

VOICES *of Mexico*

Impunity and Mexico's Justice System

Miguel Carbonell

About the North American Community

Silvia Núñez

Pensions and Health Care in Mexico

Articles By

Berenice Ramírez

And Gustavo Leal

The Debate About Transgenic Maize

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The U.S. Elections, Mexican Perspectives

Sebastián's Emotional Geometry

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18.5 x 17.5 x 22 cm. Yucatán Regional Museum of Anthropology, "Canton Palace."

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
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
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Sebastián, *Life Sphere*, 440 x 380 x 380 cm,
2003 (iron with acrylic enamel).
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
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OUR VOICE

Seemingly, President George W. Bush's invocation about terrorism will end up being a self-fulfilling prophecy. The preliminary reports from the National Commission on the terrorist attacks against the United States, or the September 11 Commission, just came out. These reports told us that Saddam Hussein's deposed government and Osama Bin Laden's Al Qaeda did not collaborate in planning or executing the September 11 attacks, as the Bush administration had argued to justify the military offensive in Iraq. Among other things, the commission also found that the U.S. security system seriously failed not only in not predicting the danger, but in formulating a response to defend the country.

In an attempt to exert damage control as soon as possible, the same day that some extracts from this report were announced, June 17, President Bush stated that the relationship did exist, but this time, he did not elaborate on the original, main argument that he and his main collaborators had made that Baghdad had been behind the attacks, demonstrating the extreme dangerousness of the Hussein regime for U.S. national security.

This report critically sketches at least two extremely grave problems. The first is that the U.S. government may have deliberately decided to exaggerate—not without an air of conspiracy—the degree of danger faced at that time and now, to “convince” the public and the U.S. and world political class that it was necessary to respond with acts of war and depose the Iraqi president, an argument the administration defends even now, albeit with certain subtle differences. The second problem is the fragility of U.S. security systems when facing the terror in September 2001. If the first were confirmed, we would be facing an institutional crisis that would probably turn into a crisis of credibility for the Bush administration, with the attending risks to his aspirations for re-election.

It would also mean a return to unhappy times for Americans: I am referring to the times in which President Richard Nixon used any means, both licit and illicit, to achieve his political ambitions, until he had to resign because of the Watergate scandal. This, in and of itself, represents a credibility risk that could have an impact on the United States unlike anything since the Vietnam War. On the other hand, it is no less important to point out that the facts revealed by the commission once again demonstrate the flimsy basis upon which Washington mounted what could be considered an underhanded stratagem against Iraq using the United Nations and many other bilateral and multilateral fronts. All of this put international security even more at risk and injures the legitimacy of its rickety institutional structure (mainly the UN), which so urgently needs reforming. Simultaneously, it once again dangerously weakened Washington's international relations with the world and its role as the self-styled central actor in reorganizing international governance, today so prey to greater, alarming vacuums of power: the great power in its labyrinth.

Given the imminent release of the complete report, the insistence of President Bush, Vice President Richard Cheney and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld on maintaining their initial argument about the criminal association between Hussein and Bin Laden will be more of an obstacle than a political advantage. It should be understood, in any case, as an immediate way to gain the most time possible, before thinking of a way out that would eliminate the risk of losing more points than those already lost in the opinion polls. Given the new circumstances, that seems very unlikely.

The U.S. government is at a crossroads during this election period: on the one hand, it can accept that the extremist foreign policy and defense strategy forged by Paul Wolfowitz and Donald Rumsfeld is beginning to be seriously affected and try to reorient it completely, which could imply admitting that they had lied and resorted to the deliberate and wrong (and, in the history of their foreign policy, failed) “construction” of the enemy in order to justify its destruction. Alternatively, it can continue in the same vein—which seems to be the decision the White House has already made—and maintain the initial argument about

the fight against terrorism, flying in the face of all logic and political legitimacy, facing the government off against different sectors of power and, in passing, wasting time in the effort to achieve a coherent solution to the world's problems. This last option of the war against terrorism not only could represent the end of President Bush's administration, but it could also repeat the past in its worst form and take the United States once again into the era of angst as the worst scenarios of Bush's prophetic invocation about terrorism since September 11 come true.

* * *

There is no doubt that the "war on terrorism," now starting to be questioned even by political actors who previously supported it unconditionally in the United States itself, and the upcoming events in the Iraq war will be decisive for the next presidential elections. As never before, foreign policy issues will have an influence on voters' preferences. We have included three articles in our "United States Affairs" section that look at different aspects of the U.S. elections from a Mexican perspective. Paz Consuelo Márquez Padilla establishes the enormous importance of the election outcome for the world, warning us of the imminent danger that the U.S. neo-conservatism, a defender of unilateral U.S. neo-imperialism will finish sinking its roots in the political system with such force that it will be almost impossible to return to more liberal times if Bush wins. Cristina Rosas, for her part, looks at the elections through the prism of a detailed analysis of the ideologies behind the newest U.S. foreign policy strategies, which justify the war in Iraq as a moral obligation of the United States to save the world from terrorism, and makes it valid to even use so-called "preventive war." Graciela Orozco and Celina Bárcenas have contributed an article with very recent information about the growing influence of Latino voters in U.S. elections, something that has prompted both parties to expend more efforts and spend more money on their campaigns in this community. The section concludes with a contribution from Zuo Xiaoyuan, who analyzes the surprising similarities in U.S. and Chinese government policies to reduce regional differences in development.

The coming election will be determinant in many ways, so much so that it may define the future not only of the United States but of specific regions. In our "North American Affairs" section, we have included two articles dealing with the process of regional integration. We begin with an evocative text by Silvia Núñez about the viability of moving toward a community of North America, surpassing the trade integration brought by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Núñez says this is possible if society and institutions develop an attitude favorable to building consensus that transcend particular interests. For Ismael Aguilar Barajas, far from an integration that points toward a community, one of whose essential traits would be the gradual opening of borders, the events of September 11 have prompted those in charge of national security to reinforce borders. In the same context of the integration of North America, in our "Canadian Issues" section, Alfonso de María y Campos, Alberto Garza and Mayomi Cid have presented us with a very complete evaluation of Mexican-Canadian relations on the sixtieth anniversary of their establishment. They conclude that positive collaboration and mutual support have overwhelmingly predominated in this case.

According to several recent polls, lack of public safety, today considered by the public to be Mexico's main problem, is inextricably linked to impunity, a phenomenon propitiated by the country's inefficient criminal justice system. For our "Politics" section, we asked specialist Miguel Carbonell to give our readers a panorama of Mexico's justice system and a commentary about recent reform proposals. In the same section, we include an article by political analyst Tania Hernández about the internal strife among the different factions of the governing National Action Party vis-à-vis the 2006 presidential elections.

Fox has often been criticized for a dearth of public policies. In "Society", Gustavo Leal brings us a severe critique of health policies and strategies —among them the new "popular" health insurance— which have not solved the system's inability to prevent and treat disease. Berenice Ramírez, for her part, has presented us with an interesting analysis of the crisis of Mexico's social security system. According to the state, it is caused by excessive pension payments, while the author maintains that it is due to the irresponsible pri-

vativation of pension funds. This section concludes with an interesting article about the community radio in Huayacocotla, Veracruz, an indigenous community. Author Zaidee Stavely explains the importance of alternative communication in a world increasingly coopted by media monopolies.

In our "Economy" section, energy expert Sergio Benito Osorio offers a penetrating analysis of the multiple services contracts issued by the country's government oil giant *Petróleos Mexicanos* (Pemex). These contracts have been created by the state to allocate large tracts of land to foreign companies for exploring, drilling and processing natural gas, something which not only is a violation of the Constitution, but is not in Mexico's strategic or commercial interests.

* * *

"Powerful art of massive dimensions, violent colors and expressive force capable of shaking up the most diverse aesthetic opinions." This is how René Avilés Fabila describes the work of Sebastián, a Mexican sculptor who has spent more than 30 years enriching the panorama of modern sculpture. On the occasion of his exposition "Emotional Geometry" at the Old San Ildefonso College, Vincenzo Sanfo opens a window briefly illustrating Sebastian's visual and conceptual alternative for sculpture and art in general in our "Art and Culture" section. Then Rebeca Maldonado presents the work by talented, young Mexican visual artist María Tello, recognized in national art circles for her original proposal, based on a specific search for the essence of objects, an attempt to strip naked the simple things of daily life to reveal them with that other gaze that can only be offered by someone who has a profound philosophical vision.

"The Splendor of Mexico" takes us on this occasion to Tamaulipas, in the extreme northeast of the country, whose history goes back millions of years. Marisol Montellano looks at the details of its geological past and the fossil wealth distributed in a large part of the state. Gustavo Ramírez takes us along the roads of its pre-Hispanic history, including the development of different civilizations in a very bio-diverse land: semi-desert, forest and jungle. Lastly, Carlos Rugeiro tells us the history of Guerrero Viejo, a town that disappeared under the reservoir of the International Falcon Dam, emerging years later to show the ruins of its splendid past.

In "Museums" we feature the Huastec Culture Museum, part of the modern Metropolitan Space Cultural Complex, inaugurated recently in the city of Tampico. The museum aims to recuperate the ancient Huastec culture, showing through its creations, traditions and customs that its roots are still alive in our day. Finishing up the contributions about this beautiful region, the "Ecology" section includes an article about one of Mexico's most important biosphere reserves, rich in biodiversity: El Cielo. With four ecosystems that produce three distinct climates, rich in native fauna and flora, this reserve is the patrimony of humanity. The section concludes with an article by Edit Antal about the thorny question of transgenic maize imports: here positions in Mexico and the United States are diametrically opposed since one society values the cultural content of these crops, while the other measures them only in terms of profitability.

The recent death of one of the most renowned and original dramatists of the Mexican theater, Hugo Argüelles, prompted *Voices of Mexico* to pay homage to him in our "Literature" section. In addition to including a fragment of one of the works that earned him national prestige, *Los huesos del amor y de la muerte* (The Bones of Love and Death), we present a review of his life and work by director and theater critic Gonzalo Valdés Medellín.

Lastly, on this occasion, "In Memoriam" is dedicated to celebrated university professor and philosopher Leopoldo Zea. One of his most outstanding disciples, Mario Magallón explains that Zea was not only the main promoter of Latin American studies in our National University, but also the most important representative of the twentieth century's most original, critical and combative current of Latin American philosophical thought.

José Luis Valdés-Ugalde



Silent march against crime, May 27, 2004.

When Impunity Is the Rule The Reform of Mexico's Criminal Justice System

Miguel Carbonell*

One of Mexico's gravest problems is insecurity, both physical and legal; the former because there

is a high incidence of day-to-day violence in the countryside and the city alike, affecting both poor and rich; the latter because there is no appropriate legal framework to process social differences and violations of norms. The law

as a rule for co-existence continues to be resorted to only exceptionally.

In the absence of legality as a model for behavior, different alternative solutions come to the fore; the simplest ones imply that many people just do not

* Researcher at the UNAM Institute for Legal Research.

exercise their rights; the most serious ones presuppose the loss of property or even someone's life with practically no recourse whatsoever.

DIAGNOSTIC ANALYSIS

A few figures can help to explain why this pessimistic panorama is the case. The most serious studies agree that fewer than 1 percent of all crimes committed are punished.¹ According to Guillermo Zepeda, author of the broadest study on impunity and the ineffective-

police make an arrest after a longer time has passed is very low; this lets us infer that Mexican police may know how to do surveillance, but do not know how to investigate.

Strict compliance with arrest warrants is not a strong point with Mexican police either. In 2000, only 33 percent of arrest warrants were actually served; the year before, the figure was only 25 percent. In 2000, then, 253,539 arrest warrants were not served.⁴

Now, the short time span between the commission of a crime and arrest shows another dangerous trait of the

The most serious studies agree that fewer than one percent of all crimes committed in Mexico are punished.

ness of the criminal justice system in Mexico, only 3.3 percent of all criminal complaints result in an alleged perpetrator of a crime actually coming before a judge (simply coming before the judge, not necessarily being convicted); this means that in 96.7 percent of cases, impunity prevails.²

To a great extent, impunity is the result of low institutional effectiveness of Mexican police forces. Most arrests are made at the time the crime is committed or within the following three hours. According to a survey of penitentiary inmates, 48 percent said they were arrested only a few minutes (fewer than 60) after the crime was committed. Another 22 percent were arrested between the second hour and 24 hours after the crime.³ That is, 70 percent were detained less than 24 hours after the commission of the crime. This means that the possibility that the

Mexican criminal justice system: the police often make arrests without orders from a judge. Article 16 of the Constitution allows for the arrest of an individual when caught *flagrante delicto* or when there is no doubt that the case is urgent, as long the crime in question is classified as serious and a judge's order cannot be obtained. Approximately 40 percent of all detentions in Mexico are made without the arrest warrant that should be issued by a judge.⁵ A great deal of imagination is not needed to see the danger this puts individuals in of being arbitrarily detained by the police, particularly if he or she lives or works in a poor neighborhood.

While all this shows how unprotected victims are, the circumstances of detainees are far from idyllic. Seventy-one percent of all detainees in Mexico City's Federal District did not have the

advice of a lawyer while under arrest and when coming before the "public ministry" or district attorney/arraignment judge.⁶ Of the 30 percent who did have the support of counsel, the vast majority (70 percent) did not have the opportunity to speak to him or her privately. Once before the judge who hears the charges, 60 percent of detainees were not informed that they had the right to make no statement. During their preparatory statements before the legal authorities, one out of every four detainees was not assisted by counsel.⁷ Eighty percent of detainees never spoke with the judge who condemned them, and in 71 percent of cases, the judge was not present during the prisoner's statement (in the judicial offices).⁸ Obviously, the Mexican Constitution stipulates the prisoner's right to a lawyer from the moment he or she is arrested, as well as his/her right to make no statement (Article 20). And criminal procedural law demands the presence of the judge during the judicial proceedings.

This information justifies the idea that the criminal justice system is a wide network of ineffectiveness and corruption that can trap and process very few criminals. But, an important issue must be clarified if we are to have a true image of that network: who does the criminal justice system trap?

Most prisoners who have been tried, convicted and sentenced have committed crimes against property, particularly petty theft, or crimes against health, particularly drug dealing in small amounts (caught with less than U.S.\$100 worth of drugs on their person, and half of those caught with less than U.S.\$16 worth in their possession). Some analysts say that this shows that the police, rather than arresting real

drug dealers, are actually arresting consumers, probably to fill an arrest quota established by their superiors.⁹ Also, the criminal justice system seems to basically trap first-time offenders: only 29 percent of those arrested had ever been convicted of any crime before.¹⁰

What we can conclude is that the criminal justice system processes first-time offenders who have been accused of petty crimes, and leaves the experts who commit crimes for substantial amounts at large. In Mexico's criminal justice system, those punished for "white collar" crime are truly the exception.

REFORMS

Given this discouraging panorama, in late March 2004, President Fox presented an ambitious, very comprehensive bill to reform the justice system, focused particularly on the criminal justice system.

The bill covers constitutional issues and matters dealt with in regular legislation. It would be very complex to try to even summarize all the legislative reforms it proposes. I will limit myself to briefly commenting on some of the Fox bill's proposed amendments to the Constitution.

The proposed constitutional reform has two main objectives: a) strengthening fundamental rights of individuals involved, from one vantage point or the other, in criminal proceedings; and b) redefining the legal regimen of the institutions in charge of the investigation and prosecution of criminal offenses.

To achieve the first aim, the bill proposes a profound reform of the legal system for juveniles accused of committing a crime. Specialized bodies

would be created, both in the field of prosecution and the administration of justice, that in all cases would put a priority on the minor's greater interest, as stipulated by the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, of which Mexico is a signatory. Children under 12 would be exempted from all legal responsibility; children from 12 to 17 would be considered juvenile offenders; and only those from the age of 18 on would be tried as adults.

Another proposal is to amend Article 20 of the Constitution to include the presumption of innocence until found

The bill stipulates that any statement prisoners make before authorities other than judges is to be considered null and void, and therefore cannot be entered into evidence against the accused. If the accused has not been assisted by a lawyer, any statement made before a judge would also be considered null and void. This reform is important because mistreatment and undue pressure continue to be practices in Mexico in many cases during interrogation (in some cases, torture is even used; although it has notably decreased in recent years, unfortunately,

The criminal justice system is a wide network of ineffectiveness and corruption that only traps and processes very few criminals.

guilty for anyone accused of a crime. Although it may sound strange, Mexico's Constitution has not until now included the presumption of innocence despite its being central to any democratic justice system.

Currently, the Constitution stipulates that the accused can be assisted during his or her criminal proceedings by a "lawyer or trusted person." Prisoners being assisted by a "trusted person" has often meant a bad defense for the accused because it has meant that what the legal system knows as "coyotes," or non-lawyers who carry out the defense of the accused, are legal. Fox's reform proposes to eliminate the category of "trusted person" and stipulate that the only ones authorized to defend the accused be "certified lawyers" or, if the accused does not have the money to pay a lawyer or does not want to name one, public defenders.

it has still not completely disappeared from police interrogations).

The second aim of the bill is to change the legal system regarding the bodies charged with the prosecution of justice. Today, the public is very concerned with suspicions that district attorney's offices act more based on political than legal considerations (to be sure, these suspicions exist in many countries). To eliminate these—to a certain extent well founded—suspicions, the proposal is to create autonomous bodies that would replace the *procuraduría* (Attorney General's Office) on both the federal and state level. This is an idea that has been proposed for years by prestigious jurists from the UNAM Institute for Legal Research and has been widely known in comparative law. The bill proposes the creation of autonomous bodies called *fiscalías* (prosecutors) for both the federal and state governments.

If the reform is approved, it would fall to the president to nominate the “*Fiscal General de la República*” (general federal prosecutor), subject to Senate ratification. The appointment would last five years and the term could be extended another five years. In contrast with the current posts of attorney general or district attorney, the prosecutor could only be removed by impeachment, the elimination of immunity and a criminal trial, or impeachment and a political trial in the Congress: in effect, he/she practically could not be removed from the post.

Although it may sound strange, Mexico’s
Constitution has not until now included the
presumption of innocence.

In addition to establishing the post of general prosecutor, the bill would create circuit prosecutors whose jurisdiction would cover a specific territory. The circuit prosecutors would also be nominated by the president on the basis of a proposal from the general prosecutor, contingent on Senate ratification; they would be in office for four years, and could repeat their terms once.

One of the dilemmas that the writers of the bill had to face was what to do about the judicial (or investigative) police (today called the Federal Investigations Agency, or AFI), currently operating under the aegis of the Federal Attorney General’s Office. That is, could the new autonomous body called the general federal prosecutor’s office have a police force under its command? The bill answers this question in the negative, proposing that federal police forces

unify under the existing Ministry of Public Security. This does not seem to be the best choice and, in fact, is one of the issues academics have criticized most in the bill.

One of the bill’s most worrisome (or least fortunate) proposals is linked to allowing the law to establish a criminal legal regimen for fighting organized crime. We already have a “Law against Organized Crime”; but experts have questioned several of its articles as unconstitutional.¹¹ The idea of letting legislators create a series of criminal rules applicable only to organized crime, thus

creating an exceptional criminal subsystem, is very dangerous and could pose grave risks for the fundamental rights of everyone living in Mexico.

CONCLUSION

In any case, Mexico’s criminal justice system is the subject of a great deal of dissatisfaction. Probably no single reform could do away overnight with decades of incapability, negligence and corruption. But we have a duty to try to generate institutional changes in the field of justice because the worst thing that can happen is that things remain as they are.

Wiping out the ominous statistics that I mentioned in the first part of this article will depend on the quality of the changes we make and their commitment to the fundamental rights of every-

one involved in criminal procedures (people brought up on charges, victims, those convicted of a crime, minors, etc.). To ensure a successful conclusion to this process, it is important that the public be acquainted with the reform proposals and, as far as possible, follow the discussion that has already begun in the legislature. **NM**

NOTES

¹ Marcelo Bergman, comp., *Delincuencia, marginalidad y desempeño institucional. Resultados de la encuesta a población en reclusión en tres entidades de la República Mexicana* (Mexico City: CIDE, 2003), p. 32.

² Guillermo Zepeda Lecuona, *Crimen sin castigo. Procuración de justicia y ministerio público en México* (Mexico City: CIDAC/Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2004), p. 220.

³ Marcelo Bergman, op. cit., p. 45.

⁴ Zepeda, op. cit., pp. 205-206.

⁵ Zepeda, op. cit., p. 245.

⁶ In Mexico’s criminal justice system, the “public ministry” is the first body before whom a detainee is presented; a mixture of the district attorney and the arraignment judge who first hears the case, the “public ministry” decides if there has been a crime and whether sufficient evidence exists to charge the detainee and hold him/her over for trial. [Editor’s Note.]

⁷ Zepeda, op. cit., pp. 252-253.

⁸ Marcelo Bergman, op. cit., p. 47.

⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 38.

¹¹ The most complete study on this issue as far as I know is the one by Sergio García Ramírez, *Delincuencia organizada*, third edition (Mexico City: UNAM/Porrúa, 2002).



Juan Pablo Zamora/Cuattrosucro



Javier Tapia/Cuattrosucro

The most recent polls say First Lady Martha Sahagún and Minister of the Interior Santiago Creel are the two front-runners for the PAN's 2006 presidential nomination.

The National Action Party In Crisis

Tania Hernández Vicencio*

Since Vicente Fox took office in 2000, the National Action Party (PAN) has faced a crisis rooted in the open struggle among its different factions for control of the party and in the wear and tear on it from occupying Mexico's presidency.

This article aims to broadly sketch the PAN's current situation and crisis. To do that, I will begin by saying that the

PAN still exhibits enormous tension between two dynamics: on the one hand, its highly centralized structure and decision making, and, on the other hand, the demand to open up to building an innovative party and government project.


In that context, I maintain that PAN members have displayed their willingness to foster merely gradual change in their structure and internal life, but the lack of a long-term project that would make it possible to attack a series of problems derived from being in office.

Despite the almost 15 years that the PAN has been in office in some states, its members have been incapable of moving forward in the construction of an alternative model for party-government relations.

INTERNAL GRADUALISM

Although the PAN has grown and its structure modernized, the party has not developed institutionally. Its member-

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Nelly Salas/Cuartoscuro

Carlos Medina Plascencia, the head of the PAN caucus in the Chamber of Deputies, is also in the race.

In the four years since Fox took office, the party has simply accompanied the administration. The PAN is the party in government, but without the government.

ship increased 23 percent between 2000 and 2001, and today it has 267,000 active members and 800,000 adherents; new internal secretariats have been created, and internal functioning has been overhauled. Nevertheless, the PAN lacks a project for long-term institutional development that in addition to dealing with its needs as a political organization would create the basis for facing the new challenges derived from occupying federal office. Several events show this.

For example, PAN members have been reforming their by-laws with an eye to immediacy, a reflection more than anything else of the sharp dispute over control of the party, candidacies and the definition of the new mechanisms for links between the party and the government. Suffice it to say that over 60 years the PAN amended its by-laws nine times, and since taking federal office, it has already had two

reforms of its basic documents, plus updating its principles and creating a code of ethics for its public officials, given that some have been involved in corruption scandals, influence peddling and even murders.

Among the 2001 changes in the by-laws, three deserve mention: a) An increase in the number of participants in the National Council to 300 council members. Of these, 150 (such as former national leaders, governors, founders) automatically become members; 15 are proposed by the National Executive Committee (NEC) and 135 are taken from those in the top places on the lists drawn up in each state. The other 150 are elected in the National Assembly from among the names on the state lists; b) The creation of municipal sub-committees made up of several electoral sections, that will carry out political activism territorially; c) Requiring aspirants to being recognized as active mil-

itants to spend a year and a half as adherents instead of three years as some conservative PAN members proposed.

However, a fundamental limit is that two substantial tasks have been added to the National Executive Committee's responsibilities: developing mechanisms to orient party action in the public administration, and fostering models of relations with society within the party's traditional framework.

With the March 2002 PAN leadership election, when Luis Felipe Bravo Mena was voted in again, an intense dispute between two visions was thrown into sharp relief. One vision centered on the functional modernization of internal bodies, the use of models for territorial development centered on the municipal sub-committees and a role for the PAN of simply accompanying its administration's actions, in what in Bravo Mena's words was the quest for a "democratic link."

The other view was Carlos Medina Plascencia's, who defended the need for a profound transformation based on opening up to citizen participation, the consolidation of social networks to support PAN administrations, taking party work out to electoral sections, neighborhoods and communities and strengthening the relationship between party and government; for this, he put forward the idea of fostering a much-needed "shared management."

In addition, with the April 2004 changes in the by-laws, it became clear that the point of greatest conflict was Article 37, dealing with procedures for nominating the candidate for the presidency. The winning proposal, backed by the NEC, left the decision in the hands of active militants and adherents. The proposal backed by Minister of the Interior Santiago Creel would have

opened up the decision to the citizenry, or, in other words, including PAN sympathizers. The 2001 changes, but above all the 2004 changes, were marked by the defense of a process of “opening, but with identity,” a phrase coined by Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, one of the main leaders of the doctrinaire faction, a member of the so-called “custodian families” and an aspirant to the 2006 PAN presidential nomination.

