments are not considered an electoral expenditure.

On the other hand, by law the IFE must carry out a great number of tasks and procedures that were developed to make its activities trustworthy. Sometimes they seem excessive and redundant, but if they guarantee trust in electoral processes, the expenditure is more than justified.

With regard to public funding of parties, we should take into consideration that the overarching political decision made in our country was that we should make public funding supercede private contributions. This guarantees that there are balanced conditions for competition and that funding is not used to control the parties by corporatist or even underworld groups. In addition, this also ensures official monitoring of all party finances. Perhaps the system of financing could be adjusted in the future. But I think that the basic concept is operating fine.

VM: What is your perception of the current state of the national political culture and its relationship with the consolidation of democracy in Mexico?

JW: National political culture is evolving rapidly. A good number of the changes

derive from the opening of democratic spaces in recent years. All Mexicans are constantly learning about this. Recent polls on the public's political culture show that there are chiaroscuros with regard to the affirmation of democratic values like tolerance and respect for the law; but they also reveal Mexicans' support for democratic forms of government.

VM: What would be the best way to balance pluralism and democratic governability in Mexico, particularly in light of the legislative slowness —some would say paralysis— with which the so-called divided government has functioned federally?

JW: There is no other way forward to governability than negotiation and accords among political forces. Today, we have a legal framework, and institutions have been built that favor politics operating in its best sense: producing agreements that allow people and groups to live together even though they have different visions of the world, different ideological convictions and varied interests. Without denying that certain political reforms could contribute to governability, I think that currently, the responsible behavior of political actors and their respect for the law are the factors that most contribute to democracy being both effective and legitimate.

VM: Is there anything else that you would like to add for the readers of *Voices of Mexico*?

JW: Just my thanks. VM

Notes

[1] Councilor Woldenberg refers here to the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas that broke out January 1 and, above all, to the assassinations of Institutional Revolutionary Party presidential candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio in March and of PRI General Secretary Francisco Ruiz Massieu in September. [Editor's Note.]

[2] In Mexico, national political groups, registered by the IFE that fulfill a series of legal prerequisites, are entitled to receive public money to finance several kinds of activities: political campaigning, operating expenses and research and dissemination of democratic culture and ideas, as well as political education. [Editor's Note.]

From Disinterest to Excess The Cultural Bases for Political Participation in Mexico

Roberto Gutiérrez*

Pedro Mera/Cuartoscuro

Mobilization in San Mateo Atenco against the construction of an international airport in the area.

In Mexico's intellectual and political milieu, the characteristics, types and orientations that should distinguish democratic forms of participation from other kinds of political activity do not seem to have been sufficiently pinpointed. It seems necessary to introduce into the debate the importance of certain cultural variables without which individual or social group involvement in processing public matters is relatively insignificant or even counterproductive for the stabilization of our young democracy and its governmental effectiveness.

I am interested in underlining this point since it clearly expresses one of the greatest current problems in the process of building a democracy in Mexico: the coexistence of society's enormous disinterest in public matters and hyperactive social groups that have developed forms of participation inconsistent with the principles and values of a democratic culture. Briefly, in the wake of the majority's rejection of participating in a widely scorned sphere of activity, certain forms of political action on the part of consistent minorities has

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intensified, which far from contributing to the consolidation of institutional routines and forms of social relations appropriate to a democracy, contribute to the erosion of both its legal and axiological pillars. And in a situation of political transition like the one Mexico has been experiencing in recent years, it has not been easy to find a balance between the subject, pragmatic and providentialist culture stemming from our revolutionary heritage and a culture of legal, responsible, tolerant participation, capable of creating a solid basis for the two main characteristics of modern democracies: the representativeness of their institutions and the governability of the political system in the framework of the rule of law.

Thus, given the breakdown of many of the traditional mechanisms of political discipline, cohesion and authority, an unprecedented situation has emerged in which factors traditional to our political-cultural history have taken on new meanings, factors such as the discredit of public institutions, disrespect for legality, the weakness of the citizen as a category, making personalized leaderships supreme, the acceptance of patronage as the norm in relations, the tendency to see social movements as great quests for justice and imposing an extreme moral character on conflicts, among others. In an atmosphere of political opening and the relative lack of definition of new forms of relations among socio-political actors and state institutions, the force of this cultural substratum, together with the maintenance of profound inequalities that have increased tension and social clashes, has meant that many of the most visible expressions of participation are forms of extra-institutional protest, not very conducive to tolerance, dialogue and negotiation and sometimes openly extra-legal. Though this cannot be generalized —since undoubtedly forms of public participation exist with other bases— it does seem appropriate to underline the gravity of their effects for Mexican public life as a whole.

It must be said that this is not only a cultural obstacle situated in the dynamic of society, since its continuance can be explained to a great extent by the manner in which the political elites themselves are dealing with it and reacting to it in the country's new phase. Faced for the last few years increasingly with the choice of maintaining momentary political stability or accepting the costs of consolidating a new form of negotiation and generation of agreements that does not undermine legality and protects the rights of third parties, they have usually opted for the former. Many have commented that this inability to consolidate a rule of law brings with it a profound socio-political lesson that, among other things, distorts participation, feeds uncertainty and delays the entire process of democratic consolidation. Of course, it must not be forgotten that when conflicts are posed, processed and resolved against the current of civic education aimed at socializing through different institutional efforts, that education tends to be devalued and lose its sense of reality and effectiveness in the formation of civic identities. This obviously does not mean such efforts should be abandoned, but rather, that they should be intensified and extended to strengthen society's capacity and consciousness to evaluate the behavior of the state and collective movements.

From this viewpoint, no truly democratizing project can elude the question of what is expected from that participation, what its meaning must be and what its conditions and breadth are, and therefore, also, what its limits are. If the model of citizenship promoted is too ambitious in its levels and forms of participation, it is very feasible that most of those who might be interested in taking on some kind of political commitment will not do so. As I have pointed out, both sides of the coin, excessive participation and profound indifference, are perfectly identifiable in contemporary Mexico.

Many of the most visible political expressions of participation are forms of extra-institutional protest, not very conducive to tolerance.

After a closer look, the panorama of the citizenry's "political education" is not very encouraging. The results of the recent National Survey on Political Culture and Civic Practices clearly show the magnitude of the challenges.[1] What is in play is no minor matter. We are dealing with the possibility of building a form of government and social coexistence that could overcome the obstacles stemming both from the concentration of authoritarian power and the paralysis and ineffectiveness that arise from the inability to find mechanisms to productively involve the citizenry in public matters, a strategic aim in situations like Mexico's in which

the political organizations inherent to representative democracy —that is, political parties— have notable inabilities. In that sense, despite the irrefutable fact that the political culture is formed through prolonged and contradictory processes of social learning in which a great number of formative factors of different kinds intervene, it is also true that the deliberate effort to introduce certain values, information and expectations has central importance for orienting the collective dynamic in one direction or another.

Undoubtedly, beyond voting to elect the government, the fragility of citizens' participation as such in the public sphere begins precisely with the scant number of individuals who recognize themselves as citizens. Today, Mexicans only barely associate the category of "citizen" with public matters, political parties and politics (they make this association in only 4.20 percent, 3.65 percent and 7.25 percent of cases, respectively).[2] This illustrates the difficulty in clearly perceiving the implications that come with an effective exercise of citizenship. This is not strange if we consider Mexican political tradition, strongly conditioned by corporatist practices and an official discourse that for decades put the reference to "the people" or "people's groups" ahead of the category of the citizen, which was identified with the liberal current, not dear to the heart of the post-revolutionary political mentality, as well as to the class or populist discourse of a large part of the left. There is, therefore, an enormous educational job to be done in order to infuse new value into the image of this central piece of the democratic dynamic, which presupposes a new positioning within specific institutional frameworks in which the citizen will have to play a much more active and defining role in the design and implementation of public policies.

"Learning to participate," a precondition for this to really happen in which the contents and methods of formal education intervene decisively as a privileged agent for socialization, seems to be the only feasible route for assuming and practicing politics in a different way in the face of the cultural indigence of the media, the churches, unions and the parties themselves. The fact that, today, more than half the public (54.9 percent) believes that "politics is very complicated and that is why most people do not understand it" clearly indicates that up until now it has not been possible to build meaningful links that make its language, instruments and usefulness understandable from the point of view of daily life. Changing this requires, first of all, an increase in the level of information about public affairs in general (their content, institutional reference points and social effects) and citizens' rights in particular. Without this, the connection between citizenship and politics will be permanently severed or distorted. Another negative thing about this panorama is that 34.96 percent of the public is not familiar with their constitutional rights, and only 4.52 percent say they are very familiar with them. In addition, there is enormous disinterest in public matters: only 13.21 percent of those surveyed say they are "very interested" in them.

The difficulties in orienting oneself in the field of politics and the even greater difficulty in practicing politics democratically can be clearly seen in the survey question that deals with the words the public associates or relates to democracy. More than half (54.24 percent) of those surveyed have insufficient information to define their meaning and simply answer that they do not know. This explains why only a little over half of those surveyed believe that "Mexico is a democracy" and, of those, only 10.94 percent say that this is because elections are held and 6.47 percent because specific freedoms exist. This does not speak well of the socializing apparatuses that provide information on which the citizens base their judgments and evaluations, particularly television, the medium most used to find out about what is happening in politics (80.11 percent of those interviewed used television for this). Given the sensationalism and entertainment dynamic prevalent in the electronic media, legal reforms should be implemented to ensure that they live up to their social responsibility, linked not only to the quality of the information they disseminate, but also to the values and expectations they propose as models.

Speaking of values, one in particular is fundamental for democracy: tolerance. In this value are concentrated the possibilities for structuring a sociopolitical order in which pluralism does

The fragility of citizens' public participation begins precisely with the scant number of individuals who recognize themselves as citizens.

not lead to anarchy nor competition to battles. What is more, if understood in its broadest sense, tolerance is an indispensable prerequisite for developing forms of open, flexible negotiations. It is no exaggeration to say that clarity on this point is the center of the political culture's democratic coherence. In today's Mexico, it seems difficult to be optimistic about this, when we see that 54.68 percent of the public "would not agree to someone being on television who they know will say things that go against their beliefs"; an additional 12.42 percent "don't know" if they would agree to this.

It is also a matter for concern that there is a very negative perception in society about solidarity: 77 percent of citizens thought that "most people almost always only worry about themselves." This is indicative of a society that tends toward atomization and selfish behavior and makes for difficulties in collective organization around common causes (50.26 percent of those interviewed thought this would be "somewhat unlikely" or "very unlikely").

Given these deficiencies, education for public participation should emphasize the way in which society values legality as a crucial variable in the make-up of a democratic culture. In today's Mexico, no one is unaware of the fact that the continual transgression of the rule of law by citizens, social movements, business interests and authorities on all levels completely distorts the social dynamic, bringing it to the brink of the pre-political stage of informal arrangements and the survival of the fittest. Without respect for the law, there is no way that the rule of law can function correctly, nor can coexistence in society develop in a predictable, secure way. We cannot underestimate the fact that the weakness of the culture of legality has always been one of the most damaging factors for the country's public health. The proclivity for de facto agreements, corruption, the abuse of power as well as illegal pressure on the government has had negative effects not only in the political sphere, but also in the economy and society as a whole, gravely affecting institutions' rationality and effectiveness. Without a culture of legality, democratic consolidation is not possible, nor is sustainable development nor civility in collective coexistence.[3]

Society's perception of a generalized breakdown of the law is an accepted fact. To the question, "Who do you think respects laws least, those in government, the citizens or both?" 42.43 percent answered that no one respects them. Only 13.12 percent think that both those in government and the public respect the law and 30.93 percent are of the opinion that those in government respect it less. If we add the fact that 67.56 percent think that corruption involves both politicians and common citizens, we will have a clear idea of the assimilation of legality in the whole of society.[4] All of this underlines the importance of using cultural initiatives and measures of institutional control to encourage the convergence of the two basic facets of civic education: the citizenry's practical experiences and the socialization of information and values that contribute to giving a particular meaning to those experiences.

As a whole, this panorama explains the prevailing precariousness of public participation: 85.46 percent of Mexican citizens do not belong to any organization, and those who do are divided in equally small numbers among a variety of kinds of organizations: unions (3.60 percent), social groups (1.37 percent), religious (5.36 percent), political (1.06 percent) or civic groups (2.25 percent) and agricultural organizations (1.85 percent). Along the same lines, 88.86 percent have never participated in creating new groups or organizations to solve problems in their communities and 87.60 percent have never tried to influence decision-making there.

The not-always democratic orientation of political participation is a sensitive problem in the consolidation of Mexican democracy.

These figures illustrate the weakness of Mexico's social fabric, characterized by a quite low level of self-organizing capabilities except in special cases, such as natural disasters, momentary aid to vulnerable groups or religious matters, in which the primary mechanisms of collective solidarity are put into motion or when there is a perceived attack on specific interests. It is therefore not strange that if we look at the most significant expressions of social participation in recent years, it is difficult to find proposals of social or political programs with a perspective of improving the rationality of one institution or another. The basically opposition-oriented nature of these movements —and in some cases, their strictly conserva-

tive character— is not divorced from a subject identity centered on compensation historically received from the state. Neither is it disassociated from the contempt for the law or the widespread idea that if a law is considered unfair it can be disobeyed.

The not-always democratic orientation of political participation is one of the most sensitive problems in the perspective of redefining the political system and the consolidation of Mexican democracy. Without an active social base that is co-responsible and constructive,[5] institutional activity will hit no corresponding civic-cultural note capable of ensuring the viability of its initiatives or of accompanying and democratically limiting the exercise of power. VM

Notes

[1] *Encuesta Nacional sobre Cultura Política y Prácticas Ciudadanas* (Mexico City: Secretaría de Gobernación, 2002).

[2] This is in response to a question that allows for two answers from each interviewee and therefore doubles the possible relative percentages.

[3] People's alienation from the law is related to their lack of trust in the institutions that are supposed to administer justice. In that sense, the fact that 56.63 percent of those surveyed have an "average", "bad" or "very bad" opinion of judges and courts, while only 11.75 percent held them in "good" or "very good" esteem, is of great import. The Supreme Court is "highly trusted" by only 10.18 percent of the public, less than the church (55.69 percent) or teachers (42.32 percent) or even the media (21.67 percent).

[4] In Transparency International's last annual report, Mexico continues to rate very low in terms of control over corruption, and is surpassed even by less developed countries like Peru, El Salvador or Senegal.

[5] It should be noted that the potential interest in participating, although not overwhelming, is greater that real participation. This is shown by the figure of 46.36 percent of citizens who would be willing "to help solve a problem in their community" while 65.77 percent would agree to cooperate to work "to support the communities and improve public services" if asked by the government. The matter involves, then, finding the forms and mechanisms that can activate that participation.

Political Parties And The 2003 Mid-Term Elections Challenges and Proposals

Rubén R. García Clarck*

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Communist regimes of Eastern Europe threw left parties into ideological crisis. Fully aware of the current inviability of the socialist revolution and the failings of the welfare state, the left is debating the Third Way, as a proposal for renovating social democracy in the framework of a runaway world, to use Anthony Giddens' phrase. Together with the ideological crisis of the left worldwide, hybrid party coalitions have begun to emerge, joining left-wing and right-wing forces in the model of the "catch-all party."

Neoliberal globalization has weakened both the sovereignty of national states and the ability of traditional political actors (parties and parliaments) to represent the complex societies of our time, particularly the new social movements. This crisis of political representation is manifested in the emergence of candidates and movements from civil society, independent of parties, a decrease in party membership and electoral participation, as well as low levels of public confidence in political institutions.

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Closing the gap between the parties and society so that people become more actively involved in public life through them is a challenge of the first water for Mexico's democratic development.

As can be seen in the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) 2002 Report on Human Development, in recent years there has been a considerable decrease in the size of party membership in European countries and the United States, while in Latin America, public confidence in political parties has dropped very low, beneath that proffered the Church, the armed forces, the president, television, the police, the judicial branch and national congresses. These low levels of confidence contrast with the central role that parties still have in democracy, which is the reason that one of the UNDP report's recommendations is the strengthening of "official democratic institutions."[1]

In Mexico, only 5.36 percent of the adult population expresses a great deal of confidence in parties, while 18.81 percent expresses some confidence.[2] Together with the other factors, these indicators can be attributed to the public's negative perception of politics, which it associates with corruption, deficient performance by public officials and congresspersons and party elitism, seen as proof that they only look after their own interests. Another explanation is the scant direct communication between parties and the citizenry. Parties give more weight in electoral campaigns to the electronic media, which leads to simplified messages, a blurring of ideological proposals and a weakening of political identities.

Despite the public's scant confidence in political parties, 67 percent of Mexicans think they have a great deal of influence in Mexico's political life, surpassed only by the president.[3] The public sees parties' political influence in the phenomenon dubbed the "party-ocracy" since, in its view, it is the parties who run candidates for election, make decisions in the legislature and frequently hold up the country's operation when they delay the approval of the federal budget. In

Juan Pablo Zamo /Cua

Patricia Mercado (left), president of Possible Mexico, a political organization running for election for the first time.

addition, President Fox has taken it upon himself to strengthen this perception when he has stated, both at home and abroad, that he is the victim of the brakes that opposition parties have put on Congress' activities.

Closing the gap between the parties and society so that people become more actively involved in public life through them is a challenge of the first water for Mexico's democratic development. In the framework of democratic transition, the party system has evolved from a practically single party stage to a multi-party, competitive system in which alternation in office is not only possible but has already occurred on every level of political representation. As Octavio Rodríguez Araujo says, "The party system in Mexico changed....The system of the dominant or hegemonic party no longer exists. But the parties have also changed by abandoning their old principles and their more or less ideological nature and becoming more ideologically ambiguous and seeking the vote by adjusting their political discourse to that need, as the competitive parties that they are."[4]

The citizenry has advanced from voting to fulfill a civic obligation to voting pro-actively, to give the victory to a specific party or candidate.

The country's three main parties have moved toward institutionalization enough to be functional to democratic competition.[5] For its part, the citizenry has advanced from voting to fulfill a civic obligation to voting pro-actively, to give the victory to a specific party or candidate. This advance reflects a consolidation of voters' identities and political positioning in the country. As Alejandro Moreno and Elizabeth Zechmeister have observed, "The location of party voters has evolved in an interesting way....PRD [Party of the Democratic Revolution] followers continue to be to the left of the other main parties, but moving more to the right. National Action Party [PAN] followers, for their part, also moved to the right, so much so that in May 2002 they were to the right of the PRI [Institutional Revolutionary Party].... This forces us to think about what new content is associated with the left and the right in Mexican politics today."[6] This new content is determined by alternation itself, with the interchange of positions between the PRI and the PAN as administration and opposition, and the proximity of mid-term elections, both of which lead the parties to differentiate their political proposals.

Mexicans' electoral preferences have centered on three forces, spurring the recurring question about the raison d'être of the eight remaining parties. While these organizations do have a social base that has allowed them to obtain their registration as national parties, it is also true that they are a reflection of the fragmentation of the country's political elites and tend to scatter the vote without necessarily representing a differentiated ideological option on basic issues. In any case, their scant social and political representativeness could lead them to make strategic alliances that would allow them to survive inside the party system.

In the 2000 elections, two alliances and three parties ran against the governing PRI. The PRI had adopted a neoliberal program in its last few terms in office. In addition, given the specter of a defeat, it reincorporated in its platform some theses from its classical period, like the state as the driving force behind the economy and the promotor of social justice, bringing them up to date with a proposal

of greater participation from the private sector in national development. For its part, the Alliance for Change, made up of the PAN and the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM), proposed the continuity of the neoliberal model in the framework of an economy with a human face, plus the added attraction of alternation in the presidency with the candidacy of the charismatic Vicente Fox. Another option was the Alliance for Mexico, made up of five parties, three from the center left (the PRD, the Labor Party [PT], and Democratic Convergence [CD]) and two from the center right (the Social Alliance Party [PAS] and the Party of the Nationalist Society [PSN]). Grouped around the candidacy of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, these parties proposed economic development with social equality. Other contenders in the elections were the Party of the Democratic Center (PCD), the Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution (PARM) and the Social Democracy Party (PDS), with social democratic platforms.

Balloting concentrated on three main forces (the Alliance for Change, the PRI and the Alliance for Mexico), preventing the PCD, the PARM and the PDS from getting enough votes to obtain seats in Congress and maintain their registration as national political parties. Despite the fact that voters' preferences in 2000 pointed to diminishing the number of parties, three organizations managed to obtain registration as new political parties in 2002: Citizens' Force (FC), Possible Mexico (MP) and the Mexican Liberal Party (PLM). With different emphases, these three organizations consider themselves to be on the left of the political spectrum. Thus, the parties that lost their registration were replaced by others with a similar ideological profile. In fact, some PDS activists became members of MP or FC.



Pedro IV

Jorge Alcocer, president of Citizen's Force, another of the new parties on the electoral spectrum.

Mexicans' electoral preferences have centered on three forces, spurring the recurring question about the raison d'être of the eight remaining parties.

In the current race, the governing party is in fact defending a center-right program, although its discourse is that of the center. Most of the opposition is presenting center-left ideological positions. Party alliances will probably be formed in some specific districts, but at the time of this writing exactly where and among whom is not yet clear (see table of compared positions).

In the current electoral process, the biggest differences between the PAN and opposition parties are in the areas of energy policy, while the most important agreements are in the aim of moving toward the consolidation of democracy in Mexico. This is why it is possible to again expect the creation of a common agenda among parliamentary caucuses for the political reform of the state.[7] In matters of economic, social and foreign policy, the parties have different, but not necessarily incompatible, proposals, which could lead to considerable parliamentary agreements.

Based on their different electoral campaigns and the design of renewed strategies for winning the vote, some parties have stated that their aim is to achieve a congressional majority; others only seek to increase or maintain their current positions; and the new ones want to make themselves known in order to get enough votes to keep their registration as officially recognized parties. To the three main parties' national leaders, the challenges they face in these mid-term elections are: obtaining a majority in the Chamber of Deputies to push forward "the structural reforms that will ensure the viability of the nation in coming years" (Luis Felipe Bravo of the PAN); win 300 of the 500 seats in the Chamber of Deputies as a step toward recovering the presidency in 2006 based on their previously demonstrated ability to govern and the necessary renovation of the party (Roberto Madrazo of the PRI); win 130 seats in the Chamber of Deputies to move toward being "the only alternative for real change in the country" vis-à-vis the neoliberal project (Rosario Robles of the PRD).[8]

Regardless of each party's legitimate electoral expectations, the greatest challenge for all the parties, given the

probability that no party will achieve a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, will be to devise the agreements that the country's development urgently requires among the congressional caucuses and between the legislative and executive branches of government. Once the inevitable polarization of the elections is overcome, the actors on the national political scene will have the responsibility of creating a dialogue and negotiation capable of dealing with the enormous legislative agenda that cannot wait a minute longer at the same time that they respect their principles and specific commitments to society. That is the only way that the public's trust in the parties, as well as the confidence of international public opinion in Mexico's economic and political viability, can expand. VM

Notes

[1] Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo, *Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano 2002. Profundizar la democracia en un mundo fragmentado* (Madrid: Mundi-Prensa, 2002), p. 69.

[2] Secretaría de Gobernación (Segob) and Fundación Este País, "Conociendo a los ciudadanos mexicanos. Principales resultados de la Encuesta Nacional sobre Cultura Política y Prácticas Ciudadanas 2001 de la Segob," supplement *Este País* 137 (Mexico City), August 2002, p. 13.

[3] Ibid., p. 12.

[4] Octavio Rodríguez Araujo, "Los partidos políticos en México, origen y desarrollo," Carlos Sirvent, comp., *Partidos políticos y procesos electorales en México* (Mexico City: Miguel Ángel Porrúa/UNAM, 2002), p. 59.

[5] Miguel González Compeán and Leonardo Lomelí, comps., *El partido de la Revolución. Institución y conflicto (1928-1999)*, (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2000), p. 670; Soledad Loaeza, *El Partido Acción Nacional: La larga marcha (1939-1994)*, (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1999); Francisco Reveles Márquez, comp., *Partido Acción Nacional: Los signos de la institucionalización* (Mexico City: UNAM/Gernika, 2002), p. 568; Marco Aurelio Sánchez, *PRD: La élite en crisis* (Mexico City: Plaza y Valdés, 1999); Marco Aurelio Sánchez, *PRD: El rostro y la máscara. Reporte de la crisis terminal de una élite política* (Mexico City: Centro de Estudios de Política Comparada/Centro de Estudios para la Transición Democrática, 2001).

[6] Alejandro Romero and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister, "Hacia una definición de la izquierda y de la derecha en México," *Este País* 141 (Mexico City), December 2002, pp. 73-74.

[7] The political reform of the state includes all the legislative changes needed to bring the country's political and governmental institutions (created on the whole during the period of the authoritarianism of the practically single party system) into line with the new political and economic situation: the consolidation of democracy and globalization. Efforts to achieve a political reform of the state have failed in recent years. Despite apparent agreement of political platforms about the need to carry it out, the parties seem to have opted for short-term, merely electoral strategies and not for long-term politics of consensus. [Editor's Note.]

[8] "Desafíos y perspectivas. PAN, PRI, PRD," *El Cotidiano* 115 (Mexico City), September-October 2002, pp. 7-31.

2003 Electoral Platforms. The Parties and Their Proposals

PARTY*	DOMESTIC POLICY	ECONOMY	SOCIETY	FOREIGN POLICY
National Action Party (PAN)	Consolidate democratic change through the institutional design of political co-responsibility in a pluralist framework. Legalize consecutive reelection of legislators and decrease the number of deputies and campaign spending.	Constitutional reform to allow private sector participation in the generation of electricity, safeguarding state sovereignty over energy resources.	Sustainable human development based on employment, social solidarity of the state and society's participation in food supply, health and education.	Diversify federal government's international actions and promote the reforms needed so the Senate can participate in international negotiations.
Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI)	Strengthen the division of labor and collaboration among legislators. Promote a reform to review federal executive prerogatives, particularly those linked to the veto and the nomination of public servants subject to ratification.	Design a long-term state energy policy. Maintain electricity supply as a public service, operated exclusively by the state.	Legislate the participation of the media, the government, the private sector and society as a whole in the dissemination of women's and children's rights.	Defend and preserve national identity, dignity, beliefs and culture worldwide. Foster a bilateral, integral migratory agreement that would take into consideration Mexicans' human rights abroad.
Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD)	Seek a national accord with other political and social forces to find ways to develop democracy and solve the country's broad social and economic problems, leaving behind political paralysis and the lack of reforms.	Foster the approval of a Program of Economic Reactivation. Maintain the electricity sector as a public service under state management.	Ensure appropriate pensions and retirement. Grant food stamps for people over 70, create full-time schools, guarantee health services to the entire population and promote low-income housing.	Review the North American Free Trade Agreement with the United States and Canada. Establish an international migratory agreement with the United States.
Labor Party (PT)	Continue and deepen the democratic reform of the state. Reject consecutive reelection of legislators.	Reform labor legislation to include a new labor and business culture, agreements by consensus, modernization of federal public administration, efficient administration of justice in labor matters, union democracy and labor relations with other countries.	Reform the Constitution and legislation to include the legitimate rights of indigenous peoples and communities along the lines of the San Andrés Accords.	Legislate to establish the defense and safeguarding of labor, human and social rights of Mexican migrant workers.
Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM)	Promote public participation in designing state and municipal government programs and projects as a condition for receiving federal funding.	Create a new economic model based on sustainable development.	Design programs to raise consciousness and educate civil society to prevent, control and reduce pollution levels and protect natural resources.	Continue to actively participate in international environmental fora.
Democratic Convergence (CD)	Consolidation of democracy given the challenges of governability.	Support for the domestic market and solidarity between businessmen and workers.	Solve the problems of inequality and poverty through quality education.	Democratize foreign policy, adapting it to the new world situation.
Social Alliance Party (PAS)	Amend the Constitution to include direct democracy. Make community administration a fourth level of government in addition to municipal, state and federal.	Establish co-ownership and joint management in private, social and public companies.	Right of parents to require that their children receive religious education in public schools. Church access to the media.	Seek the total cancellation or notable reduction of the foreign debt. Seek equal vote of all countries in international bodies.
Party of the Nationalist Society (PSN)	Promote electoral reform to allow for fair, equitable participation of emerging political currents.	Prevent the privatization of Mexican state companies and foreign investment in strategic sectors of the national economy.	Integral reform of national education, safeguarding patriotic values as a fundamental principle.	Review the North American Free Trade Agreement agricultural chapters.
Mexican Liberal Party (PLM)	Raise the revocation of elected officials' mandate to a constitutional level. Legalize consecutive reelection of legislators. Create a civic body to monitor transparency in governmental information.	Promote equitable fiscal reform to tax the richest individuals, companies and institutions.	Promote a National Program against Poverty to halve the number of individuals and families in extreme poverty in three years.	Attenuate the negative effects of globalization through compensatory policies that protect agriculture and industry.
Possible Mexico (MP)	Defense of political pluralism and reform of the state (decentralization, professionalization of public service and the fight against corruption).	Redistributive policy for an economic reform that would promote growth, with a broad social pact.	Promote action against discrimination, particularly against homosexuals, and compensation for vulnerable groups. Decriminalization of marihuana use.	Seek favorable positioning in the globalized world; fight against abuses and asymmetries.
Citizens' Force (FC)	Review existing mechanisms of public participation.	Market economy that promotes domestic savings and the export sector.	Policy of sustainable development, including the fight against poverty, rural employment and environmental protection.	Respect the Constitution by involving the legislature in foreign policy design.

* Parties are listed in the order they appear on the ballot.

Source: The national political parties' 2003 electoral platforms.

Projected Votes for July 2003

According to a national survey[1] by Grupo Reforma, the 2003 federal elections have not sparked the interest of the Mexican public, the majority of which is paying attention to the Iraq conflict.

Survey results give the National Action Party (PAN) 38 percent of the public's support up until early March, while the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) had 37 percent, without counting what could be added by the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM) where the two have made an alliance. Support for the PAN today is four points lower than it was three months ago, practically eliminating its lead with regard to the PRI. The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) comes in third, with 17 percent of the projected vote, and the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico (PVEM) is in fourth place with 4 percent. The rest of the parties jointly get five percent of the projected vote: two percent for Convergence for Democracy (CD), one percent for the Labor Party (PT) and one percent divided among the Social Alliance Party (PAS), Possible Mexico (MP) and Citizens' Force (FC). The Party of the Nationalist Society (PSN) was not mentioned by anyone in the poll.