The PAN has fostered gradual changes in its internal life, but has also left to one side central questions like, for example, those related to making its highly centralized structure more flexible and to developing really new mechanisms for linking the party and society, which would permit the construction of larger and more permanent alliances and support for its government proposal.

One of the issues that PAN members do not dare openly recognize is the fact that the party’s formal structure has been overrun on different occasions, since the so-called “neo-PANistas” began to design their own electoral campaigns. Just to mention two cases, we should remember that the candidacies of Ernesto Ruffo and Manuel Clouthier were supported by candidate campaign committees independent from the party-designated committee.¹ Perhaps the most patent case of the structure’s crisis was shown by the functioning of the parallel structure called Friends of Fox, an organization that contributed decisively to the PAN candidate’s victory, but whose members did not make significant commitments to the party. We could even think that given the structural limits, the leaderships have had to create different options for carrying out political proselytism. This is the case of the organization called Mexico 2020, headed by Carlos Me-



President Fox forced Minister of Energy Felipe Calderón to resign because he openly announced his intention to run.

Karla García/Cuartaesfera

The PAN lacks a project for long-term institutional development that would create the basis for facing new challenges.

dina Plascencia and the Fundación Vamos México (Let’s Go Mexico Foundation) that backs the political work done by first lady Martha Sahagún.

NO ALTERNATIVE MODEL FOR THE PARTY-GOVERNMENT RELATIONSHIP

For almost 15 years, the PAN has occupied the governor’s mansion in several states nationwide and one of the main problems has been the relationship between party and administration. For four years now, the party has headed up the federal government, and it does not seem to be willing to move forward to solve this underlying problem.

The PAN is the party in government, but without the government. The PAN has had little capacity to have an impact on three issues fundamental for any party in office: the construction of political accords between the executive

branch and its congressional caucus, the creation of public policies and the designation of a governing team. With regard to the last point, we should remember that since Vicente Fox appointed his governing team, a sector of the PAN expressed its unhappiness with the nominations and even requested the substitution of people not identified with the party. This led to a further breakdown of the already weak link between President Fox and his party.

The relationship between the PAN and Vicente Fox throughout these almost four years has been based on the formula called the “democratic link,” whereby the party decided to simply accompany the administration. This concept has been more a diffuse attempt at innovation vis-à-vis the traditional subordination of the party to the government than a real alternative proposal. In practice, it has contributed to generating the image of a rudderless government

without its natural support, an administration that cannot find counterparts for dialogue inside or outside the PAN.

It should be mentioned that by August 2001, the Liaison Committee for setting up the mechanisms for coordination between the PAN and the executive branch had been created. The agreement was to hold periodic meetings that would try to make party and government actions jibe. However, this commission was never sufficiently effective and the initial objectives were never met. Thus, until now, Mexico has been witness to multiple examples of non-cooperation, in which the lack of polit-

forgot that an opposition that has the will to become the government and stay in office has to give appropriate importance to its function as an intermediary between society, legislators and those in government. Its lack of skill in positively integrating the experience accumulated on a regional level has shown that it basically is still acting as a party seeking greater spaces in the electoral and party system, without a precise idea of why it wants to be in office.

If a strategy for cooperation between party and government had been sought, in the last leadership election, some obligatory questions would have been:

To the problematic relationship between the PAN and Vicente Fox were added the conflicts created by First Lady Martha Sahagún's proselytizing.

ical acumen on the part of the National Action Party leadership has been the central characteristic.

It is true that 70 years of subordination of a party to the president force a reformulation of the relationship between two autonomous—though not independent—spaces in the responsibility for the exercise of government.² However, PAN members do not yet have a clear proposal that distinguishes the difference between that relationship with a traditionally opposition party and one in office. Seemingly, they have been incapable of understanding the heavy responsibility of an administration that has emerged from the opposition, in the context of sharp electoral and political competition, where one of the necessary principles is creating institutional agreements.

The constant clashes make it possible to say that the National Action Party

What type of leadership would guarantee a more fluid, politically productive relationship for a government facing difficulties in implementing its central proposals? Who could foster greater consensus inside the PAN legislative caucus and at the same time support the relationship between PAN deputies and the executive? What type of leadership could head up the process of transformation the PAN needs to give a broader, more solid social base to its governments?

Perhaps an external element that could additionally help understand the difficulty the Fox administration is having in coming to long-term agreements is the fact that while PAN members make up a new political elite, this elite has not managed to totally reconcile its interests with those of Mexico's political class. This limits its possibilities for coming to fundamental agree-

ments such as the structural reforms on which President Fox has centered his administration's agenda.

To the problematic relationship between the PAN and Vicente Fox were added the conflicts created by First Lady Martha Sahagún's proselytizing. By early 2004, Sahagún had aspired to being a member of her party's NEC, although after gauging her colleagues' reactions, the first lady ended up by halting her drive to become a member of the PAN's most important decision-making body. Evidently, by seeking an NEC seat, she put the idea before the public that she would seek her party's nomination in 2006 from inside the PAN.

Although Martha Sahagún understood that she had taken the wrong road, and sent the media a letter in which she seemed to renounce her aspirations to the presidency, as well as withdrawing momentarily from party activity, the truth is that until now, she maintains a double discourse in which the only clear point is that she has not completely abandoned the idea of a possible nomination.

The conflicts around Mrs. Sahagún's intentions unified the PAN's main political factions. This was clear at a meeting held at the presidential residence, Los Pinos, with representatives of the four most important factions: Diego Fernández de Cevallos and Juan José Rodríguez Prats, from the pragmatic faction; Felipe Calderón Hinojosa and Germán Martínez Cázares, from the doctrinaire faction; the extreme right-wing faction, headed up by Luis Felipe Bravo Mena and Manuel Espino; and Ramón Muñoz and Ramón Martínez Huerta, who have defended the interests of the Fox faction, known as the "Guanajuato group." All of them agreed on the need for the first lady to

be more discrete, in exchange for a more moderate position from the party leadership with regard to the Fox administration.

FINAL COMMENTS

Evidently, PAN members have once again decided to postpone a real discussion that would clarify the specificities of its crisis as a party in office. Caught in the dispute for control over the party, candidacies and public posts, they continue to leave for another time the profound transformation that would allow the party to deal with its new challenges and build a really different proposal in its relationship with the government.

The party structure is not resolving the problems related to the creation of larger alliances and the identification of demands and proposals in a more

permanent way, or working on the creation of an alternative proposal for the party-government relationship. The situation the PAN has faced since it took office is the last reflection of a dilemma that it still has not resolved: how can it continue to govern based on an institutional structure that still has important limits on its process of change? This situation has become a dilemma for the party that can be formulated as "transformation vs. continuity" and is a choice for its governments centered on the importance of external vs. internal alliances.

As if this were not enough, once again electoral and political calendars are superceding the solution of long-term institutional problems, which would surely contribute to the PAN recovering important spaces that it has lost in recent elections and even to its advancing in others, in addition to being able to


more clearly visualize the road it should take forward to reach its new objectives.

Statements by former Energy Minister Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, Senator Carlos Medina Plascencia and PAN congressional caucus leader Francisco Barrio about the possibility of making bids for the PAN presidential nomination in 2006, and Minister of the Interior Santiago Creel's clear desire to do the same, have once again focused the discussion basically on the elections, shunting to one side the fundamental problems. **MM**

NOTES

¹ These two candidates ran for the governor's seat in Baja California in 1989 and the presidency in 1988, respectively. [Editor's Note.]


² The author is referring to the 70 years in which the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) was in office. [Editor's Note.]




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
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Five Notes About Health Care in Mexico

Gustavo Leal Fernández*

ONE: BALANCING PREVENTION AND CURE

Any modern health system must both prevent and treat diseases. This is its main task. Such a serious responsibility is often associated with its capacity

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Mexico is suffering today from an incoherent government combination of prevention and cure, in which the state tends to disavow its responsibility.

to provide integral care to the individual and the community.

To meet this responsibility, these systems use, first, health promotion and education (for example in the free textbooks distributed by the Ministry of

Education) and preventive campaigns (like the Health Ministry's twice-yearly National Vaccination Weeks).

Prevention also includes other actions to diminish risk factors (frequently related to life style like excessive tobacco, alco-

The mixture of public health with medical care is the main service provision problem currently facing the health sector.

hol or drug consumption or high-risk sexual-reproductive practices) that may eventually cause illness. Finally, prevention also aspires to reducing accidents, homicides, certain environmental risks and some strictly work-related conditions.

But once a person has become ill, the health system must be able to provide integral care: diagnosis, treatment and rehabilitation.

Therefore, it is useful to distinguish between health care system users and patients. Strictly speaking, a user who is vaccinated and a mother who gives


birth are basically healthy, while a person ill with and being monitored for diabetes or with terminal cancer have seen their welfare diminished; they are in danger, the victims of a disease, and they are suffering. While a user enters and leaves the system voluntarily, the patient is a kind of sun in the care network, a sun whose movements order the entire system of planets seeking to care for his/her illness.

Therefore, the quality of any health system is expressed in its real capacity to implement preventive policies that effectively avoid disease and, to that same

extent, consistently improve the health of the population, and in the order, precision and extent of the doctors' and nurses' interventions to restore health to someone who has fallen ill.

TWO: BUT IN MEXICO, PREVENTION AND CURE DO NOT WORK

Despite the fact that in 2002, 5.8 percent of the gross domestic product was spent on health, the National Health System (whose public-private design was created by the last Institutional



Mexico should improve the quality
of its clinical treatment, extending the IMSS Model of Integral
Medical Care to the entire country.

Revolutionary Party administrations) does not adequately prevent illness nor treat disease.

Suffice it to consider that, following World Bank recommendations, the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) says it works on supposedly improving family medicine in which first-level care is an institutional priority.¹ To that end, it has equipped 101 units with computers, servers and printers to create electronic medical files. But the IMSS also established the PREVENIMSS-Integrated Health Programs, which aims at the systematic, ordered implementation of actions linked to health promotion, nutritional monitoring, disease prevention, detection and control, and reproductive health, by age groups. While the IMSS is awash in a total lack of clinical policies for caring for patients, its officials happily stated that, "By December 2002, 5,226,412 'health cards' had been handed out to those affiliated to the IMSS. This new focus has a long-term vision that will have an influence on creating a culture of the individual sharing responsibility for his/her own health through actions of education, prevention and health promotion among children, teenagers, women, men and older adults."²

And that is not all. Since 2002, the IMSS of "the government of change,"³ Vicente Fox's IMSS, changed the health part of the Opportunities Human Development Assistance Program (Basic Package) into an institution especially designed to give highly specialized care

to medical conditions.⁴ The authorities have reported that they are working with "the 13 actions of the essential health package, the food supplements for under-fives, pregnant and nursing women, and health education and promotion with sessions on 35 issues in 660 operational modules. By December 2002, 275,172 families were being monitored."⁵

In addition, emphasizing self-health care, the current administration's 2001-2006 National Health Program has sought to make national "policies" jibe with the management, "preventive-ist" vogues imposed by Dr. Gro Harlem Brundtland's World Health Organization.

And all this is happening when in 1999, 443,950 people died. Approximately half of this number, 52.1 percent, died from one of the following five causes: heart disease (ischemia and acute attack of the myocardium); malignant tumors (of the digestive tract, the stomach, liver and gall bladder and the genital-urinary tract, the cervix and prostate gland); diabetes mellitus; traffic accidents; and liver disease (alcoholism and hepatitis).

This situation, that should be dealt with by balanced, resolved preventive and curative policies, is often "resolved" in government discourse by a never-proven "epidemiological transition."⁶ This, more than orienting these policies, tends to have a vested interest in masking the disease and death of the Mexican population.

As has been pointed out on more than one occasion, this mixture of public health with medical care is the main service provision problem currently facing the health sector.

The fact that the IMSS, the main national public health institution designed to treat disease, is deficiently performing its preventive work indicates that, since Guillermo Soberón headed up the Health Ministry, those in political posts responsible for health care in Mexico have been on the wrong track.⁷

THREE: WHAT HAS FAILED?

Undoubtedly, priorities should be re-considered before undertaking to map national health and disease.

In the first place, Mexico should improve its population's health with effective prevention policies that are part of real strategies both inside and outside the sector.

For this to happen, the current institutional format of the Ministry of Health should be broadened out, concentrating exclusively on the tasks of community health, with the entire cooperation of the other branches of the public administration directly involved in the matter (notably the Ministries of Education, of the Environment and Natural Resources and of Agriculture, among others).

In the second place, Mexico should improve the quality of its clinical treat-

TABLE I
THE LEADING CAUSES OF DEATH IN MEXICO (1922-1995)

CAUSE ¹	YEAR								
	1922	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	1995
Pneumonia and influenza/ influenza and pneumonia	11.2	11.0	16.3	16.7	12.5	17.2	8.8		
Diarrhea and enteritis/gastroenteritis and colitis/enteritis and other diarrheal diseases/infectious intestinal diseases	7.1	18.1	21.0	17.2	14.1	14.8	9.5		
Fever and paludal cachexia/malaria	6.9	6.2	5.2	5.5					
Whooping cough	3.9	4.2							
Smallpox	3.3	3.9							
Violent or accidental deaths/accidents, poisoning and violence/accidents			5.1	5.9	3.2		11.1	9.3	8.3
Measles			3.9						
Certain early childhood diseases/ early childhood diseases/certain causes of perinatal morbidity and mortality				6.0	10.4	5.2		5.5	
Malignant tumors					2.8	3.8	6.1	9.7	11.2
Heart diseases						6.9	8.5	12.5	14.8
Diabetes mellitus								6.1	7.7
Cerebro-vascular disease									5.4
% of total deaths per year due to five leading causes	32.4	43.4	51.6	51.3	43.0	48.0	44.0	43.1	47.4

¹ As one would expect, the International Disease Classification (IDC) used for grouping these ailments changed during the century (WHO, 1993); but beyond these changes, it is quite easy to see the progressive modification of the profile itself.

Sources: SSA, *Compendio histórico. Estadísticas Vitales 1893-1993. Estados Unidos Mexicanos* (Mexico City: Dirección General de Estadística, Informática y Evaluación, Secretaría de Salud, 1993), pp. 35-41; and *Mortalidad 1995* (Mexico City: Dirección General de Estadística e Informática, Secretaría de Salud, 1996), p. 69.

ment, extending the IMSS Model of Integral Medical Care to the entire country.

Finally, private medicine, the insurance system associated with it and the pharmaceutical and medical equipment industries should be correctly regulated using the IMSS Model of Integral Medical Care. This would guarantee that they provide timely care and ser-

vices in a modern regulatory framework.

At the dawn of the twenty-first century, then, Mexico should finally be able to efficiently measure the impact of its preventive policies through good practice signals in community health and consistently strengthen, once and for all, the clinical policies that guide doctors' and nurses' care of patients.

Politicians in charge of health must also intervene in the complex issue of medical training, regulating the excessive number of schools and their high enrollment, that can often barely offer their graduates the prospects of under- or unemployment. They should urgently adjust the study programs to the country's current health and disease profile, coherently consolidating the

distribution of doctors where they are needed.

FOUR: THE "CHANGE" FOX DID NOT MAKE

Health in Mexico today is suffering from an incoherent government combination of prevention and cure, in which the state tends to disavow its responsibility for patient care in exchange

for rudimentary health promotion and prevention.

In the last 22 years, the state says it is providing "health" services when, strictly speaking, it is barely distributing basic, essential packages. The government demands hikes in health spending, but if its "preventive" policies were radical, it should rather optimize the resources it already has and spend more and more appropriately, with new clinical parameters, on care for the patients

with the diseases that plague and kill the Mexican population.

The Program of Free Medical Services and Medications operated by the current Mexico City government's Health Ministry has not incorporated alternative clinical policies for helping its patients and doctors either. Strictly speaking, it is a social strategy that includes some medical interventions.

In addition, poverty and inequality, domestic and foreign migration, dis-

TABLE 2
SOCIAL SECURITY HEALTH CARE COVERAGE (1944-2000)

YEAR	TOTAL POPULATION	POPULATION WITH COVERAGE	% OF POPULATION WITH COVERAGE	COVERAGE BY INSTITUTION							
				IMSS (%)	ISSSTE (%)	PEMEX (%)	NAT. RAILROAD COMPANY (%)	MINISTRY OF DEFENSE (%)	NAT. MILITARY SERVICE (%)	STATE (%)	
1944		355,527		100.00							
1945		533,555		100.00							
1950	25,791,017	1,111,544	4.31	87.64		12.36					
1955		1,750,563		90.04		9.98					
1960	34,231,290	4,016,563	11.50	83.17	12.14	4.69					
1965	42,729,000	8,607,828	20.15	79.18	12.44	2.70	2.47	2.28	0.93		
1970	48,225,238	12,195,991	25.29	81.14	11.05	2.68	2.28	2.20	0.65		
1975	60,153,387	20,763,857	34.52	76.17	16.61	2.50	2.00	1.98	0.74		
1980	66,846,833	30,773,224	46.04	78.40	16.20	2.10	1.72	1.11	0.47		
1985	77,938,288	39,498,266	50.68	79.82	16.32	2.64		0.43	0.79		
1990	81,249,645	48,028,003	59.11	80.32	16.81	1.87		0.66	0.34		
1995	911,58,290	45,723,840	50.16	75.07	20.22	1.13		0.69	0.47	2.41	
2000*	97,483,412	59,231,330	60.76	78.56	16.99	1.09		0.82	0.32	2.21	

* The source consulted (Grupo Interinstitucional de Información en Salud, or GIIS) mentions an overestimation of the number of affiliated clients. The 2000 Census (INEGI 2000) reports that only 40.13 percent of the total population has a right to social security institutions' care.

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática, www.inegi.gob.mx, Instituto Mexicano de Seguro Social, www.imss.gob.mx, Sistema Nacional de Salud and Grupo Interinstitucional de Información en Salud.

In the arena of health and social security, the current administration betrayed its offer of “change” and today is reduced to unfortunate continuity.

eases among the rural and indigenous population and the physically and mentally challenged, among many other factors, increasingly weigh on the potential for an answer and the supposed “sovereignty” over the decisions of the National Health System.

Faced with the legacy of the PRI governments, during his presidential campaign, Vicente Fox heard three main demands: solving the problem of the chronic lack of medication in the public health care system; getting all the finished health infrastructure (health centers, clinics and hospitals), closed for budget reasons, up and running; and solving the problem of patients having to wait long periods for surgery.

Little or none of this has been done. Everyone who voted for “change” now pays more taxes and fees, pays for more medications that used to be free and receives the same or worse services than Fox inherited from the PRI. For those voters, the only return on “Foxism” has been the apocalyptic financial “diagnostic analysis” of the “liabilities” of the IMSS and the State Workers Institute for Social Security and Services (ISSSTE), which provides medical care for public employees and their families.

The case of the fantastic “star” health program, the so-called “Popular Insurance” publicized by the Health Ministry, is even worse. Offering to provide medical care that today’s national system cannot guarantee; replacing care with general, rudimentary public health measures; with no firm basis

of funding; charging patients for services through a pre-paid system; imposing on the states an authoritarian scheme of expenditures through the Finance Ministry; and exposing the work of doctors and nurses to the just demands of a population that has “purchased” a policy for which they will not receive anything in exchange, this “innovative program” —which is neither an insurance policy nor “popular”— is a candidate for being the biggest institutional fraud of the “administration of change.” For example, Fox has promised that 5 million families (25 million Mexicans) will be affiliated by 2006. At the end of the day, the Popular Insurance just has a new image to distribute the same resources to the states that the PRI government did: 45 percent, medications; 23 percent, wages; 16.6 percent, equipment.

This shows that those currently in charge of health policy are profoundly confused about the difference between the final goal of any health system (improving people’s state of health and curing disease) and one of its intermediate goals: financing service provision.

But citizen-voters are not concerned about the wherefore of that financing. Once their taxes are paid, when they get sick, what they expect is a system that can give a resolute, worthy medical response.

Thus, in the arena of health and social security, the current administration betrayed its offer of “change” and today is reduced to unfortunate continuity.

FIVE: WHAT IS TO BE DONE?

It is simply ridiculous that those responsible for health policy should demagogically invoke a “democratization of health,” when any day of the week, Mexican patients, despite their “civil, political and social rights” being established in the Constitution, pay for services that cannot cure them.

The only hope is that in 2006, the voters, including those who voted for “change,” opt for a new elite. That new administration, when taking over public policy design and calling for decision-makers’ accountability today, must formulate other actions that are up to the needs of the nation, able to balance with imagination, audacity and seriousness modern prevention and cure. **MM**

NOTES

¹ The IMSS is the institution that provides medical care and pensions for private sector Mexican workers and their families. [Editor’s Note.]

² Santiago Levy, *IMSS. Informe de la Dirección General XCII Asamblea General Ordinaria* (Mexico City: IMSS, 26 May 2003), pp. 29-31.

³ This is how the Vicente Fox administration refers to itself. [Editor’s Note.]

⁴ The Opportunities Program is the Fox administration’s main tool in social development and the fight against poverty and marginalization. [Editor’s Note.]

⁵ Santiago Levy, *op. cit.*, pp. 42-43.

⁶ The author is referring to the debate about the supposed transition in diseases among the Mexican population in which diseases typical of underdevelopment (above all gastrointestinal and respiratory illnesses) would make way for diseases more characteristic of developed countries (cardiovascular conditions, cancer, obesity, etc.). [Editor’s Note.]

⁷ Guillermo Soberón has been and continues to be one of the doctor-politicians most influential in defining health policy in Mexico. He was minister of health from 1982 to 1988 under the Miguel de la Madrid administration. Currently, he heads up the Mexican Foundation for Health. [Editor’s Note.]



The Impact of Mexico's Social Security Crisis

Berenice P. Ramírez López*

The Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) financial crisis has been in the national media in recent months and is one of the most important challenges to public finance and economic policies. The way this crisis is resolved will determine future

social protection policies, which will in the long run have an impact on Mexicans' well-being.

A quick glance at the financial situation of Mexico's social security institutes shows that the main problem is a lack of resources to meet existing commitments. Among them is the lack of actuarial reserves to deal with the growing number of retirees and pensioners, creating a crisis in the pension system.¹

It should be remembered that the main objective of pensions is to be part of a social system that protects workers' present and future incomes in the event of disability or old age.

Wage workers in Mexico have a right to a pension when it is stipulated in their contract; today, this covers only 17.7 percent of the population, or 36.7 percent of the work force with jobs.² Clearly, coverage is very limited.

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Pensions are financed from three sources: the worker contributes according to his/her base wage and the employer matches that amount. The government makes up the difference.³

The social security institutions that provide these services are the IMSS, created in 1943; the State Workers Institute for Social Security and Services (ISSSTE), created in 1959; the Armed Forces Social Security Institute (ISSFAM) and decentralized public bodies and companies like *Petróleos Mexicanos* (Mexican Petroleum Company or Pemex); the *Comisión Federal de Electricidad* (the Federal Electricity Commission or CFE); *Luz y Fuerza del Centro*

the pension system was changed to a privately managed one of defined contributions and individual savings accounts.⁴ This system is obligatory for workers who began working in the private sector as of July 1, 1997.

If we take into account the small number of workers who have a right to a pension, the diversity of requirements and the obstacles to getting one, the lack of actuarial reserves to sustain the systems, the economic context mainly characterized by a long period of lack of sustained growth, the drop in income and wages for over 20 years, increased unemployment and informal activity (that situates 63.3 percent of

Key among the arguments justifying the reforms of the social security institutes is the impact of the demographic transition: a declining mortality rate and increased life expectancy. Mexicans' average life expectancy has jumped 28 years, going from 48 in 1943 to 76 by 2004. This has meant that pensions have to be paid out for longer periods. Since they are given after a certain number of years of work and not because the individual reaches a certain age, workers can retire before the age of 60. This pressures the finances of the social security institutions and if there is continued insistence on reforming the pension systems using the model of defined contributions, individual accounts and private management (*Afores*), in the transition period, current pensions will necessarily have to be paid by the government. The Ministry of Finance maintains that today, the state is spending 19.8 billion pesos a year on pensions, or 13 percent of the government budget.⁸

Without a doubt, these demographic changes affect the pension systems, but the way it affects them is more related to the dynamics of the economy and the change in the pattern of social reproduction implemented in the country more than 20 years ago, as well as with the systematic deficit in waged job creation. Nevertheless, demographic aging is a trend that must be taken into account when designing public policy since the number of people over 65 will grow very dynamically, almost 400 percent between 2000 and 2050. This will necessarily have an impact on, among other things, the cost of health care for older adults. However, it should be emphasized that what today has the largest impact on pension funds is the lack of econom-

Pensions and health care will depend increasingly on individuals' savings and will stop being an obligation of the state.

(*Light and Electricity of Central Mexico* or *LyFC*); and the development banks *Banobras* and *Nacional Financiera*. These social security institutes, in addition to providing pensions also offer health services and other benefits both to workers and their families, covering 49.2 percent of the total population.

The retirement system written into law in the 1940s and 1950s specifies defined benefits and is based on solidarity, using the formula that employed workers finance the passive workers. This is the characteristic of the entire system, known as the distribution system, although the different age requirements, time worked required and some additional benefits are what determine the big differences in today's retirement schemes. In the case of workers signed up with the IMSS, with the reform that went into effect in 1997,

the employed work force with no right to benefits),⁵ increased life expectancy and epidemiological changes, we can conclude that the pension systems need to be reformed. However, what is debatable is that this reform can have only a single orientation: substituting privately managed models of defined contributions for pay-as-you-go defined benefits systems based on solidarity.

I already said this when, some time ago, I did a rapid analysis of the 1997 reform of the IMSS. It should be noted that what was proposed to resolve the institute's financing has not been achieved, nor has greater coverage. Six years after the IMSS was reformed, it has 180 billion pesos in liabilities.⁶ In terms of coverage, in 1990, the IMSS provided medical care for 41.2 percent of the total population; in 1997, 39.5 percent; and in 2003, 39.2 percent.⁷

ic growth and the distortions in the Mexican economy, which have meant the dearth of formal sector job creation and the growth of informal activities, with the resulting creation of jobs without any kind of social security (and therefore people employed who are not paying into any pension fund). Obviously, given these circumstances, the ratio of active workers to retirees tends to shrink steadily. However, this situation would not have been so radical if the creation of waged jobs had not stopped, if public sector employment had not plummeted and if the drop in income had not been as large as it has been in the last 20 years.

It is important to mention that if *the reforms* of the pension system made up until today have been to create a privately managed system of defined contributions and individual accounts it is because they are prescribed by the economic model. That is, the reform of the IMSS was implemented when the structural reforms that changed the country's economic and social reproduction models had already been made after 1982, leading the way to an open economy based on the principles of the free market, shored up by the trade and financial opening, the liberalization of goods and services, the privatization of state and para-state bodies and the reform of the state. Therefore, the reform of social security is part of the so-called second generation structural reforms whose aim is for economic growth to be based on international competition, trade and financial liberalization and privatization. This has even led to the commercialization of services traditionally provided by the state, among them, health care and pensions. These matters are increasingly thrown into the sphere of indi-

vidual responsibility. That is, pensions and health care will depend increasingly on individuals' savings (which means that they have to have a paying job) and will stop being an obligation of the state, as is still stipulated by the Constitution.

We should consider that if we start from the current low income levels, even if they are managed very well and profitably, pensions are at most going to correspond to the income level with which contributions were made. According to the National Employment Survey, we find that by late 2002, 9.4 percent of employed persons did not receive any wage at all; 16.2 percent

savings, and taking into account that for every peso saved, only 75 cents would actually be deposited in their accounts with the rest going for administration costs,⁹ the remaining 26.9 percent would get a pension or income for life.

The pertinent question is: Why is a reform made based on defined contributions, individual capitalization and private management if it is very probable that in the long run most of the pensions will be guaranteed minimum pensions, which makes for a higher fiscal burden and, with the weight of labor liabilities and the payment of government bonds to which a large part of the worker's savings have been

Any proposal to reform the pension system
must include everyone who is carrying out productive activity,
even in the informal sector.

earned less than minimum wage; 25.14 percent earned between minimum wage and double that wage; 22.2 percent earned between twice and three times that amount; 15.8 percent earned between three and five times minimum wage; and only 11.14 percent earned more than five times the minimum wage. If all employed persons were part of a privately managed system of defined contributions and individual capitalization, 25.6 percent of those with jobs either would not pay any social security tax or their contributions would be so small that at the end of their life they would not have contributed enough to earn them a pension. Based on their income and contributions, 47.4 percent would get a minimum pension. And if we had economic growth, recovery of purchasing power and high interest rates for their

committed, public debt is growing and will continue to grow enormously? And why, when financing is required to foster economic growth, are very significant resources such as workers' forced savings managed by private companies, which quite naturally seek profitability and therefore see pension fund management as a juicy business deal that seems to leave few benefits to the domestic market?

Another of the aims of the 1997 IMSS pension reform is closely linked to financial market behavior and the possibility that most of the resources gathered from workers' forced savings could be channeled into productive investment and, with that, generate a virtuous circle of economic growth, which in the medium term would improve workers' earnings and the creation of more waged jobs.

The reality has been quite different. Domestic savings has dropped from 24 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1997 to 18 percent in 2002. Investment behavior also shows this effect: the economic recovery still does not have the push needed to make fixed gross investment grow. Then, where are the workers' forced savings, the financial resources being managed by the Private Administrators of Pension Funds (Afores)?

The resources managed by the Afores are channeled into the Pension Fund Investment Societies (Siefores), regulated by the National Savings for Retirement Commission (Consar). The

another factor for financial invariability of the country's economy if the amount of resources—which are significant—becomes part of the mass of financial resources that have been inserted into the dynamic of the international financial market.

If we are faced with the need to continue to reform the pension system to ensure appropriate financial viability and security to retirees of today and the future, what should be proposed?

Taking into account that the population over the age of 60 represents 5 percent of the work force, that 21.7 percent of households state that the head of the household is over 60, that only 17

tutions if the new reforms are to have positive results.

Equally, any proposal to reform the pension system must include everyone who is carrying out productive activity. Concretely, mechanisms for incorporating the informal sector must be created. The different existing pension schemes should also be harmonized with regard to requirements like the years the individual must pay into the fund, minimum retirement age, etc.

The pension commitments of all the institutions are said to have already reached 130 percent of GDP. The discussion of this issue seems to have just started and the only proposal until now is to continue with private management of these savings, without analyzing the consequences for social security.

However, I think it is viable to implement a national pension system funded by the state that would establish transparent rules with appropriate investments, favoring national productive sectors, with low operating costs, free from political interference.¹³ If one of the country's basic problems today is financing economic growth, it would be a shame that workers' resources were once again lost, that their savings not contribute to establishing viable social security, with pensions that can give them some certainty, and that these resources not be channeled into the country's productive activity. **MM**

What has the largest impact on pension funds today is the lack of economic growth and the distortions in the Mexican economy.

regulations aim to protect the workers' savings, even though they have no guarantee of their profitability. Up until now, these resources have been invested in the following way: 82.4 percent are turned into government bonds; 10.8 percent is channeled into corporate credit; 4.4 percent to financial institutions; and 2.3 percent to state bodies.¹⁰ Of the monies that go to corporations, 70 percent goes to the largest companies, linked to the service sector, and, in second place, to manufacturing.¹¹

By January 2004, the accumulated savings of the workers came to 403.6688 trillion pesos, which represented 6 percent of GDP. The paradox of the 1997 reform is that it was made to financially alleviate the IMSS, which today is reporting greater financial difficulties, since its public debt has increased geometrically and may even become

percent of those over 60 have a pension,¹² that 80 percent of those households live in poverty, I think that pensions, as an essential part of the social safety net, must be returned to the public sphere. Therefore, they should be removed from the logic of private business's single-minded quest for profitability. In situations where the population has insufficient coverage and such high wage and labor heterogeneity, pension models are only actuarially sustainable if they are based on redistributive solidarity since the risks of illness, disability and labor matters are also diverse. In addition, we have to keep in mind that if social security is financed with state, business and workers' contributions, we must have sustained economic growth as a general precondition, and in particular, better use must be made of the resources earmarked for the insti-

NOTES

¹ From 1980 to 2003, the number of active workers per retiree has gone from 13.1 to 6 in the IMSS. In the State Workers Institute for Social Security and Services (ISSSTE), the ratio has dropped from 19 to 4. *Tercer Informe de Gobierno* (Mexico City: Presidencia de México, 2003).

² This percentage has been calculated using information from the 2003 National Employment Survey, published by the National Statistics Institute and the Ministry of Labor in Aguascalientes, the state social security institutes and the statistical compendia from the September 2003 President's Report to the Nation.

³ In the case of government employees, obviously social security payments are made only by the worker and the government.

⁴ Pension systems can be based on defined benefits or defined contributions. The defined benefit systems (pay-as-you-go or solidarity-based systems) stipulate that at the time of retiring, the right to the pension and its amount are decided according to the average wage in a specified number of years and weeks that the worker made payments into the system. The body that gives the pension guarantees its payment until the worker's demise. In the defined contribution plans, benefits depend on the funds accumulated individually. When the worker retires, he/she receives the bal-

ance accumulated and if what has been saved is sufficient, he/she can contract with the private fund manager a life-long income or programmed retirement. He/she assumes the risks of financial profitability and of surviving longer than expected.

⁵ Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Geografía e Informática-Secretaría del Trabajo y Previsión Social, *Encuesta Nacional de Empleo* (Aguascalientes: INEGI-STPS 2003).

⁶ Jaime Sánchez Susarrey, "Salvemos al IMSS," *Reforma* (Mexico City), 15 May 2003. This was an editorial based on an interview with Santiago Levy, the general director of the IMSS.

⁷ *Anexo al Tercer Informe de Gobierno* (Mexico City: Presidencia de la República, 2003), p. 80.

⁸ *Reforma* (Mexico City), 21 May 2004.

⁹ Commissions are charged on the basis of the integrated base wage. That is why the Afores have made such high profits since they were

instituted. See Ángel Guillermo Ruíz Moreno, *Las Afores* (Mexico City: Porrúa, 2002).

¹⁰ *Anexos 1, 2 y 3, Tercer Informe de Gobierno* (Mexico City: Presidencia de la República, 2003).

¹¹ Among the companies are America Movil, Telmex, Televisa, Grupo Carso, Telecom, Bimbo, Coca-Cola Femsa, Cigarrera La Moderna, Imsa and Kimberly Clark. Of the monies invested in the financial sector, they represent 10 percent of the total in Afores; and the financial institutions that absorb them are Ford, General Motors Company, Casita, Crédito y Casa (Consar, "Valores corporativos en las carteras de las Siefors Básicas," www.consar.gob.mx/estadisticas/2004/febrero).

¹² Berenice Ramírez, "Envejecimiento demográfico, pensiones y desarrollo económico en México," unpublished paper, 2003.

¹³ This model has been implemented in 26 countries. The closest example is in Quebec, Canada.

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


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
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Photos courtesy of Zaidee Stavely

Over the Radio and into the Woods

Zaidee Stavely*

Emerging from the foliage of the northern Veracruz mountains, a trombone plays a single note,

* Free-lance journalist and translator. She also writes poetry and plays Huastec violin.

then another, and is followed by trumpets, cornets, tubas and drums. The musicians march out from among the pines, having walked miles to participate in this celebration of Saint Cecilia.

Blasting away, they take their place in the line, where another nine bands are

already waiting. One group of musicians is decked out in matching blue suits. Others sport ponytails and Che Guevara T-shirts, while many wear baggy jeans and baseball caps. The drums are painted with the names of the bands and colorful images of deer, mountains, starry

skies and roads winding their way among houses.

A young indigenous woman runs from one band to another with a small minidisk player to record the songs for the radio. When one band finishes, she looks around quizzically, wondering who will be the next to begin, then rushes off at the first blast of a trumpet.

The woman is Lucrecia Linares, Tepehua radio announcer for Radio Huayacocotla, a shortwave community radio that transmits in Spanish as well as the three indigenous languages of the region, Otomí, Nahua and Tepehua.

Today, the radio's directors and announcers have come to the Otomí community of Pie de la Cuesta for a special celebration of Saint Cecilia, patron saint of musicians. In the last year, the radio has helped pay for instruments for eight new bands, two of them made up of mostly young people, making a total of 12 bands in the municipality of Texcatepec.

As the procession makes its way down, then up the hill, meeting two bands from the community, winding around to the church and back to the basketball court which is the center of town, a crackling radio calls from a one-room wooden shack with a corrugated tin roof as the procession passes.

"Radio Huayacocotla, the voice of the campesinos, XEJN, broadcasting for you at 2390 kilohertz with 500 watts of power to the Sierra Norte of Veracruz."

Even here in Pie de la Cuesta, three hours by car on a dirt road, and a seven-hour walk from the town of Huayacocotla, where the radio is located, the people listen to the shortwave station, which programs music ranging from *rancheras* and *norteñas* to *banda* and Huastec trios from the region, as well as birthday greetings, community announce-

ments and informative shows ranging from "The Rights of My People" on human rights to "The Sullen Cow" about raising cattle. The news is transmitted in Spanish twice a week, and in Otomí, Nahua and Tepehua once a week.

Linares, who is from the nearby municipality of Tlachichilco, did not used to listen to Radio Huaya much.

"I thought the radio was like all the others, but it's not. This radio is for all people, rich and poor. Radio Huaya is for everyone."

What she did listen to were radio soap operas. In communities where there is no television, people listen to

Some of the bands have traveled all the way to Huayacocotla to record in the studio; others are just learning. But today, everyone is invited to play together.

And play together they do. Although at the beginning the bands take turns playing one at a time, in the afternoon they begin to blast all together, making it difficult to distinguish the tunes filling the air against the bright pink sunset over the mountains.

Across the ravine, in Huayacocotla, the telephone rings in a bright building painted with a mural of green mountains, groups of farmers and indigenous

Even if the government decides not to give them AM or FM licenses, Radio Huayacocotla is becoming a bulwark for indigenous autonomy.

Radio Huaya's radio dramas every day. The priority for Radio Mita (in Otomí) or Radio Lacaxcajak (in Tepehua) are the indigenous people who live in these mountains of Veracruz. From the language spoken on the radio to local music and interviews in rural areas, the radio "is the people," as coordinator and Otomí announcer Pedro Ruperto explains to me.

Ten years ago, explains Ruperto, the young people in Huayacocotla did not like the radio or the music it played. Now, with *banda* music on the rise, people pay for the indigenous bands to play for parties.

"Young people want to learn to play an instrument now," he tells me.

Many of the older members of the indigenous communities in Texcatepec have told the radio that they see the bands as a way for young people to be reintegrated into the community.

people and a man with a microphone. Inside, a man sitting at a typewriter, surrounded by piles of old tapes and records, answers the phone.

"Hello," says the voice from the other end. "This is Diego Alberto calling from New York. I would like to dedicate 'Las Mañanitas' to my daughter who is turning three today."

Every day, Radio Huaya receives calls from indigenous and mestizo men who have migrated to New York. A large part of the announcements made six times a day are messages from *El Otro Lado* (The Other Side): "Angelina García, please go to the telephone booth in El Papatlar on Saturday at 10:00 to receive a phone call from Isaac," or "The family of Pablo Ricardo, don't worry; he arrived safely at his destination."

The radio has become a form of communication in a region where there are few phones and an unreliable mail



The priority is the indigenous people who live in the mountains of Veracruz. From the language spoken on the radio to local music and interviews in rural areas, the radio “is the people.”

service. Migrants working in carwashes, as delivery boys or in construction send messages to receive money orders, phone calls or just to say hello from Queens and the Bronx.

Radio Huaya receives between 800 and 1,000 hand-delivered letters a week. Ricardo González, one of three radio announcers at the station, explains that many of them are sent from surrounding indigenous communities with the merchants who come into Huayacocotla for the weekly market.

The letters are not the only way they know the radio’s 500 watts are working.

“In the indigenous communities, the people know you,” explains Pedro Ruperto. “You arrive and they ask, ‘Who are you?’ ‘Pedro Ruperto,’ you say, or ‘Ricardo González,’ and they hug you.

“It feels good to know they are listening to you when they heat tortillas, when they are eating, when they are sad, when they are happy.”

Radio Huayacocotla dates back to 1965, when a radio school was established here. In 1973, however, the program closed, and in 1975, a group of Jesuits was invited to come to Huaya and establish a community radio project, based on programs in South and Central America.

In those years, the first changes were made, converting the antenna from a “clothesline” to a tall vertical tower. At first, the Jesuits focused on problems such as foresting resources and kaolin production in the mestizo communities.

Alfredo Zepeda, one of the first Jesuit priests to arrive in Huaya, laughs, remembering how they used to play protest music by Silvio Rodríguez instead of local music from the region.

“In those days I didn’t even know how to say hello or thank you in Otomí,” he says. “I knew Otomí was spoken, but you never saw them or talked with them or had any real contact.”

In the early 1990s, all of this changed. In Texcatepec, directly across the ravine from Huayacocotla, outbreaks of violence exploded over land issues.

Every day people who were organizing in the valleys began to be kidnapped, tortured or killed.

“We turned things around and tried to see the world not just from Huaya, but from the indigenous communities,” explains Zepeda.

In 1995, soon after the Zapatista rebellion in Chiapas, Radio Huayacocotla was one of many community radios closed down by the government. For three months, because of supposed “technical errors,” the “Voice of the Campesinos” remained off the air.

Authorities told Zepeda, “You are broadcasting coded messages.” Zepeda’s answer: “That code is Otomí.”

In fact, Radio Huaya is one of only two community radio stations in Mex-

Every day, Radio Huaya receives calls from indigenous and mestizo men who have migrated to New York. It has become a form of communication in a region where there are few phones and an unreliable mail service.



ico with permission to transmit, but only on shortwave. Although the radio has distributed at least 1,700 shortwave sets in the region, people still come into the station to ask how they can make their radio get Radio Huaya.

Because it is shortwave and has no filters at the moment, the radio sometimes turns up in unwanted places: the television, for example, or the speakers in the Catholic church.

"Los Cuatro del Pueblo play really well, don't they?" one man asked Ricardo González. "I don't have a radio, but my neighbor plays it at top volume!"

Currently, Radio Huaya is one of 43 radio stations in Mexico belonging to the World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (AMARC) negotiating with the Ministry of the Interior to ask for legal permission to broadcast on FM or AM.

The AMARC radios range from indigenous radios to urban youth stations

to women's programs. Most of them have no legal permits whatsoever. One group in the northern state of Sonora was told to prove they had at least one million pesos (about U.S.\$100,000) and even then the permission would not be guaranteed.

For the government, community radios are easily bunched together as "pirate, clandestine, guerrilla and subversive," and in the past it has used the army to investigate and report on them.

Aleida Calleja, director of AMARC México says the majority of reports against community radios come from the owners of private commercial stations.

"Mexico is number one in media monopolies," she states. According to AMARC, two families control 86 percent of the country's television, and 13 groups manage 90 percent of radio broadcasts.

Although the Ministry of the Interior promised not to make any moves against the radio stations during dialogue with AMARC, the Ministry of Communications and Transportation has attempted to close down several different community radios, from Oaxaca and Michoacán to the outskirts of Mexico City in 2003.

Radio Huaya has asked for permission to broadcast on AM twice in the past. Denied in 1978, in 1984 the radio received permission from the Ministry of Communications and Transportation to transmit on 1350 KHz, but the Ministry of the Interior never followed through.


Even if the government decides not to give them AM or FM licenses, Radio Huayacocotla is becoming a bulwark for indigenous autonomy. There, in the small town with cobblestone streets and apple trees perched among pine forested mountains, two adolescent girls approach the door to the station.

Giggling, they walk through the waiting area, covered in photographs and posters, and explain they want to send a message.

Lucrecia Linares leads them down the hall into the studio covered in foam rubber, across from the tiny cabin where Ricardo González is sitting among compact disks and a newly acquired computer.

"We have a dedication," he says in Spanish, and signals for them to begin. The girls speak one at a time, in Spanish and then in Tepehua, and leave with shy smiles on their faces.


In the studio, between smooth pine walls and microphones, standing under the foam rubber ceiling, one can almost hear a brass band playing, recording their first tune to be played over the radio and into these hills. **MM**



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
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
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Vicenzo Sanfo*



Quetzalcóatl Equinox,
39 x 19 x 19 cm, 1993 (bronze).
Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.



Blue Sphere, 8 m in diameter, 2002 (iron with acrylic enamel). Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.

When I first saw Sebastián's work on one of my trips to Mexico, I immediately understood that he was a very important artist and that the search he was making went far beyond the purely local: he spoke to the entire world in an extremely personal language with universal scope. The first work I saw was *Horse Head*, masterfully placed and, perhaps, one of the twentieth century's most important monumental sculptures.¹

Some years have passed since then, but I continued to want to meet the artist—I was already familiar with his work thanks to books I had bought to study it more closely—and finally, unexpectedly, the opportunity to meet him came, contrived together with a far off country with thousands of years of history behind it: China.

When I was curator of the first Beijing Biennial, a very important historic event, Sebastián was proposed to represent Mexico; obviously, I approved the idea enthusiastically, happy to be able to meet a master whose work had fascinated me for so long. For me, then, it was a pleasant surprise to discover that the artist, capable of competing with the monumental stature of skyscrapers and with the imperiousness of great contemporary architecture, capable of dominating iron and steel, of bending to his will forms of unthinkable size, was amenable, extremely courteous and unassuming.

Over the days in China, the pleasure of that meeting became a friendship of great intellec-

tual intensity, reinforced by a common vision of contemporary art and, particularly, the great unexpressed potential of contemporary Mexican art that is, in my opinion, worth of a great deal of attention. This common conception of the contemporary art world became the glue of a friendship, strengthened by my successive visits to his studies and my more and more profound understanding of his quest.

Today, Sebastián's course seems clearer to me, his place in the contemporary art world more certain and his identity more secure. I place him among the great sculptors of our time, among those whose work is destined to give the art world to come new ways forward. However, Sebastián's work could not be understood without taking into account a vision of sculpture derived from logic and mathematical reflection, from the impact of quantum theories, of the fundamental laws of geometry, of the rules of balance in composition and of the use of new instruments for research and calculation, capable of causing that feeling of grandeur and stupefaction innate in human beings when standing before a work of genius.

For the sculptor, aspiring to the monumental is necessary to make the greatest possible number of people feel amazement at perfection, in which the work of art is the closest thing to divine wonders. For Sebastián, the Brancusian aspiration to the essence of the sublime, which finds in this essence the road of asceticism and, as a result, of absolute spirituality, is valid.

Resorting to mathematical models to create his compositions is a way of channeling the search

* Art critic. Curator of the Beijing Biennial.



The Goller, 13 m, 2002 (iron with acrylic enamel). Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.

“These sculptures embody great paradoxes. They are fragile, fun and volatile and they weigh tons. They remind you of the folds in origami that move with the slightest puff of wind, yet enormous technical difficulties have to be overcome to put them in place.”²

BEATRIZ ESPEJO

for that Brancusian perfection of the essential, that clearly defines his limits and perspectives. Equally, there is no doubt of the nearness of certain searches à la Calder that, through the use of new forms, of materials from industry and of color, offer new perspectives to contemporary sculpture. At the same time, the similarity of attempts and searches is indicative of another great actor: Vaserey, of course, seen not only as a great master of optical art, but rather as the researcher of those balances in composition I mentioned before. However, it seems to me to be appropriate to situate Sebastián’s quest in the common trajectory of Chillida who has partly followed the same road, though with other media and other prerogatives.

I think that whoever wants to systematically and profoundly face the history of the sculpture of our time cannot help but take into consideration Sebastián’s work and the value of his quest, recognizing in him the stigmata of the great artist because of his courage, inventiveness, and the modernity of his course.

The numerous public sculptures exhibited not only in Mexico but almost all around the world speak of him with continual appreciation for his work, work that should be an unquestionable reason for pride for Mexico and, for him, for international

consolidation, even though he is barely starting and still has far to go in the future.

A visit to his studios and direct contact with his sculpting career make it clear how easy it is to understand and appreciate his language internationally and how his large sculptures do not lose the feeling of the monumental even when they are rendered in small formats using materials like silver, wood or plastic. Sebastián’s surprising reality is that, through the use of mathematics and the laws of geometry, he manages to condense in small proportions all the monumental feeling of his largest pieces; thus, our minds can read the DNA that they carry with them and that is ready to expand in space where they will be turned into *Phoenix Arch*, *Door of Monterrey*, *Large Spider*, *Door of Chihuahua* or other forms in becoming, unique and autonomous, but generated by the same matrix.

Thus, to speak of Sebastián is to speak of sculpture that looks to the future, of sculpture capable of allowing us to get a glimpse at new visual frontiers and with which the force of Man’s imagination manages to surpass the narrow limits of figuration and step into a world between science and technology, so highly valued by the new generations.

Sebastián’s sculpture is related to Stanley Kubrick’s avant garde cinema, to John Cage’s sound re-

search, to Frank O'Ghery's daring architecture. It is, in summary, avant garde à la Leonardo, to the extent that it is scientifically poetical and, therefore, the antithesis of traditional sculpture. His monumental sculpture does not celebrate a man, whether he be leader or *condottiero*, but rather celebrates humankind and its intelligence. It celebrates everything that humankind in its earthly history has managed to conquer through collective efforts in a continual quest for itself. Herein lies the greatness of Sebastián's work, in the awareness that the revelation of art is to celebrate humankind as such, as an intelligent being, capable of thinking and seeing what are often unknown spaces and worlds.