Everything seems to point to once again to having a divided government, with no majority for any party, making legislating difficult and putting the country's governability to the test.

IF ELECTIONS FOR FEDERAL DEPUTIES WERE HELD TODAY, WHICH PARTY WOULD YOU VOTE FOR? PROJECTED VOTES (%)

	SEPTEMBER 2002	DECEMBER 2002	MARCH 2003
PAN	43	42	38
PRI	40	33	37
PRD	14	16	17
PVEM	2	5	4
CD	0	1	2
PT	1	2	1
Others	0	1	1*

* Others: PAS 0.7%; PLM 0.2%; Possible Mexico 0.2%; Citizens' Force 0.1% and PSN 0.0%.

Source: http://www.reforma.com/ed_impresa/ej_anteriores/default.asp?Secciones=nacional&Fechas=030303

NOTE

[1] The survey was applied to 1,498 adult Mexicans in their homes between March 15 and 17 and has a theoretical margin of error of +/-2.5 percent. The sample was systematically random, based on the country's electoral sub-district divisions, or sections, classified as urban, mixed and rural. One hundred points were selected in 44 cities with more than 15,000 inhabitants and 33 places with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants. The effective percentages that appear in the table do not include non-responses or the answers "I don't know" or "I will not vote," which totalled 16 percent in March. The survey used a ballot box and ballot listing the 11 parties registered with the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE).

NAFTA and the Future of Integration In North America

Isabel Studer*

Pedro Valtierra/Cuartoscuro

The problems of Mexico's countryside have sparked a discussion about reviewing NAFTA.

The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was a watershed in Mexico's international relations. When it proposed negotiating the treaty, Mexico was recognizing the need to institutionalize its already growing economic integration with the United States, and was willing to develop its until then non-existent links with Canada. Thus, with NAFTA, Mexico tacitly accepted having a common future with its two neighbors to the north.

As soon as he took office, Mexican President Vicente Fox proposed to his counterparts in the United States and Canada to deepen the process of integration in North America. A migratory agreement between Mexico and the United States would establish the basis for a common North American market, adding the free transit of workers throughout the region to the free flow of goods, services and capital. He also requested U.S. and Canadian cooperation to jointly solve the problems of underdevelopment in Mexico and correct the asymmetries among the three North American countries. The terrorist attacks on Washington and New York, however, indefinitely postponed negotiations on these proposals, as well as governmental dialogue about how to advance in North American integration.

The current political situation in Mexico has once again put NAFTA at the center of national public debate because of peasant demands to review and renegotiate its agricultural chapters. If this were to happen, it would set a precedent for reviewing other parts of the treaty, thus opening Pandora's box and most certainly leading to demands by many groups in the three countries, which could mean an end of NAFTA. That scenario would clearly be in detriment to Mexico's interests. In

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GRAPH 1
MÉXICO-U.S. TRADE



Source: Economy Ministry with Bank of Mexico data and USDOC with importing country figures.

order to understand why, it is necessary to explain what NAFTA is, what historic meaning it has for Mexico and what its effects have been on the Mexican economy in the last decade.

WHAT IS NAFTA?

Since Canada and the United States already had a free trade agreement, NAFTA centered on liberalizing trade between Mexico and the other two countries. The reduction of tariffs for a great deal of trade is achieved in a 10-year period, with 15 years for sensitive items like used cars and some agricultural products such as corn. NAFTA also includes the creation of a customs union for computer products, that is, a common tariff for the three countries. With this exception, Canada, Mexico and the United States maintain their own tariffs and trade policies toward third parties, which has made it possible, among other things, for Mexico to negotiate free trade agreements with more than 30 other countries.

NAFTA is not only a free trade agreement, but also introduces innovations that guarantee investors' rights and facilitates the free flow of capital throughout the region. For example, it protects intellectual property rights, impedes distortions in investments, includes the liberalization of financial services and gives national treatment to foreign investors, as well as the possibility for them to appear before supra-national bodies for dispute settlement with any of the governments in North America. It is also the first free trade agreement that includes parallel accords on environmental and labor standards, which aim to prevent lower standards from becoming a competitive advantage for one of the region's countries.

NAFTA'S RESULTS

If measured by trade and investment levels, there is no denying that NAFTA has been positive for Mexico. Its impact on Mexico's trade has been greater than on Canada's and the U.S.'s because Mexico had the highest relative levels of protectionism before the treaty came into effect. Thanks to NAFTA and the more than 30 other free trade agreements Mexico has signed, it has become the world's seventh exporting power and one of the biggest targets for foreign direct investment (FDI). Exports made up more than half the gross domestic product (GDP) growth between 1993 and 2001, reaching 28 percent of GDP in 2001 compared to 15 percent in 1993.

Since the treaty came into effect in 1994, trilateral trade has more than doubled, with a growth of 115 percent, coming to U.S.$622 billion in 2001. In the same period, bilateral trade between Mexico and the United States has almost tripled, making Mexico its northern neighbor's second trade partner, the second largest market for U.S. products and the second largest supplier of goods. Graph 1 shows that in 2001, bilateral trade was over U.S.$245 billion, compared to U.S.$85 billion in 1993. In 2001, Mexican exports to the United States came to almost U.S.$131 billion, 11.5 percent of the value of all U.S. imports, compared to 6.9 percent in 1993. Mexican imports of U.S. products also grew 2.5 times those of 1993 to total U.S.$114 billion in 2001. Although trade between Mexico and Canada continues to be relatively small (about 2 percent of total trilateral trade), it has also grown rapidly, reaching U.S.$12 billion in 2001 (see graph 2).

NAFTA and the many free trade agreements Mexico has signed in the last decade offer certainty to foreign companies in setting up operations in Mexico and in having privileged, guaranteed access for their products to North American markets and those of another 30 countries worldwide. Thus, between 1994 and June 2002, Mexico received U.S.$119 billion in FDI. The United States and Canada are the first

and fourth source, respectively, of FDI in Mexico. Between 1994 and December 2001, accumulated U.S. investments came to U.S.$64.7 billion and Canadian investments totaled U.S.$3.8 billion, the vast majority in manufacturing and services. Half of the FDI in North America is intra-regional. These figures indicate the region's level of integration since FDI flows create deeper links between national economies than trade (see graph 3).

While these figures showing a substantial increase in trade and investment are incontrovertible, there is a wide-ranging controversy about the overall impact of NAFTA on the national economy. Some argue correctly that increased trade and investment are not the direct result of the treaty, but rather are trends that already existed from the mid-1980s, a consequence of a series of Mexican government economic measures.

NAFTA's detractors argue that trade and investment figures hide the treaty's effects in terms of distribution. President Fox himself has said that NAFTA is not sufficient to deal with Mexico's development problems and to create enough jobs to stop the continual stream of Mexican workers across our northern border. Critics say that the winners under this treaty, like the electrical, electronics and auto industries —which jointly represent almost half of Mexico's total exports to the United States and which have experienced the country's highest growth rates— are dominated by multinational corporations that tend to sacrifice workers' wages and benefits to maintain their international competitiveness. They also tend to use more technology-intensive than labor-intensive productive processes. According to this more negative viewpoint, this explains why the flow of Mexican workers who emigrate to the United States has not been reversed. However, according to Ministry of the Economy data, companies with FDI have been an important source of better paying jobs in Mexico (in recent years they represent half the jobs created nationwide). In the last analysis, these are jobs that would not have been created without NAFTA.

Certainly, the debate between critics and defenders will continue since it is practically impossible to draw up a balance sheet of the global economic impact of the treaty because, on the one hand, economic growth, job creation and industrial performance depend not only on the treaty, but on a wide variety of factors and political and economic decisions made both in Mexico and abroad. In addition, it is difficult to measure other indirect but important consequences of NAFTA.

GRAPH 2
MEXICAN-CANADIAN TRADE



Source: Economy Ministry with Bank of Mexico data and Statistics Canada using importing country figures.

NAFTA'S SIGNIFICANCE FOR MEXICO

NAFTA represents Mexico's commitment to continue the process of trade and investment liberalization that began in the 1980s. Through this international treaty, the administration of Carlos Salinas de Gortari sought to anchor the reforms of economic modernization that were introduced in Mexico from the early 1980s, putting an end to statism and the import-substitution model that for almost four decades had restricted both imports and foreign direct investment.

NAFTA was, then, one of the instruments designed by the Mexican government to impose clear rules offering certainty and security to producers, exporters, importers and investors from the region, thus attracting foreign investment to Mexico. This goal had not been achieved with previous trade liberalization measures, particularly with Mexico's entry into the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade in 1987, and was fundamental for the recovery of the national economy that had crashed with the 1981 financial crisis. NAFTA also had important symbolic value, projecting to the world a radical break with Mexico's past and a new vision of a modern country, ready to face the challenges of globalization and integration with the colossus of the North.

GRAPH 3
ACCUMMULATED FDI



Source: Economy Ministry with Bank of Mexico data.

For some analysts, one of the indirect consequences of NAFTA is having facilitated a rapid economic recovery after the late-1994 financial debacle, as well as macroeconomic and political stability that other Latin American countries have not been able to maintain. This stability has been one of the most important benefits that the United States has gotten out of NAFTA.

For Mexico, the treaty has also meant guaranteed access to the U.S. market, a shield against powerful groups there who can resort to protectionism. Getting that guaranteed access was key during NAFTA negotiations, since the continuance of the late 1980s export success story chalked up by Mexico-U.S. joint industrial production based on the border maquiladora plants depended on it. Investment in this program was endangered by growing opposition from unions and other groups in the United States who opposed sending manufacturing jobs south of the border and the increased Mexican exports that this generated. With NAFTA, Mexican products enjoy preferential access to the U.S. market, although —as can be seen by the U.S. refusal to allow Mexican trucks to cross over into its territory or by the measures to impede the export of Mexican brooms or tomatoes— the treaty's trade dispute settlement mechanisms are not perfect and are still subject to some special interests that manage to use U.S. regulations to protect themselves from foreign competition.

Press reports about these protectionist measures have scarcely helped to increase the already scant popularity of NAFTA among the Mexican and Canadian publics. Neither has it been popular in the United States. From the moment it was proposed, unions and other groups organized to oppose the U.S. government negotiating an agreement with Mexico that did not ensure the improvement of environmental protection standards and the defense of labor and human rights. These demands became an issue in the 1993 U.S. presidential campaign. Independent candidate Ross Perot popularized the idea that Mexico, by exploiting its lower labor and environmental standards, would create a "giant sucking sound," the sound of the massive flight of U.S. investment and jobs. The winning candidate, William Clinton, finally supported NAFTA, but only in exchange for negotiating parallel agreements on environmental and labor questions. These concessions were also necessary for the treaty to be approved by the U.S. Congress itself. From the moment the Mexican government proposed the negotiation of a free trade agreement, it fought an uphill public relations battle to convince certain key sectors in the United States of its importance not only for Mexico, but for the U.S. itself. The Mexican government's lobbying efforts to convince the U.S. Congress to approve NAFTA were enormous. The treaty was approved by 234 votes to 202 in the House of Representatives and 61 votes in favor and 38 against in the Senate, but only after Mexico had made important concessions: these particularly pertained to accepting the parallel environmental and labor agreements, the creation of a North American Development Bank and a Border Environmental Cooperation Commission and adjustments in what had already been negotiated for sugar, some citrus fruits and winter vegetables.

A decade after NAFTA came into effect, it still does not have the staunch, unwavering support of the U.S. public. The current situation, in which Mexico has plummeted on the list of U.S. foreign policy priorities, naturally makes thinking about a more ambitious agenda for integrating North America impossible. But requesting a review of NAFTA could unleash a new political struggle with an uncertain outcome for the treaty itself. Considering the levels of integration of Mexico and the United States reached in the last decade, neither would benefit from dismantling NAFTA. VM

Mexico's Foreign Trade Policy Between Puebla and Cancun[1]

María Cristina Rosas*

Eunice Adorno/Cuartoscuro

Minister of the Economy Fernando Canales Clariond, left, and Minister of Foreign Relations Luis Ernesto Derbez, right.

Mexico's economic diplomacy under the Vicente Fox administration has been visible in international fora and events held in our country. This was the case in 2002 of the March UN Summit on Financing for Development in Monterrey and at the November leaders forum of the Asian Pacific Economic Coordination (APEC) in Los Cabos. The year 2003 will also see important meetings and international economic negotiations in Mexico. Puebla will be the host for the last stretch of the negotiations for the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), while in September, Cancun will be the venue for the Fifth Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization (WTO), which will continue the debate on the broad agenda of the Doha Round. The Euro-Latin American Summit is also coming up soon.

At first glance, economic diplomacy can be considered successful in terms of the visibility that Mexico has achieved worldwide by hosting these events. However, the country's leadership is not completely clear, given that in addition to being host, Mexico could well use these fora to promote its interests.

True, it is difficult to promote specific agendas in the UN, the APEC, the FTAA and/or the WTO under current conditions. For example, in Monterrey, the theme of financing for development paled in the shadow of the U.S. slogan of making the priority the fight against financing terrorism. Something similar happened at the APEC meeting, where the main resolution hinged precisely on the struggle against terrorism. In other words, terrorism —and now war is "eating up" the specific

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TABLE 1
MEXICO'S TEN MOST IMPORTANT EXPORTERS

POSITION	EXPORTER	TOTAL EXPORTS (BILLIONS OF PESOS)	MAIN EXPORTS	DESTINATION
1	Petróleos Mexicanos/Mexico City	108.676689	Crude oil	U.S.
2	Volkswagen de México/Puebla, Puebla	51.888227	Automobiles, auto parts	U.S./Canada/ Germany
3	General Motors de México/Mexico City	48.078236	Automobiles	U.S./Canada
4	Cementos Mexicanos/Monterrey, Nuevo León	25.379117	Cement, concrete	ND
5	Ford Motor Company/Mexico City	25.041676	Vehicles, auto parts	U.S./Canada
6	Teléfonos de México/Mexico City	15.205416	International long distance services	U.S.
7	Alfa y Subs/Garza García, Nuevo León	9.508944	Various	U.S./Canada/ Latin America
8	Desc/Mexico City	9.281357	Auto parts, chemicals, food products	U.S./Canada
9	Hewlett-Packard de México/ Mexico City	8.881294	Microcomputers, computers and printers	U.S./Canada/ Australia
10	Grupo Bimbo/Mexico City	7.659875	Bread products	U.S.

Source: *Expansión* magazine, 16-30 August 2000, pp. 92-95.

agendas of the international bodies and fora.

What can be expected from the negotiations slated for Puebla and Cancun? Even though the Iraq affair and the struggle against terrorism will be present, the issues specific to these fora —that is, the creation of a hemisphere-wide free trade area and liberalization of international trade— should be dealt with. Mexico, as host, will have a great responsibility. But, the question is, does Mexico have the capability to exert leadership in these fora, leadership that can aim to satisfy its particular interests at the same time that it generates niche agendas that are also in the interest of other nations? To respond to this question, we must take a look at the country's foreign trade policy.

Foreign trade policy is part of overall foreign policy. Its task is to promote Mexico's trade interests throughout the world. To do that, it includes a series of initiatives that on different levels can combine unilateral action and bilateral, regional and multilateral negotiations.

Nevertheless, only by identifying the country's specific needs can a successful foreign trade policy be developed in which, for example, the signing of free trade agreements is part of a master plan, an industrial policy, since otherwise, they will become ends in themselves. Therefore, it is necessary to first of all define industrial policy and then clearly establish the place that Mexico's trade negotiations with the world will occupy.

Why is an industrial policy necessary in the first place? A review of Mexico's foreign trade reveals deficiencies that can only be resolved if there is a master plan. Today, Mexico is the world's eighth largest exporting economy. If, as the theorists say, the ultimate end of economic activity is social well-being, it should be noted that in 2002, Mexico rated fifty-fourth of all the world's countries with regard to human development indices. It headed up the countries with "medium human development" and was ranked lower than

Table 2
Mexico's Ten Most Important Importers

Position	Importer	Total Imports (Billions of Pesos)	Main Imports	Country Imported From
1	General Motors de México/Mexico City	34.080926	Auto parts, automobiles	U.S.
2	Ford Motor Company/Mexico City	31.824284	Auto parts, automobiles	U.S.
3	Petróleos Mexicanos/Mexico City	25.490776	Gasoline	U.S.
4	Volkswagen de México/Puebla, Puebla	24.502605	Auto parts, automobiles	Germany/ Brazil/Spain
5	Carso Global Telecom/Mexico City	19.871281	ND	ND
6	Teléfonos de México/Mexico City	19.524042	Telephone equipment	U.S./Canada/ Europe
7	Savia/Monterrey, Nuevo León	14.088240	Cardboard, film, cellulose fiber, seeds	U.S.
8	Grupo Carso/Mexico City	7.543274	ND	ND
9	Aerovías de México y Subs/Mexico City	6.711112	Airplane parts, accessories and spare parts	U.S.
10	Desc/Mexico City	5.956383	Auto parts	U.S./Canada

Source: *Expansión* magazine, 16-30 August 2000, pp. 96-99.

other Latin American and Caribbean nations like Antigua and Barbuda (fifty-second on the list), Trinidad and Tobago (fiftieth), Costa Rica (forty-third), Bahamas (forty-first), Uruguay (fortieth), Chile (thirty-eighth) and Barbados (thirty-first). That is, Mexico's trade dynamism has not made for well-being for its inhabitants.

Mexico's trade is notably versatile due largely to the economic reforms that began to be put in place in the second half of the 1980s. These reforms, brought on by the crisis suffered throughout the so-called "lost decade" and influenced by a broad range of events worldwide, exposed the domestic economy to the demands and scrutiny of the international economy.

The economic reforms led to the trade opening, which happened very rapidly, contributing to the inability of an enormous number of small and medium-sized companies to adapt to the new conditions. We should not lose sight of the fact that three-quarters of all jobs in Mexico are with small and medium-sized companies and that the trade opening produced one of three effects in them: 1) they went under because they were unable to compete; 2) "attractive" firms were able to merge with foreign companies; or 3) some became "distributors" or "representatives" of foreign companies. In other words, the trade opening produced a break in productive chains that has considerably affected the profile of Mexico's foreign trade.

Of course, this has not been an isolated process. In the globalized world, economic power is one of the main roads to political power. There are actors on the international scene with enormous influence because of the economic resources they command. Among those actors are multinational corporations, which try to substantially decrease the mechanisms of control that states have traditionally exercised over them. It is also the corporations that think trade agreements are desirable given that, as everyone knows, a substantial part of international trade is intra-firm.

The country went from having "petroleum-ization" of exports to having "petroleum-ization" of income.

Thanks to free trade, they can slash their production costs because they face fewer obstacles to entering different countries, saving both time and material resources. With regard to governments, the impact that dismantling obstacles to trade has on tax revenues is seldom analyzed. Certainly, economies as open as Mexico's, Argentina's and Chile's take in smaller revenues through imports than countries like Brazil, which continues to have important barriers to the flow of goods and services from abroad.

Given this, the participation of oil in Mexico's foreign trade ceded ground to manufactured goods. While this has been considered positive given that the "petroleum-ization" of the economy was largely responsible for the crisis the country went through in the 1980s, a more careful analysis will show that while oil and its derivatives no longer dominate Mexican exports, they do play a preponderate role in the generation of the country's net income. Why?

When national productive chains disappeared (given that, as different businessmen have pointed out, practically all productive activity in the country requires imported inputs), Mexican exports became very dependent on imported inputs. In other words, to export more, you have to import more.

In practice, this leaves oil exports with the responsibility of generating a substantial part of net income, given that it is a product which, compared to manufactured goods, requires fewer imported inputs. This means that the country went from having "petroleum-ization" of exports to having "petroleum-ization" of income.

This is why devaluations are so bad for Mexico, whose economy depends so much on the importation of inputs. This greatly diminishes exports' competitiveness, since the country is frequently accused by its trade partners of dumping, given that the depreciation of Mexico's currency in effect makes exported products seem cheaper than in the domestic market. In addition, we should remember that there are imports that Mexico simply cannot stop buying, for example, food and basic grains, given that the country lost its self-sufficiency in food production long ago. Today, Mexico's agricultural sector vis-à-vis the free trade agreement is cause for broad debate, but this is neither a new issue nor is agriculture's deterioration unexpected.

The architects of Mexico's rapid trade opening have said that dependence on inputs from abroad is not negative because it allows the country access to technologies that it otherwise would not have. However, large multinational corporations increasingly condition technological transfers to the countries where they operate adopting certain rules with regard to intellectual property, and their point of view is not based mainly on a transfer-of-technology-development equation. The issue is important because the main Latin American corporations are subsidiaries of giant multinational companies that tend to shore up their position in world markets and therefore, foment the transfer of technology in order to improve productive efficiency to increase competitiveness, not necessarily to foster social well-being in the places where they operate.

Foreign investment follows this same dynamic. In other times, governments could impose the condition that multinational corporations employ domestic labor, repatriate only part of their profits and transfer technology. Today, many corporations impose the condition that governments interfere as little as possible with their operations under threat of their seeking other locations that would regulate less. In other times, governments could apply codes of conduct to corporations. Today, the most that can be hoped for is that multinationals take on a non-obligatory commitment like the UN Global Compact under the flexible aegis of "corporate responsibility."

In addition to Mexico's dependence in matters of international trade and foreign investment, the country's foreign trade relations are becoming Americanized. The United States is our main partner and the North American Free Trade Agreement broadens and intensifies those links. Despite this, Mexico has aggressively developed trade negotiations with different countries of the world, some very far away, like Israel. Currently, ten "new generation" trade agreements (so called because they go far beyond simple tariff deregulation) are in force. Most of these were signed with Latin American countries, plus the European Union and Israel. The argument in favor of these agreements is diversification, although it seems difficult, at least in the short

Table 3
Mexico's Ten Most Important Multinationals

2000	1999	Name	National Sales (Billions of Dollars)	Number of Employees (Mexico)	National Assets (Billions of Dollars)	Origin	Sector	Mother Company
1	2	Daimler Chrysler de México Holding	7.3164	11,500	2.9219	U.S./ Germany	Auto	Daimler Chrysler
2	1	General Motors de México	7.3039	12,080	4.1525	U.S.	Auto	General Motors
3	4	Volkswagen de México	6.8730	15,977	3.1492	Germany	Auto	Volkswagen
4	3	Wal-Mart de México	6.3570	70,700	4.4400	U.S.	Retail	Wal-Mart Stores
5	5	Ford Motor Company	4.6102	7,868	2.8248	U.S.	Auto	Ford Motor Company
6	13	IBM de México	3.3930	132	0.0368	U.S.	Electronics	International Business Machines
7	10	Nissan	2.6836	8,311	ND	Japan	Auto	Nissan Motor
8	30	Motorola de México	2.6000	1,885	0.1915	U.S.	Electronics	Motorola
9	6	Sabritas	2.4850	17,000	ND	U.S.	Food products	Frito Lay
10	9	SBC Communications (Telmex)	2.4683	17,718	4.579	U.S.	Telecom-munications	SBC Telecom-munications

Note: According to *Expansión* magazine, other companies should be included in this table, but are excluded because they did not respond to the survey sent by Grupo Expansión. These companies are Hitachi, Toshiba, Renault, Carrefour, Avantel, BMW, Texaco Mexicana, JC Penney, Intel, Johnson & Johnson, Costco, UPS, Samsung Electronics, Dell Computer, Alcatel Indetel, Canon Mexicana, Nortel, American Express, Sanyo Electric, Roche-Syntex, Johnson Controls, Smithkline Beecham, MacDonalds Sistemas de México, Danone de México, Cía. Hulera Goodyear.

Source: Table developed by the Department of Research and Development, *Expansión* magazine, 17-27 December 2000, pp. 63-65.

term, because of the lack of infrastructure and the inexperience of Mexican small and medium-sized companies in doing business in non-traditional, unknown markets different from that of the United States, with which they prefer to deal despite everything.

In contrast, European small and medium-sized businesses and those from other partners in Mexico's trade agreements have experience in exporting to more diverse markets, which could make for trade deficits (or an increase in the already existing deficits) if these nations, and not Mexico, make the best of the terms of the agreements in the short term.

With the signing of the Mexico-European Union Free Trade Political Negotiation and Cooperation Agreement (FTA), Mexico is inaugurating an

era of a new type of agreements that go beyond the strictly economic sphere by including political and foreign policy commitments (such as respect for democratic institutions and human rights). These items could be demanded in the future by other partners, like the United States. Therein lies their importance. For now, suffice it to mention that the FTAA negotiations already include a democracy clause, which conditions the enjoyment of preferential treatment to the respect for human rights, governability and democratic institutions. Clauses like this one are already standard in international trade negotiations.

Clearly numerous challenges exist that only an industrial policy could help to face. An industrial policy would have to take into account domestic needs and capabilities given global demands, in order to design a strategy that would make it possible to promote Mexico's trade interests worldwide. It must be understood that free trade agreements with specific partners are no substitute for an industrial policy and cannot be seen as an end in themselves. That is, the ultimate end of the European Union agreement was not its own signing and coming into force, but rather to serve as an economic and, above all, political instrument so that Mexico could agree to more favorable negotiating conditions with Western Europe and other trade partners. Mexico's being the first country to reach an agreement like this with the European Union put it in the vanguard, but the process is not over when the instrument enters into effect. Quite to the contrary: what is really important for the E.U.-Mexico FTA is just beginning because the agreements are merely means of access to markets. Chile, a country which has much more diverse international trade relations than Mexico, recently signed a free trade agreement with the European Union that was much more sophisticated than the Mexican one. This gives Chilean products advantages, particularly because it is more accustomed to entering remote markets, a marked difference with Mexican small and medium-sized companies.

Mexico's hosting international economic fora makes for a good moment to review the broad gamut of trade commitments that it has signed with the world, to evaluate the unilateral, bilateral, regional and multilateral initiatives it participates in within the framework of an industrial policy, to determine lines of action, one of which must point to evaluating the agreements already in effect to determine whether new accords should be signed.

It would also be important to be very clear on what Mexico's foreign trade policy is not, given that there seems to be a tendency to understand it as identical to foreign policy, when it is only part of it. In point of fact, the non-economic part of foreign policy seems to be rapidly losing ground in the face of the imperative of effecting multiple trade negotiations. This implies a risk: when the political dimension of any negotiation is lost from sight, commitments can be made that do not guarantee an appropriate promotion of Mexico's interests in the world.

To the frustration of developing countries, global agendas do not often consist of what they suggest, given that, internationally, the realities of power give only certain players a privileged position. The negotiating schedule, for example, of the Uruguay Round was marked by the U.S. Congress because it had placed specific time limits on President Clinton's authority to negotiate. Not concluding the multilateral negotiations in 1993 would have led to much more protracted negotiations in what was already the longest round in the history of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Despite this, as host of regional and multilateral trade negotiations, Mexico could take advantage of the debate and the creation of consensuses around certain issues in which it had particular interest, for example, the agricultural negotiations inside the FTAA or the WTO agenda on development. In the Doha Round, there are, in fact, working groups on cardinal issues, such as, for example, the one that looks at the relationship between international trade and foreign debt, a topic of great importance in Latin America, particularly for a nation like Argentina with its virtual moratorium, and also for countries like Brazil and Mexico, the countries with the highest debts in the region. In that sense, the priority issues for Mexican interests have already been included one way or another in the FTAA and WTO agendas. Therefore, perhaps what is needed is to push them decisively so that, regardless of the resolutions approved with regard to the fight against terrorism, they get the attention they deserve. And Mexico can certainly carry out that task. VM

Notes

[1] A preliminary version of these reflections was part of a paper prepared for the International Forum of Compared Policy "Diplomacy, Foreign Trade and the Law," held August 22-24, 2002 in Goiania, Goiás, Brazil.

The Magic Of Mata Ortiz



▲ Jaime Quezada, graphite-finished pot with four-pointed mouth, 23.5 x 24 cm. Native & Nature Collection.

Almost by definition, our towns' craft tradition has been handed down from generation to generation for centuries from pre-Hispanic to colonial and independence times. In each place or region, techniques and objects, colors and materials preserve stories that explain their inhabitants' mastery of one craft or another. States like Michoacán, Oaxaca and Puebla, for example, are lost in time when you look for the origin of many of their craft traditions.

Nevertheless, in recent decades, we have seen that these skills tend to disappear or be corrupted, overwhelmed by the avalanche of plastic and industrial production. Increasingly, objects lose their unique character to become practically mass produced items found everywhere. These goods have an advantage when they compete with traditionally made objects, whose master craftsmen have preserved or recovered original techniques and

Photos by Jorge Vértiz. Reproduced by permission of *Artes de México* magazine.

◂ Humberto Ponce Ávalos and Blanca Almeida Gallegos, pot with red and black squares, 30 x 31 cm. Private collection.



▴ Héctor Gallegos and Graciela Martínez, white clay jug with design divided in thirds, 35.6 x 20.3 cm. Private collection.

the cultural value of their craft and are willing to invest the time needed to create unique, beautiful pieces whose survival will depend on demand, an "outrageous" sale price and an exclusive market, since only in that way can the value of the labor put into them be recovered.

No one can deny this bleak fate of Mexican artisan life, unless they look at the example of Mata Ortiz, a town of ex-railroad workers and loggers converted into artisans just over the last three decades. Their mastery as ceramicists seems to counter a non-written law in Mexico's craft tradition that says that a craft well plied is inherited, and, if it goes back more than 100 years, all the better.

Here in the town and environs of Mata Ortiz, there are no centuries to be dredged up, nor interminable family trees of craftsmen. Here, it all started as the adventure of an adolescent boy with a bent for sketching and the arts: Juan Quezada, whose passionate curiosity led him to reproduce pieces similar to those left behind hundreds of years ago in the imposing

site where the Paquimé culture once flourished. The story continued with the fortuitous "discovery" of this modern artisan, whose art was profoundly rooted in the past, and continues in the present, when dexterity and the total domination of the craft have been socialized until they benefit a whole town, more to our own surprise than to that of outsiders.

A Young Legend

A few details more or a few details less, all the stories about the conversion of Mata Ortiz into a town of noteworthy ceramicists begin in the 1970s with the discovery of the work of Juan Quezada, a self-taught potter, in the United States.

It all started as the adventure of
and adolescent boy with a bent for sketching and
the arts: Juan Quezada.

Manuel Rodríguez Guillén,
pot with M.C. Escher like perspective,
24.1 x 17.8 cm.
Private collection.