Sebastián's work, in its quest for the grandiose in a perfect, scientifically coordinated order, is capa-

ble of making us glimpse those horizons, new spaces in which we can co-exist with the cosmic universe, overcoming the barriers of space and time. Sebastián's work is all of this, a harmonic whole, timeless; it is work that gives itself over to the future, a great future. ■■■

NOTES

¹This article was taken from *Geometría Emocional, Sebastián*, the catalogue of the exhibition of the same name (Mexico City: Antiguo Colegio de San Ildefonso, UNAM-CONACULTA, Mexico City Government, Fundación Sebastián, March, 2004). Published here by permission of the author.

²All quotes taken from the books *Sebastián ante la crítica. Antología de textos* (Mexico City: Taller Sebastián/Ediciones del Equilibrista, 1996); and *Sebastián ante la crítica. Antología de Textos II* (Madrid: Taller Sebastián/Turner, 2004).

All photos are courtesy of Fundación Sebastián.

“Abstraction allows Sebastián to pay homage
not to a version of Paradise, but to the human ability
to create the sacred on Earth.”

BRUCE NOVOA



Baroque Altar, 550 x 750 x 50 cm, 2004 (iron with acrylic enamel). Photo: Gianfranco Dal Bianco.



I



II



III



IV



V



VI



VII



VIII



IX



X



XI



XII



XIII




XIV



XV

The Way of the Cross (15 pieces), 200 x 200 x 20 cm each, 2004 (iron with acrylic enamel). Digital Illustrations.



Hypercube, 100 x 100 x 100 cm, 2002 (cardboard model).
Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.

Guardian Angel, no measurements available, 2003 (bronze).
Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.



Nagoya Palm, 92 x 62 x 39 cm, 1993 (bronze). Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.

“This man is a modern alchemist who knows more than anyone else understands, amalgamating it in a series of objects that cross our minds, sometimes entering through the eyes, sometimes through the stomach.”

MATÍAS CARVAJAL



[Olmec] Head, 65 x 50 x 55 cm, 1992 (iron with acrylic enamel).
Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.



Crazy Chair, no measurements available, 1995 (mahogany).
Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.

“Sebastián’s artistic adventure accepts all the terms of poetic creation, all the risks of the imagination; it thus redeems us from the perfection of ‘pure’ forms.”

ALFREDO GRACIA VICENTE




Nezahualcóyotl's Throne, no measurements available, 1978 (iron painted with acrylic).
Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.



Simplicial, 74 x 67 x 63 cm, 2001 (iron with acrylic enamel).
Photo: Jesús Sánchez Uribe.

“Sebastián’s geometric forms shift in continual movement, always the same and always different. His discourse parallels the discourse of life.”

JORGE ALBERTO MANRIQUE



Tzompantli, 115 x 115 x 35 cm, 1995 (iron with acrylic enamel). Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.

“The doors he has conceived for different cities can be gone through;
their open arms are welcoming, their good-byes, warm; they exalt the city
but never make it prohibitive or hermetic.”

EMILIO CARBALLIDO



Door of Colima's Royal Highway, 20 m, 2001 (iron with acrylic enamel). Photo: Enrique Bostelmann.

María Tello Sensing Matter

Rebeca Maldonado*



Photos courtesy of María Tello

Untitled, 54 x 45 cm (mixed media on paper).

*It is as though [the free spirit]
has somehow opened its eyes for
the first time to see nearby things.*

Nietzsche

Barcelona is the city where María Tello's painting comes alive. She lived there in a small apartment on Mallorca Street in Ensanche after finishing her studies in philosophy. She would soon find a place in painting and sketching workshops in the Leonardo da Vinci Academy and the Barcelona Artistic Circle (1986-1991), which led to two exhibitions in the Cartoon

* Mexican philosopher and art critic.

Gallery, one called "Diversity of the Natural." In the works of this first period, day-to-day objects appear in their silence, surrounded by an aura and mystery, after having moved through the far-off spheres of metaphysics and philosophy, substance and the absolute: slippers, a coffee pot, a table, a lamp or a chair manifest themselves as a perpetually moving syntax. On her return to Mexico City, the surroundings have to become recognizable, as do the landscapes during her trips back and forth to the city of Tulancingo. The result of this re-vision of things was the exhibition "No Place Left."

In 1998, María prepared the exhibition "Flavored" at Casa Lamm's Pegasus Bookstore. The

In an initial sense, our feelings have no form, and this is what María Tello underlines visually with the power of the materials. These works abandon us to the uncertainty of emotion and of feeling as primary data of reality.




Chair, 120 x 70 cm, 2002 (acrylic on canvas).




Still Life with Limes, 120 x 100 cm, 1992 (acrylic on canvas).



Crossed Roads 1, 12 x 15 cm, 2004
(mixed media on wood).



Crossed Roads 2, 12 x 15 cm, 2004
(mixed media on wood).



Crossed Roads 3, 12 x 15 cm, 2004
(mixed media on wood).

center of attention was no longer objects from her study or home, but things from the plant world: figs, pomegranates, peas, pears. The primordial tendency to present one and the same object in an ever new syntax transformed itself. The variety of intimate, day-to-day objects is reduced to a single thing. In the manner of Morandi, María would learn to see multiple, movable perspectives in a single object, for example, a pomegranate. In the 1998 collective exhibition “Nothing Like Home,” Tello makes this work perspective into an obsession. In this group of works, the constant, predominant object of study are scissors with different outlines, forms, backgrounds, tones, focuses and contours. This tendency to repeat an object will remain. In the exhibition in Xalapa, Veracruz’s Ágo-


ra and Mexico City’s Café La Selva (2001), the protagonists would be chairs, but now the painter would focus on them in parts (seat and back, the angle of the back or the seat) and would present the object in a normal and inverted position alternately in a series of canvases. Amidst this new attempt, something new would happen. The object began to lose its contours and was lost in the background until it revealed a blurry entity, a human figure, that would progressively take on the character of a specter until it became just a living stain. Thus, María Tello’s painting went through a progressive process of dissolving the reference point. Tello frees her painting of references and of the syntax of ever recognizable forms. She abandons figurativeness. In the history of twentieth-century




Scissors 3, 16 x 25 cm, 2001 (acrylic on paper).



Shoes, 100 x 80 cm, 2001 (acrylic on canvas).



Red Painting 1, 72 x 42 cm, 2004 (oil on wood).



Red Painting 2, 72 x 42 cm, 2004 (oil on wood).



There's No Place, 120 x 90 cm, 1997 (acrylic on canvas).

If in Tello color takes a place in each cell of her consciousness, and on the canvas, the whole of these works is a living process of becoming.



White Triptych, 90 x 60 cm, 2004 (acrylic on wood).



Quijiniuil, 60 x 15 cm, 1998 (acrylic on paper).

painting, this art was called informal (non-formal) art, abstract expressionism or gesture abstraction.

The idea is to accede to the origin of matter, of undoing form to sense matter, pure materialism. Matter itself becomes the extreme of words and things in an act of absolution of forms, of limits and of precise contours. It is as if María Tello made what Dickinson said her own: "The things to see/by Ear unheard/Unscrutinized Eye." There is a deformation that limits any vision: seeking correspondence with something that pre-exists in the world, when what happens and is taking place is pure creation. And that something is self-referential; it places itself; it is immediately there. The relationship that takes place between painting and paper through the hands in Tello's recent work (2003-2004) is of this kind. In it, we do not discover pre-existing forms to which attention has been paid one way or another. Rather, there is a forgetfulness and erasure of everything preceding it, to be able to pay attention to the world in cre-

ation. It is not that form stops existing, but rather that it is a non-identifiable form, born now of the pure feeling for matter. This should not come as a surprise; in an initial sense, our feelings have no form either, and this is what María Tello underlines visually with the power of the materials. These works abandon us to the uncertainty of emotion and of feeling as primary data of reality. Human beings, up front, see the collision of emotions and extremely powerful feelings and not a structured, connected work. "Shout out a cry of pain! A red cry!" says Clarice Lispector. This new cycle of María Tello's work begins with red.

It is not the blood that we all know flows through the human body giving life from moment to moment; it is the blood that has come out of veins and arteries. It is the world-become-blood, inundated with blood, that clots, thickens, concentrates; the red dribbles off the wood, holds onto the paper, filters through the canvas. In this context of creation in red, an unconnected, frag-



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mented heart puzzle appears. Or a series of red lines no longer than 18 centimeters long in different combinations from which red drops burst onto little white papers. Scars? Wounds?

With the pure power of color and of the material, expression is achieved.

Painting is transformed into being in the world amidst the black, the red or the nothing. The color has a meaning that comes from the language of the matter itself. The color is the language realizing itself in the act of painting, discovering itself in the moment of painting (action painting). The color knows exactly where to be; it takes its place and, on creating spaces and hollows, creates a form.

The canvas takes the place of consciousness and now the artist also shows us life in its labyrinths, with its more or less intricate knots, with roads of whites, blacks or of reds, oranges, yellows, and once in a while, de-knottings. In them, the painter tries out new points of departure and arrival. The colors become bolder, agitated; they move, as though the trajectory of life were being captured in all its turbulence, quivering like water in the flow of a river.

We could think that if in Tello color takes a place in each cell of her consciousness and on the canvas, the whole of these works is a living process of becoming. The series of palettes in blues, reds, golds or blacks tells us that color is life, that it is transfigured and turns around a vacuum that nonetheless can never be filled. Perhaps that is why the colors on the palettes come alive, become more intense. Life is forged on the palettes. And from the perspective of the artist's palette, nothing will be able to achieve a finished form.

Tello shows signs of an open becoming, never finished or formed. The artist, in this creative becoming, needs all the colors and all the shades, the blacks, reds and whites, those whites that with the help of scrapings wash out the very intense pain, the very painful past, until it turns it into shadow, specter and forgetfulness. In the series of whites, the artist completes an exercise of de-nuding and de-knotting until she achieves life in its silence: empty. **MM**



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
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
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p u b l i c a t i o n s

Cambio climático: desacuerdo entre Estados Unidos y Europa

Edit Antal

This book uses a constructivist focus to explain the differences between the United States and the European Union with regard to climatic change. The United States takes no preventive measures until the damage has been proven and can be measured and refuses to revise its way of life, production and consumption. Europe, on the other hand, is more cautious and is making ready to take measures even at the expense of economic losses.



Cine y propaganda para Latinoamérica. México y Estados Unidos en la encrucijada de los años cuarenta



Francisco Peredo Castro

When in the late 1930s, fascist propaganda films threatened to flood Latin America, the allies reacted rapidly, from Mexico to the north and Argentina to the south. In a film production project coordinated by the United States and Mexico at a time of diplomatic tension and international intrigue, Mexico emerged as the region's firmest ally. For that reason, it would later receive fundamental support to consolidate its movie industry and achieve its cinematic "Golden Age."

East Los Angeles. Historia de un barrio

Ricardo Romo

This book, a classic in its field, traces the history of the largest and most important Mexican American community in the United States, East Los Angeles. It is a detailed review of the development of a community that has had to construct and defend its identity to survive in what were often hostile surroundings. The book also sketches the beginnings of the Chicano movement and the emergence of Mexican-American political and social organizations.




Migración temporal en América del Norte. Propuestas y respuestas

Mónica Vereá

The author puts forward the causes behind international migration and studies the evolution of policies on temporary migrants (tourists, businessmen, workers and students) to the United States and Canada, their impact on the integration of Latino communities in general and Mexican communities in particular, and how the September 11 attacks were a turning point in the regional migratory debate.

For further information contact:

Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte, CISAN,
Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Torre de Humanidades II, piso 9, Ciudad Universitaria, 04510,
México, D.F. Tel. 5623-0015; fax: 5623-0014; e-mail: cisan@servidor.unam.mx




CISAN

p u b l i c a t i o n s

Chiapas.
Interpretaciones sobre la
negociación y la paz

Cynthia Arnsón,
Raúl Benítez Manaut,
Andrew Selee, comps.


This book presents the debate on the Chiapas peace process and the causes behind the failure of the negotiations. Mexican and foreign academics, as well as some of the conflict's protagonists, analyze its structural causes, indigenous rights and the San Andrés Accords.



Globalidad y conflicto.
Estados Unidos y
la crisis de septiembre

José Luis Valdés Ugalde
and Diego Valadés, comp.


The events of September 11, 2001 have prompted the concepts of security and globalization to be posed in different ways and have given them new meaning. This book is the first Spanish-language academic publication in which specialists from different fields analyze these issues.



Desde el sur. Visiones de
Estados Unidos y Canadá desde
América Latina a principios
del siglo xx, vol. 3, Canadá

Paz Consuelo Márquez-Padilla,
Germán Pérez Fernández
del Castillo, Remedios Gómez Arnau,
comps.


Stimulating articles by well-known Canada scholars make up the third and last volume of this series, reflecting the country's different characteristics: a post-national, multicultural, pro-internationalist and multilateral state, receiver of migrants, a paradigm of economic policies and development and a dynamic player in America's and the world's political and economic concert.



Las políticas exteriores de Estados
Unidos, Canadá y México en el
umbral del siglo xxi

Remedios Gómez Arnau, Rosío Vargas
Suárez and Julian Castro Rea, comp.

Foreign policy design in North America has been reformulated with the beginning of the new century. The U.S. faces the choice of acting alone or through multilateral cooperation in matters of national security. Using the concept of "human security", the authors look at the perspectives for Canadian foreign policy. Mexico, for its part, is seen in light of the redefinition of its foreign policy, particularly vis-à-vis its multiple trade agreements.



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Fronteras en América del Norte. Estudios multidisciplinares
Una herida por otra. Testimonios de latin@s en Estados Unidos sobre 11/s.
El debate sobre el terrorismo entre Estados Unidos y Europa



Multiple Services Contracts A Failed Opening in Fossil Fuels

Sergio Benito Osorio*

In July 2003, Mexico's oil giant Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex) called for bidding on the exploitation of natural gas in the vast Burgos Basin, 13,000 square kilometers covering parts of the states of Coahuila, Nuevo León and Tamaulipas. It is the largest private investment program ever launched by the

government and, because of its financial size and political aims, should be considered central to President Fox's endeavors.

It was designed to partner Pemex with the world's large oil companies in order to satisfy the country's natural gas needs over the next two decades. However, it caused such heated debate that Pemex could not call for bidding earlier, despite being authorized since 2002. And it is not that it was a bad business

deal. On the contrary, participants will make considerable profits since the contracts will be guaranteed by the state (through programs with differed impact on expenditures known as *Pidiregas*) and the trends in gas prices are very attractive. In addition, enough exploration has been done in the area to be reasonably certain that sufficient quantities of gas will be found to attract investors. So, the problem is not the financial viability of the projects, but rather their legality and

* Member of Mexico's Citizens' Energy Monitoring Group and energy analyst. sosorir@hotmail.com

what they could lead to in the national oil industry.

Practically from the start, the Fox administration announced the strategy of opening the fossil fuel and natural dry gas sectors to private investment, covering exploration, extraction, processing and transportation in a single contract so that a single operator could carry them all out in a given territory ceded exclusively by Pemex. This way of organizing the participation of private companies in the oil industry was justified as a simple matter of administrative efficiency, consolidating many contracts into one. However, this kind of creativity weakens Pemex's constitutional mandate to exploit fossil fuels within Mexico's borders.

Opening up to private capital was announced using the by-now typical argument that Pemex did not have the money needed to increase the gas supply and satisfy the demand that in recent years has spurred gas imports to increase to 20 percent of national consumption. Pemex management carried out an ample campaign abroad to attract large companies specialized in these activities so that they could contribute not only capital, but also technology that would help develop this sector, so strategic for the country.

The project consisted of drilling 822 exploratory wells, 4,250 development wells and processing a billion cubic feet of gas a day. The investment would come to U.S.\$10 billion over 15 years. Earnings would be U.S.\$14.911 billion; outlay for amortization, financial costs and operations would come to U.S.\$13.424 billion; and profits before taxes would be U.S.\$1.487 billion. That is, at the most, the Mexican state would receive 9.9 percent of the earnings from exploiting its gas reserves for

20 years. What is more, the flow model that the administration sent Congress takes the price of gas as key, establishing an average of U.S.\$3.39 per thousand cubic feet. While it is true that coming up with a price estimate for 20 years into the future for a fuel as linked to oil prices as this one will always have a high margin for error, this very consideration should lead us to think that if the price of gas were 10 or 15 percent lower than average, the project would no longer be profitable for the state and the only ones to benefit would be the private investors.

Practically from the start, the Fox administration announced the strategy of opening the fossil fuel and natural dry gas sectors to private investment.

Even though the contract clauses have been modified to eliminate some problems, they still establish, for example, that for the contract to be upheld, Pemex will not replace or participate in the works carried out by the contracting company. In that sense, Pemex is prohibited from exploiting the area signed over in the contract; the contracting company can later use the knowledge and information derived from Mexican fields; the national content is very vague and does not stimulate the inclusion of capital goods, other equipment and nationally produced inputs. This last point is very important because the development of the national energy sector must be seen as a lever for fostering the country's industrial development; otherwise, fossil fuels could again become enclave economies for export or create grave technological dependence.

Pemex will only play an administrative role: it will request and receive

reports; it will do the accounting, sell the gas and pay the company that carries out the actual work. Therefore, the public body that by law represents the Mexican state in the exploitation of fossil fuels is de facto being replaced; this is the center of the legal discrepancy that the courts would have to decide if some legislators' objections were taken to trial.

The authorities maintain that Article 6 of the legislation about oil allows for signing contracts with private companies or individuals and that, today, they have hundreds or even thousands

of them covering different oil industry needs. They also maintain that the Constitution only prohibits risk contracts and that, in this case, the state will always keep control over any fossil fuels that might be extracted.

Certainly, Pemex has signed a large number of contracts for acquiring inputs, material, equipment and services from many private companies, as is to be expected from a company that does more than U.S.\$20 billion a year in business. The problem lies in that, in this case, we are referring to a contract that grants all exploration, extraction and transportation activities to a single contractor who has exclusive rights for the life of the contract in a specific area, even excluding Pemex itself.

Article 6 that Pemex's lawyers cite must be read together with the preceding articles. Article 2 says that "only the nation shall exploit the fossil fuels that make up the oil industry"; Article



Andrew Winning/Reuters

Participants will make considerable profits since the contracts will be guaranteed by the state and the trends in gas prices are very attractive.

3 stipulates that the oil industry includes exploration, exploitation, elaboration, storage and first-hand sale of these kinds of products; Article 4 specifies that all these activities will be carried out by Pemex and its subsidiaries. The logic of the text makes it clear Pemex can sign any contract to rent equipment or retain specific services as long as they do not involve the exploitation of fossil fuels.

In this debate, it has also been said that the 1960 reform of paragraph six of Article 27 of the Constitution that included the phrase, “neither concessions nor contracts shall be granted, nor shall any that have been granted subsist,” was incorporated in strict reference to risk contracts. This is not exactly the case, since the *Diario de los Debates* (Congressional Record) reports a discussion about the reviewing com-

mission’s decision on whether or not to maintain the term “contract” in reference to mining in order to better protect small miners. But with regard to oil, the deputies were clear, when Deputy Enrique Sada Baigts said, “When speaking of the country’s oil, the commission will never accept opening the door, leaving the signing of contracts to the discretion of the public administration.”¹ As can be seen, at no time did the legislator make exclusive reference to risk contracts. On the contrary, the main aim was to protect the state’s exclusive right over the “exploitation” of oil.

Regardless of these legal questions, the proposed contract does not benefit Pemex. And I am not referring to the financial question, but to the wealth of technical-scientific knowledge, since by being excluded from direct exploitation, Pemex will have to share strategic

information about deposits, will not train personnel nor have the opportunity to broaden its technological knowledge. And this is vitally important, since clearly the strength of a world-class company is not only its financial capability, but also its command of technology and specialized knowledge, two factors that determine how it evolves.

Seven blocks of territory in the Burgos Basin were bid for. This is the most productive of the country’s four dry gas basins.² Investors were given studies of prospecting, wells and installations that not only established the certainty of large gas reserves but also made it possible to begin extraction very quickly. However, none of the large multinationals participated and two bidding processes ended without awarding a contract to anyone. For the five blocks assigned, promises of investment for U.S.\$4.3 billion were made over a period of 15 to 20 years, to produce 425 million cubic feet of gas a day. Three years later, this government program had reached less than 50 percent of its initial target. Of course, the non-assigned blocks could be adjusted and perhaps assigned, but there is very little chance that they will attract the kind of companies originally intended. We should remember that the only “major” that came in was Exxon-Mobil, but it bowed out from the beginning and did not bid again. Finally, it was Repsol and Petrobras, two medium-sized companies (smaller than Pemex), that contributed the capital and technology that, according to Mexican authorities, Pemex cannot supply.

Actually, the blocks that were not awarded are the largest and the ones with the biggest reserves, and they require very large investments, viable only for the world’s largest companies, which

have already shown their disinterest because the deal offered does not allow them to write Mexican gas reserves into their books as assets nor does it give them sufficient control over the product. In fact, Repsol and Petrobras may have participated precisely because their size leads them to accept projects for the sale of services and because they have also made a priority of increasing their presence in Latin America.

According to public information from the Pemex Exploración Producción's Northern Region, between 1997 and 2001, Pemex had invested U.S.\$2.826 billion in the Burgos Basin, and had sales for U.S.\$4.912 billion, reaping U.S.\$1.176 billion in profits. That is to say, it invested over U.S.\$700 million a year (a figure double that which the multiple services contract holders have promised to invest) and made an average of U.S.\$294 million annually, contributing almost an additional 500 million cubic feet a day. In the light of these figures and the results up until now, it is difficult for the defenders of multiple services contracts to justify this strategy as the best one for developing gas extraction for consumers.

Pemex management has said that the strategy for including private companies in natural gas extraction has been satisfactory and that new multiple services contracts will be signed for developing the Coatzacoalcos, Gas Terciario and Cuichapa projects in Veracruz and Tabasco states, both at sea and on land. But the facts point to the opposite conclusion. The strategy of operating the fossil fuel sector with private capital and management is stymied in its own inconsistency: it is insufficient for attracting players big enough to make it viable since the big multinational corporations only participate when they


can take the lion's share, and legally, it cannot go any further because of the risk of being declared unconstitutional.

It may not be premature to say that opening Mexico's fossil fuel sector to private investment has been a failure and to relearn the old lesson that the multinationals do not participate if they do not have complete control over the operation. As a result, Pemex must seek self-sustaining alternatives or global agreements with companies that offer advantages in specific items where it really needs them.

It is possible to satisfy the demand for gas without selling off the country's

natural resources too cheaply if we take a look at public companies' potential and aim to turn them into global companies. We just have to think about the fact that in the first quarter of 2004, tax revenues from oil came to more than U.S.\$9 billion and the Fund for Stabilization of Oil Earnings has more than an additional U.S.\$600 million that could be very useful if the policy focus of forced liberalization of the sector changed.

It would even be more profitable (and appropriate for both economic and environmental reasons) to stop massively burning off gas in the Gulf of



At the most, the Mexican state would receive 9.9 percent of the earnings from exploiting its gas reserves for 20 years.

Mexico, particularly in the Cantarell project, which comes to more than 200 million cubic feet a day. Congress should set a deadline for stopping the burning of gas in order to take full advantage of this natural resource that today is simply wasted.

The federal government decided to move ahead by itself in this sensitive area toward private investment, despite criticism from Congress that will broaden out and sharpen with time, making it possible for the first time since the 1938 oil expropriation for foreign companies to take charge of exploration, extraction and transportation of fossil fuels. Instead of shunting Pemex to one side, why not broaden out the vision to establish common business ventures,

bigger alliances in which the private companies can obtain larger profits at the same time that Pemex does, and even to include small and medium-sized Mexican companies?

Actually, Pemex requires a profound structural reform so it can be more flexible and capable, not only of getting the financing it needs, but also of establishing the partnerships that its modernization requires technologically. But this reform will hardly be possible if the changes are forced ones. Legislative consensus will be blocked from the get-go if Congress has the impression that the administration wants to impose its will even at the cost of violating the fundamental law of the land. **NM**

NOTES

¹ "With regard to oil...we think it should be settled once and for all in Article 27 of the Constitution that neither concessions nor contracts shall be granted, nor shall any that have been granted subsist, and that only the nation shall be able to exploit these products in the terms that the respective legislation stipulates; because despite the fact that the Constituent Congress's aim has been clear, after the December 1939 reform completely removing oil exploitation from the regimen of concessions or contracts, when it was passed, the corresponding regulations once again sparked a legal debate about the subsistence of some concessions or rights of private companies or individuals to exploit oil. Therefore, to avoid any further controversy, the reform should proceed." *Diario de Debates* (Mexico City), 22 October 1959.


² The other three are Veracruz, Macuspana and Lankahuasa on the Gulf of Mexico continental platform.


ERRATA

In issue 67 of *Voices of Mexico*, in the "Economy" article "Mexican Foreign Trade in Trouble, China's Impact" by Gerardo Bracho, there are three mistakes:

- Page 50, paragraph 2, lines 10-12 read, "U.S. exports grew by 8.4 percent, but Mexican exports to the U.S. only by 1.6 percent." It should read, "U.S. exports grew by 8.4 percent, but Mexican exports to the U.S. only by 2.6 percent."
- Page 50, paragraph 3, lines 10-13 read, "U.S. imports from China were on average 26.6 percent higher than their 2000 level, those coming from Mexico were on average 0.8 percent lower." It should read, "U.S. imports from China were on average 26.6 percent higher than their 2000 level, those coming from Mexico were on average 2.9 percent lower."
- Page 55, Graph 4, the part of the key that reads

Imports U.S. Imports other countries
 should read
 Imports U.S. Imports other countries





Jim Young/Reuters

The North American Community How Much a Matter of Attitude?

Silvia Núñez García*

Recognizing the undeniable interdependence among Mexico, Canada and the United States since NAFTA, we can trace increasing awareness among many actors about the need to move forward harmoniously in the process. From federal, state

and local levels of government to diplomats, from businessmen, scholars, labor communities to nongovernmental organizations, the three countries face the common challenge of upgrading security in North America.

To do so, one of the very first tasks would be to defeat an important number of skeptics about the steps to be taken, with an eye to preserving per-

haps an old or *démodé* concept of sovereignty.

Examples of this can be seen in the Mexican domestic debate over the state-owned oil industry's loss of autonomy, while in the United States influential voices have reemerged fearing a new *conquest* of the Southwest by Mexican immigrants, thus neglecting the evolution of an English-Spanish bilingual America.¹

*Academic secretary of the Center for Research on North America (CISAN).

In a scenario where economic opportunity expresses itself strongly regionally, rethinking a North American Community (NAC) has become a necessity; it is not something that can just be disregarded. My emphasis here aims to be provocative about two issues of the current integration process which I consider have not been greatly studied, and perhaps purposely avoided in the main debate: the social and the cultural dimensions.

An increasing number of actors in our
three nations are already speaking in a single language:
one of concern about a common future.

Although it is still true, as Charles Doran said almost a decade ago, that “no one... identifies himself or herself as a North American,”² migration, the media, the entertainment industry, the internet and even culinary habits bind North Americans together today in an unprecedented way.

Considering that in a subtle but consistent manner, social and cultural forces interact among Mexico, the United States and Canada to give birth to the idea of North America, the tri-lateral community is approaching a point where key questions need to be properly discussed in order to explore the feasibility of building a common regional identity.

By understanding most international political thinkers' mistrust of culture—which can be understood as an effect of the dominant paradigm of realism, reinforced by the 9/11 events—we are in a very privileged position to start reinterpreting the essential elements for new definitions of both national and regional interest.

If we accept Francis Fukuyama's idea of culture as an inherited ethical habit,³ it is therefore not a rational choice. Embedded with values, culture gives meaning to the codes through which societies regulate individual and collective behavior.

Indeed, if we pursue a “more perfect region” to strengthen sovereignty and security, our three nations have to take sides with one of the two opposing perspectives prevalent in interna-

tional politics about the interaction of different cultures:

- a) The optimistic view considers that cultural differences may provide a solid foundation for deepening international cooperation, since it is imbued with a high degree of cultural self-confidence. The core of this hypothesis is equivalent to the idea that *opposites attract*.
- b) The pessimistic view believes that societies sharing cultural affinities co-operate with each other and that efforts to shift societies from one civilization to another are unsuccessful.⁴

In order to decide which way to go, we have to understand that the North American Community is still trapped and separated regarding the search for a social imagery of its own. Although this exists through each society's expression of the social and cultural interaction among its members, as Charles Taylor has stated, the challenge for

the emergence of a NAC rests upon “cooperation and coherence without a forced convergence.”⁵

Aside from what has happened to NAFTA in the formal sphere of power and the policy making arena, there is an ongoing social reservoir in the three countries that demands decentralizing and reinforcing attention toward the definition of a North American Community as a whole, as there already are several “*North American communities*” in action (in business, politics, education, churches, etc.), but most probably in isolation or in contradiction with each other.

Therefore, undeniably, we must analyze this reality by exploring answers to some of these questions: Is there a point where these North American communities intersect? Why can this take place? In the aftermath of 9/11, how can dominant or traditional values like freedom, democracy or patriotism in Mexico, the United States and Canada be explained? Which of them is being challenged, transformed or reinforced as a result of regional interaction?

The promotion of an enduring NAC requires recognizing that alternative values such as tolerance, diversity and inclusion must be cornerstones of a regional common trust. If we embrace the optimistic paradigm that stands for the preservation of cultural differences as a window of opportunity for the NAC, cultural identity could be recognized as the alpha and omega of a new approach to sovereignty.

Beyond the complexity of the integration process of North America, an increasing number of actors in our three nations are already speaking in a single language: one of concern about a common future. This irrefutable fact demonstrates the need to include more

voices from civil society, in order to rebuild the capacities for the best possible outcome for the NAC.

The North American Community is faced with the task of preparing for a constantly changing, interconnected society. As the feeling of insecurity not only comes from terrorist threats but from uncertainty about job loss, health, etc., breaking new ground implies identifying the paradoxical need for permanent transformation.

Trade and security are only instrumental for the construction of the North American Community; trust is the glue necessary for establishing a broader scheme of values and social norms committed to the overall quality of life in North America. Still squabbling, "North Americans" resist accepting John

Lennon's rule that "Life is what happens to us while we are busy making other plans."

We still are in the stage of building sympathy for each other. Reaching a "more perfect region" will only be possible by creating regional institutions committed to empathy for one another. Only through them shall we find new principles of thinking and creative ways of problem solving.

To conclude, I maintain some of the general recommendations of an organization called Communities of the Future, projecting them to envision the notion of a North American Community. Mexican, U.S. and Canadian societies need to begin to change how we think, how we relate to each other and how we educate and learn. **NAM**

NOTES

¹ See Samuel P. Huntington, "The Hispanic Challenge," *Foreign Policy* (March-April 2004), p. 30-39.

² Charles F. Doran, "Building a North American Community," *Current History* vol. 94, no. 590 (March 1995).

³ Francis Fukuyama, *Trust. The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* (New York: The Free Press, 1995).

⁴ Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations?" *Foreign Affairs* no. 72 (1994), pp. 22-49.

⁵ Rod Dobell published a brilliant essay on the characteristics of and the challenges to be faced by a NAC, "A Social Charter for a North American Community", *ISUMA-Canadian Journal of Policy Research* (spring 2000), pp. 52-56.

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From a Borderless World To a Fortress World? The Two U.S. Borders after 9/11¹

Ismael Aguilar Barajas*

Globalization is a journey. But it is a journey toward an unreachable destination, "the globalized world." A "globalized" economy could be defined as one in which neither distance nor national borders impede economic transactions. This would be a world where the costs of transport and communications were zero and the barriers created by differing national jurisdictions had vanished. Needless to say, we do not live in anything even close to such a world. And since many of the things we transport (including ourselves) are physical, we never will.²

The ability of the state to patrol its boundaries, in a sociological as well as a political sense, is critical because if the state fails to do so, if "strangers" can enter a country at will, the ability of the state to shape and define a nation is compromised.³

D. JACOBSON

M. WOLF

TOWARD A WORLD WITHOUT BORDERS?

For the last 20 years, people have been saying that globalization was leading to a world without borders. The expression "borderless world" became popular, nourished by different positions that involved, among other spheres, the economy and finance, culture and institutions. The book *The Borderless World* became a reference point and its content was frequently accepted as an act of faith.⁴ However, this popular or light version did not entirely jibe with the fortification that could already be


observed and which was dramatically accentuated by the events of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, D.C.

In the framework of the phobia that 9/11 left in its wake, the impression is created that we have moved from open to closed borders. In any case, the obligatory question is whether borders were totally open. And, the answer is that they certainly were not. One conclusion about this is that, by definition, complete economic integration happens with a system of totally open borders. Way before the 9/11 terrorist attacks, analysts were already saying there were economic and political reasons to defend the importance of international borders and to say that the transnationalization of the economy did not mean a world without borders.⁵

This is clearly shown in the case of international migration, generally excluded from the process of globalization.⁶ According to Tapinos and De-launay, this exclusion is the biggest single difference that distinguishes the world economy's new tendencies from previous stages of globalization in which the work force not only accompanied the mobility of capital, but represented a key factor in the globalization of the economies. Migration is the missing link in globalization.⁷

Because of the 9/11 attacks, old and new dichotomies, such as freedom versus security, have been reconsidered. T.F. Powers considers that this particular case is a false debate because security implies freedom, and freedom presupposes security. Every threat, regardless of its origin, is an attack on

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Pedro Valherra/Cuartoscuro

freedom and against security.⁸ This forces us to hone in on the deeper question: taking real threats to national security carefully under consideration but not allowing this to lead to a regime of terror and abuse that would restrict basic freedoms in the name of security.

Despite the efforts to clarify the discussion, it is a fact that concern over security after the 9/11 attacks has radically altered the U.S. agenda vis-à-vis the rest of the world. Castañeda illustrates this very well for Latin America and Mexico in particular, a country whose negotiations for a migratory accord with the U.S. collapsed along with the Twin Towers.⁹

Borders are multi-porous, multi-dimensional, multi-functional and multi-selective (see figure 1). If globalization comes through different avenues, each of them has its own borders, its own velocities and results.¹⁰ Just as large legal and illegal financial transactions can be electronically transferred, so can large sums of money associated with globalization's illegitimate aspects

—especially terrorism—physically move across international borders. At the same moment that a tie-wearing, legal immigrant arrives at a port of entry of an industrialized country, one of his countrymen risks his life crossing a river or a desert to arrive in the same country. Probably the legal immigrant is bothered by increased border controls, but it makes no sense in the second case to speak of open borders. This leads us to the discussion of the relevance of borders from the perspective of liberalism.

ECONOMIC-POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND BORDERS


The notion of liberalism is central to analyzing the economic role of the border, and immediately creates a contradiction. Globalization is rooted in freedom because it means freer movement of goods, services, ideas and people around the world.¹¹ In that sense, it is very difficult to harmonize the basic points of economic liberalism (with its

emphasis on the free functioning of fully competitive markets) and political liberalism (with its emphasis on the rights of all citizens, including, of course, their mobility) (see figure 2). This is the origin of the expression “open market-closed border.”

Trade and investment flows spur processes of “de-borderization,” while illegal migration and matters of national security create processes of “re-borderization.”¹² That is, if we are really going to talk about liberalism, then free markets coexist with the free circulation of individuals.¹³ This is the origin of what is known as “the great liberal paradox of migration.”¹⁴ Related to this is the selective nature of migratory controls themselves, so that, as brutal as it may seem, the expression “computer engineers yes, huddled masses, no” is very valid.¹⁵

What is more, on the borders it is proved that if the globalized economy is defined as one in which neither distance nor national borders impede economic transactions, with free circulation

FIGURE 1
INTERNATIONAL BORDER FLOWS



of goods, services, capital and individuals, then there will never be complete integration. This would imply a world in which transportation and communications costs were zero and in which there were no barriers created by different national jurisdictions. It is clear that we are a long way from a world of this kind.¹⁶

Simple textbook knowledge clearly shows that international borders delimit different spheres of economic activity.¹⁷ Among other things, borders mark off areas of currency, restrict imports and immigration, control international capital flows and limit the ownership of assets. In these contact zones, non-tariff barriers to trade also become very visible, as does the juxtaposition of historic and cultural dimensions. This can be seen even in very integrated economies, such as on the Canadian-U.S. border.¹⁸ There is, then, a fundamental difference between free trade, which is impossible to achieve, and freer trade, which is more feasi-

ble¹⁹ and coincides very well with the aforementioned definition by Micklethwait and Wooldridge.

Despite the restrictions cited, the relative freedom with which the market in goods and services functions has no parallel when looking at migration. It is no surprise that migration puts liberalism to the test. From the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s, governments have been increasing immigration controls (see table 1). The table shows that in 1976, only six percent of governments had policies to decrease immigration, while by the end of the 1980s, this number rose to 32 percent. It reached a peak in 1993 (35 percent), remaining at 33 percent in 1995. In the specific case of Mexican migration to the United States, it was very clear in those years that for some circles, this "foreign invasion" represented a serious threat to national security, thus justifying the use of the police given that, according to those circles, it was causing criminal behavior domestically.²⁰ In recent

years, several countries have made it more difficult to become citizens. "In some countries, the children of immigrants who have lived in the country as long as three generations do not necessarily acquire citizenship automatically."²¹ In this framework, the distinction between who is a citizen and who is a foreigner is crucial, particularly because the criteria for membership determine the human fabric of the modern nation-state.²²

THE UNITED STATES AND ITS BORDERS WITH MEXICO AND CANADA AFTER 9/11

It is unnecessary to underline that while the events of 9/11 may be more associated with limiting the mobility of individuals, they also affected the free movement of goods and damaged the United States' economic relations with the world. This is particularly applicable to Mexico, and to a lesser extent—though increasingly—to Canada. The recently passed Bioterrorism Act, stipulating meticulous checking of food imports, is a very good example of this.

Another example, in this case of the transborder economy between Mexico and the U.S. is the U.S. Visitor and Immigrant Status Indicator Technology Program (U.S. Visit Program). This program aims to implement a biometric check system in 2004 whereby visitors and tourists along the U.S. border will not be able to stay more than three days, under threat of losing both their visas and passports. Going 25 miles beyond the border would require a special permit. In contrast with today's practice, all exits from the country will be checked to verify that the duration of stay is

being complied with. Given its greater economic dependence on Mexico, the Texas border area will be severely affected by this. Therefore, it is no surprise that organized merchants are demanding a relaxation of controls at Mexican-U.S. border crossings.²³


In the case of its southern border, at the same time that free trade policies are intensifying, the United States is also toughening its migratory controls, including militarization. Different analysts have questioned this U.S. position vis-à-vis Mexico, which though it has been made more precise or been put into context by the events of 9/11, continues to be in force with regard to long-term relations between the two nations.²⁴

Among other considerations, it is doubtful that, in the long run, police and/or militarized control is the best option to deal with such an extremely complex border.²⁵ It is a fact that more stringent controls could not put a brake on previous waves of migration, but, above all it has sent a very ambiguous message, making it difficult to see whether Mexico-U.S. relations are a threat or a partnership.²⁶

Perceptions about the Canadian-U.S. border also changed after 9/11. It has been called "the forgotten border" or the new weak point, and it is also uncomfortably seen as a matter of national security.²⁷ After all, before the attacks there had already been incidents indicating that terrorists had crossed that border into the United States.²⁸ This author doubts that increased personnel will do what has not been done in the south with many more officers.

The economic costs of border security are common to both U.S. borders. This is an issue that manifests itself in different ways and needs a

FIGURE 2
ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL LIBERALISM AND IMMIGRATION



Source: The author, based on J. F. Hollifield, *Immigrant, Markets and State. The Political Economy of Postwar Europe* (Cambridge and London: Harvard University Press, 1992).

It is in the best self-interest of nations
for their border agendas to be dealt with jointly and
not unilaterally.

multidimensional perspective to be understood. Before September 11, analysts argued that border control costs could be very high,²⁹ which served to markedly underline the economic importance of the borders. In a post-9/11 context, the argument goes that security costs function as a barrier or self-imposed trade embargo.

SOME CONCLUSIONS

Globalization is a real process with many implications and contradictions. It gives rise to the co-existence of integration and disintegration, prosperity with backwardness, and creates its own borders. There is no perfect integration of markets and, in that sense, borders limit or paralyze integration. Even in

these globalized times, borders are porous to differing degrees. It is paradoxical that, in many senses, we have advanced not toward a borderless world, but toward a fortress world, full of complexities, choices, paradoxes, in which there is no space for a simplistic reading of phenomena and the policies that accompany them.

This is shown very clearly in the case of the Canadian-U.S. border, which delimits the two most liberalized economies in the world. It is also proof that the evidence of greater economic integration demonstrates that national borders do not matter for the production and world distribution of goods and services. When delimiting more asymmetrical neighbors, the border—understood as a wall—is much more visible and supports the hypothesis that

TABLE I
GOVERNMENT POLICY ON MIGRATION LEVELS (1976-1995)
 (% OF COUNTRIES)

YEAR	TO INCREASE MIGRATION	TO MAINTAIN MIGRATION	TO DECREASE MIGRATION	TOTAL %	NUMBER OF COUNTRIES
1976	7	87	6	100	156
1978	6	84	10	100	158
1980	6	79	15	100	165
1983	5	78	17	100	168
1986	4	77	19	100	170
1989	5	64	32	100	170
1993	4	61	35	100	190
1995	5	61	33	100	190

Source: United Nations, *Políticas Migratorias Internacionales* (New York: UN, 1998), p. 3.

Trade and investment flows spur processes of “de-borderization,” while illegal migration and matters of national security create processes of “re-borderization.”

complete integration would imply markets of products without borders. Just as with Mexico, post-9/11 conditions have changed the way in which the United States conceives of its economic relations with Canada, materialized in greater control over the mobility of goods and individuals, whose underlying condition is the phantom—real or imaginary—of security.

On the other hand, if—as is commonly understood—the political border is the separation of two different sovereign nations,³⁰ the role of the state in keeping the borders safe is just as imperative as always.³¹ What is more, if globalization facilitates illicit activities like terrorism or running contraband, then the disappearance of borders could be disastrous for the economy and development.³² In this sense,

deciding what, how and who enters their territory is a legitimate function of nation-states. Care will have to be taken, however, to keep the world economic system open since it functions by means of the different flows across international borders. This is one of the great dilemmas brought about by the 9/11 terrorist attacks: how long will concern about security affect the legal transit of goods, individuals and of the economy?

Of the different paradoxes between migration and globalization, one is particularly useful for understanding the new role of borders. The same market mechanisms that feed globalization can also increase (rather than diminish) migratory flows.³³ This would make Bhagwati right when he says, paradoxically, that “the capabili-


ty of controlling immigration weakened to the extent that the intention of controlling it increased.”³⁴ As a result, a focus beyond border control has been proposed (in the form of punishment for countries of origin, stricter border control measures, and sanctions to employers and undocumented immigrants themselves) to manage migration in such a way that everybody wins.

The Mexico-U.S. border clearly shows the need to create a more comprehensive vision on the part of both countries so that the broad variety of issues involved can be properly attended to. While this multi-dimensionality is not exclusive to this border, few of the world’s borders display the juxtaposition of demographic, environmental, political and economic factors, including some of the illegitimate results of globalization (traffic in persons, money, goods, arms and drugs).


Dealing with the border question implies great challenges for twenty-first-century diplomacy. Cooperation will play an indispensable role. But that cooperation, based on political will, requires a fundamental input: the comprehensive understanding of complex inter-dependencies, including respect for profound, voluntary negotiation. It is in the best self-interest of nations for their border agendas to be dealt with jointly and not unilaterally. Despite this need, the range of this new border arrangement must also be recognized since, as De Villepin says, the real border is that of the relationship, that of Man.³⁵ The last border is inside each person, in the relationship and contact with others.³⁶ It is based on these considerations that the notion of a borderless world—sometimes treated lightly—should be reexamined. ■■■

NOTES

- ¹ This is a new version of a paper presented at the international colloquium "Globalization and Its Effects: New Debates, New Approaches" held in the ESCP-EAP in Paris, June 24 and 25, 2003. The study was sponsored by the "Economic Agenda on Mexico's Northern Border" Chair of the Monterrey Technological Institute of Higher Learning (ITESM), Monterrey campus. The author also wishes to thank the ITESM Monterrey campus Administration and Finance Division for its financial support and the help of the ESCP-EAP Organizing Committee. I also thank the colloquium participants for their comments. As usual, the author bears exclusive responsibility for errors or omissions.
- ² M. Wolf, "Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?" *Foreign Affairs* 80 (1) (New York), 2001, pp. 178-179.
- ³ D. Jacobson, *Rights Across Borders. Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship* (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University, 1997), pp. 5-6.
- ⁴ K. Ohmae, *The Borderless World. Power and Strategy in the Interlinked World* (New York: Harper Business, 1990).
- ⁵ See S. Collinson, *Beyond Borders. West European Migration Policy Towards the 21st Century* (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1993); J. Ceglowski, "Has Globalization Created a Borderless World?" *Business Review* (Washington), March-April 1998, pp. 7-27; and M. Mann, "La globalización y el 11 de septiembre," *New Left Review* (New York) 2002, pp. 5-26.
- ⁶ G. Tapinos and D. Delaunay, "Can One Really Talk of the Globalisation of Migration Flows?" OECD, comp., *Globalisation, Migration and Development* (Paris: Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2000), pp. 35-58.
- ⁷ See D. Coyle, *Sex, Drugs & Economics. An Unconventional Introduction to Economics* (New York and London: Texere, 2002).
- ⁸ T.F. Powers, "Can We Be Secure and Free?" *The Public Interest* 151 (Washington, D.C.), 2003, pp. 3-24.
- ⁹ J. Castañeda, "La relación olvidada," *Foreign Affairs en español* vol. 3, no. 2 (Mexico City), pp. 138-153.
- ¹⁰ Different typologies show the faces of globalization. For Mann (op. cit.), globalization consists of the interactive expansion of economic, military, political and ideological networks. In his "International Economics: Unlocking the Mysteries of Globalization" (*Foreign Policy* [Washington, D.C.] spring, special edition, pp. 97-111), J. Sachs presents four avenues (trade, production, finance and regulatory/institutional) and four types of impact (on economic growth, on the distribution of income, on macroeconomic stability and on government institutions. In his "Clash of Globalizations" (*Foreign Affairs* 81 [4], [New York], 2002, pp. 104-115), S. Hoffmann refers to several dimensions of the globalization process (economic, political, institutional, cultural and terrorism). C. Ruiz Durán, in his "Perspectivas y opciones globales ante el cambio mundial" (J. Basave et al., comps., *Globalización y alternativas incluyentes para el siglo XXI* [Mexico City: UNAM, UAM and Miguel Ángel Porrúa, 2002]), points to the heterogeneous nature of this process. L. De Sebastián, in his *Neoliberalismo. Apuntes críticos de economía internacional* (Madrid: Editorial Trotta, 1997), underlines its impact on the most vulnerable groups and the attention these groups should therefore be paid. However, in "Globalization without a Net" (*Foreign Policy* [Washington, D.C.] July-August 2001, pp. 78-79), V. Tanzi shows the enormous difficulties for integrating the world economy and protecting the poor at the same time, forcing a rethinking of the role of the state with regard to supporting the most needy groups. Finally, M. Jovanovic, in *European Economic Integration. Limits and Prospects* (London and New York: Routledge, 1997), suggests the need to respect diversity in strategies for economic integration.
- ¹¹ J. Micklethwait and A. Wooldridge, *A Future Perfect. The Challenge and Promise of Globalization* (New York: Random House, 2003), p. xix.
- ¹² J. Blatter and N. Clement, "Cross-Border Cooperation in Europe: Historical Development, Institutionalization, and Contrasts with North America," *Journal of Borderland Studies* 15 (1) (San Diego), 2000, pp. 15-53.
- ¹³ J. Seabrook, "A Global Market for All," *New Statesman* (London), 26 June 1998, pp. 25-26.
- ¹⁴ J.F. Hollifield, *Immigrants, Markets and States. The Political Economy of Postwar Europe* (Cambridge, Mass. and London: Harvard University Press, 1992).
- ¹⁵ J. Bhagwati, "Más allá del control fronterizo," *Foreign Affairs en español* 3 (2) (Mexico City), 2002, pp. 165-175.
- ¹⁶ M. Wolf, op. cit.
- ¹⁷ P.R. Krugman and M. Obstfeld, *International Economics* (New York: Addison Wesley, 2003) and B.V. and R.M. Yarbrough, "The World Economy," *Trade and Finance* (Mason, Ohio: Thomson South Western, 2003).
- ¹⁸ Ceglowski, op. cit.
- ¹⁹ D.A. Irwin, *Free Trade under Fire* (Princeton, New Jersey and Woodstock: University of Princeton, 2002).
- ²⁰ L. Herrera-Lasso, "The Impact of U.S. Immigration Policy on U.S.-Mexican Relations," *Voices of Mexico* 46 (Mexico City), January-March 1999, pp. 47-52.
- ²¹ United Nations, *Políticas Migratorias Internacionales* (New York: United Nations, 1998), p. 6.
- ²² Jacobson, op. cit.
- ²³ "Merchants from southern Texas and Matamoros, Mexico, asked the director of the U.S. Visitors' Program to relax inspections of tourists trying to enter the border area." *El Norte* (Monterrey, Nuevo León), 20 November 2003.
- ²⁴ P. Martin, "Mexican-U.S. Migration Policies and Economic Impacts," *Challenge* (Armonk, New York), March-April 1995, pp. 56-62; J. G. Castañeda, *The Estados Unidos Affair. Cinco ensayos sobre un amor oblicuo* (Mexico City: Aguilar, 1996); P.M. Orrenius, "Illegal Immigration and Enforcement Along the U.S.-Mexico Border: An Overview," *Economic and Financial Review* (Dallas, Texas), first quarter, 2001, pp. 2-11.
- ²⁵ S.E. Flynn, "Beyond Border Control," *Foreign Affairs* 79 (6) (New York), 2000, pp. 57-68; Orrenius, op. cit.; and P. Andreas, "La redefinición de las fronteras estadounidenses después del 11 de septiembre," *Foreign Affairs en español* 2 (1) (Mexico City), 2002, pp. 165-175.
- ²⁶ Herrera-Lasso, op. cit.
- ²⁷ Andreas, op. cit.
- ²⁸ See Flynn, op. cit. The author talks about the suspicions of an immigration official that led to the arrest of an individual, allegedly associated with Bin Laden, who was trying to take explosives into the United States across the Canadian border.
- ²⁹ Flynn, op. cit. and Tapinos, op. cit.
- ³⁰ J.B. Duroselle, *Todo imperio perecerá. Teoría sobre las relaciones internacionales* (Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1998).
- ³¹ Flynn, op. cit.
- ³² Andreas, op. cit.
- ³³ Tapinos, op. cit.
- ³⁴ Bhagwati, op. cit., p. 164.
- ³⁵ D. De Villepin, "El nuevo espíritu de la frontera," *Foreign Affairs en español* 3 (4) (Mexico City), 2003, pp. 22-35.
- ³⁶ Wolf, op. cit.