Juan was a young man whose fascination for clay and its secrets awakened during his teens when he found shards of Paquimé ceramics along the way on his long walks to gather firewood. The geometry of the design and the predominant red and black on the pieces of clay spoke of the splendor of this pre-Hispanic culture, a powerful trade and religious center that developed in Mexico's North. Determined to reproduce the beauty and discover the techniques used to make it, Juan began to experiment with clays, paints and firing, dyes and decorations, making pieces that he sold sporadically.

Three of these pieces were purchased in 1976 in New Mexico by Spencer MacCallum, an anthropologist and art historian, who never rested until he found their maker. California resident Spencer traveled to New Mexico, crossed the border and began his investigation in northern Chihuahua. It is said that, with a photo of the vessels in hand, he went through the isolated little towns on his way asking if people knew the person who had made them. He continued until he came to Nuevo Casas Grandes and from there, to Mata Ortiz, a town connected to the rest of the state by the railroad. From the end of the nine-

teenth century until the late 1950s, the town had survived mainly thanks to the railroad and logging, but in 1963, with the closing of the railroad repair shop, the main source of jobs, it had gone steadily downhill.

This is where MacCallum finally found who he was looking for. By then, Juan had perfected his technique and materials and only financial concerns kept him from spending all his time making ceramics. Convinced that Juan Quezada was the maker of the receptacles he had bought, Spencer decided to encourage the potter to continue his experiments and promised to buy the best pieces he made. This was the beginning of an almost decade-long relationship that benefitted first Quezada and then other potters of the town.

But Quezada did not make his technique a mysterious, inexplicable act of magic; he did not say that his art was the result of an innate ability. With time, and after seeing proof of his followers' seriousness, he shared some of his discoveries and improvements with other potters. This socialization of knowledge turned pottery into the main economic activity for more than 300 families. More than two de-

▲ Porfirio "Pilo" Mora V., mixed clay pot with black geometric decoration, 22 x 19.5 cm. Native & Nature Collection.

cades later, one can speak of different styles in Mata Ortiz ceramics; the different colored clays and techniques have diversified, and many of the craftsmen have become internationally famous, although the brightest star in the firmament undoubtedly continues to be Don Juan Quezada.

Original Artistic Expression

Of elegant, sinuous forms, walls fine and light to the touch, and interconnected geometrical designs made up of multiple thin lines, in which black dominates, Mata Ortiz ceramics are, from their very inception, ornamental. Though they are inspired in the beauty and perfection of their pre-Hispanic forebears, the pieces produced in this singular northern Mexican town are characters in their own story.

The technique seems simple, which makes the results all the more surprising. After working with different soils from the region, Quezada achieved a mixture of clay with the perfect balance of humidity and plasticity that allows

▲ Lydia Quezada Celado, pink clay pot with jagged mouth and polychromatic decoration, 28 x 23 cm. Native & Nature Collection.

him to mold and design a piece without its breaking or sagging during the process.

Ceramicists do not use potter's wheels in Mata Ortiz. They start with a clay "tortilla" on a base. Around that, a roll of clay is placed and molded upward with the hands until the desired form is achieved. The piece is dried naturally, then sanded with commercial sandpaper and polished, usually with an agate stone. Then the receptacle is given a light bath of oil and water.

Then comes the design, using natural, locally-produced pigments and extra-fine brushes made of children's hair (first they experimented with animal hair and feathers); this makes decorating the receptacle an art in itself. There are no pre-established designs or sketches, although the complex geometry, the motifs and dominant colors give each of the pieces its own special identity. Today, the forms, clays and decorations diverge from the original tradition without losing their quality.

Perhaps the most interesting process of all is the firing of the pieces. Don Juan Quezada spent a long time experimenting to achieve a firing that would respect the tones of the clay



▲ Leonel López Sáenz, pot with lizards, using graffito techniques, 19 x 22.9 cm. Private collection.

▲ Mauro "Chico" Corona Quezada, white clay pot with closed mouth and polychromatic decoration, 31 x 26.5 cm.
Native & Nature Collection.

Of elegant, sinuous forms, walls fine and light to the touch, Mata Ortiz ceramics are, from their very inception, ornamental.

and the paint. After testing with wood and coal, the most perfect method was to put the pieces on the ground, protect them with an inverted clay pot, cover it with cow dung impregnated with kerosene, light it on fire and keep the fire going until the temperature got to 800 degrees Celsius. (The pot acts as refractory ware, preventing sudden, uneven heating that would change and stain the colors.) Forty minutes later, the process is finished, except for slowly cooling the pieces, for which a preheated stove oven is used. Today, cow dung is not easily acquired, so they have also used poplar bark. However, since this is also scarce, the potters have been thinking that in the future, electric ovens may be an option, even though this goes against tradition.

Mata Ortiz ceramics seem to still have a long life ahead of them. Their fame, particularly abroad, where many pieces are shown in museums and galleries and admired by private collectors, is no obstacle to recognizing that the language of the clay in this case has achieved an undisputed artistic expression. MM

Elsie Montiel
Editor

The Sand and the Signs Three Cultural Aspects of The Chihuahua Desert

Enrique Servín*



Photos by Ignacio Guerrero

One of the most ecologically pristine and best preserved areas on our planet is the Chihuahua Desert, the largest in North America. Its geographic expanse, covering parts of Mexico and the United States, including the states of San Luis Potosí, Durango, Coahuila, Chihuahua, New Mexico and Texas, contains some of the hemisphere's most spectacular scenery: vast blue valleys, dunes and canyons of architectural beauty that have known human activity for several millennia. The history of the interaction between humanity and its habitat in this region has been original and sometimes dramatic. Three facets of this ancient, complex relationship should be enough to serve as examples.

The World of Caves

One of the most enigmatic vestiges of the presence of human beings in the Chihuahua Desert is the cave art that has marked and beautified the rocks of this region during different periods and in various styles. Finding archaeological remains in a forest or a fertile plain is not as impressive and surprising as finding them in the middle of a sand deposit or a desert mountain range. Some of the hills and knolls of the Chihuahua Desert are true galleries of rock glyphs, constellations of schematic, ambiguous signs whose original meaning we may not be able to completely understand, although their magical-ritual intent seems evident. In this way, Man in the Americas first impressed his concerns and conception of the world on the desert surface, changing it and giving it a profoundly human meaning.

Finding a single one of these pictures can be an intense, exciting experience: some seem to be simple abstractions; others, magical insects; still others look like the language of cultures closer to us in time, with hunting animals, men on the plains and women giving birth: a mythical woman that perpetuates the human presence in the cosmos. Centuries after the appearance of the first rock engravings, Man's transformation of the desert would develop to the point of producing irrigation systems and cities as complex as those of the Paquimé. Although the rock drawings are not, strictly speaking, the oldest signs of culture in the desert in the Americas, their beauty and longevity have made them beautiful symbols of their humanization, their historical appropriation by Man.

The Other Dimensions Of The Real World

The general style of the desert pictographs brings to mind the hallucinogenic effects of one of the other most important links of the Chihuahua Desert with the history of culture: peyote, which, in Nahuatl (*peyotl*) can be translated —depending on the etymology— as "luminosity." For Amerinds, peyote is the door to other dimensions of reality, the recovery of the original language through which all beings (the elements, plants, animals, men and gods) originally communicated. With some variations, this vision was shared in the past by many cultures which historically had contact with each other and, despite half a millennium of Hispanic and mestizo cultural pressure, it is still shared by some contemporary ethnic groups linked to the Chihuahua Desert, like the Tarahumara

* Author of *Ralámuli Ra'ichábo: ¡hablemos el tarahumar!* (Ralámuli Ra'ichábo: Let's Speak Tarahumar!) and *Luces y voces del desierto chihuahuense* (Lights and Voices of the Chihuahua Desert).

and the Huichol. Both the art and the religion of the first peoples of this desert —and even others from southern Mexico and the northern United States— are difficult to explain if we do not understand what this cactus indigenous and exclusive to this region has meant to them. The use of peyote for rituals and its influence in the desert cultures has not only not diminished, but over the last 100 years has spread northward considerably to the United States, as can be seen in the case of the Navajo, the country's largest indigenous minority. What is more, given its place in anthropological and even literary works —suffice it to mention the novels of Carlos Castaneda and his followers— the plant is known worldwide and has become an additional symbol of the relationship between nature and culture.

The Threshold or the Last Frontier

Lastly, from the viewpoint of the collective imagination in the modern societies that share this geographical expanse, the Chihuahua Desert has taken on at least two very defined and very different —depending on whether it is in the Anglo-American or the Mexican culture— mythological forms. While to the north





In Mexican culture the desert is
an almost magic, virgin space, sometimes
peopled by phantoms.



of the border, the desert gave rise to the myth of the boundary, the challenge of the last frontier (a savage expanse appropriate for the epic of national expansion and the forging of the U.S. character), in Mexican culture, the desert has appeared as an netherworld threshold, an almost magic space, sometimes uninhabited and virgin (a metaphor for the universe), and at other times peopled by phantoms and the apparitions of our cultural archetypes: the weeping woman, the orphan, the patriarch.

In the United States, the myth of the boundary has been played out in films with the Wild West, as well as in fiction, one of whose most intense moments has been the novels of Cormac McCarthy. In Mexico, the myth of the threshold has given rise to equally splendid works of literature, among them *Pedro Páramo*, by Juan Rulfo, whose ghost town, Comala, inhabited by souls in pain and located in a desert of unknown location, serves as the scene of the drama of the Mexican and universal man. Also noteworthy are the stories of Jesús Gardea, where the Chihuahua Desert appears incandescent and limitless, more a state of being or a dimension of the imagination than a geographical region: the imaginary space in which the heaven and hell of all men merge. **VM**

NAFTA and Peasant Protests

José Luis Calva*



Victoria Valtierra/Cuartoscuro

Since the end of 2002, peasant protests, mobilizations and demands to renegotiate the agricultural chapters of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have been an outstanding reason for concern in Mexico.

The immediate cause of peasant protests is, of course, the elimination of trade restrictions on important agricultural and livestock products that came into effect this year as part of NAFTA. This is above all because they happen after the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 came into effect in the United States, which significantly increased subsidies and supports for agriculture, sharpening Mexican producers' competitive disadvantage.

While the U.S. has 1.6 tractors per agricultural worker and Canada has 1.8, in Mexico, there are only two tractors per 100 workers.

Both events, however, are really the last straw for peasants, after two decades in which the Mexican countryside has been turned into an enormous laboratory to experiment with "structural adjustments" prescribed by the Washington Consensus. These "structural reforms," consistently applied in Mexico since the 1980s, include the liberalization of agriculture along three main lines: 1) the severe reduction of state participation in actively promoting sectoral economic development; 2) a unilateral, abrupt trade opening since 1984 that ended up with the complete inclusion of agriculture in NAFTA; 3) the reform of agrarian legisla-

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tion to eliminate provisions that banned the sale, confiscation, embargo of or time limitations on peasant collective *ejido* and communal lands, as instituted by the Mexican Revolution, thus opening up different ways for land to be sold and concentrated in large production units.

The reforms' promoters and implementers supposed that this liberalizing program, which left the free assignation of productive factors to private individuals and spontaneous market forces, would lead to increased efficiency and capital investment in agriculture and the development of food and agricultural raw materials production.

The results of the neoliberal experiment, however, have been very different. The 2001 per capita value of the agricultural and forestry gross domestic product (GDP) was 14.3 percent less than in 1981. In per capita kilograms, production of the eight main basic grains was 21.8 percent less in 2001 than 20 years before; per capita red meat production went down 28.8 percent in the same time period; liters per capita of milk production dropped 8.4 percent; and lumber production in cubic decimeters plummeted 39.9 percent with regard to 1981.[1]

Despite the reduction in food consumption of Mexicans who fell below the poverty and extreme poverty lines, imports of food products skyrocketed from U.S.$1.79 billion in 1982 to U.S.$7.2744 billion in 1994 and U.S.$11.0774 billion in 2001.[2]

The essential principles and instruments of the neoliberal reform of agricultural policy necessarily had to lead to this result.

In the first place, the unilateral, abrupt trade opening is repeatedly combined with a sinister policy of keeping the peso strong by using the exchange rate as a pillar of an anti-inflationary policy that has led to growing overvaluing of our currency (a phenomenon clear in the 1989-1994 administration and again in 1997-2002). This together with the suppression of guaranteed price supports, has caused an abrupt descent in the real prices of agricultural products, which came under the sway of international prices, in which Mexico has clear competitive disadvantages.[3] Between 1982 and 2001, corn growers lost 56.2 percent of the purchasing power of their grain vis-à-vis the national index of consumer prices (adding the sale price to the Procampo per-ton subsidy, instituted in 1993 as an instrument to compensate for the deterioration of prices because of the NAFTA trade liberalization). Wheat growers lost 46.3 percent; bean growers, 37 percent; and soybean producers, 62.4 percent. In terms of profitability, the loss was even greater: transformed into constant purchasing power units with the index of agricultural raw material prices for fertilizers, fuel, etc., corn prices dropped 62.1 percent; wheat prices, 53.8 percent; beans 45.6 percent; and soybeans 67.5 percent.[4]

As a result, not only was the countryside de-capitalized, but rural poverty also increased. According to the Ministry of Social Development's most recent survey, 69.3 percent of the rural population is poor and 42.4 percent lives in abject poverty.[5]

To the adverse effects of the decline in the agricultural sector's terms of exchange was added the state's abrupt withdrawal from its other economic support activities. In contrast to what happened in countries with vigorous agricultural sectors (the United States, Canada, the European Union, etc.), which shored up their government intervention in the countryside —going as far as guerrilla warfare in subsidies— in Mexico there was a precipitate suppression of or reduction in sectoral programs. This was attributable to the neoliberal notion that private agents acting in deregulated markets without distortions stemming from sectoral programs achieve the optimum assignation of productive resources.

According to a recent survey, 69.3 percent of Mexico's rural population is poor and 42.4 percent lives in abject poverty.

Public investment in rural projects decreased 95.5 percent from 1982 to 2001 to less than one-twentieth of what it had been. This affected the much needed expansion of infrastructure. For example, the annual increase in the area of irrigated land dropped from 146,100 hectares in 1981 to 5,800 hectares in 2001. Monies used to maintain already existing infrastructure also dropped. In addition, overall public spending for rural development programs declined 73.1 percent between 1981 and 2001. If we disregard —as we should to make the figures comparable— the Procampo monies used to partially compensate for the deterioration of real grain prices caused by Mexico's inclusion in NAFTA, the drop in public spend-

Public investment in rural projects decreased 95.5 percent from 1982 to 2001 to less than one-twentieth of what it had been.

ing on agricultural programs was 82.6 percent between 1982 and 2001. This affected strategic items like research, agricultural extension services,[6] plant sanitation, etc., and canceled specific support programs, such as the one providing agricultural machinery.[7]

Finally, the third major cause of the collapse of the agricultural sector is the scarcity of working capital available as credit. On the one hand, the national development bank decreased its lines of agricultural credit from 19.193 billion pesos in 1981 (measured in December at constant 1994 prices) to 4.0189 billion pesos in 2001. This severely affected the most needy peasants: the area covered by Banrural credits dropped from 7.3 million hectares in 1982 to only 1.5 million in 2001.[8] On the other hand, agricultural loans awarded by commercial banks dropped sharply from 19.1404 billion pesos in 1981 to 6.647 billion pesos in 1987. Although there was significant growth in these loans from 1988 to 1994, they later dropped to 9.9165 billion pesos in 2001. Loans to the agricultural sector by the banking system as a whole, from both commercial and development banks, dropped from 38.3333 billion pesos in 1981 (at 1994 prices) to 13.6353 billion pesos in 2001. In addition, the overdue loan portfolio, even after all cancelled and condoned loans are taken into effect, came to 60 percent of that amount in 2001 (8.1754 billion pesos), which put the real loans at only 5.4599 billion pesos, about one-sixth of what it had been in the early 1980s.[9]

The causes of the agricultural disaster, instead of being combatted, were confused, with the *ejido* singled out as the main culprit. As a result, a neoliberal agrarian reform was legislated, breaking the social contract established by the Mexican Revolution by putting an end to the distribution of land ---established by the 1917 Constitution— before it had been completed in important areas of the country like most of the state of Chiapas. The reform also suppressed the form of land ownership established since Zapata's 1915 Agrarian Law, making *ejido* and communal land unsaleable, not subject to embargo or time limitations, and opened up the possibilities for various forms of reconcentration of the land. This means that, taken to the extreme, for-profit companies could create 10,933 latifundia covering all of Mexico's 180 million hectares of agricultural, cattle-raising and forest lands.[10]

In this way, instead of resolving the agricultural crisis, another, political crisis was added to it: the Zapatista uprising in Chiapas, set off precisely, according to Subcommander Marcos, by the neoliberal reform of Article 27 of the Constitution.

U.S. Assymetric Policies

The scissor-like move against the Mexican agricultural sector, made up of the Farm Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 and the round of NAFTA-based trade tariff eliminations on important livestock and agricultural products has awakened justified concerns among rural producers.

The Farm Security and Rural Investment Act is cause enough for concern because it not only consolidates emergency budget increases over the last four years aimed at shoring up U.S. farmers' incomes, but also significantly increases fiscal supports channeled into agricultural development. In addition, as has been the case since the 1933 Farm Bill, which instituted the current price-support system, government monies not only cover the costs of horizontal instruments for supporting agriculture (research and education, land conservation, etc.), but are mainly aimed at subsidizing specific areas of production (wheat, corn, rice, soybeans, cotton, sugar, milk, beans, etc., including some products that, like honey, received no subsidies under the previous Farm Bill).

Nothing is new under the sun. If the United States has managed to turn itself into the world's first agricultural power and the largest exporter of agricultural and livestock products, this has been thanks to its persistent agricultural policies, originating with the 1862 Morril Act, designed with an eye to long-term planning. In particular, its price-supports policy, instituted in 1933 and bolstered by the 2002 Farm Bill, gives certainty to agricultural producers, allowing them appropriate margins of profitability and safeguarding them from market price fluctuations.

Contrary to persistent U.S. agricultural pragmatism, in Mexico, we are now completing two decades of per-

sistent agricultural neoliberalism, that is, the fanatical application of structural adjustment policies that the United States recommends to everyone else, but does not implement itself.

Of course, overall support to the agricultural sector in Mexico is very inferior to what the U.S. government gives its agricultural sector. According to the uniform methodology that the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development applies in evaluating its member countries' agricultural policies, support received by U.S. farmers in 2001 came to 47.2 percent of the total value of agricultural production, while that received by Mexican peasants came to only 24.1 percent of output.[11]

In addition, in the area covered by NAFTA, there are profound asymmetries in productivity, technological development and natural resource supply. From 1997 to 2001, in Mexico, we harvested 2.4 tons of corn per hectare, compared to 8.4 tons in the United States and 7.3 tons in Canada; beans yielded 606 kilograms per hectare, compared to 1,846 in the United States and 1,849 in Canada; we harvested 4.4 tons of rice per hectare, compared to 6.8 tons in the United States, etc.[12] The differences in the ratio of workers to productivity are even greater: in Mexico the gross value of agricultural output per worker was U.S.$3,758.90 in 2001, while in the U.S. it was U.S.$67,871.30 and in Canada, U.S.$54,081.60.[13]

The enormous productivity gap is derived from the United States' high investment in research and technological innovation, as well as its internal price and subsidy policies, which have favored continual capitalization and introduction of technology by guaranteeing farm profitability. While the U.S. has 1.6 tractors per agricultural worker (counting the entire agricultural work force), and Canada has 1.8 tractors per worker, in Mexico, there are only two tractors per 100 workers. For each person occupied in Mexican agriculture, 209.6 kilograms of fertilizers are used, while in the United States, 6,114 kilograms are applied and in Canada, 6,352.[14]

In addition, there is an enormous gap in natural resource supply. For each agricultural worker, the United States has 59.1 hectares of cultivated land —of which 7.4 hectares are irrigated—, 79 hectares of pasture land and 58.5 hectares of forests. In Mexico, we have only 3.1 hectares of cultivated land —of which 0.7 hectares are irrigated , 9.2 hectares of pasture land and 2.8 hectares of forests. In Canada, the figures are 117.2 hectares of cultivated land, 1.9 hectares irrigated, 74.4 hectares of pasture lands and 116.8 hectares of forests per worker. In addition, the quality of these resources in terms of topography, rainfall and temperature is also superior in the northern countries.

These are the reasons behind the peasant demand to renegotiate NAFTA and implement a vigorous agricultural development policy. In January, February and March 2003, peasant mobilizations have prompted the government to sit down to negotiate with the main rural producers' organizations in a "Dialogue for a State Policy in the Countryside." The crucial question is, precisely, to decide whether the Mexican countryside should continue to be used as an enormous neoliberal laboratory or, in deference to the legitimate complaints of Mexican rural producers, we should reformulate our strategy for agricultural development, designing the instruments for sectoral economic policy that will open up the way for sustained agricultural development with equity. VM

Notes

[1] INEGI, *Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México* (http://www.inegi.gob.mx/difusion/espanol/fbie.html); Banco de México, *Indicadores Económicos* (http://www.banxico.org.mx/eInfoFinanciera/FSinfoFinanciera.html); Secretaría de Hacienda y Crédito Público, *Cuenta de la Hacienda Pública Federal* (Mexico City: SHCP, 1981 a 2001); SAGARPA, SIEAP, www.siea.sagarpa.gob.mx; and Vicente Fox, *Segundo Informe de Gobierno, Anexo Estadístico* (Mexico City: Presidencia de la República, 2002).

[2] Ibid.

[3] Guaranteed support prices were a system whereby the Mexican state guaranteed a minimum payment for the harvest of different agricultural products; if the market price was lower than the guaranteed price, the state made up the difference. [Editor's Note.]

[4] INEGI, et al., op. cit.

[5] Sedesol, *Evaluación y características de la pobreza en México en la última década del siglo XX* (Mexico City: Sedesol, 2002).

[6] Agricultural extension services were provided by the state's sending agronomists to provide advisory services and training to peasants about ways to make their farming more efficient. [Editor's Note.]

[7] OECD, *Agricultural Policies in OECD Countries. Monitoring and Evaluation 2002* (Paris OECD, 2002).

[8] Banrural is short for the National Rural Credit Bank, part of the state-operated development banking system. [Editor's Note.]

[9] OECD, op. cit.

[10] José Luis Calva, *La disputa por la tierra* (Mexico City: Fontamara, 1993).

[11] OECD, op. cit.

[12] Food and Agriculture Organization, *Statistical Database* (http://apps.fao.org/page/collections?subset=agriculture&language=ES).

[13] OECD, op. cit. and FAO, op. cit.

[14] FAO, op. cit.

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

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The Mexican Countryside And NAFTA

Blanca Rubio*

Pedro Valtierra/Cuartoscuro

Peasants face imports of low-priced goods that replace their products.

INTRODUCTION[1]

In December 2002, a broad movement of Mexican rural producers emerged demanding the renegotiation of the agricultural chapters of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). Led by the "The Countryside Can't Stand Any More" Front, the Permanent Agrarian Congress and El Barzón,[2] the movement managed to get the Vicente Fox administration to set up eight discussion groups with the aim of creating a national accord to solve the problems of Mexico's countryside.

This movement is a reflection of widespread dissatisfaction because the trade opening and NAFTA since it came into effect in January 1994 have increased the exclusion of producers of basic goods. These producers have faced the import of low-priced goods that have replaced their products, the fall of domestic prices and a lack of marketing of their goods. This has brought with it low agricultural profitability and aggravated impoverishment and rural migration.

The government maintains that NAFTA has affected Mexican basic food

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The fundamental factor that allows U.S. growers to compete favorably with Mexican producers is subsidies.

producers because of their technological backwardness and lack of entrepreneurial vision, which limits their competitiveness internationally. Administration spokespersons also allege that the mobilizations are more politically than economically motivated since 2003 is an electoral year and what the organizations' leaders are really doing is using the demonstrations to vie for public office.

The problem, however, is more complicated than that, and goes beyond domestic motives since it is to a great extent the result of the utilization of food as a means to fight for world hegemony among the great powers.

In this article, I will attempt to demonstrate that the ruin of Mexican producers is not caused by their technological backwardness, but by the conditions of competition that the United States imposes through its food expansion policy. I will also show that the peasants' struggle demanding a stop to the import of goods that compete unfairly with domestic products is a just one.

Food in the Fight For World Economic Hegemony

During the 1970s, U.S. competitiveness dropped vis-à-vis Japan and Germany. This was expressed in the decline in industrial productivity that brought growth down from an annual 3 percent from 1947 to 1958 to 1.6 percent from 1966 to 1974.[3] This process, together with Japan's supremacy in electronics and Europe's competition in the automobile industry led the Nixon administration to emphasize three areas of worldwide competition: arms, patents and basic food items.[4]

With these objectives, the United States increased the area of cultivated land by 24 million hectares and pushed yields up 25 percent in the 1970s.[5]

With the passing years, the country became the world's foremost grain exporter, accounting for 34.5 percent of global exports (23 percent of wheat exports, 58.62 percent of corn, 85.7 percent of sorghum, 59.7 percent of soy and 11.81 percent of rice).[6]

Productive and trade supremacy allowed the United Sates to have an important degree of control over the world's grain market. In the 1990s, it began a food expansion strategy centered on the following mechanisms: 1) fostering production beyond the needs of the world market; 2) establishing dumping prices below production costs of exported goods; 3) increasing subsidies for elite producers; 4) fostering trade agreements with Latin American countries and pressuring them to open up their borders and reduce import tariffs.

With this strategy, in the United States the price of wheat was set as much as 40 percent under production cost and of corn as much as 20 percent below cost.[7] To compensate its producers for the loss that these prices would mean, subsidies were increased considerably. In May 2002, the Bush administration increased direct supports to growers by more than 80 percent vis-à-vis what was established in the 1996 Farm Bill, with a U.S.$190 billion package over the next 10 years, which means that each farmer will receive an average of U.S.$9,000 a year.[8]

This way, despite low prices, farmers produce more and more, which has created a chronic world glut of food products that are then sold to underdeveloped countries —particularly in Latin America— through trade agreements that eliminate tariff barriers for basic grains.

The main beneficiaries of this situation have been large multinational corporations: grain producers like Cargill and ADM, agribusinesses that turn agricultural products into processed food and producers of balanced animal fodder, oils, flour, dairy and meat products, fructose, soft drinks, etc.

Distributors reap high profits by selling at very low prices to underdeveloped countries, thus breaking domestic agriculture and placing their goods on a practically unlimited market. Agribusiness, for its part, obtains inputs at very low prices, thus reducing their costs and raising their profits.

The effect of low-priced U.S. exports in underdeveloped countries can be seen in the decline of domestic prices of agricultural goods. Between 1993 and 1998, in Mexico the price of corn dropped 58.32 percent in real terms; the price of wheat dropped 24 percent; beans, 47 percent; soy beans, 22 percent; and sorghum, 25.2 percent.[9]

Unlike in the United States, in Mexico these low prices are not compensated by high subsidies. While between 1998 and 2000, each U.S. producer

received an average of U.S.$20,800, in Mexico, they only received U.S.$720.[10]

This clearly shows that the fundamental factor that allows U.S. growers to compete favorably with Mexican producers is subsidies, since production at international market prices is not even profitable for them.

On the other hand, although substantial differences in productivity and technology do exist, they are not what causes Mexicans' lack of competitiveness. The highest-yield crops produced in Mexico, like wheat and soy, are the ones that have been substituted the most.[11] Mexico's wheat dependence went from 8.3 percent in 1990 to 49.4 percent in 1999; soy dependence went from 56.8 percent to 96.9 percent in the same period.[12] Soy production has practically disappeared in Mexico.

Consequences For National Food Production

Mexican producers lack official support, face the import of highly subsidized, low-priced goods and very often have difficulty finding buyers for their products. This means that they are forced to rent out their land, emigrate, produce only for their own consumption or, in the end, completely abandon farming.

For this reason, the area harvested dropped from 13.3 million hectares in 1990 to 13.2 million in 1995 and 11.9 million in 2000.[13]

Unfair trade practices have brought with them the massive bankruptcy of productive units. Of the 4 million profit-making producers that existed in 1994, only 300,000 were left in 2000. Earnings from plots no longer allows producers to survive and they have to seek income in other activities. According to the Economic Conference for Latin America, between 70 and 80 percent of small landowners' family income comes from other than agricultural activities.[14]

Sixty percent of rural inhabitants are sunk in extreme poverty and 75.3 percent of rural areas are considered highly marginalized.[15]

If NAFTA is not renegotiated to exclude products such as corn, beans and wheat, Mexican producers will continue to suffer great losses.

Producers' Organized Response

The critical situation faced by rural producers has spurred a movement that seeks to improve living conditions for farmers and achieve a decent income from working the land. In 1999, El Barzón producers organized a horseback mobilization from Ciudad Juárez to Mexico City, covering thousands of kilometers to demand a change in then-President Ernesto Zedillo's policy. That same year, bean producers mobilized nationwide to protest against illegal bean imports.

In 2001, Sinaloa's white corn producers blockaded highways and oil refineries to demand the purchase of and payment for their crops. This movement was roundly echoed by sugar cane growers throughout the country who demanded the payment of 4.5 billion pesos for their crops, while Campeche rice growers peacefully took over maquiladora plants in Champotón and Escárcega to get back the rice that the Rural Credit Bank (Banrural) had taken against payment of their debts. Grape growers from Zacatecas came together that year to demand a stop to grape imports from the United States by Mexico's largest wine producer, Pedro Domecq, while Oaxaca and Veracruz pineapple growers also mobilized to demand the end of pineapple imports from Thailand. This series of movements culminated August 3, 2001 with the creation of the National Front for the Defense of the Countryside.

As I mentioned initially, at the end of 2002 a movement led by "The Countryside Can't Stand Anymore" Front emerged, organizing mobilizations like the take-over of the Ciudad Juárez international bridge, a hunger strike at the Angel of Independence monument in Mexico City and a march of more than 100,000 to the capital's central Zócalo square, January 31, 2003.

Recent mobilizations, then, have not emerged as a ploy in this year's electoral campaigns, but have a long history behind them. While individual peasant leaders may have electoral aspirations, that has been neither the origin nor the driving force behind the movement.

The movement has a real basis in the demand for justice and great clarity about the alternatives. It would be useless to partially increase the budget and create a few productive programs as a palliative for solving the countryside's problems. As long as NAFTA is not renegotiated to exclude certain important products, such as corn,

beans, sorghum, soy, rice and wheat, producers will continue to suffer losses and go bankrupt.

The only way to reestablish national production capacity is by following the example of developed countries. They protect their agriculture, create high subsidies to foster production, jealously preserve self-sufficiency and achieve food sovereignty. At the end of the day, the peasant organizations are demanding an agricultural policy similar to the one in the United States. Nothing more and nothing less. VM

Notes

[1] The author thanks Víctor Rosales for his support in gathering and systematizing the documentary and statistical information used in this article.

[2] The second two are peasant organizations that have opposed NAFTA from the beginning. El Barzón was organized by debtors to demand suspension of the payment of the debt contracted by broad sectors of Mexican society with Mexican banks before 1995, when interest rates skyrocketed. [Editor's Note.]

[3] B. Coriat, *El taller y el cronómetro. Ensayo sobre el taylorismo, el fordismo y la producción en masa* (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1977), p. 148.

[4] Peter Rosset, "The ABC of Farm Bill Payments," *Backgrounder* 8, no. 3 (Institute for Food and Development Policy), 2002.

[5] Magda Fritscher, "¿Librecambio o proteccionismo? Apuntes sobre la disyuntiva agrícola mundial," *Polis*, no. 92 (Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana, Iztapalapa), 1993.

[6] FAO, *Faostat, P.C.* (Rome: FAO, 2002).

[7] Rosset, op. cit.

[8] Anuradha Mittal, "Giving Away the Farm: The 2002 Farm Bill," *Backgrounder* 8, no. 3 (Institute for Food and Development Policy), 2002.

[9] Blanca Rubio, "Los impactos de la globalización en el campo mexicano" (paper presented at the II World Congress on Rural Development in the Framework of Globalization, at Laguardia, Spain, 24-26 October 2002).

[10] Alejandro Nadal, "Subsidios agrícolas: más allá de la parodia," *La Jornada* (Mexico City), 15 May 2002.

[11] Mexican yields for wheat are higher than in the United States, since in Mexico wheat is grown on irrigated land, whereas in the United States, it is grown on rain-fed land. Our soy yield is lower than that of the United States, but higher than the world average.

[12] Figures taken from Ernesto Zedillo, *VI Informe de Gobierno. Anexo Estadístico* (Mexico City: Secretaría de la Presidencia, 2000).

[13] Secretaría de Agricultura, *Programa Sectorial de Agricultura, Ganadería, Desarrollo Rural, Pesca y Alimentación 2001-2006* (Mexico City: Secretaría de Agricultura, 2001).

[14] Blanca Rubio, *Explotados y excluidos. Los campesinos latinoamericanos en la fase agroexportadora neoliberal* (Mexico City: Editorial Plaza y Valdés/Universidad Autónoma de Chapingo, 2001).

[15] Progresa, *Documento Progresa* (Mexico City: Progresa, 1998).

Mexican Foreign Policy and the War

Roberto Peña Guerrero*

Romeo Ranoco/Reuters

The demand for peace and the rejection of war have been constants in most countries of the world.

The Ideal Scenario
The Collapse of the Fiction

The Vicente Fox administration's foreign policy was designed from the outset on the basis of two overarching orientations: the construction of a strategic relationship with the United States and Mexico's active participation in the creation of a new international system, through a more intense presence in multilateral fora. The interaction between the two orientations was based on the premise that participation in multilateral fora would counter the asymmetrical relationship with the United States.

The differences between Mexico and the United States about international security and militarist solutions are profound and irreconcilable.

Two years and four months into the administration, the advances and results have been minimal and controversial. In bilateral relations, the state

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The U. S., exercising its status as the single hegemonic power, has pressured the world to ally with its purely military, police-like strategies and actions.

of affairs has gone from an initial festive enthusiasm, represented by the "spirit of San Cristóbal"[1] and the "privileged place" that President Bush gave Mexico in his foreign policy, to one of permanent disappointment, particularly because of the stymied negotiations of a migratory agreement, Fox's main objective vis-à-vis the United States.

With regard to Mexico's participation in multilateral fora, the attitude has gone from protagonism and cocksureness, such as when Mexico's becoming a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council was "cheered," to a more measured, cautious stance. This is both because of the political-diplomatic errors that have been made (for example, the case of Cuba), as well as because of the pressure Mexico has been under to line up with U.S. positions (for example, with regard to the armed intervention in Iraq).

Despite the fact that the aims of these two orientations are valid and necessary, it would seem that they were developed in the context of an ideal, fictional scenario. Certain internal and external variables were over-valued. On the one hand, it was thought that political changes in Mexico, particularly the exemplary electoral process that gave Vicente Fox the presidency, endowed the new administration with democratic legitimacy. The government thought to capitalize on this abroad, taking advantage of what was called the "democratic bonus," which allowed them to promote and support initiatives, some of which have violated the doctrines of foreign policy laid out in the Mexican Constitution. This has caused serious internal breaks in the historic consensuses that characterized the country's diplomacy. On the other hand, foreign policy makers perceived that the changes in international society since the end of the Cold War, fostered to a great extent by economic globalization, foreshadowed the creation of a new system, where the three great assets of neoliberal globalization (democracy, the free market and respect for human rights) would begin to bear fruit, improving the well being of Mexican society.

However, this ideal scenario collapsed abruptly with the September 11 terrorist attacks, complicating the possibilities of moving forward on the two negotiating fronts defined by the overarching orientations. In bilateral relations, the "spirit of San Cristóbal" has faded to an anecdote, with the United States situating Mexico back in the real place it has historically occupied within White House's foreign policy priorities. Thus, the ideal of a migratory accord is fading, with negotiations stymied until today. In addition, the "democratic bonus" has already run its course. In multilateral fora, particularly in the UN Security Council, the policy of global struggle against international terrorism imposed by the United States, exercising its status as the single hegemonic power, has pressured the world to ally with its purely military, police-like strategies and actions, in which war once again occupies a preponderant place as a "means of solution" for international controversies. In this context of crisis, the activist impetus of Fox administration foreign policy has had to be moderated because, given White House pressure to automatically line up with its "crusade" against terrorism and the countries of the so-called "axis of evil," the wrong decisions would carry with them grave costs both for Mexico as a country in its foreign relations and for the Fox administration itself and the president's party.

The Real Scenario
The War Crisis

The Fox administration has made a priority of its bilateral relationship with the United States to the degree of placing it at the center of Mexico's entire international strategy. The reasons are impossible to argue with: the profound articulation between the Mexican and U.S. economies; the intense dynamic along the two countries' shared border; and, in general, their structural links determined in the last analysis by the hegemonic role the United States plays worldwide, which redefine for Mexico the parameters of national, regional, hemispheric and world security.

However, it is clear that President Fox's advisors saw only the ideal scenario and not the real one, in which a series of actors and factors have been pressuring inside the United States to make U.S. political, economic and military supremacy worldwide felt. The result was the very imposition of George W. Bush as president of the United States and the creation of a war cabinet from the very beginning of his administration. However, the September 11

terrorist acts were the detonators for the war cabinet to go into action. We are experiencing the consequences of that, with the world immersed in a context of permanent war, first with the invasion and military control of Afghanistan and secondly, with the current war against Iraq.

The real scenario took the Fox administration by surprise, even though some political and academic analysts had been insisting in recent years about the new threats to international security, among them international terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The lack of an analysis of the immediate political balance of forces —that is to say, the military balance of forces— as well as the lack of a design of probable war scenarios, considering our proximity to the world's first military power, seem to be what is behind Mexico's foreign policy not being prepared and not even having had the appropriate diplomatic mechanisms for a quick response needed to deal efficiently with prevailing circumstances in international politics since September 11.

The pressure from the Bush administration for Mexico to support the White House's militaristic policies, particularly the military attack against Iraq, has reached levels that make Mexican society itself question them. The U.S. government has been concerned with Mexico's position in the Security Council since the passing of Resolution 1441, when Mexico aligned with the position to peacefully disarm Iraq and repeatedly opposed any unilateral stance. This was consistent with its foreign policy norms and principles, contained in the Constitution, particularly "the peaceful solution of controversies," "the proscription of threats or the use of force in international relations" and "the struggle for international peace and security."

Mexico's traditional pro-peace position is rooted in the geopolitical determinants of its proximity to the world's foremost military power.

President Fox has repeatedly stated that Mexico is "against war" and "for peace and the peaceful disarmament of Iraq," and "against unilateral actions," in allusion to U.S. government policy. This position has earned Fox great support from Mexican public opinion at a time in which domestic political tempos are pressing because of the proximity of the July federal elections. However, during the days prior to the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. government unleashed a diplomatic offensive with the aid of its unconditional allies, the governments of England and Spain, against the other members of the Security Council seeking support for a second resolution to legitimize armed intervention in Iraq. But the offensive failed and the U.S. government began to make arrogant statements, like on March 6, when President Bush said that the United States "didn't need anyone's permission" to attack Iraq, and directly threaten the Security Council's permanent members, such as when Colin Powell said on March 9, "We'll see who is willing to veto a resolution brought by the United States," adding that France's decision to veto would bring "grave consequences in relations between the two countries." In that context, the pressures on the Mexican government became more obvious, to the point that Washington resorted to the good offices of its unconditional allies, such as with the surprise visit to Fox by Spanish Prime Minister José María Aznar, to try to get Mexico to change its position.

Mexico has not only been pressured from abroad, but also from inside the country itself. Some politicians, academics and representatives of the business community have said that if Mexico does not step into line and support the United States, the risks of possible economic reprisals would be enormous. This discourse contains a fallacy since it is not in U.S. government interests to destabilize Mexico because that would affect its own interests and those of many U.S. businessmen. Therefore, any measure against Mexico would immediately cause a backlash.

At the same time, Mexico has adopted a position on the war in Iraq in accordance with its national interests. This affirmation not only has a specific weight in political discourse, but is also very realistic because of the consequences that a war in which the United States intervenes directly has for the country. Mexico's traditional pro-peace position is not the product of idealism, but is rooted in the geopolitical determinants of its proximity to the world's foremost military power, and the costs of supporting its war initiatives open up windows of vulnerability for our own national security.

Mexico is not threatened by international terrorism for the simple reason that it has never contributed, directly or indirectly, to what caused it, as the United States has. In addition, in the concrete

case of Iraq, some international actors think that the international sanctions that have been applied since Desert Storm and the disarmament that it has been subject to have minimized the threat that Saddam Hussein poses to the world. Therefore, a military attack against Iraq is counterproductive and will have unsuspected repercussions for world stability.

Wars detonate crises of all kinds. In Mexico there has been special concern about its effects on the national economy because, with the direct involvement of the United States, its main economic partner, and with an attack on an oil-producing country like Iraq, the consequences in the world oil market are immediate and will have important repercussions in Mexico. The first economic impact of any war is inflation. That is why possible scenarios can be developed based on the duration of the war. The most favorable scenario is a war lasting no longer than six weeks, with the consideration that this would allow for the elimination of market uncertainty and for reorienting the world economy, which would, at the same time, cause a three percent increase this year in Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP).[2] An unfavorable scenario would be a war that lasted longer than six weeks, causing the U.S. economy to go into recession and the devaluation of the dollar, inevitably dragging the Mexican peso along with it and probably producing negative GDP growth. A disastrous scenario, with a prolonged, indefinite war, would cause a world recession, in which oil prices could soar to up to U.S.$60 a barrel, and Mexican GDP would drop sharply. The obligatory question would be: Is Mexico prepared to deal with the results of each of these scenarios?

Despite the resistance of world public opinion to the war, a dangerous discourse has been developed; in Mexico, some politicians and academics have reproduced it to justify supposed militaristic solutions to the threats the world is facing. This discourse is based on two premises: the real, undeniable presence of international terrorism and the possibility that terrorist groups and the countries that protect them could obtain or develop arms of mass destruction. This leads us to the question of how these threats can be eliminated and how the fight against terrorism should be organized. The U.S. government has provided the answer, particularly since 9/11, by saying that the United States is international terrorism's central target and that therefore its interests in the world are under threat. Accordingly, it has put itself forward as the leader of the global struggle against terrorism. This discourse seeks to convince all the world's countries to ally themselves to the militarist policy of the Bush administration.

However, in the concrete case of Iraq, there is no proof that Saddam Hussein's government has fostered terrorist groups or supported Osama Bin Laden and Al Qaeda. Neither is there any proof that it possesses weapons of mass destruction. This has caused suspicions internationally about the real aims of the Bush administration's invasion of Iraq.

Mexico's foreign policy vis-à-vis the hostilities in Iraq has two sides to it: on the one hand, reactivating diplomacy in the Security Council after the break that occurred, to contribute to the solution of the humanitarian crisis of the Iraqi people, and, on the other hand, separating as much as possible the issues on the Mexico-U.S. bilateral agenda from the positions adopted in multilateral fora. Obviously, this contradicts the supposed interaction that should exist between the two orientations of Mexico's foreign policy, in which active participation in multilateral fora would be a counterweight to the asymmetrical relationship with the United States.

In summary, the differences between Mexico and the United States about international security and militarist solutions are profound and irreconcilable. But for concrete, objective reasons, Mexico must maintain its position about the peaceful solution to international controversies. Just as President Bush recently said about Mexico that he wants to have "a prosperous, peaceful neighbor," so the government and society of Mexico as a whole also want to have a prosperous, peaceful neighbor. Mexico, like the world, needs a U.S. leadership committed to peace and international security, that will use its hegemony responsibly to promote a more just, equitable international society in which the law and legality prevail over barbarism. VM

Notes

[1] President Fox's San Cristóbal ranch was the site of the first meeting between him and George Bush, at which Bush stated that Mexico was U.S. foreign policy's number one priority. A short time later came the events of September 11. [Editor's Note.]

[2] Mexico's Finance Minister has revised this goal, reducing it to 2.5 percent in the best of cases. [Editor's Note.]

The Hispanic Market In The U.S. Midwest

Salvador Ramírez-Contreras*



Introduction

After the U.S. Civil War (1861-1865), the Midwest grew spectacularly, with industrialization and waves of migration playing an important role.

The Latino community began to settle in the area, made up of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota and Wisconsin, in the early twentieth century. Mexicans began to move into Illinois and other states of the region due to railroad construction and the demand for labor in local industries. Later, the Mexican population increased with the arrival to Chicago of thousands of workers brought in to break the big 1919 strike. Between 1910 and 1920, approximately 250,000 people emigrated there.[1]

In those same years, a large influx of Mexican laborers also came to the states of Indiana, Michigan and Ohio to work in heavy industry and meat packing plants. Latino migration to the other states of the Midwest is more recent.

Demography

To get a current panorama of growth trends in the Latino population in the Midwest, we have to look back ten

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Table 1
Growth of the Hispanic Population 1990-2000

STATE	1990	2000	GROWTH (%)
Illinois	904,446	1,530,262	69
Indiana	98,788	214,536	117
Iowa	32,647	82,473	153
Kansas	93,670	188,252	101
Michigan	201,596	323,877	61
Minnesota	53,884	143,382	166
Missouri	61,702	118,592	92
Nebraska	36,969	94,425	155
North Dakota	4,665	7,786	67
Ohio	139,696	217,123	55
South Dakota	5,252	10,903	108
Wisconsin	93,194	192,921	107
Total	**1,726,509**	**3,124,532**	**81**

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 1990/Census 2000.

Several factors have an impact on the growth of Latinos' purchasing power. The most important is that they have increasing job opportunities.

Table 2
Current Hispanic Population in the Midwest

STATE	TOTAL POPULATION	HISPANIC POPULATION	% OF HISPANICS
Illinois	12,419,293	1,530,262	12
Indiana	6,080,485	214,536	4
Iowa	2,926,324	82,473	3
Kansas	2,688,418	188,252	7
Michigan	9,938,444	323,877	3
Minnesota	4,919,479	143,382	3
Missouri	5,595,211	118,592	2
Nebraska	1,711,263	94,425	6
North Dakota	642,200	7,786	1
Ohio	11,353,140	217,123	2
South Dakota	754,844	10,903	1
Wisconsin	5,363,675	192,921	4
Total	**64,392,776**	**3,124,532**	**5**

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171), Summary File.

years (see table 1). We can see how this group has really increased enormously. Latinos went from 1.7 million in 1990 to 3.1 million in 2000, an 81 percent rise. This allows us to understand the increasing importance of the Hispanic population in recent years and for the future.

In table 1 we can also see how, of the 12 Midwest states, only five did not double their Hispanic population, though they did experience more than 50 percent growth. States like Minnesota, Nebraska and Iowa, on the other hand, had increases of over 150 percent.

During the same decade, the Latino population in Illinois increased 69 percent, from 904,446 to 1,530,262. It is currently the second minority in that state, only slightly smaller than the African American population.

Table 2 shows the states with the largest groups of Hispanics vis-à-vis the total population: Illinois (with 12 percent), Kansas (with 7 percent), and Nebraska (with 6 percent) are the most important. However, in absolute terms, Michigan has the second largest number of Latinos, followed by Ohio and Indiana.

Illinois, with its 1.5 million Hispanics, 49 percent of those living in the entire Midwest, is the largest, followed by Michigan, with 10.4 percent, and Indiana and Ohio, with 6.9 percent each.

It is important to note that Mexicans are the largest group of Hispanics in the region, as can be seen in table 3. An average of 70 percent of the Hispanic population is Mexican; and in some states, like Kansas, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa and Nebraska, Mexicans exceed that percentage. In Ohio, however, only 41 percent of all Hispanics are Mexican.

Economic Data

Several factors have an impact on the growth of Latinos' purchasing power. Perhaps the most important is that they have increasing job opportunities. Other factors include an increase in the number of Hispanics who have successfully opened their own businesses, plus the sector's demographic growth trends, which strengthen their markets. Migration also plays an important role, bringing in a primarily young population, a new work force that is constantly added to the market.

According to the U.S. Census Bureau, from 1990 to 1998, Latino families have consistently increased their average yearly incomes. An October 1999 Census Bureau study states that in 1998, the income of the average Hispanic household was about U.S.$28,300 (table 4).

Compared to other minority groups, in 1998, as shown in the table, Latinos had higher incomes than African Americans (U.S.$25,350 per family on the average), although significantly lower than families of Asian origin (U.S.$46,640 per household). Cubans were the national segment with the largest family incomes of all the Hispanics, while Puerto Ricans had the lowest.

In her book *Marketing to American Latinos*, Isabel Valdés states the well known fact that Hispanics' average per capita income in the United States is much higher than that of families in Latin American countries.[2]

If we look at the growth figures for Hispanic purchasing power produced by the University of Georgia (table 5), we can see that among the 10 states with the highest growth in the U.S. for 1990-2001 are Nebraska and Iowa, in fifth and ninth place respectively, both with about 200 percent growth. Finally, among the 10 states with greatest Latino purchasing power for 2001, Illinois was in tenth place.

As a whole, the Midwest currently accounts for almost U.S.$38 billion in Hispanic buying power a year, a 124 percent increase, rating higher than the estimated national average of 118 percent.

Graph 1 shows that Illinois is the state with the greatest purchasing power in the region (U.S.$18.7 billion), concentrating almost 50 percent of the Hispanic population. Nevertheless, even while recognizing that in only a decade Illinois doubled its purchasing power,

Table 3
Mexican Population Compared to Hispanic Population In the Midwest

STATE	HISPANIC POPULATION	MEXICAN POPULATION	% OF MEXICANS
Illinois	1,530,262	1,144,390	75
Indiana	214,536	153,042	71
Iowa	82,473	61,154	74
Kansas	188,252	148,270	79
Michigan	323,877	220,769	68
Minnesota	143,382	95,613	67
Missouri	118,592	77,887	66
Nebraska	94,425	71,030	75
North Dakota	7,786	4,295	55
Ohio	217,123	90,663	41
South Dakota	10,903	6,364	58
Wisconsin	192,921	126,719	65
TOTAL	**3,124,532**	**2,200,196**	**70**

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Census 2000 Redistricting Data (Public Law 94-171), Summary File.

Table 4
Income by Ethnic Group (USD)

YEAR	1990*	1998**
Hispanics	22,300	28,300
Afro-Americans	18,680	25,350
Whites	31,230	40,912
Asians, Pacific Islanders	38,450	46,640

* Average income in current dollars.
** Average income in constant dollars.
Source: U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States 2000.

GRAPH 1
SIZE AND DISTRIBUTION OF HISPANIC PURCHASING POWER IN THE MIDWEST



Source: The Selig Center for Economic Growth, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, July-August 2000.

we should note that other states like Nebraska, Iowa and Minnesota also experienced spectacular growth, higher even than Illinois'.

At the same time the current difference in purchasing power between Illinois and the two states that follow it is noteworthy, since Michigan can only boast 11.5 percent and Ohio, only 8.1 percent. The rest are significantly lower. However, we should not lose sight of the percentages of increased buying power over the last decade given that the Midwest Hispanic market is a considerable niche for Mexican products.

The last economic census, done in 1997 by the U.S. Department of Commerce,[3] states that there are a total of 20.8 million businesses (not including agricultural businesses) in the U.S.[4]

TABLE 5
HISPANIC PURCHASING POWER IN THE MIDWEST

STATE	PURCHASING POWER (MILLIONS OF USD) 1990	2001	INCREASE 1990 TO 2001 (%)
Illinois	8,592	18,768	118
Indiana	1,039	2,499	140
Iowa	311	907	192
Kansas	880	2,142	143
Michigan	2,159	4,384	103
Minnesota	499	1,389	179
Missouri	752	1,682	124
Nebraska	334	1,114	234
North Dakota	33	91	175
Ohio	1,520	3,090	103
South Dakota	47	129	173
Wisconsin	759	1,765	133
TOTAL	**16,925**	**37,960**	**124**

Source: The Selig Center for Economic Growth, Terry College of Business, University of Georgia, July-August 2000.

GRAPH 2
HISPANIC BUSINESSES IN THE MIDWEST BY ETHNIC ORIGIN OF OWNER



Source: U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce Census 1997.

TABLE 6
MEXICAN AND HISPANIC BUSINESSES BY STATE

STATE	NUMBER OF BUSINESSES		MEXICAN (%)
	HISPANIC	MEXICAN	
Illinois	31,010	15,584	50
Indiana	4,277	2,102	49
Iowa	1,343	712	53
Kansas	3,547	1,999	56
Michigan	9,997	3,914	39
Minnesota	3,616	1,163	32
Missouri	4,107	1,644	40
Nebraska	1,437	807	56
North Dakota	444	83	19
Ohio	6,448	1,516	24
South Dakota	261	69	26
Wisconsin	3,020	1,057	35
TOTAL	**69,507**	**30,650**	**44**

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Census 1997.

Of these, 5.8 percent, or around 1.2 million, belong to Hispanics. They employ more than 1.3 million people and make a total of U.S.$186.3 billion in sales yearly. Forty-two percent of Hispanic firms are in the service sector.

Of the more than four million businesses in the 12 Midwest states, 69,507 belong to people of Hispanic origins (table 6). Illinois once again heads the list, with almost half the region's Hispanic firms. Nationwide, it is in sixth place, preceded by New Jersey, New York, Florida, Texas and California, in ascending order.

The region boasts 30,650 Mexican establishments. Mexicans also own more than half the Latino-owned businesses in four of the midwestern states: Kansas (56.4 percent), Nebraska (56.2

percent), Iowa (53 percent) and Illinois (50.3 percent).

After Illinois, the two states with the most Hispanic businesses are Michigan and Ohio (see table 7). The three together generate sales of U.S.$8.3 billion, 70.5 percent of all Hispanic sales in the region.

A comparative analysis of the Latino population in each state and the number of Hispanic-owned businesses indicates, for example, that in Chicago, two out of every 100 Latinos are business owners. An interesting piece of information is that, of every 100 inhabitants, six are business owners in North Dakota, four in Missouri and three in Michigan. North Dakota is particularly noteworthy in that, with a Hispanic population of only 7,786, there are almost 500 Latino-owned businesses and a purchasing power of U.S.$91 million, an increase of no less than 175 percent over the last decade. These numbers show that this state's economy is very dynamic.

Table 8 shows that the Chicago metropolitan area boasts 27,488 Latino businesses, with U.S.$4.554 billion in annual sales, putting it in eighth place among the 10 largest U.S. metropolitan areas with regard to registered Hispanic-owned companies. Chicago is in ninth place of the 10 cities with the most Hispanic businesses.

The Chicago metropolitan area's demographic and economic importance in the Midwest makes it undoubtedly the region's main Hispanic market. Added to those of the St. Louis metropolitan area (which has the fourth largest number of Hispanic businesses of the 10 biggest cities in the region), the two have 29,456 businesses, with annual sales of almost U.S.$5 billion.

Table 7
Sales of Hispanic Businesses in the Midwest

	Number of businesses			
State	Total	Hispanic-owned	% that are Hispanic-owned	Sales of Hispanic-owned businesses (millions of USD)
Illinois	882,053	31,010	3.5	4,814
Indiana	413,400	4,277	1.0	818
Iowa	227,562	1,343	0.6	233
Kansas	213,392	3,547	1.7	403
Michigan	677,473	9,997	1.5	1,967
Minnesota	410,034	3,616	0.9	392
Missouri	411,403	4,107	1.0	587
Nebraska	138,762	1,437	1.0	141
North Dakota	55,266	444	0.8	22
Ohio	781,284	6,448	0.8	1,513
South Dakota	65,791	261	0.4	59
Wisconsin	366,436	3,020	0.8	817
Total	**4,642,856**	**69,507**	**1.5**	**11,766**

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Census 1997.

Table 8
Metropolitan Areas with Greatest Number of Hispanic-Owned Businesses

City	State	Number of businesses	Sales (millions of USD)
Chicago	Illinois	27,488	4,554
Detroit	Michigan	4,377	1,378
Kansas City	Missouri	1,995	259
St. Louis	Illinois	1,968	333
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria	Ohio	1,447	193
Milwaukee-Waukesha	Wisconsin	1,304	515
Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland	Indiana	1,271	101
Gary	Indiana	1,100	176
Indianapolis	Indiana	884	219
Ann Arbor	Michigan	875	61

Source: Developed by the Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation (FSMA) with data from the *U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Census 1997.*

TABLE 9
METROPOLITAN AREAS WITH LARGEST SALES BY HISPANIC BUSINESSES

CITY	STATE	NUMBER OF HISPANIC BUSINESSES	SALES (MILLIONS OF USD)
Chicago	Illinois	27,488	4,554
Detroit	Michigan	4,377	1,378
Milwaukee-Waukesha	Wisconsin	1,304	515
St. Louis	Illinois	1,968	333
Dayton-Springfield	Ohio	638	295
Kansas City	Missouri	1,995	259
Indianapolis	Indiana	884	219
Cleveland-Lorain-Elyria	Ohio	1,447	193
Kalamazoo-Battle Creek	Michigan	236	184
Gary	Indiana	1,100	176

Source: Developed by the Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation (FSMA) with data from the *U.S. Census Bureau, U.S. Department of Commerce, Economic Census 1997.*

The Detroit metropolitan area is also an important business center for Hispanics, and together with Ann Arbor, another metropolitan area in the same state, has 5,252 firms with annual sales of U.S.$1.439 billion. Indiana is the only state that has three metropolitan areas, with a total of 3,255 firms with annual sales of U.S.$496 million.

The cities of Chicago and Detroit come in first and second with regard to sales of Hispanic businesses (table 8). Third place is occupied by Milwaukee-Waukesha, and Kansas City is sixth. The table shows two cities that are not among the first 10 with regard to the number of businesses: Dayton-Springfield and Kalamazoo-Battle Creek. In these, with far fewer firms, more sales are generated than in cities like Grand Rapids-Muskegon-Holland and Ann Arbor, which are in seventh and tenth place respectively.

CONCLUSIONS

One of the factors that has contributed to the social and economic development of the U.S. Midwest has undoubtedly been migration. Specifically, the Hispanic population grew considerably in the region in the last decade of the twentieth century, creating important Latino communities, particularly in the states of Illinois, Michigan, Indiana and Ohio.

Of the region's 12 states, Illinois is the most important, both in the region, where it undoubtedly has the lead, and nationwide. It is among the top 10 states in the country for all socioeconomic indicators and also has one of the largest Hispanic populations.

Hispanics as a whole, in addition to being significant as consumers in the U.S. market, also participate as business owners who create jobs and produce goods and services.

In recent years, Hispanics' success has been reflected in better job opportunities, access to key posts in private and public institutions and, above all, in the growing number of Hispanic businesses in cities like Chicago, Detroit, Kansas City and St. Louis.

All this has meant that Hispanic buying power in this region has increased more than 100 percent over the last decade, demonstrating what good economic performance the Latino community has had.

Clearly it is imperative that U.S. businesses win over the Hispanic consumer. Therefore, it is fundamental that Mexican companies recognize the importance of the Hispanic market as one of the biggest growth segments in the United States. This will allow them to understand the importance of the Hispanic consumer, since he/she is a natural market for a wide variety of Mexican products, particularly in regions like the Midwest, where the Mexican population predominates and where, therefore, adapting these products is easier because of a similarity in tastes of Hispanic and Mexican consumers, at the same time that the Spanish language offers direct advantages for market promotion and penetration. VM

NOTES

[1] Roger Díaz de Cossío, Graciela Orozco and Esther González, *Los mexicanos en Estados Unidos* (Mexico City: Editorial SITESA, 1997).

[2] M. Isabel Valdés, *Marketing to American Latinos. A Guide to the In-Culture Approach* (Ithaca, New York: Paramount Market Publishing, 2000).

[3] Figures for these items from the 2000 census have not yet been released.

[4] The terms "business", "firm" and "company" will be used interchangeably to refer to a company dedicated to commerce, whether it be a producer, distributor or retailer of goods and services selling to the final consumer.

Some Issues in Canada's Experience with NAFTA

Edward J. Chambers*

Andy Clark/Reuters

Since 9/11, crossing the U.S.-Canadian border has become more difficult.

Being neighbor to a behemoth, even a friendly one, is never easy. The complexities of the relationship grow exponentially with the maze of intertwined linkages. Hence the ongoing search for new ways to augment positive neighborly interaction and reduce the pitfalls of misunderstanding. These circumstances were at the root of Canada's 1988 signing of the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSTA), five years prior to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This brief article provides some Canadian background to CUSTA and NAFTA, assesses the experience of the key manufacturing sector before and after free trade, looks at U.S. trade remedy laws and secure access to the American market, considers public attitudes to economic ties with the U.S., and finally examines some matters that now preoccupy national thinking about trade.