Robert Sorbo/Reuters



Kevin Lamarque/Reuters

The 2004 U.S. Elections What Is at Stake?

Paz Consuelo Márquez-Padilla*

It is a cliché that elections for a second presidential term are relatively unimportant in the United States, because incumbent presidents tend to be reelected if they keep the economy in good shape. The sign Bill Clinton used to keep on his desk that read, “It’s the economy, stupid,” is famous; it was to remind him that the economy, like no other issue, determines the election (as George Bush, Sr. knows very well). However, the traditional parameters cannot

be applied so easily today, with the 9/11 terror, the obsession with security and the military occupation of Iraq at center stage. We could resort to another golden rule of U.S. politics: if the country is in crisis, Americans always rally around their president. However, favorable public opinion is also increasingly weak and is polarizing around the policy of preventive war.

The analysis of scenarios for the November elections is difficult and necessarily inconclusive. On the one hand, the economy seems to have begun to

recover; however, it has not recovered as much as expected and not everyone sees growth. So, we cannot predict that President Bush will be reelected, at least, not easily. On the other hand, although there is a crisis, frustration at not catching Bin Laden and the recent photos showing clear mistreatment of Iraqi prisoners bring into question the means for confronting the U.S. security crisis. What is more, criticism has increased recently about the way the Republican president has waged the war against terrorism.

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The upcoming elections are of historic importance because, regardless of who is elected, a neo-conservative revolution that has been brewing and, once established, will be very difficult to de-activate, may be consolidated. Either the neo-conservatives harden up their unilateralist, unipolar agenda or the Democrats take office and try to reverse some of the changes of the Bush era. The outcome will have a great impact on the United States and the world. The task seems easier for the Republicans, who dominate the three branches of government. By contrast, if the Democrats win, they will be faced with a divided government.

In this article, I will review the elections and the two golden rules of the U.S. political system and look at the issue of the neo-conservative revolution in the United States. Campaign strategists have realized that the economy has not been able to consolidate its recovery and are centering Bush's reelection campaign on what a great war leader he has been, trying to infuse fear among the public and putting forward the crisis to make the most of the second rule (Americans unite in a crisis). The question, then, would be whether this strategy has been successful and whether there will be another terrorist attack or not.

Two points should be emphasized here. On the one hand, the belief that the Iraq war would come to a rapid conclusion has turned out to be unfounded. It seems that none of the military strategists was capable of predicting what is really happening in Iraq. Although people talked about the end of the war, reality has turned out to be different. With the occupation and the apparent initial military victory, a second type of armed clash was born: an urban guer-

rilla war that has caused more casualties than the war itself. This has led to a kind of reversal in the famous May 24, 2004 speech. Bush proposed five points in that speech: 1) returning sovereignty to the Iraqis through a provisional government and scheduling the beginning of the withdrawal of the U.S. army after June 30; 2) reestablishing security; 3) building infrastructure; 4) seeking greater international participation; and 5) carrying out elections for the new government. The idea is to create an assembly to draft a Constitution, under which elections would be organized.

Mixing the timing of the U.S. elections with the timing of Iraq reconstruction may be explosive.

Bush's speech sparked more questions and confusion than answers. He talked about leaving Iraq and handing over sovereignty to different groups who would build their democratic government. What will happen if instability continues in Iraq? What will happen if a radical, anti-U.S. group takes power? And what if Al Qaeda takes advantage of the vacuum of power to set up its center of operations? How would the paradox be interpreted if instead of propagating democracies, they help propagate instability, conflict and hunger? It is to be expected that people are already asking these questions in the White House because they do not seem very naive. Many observers imagined that it would not be an easy war. In any case, a rapid withdrawal would be the best course of action. However, the problem could be made much greater if tragic decisions were made hastily be-

cause of the approaching elections. If they have already made the mistake of going in without taking into account all the consequences, hopefully they will not leave making the same mistake.

Mixing the timing of the U.S. elections with the timing of Iraq reconstruction may be explosive. Each process has different rhythms and confusing them would be another grave mistake. If Bush and his strategists are only thinking now of the imperious necessity of winning the elections and of how good it would look to voters to begin to withdraw troops from Iraq, they are running the risk that once the elections are

over, the situation in Iraq and in the rest of the region could be unmanageable. Hopefully, the strategists are taking into consideration that, if there is a sharp clash in Iraq, the start of the U.S. withdrawal would have to be postponed until after the elections, meaning that they could deal with this problem later with more reflection and care. Winning the elections at any cost may lead to transcendental consequences in the international order, which would end by affecting all the actors involved. Among other things, this is due to the hike in oil prices that will inevitably have a new impact on the U.S. and world economies, a process that has actually already begun.

This is not an easy time in the United States. The public wants to believe in its leaders, but there are more and more reasons to doubt them. The first is that until now, no one has found weapons

of mass destruction. Second came the abhorrent photographs of torture, so staggering that we could easily have believed they were doctored, but that the military high command almost immediately accepted as real. About the lack of weapons of mass destruction, the neo-conservatives immediately began to change the justification of the war, arguing now that while the weapons had not been found, no one could deny that the Iraqis are better off without Hussein's repression. They argued something that in general is undeniable: the world today is better off without constant threats from Hussein. But a short time later the photographs of torture were released and then the difference between the good guys and the bad guys began to blur. The U.S. public could easily accept that, despite everything, Hussein had to be done away with, and the legitimacy of the leaders, although threatened, remained unstained. However, the evidence of tortures and humiliating treatment of Iraqi prisoners of war has sparked serious questions, and there is a feeling that the photos are not even the tip of the iceberg. The point is whether the whole iceberg will be revealed before or after the elections.

Until now, the polls show the public's great disillusionment, with lower and lower approval ratings for the way in which President Bush has managed the war against terrorism. According to May 29 CNN surveys, 46 percent approved Bush's performance and 49 percent disapproved it. We cannot ignore that many Americans feel that anyone who questions the president's performance is unpatriotic, and that a large part of the population believes there is a direct link between Hussein and the 9/11 terrorist attacks. That is

why Congress approved the Patriot Act soon after the attack on the Twin Towers. But today, with the passage of time, people are beginning to realize how that law is infringing in practice on civil liberties: it allows, for example, searches without a warrant, jailings for long periods without trial, violations of privacy, controls on the kind of reading people do in public libraries and the isolation of the prisoners in Guantánamo. What at first was seen as an unavoidable necessity is today beginning to be seen with certain reservations. Rights and freedoms that

tributed to Al Gore losing his bid for the presidency—launched his own independent candidacy, which will undoubtedly take votes away from the Democratic candidate.

One of the central factors in this election will no doubt be the money each of the candidates raises to fuel his campaign. By early July, Bush had U.S.\$214 million, while John Kerry said he had raised U.S.\$148 million. The big oil companies and large consortia are not willing to give up power so easily. The big tax cuts under Bush, Jr. and the promise of more to come

Campaign strategists are centering Bush's reelection campaign on what a great war leader he has been.

had appeared to be battles won by Americans now seem to be belittled by the threat. The question is whether once the crisis is past, those rights will be reinstated, or if these changes are simply part of the neo-conservative revolution, which may be unstoppable.

Despite the fact that not the entire right wing is happy with the size of the domestic deficit or the administration's migratory policies, it is a Republican Party success that no other candidate was fielded threatening Bush's campaign.¹ For the time being, the Christian right is satisfied with promises of the prohibition of homosexual marriage and the establishment of certain limits for abortion, as well as the renewed debate about banning the teaching of the theory of evolution in schools.

By contrast, the liberals were not able to close ranks around a single candidate. Ralph Nader—who con-

tributed to Al Gore losing his bid for the presidency—launched his own independent candidacy, which will undoubtedly take votes away from the Democratic candidate.

tributed to Al Gore losing his bid for the presidency—launched his own independent candidacy, which will undoubtedly take votes away from the Democratic candidate. One of the central factors in this election will no doubt be the money each of the candidates raises to fuel his campaign. By early July, Bush had U.S.\$214 million, while John Kerry said he had raised U.S.\$148 million. The big oil companies and large consortia are not willing to give up power so easily. The big tax cuts under Bush, Jr. and the promise of more to come have undoubtedly benefited them, and they will not want to see their profits affected by new taxes that the Democrats would responsibly have to institute given the enormous growth of the budget deficit.

If the 2000 election showed anything, it is that the population is divided. But it is also important to point out that the division was more over candidates than platforms, which were not very different. Today, that division marks a clear, visible difference between one party and the other. The proposals of both parties are more distant than ever before. While the last elections had a low turn-out, in this election, Americans will probably come out to vote in greater numbers. This will make a big difference no matter who the winner is, and, in addition, people have already learned that every vote counts, as could be seen by the Florida scandal in 2000. In the current

elections, the redefinition of the United States is at stake. They will either consolidate what Paul Krugman has called the neo-conservative revolution, or the Democrats will be able to stop it.² In the last elections, the Democrats went to the party's grass roots to get out the vote. In the 2004 elections, the Republicans have woven electoral networks with the same aim. According to June CNN polls, currently the candidates are practically tied: Bush is supported by 47 percent of the voters and Kerry by 49 percent, with a margin of error of +/- 2 percent. Also in early June, only

would lead everyone to close ranks around the president), then Democratic candidate John Kerry has big possibilities. If a situation arises that is perceived as a crisis and Bush is reelected, the so-called neo-conservative revolution will begin to consolidate. That revolution looks with disdain at the United Nations and thinks it is an unnecessary risk acting within it because it sees it as an institution that intervenes in its sovereignty and twists its interests. Therefore, neo-conservatives resort to arrogant unilateralism that ignores the rest of the world's countries. Behind

today it is clear that the neo-conservatives hold ideological sway over the party.

The large, irresponsible tax cuts favoring the most privileged sectors of society have turned the U.S.\$230-billion surplus Bush inherited into a deficit of U.S.\$300 billion. Undoubtedly, this has led to the reduction of the social safety net that had been built over many years by the welfare state. But it is precisely that welfare state that the neo-conservatives oppose. They argue for a minimal state that would allow freedom to large corporations, in their opinion the driving force behind the U.S. economy's development. To conclude, we can say that more than the 9/11 crisis leading to a neo-conservative agenda, that crisis was used to impose the neo-conservative agenda. That is what is delicate about the situation.

The strategy of preventive war can be considered the heart of the neo-conservative foreign policy strategy.

between 8 and 10 percent of voters were uncommitted. The fight for this group will be ferocious.

Finally, of the two golden rules of U.S. politics, the one about the economy seems to be predominating; it has not recovered completely, which is reflected in the opinion polls. Announcements of jobs being destroyed are constant and unemployment is at 5.6 percent. GDP growth for the first quarter was 4.4 percent, and in March, it was 5 percent. Not at all bad. It is not only important, however, that it continue to recover, but that the public perceive it as recovering. A vast majority disapproves of how Bush is managing both domestic and foreign policy; 65 percent thinks the country is on the wrong track.³

The war in Iraq is now beginning to look like a disaster. And if a bigger crisis does not emerge (due, for example, to the threatened terrorist attack, which

this unilateralism the religious vision of manifest destiny, the divine mission, reemerges. At the same time, this vision demonstrates an inability to understand the profound mixture of the religious and the political in the Muslim civilization and the need to accept a plurality of models, not thinking the United States is the only model for development. Different negative reactions have emerged because of this vision.⁴

Currently, the strategy of preventive war can be considered the heart of the neo-conservative foreign policy strategy. Its main points are more than a decade old and from the start they included the possibility of an attack on Iraq and the other countries of the so-called Axis of Evil before it was too late. They also justify the intervention to —paradoxically—impose democracies. Although the most conservative wing of the Republican Party is against this unfettered foreign policy activism,

The face of the United States is changing with regard to domestic policy: support for institutions created in the period of the "New Society" to help least favored groups is being withdrawn; social support networks that compensate the least able for the roughness of the market are being deactivated; civil liberties and freedom of thought, due process for jailing suspects and respect for prisoners' rights are being threatened; environmental protection measures are being ignored when the country voted against the Kyoto Protocol about climatic change. All of this, in addition to the growth of a National Security State based on a great military-industrial complex that threatens democracy itself.⁵ In foreign policy, the conservative revolution returns to the Biblical vision in which the "Divinity" gives "manifest destiny" to the United States to act as a benevolent imperialism, exporting and imposing democracies at the same time

that it places little importance on democracy domestically, as was confirmed by the 2000 elections. And instead of aspiring to jointly building an international order ruled by international institutions, the neo-conservatives in office also voted against the creation of the International Criminal Court and resort to preventive war justified by their "need" of security. In foreign policy we find an "America unbound," and in domestic politics, every day more institutions that soften the disparities created by the market are eliminated.⁶ The coming U.S. elections are in the hands of American voters, but today as never before, for better or for worse,

the consequences will have an impact on the whole world. **MM**

NOTES

¹ Neo-conservative strategists Karl Rove and Karen Hughes are part of the Republican Party campaign. Hughes is the person who presented George Bush as a conservative with compassion. We will have to see who dominates the campaign, but it seems it will be Rove, who takes a harder line. See Elizabeth Drew, *The New York Review of Books*, 10 June 2004.

² Paul Krugman, following a model invented by Henry Kissinger, talks about a neo-conservative revolution today that does not accept the legitimacy of the system. Paul Krugman, *The Great Unraveling. Losing Our Way in the New Century* (New York: Norton & Co., 2003).

³ CBS polls, quoted in "Rumbling from the Right," *The Economist*, 29 May 2004, p. 27.

⁴ Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's security advisor, has accepted that the Taliban grew thanks to U.S. support to weaken the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. See William Pfaff, "The American Mission?" *New York Review of Books*, 8 April 2004.

⁵ The defense industry contributes large amounts to the campaigns. Between 1990 and 2002 it gave U.S.\$70 million to different candidates. To look more closely at the argument about the need to promote democracy internally and abroad, as well as the threats of the National Security State, see William E. Hudson, *American Democracy in Peril* (Washington, D.C.: C.Q. Press, 2004), p. 321.

⁶ Ivo H. Daalder and James M. Lindsay, *America Unbound. The Bush Revolution in Foreign Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2003).

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
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Hispanics Before the 2004 Elections Participation and Political Power

Graciela Orozco* Celina Bárcenas**

In early 2004 we witnessed the first skirmishes of the intense battle to occupy the Oval Office: Democratic Party primaries were determining which candidate will run against incumbent Republican George W. Bush.

* Executive director of the Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation.

** Coordinator of research and studies, Mexican-American Solidarity Foundation.

And while the contenders from both parties develop their campaign strategies and proposals to convince the greatest possible number of citizens, eyes are on the voters, their profile, their concerns and their political preferences.

In accordance with U.S. society's demographic, socio-economic and multi-ethnic diversity, the profile of the U.S. electorate presents analysts with a broad

gamut of variables that spark speculation and debate. The Hispanic sector of the electorate is no exception in this political game. Since the Latino community has become the country's largest ethnic minority, with growing influence in all spheres, the potential for the Hispanic electorate is the object of constant analysis. The 2000 presidential elections, the 2002 mid-term elections

TABLE 1
DISTRIBUTION OF ELECTORAL VOTES IN THE U.S.

STATE	ELECTORAL VOTES	STATE	ELECTORAL VOTES	STATE	ELECTORAL VOTES
Alabama	9	Kentucky	8	North Dakota	3
Alaska	3	Louisiana	9	Ohio	20
Arizona	10	Maine	4	Oklahoma	7
Arkansas	6	Maryland	10	Oregon	7
California	55	Massachusetts	12	Pennsylvania	21
Colorado	9	Michigan	17	Rhode Island	4
Connecticut	7	Minnesota	10	South Carolina	8
Delaware	3	Mississippi	6	South Dakota	3
District of Columbia	3	Missouri	11	Tennessee	11
Florida	27	Montana	3	Texas	34
Georgia	15	Nebraska	5	Utah	5
Hawaii	4	Nevada	5	Vermont	3
Idaho	4	New Hampshire	4	Virginia	13
Illinois	21	New Jersey	15	Washington	11
Indiana	11	New Mexico	5	West Virginia	5
Iowa	7	New York	31	Wisconsin	10
Kansas	6	North Carolina	15	Wyoming	3

■ States with higher number of or greater concentration of Latinos.

Source: Thomas H. Neale, *The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential Elections*, RS20273, Congressional Research Service (CRS), The Library of Congress, September 2003.

TABLE 2
HISPANIC CITIZENS AND VOTERS, 1996 AND 2000 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS

YEAR	HISPANICS OVER 18	CITIZENS	CITIZENS OVER 18	REGISTERED VOTERS	REGISTERED VOTERS/ CITIZENS	VOTERS	VOTERS/ REGISTERED VOTERS
1996	18,426,000	11,209,000	60.8%	6,573,000	58.6%	4,928,000	75.0%
2000	21,598,000	13,158,000	60.9%	7,546,000	57.3%	5,394,000	71.5%

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, *Voting and Registration in the Elections of November 2000*, February 2002, P20-542, <http://www.census.gov>.


and the California state referendum in late 2003 have been valuable testing grounds providing consistent information about these voters' profile. Based on this information and specialized polls done by research centers like the Pew Hispanic Center, the Henry Kaiser Family Foundation and the William C. Velásquez Institute, in this article we will look at some issues involving Hispanics, their political participation and their potential political influence in 2004.

DEMOGRAPHICS AND POLITICAL POWER

According to the latest Census Bureau figures, in 2002, 38,761,301 Latinos lived in the United States, a 9.78 percent increase in just two years since 2000.¹ This confirms that the community has continued to grow (from 1990 to 2000, it grew 58 percent, while the overall population increase was only 13 percent). In addition, the Latino population has spread to practically all the states of the Union, creating important enclaves in states that traditionally had no or few Hispanics. For example, North Carolina increased its Latino population by 394 percent; Arkansas by 323 percent; and Georgia by 300 percent.²

This undoubtedly has a series of political implications. Therefore, many students of the U.S. political system agree that the Latino community plays a role as an emerging electoral force worthy of consideration, with broad potential for the coming years, potential that could even be definitive in some local and state elections.

Without contradicting this, we should review some factors that condition His-



Latino organizations mobilize in different ways,
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importance into political clout.

panics' political participation and, therefore, their political power. Given the particular characteristics of the U.S. electoral system, demographic and geographical variables are determinant in making up the Electoral College, the body which in the last analysis determines the outcome of the presidential and vice presidential election.

According to Table 1, the five states with the largest number of electoral votes are California, Texas, New York, Florida and Illinois; together they make for a total of 168 electoral votes. These states, in the very same order, are the ones that have the largest Hispanic populations. If we add the nine states that follow in terms of the number of Hispanic inhabitants (Arizona, New Jersey, New Mexico, Colorado, Washington,

Georgia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania and Nevada), the number of electoral votes would total 271, enough to decide the presidential race. This should suffice to show Hispanics' political potential and current ability to have an impact on the results in some elections. Even though the relative weight of the Latino community vis-à-vis the total population in each state is still insufficient to ensure wins by itself, it is increasingly important. Thus, in New Mexico, for example, Hispanics already make up 42.1 percent of the population and in California and Texas, 32.4 percent and 32 percent, respectively.

We also have to consider prerequisites that the U.S. system demands of its nationals in order to vote; there are three basic requirements: being 18 or


over, being a citizen of the United States (whether by birth or naturalization) and registering to vote.

Table 2 compares the figures for Latinos who complied with these voting requirements in the 1996 and 2000 presidential elections. It shows the variation in growth in each category. Both in 1996 and 2000, between 60 and 65 percent of Hispanics were of voting age, but only 60 percent of them were U.S. citizens. This means that in the 2000 presidential elections, only 37 percent of the 35.3 million Latinos in the U.S. fulfilled two of the three prerequisites to be able to vote. The third prerequisite, registering, limited the Hispanics even more in both elections. Lastly, as the table shows, in 2000, the Hispanic electorate came to 7.5 million, but only 5.4 million actually voted, making up only 5.3 percent of total voters in that election.

Hispanics, as an electorate, have undeniably evolved numerically. Thus, between 1972 and 2000, the number of Latinos registered to vote grew 202 percent. However, it is clear that most of the community cannot vote. About 35 percent are barred from voting because they have not yet come of age; others because they are not U.S. citizens; and many because they have not registered to vote. In addition, abstentionism is high among Hispanics, something which, if not exclusive to this community, is a matter for concern for such a numerically significant minority.

This is why the Latino organizations have carried out an intense voter registration campaign. They mobilize in different ways, but always with the same end: translating their numerical importance into political clout. Regardless of whether the elections are local or national, these organizations try to

GRAPH 2
SCHOOLING OF VOTING-AGE LATINOS



Source: *National Latino 2003 Opinion Poll Results*. William C. Velásquez Institute. www.wcvi.org/latino_voter_research/polls/national/nat_pres_all.html

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create awareness among Hispanic citizens about the community's political potential and the enormous opportunities that can be enjoyed if political participation makes a common front possible in the struggle to improve their quality of life in the United States.

The goal for organizations like the San Antonio-based Southwest Voter Registration Education Project (SVREP) is to have 10 million Latinos registered to vote in the 2004 presidential elections.³

To achieve this goal, the SVREP not only focuses its efforts in 14 states,⁴ but has also joined together with organizations from the Midwest, the East and the Southeast to reach Latinos nationwide. This organization, founded in 1974, claims to have registered 20,000

new voters in only eight states for the 2002 mid-term elections, contributing to a record 25 Hispanic congresspersons in the 108th Congress.

We will have to wait to see if these organizations' efforts to get out the Hispanic vote in the 2004 elections meets their goal of 10 million voters and overcoming the almost 30-percent abstention rate at the polls.

PROFILE OF THE HISPANIC ELECTORATE

Recent surveys reveal the current demographic profile of Hispanic voters in the United States.⁵ Among the important characteristics are the following:

- Fifty-one percent of Latino voters are men; 49 percent are women.
- More than half the voters said they were born in the United States (Graph 1); 19 percent were of Mexican origin; and Puerto Ricans, Cubans, Dominicans, Salvadorans and Colombians are only a small percentage.
- Fifty-six percent have lived in the United States all their lives; 22 percent, more than 25 years; 12 percent, between 16 and 25 years; and 8 percent, less than 15 years.
- Forty-nine percent of Latino voters are between 30 and 54 years old, while one in every four (23 percent) are between 18 and 29.⁶

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- Twenty-nine percent of Latinos of voting age report having graduated from high school (see Graph 2); 26 percent said they had begun college but did not finish; 21 percent graduated from the university; this leaves 15 percent of the population with less than a high school education and 7 percent with postgraduate studies.
- Six out of every 10 Latinos of voting age are married; 24 percent are single; and 6 percent are divorced.
- Surveys show that one-fourth of Latinos registered to vote make between U.S.\$20,001 and U.S.\$40,000 a year, while 18 percent make less than U.S.\$20,000 a year.
- Sixty percent of Latino voters are registered Democrats, a historical constant, although in recent years in general people tend to vote more for

the candidate than for the party he or she represents.⁷

- Fifty-eight percent of those surveyed say they plan to vote in the next elections.
- The issues that most concern Hispanic voters are, in order of importance: education, employment and the economy, the fight against terrorism, crime and drugs, health services, discrimination, social security and taxes.⁸
- Geographically, Latino voters are concentrated in two regions, the West and the South, which include the states with the highest Hispanic populations (California, Arizona, New Mexico and Colorado in the West

and Florida and Texas in the South). The Northeast, including New York and New Jersey, is also important. In the Midwest, except Illinois, where historically the Latino community has participated actively in politics, it will be necessary to wait for the new Hispanic communities that have grown dynamically in recent years to acquire more strength and begin to participate in politics and elections.