BACKGROUND

The real debates in Canada over participation in CUSTA came to a head in the 1988 federal election, won by the Progressive Conservative Party which, during its previous 1984 mandate, had espoused a policy of free trade with the U.S. and entered into treaty negotiations. The debates over free trade were very much centered on the economic questions of more secure access to the U.S. market as opposed to the increased risk, and possible hollowing out, of value-added activity in the goods producing sector. Political concerns were expressed about the erosion of sovereignty and threats to Canadian social programs, despite greater market opportunity and the potential welfare gains from freer trade.[1]

CUSTA took effect in 1989. Subsequently, as preliminary discussions between the U.S. and Mexico were underway, Canada's attitude toward a prospective NAFTA was initially one of indifference, but this changed with the realization that a tripartite treaty arrangement would be preferable to two hub-and-spoke structures —U.S.-Mexico and U.S.-Canada. In part this change of policy direction acknowledged that the relationships between two smaller and one dominant economy under a NAFTA with trilateral institutional structures could place the two smaller economies in a somewhat less exposed bargaining position than under separate treaty-based hub-spoke links.

Despite these hopes, however, the reality is that trade relationships remain hub-and-spoke with the U.S. being both Canada's and Mexico's dominant trading partner, while trade between Canada and Mexico, though growing, remains extremely limited. For example, Canadian merchandise shipments to the U.S. in 2001 amounted to Can$325.4 billion, or almost 87 percent of total exports, contrasted with shipments to Mexico of Can$2.6 billion.[2] Of Mexican exports more than four-fifths went to the U.S. Further, despite NAFTA encompassing not only trade but also service and investment flows between the three countries, tripartite institutional structures (apart from the side agreements on labor and the environment) to monitor the agreement are for all practical purposes non-existent. Against this background, any assessment of the experience with Canada's main trading partner must consider the effects of CUSTA as well as NAFTA.

The U.S. is both Canada's and Mexico's dominant trading partner, while trade between Canada and Mexico, though growing, remains extremely limited.

THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR

Evaluation of CUSTA/NAFTA must address what has happened to manufacturing —the value-added goods-producing sector highlighted in any trade agreement. Free trade supporters stressed that an agreement would rationalize the sector as scale effects from a greatly expanded market brought about improved productivity, lower unit costs and positive changes in the long-run behavior of capital investment. The real effective exchange rate (U.S.$/Can$) also influences the competitiveness of this sector. From the 1980s through 1991 prior to free trade and continuing into the recession and restructuring of 1990-1991, this rate appreciated by 21 percent; in contrast, from that point through the end of the century the real rate depreciated by 28 percent.[3]

Table 1 summarises manufacturing's actual growth record over the past two decades, pre- and post-trade agreements. Growth rates are estimated from log linear trend lines fitted to the annual real gross domestic product (GDP) of the 21 major components of manufacturing. The table ranks sectors in descending order by 1992-2000 growth rates allowing comparison with the 1982-1989 period. The following criteria were used to determine dating: first, the 1982-89 era is pre-agreement and 1992-2000 is post-agreement; second, while these were years of cyclical expansion in the economy ending in the respective cyclical peaks of 1989 and 2000; and third, 1990 and 1991 are omitted because the sector generally was adversely affected by a combination of recession and restructuring. Table 1 shows that some sectors, such as computer and electronics, furniture and plastics, grew at above aggregate rates in both periods. It also reveals that for manufacturing as a whole, growth rates in the two periods were identical and

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Table 1
Annual Growth Rate (%) in Real gdp
Canadian Manufacturing Sectors for Selected Periods

SECTOR	1992-2000	1982-1989
Computer and electronics	14.0	12.0
Furniture	9.8	6.5
Fabricated metals	8.1	4.0
Plastics	7.7	9.9
Transportation equipment	7.2	7.6
Machinery	6.4	8.3
Rubber products	5.9	4.2
Total Manufacturing	**5.1**	**5.1**
Miscellaneous manufacturing	4.9	3.1
Wood products	4.8	8.5
Non-metallic minerals	4.8	6.0
Electrical equipment	4.5	2.9
Primary metals	3.8	5.7
Textiles	2.8	1.8
Chemicals	2.6	5.6
Petroleum and coal products	2.3	6.0
Paper products	2.0	2.6
Food products	1.7	1.0
Clothing	1.6	2.9
Beverages	1.0	1.1
Printing and publishing	-0.7	3.2
Leather products	-5.4	-1.4

Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, Table 2790017.

also that there has been some realignment within the sector: five components grew more rapidly than the entire sector in both eras, and five which were above the overall growth rate in the first period fell below it in the second. In the post-agreement period, two sectors below the aggregate rate in the first period exceeded it in the 1992-2000 period. More generally, 13 of the 21 sectors registered lower growth rates in the post-free trade era.

What of productivity in Canadian manufacturing? The evidence in table 2 is disappointing in light of the stress given free trade's potential for improved productivity performance in this sector. The table contains two alternative measures: labor and multi-factor productivity over the respective periods. Estimates are also derived from log linear trends fitted to the annual data. Labor productivity increased at an annual rate of 2.0 percent between 1982 and 1989, slightly higher than the 1.7 percent recorded in the later period while multi-factor productivity (which accounts for capital as well as labor inputs) increased at a 1.5 percent annual rate in the first era compared with 1.0 percent in 1992-2000.[4]

Manufacturing appears to have held its own, justifying neither the optimism nor the pessimism which characterized domestic debate over CUSTA. Some restructuring occurred, frustrated by the continued exchange rate appreciation during the 1989-1991 years. At best no acceleration in productivity is apparent, and at worst productivity improvement decelerated.

Separate from, but clearly related to a U.S. security perimeter, are the arguments for expanding NAFTA into a customs union.

Secure Market Access

Secure access to the American market —self-evident from the fact that in the 1980s up to four-fifths of merchandise exports went to the U.S.— was at the core of Canada's search for a free trade agreement. The highly successful 1965 Canada/U.S. Auto Pact, effectively a sectoral free trade arrangement, was suggestive of the possibilities inherent in the more general approach. Canadian CUSTA negotiators sought treaty clauses exempting Canada from U.S. Trade Remedy Laws, namely anti-dumping, countervail and safeguard provisions. However, for the U.S., this exemption was a "deal breaker." The compromise was a panel-based dispute settlement procedure, reflected presently in Chapters 18 and 19 of NAFTA, with a provision for continuing negotiations on the trade remedy laws with the intent of arriving at a common approach. Efforts at the latter, however, went nowhere and were abandoned prior to the signing of NAFTA.

How has market access worked out? First, we should be clear that an overwhelming proportion of two-way Canada/U.S. trade flows smoothly on a daily basis, meeting the expectations of a free trade agreement. Much of that is intra-company trade in transportation equipment which accounts currently for just under 25 percent of merchandise exports.[5] Second, we should also recognize that Canada/U.S. border passage has —at least until 9/11— been relatively easy and straightforward, moved along, in large part, by the provisions for bi-national working committees in CUSTA/NAFTA.[6] At the same time, there have been a number of recurring trade issues involving up to 10 percent of Canadian exports (excluding intra-company trade) where experience has been unsatisfactory. These disputes are concentrated in softwood lumber, steel industry products, magnesium and agriculture (mainly with regard to pork products and the existence of the Canadian Wheat Board).

The prime example is Canadian exports of softwood lumber, an industry not concentrated geographically, but significant in all regions of the country, particularly in British Columbia, Quebec, Ontario and Alberta, where virtually all timber is on provincial government land. Historically, in British Columbia and Quebec this industry has been considered an instrument for rural regional development. Current difficulties in this sector's trade with the U.S. go back to 1982 (indeed they go back to discussion over the proposed Reciprocity Treaty of 1911), prior to CUSTA and have been the subject of anti-dumping and countervail in 1982, 1986, 1991 and 1998. Accommodation —not resolution— has been secured through a variety of *ad hoc* protocols ranging from an export tax to quotas. Presently the U.S. application of subsidy and countervail to this industry is

Table 2
Annual Rate (%) of Productivity Growth In Canadian Manufacturing

Years	Labor Productivity	Multi-Factor Productivity
1982-1989	2.0	1.5
1992-2000	1.7	1.0

Source: Statistics Canada, CANSIM II, series v720309 and v204354.

once again being challenged, this time simultaneously, before both NAFTA Chapter 19 panels and the World Trade Organization (WTO), while protracted negotiations for yet another *ad hoc* agreement are also underway.

The range of steel products subject to anti-dumping, countervail and safeguard investigations and actions include, but are not limited to, steel pipes, iron construction castings, tubular goods, new steel rails, flat rolled carbon steel and steel wire rods. While this is not the place to explore the record of these disputes, an objective observer would most likely conclude that for all practical purposes the softwood and primary steel sectors are *de facto* "carve outs" from NAFTA.

The NAFTA dispute settlement process in Chapter 19 falls short of an adequate substitute for exemption from U.S. trade remedy laws. These laws are relatively easy for domestic producers, trade associations or labor unions to trigger: in the case of anti-dumping and countervail an application will be entertained if put forward by petitioners accounting for 25 percent of domestic production and 50 percent in that segment of the industry seeking protection. Incentives to meet these conditions are contained in the "Byrd Amendment" which provides for the transfer of duties, once authorized, not to general revenues but rather to domestic producers and only to those who were signatories to the case.[7] (In January this year 61 members of the U.S. Senate passed a resolution requesting the President to maintain the provision despite adverse WTO rulings). Additional difficulties are the methodologies used by the International Trade Administration (ITA) in determining the fact of dumping or subsidy, and the International Trade Commission (ITC) in assessing domestic injury are not always reconcilable with economic analysis in the sense that the assumptions are narrow and empirically insupportable. Finally, trade remedy laws provide that administrative reviews can be requested by any party within 12 months of the anniversary date of an order. In some cases (for example, pork products and magnesium), annual administrative reviews have gone on for a decade or more. One can be pardoned for concluding that while from the U.S. perspective, trade remedy laws in their present form assure "fair trade," others see them as an invitation to harassment.

> Secure access to the American market was at the core of Canada's search for a free trade agreement.

Public Attitudes

Recent studies reveal that Canadian support for closer ties with the United States, strongly positive in 1990 (71 percent), increased in 2000 (79 percent).[8] On the other hand, a significant majority in both years opposed doing away with the border though the percentage favoring this option increased in the decade from one-quarter to one-third of the sample. As the authors suggest increased border elimination follows from free trade and from greatly expanded cross-border transactions of all types. The research also finds that cross-national trust was a uniformly significant predictor of Canadian support for closer economic ties with the U.S. in both 1990 and 2000. Trust, however, is a multi-dimensional concept arising from a host of political and social facts and perceptions.

Economic and business ties are just one element in trust, albeit an important one. Numerous Bush administration policies visible in the failures to sign Kyoto, the Land Mines Treaty and the Biological Weapons convention and join the International Criminal Court, coupled with abrogation of the nuclear weapons treaty appear to reverse the multilateral policies pursued by administrations of both political parties in the half century following World War II. Such policies clearly signal a unilateral rather than multilateral approach. These and other events such as the apparent racial profiling at the U.S. border of Canadian citizens of Middle Eastern lineage have reinforced the towering importance of homeland security —an issue certainly trumping trade— and have altered the setting of Canada/U.S. trade relationships bringing about not only renewed Canadian debate on NAFTA's future directions but also, according to an October 2002 poll, a reduction in public support for closer economic ties with the U.S.[9] In that poll, the 66 percent favoring closer ties has fallen from 79 percent in 2000 to below the 1990 level of 71 percent.

What's Next?

In the short run Canada's prime objective is border access, first to address se-

curity concerns thereby maintaining an expeditious flow of hour-to-hour border traffic, and secondly to provide better infrastructure to deal with the bottlenecks created by the greatly increased volume of trade flows abundantly evident before 9/11. Recognizing that Canada/U.S. border issues differ from those at the Mexico/U.S. border, Canada entered into bilateral negotiations with the U.S. on these questions. The result is the 30-point Smart Border Action Plan (SBAP) signed in December 2002. Security provisions include improved screening technology, joint enhancement coordination at the border, common visa policies, enhanced seaport security including container targeting with joint teams, and coordinated refugee claims. Infrastructure needs are included in the action plan and funding for the improvements authorized by both governments. These are long overdue but will still require substantial time to implement.

Security overlays intermediate and longer term trade policy questions. In response, some have expressed support for bold new initiatives such as a North American security perimeter suggesting that this will eliminate most, if not all, border access difficulties. The question is whether this step would involve an unacceptable erosion of sovereignty occasioned —in the absence of reciprocal acceptance of each nation's security personnel and clearance procedures— by the presence of measurable numbers of U.S. security officials on Canadian territory. Others prefer getting on with prompt execution of SBAP rather than exploring a grand new design. Separate from, but clearly related to a security perimeter, are the arguments for expanding NAFTA into a customs union. While a common supernational external tariff would have the advantage of that portion of costly regulation and paper work associated with cross-border rules of origin problems, it would not ameliorate a major irritant, i.e., U.S. trade remedy laws (nor for that matter would a North American security perimeter). Since it is highly unlikely that the U.S. has any interest in amending these laws, a helpful step would be to pursue revision of the dispute settlement chapters of NAFTA with the aim of substituting a permanent court capable of developing case law and establishing precedents in lieu of present *ad hoc* tribunals. While unlikely in the near future, this is a longer term objective of much merit, one in Canada's vital interest.

Meanwhile, in the background overshadowed by the need to address security questions, Canada's current free trade initiatives include Free Trade Area of the Americas negotiations as well as distinct discussions with the countries of Central America. Should either or both of these come to fruition, it is unclear how they might relate to NAFTA. A new continental priority on trade issues may emerge from the present uncertainties but that probability appears fairly remote. IM

NOTES

[1] For a consideration of the economic arguments and the estimates underlying them, see Charles Coughlin, *Review of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis* (September-October 1990), pp. 40-58, and Randall Wigle, *Canadian Journal of Economics* 21 (1988), pp. 539-564.

[2] These are Statistics Canada data (CANSIMII series v196448, v196806 and v192150). Mexican data from INEGI report Canadian imports into Mexico at about 2.5 times the Statistics Canada figure.

[3] The measure of the real exchange rate was calculated by dividing the nominal U.S.$/Can$ rate by the ratio of the Canadian CPI index for goods to the U.S. CPI index for goods. Appreciation was concentrated in the 1985-1991 period which in 1990 and 1991 exacerbated the recession and impeded restructuring; depreciation was strongest in the 1991-1994 years.

[4] An alternative measure of productivity is from the cyclical peak in 1981 to the peak in 1989 and from the latter to the most recent peak in 2000. This alternative indicates that labor productivity increased at 2.2 and 2.3 percent in the respective eras, while multifactor productivity rose at the rate of 1.65 percent pre-CUSTA and 1.3 percent from 1989 to 2000.

[5] Canadian merchandise exports, like those of Mexico, tend to be concentrated in a relatively few establishments. In 2000, the 50 largest exporting enterprises accounted for 49 percent of total export values, and 47 percent was in the transportation equipment sector. See Statistics Canada, *Canadian Export Registry 1993-2000* (Ottawa, Cat. 65-506-XIE).

[6] Illegal migration in either direction is not a problem on the Canada/U.S. border. Further, direct international trucking service between Canada and the U.S., based on reciprocity in vehicle safety regulations and driver certification, has been permitted for years. Generally, customs regulation and border crossing congestion, while far from perfect, has been handled more efficiently at the Canada/U.S. border.

[7] The Continued Dumping and Subsidy Act (2000), an amendment to the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930.

[8] Neil Nevitte *et al.*, "Ten Years After: Canadian Attitudes toward Continentalism," E. J. Chambers and P. H. Smith, eds., *NAFTA in the New Millennium* (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press, 2002).

[9] This poll was conducted in October 2002 and reported in Douglas Fife, *National Post*, 21 October 2002.

Pancho Villa
An Agrarian Statesman

María Luisa Reyes Landa*

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Francisco (Pancho) Villa is one of the most remembered and best known men in the history of twentieth century Mexico, particularly of the 1910 armed movement. Born June 5, 1878 in Coyotada, Durango, his parents worked as sharecroppers on the haciendas of one of Durango's great landowners. According to Arnaldo Córdova, this experience led Villa to the conclusion that Mexico's fundamental problem was land, particularly the concentration of land in a few hands. Because of this, in the revolution, he always showed great concern for making decrees, proposing agrarian reform laws and putting them into practice: a key example of this was the General Agrarian Law, written in 1915.

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The Man

Events forced Villa to run away from his birthplace and live outside the law, a circumstance that would separate him from his mother and brothers (his father

His ability to understand, help and defend common people earned him recognition as a revolutionary.

was already dead). He joined a group of bandits and changed his name from Doroteo Arango to Francisco Villa; he never had the opportunity to go to school. Perhaps this was what made him practically a fanatic about the importance of education.[1] Villa scholar Friedrich Katz tells us that despite his scant education, he was not without ideology and that his set of ideas was not by any means limited to his hatred of the oligarchy.[2]

Villa was strong of body and did the rough work of the countryside.[3] A paradigmatic trait of his personality from his youth, according to Francisco Almada, was that he was energetic and violent, and never allowed himself to be humiliated by anyone.[4] His experience with exploitation and being on the run from the law nurtured in him an enormous resentment against the rich as his enemies and the enemies of the others of his class.

He was a man of contradictory feelings, charitable, loving and respectful at the same time that he was capable of having all prisoners of war executed during his time as a revolutionary. When living in the city of Chihuahua, he had schools built and housed street children in boarding schools. According to historian Enrique Krauze, he also created a fund to give scholarships to needy children.[5]

The general neither drank nor smoked, but he was famous as a ladies' man. In fact, using fake priests and judges, he "married" several different women. But he never forgot the children he had with them, and supported and raised them. Villa would be remembered, then, for his controversial personality, changeable, indomitable, going from wrath to sentimentality from one moment to the next.

As governor of Chihuahua, he occupied himself with organizing the public administration; he confiscated the property of Victoriano Huerta supporters, founded the Bank of Chihuahua, had paper money printed and, although he only spent a month in office (from December 8, 1913 to January 8, 1914) he continued to govern through the military governors he appointed after him.

His ability to understand, help and defend common people earned him recognition as a revolutionary who supported laws and improvements for the inhabitants of Chihuahua and nationwide.

The Military Man

Villa received his first military training as a forced recruit, escaping to live as a fugitive. Later, he joined the forces of Don Francisco I. Madero, where he rose to the rank of colonel. His military activities were greatly aided by the experience he had garnered as a fugitive from the law. Repentant of having participated in the insubordination of Pascual Orozco's in February 1912, he published a manifesto and joined the government forces, concretely the Division of the North, under the command of General Victoriano Huerta, where he was appointed brigadier general. However, he had serious clashes with Huerta and was on the verge of being shot, when he was saved by Madero's brothers. After this incident, Villa was imprisoned in Mexico City, where he escaped and fled to the United States. He later returned to raise an army to fight Huerta, who had assassinated President Madero and Vice President José María Pino Suárez in February 1913. In 1914, after many battles in the constitutionalist army, Villa was named division general. In April of that year, conflicts broke out between Villa and Venustiano Carranza, the head of the Constitutionalist Army, because of statements the latter made about the U.S. occupation of Veracruz. A short time later, in September 1914, Villa withdrew his recognition of Carranza as head of the Constitutionalist Armies.

The Agrarian Statesman

Arnaldo Córdova says that Villism's essence and ideal rest on the rural poor's profound need for land, an unleashed natural force, and a vague utopia of the future Mexico. With secular roots, although perhaps fresher and younger than those of Zapatism, the needs expressed

With secular roots, the needs expressed by Villism were not limited to the demand for land.

by Villism were not limited to the demand for land, although that was the basis for all the rest.[6]

The agrarian reform was the central, recurring theme both of Villa's public statements and of his government newspapers. The press was very important to him: General Villa himself encouraged the foundation of several newspapers like *Vida Nueva* (New Life) and *Periódico Oficial* (Official Gazette) because he recognized the enormous power of the written word. According to Katz, Villista newspapers constantly reported on agrarian reform measures taken by revolutionary officials in other parts of Mexico.

General Villa's dream was to give land to the uprooted of the North who, without leaving the army, would give a new meaning to the homeland, as he conceived of it. Córdova quotes an interview with John Reed in which Villa said, "All over the Republic we will establish military colonies of veterans of the revolution. The state will guarantee them land to till and will establish industries to give them work. They will work three days a week, and hard, and the other three days they will receive military instruction."[7]

The General Agrarian Law is probably one of Villism's most important agrarian documents. It was proclaimed in León, May 24, 1915, and signed by Francisco Villa, commanding general of operations of the Conventionalist Army.

The law has 20 articles and several introductory remarks. These remarks state that Mexico's source of wealth is its land, concentrated in very few hands and much of it uncultivated. For this reason, the poor need to take up arms to remedy the situation and distribute it equally. Among the law's important articles are Article 1, which states that peace and large tracts of privately-owned land are incompatible; it asks that the states fix the maximum size of what will be called private land, an amount that cannot be exceeded except in certain cases indicated in Article 18. Article 3 declares that it is in the public interest to break up the excess land of all large tracts. Article 4 announces the expropriation of lands around indigenous towns. Article 6 announces the expropriation of springs, dams and all other water resources. This law was not ratified or put into practice since Villa's military defeat meant the decline of Villism.

In essence, these and many other articles of the law are a reflection of an ideology that centered on and favored the people, the poor and the marginalized. This was a very important facet of General Villa that show his qualities as an agrarian statesman. VM

Notes

[1] Education was of primary importance for Villa. Many of his political acts demonstrate this: he founded schools and was of particular help to the school of nursing in Chihuahua; he also insisted that children should go regularly to school.

[2] For more about Friedrich Katz's research on Villa, see *Imágenes de Pancho Villa* (Mexico City: Ediciones ERA-Conaculta-INAH, 1999) and *Pancho Villa* (Mexico City: Ediciones ERA, 1999).

[3] He bought and sold cattle in the city of Chihuahua. However, given his lack of education, he did not hesitate to steal cattle at the first opportunity, something for which he was roundly criticized.

[4] Francisco R. Almada, *Gobernadores del estado de Chihuahua* (Chihuahua, Chihuahua: Centro Librero la Prensa, S.A. de C.V., 1980).

[5] Enrique Krauze, *Francisco Villa. Entre el ángel y el fierro* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1987, p. 42). He was perpetually concerned about children; besides educating them, whenever he had the chance to be with them, he treated them very tenderly.

[6] Arnaldo Córdova splendidly explains the ideals of Villism in different works, like *La ideología de la Revolución Mexicana. La formación del nuevo régimen* (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales-UNAM, 1988).

[7] These military colonies, as conceived of by General Villa, were not accepted by some of his followers and unfortunately they were never created. The closest thing to them was the organization of his hacienda, Canutillo, in his last years. Arnaldo Córdova, op. cit., p. 159.

Luis Terrazas
Lord and Master of Chihuahua

Jaime Abundis Canales*

A deep blue sky frames the first rocky steps of the Sierra Madre Occidental where the Chihuahua highland ends, so blue and intense that it makes you inhale deeply in a vain attempt to fill yourself with infinity. Not far from places like La Angostura and its stone glyphs, Paquimé with its earth architecture, Dublán with its Mormons, Janos with its presidio and Menonites, Juan Mata Ortiz and the memory of the Apaches and Nuevo Casas Grandes, replete with hope, sits the grange of San Diego Hacienda in the middle of the plain, from where the peaks of the proud mountains can be seen toward the west. San Diego Hacienda seems to summarize the genesis and development of Chihuahua. In another time, it bubbled with activity; thousands of steers spread in all directions as far as the eye could see, grazing as they waited to be branded or herded to where they would be sold, while conflicts of all kinds plagued cowboys, peons, indigenous, foremen and owners. Today, the big old house is empty and abandoned, but despite that, it still testifies to the opulence of the past; its triple central arches boast the name of the hacienda and two initials, L.T., the initials of its old owner, Luis Terrazas.

While in Mexico City the second presidential term after Independence was beginning immersed in the crisis of 1829, the state capital saw the birth of the man who would become the lord and master of Chihuahua. Educated in a seminary and the Literary Institute, as a very young man, Luis Terrazas would witness the invasion of U.S. troops and the impotence of his fellow Chihuahuans, headed up by Ángel Trías, in defending the semi-arid vastness of his state. Attracted to public affairs from 1851 on, he joined the Liberals who unveiled the Constitution of 1857. When the war of the Reform broke out, he took up arms and suffered his first defeat at the hands of the Conservatives at Tabalaopa Hacienda, in the suburbs of the capital in August 1860. Scant local support for the conservative side meant that it did not last in power very long, leaving the governorship to Terrazas. That was the beginning of a road that would indissolubly link his life to Chihuahua. In the prime of his youth, he was able to overcome his detractors' opposition and put an end to the influence of Ángel Trías, the previous caudillo.

Luis Terrazas' cousin, Colonel Joaquín Terrazas y Quezada, would leave a deep mark on Chihuahua history in this same period. Joaquín possessed virtues uncommon in those years: a faithful, loyal, indefatigable republican soldier, he became a true hero of the struggle against the barbarous Indians, to the point of definitively beating Vitorio's Apache forces in Tres Castillos in 1880, without ever aspiring to use his prestige or arms for personal gain. In clear contrast with Joaquín, Luis —or rather, Don Luis, as those he governed called him was loyal to

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President Benito Juárez and the republic until the moment of the French intervention, although at the same time always manipulating the public coffers as though they were his own and politically maneouvering to consolidate his power.

When the French occupation forced Juárez on his pilgrimage, Terrazas hesitated to support him at first, but he was able to act with sagacity to end up reconciled with the president and once again head up his state after recovering the capital city from the imperialists in March 1866. After the republican victory, he began his personal economic consolidation so that by 1873, at the end of his gubernatorial term, he was the great landowner of Chihuahua. Using public office to acquire lands and businesses put him on the road to economic success.

Luck did not turn its back on him despite his armed opposition to the Plan de la Noria rebels, promoted by Porfirio Díaz against Juárez. Once again, Tabalaopa Hacienda was the scene of another military defeat of Terrazas at the hands of rebel commander Donato Guerra in July 1872. However, in September, he was negotiating from a position of strength with Porfirio Díaz, whose enemy he became, so that when Díaz became president almost five years later, political misfortune seemed to hover over Don Luis' head.

Contrary to all expectations, Terrazas was able to wait for his moment. In 1880, he once again became governor of the state against the wishes of Díaz. The four years of his administration saw the state grow economically; the railroads, mining and cattle raising were intimately linked to this boom. But Díaz managed to put his close collaborator General Carlos Pacheco into the governor's seat in 1884 to counter Terrazas' influence. Terrazas, for his part, took defeat gracefully and devoted himself to his businesses with even more dedication. In addition to buying more lands, he ventured into finance with the Minero Bank and La Laguna and Monterrey investors.

The years of the *Porfirista* dictatorship marked the zenith of the big latifundia in northern Mexico when U.S. markets opened up to cattle exports and the federal government adopted the policy of privatizing unutilized lands to promote their productive use. Chihuahua was exemplary in this. Powerful foreigners and local families acquired lands using the facilities offered. The Luján family accumulated almost 200,000 hectares on its Santa Gertrudis Hacienda; the Zuloaga had more than 600,000 in Bustillos and Satevó; Mexico Northwestern Railway acquired one million hectares; publisher Randolph Hearst had 350,000 in Bavícora; and T.O. Riverside was able to assemble 500,000 in the municipalities of Guadalupe and Ojinaga. But bigger than all of them was Don Luis Terrazas, who bought two million hectares between 1874 and 1907 alone, which he added to the land he already owned. He possessed 400,000 steers, 100,000 sheep and 25,000 horses.

This system of cattle ranches was hardly just or humane for the workers, whose precarious situation contrasted sharply with the luxurious lives of the owners. The hacienda owners' lands included towns, where inhabitants lived in a regime that differed little from that of the colonial *encomienda*. Permanent or temporary workers received ludicrous wages for an inhuman amount and kind of work: 15 to 31 cents a day. In addition, they were obliged to buy their goods in the hacienda's company store, driving them into debt and chaining them for life on survival levels.

The Terrazas' privileged position facilitated his getting closer to President Díaz and helped him return to the governor's mansion at the age of 73 in 1903. This marked the reconciliation between the two caudillos. He was also successful in making sure that his numerous offspring (14 children) consolidated his influence through alliances by marriage: his fifth daughter, Ángela, married Enrique C. Creel, son of the U.S. consul in Chihuahua, who would succeed Terrazas in the governor's seat in 1904 when he took a leave of absence. The harmonious relationship between Díaz and the Terrazas clan favored the expansion of the family businesses.

When the Mexican Revolution broke out in 1910, Terrazas decided to seek exile in the United States; he returned 10 years later and died in his native city in 1923. His life clearly reflected the model of development encouraged by the *Porfirista* dictatorship that allowed local elites to unrestrictedly enrich themselves, managing public affairs completely in their own interests.

The main buildings of San Diego Hacienda, one of the many Terrazas haciendas, are preserved in the northwest of the state, testimony to the era in which Luis Terrazas was recognized as lord and master of Chihuahua, a time of strong and keen-witted caudillos. VM

Cosmogony, Religion and Daily Life Chihuahua's Cave Art

Arturo Guevara Sánchez*

At the end of the pre-Hispanic period in the vast area that is now Chihuahua lived numerous nomadic and semi-nomadic indigenous groups with very similar habits, beliefs and tools, which makes it difficult to distinguish the vestiges of one group from another. The only thing known about many of these groups is their name.

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The indigenous were able to adapt to very diverse environments; some used the resources of the territory's western mountains, like the little-known Tubar; others moved along the great plains of the central area, such as the Concho, one of the largest groups. The more arid, hostile regions of the North and East were occupied by many groups, among them the Chizo, the Suma, the Jano and the Patarabuey.

Although they had a broad range of resources, these groups' existence was unstable and could

be disrupted simply by an early frost or a strong, persistent wind. Many dangers were surely faced with magic. Rocks picked as sanctuaries still present us today with paintings of shamans, normally praying or dancing, wearing large animal horns during ceremonies. Some groups particularly feared winds and whirlwinds, and the beautiful spiral lines that embellish these rocks probably represent these or similar phenomena.

An Enduring Record of Culture

Because cave art has been practiced since time immemorial, dating it is difficult, although it should be pointed out that perhaps a good part of the work we have seen in Chihuahua dates from the end of the pre-Hispanic period and the early colonial period (sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) when human groups proliferated.

The beliefs of ancient Chihuahua inhabitants were represented with abstract designs whose meanings are still unknown to us. Nevertheless, on some rocks in central Chihuahua, we can observe a cross-shaped design, the result of influence from Mesoamerican groups, that represents things very highly valued by society. Another interesting design is a figure in the shape of an X inscribed in a square, which many researchers think signifies the concept of territory, the area delimited by the position of the Sun on the horizon during the equinox and solstice.

Indigenous artists put the objects and ideas they considered important in their paintings and etchings: in the rock paintings it is possible to recognize some stylized plants, probably the ones collected in their search for food; small groups of deer, animals prized in hunting-gathering societies, running in formation, including females and young. Also depicted are a circular figure with parallel lines extending downward, considered a representation of the cloud-rain binomial, and peyote (*Lophophora*), that was and continues to be of primary importance in the religion of Mexican indigenous.

After the arrival of the Spanish, religious sincretism resulted in the painted or etched rocks from the colonial period often having a greater variety of symbolism: ancestral figures (suns, clouds and deer) associated with designs taken from Christian iconography (crosses, doves, musical instruments and European dress), which enriches the series of ideas represented, although unfortunately, we still cannot decipher them completely.

Cave of the Figures. Figure praying.

Cave of the Figures. The paintings are attributed to the Concho.

In Chihuahua, decorated caves and rocky places abound and are, for the most part, simple: a hunter who decided to etch a figure because the gods asked him to, or an indigenous group that left a lasting testimony of their petitions to the gods. However, there are complex works, such as at the Piedra de las Monas (the Stone of the Figures) in central Chihuahua, which includes the aforementioned abstract figures and a group of dancers wearing large hats. It probably represents a dance of the Concho group (that the Europeans called *Mitotes*), petitioning the gods, celebrating a victory or preparing for a dangerous undertaking. The ritual usually included the consumption of peyote. The hats are an indication of European influence.

Unfortunately, some treasure seekers assume that these sites were inhabited by indigenous groups who possessed great riches and that the paintings or etchings indicated their location, hidden under the rocks or the soil of the caves. This unfounded assumption has caused the destruction of many archaeological sites, as happened in a good part of the Piedra de las Monas, damaged beyond repair.

The Cave of the Luises

In the Cave of the Luises, near the city of Chihuahua, we can see some aspects of daily life, like the small group of running deer associated with abstract figures. This small site also boasts an image of the large tip of a projectile, similar to the M-shaped Shumla type, that was used in hunting. The site's large blocks show the symbol of what was highly valued associated with a figure wearing a set of animal horns, almost surely a praying shaman. Here, I would point out that for now I have limited myself to mentioning certain figures depicted without pondering over the position they are in.

The Remedios Cave

In the area inhabited by the Toboso, a group of hunter-gatherers who lived in Chihuahua's Southeast, very well known in the colonial period for their rebelliousness and skill in combat and survival in the region's most inhospitable areas, several examples of rock art are extant. Undoubtedly the most beautiful of these is the one in a natural hollow known as the Remedios Cave, located atop a hill in the municipality of Jiménez, very close to the Coahuila border.

The floor of the cave is slightly inclined and must have been rather uncomfortable as a dwelling. This, and the presence of numerous paintings allows us to suppose that it was an indigenous sanctuary, unknown to us until recently. Here, we find some aligned triangles, considered to be the representation of the mountain ranges of the area. Also pre-

sent among the sea of abstract forms, is the fine line drawing of an indigenous man in half profile, carrying a bow. The figure's most outstanding feature is his headdress of long feathers, in the style many Toboso wore. The figure seems to indicate that the hunter had bagged a prey, perhaps a small mammal, or that he specialized in that species. Despite the stylization, the figure is imposing, as he must have been for the Toboso who saw it.

The sites we consider sanctuaries are near natural bodies of water where game and plant life were more abundant. Very near the Remedios Cave is a beautiful spring, frequently visited by Chihuahua residents and people from other states, since the waters are said to have healing properties.

Samalayuca

Another site with rock art, Samalayuca, is in the north, very close to the U.S. border. In this vast region, remains like a fish-shaped Folsom projectile tip, used by the oldest groups in the hemisphere, have been discovered. Much more recent remains have also been found, like semi-underground rooms, similar to those used by groups from the U.S. Southwest and Paquimé, even though we know that the area was inhabited by the Suma, a group that died out during the colonial period. Samalayuca is also known for having large sand deposits, the vestiges of an ancient lake.

Although there is no way to know for sure, the difference in styles in the region's rock etchings leads us to suppose that every culture in the area had a hand in making them. The large figures have been carved deeply into the rock; the small figures are stupendously delicate, speaking to a domination of techniques. Despite its importance, this site has not been studied very much.

As in other cases, the area is also close to a perennial spring known as the Ojo de la Casa, which until recently was used as a bathing resort by local inhabitants. It is most certainly a remnant of the great lake that caused the formation of the Samalayuca sand deposits. Groups of hunters must have visited it to stock up on water and may have hunted aquatic birds, which still flock to the small lagoon. In Colonial times the Camino Real (Royal Road) used to pass nearby, flanked by sand.

La Angostura

Toward the west, in an open area, is La Angostura, relatively close to Casas Grandes, from which the Paquimé style must have influenced its rock paintings. The rocks engraved at this site are on the side of a small rise. They sport abstract fig-


Arturo Guevara

Cave of the Figures. The cross shows the influence of Catholicism in the indigenous world view.


Arturo Guevara

La Angostura. Abstract design that shows the influence of the Paquimé culture.

Arturo Guevara

Doves are associated with Christian iconography.

Arturo Guevara

La Angostura. The drawing seems to be the image of a comet.

ures, squares, triangles and a kind of horizontal S that seems to represent a column of smoke or steam. Also present are sunrises, stylized serpents and other religious representations like the effigy of a deer that seems to be drinking water and has a flower between its horns. This is a deer sacred in the North of Mexico, still worshipped among the Huichol. Among the figures associated with ideology are the dancers wearing animal horns, one of which is adorned in the style of the cultures of the U.S. Southwest.

At the foot of the rise is a beautiful river that must have supplied the groups that camped in the area. It would seem that they picked important times of year to come to the site, since some rocks are lined up with others with etchings on a neighboring hill. The trajectory toward the horizon of these alignments single out noteworthy points of the course of the Sun during the year.

La Cueva de las Monas

Lastly, it should be mentioned that in central Chihuahua, very near the capital city, there is a small group of caves whose walls are covered with paintings with clear colonial influence. The excellently fashioned, richly colored figures show influences of both the pre-Hispanic and colonial periods, in some cases superimposed on one another. This is the Cueva de las Monas (the Cave of the Figures), a name often given to the largest cave in the group, where a good number of abstract paintings can be found, the meaning of which, unfortunately, is unknown to us. Approximately in the center is the figure of a shaman painted white, wearing a cape and holding a processional cross and what appears to be a rosary. The shape of his feet makes it obvious that he is wearing shoes.

A running figure is also surrounded by a kind of aureole. Given the fact that the indigenous groups of Chihuahua have always practiced long, exhausting races, we suppose this is a deity associated with these events, confirmed by the beautiful aureole. The cave also contains effigies of horses, a violin, a dove with open wings representing the Holy Ghost, and numerous human figures.

The Cueva de las Monas is located on a small hill from whose base flows intermittently a stream that, we suppose, must have flowed continuously in the colonial period. In any case, the proximity of the water makes it possible for a substantial amount of vegetation to live there still, and fauna is more abundant than in surrounding areas.

One interesting aspect of these sites as a whole is the fact that indigenous thinking transformed over time, with the acceptance of new religious concepts. The ideas and objects represented on the rocks in these archaeological sites allow us access to the cultures of the ancient inhabitants of Chihuahua who, using etching and painting, left us a legacy that we continue to study and preserve. MM

Encountering Chihuahua's Canyons

Carlos Rangel Plasencia*



Photos courtesy of Sectur Chihuahua

It was getting dark. The man fixed his harsh gaze on me and in a rough voice, said bluntly, "You're not bothering anybody, friend. You're travelers, you need help and we're giving it to you. We know what it's like to be away from your family with nobody to even give you a cup of coffee. So stop saying you're a bother. And don't offer us money. If you want to pay us, do the same thing for someone else." And all together, the residents of the little hamlet got moving to make us something to eat and even emptied an entire house so we could sleep in it. I had originally only gone up to the house to ask permission to put up our tents.

Further along, a day's walk away, was the Sinforosa Canyon. Deep, broad and, above all, unknown.

We were in southern Chihuahua and wanted to cross all the canyons in the Tarahumara Mountains in a single trip. I had had my first encounter with one, like most of us, in the Copper Canyon, next to the railing at El Divisadero. The first thing that attracted me was the canyon itself, that deep gash in the earth where we discover that the paths down are filled with loose rocks and it takes hours to descend to the river. That was, in the end, the goal.

Down at the bottom, nothing could be seen but the river and the mountains towering above. After a starry night or a full moon, in the morning, the air laden with smell of greenery and your ears filled with the incessant song of cicadas, you discovered that the river was really only half the journey and you still had to climb up again.

When we returned to the railway line, our lips dry from thirst, I knew I would come back because, long after being satiated but still hungry for scenery —and that took days—, I asked myself what could be beyond there, behind the hills that rose on the other side of the canyon, the ones we had not scaled or descended. Well, that is what we were doing now: journeying through an enormous mountain range that had swallowed us from the very first days with its rain and its sun, with its cold and its wind. And here we found canyons, still far from the Copper Canyon. Soon we would

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

The canyons of Chihuahua are not exactly places to just sit and contemplate, even though we all do it.

know that they were an important part of the mountains and that the culture itself was ruled by them.

The Sinforosa Canyon was only the first that we would encounter on our journey, and even though I already "had experience" in the canyons —that can take the breath away from anyone who looks at them— nothing had prepared me for the impact of that first human lesson in the mountains, a lesson I have never forgotten: think and live as a traveler.

Two months later we would arrive at Ciudad Madera, our objective. We had crossed the main canyons, those gashes in the earth that had frightened two seventeenth-century Jesuit missionaries and continue to impress anyone who sees them. After walking hundreds of kilometers through the mountains and at the bottom of the canyons, we still asked ourselves why a canyon draws you so. What was a canyon, really?

Every time we stood on the edge, with our gaze fixed and lost in its depths, we felt we were above the world. That is perhaps their greatest attribute: making you feel that you are atop a high mountain, seeing the infinite spaces above and the real depths below. And the best of all is that there was no need to make any physical effort. All you had to do was to come on a train or some other means of transportation, free up your gaze and let yourself be carried away by the sensations unleashed inside you.

But that does not mean that the canyons are less valuable than the peaks. The canyons of Chihuahua are not exactly places to just sit and contemplate, even though we all do it. They are actually more terrifying because they challenge you: "Come and meet me." You cannot stop feeling it, although few accept it. But anyone who goes down to the bottom or climbs the mountains to get rid of the uneasiness, finds that their voice has become increasingly stronger. Why?

Perhaps it is because in some places you can find prospectors making a living by collecting tiny amounts of gold from personal mines with rudimentary mills that they make themselves. They have overcome all obstacles by dint of pure tenac-

ity and effort. It is the legend of gold or silver that is constantly with them because they are the ones that experience and personify it. A gram of gold is sufficient to loose all the stories of treasures buried during the revolution: their hope.

In Batopilas, one of the three canyons (together with the Copper and Sinforosa Canyons) that feed the Fuerte River, there is a very rich mine with its own railway, originally transported piece by piece on pack mules. Today, that mine is only ruins that continue to attract everyone who goes there and where, some say, ghosts and specters live that you can talk to if you get along with them.

Or, it may be that the meeting with the Rarámuri totally changes the meaning of your life, when you see them walking along the slopes at great speed, but as though they were not moving at all. I have followed them and marveled at their elegant gait.

Years have passed and I still remember the face of the man from the hamlet and how tired I was when I went to his house, but also the sparkle in his eye when he said, "You're not bothering anybody," using the formal form of address, because, there, everyone uses the formal form of address, even to children.

The value of the canyons is not in the gold that was and is still extracted from them, nor in the minerals we carried for days or weeks to take home and not even —or at least not completely— in their scenery full of depths and open spaces limitless to the eye.

What makes them different from a peak is the true discovery: one finds oneself among ways of thinking, of being, of living and of acting that are completely different. Encountering people. Like that midwife who waited for two days for the pregnant woman to need her services. Or when a Rarámuri (as the Tarahumara indigenous call themselves) stands in the middle of his hamlet at the bottom of a canyon, solemn, with an earthen bowl full of *tesgüino*, and pours a little on the four points of the compass to offer it to the Earth and then offers you a drink of it and you don't know what to do except drink a little while he smiles. The fiesta has begun.



One finds oneself among ways of thinking, of being, of living and of acting that are completely different.

The canyons' invitation attracts many. Few accept it. With that journey throughout the mountains, we realized one thing: after going through one canyon after another, after the hundreds of people we had met and after becoming "mountain people" little by little in our way of living and even of speaking, the truth was that we did not know them. So, our return became imminent. Over and over.

We have traveled thousands of kilometers on foot through them, following the course of the river to see if it was navigable or not, or finding something that, even though we expected it, still surprised us. Years ago, we were again on the edge of the Sinforosa Canyon. Someone had mentioned to us something about the Tubar, an extinct indigenous group that Carl Lumholtz mentions in his book *El México desconocido* (Unknown Mexico). So there we were, in the middle of a Tarahumara area. In the morning we went to the edge in search of a way down to the river. A 20-year old man came up to us.

"*Kuira-bá*," was our greeting. And in less than an hour, we had a delightful chat in which he told us how the "terrible Cocoyom (the Tubar)" had been giants who ate the "people" (the Rarámuri) and that the latter had agreed to offer them a *tesgüino* fiesta to get them drunk in a cave. Once asleep from the *tesgüino*, they set fire to many *chiltepín* (a kind of chili pepper) plants to suffocate them to death. They all died, but, our new friend told us, their houses still remained at the bottom of the canyon.

Guided by him, we reached some buildings in the middle of the canyon that we never would

We discover that the paths down are filled with loose rocks and it takes hours to descend to the river.



Contact with the mountains and the canyons
is always pleasant. All the senses,
not only the sense of sight, are rewarded.

have seen if we had been alone. I remember having stopped for a moment to see how far we had to climb down. "Impossible," I thought. And, as though he had heard me, the Rarámuri climbed down with no trouble at all. We, the visitors, could well have thought something impossible, but they, the canyon inhabitants, do not know the word.

Contact with the mountains and the canyons is always pleasant. Setting up camp next to the river and listening to hundreds of frogs or the quieting hum of the river, or the cicadas interrupted by some animal that has come to drink during the night. All the senses, not only the sense of sight, are rewarded.

This is the true discovery. The true value of the canyons and the mountains: the people, who would not be what they are without these forests or depths, without their wild animals coming occasionally into view, without that heat in their depths or the snow in winter. That is what the canyons are: an entire world that must be explored to enrich our own lives. Walking and talking allows us to learn very easily how important it is to preserve what we have as a legacy for our children. MM

The Chihuahua-Pacific Railroad

The Chihuahua-Pacific Railroad, stretching from Ojinaga, Chihuahua, to Topolobampo, Sinaloa, crosses deserts, valleys and imposing mountain ranges to reach the sea and is as astonishing as the scenery it shows us.

The idea of building this railroad came into being about 1861, as an economic enterprise that would join the U.S. Midwest to the recently discovered Oguira Bay (today Topolobampo) in Sinaloa. However, 100 years would go by before the finished railroad, today considered a prime example of engineering, could be inaugurated after joining some stretches of track and finishing others. For all those years, builders had to not only deal with the financial difficulties that a job of this magnitude implies, the change in concessionaires and a revolution, but, above all, the inhospitable terrain that had to be conquered by technical and human efforts.

The 250-kilometer length of track that goes through the heart of the Sierra Madre Occidental, to join Creel, Chihuahua, to the state of Sinaloa, was the most imposing and last built. Joining the city of Chihuahua to Los Mochis, Sinaloa, in a stretch of line that takes 15 hours to traverse, took 86 tunnels (17.2 kilometers of track) and 37 bridges spanning a total of 3.6 kilometers.

This is the portion of the railway line that most surprises travelers who ride it through the Copper Canyons to see the world that took in the survivors of the Tarahumara culture. The track rises toward Creel and reaches its highest point (2,400 meters) a little beyond it. Then, going through tunnels and over bridges, it descends among imposing canyons, skirting precipices —four of which are higher than Colorado's Grand Canyon— bringing viewers a natural beauty that otherwise could only be seen by its silent inhabitants and the occasional impetuous explorer.

Today, the Chihuahua-Pacific Railway, better known as "Chepe" after its initials in Spanish, is the only commercially operated railroad in Mexico. It offers first and second class service, with all the conveniences, and has daily runs through the Copper Canyon with stops at several intermediate stations where visitors can find accommodations. This allows them to stay over and hike down to the bottom of a canyon, or just observe the breathtaking scenery from the look-out points.

Chihuahua City of the Desert

Carlos Lascano*

Today, the modern city of Chihuahua is located between the warm loneliness of the vast deserts of the North of Mexico and the spurs of the Sierra Madre Occidental. The Sacramento and Chuvíscar Rivers flow through its valley, joining at a point called the "Meeting Place of the Rivers." It was there that Envoy Juan de Oñate, during his journey to colonize New Mexico around the year 1598, claimed this valley for the Spanish, making contact with its millennia-old inhabitants, the Concho Indians.

* Mexican writer.

▲ The Cathedral represents the baroque style of the North.

▲ The aqueduct, begun in 1751.

Photos courtesy of Carlos Lascano

Life was relatively peaceful during the colonial period. Many of the governors of New Vizcaya resided here.

The colonization of the Chihuahua Valley began slowly, lasting the entire seventeenth century. Indigenous towns, cattle ranches and a few ore-refining haciendas were the main forms of settlement. The rich mines of Santa Eulalia were discovered in the eighteenth century, unleashing a gold fever that led to the formal establishment of the city of Chihuahua, October 12, 1709. Although most historians recognize Don Antonio de Deza y Ulloa, the governor of New Vizcaya province, as the founder of the city, there are those who think the real founders were the indigenous Juan de Dios Barba and Cristóbal Luján, the discoverers of the Santa Eulalia mine.

The city's first name was Real de San Francisco de Cuéllar, in honor of Saint Francis of Assisi and Don Francisco Fernández de la Cueva, marquis of Cuéllar and viceroy of New Spain. The new town grew rapidly and by 1718 was recognized by the crown as a *villa*, acquiring a new name, San Felipe el Real de Chihuahua, in honor of the king of Spain, Felipe V. With the independence of Mexico, the city was given the name it bears today, Chihuahua.

Life was relatively peaceful during the colonial period. The economy was largely based on the Santa Eulalia mine and thanks to this, many of the governors of New Vizcaya resided there, despite the fact that the provincial capital was the city of Durango. The arrival of governors and the far-away Apache attacks were the only events that occasionally disturbed the town's tranquility.



▲ Vallino Park.



▲ Touché Mansion.

During Maximilian's empire and the French invasion, President Benito Juárez took refuge in the city for more than a year.

Toward the end of the colonial period, the new winds of independence reached Chihuahua. Miguel Hidalgo, who began the insurgents' fight, was captured and sent to Chihuahua, where he was tried and shot. Many other founding fathers were struck down with him. When Mexico finally achieved its independence from Spain in 1821, the state of Chihuahua was founded, establishing its capital in the old *villa* of San Felipe el Real, now Chihuahua.

The nineteenth century, turbulent throughout Mexico, had a big impact on Chihuahua. It went through many revolts, riots, foreign invasions —the United States and France each took the city several times— and, in addition, the Apache war intensified toward the second half of the century. During the time of Maximilian's empire and the French invasion, President Benito Juárez took refuge in the city of Chihuahua and for more than a year made it the seat of his government. Under the *Porfiriato* (the 30-year regime of Porfirio Díaz) the system of large cattle-raising haciendas was consolidated, bringing with it great wealth that was concentrated in a small elite. Chihuahua was modernized, but without benefitting the great mass of the people.

By 1910, injustices were so blatant that they spurred the break-out of the Mexican Revolution against, in the first instance, President Porfirio Díaz. The Revolution began in the state of Chihuahua and many of its most important battles were fought there. General Francisco (Pancho) Villa, the head of the Division of the North, occupied the city of Chihuahua in December 1913 and was named gover-

▲ The Sanctuary of Guadalupe.

▲ Government Palace.

nor of the state. During his brief term, Villa confiscated all the haciendas, property and businesses of the Chihuahua oligarchy and did everything he could in favor of the poor. He left a profound mark on the history of the state and of Mexico. To this day, the house where the general lived is preserved as a museum of the Revolution (see *Voices of Mexico* 62).

At the end of the revolutionary movement, the modern stage of the city of Chihuahua began and little by little it became one of the most important cities of Mexico's North. With sustained growth, until the 1950s the city provided important services to the agricultural, cattle-raising, forestry and mining sectors. With the decline of these sectors, the city has turned to the maquiladora industry, which has made for striking changes in society, not all for the better.

Today, Chihuahua is a dynamic city with a strong tradition of hard work and progressive people who rely on personal initiative to develop their community. Although there is no lack of problems and tensions derived from unbridled growth and drug trafficking, the city is quiet, with real charm that captivates anyone who goes there, beginning with its own inhabitants.

Some cities are visited for their natural attractions, others for their architecture, their museums or artistic activities; others are commercial centers. The city of Chihuahua is visited and remembered mainly for its people, its ambiance of warmth and generosity. In a world where everything is speedy, Chihuahua invites the visitor to live in tranquility and harmony, without having to give up any of the advantages of modernity. VM

▲ Lerdo Park.



▲ Door of the Sun monument.

The Museum of Cultures of the North

Arturo Guevara Sánchez*



Sectur Chihuahua

The Museo de las Culturas del Norte (Museum of Cultures of the North) is the crystallization of an old idea that we archaeologists who study Mexico's North had. It summarizes and beautifully and didactically exhibits many years of efforts and ideas from various Mexican researchers. Situated in the western part of Chihuahua in Casas Grandes, the museum is strategically located, very close to the Paquimé archaeological site, the largest and certainly the most important in Chihuahua. This gives all museum visitors the opportunity of also seeing the site, which has similar cultural traits to those of the U.S. Southwest.

The Museum of Cultures of the North has a permanent exhibit arranged in a circuit that begins with a section showing some of the oldest pre-historic remains in the country: stone tools, objects from daily life that were used by hunting-gathering families, like scrapers to skin animals with, baskets and *yaguales* (rings for carrying objects on the head), similar to those found in the Candelaria Cave in the neighboring state of Coahuila.

The archaeological material from the area is complemented with models like the one showing old houses of the Paquimé culture. The models are cross-sectioned so that the interior of the houses can also be seen. They were semi-subterranean houses, with round floor plans, that from the outside looked semi-spherical. Since these little houses had hearths, it is no surprise that they have holes in the roof to allow the smoke to escape. The stakes placed around the houses were really longer and served to form the body of the room, which was made of compressed mud. The entryway was a small tunnel through which the inhabitants had to crawl or walk stooped over in order to get in.

* Archaeologist and researcher at the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH) in Chihuahua.

A mural depicts the way the houses were distributed in the region's ancient towns during their first stages of development.

Visitors have commented that one of the museum's most attractive sections is the series of models showing what the communal houses that also existed in Paquimé were like. They were tiered buildings constructed with the poured adobe technique; the most complex varieties can be observed in the archaeological site, although in an advanced state of deterioration. The most beautiful model is a scale copy of the houses of a large cave in Mesa Verde, Colorado, in the U.S. Southwest, which undoubtedly had an influence on the builders of Paquimé.

The Mesa Verde archaeological site is steeply tiered and of several stories, some very high, like towers. Clearly, the rooms were arranged to adapt to the floor of the great cave that houses them. The tree trunks that protrude from the construction can also be seen and have been used to date the structures using dendrochronology.[1] The constructions were made of stone and some of the doorways were T-shaped, a characteristic of the Casas Grandes site.

With certain variations and on a small scale, these T-shaped doors can be seen in the Paquimé constructions. However, specialists are not completely sure of their function. It has been said that the shape of the doors is part of a defensive strategy, or is due to aesthetic reasons, but, in any case, it had religious symbolism since small, stone, very well made representations of them are found in one of the city's temples, like pieces used in worship.

The round underground places that today look like holes are actually *kivas*, or ceremonial spaces; they are so important that an additional model was

A permanent exhibit arranged in a circuit begins with a section showing some of the oldest pre-historic remains in the country.

Sectur Chihuahua

made of them. A smaller model shows a cross-section of a *kiva*, so the viewer can see its interior: the upper floor where people circulated, as well as the hole through which the faithful entered using a wooden ladder. The walls are curved and, in this case, made of stone. The floor is round; the roof has vertical supports and the end of the room is ringed by a ledge where ritual participants sat. Also visible is a cavity in which the fire was built, of vital importance in a place with winters as cold as in Mesa Verde.

Paquimé was a very large city that had trade relations with a very wide area. It is supposed that many of the materials located among the ruins had been stored —there is no trace of them being used— ready to be taken to other parts of Mexico. This is the case, for example, of a series of carefully fashioned, polished *metates* (curved stones used for grinding corn), decorated with geometric forms, showing the technical mastery of the artisans who made them.

A walk through the museum reveals numerous pieces of Paquimé ceramics, with very well done monochromatic designs, as well as other pieces of ceramics for daily use. In addition, polychromatic pieces stand out due to their magnificent finishing and decoration, in which very particular iconographic elements can be observed like circles and zigzags and broken lines.

Among the objects stored in Paquimé are sea mollusk shells used in making beautiful necklaces, bracelets, pectorals and many other pieces widely used by the inhabitants of the area. Some of the shells are very small and it is thought, although with no certainty, that they may have been used as coins. There are millions of these little shells in Paquimé and today they are exhibited, protected by large glass columns.

The most beautiful model is a scale copy of a large cave in Mesa Verde, Colorado, which had an influence on Paquimé.

Arturo Guevara

Another section displays different objects used in daily activities and others for attending festivities, like necklace beads of different colors and materials and several small stone sculptures that testify to the great ability of Paquimé carvers. One should pay particular attention to anthropomorphic ceramic pieces that show costumes worn by the city's inhabitants, with designs very similar to those on the polychromatic ceramics.

The museum also exhibits pieces that must have been used in the worship of Paquimé's deities: for example, large trumpets made with shells whose surfaces were decorated with blue-green stones which, it was said, pleased the gods. Another piece is a sculpture of a figure wearing a headdress with tiers, similar to those still used in worship by the indigenous groups of the United States Southwest.

Because of the Apaches' importance in the history of Chihuahua and Mexico both, they have been given a space in the museum, where objects used in wartime and pictures of some of their most noteworthy chiefs are displayed.

The men of the Mexican Revolution were of particular importance in the social processes that have made our country what it is today. For that reason, some of the heroes, those who offered their lives for the nation, also have a place in the museum.

The Museum of the Cultures of the North is an obligatory stopping place for Mexican and foreign tourists alike, especially for those interested in the vestiges of the very important cultures of Mexico's North. VM

Notes

[1] Dendrochronology is the science of dating events, intervals of time and variations in the environment in former periods by study of the sequence of and differences between rings of growth in trees and aged wood. [Editor's Note.]

Photos reproduced by permission of the National Institute of Anthropology and History, Conaculta-INAH-MEX.

Museo de las Culturas del Norte
Paquimé Archaeological Site
Casas Grandes Chihuahua
Phone: (636) 692 41 40
Open Tuesday to Sunday, 10 a.m. to 5 p.m.

Monitoring Drought in Chihuahua

Héctor Gadsden, José Rodríguez, Carlos Muñoz, Daniel Núñez, Octavio Hinojosa*

Photos courtesy of Chihuahua's Ecology Institute Drought Research Center

Chihuahua not only faces severe problems of water scarcity, but also the over-exploitation and pollution of the water it has.

The Drought in Chihuahua

Drought is recurring and irregular and is part of the variation of all climates on the planet, from the arid to the tropical. It is caused by a persistent anomaly in the hydrological cycle manifested in a severe deficit of rain for a sufficiently long period. It has negative repercussions in society, on the environment and on economic activity. Generally, a drought is defined in relation to the decrease in the amount of rain compared to long-term average historical precipitation. This natural disaster is slow; it does not have an epicenter or a defined trajectory and tends to extend in an irregular fashion through time and space. Its severity depends on the level of lack of humidity, its persistence and the size of the affected area. It is also important to differentiate drought from aridity: the former is a temporary, negative deviation from the norm, while the latter is a permanent characteristic of certain climates like the one that exists in most of the state of Chihuahua. When both events are present simultaneously, the problem, naturally, is greater.

* Researchers at Chihuahua's Ecology Institute Drought Research Center (CEISS).

This natural disaster does not have an epicenter or a defined trajectory and tends to expand irregularly through time and space.

The state of Chihuahua is currently still suffering from the effects of a severe drought that took place in the last decade. This can be seen, for example, in the levels of water stored in the state's main reservoirs: in 1992, the average level of the reservoirs was 100 percent of capacity; one year later it dropped by 35 percent; and in 1995, they were down to only 19 percent of capacity (see graph 1). Today, the reservoir at the La Boquilla Dam, Chihuahua's largest, is at 25 percent of capacity. The drought has caused a lack of water for 75 percent of Chihuahua's irrigated land. In general, the length of the drought has critically damaged production in agriculture, animal husbandry and forestry, as well as water supplies for human consumption.

In the state's arid and semi-arid areas, as well as in other areas, maintaining life and economic activity depends on the surface water flows and the flow through aquifers.[1] The water supply in these regions is limited in quantity and duration and may not coincide with demand.

Chihuahua not only faces severe problems of water scarcity, but also the over-exploitation and pollution of the water it has and a serious lag in infrastructure that makes it impossible to provide basic services of drinking

water and sewage to its entire population and to increase supply to agricultural areas with potential.

This is why studying how the drought functions is important for developing strategies for using and managing water. Taking into account all the factors involved, drought studies are carried out with meteorological, hydrological, soil use and socio-economic focuses. The meteorological focus compares the decrease in rain with prior years. The hydrological viewpoint studies the periods of precipitation and how the water behaves on the ground. The soil usage slant analyzes the kind of production in the region where there is drought. Finally, the socio-economic focus combines elements of the previous ones.