All this information shows that Hispanic voters' potential is real, as was clear in the 2002 elections and the 2003 California referendum. Undoubtedly, the Latino vote already has an impact on a local level and in close elections it can be the deciding factor. Nevertheless, we should remember that it is a new electorate. For that reason, even though increasing numbers of Latinos hold high

posts in the public and private sectors, there is still a long way to go before Hispanics mature as voters and establish electoral strategies to defend their own interests, as Afro-Americans do.

The active mobilization of the Latino vote and Hispanics' growing electoral experience bring the time closer when they will undoubtedly increase the community's political representation in elected posts. In that way, the community will have greater access to positions of power where the decisions that affect it are made. ■■■

NOTES

¹ U.S. Census Bureau, "Hispanic Population Reaches All-Time High of 38.8 Million, New Census Bureau Estimates Show," 18 June 2003, http://www.census.gov/Pressrelease/www/releases/archives/hispanic_origin_population/001130.html

² United States Hispanic Leadership Institute, *The Almanac of Latino Politics 2002-2004* (Chicago: United States Hispanic Leadership Institute, 2002).

³ Southwest Registration Education Project, *10-4 Campaign*, <http://www.svrep.org>.


⁴ Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Oklahoma, Texas, Utah and Washington.

⁵ William C. Velásquez Institute, "National Latino Voters. 2003 Opinion Poll Results," http://www.wcvi.org/latino_voter_research/polls/national/nat_pres_all.html

⁶ Pew Hispanic Center and Kaiser Family Foundation, *National Survey of Latinos: The Latino Electorate*, 2002, <http://www.pewhispanic.org>

⁷ New Democrat Network and Bendixen & Associates, *The Hispanic Electorate*, May 2002, <http://www.bendixenandassociates.com/polls.html>

⁸ Ibid.



Larry Downing/Reuters

The Fight against Terrorism And the U.S. Elections

María Cristina Rosas*

In contrast with previous U.S. elections, in November 2004, foreign policy will be decisive. President George W. Bush is seeking re-election—or for many, his first legitimate election—just as his father did 12 years ago. The parallels between father and son are interesting. In 1991, George Bush senior, with backing from the United

Nations and a coalition of 30-odd nations, made Iraq withdraw from Kuwait, which it had invaded in August 1990. The coalition victory was swift and the consensus around Washington's military operation prompted the president to proclaim the inauguration of a new world order. One year later, Bush made foreign policy the main issue in his bid to occupy the White House another four years. The problem was that the electorate, with its short memory, shunted aside the victory over Iraq and worried more about day-to-day issues like employ-

ment, job training, access to health services, education, etc. William Clinton campaigned on all these domestic issues.

Today, like his father in 1992, George W. Bush is basing his electoral platform on Iraq and foreign policy. For the current President Bush, domestic issues (like the enormous budget deficit, of such concern both at home and abroad) though important, are not a high priority. This is as far as the parallels go. Bush carried out Operation Iraqi Freedom from March 2003 on without UN authorization. In May 2003, the U.S. pres-

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(like the enormous budget deficit, of such concern both at home
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ident declared victory and the war over in Iraq, although the turmoil continues in that troubled Arab country. The number of Iraqi and U.S. casualties in the current conflict by far surpasses the number in the 1991 Gulf War.¹

THE U.S. AND IRAQ: 2004

Perhaps the main difference between the 1992 and the 2004 elections is the current Bush administration's security doctrine, a result of the attacks on New York, Washington and Pennsylvania, September 11, 2001. This doctrine has three basic premises:

- *Counter-proliferation.* To dissuade or avoid the potential use of arms of mass destruction against the U.S. through intercepting military supplies and technology transfers, attacking enemies before they can attack (preventive war). For example, policy makers speak of putting an end to terrorist regimes (or benefactors of terrorist organizations);
- *Non-proliferation.* There is almost no mention of arms limitations, but very briefly, officials allude to the U.S. seeking to strengthen current disarmament accords and regimens, including:
 - * The Nuclear Arms Non-proliferation Treaty;
 - * The Convention on Chemical Weapons;
 - * The Convention on Biological Weapons;

* The Missile Technology Control Regime.

- *Consequence management.* This refers to what would happen if U.S. territory were attacked, including with weapons of mass destruction, and the attributions that the Department of Homeland Security would have for coordinating the response.

This doctrine assumes that the best way to guarantee the security of the United States is through war, which explains why since September 11, 2001, the Bush administration talks about the war against terrorism. The strategy against terrorism thus comes into contradiction with the U.S. characterization of terrorism itself. For example, in an interesting and polemical study about "netwars", John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt propose that in order to defeat or at least control the advance of the networks (like terrorist networks), the "forces of order" should first understand them and then develop new methods of struggle.² Also, they say that to defeat the networks, you have to act like a network. This does not imply disregarding all forms of vertical command (such as that of the armies and forces of order in almost all countries), but that government structures should begin to emulate the networks. According to Arquilla and Ronfeldt, this would imply working in a more coordinated fashion among ministries, departments, areas, delegations, offices, etc., forming networks

among them to facilitate information exchange and make the decision-making process more agile in order to be able to respond rapidly to dynamic circumstances.³ Besides saying that the different agencies responsible for U.S. national security should compete less among themselves and cooperate closely to benefit national interests, it is important to point to the authors' affirmation that it is not possible to respond to an unconventional, asymmetrical threat like terrorism with conventional wars such as those carried out until now in Afghanistan and Iraq.⁴

Recently the U.S. College of War's Strategic Studies Institute published a study by Jeffrey Record in which he ferociously criticizes the way in which the threat of Al Qaeda has been identified in the U.S. with the invasion of Iraq. The study is about the war against terrorism and is put in terms of three characteristics that the Bush administration has given it:

- The evaluation of the terrorist threat;
- the spectrum and the possibilities of U.S. offensive commitments; and
- the political, fiscal and military sustainability of the war.

Jeffrey Record's main hypothesis is that:

The global war on terrorism as it has so far been defined and conducted is strategically unfocused, promises much

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security doctrine, a result of 9/11.

more than it can deliver, and threatens to dissipate scarce U.S. military and other means over too many ends. It violates the fundamental strategic principles of discrimination and concentration.⁵

For Record, the fact that the United States situates Saddam Hussein and his followers and Al Qaeda as a single terrorist threat is a strategic error because it ignores important differences between the two, both in their political nature and in terms of the challenge they represent and the military dissuasive action capabilities Washington can deploy to stop them. Thus, the result has been an unnecessary preventive war against Iraq that created a new space in the Middle East in favor of Islamic terrorism, distracting attention and resources away from U.S. security given new attacks and a threatening Al Qaeda. Record points out that the war against Iraq was not an integral part of the U.S. war against terrorism and that presenting it as such is a mistake of mammoth proportions.⁶

WHAT IF KERRY WINS?

The United States paradoxically made the world less safe with its new security doctrine, according to the 2004 Amnesty International report.⁷ Today, Osama Bin Laden enjoys enormous popularity in opinion polls in Arab nations, even in moderate countries like Jordan. More important than popu-

larity, however, is the political protagonism and ability to dialogue that Al Qaeda has achieved thanks to the U.S. security doctrine. Today, according to the London Strategic Studies Institute, Al Qaeda has 18,000 members spread over about 60 countries and was strengthened by the war against Iraq.⁸ The stronger Al Qaeda is, the more it will need to carry out actions that create faith in that strength. This explains the March 11 terrorist attacks in Spain. There is an important lesson to be learned from these actions, claimed by Al Qaeda: now terrorist organizations know that they can determine the results of an election in a nation as important as Spain. Also, the withdrawal of Spanish troops partly as a result of those attacks will undoubtedly encourage Al Qaeda to seek a way to have an impact on U.S. domestic politics.

This is a matter of concern taking into account the coming November elections in the U.S. As a result of recent statements by U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft to the effect that officials have credible intelligence indicating that Al Qaeda is about to make what he called "large-scale attacks," nervousness about a possible repeat of what happened in Spain is growing.⁹

Linked to this is the Democratic candidacy, understood in different academic, political and diplomatic circles as synonymous with the possibility of a radical change in the way the United States carries on its relations with the world and even in its security doctrine (if John Kerry were to win in Novem-

ber). However, if Kerry won the election and became the president of the United States, there is no guarantee that there would be a drastic change in the country's foreign policy. History tells us that regardless of the party affiliation of U.S. presidents, there is a bi-partisan consensus with regard to foreign policy since nothing can erase the fact that the United States was attacked on its own territory September 11, 2001, or that the population feels unsafe, and that this insecurity ratifies, at least in part, the Bush administration's security doctrine.

We should emphasize that while this doctrine is supported by the neo-conservatives surrounding President Bush, it has also been accepted by the neo-liberal hawks of the Democratic Party. This bipartisan consensus covers three key areas of current foreign policy:

- The recognition that terrorism and rogue states, particularly those that seek to own weapons of mass destruction, are the biggest threat to the United States and the world, which is why dissuasion, containment and preventive war are justified in the fight against them.
- The Middle East is the place where the new international order will come into being, which is why Europe and East Asia are losing importance. The United States must promote democracy in the Middle East because only if the Arab nations are democratic will the U.S. be able to live in safety.

• The United States must continue to be the only economic and military super-power, not only to discourage the emergence of rival powers, but to maintain world order. Being the dominant power confers on Washington both rights and privileges and also special responsibilities that allow it to manoeuvre beyond alliances and the multilateral institutions it belongs to. According to the U.S. definition, a world with a single pole must allow it the flexibility to work through *ad hoc* coalitions and resort to and/or do without alliances and multilateral bodies as it sees fit.¹⁰

Since both Republicans and Democrats share these ideas, John Kerry would have very little room for manoeuvre if he wanted to make a sharp turn in Washington's security and foreign policy in his electoral platform.¹¹ At the end of the day, the American public would not vote for a candidate who did not project an image of security for their daily lives.

Does this mean that since there is not an abysmal difference in the Democrats' and Republicans' security and foreign policy agendas (at least for the majority of these parties), the risk of a terrorist action against the United States aimed at influencing balloting decreases? Or, on the contrary, will this "stand-off" and/or similarity in the Republican and Democratic agendas prompt new acts of terrorism precisely with the aim of changing the situation?

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

Given that Bush administration promises —such as destroying Al Qaeda and other international terrorist orga-

nizations, transforming Iraq into a prosperous, stable democracy, bringing democracy to the rest of the autocratic Middle East regimes, eradicating terrorism as an asymmetrical threat, and putting an end to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—are not very realistic, the United States should reformulate its security interests in more concrete terms, taking into consideration the limits of its power. What for many is obvious (the failure of the U.S. counter-terrorist strategy), is difficult for U.S. officials to accept because of the political costs of that kind of recognition in an electoral year.

The main teaching of U.S. mistakes is that all strategic doctrines pinpoint fundamental objectives that discriminate between what is important and what is not, and that maximize scarce resources to face security threats. However, the Bush administration has not set clear priorities or laid out the country's limits, like, for example, the exorbitant defense budget, which is not sustainable in the medium or long term, particularly with the existing budget deficit. Thus, the United States feeds the world's —and its own— insecurity. **MM**

NOTES

¹ Even though some estimates put the number of Iraqi civilian dead at 5,500 since March 20, 2003, others calculate the number at more than 10,000. See "Han muerto más de 5 mil civiles en Irak en un año," *El Universal* (Mexico City) 24 May 2003, pp. 1 and 4. The British-U.S. organization Iraq Body Count has a detailed estimate of Iraqi victims. See <http://iraqbodycount.net>. In addition to 10,000 dead, Iraq Body Count estimates the number of wounded at 20,000. For the number of dead among U.S. and other countries' soldiers, a good source is the Iraqi Coalition Casualty Count at <http://lunaville.org/warcasualties/Summary.aspx>.

² The "netwars" concept refers to different private organizations (that is not governmental)

characterized by the rapidity with which they can develop and disappear. Networks have flexible organizational structures: they are dispersed and made up of individuals and/or small groups that communicate among themselves and operate in a coordinated, interconnected fashion, often without a centralized command, but with a horizontal command. Thus, the "netwar" of these organizations is different from criminal and violent acts in which the actors prefer to create formal, hierarchical organizations using doctrines and strategies from the past. Networks can be made up of different kinds of individuals, for example, terrorists, drug traffickers, urban gang members and members of civil society who pursue "noble causes."

³ It should be remembered that Arquilla and Ronfeldt's work came out before September 11. Thus, the networks the authors had in mind were, for example, the kind of organizations that joined together in 1999 during the Third Ministerial Meeting of the World Trade Organization in Seattle, causing the collapse of the meeting, or activists like Lori Wallach, who was the main person responsible for transcribing and sending out on the internet the Multilateral Investment Agreement (MIA), which then could not be ratified by its promoters, the members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). They do mention terrorist organizations like Al Qaeda, but they are not as central to the study as they would have been if it had been done after the September 11 attacks. This is why Arquilla and Ronfeldt's work has been so criticized by civil society organizations because it puts organizations with praiseworthy agendas in favor of social well-being on the same level as terrorist organizations. See John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, *Networks and Netwars* (Santa Monica: Rand, 2004). It is also available at <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/>

⁴ For a detailed analysis of U.S. intelligence services agencies' rivalries, see Alejandro Dávila Flores, "El imperio herido: inteligencia y seguridad," *Metapolítica* vol. 8 (May-June 2004), pp. 54-62.

⁵ Jeffrey Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism* (Washington, D.C.: Strategic Studies Institute, 2003), p. v.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 6-9 and 11-16.

⁷ <http://www.amnesty.org>

⁸ "Prepara al-Qaeda golpe en Estados Unidos, dicen," *El Universal* (Mexico City), 26 May 2004, p. 4.

⁹ "Serían atentados a gran escala," *Excelsior* (Mexico City) 26 May 2004, pp. 1 and 3.

¹⁰ Sherle R. Schwenninger, "Revamping American Grand Strategy," *World Policy Journal* vol. 20, no. 3 (fall 2003), p. 25.

¹¹ It is difficult to imagine a turn of this magnitude. When Spain announced the withdrawal of its troops from Iraq, Kerry made a public statement calling on Madrid to reconsider its decision.

The U.S. and China Government Measures Against Regional Disparity

Zuo Xiaoyuan*

THE AMERICAN WEST

I began to get interested in the American West several years ago, especially when China began to carry out a strategy of developing its own west. How could a backwater of the national and world economy in 1900 turn into the world economic center at the end of the twentieth century? Did market forces do everything? What kind of role did the government play in this process?

The West in this article refers to a West located beyond the Mississippi River. The American West is supposedly characterized by personal freedom and rugged individualism, but actually the federal government played an astonishingly large role in its development. As the largest single landholder in the West, the federal government has shaped it through national policy and water, forest and land management programs. In a sense, the West's success lies in the fact that "federal programs place individual choices, local interests and regional change within a framework of national requirements and expectations."¹

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In the twentieth century the federal government was omnipresent by directly managing the regional water, grass, timber, oil and recreational space resources. It was a primary customer for many of the region's leading businesses and the main driving force behind the West's massive urbanization. Federal funds have helped pave the highways, string the power lines and build the airports that tie the West to the rest of the nation. The West found itself dependent on farm supports, subsidized water, defense contracts and mass-transit grants. The federal policies on resource development and defense have transformed the West from a backwater of the national and world economies of 1900 into a central player at the end of the twentieth century.

RETREAT FROM LAISSEZ-FAIRE

The 1930s was a rather hard time for the West, where economic depression and natural disaster merged. The federal government began to move to the foreground of western life to save the bankrupt economy. With so little opportunity for profit or productive work, the flow of capital and people from the East

that had fueled western development for nearly a century slowed to a dribble. Roosevelt made the federal government a direct dispenser of relief, a creator of jobs and a source of capital through farm-support programs, business loans and emergency relief and public work jobs to attempt to stretch a safety net under the economy. The Civil Works Administration undertook projects that ranged from repairing streets and municipal buildings to flood control. The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) employed over 2.5 million young men nationwide between 1932 and 1942 who planted hundreds of millions of trees, built tens of thousands of dams to halt erosion and worked in hundreds of parks. Since CCC projects focused on public lands, most of its projects took place in the West rather than elsewhere.

Between 1933 and 1939 the West led all other regions in per capita payments for work relief, direct relief and loans. Beyond direct relief, the government helped to reshape the West and introduce the idea of systematic planning for regional recovery and future growth. "Depression, drought and dust undermined dependence on the marketplace as an arbiter of economic activities.... Animating the New Deal in the West

was concern for rational planning for resource use. Reports of the National Resources Planning Board, several presidential committees, various regional, state and local boards all provided guidelines designed to encourage more meaning for regional economic development."² The government's most far-reaching attempt to restructure the economy came in agriculture. Over-cultivation and over-grazing encouraged by a booming market during World War I and later forced by a declining market caused environmental disaster in the 1930s. Heavy dust storms overtook the plains. To regenerate the environment, the federal government took action to withdraw land temporarily from production and solve the problem of overgrazing. It paid millions of dollars to get farmers to turn over cultivated land to reforestation. To reduce grazing pressure on the remaining grasslands, between June 1934 and January 1935, the Drought Relief Service bought up more than 8 million steers and shot those sick and too weak to transport. The government paid the cattlemen to defer grazing on damaged pastures, to manage their water more efficiently and to stabilize their herds to help to end the glut of cattle. The Taylor Grazing Act passed in 1934, finally bringing stock-raising on public lands under federal management.³

In the 1930s the Bureau of Reclamation became the builder of multi-purpose dams designed for hydroelectric power as well as irrigation. Through the bureau, the federal government had emerged as the most powerful authority in western water management. The completion of Grand Coulee and its smaller neighboring dams provided the cheapest electricity in the U.S. and the Bonneville Power Administration,

created by Congress in 1939, put that power under public control. Cheap power eventually attracted industry, and industry allowed the region to begin to escape its dependence as an extractive economy whose raw materials went elsewhere for processing and manufacture.

By the end of the 1930s, the outlines of a new West were visible. In 1940, the presence of the federal government in the West put new resources in place for an economic take-off—new electric power, new expertise in large-scale construction, workers with new skills

The American West is supposedly characterized by personal freedom and rugged individualism, but actually the federal government played an astonishingly large role in its development.

for an industrial economy and a renewed commitment to the progressive agenda of efficient resource development.

INDUSTRIALIZATION OF THE WEST

Between 1941 and 1964, the United States fought with Japan, waged war against North Korea and China and later North Vietnam. The Pacific war and its Asian follow-ups marked the final transition from the old to the new West and made the federal budget the essential driving force of western growth.⁴ The expansion of defense production and the organization of a huge military enterprise shifted the national economic balance toward the South Atlantic, the Gulf and the Pacific coast.

To meet the demands of military production during World War II, the federal government provided about 90 percent of the investment capital avail-

able in the West. The Defense Plant Corporation, an arm of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, spent nearly U.S.\$2 billion on factories in the West. Its mills at Provo, Utah, Fontana, and California created the western steel industry and the aluminum industry of the Pacific Northwest. Federal funds created the capacity to produce 52 percent of the ships built during the war. Rapid industrialization drew on millions of laborers from rural areas and other parts of the country and speeded urbanization. From 1940 to 1943, the states with the highest rates of pop-

ulation growth were California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Utah and Arizona. The boom cities of the West suffered from overpriced and insufficient housing and further burdened already overcrowded transit systems. Under the Lanham Act and related programs, the federal government financed one million temporary housing units for wartime use nationwide, most of them in the West.

After World War II, many westerners began to worry about the postwar economy. Peace represented the danger of a rapid economic turndown, with a decline of defense spending. Yet the anticipated western economic crisis never fully materialized, and the problem that did occur did not last. Both in the Senate and in the bureaucracy, Westerners had achieved enough influence to maintain a federal commitment to western development. They called for a conversion of federally built

factories in the West for peacetime uses, the continued diversification of the western economy and the development of a new air and superhighway system to open up to the outside market. A gigantic demand for consumer goods took over from military demands in driving the western economy. Westerners successfully converted the wartime industrial base to other uses and expanded it as well. Wartime workers and war veterans got federally guaranteed loans through the Federal Housing Administration and the Veterans Administration and bought homes

an inadvertent consequence of federal policies devised to handle national needs within the world economic and political system.

The West gained a central role in national policy when energy became the center of world politics in the 1970s. The crisis of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries and world oil price hikes spurred efforts to achieve national energy independence that depended heavily on the West. Oil leases on federal lands on Alaska's North Slope triggered a new Alaskan boom. Federal tax credits and subsidies en-

cal science utilized a combination of federal laboratories, private research-and-development contractors and universities. In the process of building U.S. scientific capacity, federal initiatives helped transform western university systems. Research grants and graduate student aid provided vital funding at a time when regional campuses were struggling to cope with the first arrivals from the baby boom. Direct federal funding and federal market for science-intensive production have helped to make western metro areas some of the best educated in the country.

To be brief, federal activities have transformed the U.S. West greatly. Thanks to these efforts, the West based on an extractive economy has given way to a West that lies at the center of national growth and the global economy.

Investors may enjoy all preferential policies,
including loans, tax breaks and land use, if they invest
in basic industries in China's western region.

in the West. Migration stimulated a post-war building boom that fueled the western economy. What is more, the West did not have to eliminate its dependence on government defense spending since World War II gave way to the Cold War with the Soviet Union. International tensions and war pumped federal dollars into the West. The federal government invested more in expanding military bases, supply depots, training bases, shipyards and aircraft maintenance bases in the West.

ENERGY AND THE NEW ECONOMY

In the 1960s, a series of federal initiatives reopened U.S. society and the economy to international trade and migration. By the 1970s and 1980s, the West had assumed a new importance amidst growing global networks of people, products and ideas. This was

couraged attempts to extract oil from western Colorado shale deposits. The research for alternatives to fossil fuels looked to western wind and sunlight. Federal funds created the Solar Energy Research Institute in Colorado.

Federal contracts have been the basic support for the development and utilization of new electronics and information technologies in the newly high-tech cities of the West and supplied a key market for the "fourth wave" industries that led the nation's economic expansion after World War II. Stanford Industrial Park was the first planned effort to link science and engineering faculties of major universities to the design and manufacture of new products. Federal contracts, especially from the Department of Defense, have been a mainstay of Silicon Valley. The promotion of scientific research and applications became another federal industry. The federal subsidy of physi-

CHINA'S WEST

Today, China is facing the problem of regional disparities that the U.S. did in the past. When foreign travelers marvel at the highly modernized cities in China, like Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou, they do not know that the vast region of the West is less urbanized and much less open to the outside world. Some remote and border regions—Ethnic Minority Regions—have rural areas where the annual average personal income is only about U.S.\$300, many children cannot continue their schooling due to poverty and deforestation leads to soil erosion and desertification. The West lags behind the east region by a significant margin in term of economic and social development.

Historically, inland western China is far less developed than the eastern part. When the Chinese Communist

Party defeated Chinese Guomin Party and took power in mainland China in 1949, there was almost no industry in the West, while almost all the big cities and industries were concentrated in the East. After a series of nationalizations, no private businesses were left in China. At that time, except for some nations of the socialist bloc, most countries influenced by the United States and Britain did not recognize the government headed by the Chinese Communist Party. China was immersed in a hostile environment and isolated.

What is more, the U.S.-supported Guomin Party troops located on Taiwan might fight back at any time. Therefore, mainly out of concern for national security, in the 1950s and 1960s the Chinese government set up military industries in the West and moved other industries from the East to the far west as well. Some railways were built to connect the West to the East. These activities transformed the appearance of western China and gave it a comparatively complete industrial system. From the second half of the 1960s to the 1970s, due to the "Cultural Revolution," there was almost no development of the national economy. Since the 1980s, under Deng Xiaoping the Chinese government began to carry out economic reforms and to open up to the outside world. Four special economic zones were set up on China's east coast as an experiment to try out a market economy under government regulation. The special economic zones achieved success quickly and influenced areas around them. The economy of eastern China began to jump ahead, and the western part developed very slowly. The disparity became larger and larger.

Up until recently, the situation of its western region has been an obstacle

to the further rapid growth of the national economy. Therefore, the central government began to put forward the Western Region Development Program in 2000 to eliminate regional disparities. After researching the experiences of other countries, the Chinese government set up its strategy of western development. In its "Overall Plan of Western Region Development During the Tenth Five-Year Plan Period", the central government set up the main targets, including improving infrastructure with key projects in water conservation, communications, energy and telecommunications, recovering the environment at the heads of large watersheds, upgrading traditional industries, industrial restructuring, building scientific capacity, promoting urbanization, reducing rural poverty, etc.⁵ With a different system to that of the United States, China is a country where the central government has overwhelming authority and all its decisions must be strictly carried out by local government. To ensure the program's smooth implementation, the State Council established the leading group on development with Zhu Rongji (former prime minister) as the leader and Wen Jiabao (current prime minister) as the deputy leader. This group set up an office dealing with drawing up plans, formulating policies and inspecting the government projects.