Monitoring Chihuahua's Drought

Despite the importance of carrying out permanent monitoring of the drought to lessen its effects, until recently, state- and nationwide, we did not have an up-to-date method with which to do so. Now, Chihuahua's drought monitoring makes it possible to see when the phenomenon begins and ends. It also allows us to determine its intensity and geographic extension with greater precision (see map). Having this information makes it possible to implement more sophisticated preventive and corrective measures to counteract the drought and, above all, to be able to adapt to it.



Source: Drought Research Center. Precipitation Data Source: National Water Commission and National Meteorological Service.

Methodology

The methodology for monitoring Chihuahua's drought includes the Standardized Precipitation Index (SPI) developed in 1993 by Thomas B. McKee, Noland J. Doesken and John Kleist at Colorado State University. The Drought Research Center (CEISS) of the Ecology Institute in Chihuahua designed a computer program to calculate the SPI and other analyses of climate information using historical data on total monthly precipitation issued regularly by the National Water Commission and the National Meteorological Service.

This procedure is linked up with a system of geographical information for the state. The SPI is an advanced methodology used internationally for studying droughts and includes a statistical analysis of precipitation as a parameter for dry and humid periods (see table 1). This index can be obtained for different time intervals: 3 (SPI-3), 6 (SPI-6), 12 (SPI-12), 24 (SPI-24) or 48 months (SPI-48). SPI is calculated based on a statistical adjustment of a series of historic levels of total monthly precipitation that is represented in the number of standard deviation of each level of precipitation vis-à-vis the historic average.[2] Therefore, amounts of precipitation above the his-

Table 1
Intensities of Drought and Their Possible Impact

Category	Possible impacts	SPI interval*
Normally dry	Normal conditions of precipitation.	—
Abnormally dry	The drought begins; a short period in which crops dry slowly. Crops and grasslands begin to be at risk for fire; there is some water deficit; pasture lands and crops do not completely recover.	-0.5 to -0.7
Moderate drought	Certain damage to crops and grazing land; high risk of fire. Streams, reservoirs and wells are low. Imminent scarcity of water. Requests to protect the water supply are necessary.	-0.8 to -1.2
Severe drought	Crops and grasslands are probably lost; high risk of fire. Water scarcity is common and restrictions on water use are imposed.	-1.3 to -1.5
Extreme drought	Greater loss of crops/grasslands; extreme danger of fires; extensive restrictions on water use.	-1.6 to -1.9
Exceptional drought	Exceptional, extended loss of grasslands and crops; exceptional risk of fire; water scarce in streams and wells; declaration of a state of emergency.	-2.0 or <

Note: CEISS modified the index of classification of drought severity developed by the U.S. National Drought Mitigation Center (NDMC).

*SPI = Standardized Precipitation Index.

Graph 1
Average Levels (%) of Chihuahua Water Reservoirs (May 2002)



Source: National Water Commission, 2002.

toric average in a given month will give positive SPI values, representing conditions of humidity. To the contrary, amounts of precipitation below the historic average in a given month will make for negative SPI values, which will indicate a particular intensity in the deficit of humidity (see example of SPI-12 in graph 2). We have monitored the monthly evolution of conditions both of the drought and of humidity in the state of Chihuahua.

In general, we can say that a drought begins when, over time, there is a marked tendency toward continual negative SPI values. The drought ends when the SPI value reaches positive values. The length of a drought can be pinpointed over time as a function of detecting its initial stages until its final stage.

This system is applied in countries like the United States and Australia. In Mexico, Chihuahua is the first state that has this technology to follow this silent but destructive natural phenomenon.

Benefits of Monitoring

Everyone whose activity depends on rainfall is a potential user of the information gleaned from monitoring.

For this reason, we use the statistics to make SPI graphs and a monthly map to disseminate the information through different media, like our web page (www.sequia.edu.mx). Recently, we have given the maps made based on our monthly monitoring to different federal and Chihuahua state government agencies involved in the sustainable use of natural resources so they can become accustomed to using this new cartography and the information it provides in their battle to mitigate the negative effects of this recurring climatic event. Having access to this information is key, particularly for agencies involved in water management. The maps are also given to private farmers and cattle ranchers, along with advisory services about their use and usefulness.

Soon, the information will be available for all the states in northern Mexico that border on the Rio Bravo basin.

Main Findings

In general, the CEISS has found that the droughts in the state of Chihuahua operate unequally, with different intensity, locations, coverage and duration. Nevertheless, we have discovered that the most severe, persistent droughts tend to begin in the Southwest, in the region of Guadalupe y Calvo, Morelos, Batopilas and Guachochi, an area of 3,838,489 hectares, or 15 percent of the state territory (see map). The SPI-12 results for the month of November 2002 in that area show that 59 percent of the state's forests were suffering from severe to exceptional drought. This seems to be the result of the accelerated fragmentation over many years of the forest ecosystems located in the high parts of the Conchos River basin, which have been seriously altered by human activity.[3] This has made for rapid soil erosion and the decrease in replenishment of both the underground aquifers and the surface water supply to the Conchos River medium basin, which is the reason the reservoirs do not recover the levels required to satisfy the state and international demand for what has been called "transparent gold." As a result, planning the use of surface and underground water must be done as a function of its availability and drought expectations.

The decrease in humidity levels in the environment caused by drought favors forest fires which, in turn, cause ecological damage, in addition to financial losses in commercial forests. The SPI is a very useful tool used with other variables to determine the probability of fires. It has been observed that the quantity of heat points detected in Chihuahua bears an important relation to the intensity of the drought in short spans of time.[4] SPI-3, which reflects only three months' deficit in precipitation, is particularly useful since it practically coincides with the fire season in the region. Thus, during the dry season and when there are severe to exceptional droughts, the number of potential fires is greater than in areas where the drought is less intense.

On the other hand, at the end of August, in a corn- or bean-growing area, the SPI-3 could tell us precipitation trends during the important reproductive stage and the early development of the grain. At the end of May, SPI-3 would give us an indicator of soil humidity when the plant growing season begins.

By contrast, SPI-12 indicates long-term precipitation patterns and correlates to water flows, reservoir levels and even levels of underground water in the long term. Therefore, the knowledge obtained when using the SPI-12 in continual monitoring of drought can help us more effectively administer water resources.

In general, early detection of drought will help in making preventive decisions in water reserve management given the probability of its advancing toward the interior of the state of Chihuahua.

The U.S.-Mexico Treaty

Considered overall, the International Treaty on Borders and Water signed in 1944 with the United States may favor certain Mexican states like Sonora, which receives an annual guaranteed volume of 1.850234 billion cubic meters of water from the U.S. This is not Chihuahua's case, however, since the treaty dictates that it must send the United States 431.721 million cubic meters of water a year. This water comes mainly from the Conchos River, which runs through the state. If the quota is not covered because of what the treaty calls —but does not define— "extraordinary drought," the debt is cumulative and transferred to the following five-year cycle. But, if the extraordinary drought makes it difficult for the United States to give Mexico the water it is committed to, it will reduce its delivery in the same proportion that it reduces its own consumption.

The prolonged drought that has affected Chihuahua for the last decade has meant that for several years Mexico has not been able comply with treaty stipulations. Its current accumulated debt is over 1.936 billion cubic meters of water.

This has spurred a sharp dispute between state governments on both sides of the border. Mexico intends to pay its water debt over the next five years, supplying 682 million cubic meters instead of the 432 million cubic meters it would normally deliver every year. But the fact is that no one knows how to get the water to pay this debt if Chihuahua's reservoirs continue at

Graph 2
Historical Fluctuation of SPI-12 in Delicias City



* SPI: Standard Precipitation Index.

their current low levels. The authorities are counting on the drought ending, making it possible to comply with the 1944 commitments.

With this panorama, it would be fundamental to be able to, firstly, precisely define what the 1944 treaty means by "extraordinary drought." Today it is possible to define this rather vague term with the drought indices being used both in the United States and Mexico. In the case of the SPI ratings, an equivalent of "extraordinary drought" could be something between what are technically considered "extreme drought" (-1.6 to -1.9) and "exceptional drought (-2.0 or greater). Once the term is defined, it is fundamental to pinpoint the locale where the drought originates and monitor its intensity, the geographical area it covers and its duration. In general, it must be studied throughout the basin and its zone of influence. It is also absolutely necessary to consider time parameters. Short periods of extreme or severe droughts cause an important change in the hydrological balance of a basin. However, long periods of moderate droughts can cause the same change in a basin's hydrological balance. Therefore, the combination of different intensities and durations of drought must be taken into consideration.

It is important to remember that a drought may technically come to an end, but its effects can continue for several more years. What is more, if drought is recurring and it happens again in an area key for surface flow or replenishing of the aquifers such as in the case of the high and medium basin of the Conchos River, then its effects will be even more prolonged. With monitoring, in recent years we have found recurrent droughts that vary from severe to exceptional in the forest region of Chihuahua's Southwest. This may explain in part the reservoirs' low levels in the Conchos medium basin; it affects agricultural productivity in this area and diminishes the amount of water that can be sent to the United States to pay the debt agreed to in the international treaty. In short, thanks to the new research and monitoring instruments, it is possible to propose an appendix to the 1944 treaty with cutting-edge technical specifications for monitoring drought, as well as to define under what environmental conditions an extraordinary drought may occur and therefore be able to make or not make the payments of the debt to the United States. VM

Notes

[1] An aquifer is a water-bearing bed or stratum of permeable rock, sand or gravel capable of yielding considerable quantities of water to wells and springs.

[2] The standard deviation is a measure of the variation within a set of data, calculated as the square root of the variance, a measure of the dispersion of values around a mean.

[3] A hydrological basin is an area whose water has been drained or fed into a water conduit.

[4] Heat points are places with a surface soil temperature greater than 40 degrees Centigrade in the daytime and 25 degrees Centigrade at night.

New Chicano Literature
Lorraine López

Bruce Novoa*

Not all new Chicano authors emerge from the recent tide of immigrants. Another pool of culturally specific identity that differs significantly from the general pattern of Mexican American writers, who trace their roots to people who immigrated between the Mexican Revolution and the 1960s, are those who can claim centuries-long residence in the territory now within U.S. boundaries. There are relatively few of these writers because, simply, the northernmost provinces of nineteenth-century Mexico lost to the U.S. in the 1846 war had very few inhabitants. The great majority of that population was concentrated in New Mexico, an area that has never lacked writers. Before Texas, California, or New England had settlements, New Mexico had produced literature and witnessed dramatic performances. Among the established New Mexican Chicano authors figure Rudy Anaya and Jimmy

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López' debut volume of fiction impresses one as the product of a mature author.

Santiago Baca, master craftsmen in the novel and poetry respectively. Now a new name joins them: Lorraine López —more or less.

More or less because, born in Los Angeles (1956), López is a first generation migrant to California. Her parents moved to the coast from Belen, New Mexico, where the main part of her family has resided for some four centuries, tracing its arrival to the original founding of the colony. Yet, true to U.S. custom —once the children leave the family enclave, the generations continue dispersing she too has moved again, coming to settle down in legendary Nashville, Tennessee, where she is now a professor of fiction writing and Latina/o literature at Vanderbilt University. On the way she studied at California State University, Northridge, dropped out to marry and raise two children, returned to finish a degree in education, taught secondary school, divorced, migrated back East all the way to the other coast to study at the University of Georgia where she completed a doctorate in creative writing (2000). Without exaggeration we can say that López has acquired a diverse, well-rounded education in many senses of the word.

With this background, no wonder López' debut volume of fiction impresses one as the product of a mature author. *Soy la Avon Lady and Other Stories* (2002)[1] doesn't read like a first book. Even when stories feature adolescent protagonists, there are none of the cutesy, naïve games that often betray writers in their first works -—or linger intolerably in the writing of experienced ones. In part the impression that this is an author who has honed her skills in drafts that the public will never see is explained when one learns that López is also a second generation of another sort: one of the new writers privileged to study her craft with a Latina mentor of established reputation, in her case Judith Ortiz Coffer. In other words, López represents those new Latino writers who enter an educational system transformed by the struggles of earlier activists who created positions for Latino faculty so that subsequent generations of students could feel themselves more understood, more supported in their rite of academic and creative passage. Access to Latino mentors is no insignificant factor in the development of the new Chicano writers, a fact López herself readily credits for her success.

Lorraine López' fiction breathes fresh air into Chicano fiction when the balloon of the Chicana writers boom seemed to have sprung a leak. Following on a string of less than stellar novels by some of the leading established names, Lopéz' *Soy la Avon Lady* renews our expectations for good writing. One difference lies in López' eschewing of the pretentious efforts to crank out voluminous, commercial block busters, books that have proved tedious, prolix. López writes well-structured, judiciously measured short stories. She adds nothing extraneous. Notably absent are those superficial Latino markers that have come to plague recent publications: sprinkles of Spanish, often followed by English translation, that seem more like exotic spice added to a salad to make it ethnic than essential elements of the character's or the narrator's speech pattern. And instead of characters whose lives revolve perpetually around obsessive questions of ethnic identity, López' characters are too busy trying to manage immediate challenges to personal survival to worry about where they came from and why they are maladjusted. Alienation is more a pervading characteristic of contemporary Usonian life than a psycho-historical problem of ethnicity.[2] Ethnicity appears in the stories almost as a product of coincidence: it is part of who they are, not all they are; it adds something to their personal context, but doesn't explain their dilemma -—or at least the narrator does not allow the story to bog down in meditation on the subject. Her characters may seem quirky, mildly or extremely disturbed by everyday irritations, often under excessive circumstantial pressure and pushed to the crisis point by one too many unfortunate turns of events, but they never strike us as the products

of academic or commercial manipulation by editors targeting a certain readership. Nothing in López' work appears calculated to market herself within the new niche of Latino literature.

Most impressive in her work is that in this first volume López achieves that difficult task of making what is essentially a tightly controlled artistic construct, the short story, seem spontaneous, natural, free flowing. Starting a López story is like jumping into the deep end of the pool. No wading in slowly here. The first paragraph if not the first line plunges one into the middle of an action that seems to have developed long before. Readers will sense a full, complex world implicit in the dialogue, in details of the narrative, in apparently random allusions, yet the author offers few digressions to explain or fill in the blanks. Her stories flow ever forward, sweeping one into plots that will almost always end as abruptly as they began. Not that López just drops a story; quite the opposite: she displays keen awareness of when to close off a narrative for maximum effect. It is as if in full movement of a melody, the musician would stop playing to allow the audience, singing a cappella, to taking the song beyond the end of the performance itself. López has mastered ellipsis, resisting the temptation to tell too much, to fill space just because she could. Somewhere along the way she learned a lesson some of her predecessors would be well served to heed: leave readers wanting more, not wishing for less (coincidentally, her mentor Ortiz Coffer is also a master self-editor).

López locates many of her stories in New Mexico, but again refreshingly different in location. Far from myth-laden environments (Anaya's *llanos* or his and Baca's northern urban streets), López places her characters in the hardly ever explored Truth or Consequences. Were the name not that of a real city just off Interstate 25 in lower mid-New Mexico, 150 miles south of Anaya's and Baca's Albuquerque, 75 miles north of Denise Chavez' Las Cruces, and even a hundred miles from her own ancestral Belen, readers might think it a López invention to lend her tales allegorical context. Her stories feature people suffering the consequences of some crisis of truth. At times the meaning of their existence hangs over the characters like a life sentence with no hope of parole dealt them by some perverse, faceless judge; at others it hovers just beyond reach, illusive for both character and readers alike, a mystery that becomes no less enigmatic in the telling, only more obsessive. López utilizes both the traditional forms of short story structures: linear narrative that builds to resolution and the epiphany-style in which a plot opens in momentary revelation of significance. However, in either instance she draws on different techniques irony, ellipsis, ambiguity, understatement and humor among them— to suspend full delivery on readers' expectation of meaning. Thus her best stories continue to resonate after reading. One could imagine some of them becoming novels in the future —already some of them trace a web of family relationships— although they might better be left as gems of the underestimated, under-appreciated genre of short story.

López has mastered ellipsis, resisting the temptation to tell too much.

For *Voices of Mexico* López has prepared an even more finely tuned version of a story from *Soy la Avon Lady*. It provides a fine introduction to her writing, featuring many of the traits described above. At the same time, she is already preparing to surpass this introduction with a novel and another collection of short fiction to which readers of the new Chicano literature can look forward. VM

Notes

[1] Lorraine López, *Soy la Avon Lady and Other Stories* (Willimantic, Connecticut: Curbstone Press, 2002).

[2] "Usonian" is a word coined by architect Frank Lloyd Wright to replace "American" when one refers to something from the United States. "American" pertains to all the countries of the Americas, so it should not be used to designate only the U.S.

To Control a Rabid Rodent

by Lorraine López

The day after thirteen-year-old Jonathan Escamilla accidentally shot and killed his neighbor while aiming at a prairie dog with rabies in his back yard, his mother Inocencia decided it was high time for the boy to go next door to apologize to the surviving members of the dead man's family.

"Don't 'but, Mom' me, sir," Inocencia snapped at her son that night. She snapped the television set off. "You shot that poor man next door, after all, and it's just plain rude not to go on over there and apologize." Inocencia was the kind of woman who sent thank-you notes for thank-you notes. "I spent all afternoon chilling that pineapple Jello mold for you to take over there and you're not backing out now."

"Da-ad!" Jonathan implored his father desperately.

"You heard your mother, son. Do what she says."

"They're our neighbors, for goodness sake!" Inocencia threw up her hands. "Do you want them to think...that, that... we're the kind of people who just shoot folks without dropping by to say sorry?"

Jonathan shrugged. He didn't think sorry would do it. Somehow he didn't think a gelatin mold would compensate either, and he was more than a little sensitive to the notion that they —based on his rough encounter with the deceased— might be eye-for-an-eye types, only satisfied by shooting him in return for their father's death. "It was an accident."

"All the more reason to get over there and beg their pardon. What do you say when you bump someone in the street accidentally, huh?" she demanded. Here, again, Jonathan felt the comparison grossly inadequate. "You apologize for things you didn't do on purpose that hurt other people, and you do it right away before they forget!" Her voice took on that familiar hysterical pitch that scraped the nerve endings behind Jonathan's teeth. "So get up, out of that chair, comb your hair, and take my Jello salad over right this minute, young man! And I mean right this minute, before those miniature marshmallows pucker up like raisins!"

"You heard your mother, son."

If Jonathan were the kind of boy who cursed, he might have said: "Goddamn you! You're crazy!" and stormed straight up to his room. If he were sarcastic, he would have asked why they had a death wish for their only child. But, Jonathan really was a good boy, who never did anything to displease his parents, outside of slaying Mr. Hudanish, the neighbor.

So, he gathered up the Jello mold from the kitchen counter and held it —cold and hard in its aqua plastic shell— against his breast as he stepped out onto the back porch to make his way across the yard to the Hudanish house. He hoped vainly that Tupperware —in addition to keeping fresh foods from spoiling— was also bulletproof.

The Hudanish gate slapped shut on Jonathan's buttocks stinging them like a spank. Inside the tall fence, the Hudanish yard startled him —though he'd seen it once before— even more than the tightly coiled spring on the gate.

In the dead of August, when most people fought to keep tumbleweeds from their dry dirt lawns, the Hudanishes kept an emerald carpet of closely

cropped and very dense...grass! Jonathan rubbed his eyes. Mr. Hudanish had flowers, even, delicate lacy blooms along the walk and thick beds of geranium, pansy, marigolds —even rose bushes.

Jonathan felt certain as he picked his way carefully along the stone path that the people who tended these plants in this garden would not like to find a stalk of grass bruised. And they were not likely —in his mind— to be all that nice about his killing Mr. Hudanish, albeit accidentally.

He brushed his knuckles lightly against the doorframe, hoping he would not be heard and could retreat honorably —gelatin salad in hand to tell his parents, "I knocked, but no one answered. I guess they moved to Kansas, or something."

"Coming!" Jonathan heard a voice sing out from the dark, quiet house. "I'm coming." The back door yawned wide, and the screened door framed the thin face of a young man. The fly-spotted mesh gave the man a cinematic look as though he were being gazed at through a gauze-covered lens. "Well," he smiled, puckishly, "where are you hiding it?"

"Hiding what?" Jonathan had never heard a grown man talk in such a high-pitched, lilting voice.

"The pizza, silly!"

"What pizza?"

"You didn't bring the pizza?" The young man seemed terribly disappointed.

"I brought a Jello salad," Jonathan proffered the plastic bowl.

"I don't think I ordered a salad." The man narrowed his eyes suspiciously. "Who are you?"

"Jonathan Escamilla." The words escaped like criminals from prison.

"A cousin? What?" The young man rotated his hand to indicate Jonathan should give a little more information.

"I'm Jonathan Escamilla from next door."

"Next door?"

"I'm the one that...you know..." Jonathan felt every ounce of water in his body draining through his armpits in a violently itchy way. "I'm the one that shot Mr. Hudanish."

"That was you!"

"Yes, I'm very sorry. You see, it was an accident. I really didn't mean to."

"So you're the kid that killed Dad," the Hudanish scion scratched his chin regarding Jonathan more speculatively.

"I brought you this Jello salad my mom fixed," Jonathan offered the bowl again.

"A Jello salad!" the man laughed. "That's price-



less!" He pulled open the screen door to admit his neighbor. "So you are Jonathan." He took Jonathan's hand in his and shook it warmly. "Do you know I've kind of been expecting you?"

Jonathan stepped uncertainly into the kitchen. The young Hudanish may or may not have outlined his eyes in black and dusted his cheeks with a rosy powder, but he was definitely draped in some kind of kimono dress with salmon-colored water lilies printed on it. Jonathan wanted to dump the salad on the counter and run out of the kitchen like a *cucaracha* when the lights go on.

"Ronnie, who is it?" another voice called from beyond the kitchen.

"It's Jonathan Escamilla!" Ronnie answered.

"Does he have the pizza?"

"He brought a Jello salad!"

"Isn't he the pizza boy?"

"No, he's the champagne boy!" Ronnie shrieked. "Come on out here, Franklin! You'll never believe this!"

"I'm half-dressed!"

"No, really, you've got to get out here. This is the kid that killed Dad!" Ronnie reached to pull open the refrigerator door. He brought out a great dark green bottle. "Am I glad I remembered to bring this. I bought it in New York. Do you know how long I've been saving this? Do you have any idea?"

Jonathan —stunned dumb by this reception— shook his head.

"This is real champagne, Jonathan, from France. I doubt if there's another bottle like it in all Truth or Consequences." Ronnie wiped the bottle with a dishtowel. "Do you like champagne, Jonathan?"

He fished in the cupboards near the sink.



Jonathan shrugged.

"You don't even give me time to comb my hair," another young man appeared in the doorway and Jonathan was relieved to note he wore jeans, albeit without a shirt. "I'm Franklin," he smiled at Jonathan, extending his hand. "I know, I know it's a dreadful name. It's the kind of name you give a kid you don't like very much."

"I'm Jonathan," he murmured, clasping the warm fleshy hand.

"Jonathan? How perfectly droll."

"Puh-leeze don't start with that name thing," begged Ronnie, belting his kimono more firmly. "Franklin's a fiend for names." He knelt to peer into a cabinet under the sink. "Where in blazes are those glasses I bought?"

"Who's there?" an old woman's voice —thin and accented in a German way to Jonathan's ear called out from the recesses of the house.

Though Jonathan relaxed somewhat with the increasing awareness that the Hudanish boy bore him no ill will for his accidentally killing his father, the frail sound of the woman's voice shocked him like an electrical charge.

"It's Jonathan, Mom," Ronnie called out, "from next door."

"*Haf* you got company, then?"

"Come on out, Mom. Come and meet the kid that shot Dad."

A diminutive woman, with a great skein of yellowed gray hair spun about the top of her ovoid head like a small egg balanced atop a larger egg, shambled into the kitchen. "It is a big sin to kill a human being," She wagged a swollen finger at

Jonathan. "We must be more careful with life. All of us."

"I - I - I'm terribly sorry, ma'am. I apologize for shooting Mr. Hudanish. Really I do. I am really, really sorry to everyone and I mean it."

"Ta-da!" crowed Ronnie, proudly bearing four crystal flutes from under the sink. "Franklin, you uncork while I rinse these out."

"Can you see my face, boy?" the old woman demanded, suddenly and desperately, thrusting her chin toward the kitchen light. Jonathan winced inwardly at the bald lumps of purplish scar tissue and the intricate amber detailing of old bruises and welts. "Do you know where my nose used to be?" The topography of her bumpy face comprised of endless fissures, craters and broken tributary blood vessels drove Jonathan even further toward the door until he was uncomfortably aware of the knob molding into the base of his spine.



"Can you take some bubbly?" asked Ronnie, filling a glass with foam and putting it in Jonathan's thick hand. "We are about to toast you. So you don't even have to drink any, really. Just hold the glass up like this." And Ronnie struck a pose that reminded Jonathan of the Statue of Liberty.

"When you killed my husband, when you killed Mr. Hudanish," the old woman tried to explain, taking Jonathan's hands into her own. "When you did that, I was born again. A new baby!" Her lopsided smile —paralyzed on the right side and twitching timorously on the left pricked Jonathan's conscience. He had only meant to control a rabid rodent. "An' after seven years —seven years I don't see him, I write letters, I call from the pay phone— after seven years, you have given me back my son!" Mrs. Hudanish cried, as she raised her glass to be filled. VM

Alfredo Zalce An Art of His Own

América Gabrielle*



David Hernández/*La Jornada*

His extraordinary colors, his confident line and his magnificent composition turned Alfredo Zalce (1908-2003) into one of the greats of the twentieth century, says researcher and Mexican art critic Berta Taracena, author of the book *Alfredo Zalce: un arte propio* (Alfredo Zalce: An Art of His Own).

The painter spent the first months of his infancy surrounded by the blue of the sky, the red of the earth, the green and blue of Lake Pátzcuaro. There, amidst soft hills and slight slopes that give Michoacán's scenery different perspectives; with the soil, rocky with the marks of a volcano; with the water of two rivers that pass by the edges of the city, and a few kilometers away, two lakes (Cuitzeo and Janitzio): amidst all this splendor, in the domain of the Monarch butterfly, surrounded by forests and the human warmth of women, Zalce enriched his life and his art, despite moving to Mexico City with his family at the age of one.

Years later, in his early youth, he began to work as a photographer to pay for his studies at the San Carlos Academy, where he studied painting with Germán Gedovius, sketching with Leandro Isaguirre, perspective with Juan Pacheco and anatomy with Carlos Dublán. At the same time, he joined the student movements for university autonomy and the reform of the Visual Arts School, headed up by Diego Rivera from 1924 to 1929.

In 1930, the School of Painting and Sculpture was founded in Taxco, Guerrero. In those years, Zalce experimented with his painting and did his first mural on the facade of the

* Mexican sculptress.

Ayotla Rural School, in Tlaxcala, thus beginning his very productive career. In 1933, he was a founding member of the League of Revolutionary Writers and Artists (LEAR) and, when that disappeared, together with other artists he participated in the recently founded Popular Graphics Workshop. Later he became part of the Cultural Missions, a movement backed and financed by José Vasconcelos, in which a handful of artists traveled through several states with the sole, transcendental aim of generously supporting the dissemination of culture. It was in that context that the twentieth century's most important pictorial movement came into being, the Mexican muralist movement, with painters like Diego Rivera, José Clemente Orozco, David Alfaro Siqueiros, Ramón Alva de la Canal, Fermín Revueltas, Fernando Leal and Jean Charlot.

In 1935, Alfredo Zalce witnessed one of the most important acts in the history of Mexican muralism: his friend Ramón Alva de la Canal was invited by General Lázaro Cárdenas to paint "the history of Morelos from his birth until his death" inside the statue of Morelos by sculptor Guillermo Ruiz in the center of Janitzio Island. The painter invited Zalce to collaborate with him.

The commission resulted in one of the great masterpieces of Mexican muralism: 56 panels using different techniques (fresco, encaustics and tempera, varnished with wax and copal dissolved in turpentine and then fired). It was a very enriching experience for both Zalce and Alva de la Canal.

The next year, with Pablo O'Higgins, Fernando Gamboa and Leopoldo Méndez, Zalce painted the mural *The Workers at War with Fascism* in the offices of Mexico City's National Print Shop.

In the 1940s, after several expositions, at the same time that he painted, Zalce taught at the La Esmeralda National School of Painting and Sculpture. In 1942, he painted *The Reactionary Press in Mexico* at National High School 2, a mural that was later destroyed.

Morelia: A Bastion of Creation

In 1950, Zalce decided to return to Michoacán. He move his workshop and made the city of Morelia his bastion for creation, choosing it because of its splendid baroque architecture, the chiaroscuro play of the pink stone that illuminates the tall towers of the cathedral and the hundreds of buildings of great beauty and history, with elements of the Renaissance and other architectural styles, ranging from those of the end of the sixteenth century to eclecticism and the Frenchified styles of the rule of Porfirio Díaz.

Influenced by history and the figures who left the mark of their actions on this city, Alfredo Zalce, in the words of Berta Taracena, became "one of those painters who turn into kings and lords of the ground they walk on."[1] He continued his work using all the techniques available to a visual artist: sketching, silk screening, watercolor, lithographs, etching on metal, wood, stone, copper, and linoleum, pastels, oil painting and frescoes.

In 1962, combining fresco and acrylics, he painted *The Conversion of the Indians to the Christian Creed* in Morelia's Fine Arts Palace.

In 1964, he did several paintings in tempera for the National Museum of Anthropology and History's Pre-Classical and Toltec Rooms: *Daily Life in the Pre-Classical Age*, *Reconstructed View of Cuicuilco*, *The Struggle of Quetzalcóatl* and *Reconstruction of a Toltec Temple*.

In 1983, together with Ramón Alva de la Canal and myself, Zalce founded the "Para el Arte Spacios" (For Art Spaces) cultural movement in Morelia.

In 1986, he did a bronze relief, *The Three Constitutions*, for Morelia's Chamber of Deputies, and in 1989, he painted a mural for the Mexico City Attorney General's Office.

* * *

On my last visit to Alfredo Zalce at his home, I was very glad to see that at the age of 94, he was in splendid health, thanks to the care of his loving daughter Beatriz, who at that time was planning his ninety-fifth birthday party. The party never took place because in those January days, all his projects were to conclude.

Alfredo Zalce died on Sunday afternoon, January 12. His ashes, together with those of two of his children who preceded him in death, will rest in one of his works, *The Stela*, a trio of large stone columns in Morelia. A plaque will be placed on the columns, "sober, like my father's nature," says Beatriz Zalce, "so that when people pass by they can say hello to him and send him a kiss. Zalce is from Morelia and he'll stay in Morelia."[2] VM

Notes

[1] Reforma.com, 2 December 2002.
[2] Reforma.com, 20 January 2003.
* For more about Zalce's work, see *Voices of Mexico* 45, October-December 1998.

Augusto Monterroso
A Master of Brevity and Irony

David Medina Portillo*


Pedro Valtierra/Cuartoscuro

Few things in contemporary literature are comparable to Augusto Monterroso (1921-2003). Father of a literature that made brevity a new genre, his work will be remembered for his very unusual ability to make an entire tradition out of a few books. That is how Christopher Domínguez expresses it: Monterroso's work is a school of taste and "a tradition in and of itself."

Now, it is paradoxical that one of the masters of contemporary narrative is, precisely, the author of "El dinosaurio" (The Dinosaur), undoubtedly the shortest story in the history of universal literature. In that sense, it is not by chance that another of the unquestionable, Italo Calvino —a writer raised to the heights of the canon of Western narrative, and also a brilliant essayist and the theoretician of "lightness" as one of the essential elements of the literature to come— situates Augusto Monterroso as nothing less than "a paradigm of modernity." In effect, together with "lightness" in writing, Monterroso seems to comply with all the values put forth by Calvino in his famous proposition *Six Memos for the Next Millennium*: quickness, exactitude, visibility, multiplicity and consistency. An extreme example of all this

* Editor of *La gaceta* (The Gazette), a literary magazine published by the Fondo de Cultura Económica.

would be, without a doubt, the complete text of the aforementioned short story: "Upon awakening, the dinosaur was still there."

However, it is not in the tradition of modernity that one should seek out Monterroso's Lares, his masters. He himself reminds us in the pages of his intermittent memoirs that as an adolescent he read in his city's library —"such a bad library that it only had good books"— Horace's *Epistle to the Pisos* which points to contention as one of the best aspirations of rhetoric. Not many authors of Hispanic letters are as close to the classics as Monterroso. Thus, for example, it is clear that his epigrammatic humor has Latin roots; the reinvention of fable as a genre acclimatized (thanks to him) to our skeptical modernity says something to us of a writer not far removed from the concerns of a Quevedo or a Cervantes more than a Lafontaine—, readers of a pessimistic, but also ironic Latin-ness, which brings together and plays with humor, moralism and, of course, good prose.

Curiously, it was another ironic classicist, Juan José Arreola, who was one of Monterroso's first editors in Mexico, in that legendary series that Arreola published in the 1950s, "Los Presentes" (Those Present). It was there that in an eight-page notebook appeared the stories "Uno de cada tres" (One Out of Every Three) and "El centenario" (The Centenarian) (1953). Monterroso had previously published only another short *plaquette* in the series "Los Epígrafes" (The Epigraphs) by Salvador Reyes Nevares: *El concierto y el eclipse* (The Concert and the Eclipse) (1952). Arreola's friendship in those years corresponds to a period in Monterroso's life that began his exile after the military uprisings in Guatemala during General Ubico's dictatorship. His arrival in 1944 brought him into contact with a generation of writers with whom he immediately shared readings and interests: "From the time I arrived in Mexico, I became part of a very active cultural milieu, that of the Mascarones School of Philosophy and Letters." It was a literary generation of which Monterroso, a Guatemalan born in Tegucigalpa, Honduras, became a natural member, side by side with other young promising writers like Juan José Arreola, Juan Rulfo, Alí Chumacero, Rubén Bonifaz Nuño, Jaime Sabines, Ernesto Mejía Sánchez and Luis Cardoza y Aragón, among others.

Some time later, he would live a couple of years in exile in Chile, where he worked as Pablo Neruda's secretary in *La Gaceta de Chile* (The Chile Gazette). Upon his return to Mexico in 1956, he rejoined our country's cultural life working as a staff writer in the *Revista de la Universidad* (University Magazine) and as a translator at the Fondo de Cultura Económica publishing house. In 1959, his first book came out: *Obras completas y otros relatos* (Complete Works and Other Stories), followed by two works of fiction, *La oveja negra y demás fábulas* (The Black Sheep and Other Fables) (1969) and *Movimiento perpetuo* (Perpetual Motion) (1972). With the publication of *Lo demás es silencio* (The Rest Is Silence) (1978), a "novel" whose main character, Eduardo Torres, is the author's alter ego, Monterroso began a fruitful exploration of an undefined territory in terms of genre. It is a "literary space", as Blanchot would say, sown with narratives, micro-essays, epigrams, drawings, letters, pages of diaries, *greguerías*, maxims and aphorisms, that is "texts" (as he calls them) in which his extremely personal style consummates a vocation of transparency, exact, artless expression of a prose made to last. His later books, *Viaje al centro de la fábula* (Voyage to the Center of the Fable) (1981), *La palabra mágica* (The Magic Word) (1983) and *La letra e* (The Letter "E") (1987) would undoubtedly situate themselves in that same space.

Not many authors
of Hispanic letters are as close to
the classics as Monterroso.

Monterroso was small, generous, amiable, timid and ironic: a character out of one of his own fables and, therefore, a brother in letters of a Juan de Mairena or an Abel Martín. Also, his literature is part of a stream of Hispanic-American authors who made brevity a religion, an aesthetic creed. Those heterodox members of the Hispanic literary tradition, Julio Torri, Jorge Luis Borges, Juan José Arreola or Ramón Gómez de la Serna —to randomly mention just a few of the obligatory names— would all figure, of course, in that community. They all practiced a way of understanding literature not just as "a mirror of the world" (Stendhal), but barely and perhaps a personalized reflection, a fractured mirror. That is why their works are fragmentary, a-systematic, without that will to cohesion typical of nineteenth-century narrative. Perhaps that is why, I imagine, Augusto Monterroso wrote in his famous "Decalogue of the Writer," an ironic testimony of his literary practice, "Fertility: Today I feel good, a Balzac; I am finishing a line." VM

Reviews



Globalidad y conflicto. Estados Unidos y la crisis de septiembre
(Globality and Conflict. The United States and the Crisis of September)
José Luis Valdés-Ugalde and Diego Valadés, comps.
Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte and Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, UNAM
Mexico City, 2002, 320 pp.

One of the problems facing researchers in the social sciences is the publication of their work. Analyzing current affairs rapidly enough to make the voice of academia heard among decision makers and being able to have an influence on them depends on the timeliness with which research results are disseminated. *Globalidad y conflicto. Estados Unidos y la crisis de septiembre* (Globality and Conflict. The United States and the Crisis of September) is a work published in a timely fashion by the UNAM's Center for Research on North America and Institute for Legal Research.

This book looks at the fundamental issue of our time. To what extent has globalization created more conflicts than it has resolved, both in the world and in our country, both in the political and economic spheres and in the area of international relations and law?

In the words of Marshall McLuhan, the world has become a global village. Distances have disappeared for the globalized elites, but have become gigantic for the marginalized. Economic globalization has concentrated wealth and spread poverty, causing the massive migration of entire peoples and, with it, sharpened xenophobia and racism. The abyss between the peoples of the North and those of the South has widened and ideologies have been replaced by different kinds of fundamentalism. Interdependency has turned into dependency and a new colonialism has emerged.

However, not everything has been negative in globality: what was positive until September 11 had been the quest for international cooperation to carry out global tasks, like the respect for human rights, the promotion of democracy, the conservation of the environment and the fight against drug trafficking. This positive side to globality is what has been mortally wounded since 9/11: now the human rights not only of the prisoners in Guantánamo are openly violated but also those of U.S. citizens apprehended as suspects and deprived of all their rights by being held incommunicado based on the so-called "patriotic law." Without respect for human rights, democracy loses its raison d'être.

The book looks at this situation from different points of view in 20 essays by specialists from Mexico's main universities: the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM), the Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM), the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM) and the Center for Economic Research and Teaching (CIDE). Internationalists, jurists, political scientists and economists analyze the international system after September 11, its implications for Latin America and Mexico, human rights, security, energy and the economy.

In his introduction, José Luis Valdés-Ugalde deals with the break-up of U.S. democracy and how its civil society has lost confidence in its security. He also reconstructs the history of Al Qaeda and Bin Laden.

Ignacio Díaz de la Serna alerts the reader to how violence generates more violence and hatred, and Luis María calls for international cooperation, since all countries must coordinate with each other to fight terrorism, which is why it is necessary to revitalize the United Nations.

Mónica Gambril examines Henry Kissinger's article published September 12, 2001, in which he says that to destroy terrorism it is not enough to make reprisals against a specific state, but rather that what is needed is systematic anti-terrorist efforts throughout the world, for which international alliances are required.[1]

Alejandro Chanona analyzes France's efforts to stop simplistic anti-terrorism, while Lilia Bermúdez talks about how U.S. attention to Latin America is on the wane.

Mónica Verea proposes that Mexico take advantage of "the terror of terrorism" to establish a society of security in exchange for a regional migratory system that would guarantee human and labor rights.

Ana María Salazar remembers in "El nuevo desorden mundial" (The New World Disorder) the "overlooking" of the National Security Clause in the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Interamerican Reciprocal Aid Treaty in which Mexico recognizes that an attack from without on any of the countries in the Americas is considered a strike against all of them.

Roberto Peña emphasizes the blows that democracy has suffered; Leonardo Curzio states that the reason for the state's existence is security; Francisco Valdés-Ugalde talks about a clash of civilizations; Eduardo F. Ramírez García finds September 11 equally as unjustifiable as the war in Afghanistan.

Elaine Levine talks about the recession. Rosío Vargas points to the link between war and oil and gas resources and the pressure on Mexico to open up certain areas of its economy reserved for the state by the Constitution and not negotiated in NAFTA to private investment in order to facilitate access to its oil reserves, thus ceding national political sovereignty to global economic sovereignty.[2]

José Luis Piñeyro proposes a change in the economic model. Marcos Kaplan analyzes the weakening of sovereignty. Raúl Benítez Manaut and Andrés Ávila Akerberg conclude that "the war on terrorism could block globalization."

Lastly, Manuel Becerra Ramírez calls for Mexico's peace policy to prevail in the face of temporary alliances among those who govern.

Maurice Duverger wrote that repression exercised abroad puts an end to domestic freedom. In that sense, Norman Birnbaum said that U.S. freedom was "an unnecessary victory for terrorism,"[3] and Jimmy Carter condemned the fact that the United States was forgetting its fundamental principles: international law and human rights.

The republic has become an empire with the sacrifice of constitutional freedoms and rights.[4] The right to punitive intervention to win the war and not the peace, with no respect for the Geneva Convention regarding the prisoners of war in Guantánamo,[5] has become an extra-judicial practice that allows for the transfer of prisoners to other countries for torture. Indefinite detention for suspicion of committing a crime, the denial of council, harassing people by charging them with minor offenses under immigration law are all typical of a police state.

At the same time, at North Carolina University, Protestant fundamentalists oppose teachers' assigning readings about Islam because they consider it a violation of Christian students' rights, and critics of Bush policies are accused of being unpatriotic.

These are some of the unfortunate effects of 9/11. As U.S. intellectuals and politicians say, and as the authors of this book put forward, the United States should join the world and sign the international treaties that it ignored and refused to sign before September 11, like the treaty about the fight against terrorism, on anti-personnel mines, the Kyoto treaty about global warming, the Río Pact on biodiversity and the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child. And it should not, vía bilateral agreements with states that still have not signed the Statute of Rome about the International Criminal Court, decide not to apply the terms of that statute to U.S. citizens. Unfortunately, international relations, today more than ever, are based on the ability to inflict damage and destroy.

The nation-state is no longer a guarantee of peace and security without cooperation among countries since terrorism is an international network that no nation can control alone. If the terrorists in Iraq are put a stop to, they will reappear in some other part of the world. It is cheaper to educate a child than to murder a child turned terrorist. The axis of evil will only be overcome when the axis of inequality is broken.[6]

As exclusionary nationalisms have reappeared, the new face of the U.S. government has made anti-Americanism reemerge. As Noam Chomsky writes, there have been "two horrifying crimes: September 11 and Bush's response." Anti-terrorism runs the risk of becoming what anti-communism used to be.[7]

Our proximity to the United States makes it indispensable to reflect on this situation since we carry out 90 percent of our trade with it, 90 percent of our tourism comes from and goes there, 80 percent of the foreign investment

in Mexico comes from there and 20 percent of our work force is employed there.

After 9/11, when human rights and democracy have been stepped on, when autocratic, two-faced unilateralism prevails, amidst the clash of racist fundamentalisms, we are experiencing a moment of grave jeopardy since the coordinates that used to be our reference points have changed. Mexico always had a menacing international framework as its reference point, but today the risk is of being used, thereby destroying our pacifism. We have to look both to the past and to the future.

Globality attempted to hide the underlying hegemony that since September 11 has been revealed. The negotiation of sovereignty affects the autonomy of the state, but also the freedom of its citizens.

We should keep our Latin Americanists' postulates in mind before universal integration. Bolívar aspired to the integration of Latin America, but an integration among equals because, otherwise, he said, "Once the pact is signed with the strong, the obligation of the weak is eternal." Gabriela Mistral raised her voice against the armed forces of a state that wanted to lead the world and demanded that freedom of the spirit not be reduced to servitude.

Today more than ever, these reflections may seem utopian, but it is utopias that have moved the noblest part of the human race.

Globalidad y conflicto answers and sparks many questions at the same time that it spurs debate. That is why I invite you to read it and reflect upon it.

Patricia Galeana
Historian, UNAM

NOTES

[1] Henry Kissinger, "Destroy the Network," *The Washington Post*, 12 September 2001.

[2] Benjamín R. Barber, "Lo que Estados Unidos ha aprendido y lo que no," *El País* (Madrid), 7 September 2002, p. 11.

[3] Norman Birnbaaum, "¿Guerra por la libertad o guerra contra ella?" *El País* (Madrid), 11 September 2002, p. 14.

[4] Juan Luis Cebrián, "El mundo tras el 11 de septiembre. Que América vuelva a ser América," *El País* (Madrid), 11 September 2002, p. 13.

[5] Luis Fernández Galiano, "Peatones en la Zona Cero," *El País* (Madrid), 7 September 2002, p. 13.

[6] It is very significant that the area destroyed September 11 in New York has been dubbed "ground zero," since that was the name given to the test perimeter of the Manhattan project that produced the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima. Joseph Ramoneda, "André Glucksmann: Ahora la responsabilidad del fin del mundo se ha democratizado, es inmediata," *El País* (Madrid), 7 September 2002, pp. 2-5. Glucksmann, author of *El discurso de la guerra, cinismo y pasión y la estupidez: ideologías del posmodernismo* (The Discourse of War, Cynicism and Passion and Stupidity: Ideologies of Postmodernism), was one of the protagonists of the 1968 May events in France; his most recent essay is "Dostoyevski en Manhattan" (Dostoevsky in Manhattan).

[7] Javier Valenzuela, "Biblioteca imprescindible del 11 de septiembre," *El País* (Madrid), 7 September 2002.



NAFTA in the New Millennium
Edward J. Chambers and Peter H. Smith, comps.
The University of Alberta Press/Center
for U.S.-Mexican Studies
University of California, San Diego
La Jolla, California, 2002, 504 pp.

This book brings together 21 contributions by 30 specialists, most academics in the fields of economics, political science, sociology and international relations with experience in studies linked to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The book's title illustrates the compilers' intention of trying to bring together different disciplinary focuses and studies of specific issues that, on the one hand, review and analyze the impact of NAFTA on the three countries since it

came into effect, and, on the other hand, particularly to try to delineate an agenda for the present and future of the treaty based on that experience. This overall division is well balanced, as are the issues dealt with. The book is divided into five sections: three sections, 214 pages and nine articles long, evaluate the impact of NAFTA, and two, 11 chapters and 258 pages long, look at perspectives.

The introduction is a broad overview by compilers Chambers and Smith situating the theme very well and proposing the overall lines of analysis that the other articles work with. The initial idea, shared by several of the authors, is that eight years after the treaty came into effect, particular experiences should be seen as collective lessons and be useful for a vision of the future, as a guide to deepen, reform or broaden it. The compilers do note, however, that no thought is being given to the possibility of renegotiating the treaty, but rather, to seeking a better way of fulfilling the initial aims of regional integration and, in any case, evaluating the possibility of extending it to build a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).

The introduction includes a description of the treaty, the context in which it was created, the motivations of the main negotiators and some of the most important critiques of it. This all makes up a highly illustrative and well documented whole. In the section dedicated to showing the effects of the treaty, an outstanding feature is the changes in trade trends of the United States, Canada and Mexico and among the three. Naturally, not all trade expansion can be attributed to the treaty and the authors say this. Clear trends can be identified, however, showing greater trade from 1994 on, particularly between Mexico and the United States and Canada and the United States, as well as higher U.S. investment in Mexico in the same period. Also important to note is the non-convergence of the levels and rates of production growth, national income, income per capita and wages, with the largest gap between those of the United States and Mexico.

Perhaps one missing element in the practically complete analysis presented in the introduction is that one of the treaty's main aims, generating jobs in Mexico to stop the flow of migration to the United States, has not been fulfilled even in the years of highest export growth. Legal and illegal workers continue to try to enter the United States in large numbers every day, worsening the social problems that have existed for a long time between both nations along the border. This aspect is, however, analyzed in Chapter 12, by Wayne Cornelius. Thus, while the different options for the future are appropriately touched on at the end of the introduction, none of them clearly includes the need and urgency of implementing a migratory agreement that would legalize the flow —which continues in any case— and complete the final aim of integrating the United States and Mexico.

Another issue that should be mentioned is the compilers' opinion about the treaty's defenders and critics in Mexico: in their opinion, they are one and the same, leading us to understand, perhaps, that even the most pessimistic find something positive in the treaty and, in the end, defend it. I do not consider this opinion completely well founded. On the one hand, truly academic specialists must look at the negative and positive aspects of NAFTA with equal zeal, regardless of their preferences. On the other hand, serious work has been published that is very critical of the treaty and the economic opening in Mexico, work that cannot be overlooked. With regard to the population as a whole, the evidence presented by Alejandro Moreno in Chapter 7 to the effect that the majority of the population in Mexico favors free trade in general and the treaty in particular is very questionable; the truth is that, in Mexico, recent mobilizations against NAFTA due to the problems in agriculture are a clear sign against it, at least among the very large rural, peasant sector of society.

In the first section, three chapters are dedicated to answering the question of what the impact of NAFTA has been on the economies of its three member countries. In the first chapter, Raúl Hinojosa and Robert McCleery analyze the effects on the U.S. economy in its relationship with Mexico and find no evidence of changes in trade trends, investment and production before and after the treaty. In the second chapter, José Luis Valdés-Ugalde evaluates the treaty's impact on the Mexican economy from the sectoral point of view and finds both negative and positive effects. Among the former are the breakdown of internal manufacturing productive chains. In the third chapter, Kenneth Norrie and Douglas Owram question from the Canadian point of view whether there should have been a process of trade liberalization in North America and then analyze its effects in Canada. They find that these effects have been surpassed by macroeconomic policies and low productivity.

The second section includes three chapters that study the impacts of NAFTA on a state or provincial level in each country, a topic not previously examined elsewhere. Edward Chambers analyzes the treaty's impact on trade in Alberta

and British Columbia, Canada, with contrasting results. Carlos Alba studies the treaty's political and economic impact in the state of Jalisco, Mexico, which in general has been favorable. James B. Gerber appraises the cases of Texas and California in the United States, finding that the treaty has given rise to export-led growth in both cases, above all in the high-tech sector.

The third section has three chapters dedicated to analyzing the public response to the treaty in each of the member countries. Alejandro Moreno studies the case of Mexico based on a national newspaper's three-stage survey of 1,600 adults; the majority is in favor of free trade and NAFTA, but opinions are severely divided with regard to the benefits actually obtained from the treaty. According to the article by Nevitte, Anderson and Brym, in Canada there is skepticism about NAFTA, but at the same time the desire to establish strong ties with Mexico and particularly with the United States. It should be noted that the authors find that in Canada, national pride continues to be strong, but that, nevertheless, at the same time there is a desire to increasingly integrate into the United States. In the last chapter of this section, Phillip Warf and Steven Kull examine Americans' attitudes toward the treaty, finding that a vast majority believe that free trade and U.S. trade agreements with other countries are beneficial. In particular, a majority —though not a very large majority supports NAFTA, but a great deal of skepticism also exists.

The fourth section has five chapters, which look at the issues and challenges for the treaty in the next 10 years. Graciela Bensusán examines employment, wages and productivity in the manufacturing sector of the three countries since NAFTA came into effect. She finds that productivity has grown relatively more in Mexico, that employment has not grown in any of the countries as had been hoped, and that wages have increased in Canada and the United States, while dropping in Mexico, thus widening the gap. Policies and regulations in Mexico and the United States have not converged, an issue, therefore, which will be present in the immediate future of the treaty's agenda. In the following chapter, Debra Davidson and Ross Mitchell confront the delicate problem of the environment and NAFTA, with the novel focus of asking not what the effect of the treaty has been on the environment, but what the effect of the environment and social movement activities will be on the future of the treaty. Thus, the treaty can become a forum for discussing environmental protection measures, and its economic viability will depend on its success in preserving the environment and reducing pollution. Chapter 12 is very important: Wayne Cornelius analyzes NAFTA's impact on migratory flows from Mexico to the United States. Studying immigration trends, Cornelius finds that they have not only not decreased, but that they have increased since the treaty came into effect. The short-term prospect of a migratory agreement between the two countries that would regulate this situation was suddenly cancelled after September 11, 2001. The issue was taken off the diplomatic agenda at that time, but continues to be an unresolved matter on the treaty's agenda. In the following chapter, Michele M. Veeman and Ryan Hoskins look at agriculture, pointing to the fact that this sector only accounts for 6 percent of the total labor force in the region and that some branches of it have been sharply affected while others continue to be somewhat protected in the United States and Canada. From the consumer's viewpoint, the net result of trade in agricultural products among the three signatory countries seems to be highly beneficial. The noticeable adverse effect is the destabilization of the *ejido* in Mexico as a result of corn imports.[1] Chapter 14 is dedicated to a little noted problem that is an obstacle to complete integration: the restrictions on transportation that delay the delivery of traded products and hike up costs. The authors conclude that given that the transport of goods among the three countries is mainly by land, roads must be improved, competitiveness among transport companies increased and state and provincial regulations revamped.

The final section contains six chapters dedicated to the prospects for long-term institutional development for NAFTA. In the section's first chapter (the book's fifteenth), Rolf Mirus and Natliya Rylska look into the possibilities of the treaty's institutional evolution on a broad range of alternative institutional arrangements. In particular, they compare the current situation of a free trade agreement, in which each country maintains its own tariff structure vis-à-vis non-member countries, with a customs union, in which a common tariff structure is established to deal with trade with non-member nations. The conclusion of their analysis is that the customs union would be the best way for NAFTA to evolve, but that it requires strong political leadership because of the need to coordinate policy. In chapter 16, Constance Smith explores the different possibilities for monetary coordination, looking at a range of options that go from maintaining the current state of affairs with individual currencies and exchange rate schemes in each member country to dollariza-

tion, based on the U.S. dollar. The risk of losing political sovereignty means that each country has its reservations about the audacious options in this matter, which is why more moderate monetary coordination is to be expected. In his article, Robert A. Pastor posits that the treaty's potentiality and viability is being limited by important social disparities among the three countries, particularly between Mexico and the other two, and even inside Mexico itself. The success of what the European Union has done so far to reduce disparities among countries through public policy leads Pastor to think about the creation of a fund for North American development that would correct this situation in the long run. In the following chapter, Antonio Ortiz Mena L.N. Analyzes the results of NAFTA's dispute settlement mechanisms and puts forward the changes that should be introduced in the future. In his opinion, these institutions should complement the World Trade Organization and the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas. From a different perspective, Linda E. Reif examines the same question, concluding that the number of organizations that treaty signatories belong to gives them the possibility of putting forward their disputes in several fora depending on which one is the most favorable, thus complicating the settlement process. Chapter 20 closes the section and the book and refers to the prospect that NAFTA can become the FTAA. Peter H. Smith, one of the book's two compilers, analyzes the different responses of the countries involved, concluding that while the FTAA initiative has to be promoted by the United States, it can only be achieved if Latin American countries' concerns about including the problems of inequality and poverty are addressed as aims of any agreement reached.

Pablo Ruiz Nápoles
Mexican economist

NOTES

[1] The *ejido* is an agricultural production unit divided into relatively small, peasant-owned plots. Its economic viability has been the subject of many discussions and debates. [Editor's Note.]

Dilemas de la democracia en México
(Dilemmas of Democracy in Mexico)
Rubén R. García Clarck
Instituto Electoral de Querétaro
Querétaro, Mexico, 2002, 121 pp.

The dispute about democracy in Mexico has become endless. Before the historic July 2002 elections, people discussed how to achieve transparent elections that could be accepted by all contenders. They also systematically criticized the over-long stay of the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in office and bet on alternation in the presidency for democratizing the country.

Once public belief in electoral authorities was established, and with the arrival of the National Action Party (PAN) in the Los Pinos presidential residence, it was believed that democratic transition in Mexico had concluded. However,

the scenario of a divided government in which Vicente Fox has tried to govern the country and the lack of a civic culture rooted in Mexican society are factors that have reactivated national debate about measures yet to be taken regarding the political reform of the state.

Today, discussion turns on the construction of a new relationship among the branches of government that would make it possible to overcome the conflicts between the executive and the legislature. In that framework, measures have been proposed that go from allowing the reelection of legislators to consecutive terms to the adoption of a semi-presidential regimen. The creation of mechanisms of direct democracy on a federal level and a legal framework that would favor the development of organizations of civil society to broaden out and strengthen public participation have also been proposed.

Rubén García Clarck's book is part of the debate about these and other issues on the national political agenda; his is a historic perspective with a moderate political stance. García Clarck looks at these matters through the critical review of the dilemmas that have been posited, offering a balanced solution to each one.

The dilemmas he examines are, thus, nation or democracy; parliamentary or presidential regimen; civic or party organizations; liberal or social democracy; and evolution or break. These are also the titles of his five chapters, which lead the reader through several episodes of the history of political ideas in Mexico.

When Mexico's independence from the Spanish empire was consolidated, nineteenth-century Mexicans tried to build a nation called the United States of Mexico from the ashes of 50 years of internal strife. At that time, in the context of the modern era's first wave of democratization, the debate centered on the establishment of a system of government based on democracy, monarchy or a necessary dictatorship.

This debate continued into contemporary Mexico, not about the choice between democracy and monarchy or democracy and dictatorship, but about building an authentic democratic regimen in the country. With the victory of the 1910 Revolution, a nominal democracy was established in Mexico, headed by a state party that governed the country for more than 70 years. Mexico's twentieth century was characterized by relative social peace guaranteed by a corporatist self-renewing political class and a de facto authoritarian political system. This led to the growing demand for democracy among opposition parties and Mexican society as a whole.

Based on a selective review of these positions, García Clarck takes us by the hand from that far-off nineteenth century to our day. Through a clearly defined structure, each of the chapters begins with a reference to some of the theoreticians of democracy that have discussed each of the dilemmas dealt with. Then he brings onto the scene fundamental individuals of Mexico's history, whose opinions he counterposes and analyzes. Thus, José María Luis Mora, Ignacio Ramírez, Gabino Barreda, Porfirio Díaz, Benito Juárez, Francisco I. Madero, Venustiano Carranza, Lázaro Cárdenas, Manuel Gómez Morín, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, José Woldenberg, Soledad Loaeza, Federico Reyes Heroles and the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN), among many others, discuss and take positions regarding a myriad of issues: democratic universalism, the nationalization of democracy, parliamentarianism, presidentialism, the rivalry between political parties and civic organizations, the problematic relationship between economy and democracy and the dual nature (combining evolution and breaks) of the democratic transition.

It should be said that *Dilemas de la democracia en México* presents political positions outside their specific context, particularly in the case of the EZLN, which the author anachronistically presents as equivalent to nineteenth-century liberalism. This lack of contextualization is insufficiently resolved by the author's constantly flagging the ideas with dates.

The book's fluidity of style and the author's efforts to corroborate his initial thesis (that democracy must be debated democratically, eliminating false dilemmas that arise out of a reductionist and exclusionary logic) make it attractive. In that sense, García Clarck maintains that one of the greatest challenges in consolidating democracy in Mexico is achieving the theoretical and practical inclusion of the plurality of histories, institutional bodies, actors and ideological positions in a single order.

The passages of the text, which seem to be snapshots of a real drama, single out defining moments in Mexico's political history. This book, with its novel presentation of dissenting positions, is recommended for those interested in Mexican political debate and in the torturous advance of democracy in Latin America.

Mayra Espejo Martínez
Political analyst

Problemas del desarrollo
Revista Latinoamericana de Economía

Publicación trimestral del Instituto de Investigaciones Económicas,
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México,
vol. 33, núm. 130, julio-septiembre, 2002.

Índice

Problemas del desarrollo es una revista de excelencia, forma parte del Índice de Revistas Mexicanas de Investigación Científica y Tecnológica del Conacyt y de la base de datos de economía más importante a nivel mundial: EconLit, producida por la American Economic Association, con empleo del sistema de clasificación del Journal of Economic Literature (JEL), entre otros bancos de datos del extranjero disponibles en internet como los siguientes: LADB de la Universidad de Nuevo México; LANIC-ARL de la Universidad de Texas en Austin; HLAS de la Biblioteca del Congreso de Estados Unidos; International Bibliography of Social Sciences, de la London School of Economics; Bancos Bibliográficos Latinoamericanos y de El Caribe de la UNESCO. A nivel nacional, además del Índice del Conacyt, pertenece a los siguientes bancos de datos también disponibles en internet: Alfa, del IIEc, UNAM; Citas Latinoamericanas en Ciencias Sociales y Humanidades (Clase) de la DGB, UNAM; Índice de Revistas de Educación Superior e Investigación Educativa (IRESIE), del CESU, UNAM; Catálogo Comentado de Revistas Mexicanas sobre Educación Superior e Investigación Educativa (Camex), editado en CD ROM, elaborado por el CESU, UNAM; en el EJOURNAL sitio coordinado y editado por la Dirección General de Servicios de Cómputo Académico (DGSCA) de la UNAM, aparece Problemas del Desarrollo en texto completo a partir del número 121 (abril-junio, 2000); así como de la Hemeroteca Virtual Universitaria, producto de la Gran Biblioteca Metropolitana del Consejo Regional de la Zona Metropolitana de la ANUIES.

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

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