DIRECT INVESTMENT

While studying these targets, we find that many will rely on government efforts, since capital is profit-oriented, and market forces cannot do everything. Huge amounts of money from central government have been flowing

to infrastructure projects, telecommunication networks and the improvement of the ecological system. The ministries of railways, communications, water resources, agriculture, forestry and the information industry, among others, continue to increase the proportion of funds invested in the major projects for the western region.

Some key projects are being implemented with financial assistance from the central government, such as turning farmland back into forests and reforestation and water control projects in Shaanxi and Gansu provinces and the Inner Mongolia and Ningxia Hui autonomous regions; the West-East Gas Pipeline Project; the West-East Power Transmission Project; the Qinghai-Tibet Railway Project; national trunk highways; and water resources development and water saving projects. The state offers subsidies to mitigate losses of local finance and expenses in forestation and grass cultivation. Subsidies are also offered for pension contributions at state-owned forestry companies and minimum living standard guarantee payments to laid-off workers. Farmers withdrawn from cultivated land get compensation in the form of grain and cash subsidies. In addition, the state provides farmers with seedling subsidies for cultivated land converted to forests or pasture or barren land covered with forests or grass.⁶ The central government increasingly invests in poverty reduction funds and sends agriculture and animal husbandry experts to destitute areas in central and western China to help increase people's income there. Meanwhile, support is given to all these areas developing science and technology, education, culture and healthcare facilities.

POLICIES TO ATTRACT PRIVATE CAPITAL

Though the central government has pumped a huge amount of money into western China, state subsidies and state-owned bank loans are far from being enough to fill capital needs over the next few years. Therefore, many policies have been drawn up to attract private capital into the region.

A greater proportion of the service and trade sectors in the western region are opened up to foreign investment, including banking, tourism, accounting, architecture and urban planning and legal services.

Investors may enjoy all preferential policies, including loans, tax breaks and land use, if they invest in basic industries, infrastructure development or resource exploitation in the western region. Foreign investment projects in infrastructure and other sectors in the western region are allowed a higher proportion of loans from domestic banks in Chinese currency for fixed-asset investment. Tax reduction or exemptions are granted to enterprises in government-sponsored sectors. New companies engaged in transport, power, water conservation, postal service, broadcasting and television in the western region are eligible for income tax reduction and exemption.

Also there are "preferential policies on land use" to encourage activities to benefit ecological systems in the western region. They allow economic entities or individuals engaged in forest and grass planting to own the wood and grass in question and hold land tenure. State-owned wastelands may be transferred without charge for forestation and grass planting aiming at ecological improvement.

The drive of the central government has produced instant results. For example, in the first half of 2001, the gross domestic product (GDP) of 12 provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities in western China increased by 8.7 percent. Investments in fixed assets soared 25 percent in the first three quarters of the year, much higher than the national average growth rate. More than one million hectares of low-yield farmland have been converted into grassland and 910,000 hectares of hills or wasteland have been planted with trees. Indiscriminate felling of trees on the upper reaches of the Yangtze and Yellow Rivers has halted. Construction of 10 key projects began in western China the year before at a combined cost of U.S.\$2.19 billion.

FINAL REMARKS

As we all know, market forces are the key motivations for economic development. However, the essence of private capital is to seek a profit. When there are high risks and low expectations for immediate profit, few owners of private capital want to invest. Underdeveloped areas with poor infrastructure and other unfavorable conditions are less attractive to private capital; to develop these areas, huge amounts of money and resources are needed. At the same time, developing these areas is of great importance to the entire national economy and social stability. Given this situation, government investment and promotion to create a more favorable environment for development are indispensable. What is more, sometimes the government can do what private capital cannot. In a sense, in the initial stage of the development, the role of the

government is more important than that of the market forces. With the improvement of the investment environment, the role of market forces will become more and more important.

While studying the cases of the U.S. West and China's Western Region, we may see that the combination of the role of market forces with the strengthening of macro-economic management is the key to reducing regional disparity. On the one hand, the market has an important role in allocating resources, deepening economic restructuring, expanding the opening to the outside world. On the other hand, the government's role of macro-economic regulation makes a priority of support to the underdeveloped regions and creates a favorable institutional and policy framework for its development. Particularly when market forces do not work well, strong government promotion has been essential in both countries. ■■

NOTES

- ¹ Carl Abbott, "The Federal Presence," *The Oxford History of the American West*, Clyde A. Milner II, Carol A. O'Connor and Martha A. Sandweiss, eds. (London: Oxford University Press, 1994).
- ² Richard Lowitt, *The New Deal and the West* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1984).
- ³ Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own", *A New History of the American West* (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
- ⁴ *Ibid.*
- ⁵ "Overall Plan of Western Region Development During the Tenth Five Years Plan Period," Office of the Leading Group for Western Region Development of the State Council (China), July 2002.
- ⁶ State Council of China, "Circular of the State Council on Improving Policy Measures Concerning the Conversion of Cultivated Land Back into Forestry and Pasture" no.10 (Beijing), 11 April 2002.



Andrew Winning/Reuters

Mexican-Canadian Relations In the Context of a North American Community

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The commemoration of 60 years of diplomatic relations between Mexico and Canada is a good

time to take a historical look at the main elements of current bilateral relations. This will allow us to understand the challenges posed by the fact that in recent years, a large part of that relationship has become regional because of the growing discussion in both intellectual and government circles about the future of North America and the prospects for going beyond a mere trade

association to a North American community.

Even though relations between Mexico and Canada were formalized in 1944,¹ mutual understanding developed gradually because of Mexico's close links with Latin America and Canada's with the other side of the Atlantic. For a long period, being the United States' only neighbors made it impos-

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Mexico and Canada have built their relationship
based on common positions: for example, they both came out against
the Helms-Burton Act and the invasion of Iraq.

sible for the two countries to get to know each other because of the U.S. presence. The relationship with our powerful neighbor has always been a priority for both countries and, as a result, much of both their foreign policies has been eminently reactive to it.

Canada's decision to begin to play a more active role in the hemisphere and its entry into the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990 coincided with Mexico's interest in diversifying its relations abroad and beginning its membership in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Asian Pacific Economic Coordination (APEC), two organizations Canada already belonged to.² Thus, given its regional leadership, Mexico took on particular interest for Canada.

Relations between Mexico and Canada went through a substantial quantitative and qualitative change. In less than a decade they went from having merely formal relations —although always on very good terms— to considering each other “strategic partners,” committed to building a very complete, complex political and trade agenda and bilateral, trilateral, hemispheric and global cooperation. In addition to their respective governments and business groups, a series of academic and civil society organizations from both countries participate in this.

Mexico and Canada have built their relationship based on common posi-

tions: for example, they were the only two countries in the continent that maintained relations with Cuba after its revolution; both came out against the Helms-Burton Act and, more recently, the invasion of Iraq. Similarly, the political conflicts in Chile and Central America during the 1970s and 1980s provided the opportunity for building agreements that were used to promote multilateral initiatives such as the Convention on Anti-Personnel Land Mines.

It was not until the 1990s that Mexico and Canada decided to take advantage of their proximity to the United States.³ Initially, Mexico's 1990 proposal to create a free trade agreement with the United States sparked certain skepticism in Canada because of its concern about losing its “special” relationship with its southern neighbor, with whom it already had a bilateral treaty of this kind. Mexico, for its part, was concerned that the trilateral negotiation would be very complex and not bear fruit. However, once the U.S. chose the trilateral option, the governments of Mexico and Canada weighed the advantages of this focus, which would allow them to be more precise about their asymmetrical interdependence with the world's only superpower.

Regardless of political agreements on international issues based on Mexico's and Canada's tradition of finding a counterweight to their relations with

the United States, from the beginning the bilateral relationship particularly emphasized trade and technology exchange. This flourished in the new trade dynamic that emerged after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) came into effect a decade ago. Since then, Canada has become Mexico's third trade partner and Mexico, Canada's fourth and its first in Latin America. Between 1993 and 2003, trade between the two countries grew 236.5 percent.⁴ Canada is the fourth largest foreign investor in Mexico, with 3.7 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI).⁵ Our country has also been a tourist destination for Canadians,⁶ and now many have chosen to live here. At the same time, the number of Mexican students who decide to take courses in Canada is on the rise.

The results of this relationship has to a great extent eliminated the opposition to NAFTA by certain sectors of Canadian society, especially those who thought that it would make for big job losses and a possible deterioration of the special relationship with the United States. Today it is clear that it is a successful instrument for promoting the regional economy and that it has oriented investment, technology and jobs toward a substantive increase in productivity in the area. In Mexico and Canada, the export sector has become one of the driving forces of both economies and the links between businessmen and regional corporations have

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been strengthened impressively. This, together with inter-governmental dialogue, has fostered the creation of strategic alliances for the achievement of a more competitive, prosperous and economically integrated region.

In this context, Mexican-Canadian relations are characterized by the profusion of new initiatives for cooperation. Some of them are derived from the highest level mechanism for fostering bilateral relations, the Ministerial Commission.⁷ Its most important result was the signing in 1996 of the Plan of Action which for the first time dubs the relationship strategic.

Environmental initiatives led to joint projects to protect the Monarch butterfly, as well as the exchange of experts on forest fire prevention, aquaculture and basin management. The two countries jointly promoted the establishment of a program to protect the victims of anti-personnel mines in Central America and, together with the U.S. government, another for water management in the region. A trilateral committee was set up to promote initiatives on higher education, which has been shown to have great potential.

In addition, the Mexico-Canada Program for Temporary Agricultural Workers, which began 30 years ago, has come to faithfully reflect bilateral cooperation which has gradually grown in complexity, fostering the active participation of both governments in modernizing their administration. Be-

cause the program is successful and because of the complementary nature of the two economies, officials are currently exploring the possibility of broadening out the presence of Mexican workers in other provinces and sectors of Canada.

However, as with any mature relationship, Mexico and Canada have also had their differences and tensions. In the decade of mutual discovery, conflicts arose that both governments were able to deal with through frank, direct dialogue. This was the case of Mexico's position on the sovereignty of Quebec, particularly during the 1995 referendum. Although Mexico abstained from intervening in this internal Canadian matter, later it collaborated with the Chrétien government in promoting federalism. The Canadian government came under significant pressure from its non-governmental human rights organizations with regard to the conflict in Chiapas, particularly after the Acteal massacre. Therefore, in its best tradition of "soft diplomacy," it took every opportunity to invite the Mexican government to respect human rights and seek a negotiated peace. This was probably the only discordant issue in bilateral relations; one could even say that for a few years, bilateral political relations became infused with the issue of Chiapas. The financial and moral support that some Canadian NGOs gave pro-Zapatista organizations was a matter for mutual concern. Nevertheless,

trust and frankness always won the day, as well as the tacit agreement to not intervene in each others' internal affairs.

Today, bilateral cooperation has deepened to such an extent that dialogue and communication have had the upper hand with regard to human rights conflicts such as the case of the murder of Digna Ochoa, and the murders of women in Ciudad Juárez.

TWO DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENTS MEET

Canada's interest in clean elections that would bring Mexico into the ranks of the fully democratic nations led the Canadian government to foster broad NGO and federal officials' participation as observers of the 2000 elections; most Canadian embassy officials in Mexico and personnel from the Canadian Foreign Ministry Mexico Office participated. The Canadian electoral agency, which publicly recognized that there was much to learn from the Mexican electoral process, also provided advisory services and important cooperation with Mexico's Federal Electoral Institute.

The electoral results and Vicente Fox's victory were understood both by the public and officials of both governments as a democratic success. Mexico had never before received so much attention and good press, sparked by the announcement of the president-

elect's visit to Canada. Once there, his statements about Mexico's interest in achieving in the medium term what he called "NAFTA Plus", which he defined as the creation of a North American regional space where people and goods could freely circulate, surprised the public even more.

This began an intense debate that continues to the present day. The idea was received ambiguously by some Canadian government circles. At the same time, the Canadian government's willingness to support the future administration was surprising: this was shown by the high-level audiences given by then-Prime Minister Jean Chrétien's ministers and councilors to the Mexican transition team. Mexico was also given special treatment during President Fox's state visit in April 2001, the only state visit in the framework of the Summit of the Americas. For Mexico, the meaning of the visit was to reiterate the strategic nature of its relations with Canada, not only as a trade partner, but also to guarantee a certain counterweight to relations in North America and to build hemispheric and multilateral alliances.

After identifying new avenues of cooperation, the chief executives signed a joint political statement, "Mexico and Canada: Friends, Partners and Neighbors." It seeks to strengthen mechanisms for cooperation between both countries' energy industries, to study the possible expansion of the Program for Temporary Agricultural Workers,

and to broaden cooperation with regard to natural resources and the development of human resources.

In addition to the bilateral and hemispheric component of the visit, after the Summit of the Americas concluded, the first trilateral meeting of the leaders of North America was held, a meeting which revived the debate about the region's future. In their joint statement, the three leaders expressed their commitment to continue promoting NAFTA until it is fully implemented and stated that a sense of community would be built to ensure that its benefits reached all regions and sectors of society in the three countries. Also, a trilateral working group on energy was created to design a North American focus on this issue. Finally, they committed themselves to studying the options for strengthening the North American association. In this way, an intermediate platform was created, situated between President Fox's audacious proposal and the more moderate Canadian vision.

Since this state visit, bilateral relations have been very dynamic. Numerous meetings between the heads of government, ministers and vice-ministers from both governments have made it possible to advance in new areas of bilateral action like education, human rights, human and social development, agricultural cooperation and culture. The two governments have committed themselves to developing joint actions to preserve and disseminate

cultural and linguistic diversity and broaden cooperation between the two countries' cultural industries and in preserving both nations' patrimony, as well as to strengthen the Program for Artist Residencies. In addition, as a result of the "democratic bonus" and the synergy achieved with the Fox administration, an intense agenda for cooperation on matters of federalism and good government has been developed. This includes the signing of new international instruments and a strengthening of dialogue and links between Mexican and Canadian states, provinces and municipalities. Specifically, both governments are working closely together to develop an on-line educational portal that will offer Mexican civil servants electronic training effectively and transparently. This experience could serve as a model in the hemisphere in the Summit of the Americas process.

Cooperation with regard to energy is particularly important given Canadian businessmen's expectations for increasing their Mexican investments, particularly in electricity and gas. This depends on an appropriate legal framework being in place, which is why they have expressed their concern over the delays and uncertainty about the approval of a new Mexican law in the matter.

Since September 11, 2001, Mexico and Canada have each had high-level bilateral meetings with the United States to reinforce security in the region

Environmental initiatives led to joint projects to protect the Monarch butterfly, as well as the exchange of experts on forest fire prevention and aquaculture.

through their border modernization programs. They have also consulted together about their border negotiations with the U.S., and in particular with regard to migratory policy.

One of the great challenges in all these experiences of cooperation is finding a horizontal perspective that would eliminate the tendency to think that the more developed country with the better economic and quality of life indicators should be the one to unilaterally support the other. It has always been easier to say that Mexico can learn from the experience of Canadian good government and its technological and scientific strength than to recognize the benefits Canada can receive from Mexico.

These benefits not only consist of Mexico as a real and potential market, but are also due to its innovative practices, its creativity in facing problems, the wealth of its cultural diversity, the advantages of its particular insertion in Latin America and its experience with indigenous groups.

Beyond agreement on values and positions on global issues, and in accordance with Mexican foreign policy's priority of strengthening Mexico's multilateral presence, in its first three years, the current administration has paid special attention to coming to common positions prior to multilateral meetings. Thus, starting with the Durban Conference, both governments have held consultations on human rights issues and very particularly on matters per-

taining to indigenous questions in the hemisphere.

They have also exchanged information about specific situations in certain Latin American countries like Venezuela and Argentina, especially with regard to the strategies that each government will adopt as a result. These efforts are in addition to the annual consultations held for more than five years between both Foreign Ministries' foreign policy planning offices with the aim of reviewing the most important positions and the joint actions that can be taken.

Despite a mutual interest in exploring this vein of bilateral action, the results are still very initial. Undoubtedly, more effort and discipline are needed so that, with a long-term vision, common positions can be arrived at in the multilateral sphere, with respect for each country's specificities and agendas with regard to the different issues.

TOWARD A NORTH AMERICAN COMMUNITY

In the 45 months since President Fox's proposal to take the U.S.-Canada-Mexico trade agreement further, a dynamic dialogue has developed about the future of the region that has led to the review of the North American imaginaries. The interest awakened, particularly in Canada and Mexico, has spread to all three countries' intellectual centers.

It is fair to say that Canada has established more mechanisms for a systematic review of the issue. These include Parliament's Foreign Affairs Commission, which published a detailed report about the consultations it made in the three countries to get an overview of the opinions of parliamentarians, businessmen and intellectuals.⁸

Despite government skepticism, curiously enough, it has been Canada where a broad, serious public debate has begun, particularly in the press, about the pros and cons of greater regional interdependence. Even though much of the thinking is about Canada's relationship to the United States, the Mexican component has always been present. Since September 2001, the discussion has centered on security issues, particularly with regard to the creation of a possible "North American security perimeter" and, therefore, the management of borders with the U.S. For reasons linked to sovereignty, however, the issue has been kept bilateral.

In Mexico, the discussion has emphasized the need to create new trilateral institutions. In Canada, meanwhile, the debate has centered on the different scenarios involving closer relations and greater interdependence with the United States, in which Mexico is just one more variable. The Canadians discuss Mexico's difficulty in giving the proposal concrete content, such as the polemical issue of creating "cohesion funds," which has centered that

Cooperation with regard to energy is particularly important given Canadian businessmen's expectations for increasing their Mexican investments, especially in electricity and gas.

part of the debate on the mechanisms whereby Canada could help Mexico bilaterally and trilaterally to achieve “healthy public management.” Another point of discussion is which aspects of Mexican development should continue to be financed by international banks, which ones with support from the OECD and which should be solved bilaterally between Mexico and the United States.⁹ The discussions have continued in the two additional meetings of the three countries’ leaders who—in the manner of Solomon—expressed their interest in continuing to deepen a sense of community and explore the potential for strengthening the association. In that light, President Fox referred to the “Initiative for North America” during his bilateral meetings with his U.S. and Canadian counterparts in January 2003.

This is how the debate has evolved through the discussion of the possible scenarios for greater integration: all the way from maintaining the status quo to a North America conceived of as a confederation with supranational institutions.

In the last 13 years, relations between Mexico and Canada have not only strengthened, but starting with Mexico’s new administration, have gone from a strategic-discursive stage to a strategic-real stage in which a new understanding of the issues on the global agenda has been sought, issues which previously were discordant and today are spaces for cooperation. However, the new dynamic continues to present important challenges. The impetus in the relationship could stagnate if new mechanisms for bilateral cooperation are not forged, mechanisms that make it possible to transcend mere contact for exchange of information. Given the

difference in the political systems and Canada’s extreme decentralization, new forms of rapprochement among the different levels of government of the two countries must also be explored. Bilaterally, but with the aim of fully implementing NAFTA, additional efforts are required so that not only large corporations but also medium-sized and small industries are represented in the process. Additionally, greater coordination between the governments for the possible implementation of common initiatives and policies toward third countries or multilaterally is desirable.

The dynamism that Mexican-Canadian relations have acquired in the new century could avert an impasse if both governments are able to strengthen their association. This can be achieved through effective policies and the negotiation of common positions toward our mutual neighbor that would make it possible to exercise a certain counterweight to its power, at the same time inviting it to seriously consider the discussion of the steps for building the North American Community. In addition to the three bilateral relationships that already exist, this could become the fourth regional relationship. In this entire process, Mexico should advance toward a clear definition of its vision of the region’s future. In addition to Canada’s contributions to the discussion, it will be fundamental that it reconsider some type of participation in the two mechanisms Mexico proposed to achieve greater social convergence: the Partnership for Prosperity and the Puebla-Panama Plan.

In this scenario, the celebration of 60 years of Mexican-Canadian relations and their first decade as trade partners is an unparalleled opportuni-

ty to also celebrate the consolidation of a singular and productive strategic relationship that—together with the United States—outlines the future of North America. **NM**

NOTES

- ¹ Canada established its first trade mission in Mexico in 1887.
- ² For an excellent analysis of the history of relations between Mexico and Canada, see Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, *Canadá y México: Los vecinos del vecino* (Mexico City: Instituto Matías Romero de Estudios Diplomáticos, 1997).
- ³ Carlos Rico, “Mexico-Canada. A Growing Relationship,” *Voices of Mexico*, no. 45, October-December 1998.
- ⁴ Statistics on trilateral trade from Mexico’s Office of the Ministry of the Economy in Ottawa, August 2003, <http://www.nafta-mexico.org/trade/statistics/AAGO03.pdf>
- ⁵ <http://www.economia.gob.mx/pics/p/p1239/CANJUN03.doc>
- ⁶ Approximately one million Canadians visit Mexico every year, that is, one out of every 30. This leads to greater sensitivity about the situation in Mexico. At the same time, only a little over 150,000 Mexicans travel to Canada every year.
- ⁷ The last Mexico-Canada Ministerial Commission meeting was held in Ottawa in February 1999.
- ⁸ Bernard Patry, “Report of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade, ‘Partners in North America. Advancing Canada’s Relations with the United States and Mexico,’” (Ottawa: House of Commons, December 2002).
- ⁹ Wilson Forsberg Stacey, “Canadá y México: búsqueda de puntos comunes en el continente norteamericano,” paper presented at the seminar “North American Linkages: Perspectives from the Policy Research Community,” in Ottawa in February 2002.

Tamaulipas



Tamaulipas is a privileged land, located in Mexico's extreme Northeast, with the Gulf of Mexico on one side and the U.S. border on the other. Its magnificent geographical location—the Tropic of Cancer cuts the state in two—gives it a variety of climates and ecosystems that go from jungle in the far south, cold mountain forests, to warm deserts in the north; from the immense lake mirrors and deep *cenote* sinkholes in the Huasteca region, to the beach fronts and sandy salt lagoons surrounding it.

With a history of millions of years, Tamaulipas bears noteworthy testimony of the continent's first land mammals and birds, as well as the millennia-old presence of human hunting and gathering clans, who gradually became farmers in the rocky shade

of the mountains and, thousands of years later, forged the first civilizations that have left behind the legacy of the ruins of their impressive architecture in the Huasteca region and the mountains.

During the colonial period, the state's rich natural resources prompted early attempts to control it, but the fierceness of the northern indigenous tribes made that impossible until the mid-eighteenth century. Once Mexico gained its independence, oil, cattle ranching and sea traffic sparked visible economic progress in the expansion of cities like Tampico, Matamoros, Tula and Nuevo Laredo, which also benefited by the U.S. border being established along the Rio Grande.

Voices of Mexico invites our readers to explore the pathways that reveal part of the history and riches of Tamaulipas. **MM**



Photos by Elsie Montiel

Focusing on Tamaulipas's Vertebrate Fossils

Marisol Montellano Ballesteros*

Fossils are a testimony to life in the past. Their study, together with the study of rocks, permit us to understand how life on Earth has changed. The state of Tamaulipas is rich in biological, climatic and geological formations. It has regions bathed by the waters of the Gulf of Mexico, and others at great altitudes in the Eastern Sierra Madre, thus creating an endless number of ecological niches. Although few paleontological projects have been systematically carried out in the state, the study and analysis of mainly terrestrial vertebrates have contributed important information to the understanding of different aspects of organisms' evolution and diversity. Huizachal Canyon is Mexico's oldest site for land vertebrate fossils, and fauna this ancient is scarce in the world as a whole. The study of fauna from the Pleistocene like that found in the San Lázaro *Ejido* and the El Abra Cave aids in discovering how climatic conditions have changed over the last tens of thousands of years.



Location of some vertebrate fossil remains found in Tamaulipas.
Map: Marisol Montellano.



View of a new species of turtle, collected in *Ejido San Lázaro*.
Photo: René Hernández.

The remains of vertebrate fossils have usually been discovered by chance during highway construction or the drilling of wells. Therefore, knowledge about vertebrate fossils discovered in the state is scant.

Few systematic paleontological studies have been made of the state of Tamaulipas. Nevertheless, the state's geology is complex and diverse, since it includes rocks from the pre-Cambrian period (more than 600 million years old) to very recent rocks. This geological record is rich and diverse, including invertebrates, microfossils, plants, pollen and vertebrates.

The remains of vertebrate fossils have usually been discovered by chance during highway construction or the drilling of wells. Therefore, knowledge about vertebrate fossils discovered in the state until now is scant (see map). In this article, I will briefly enumerate some of the state's fossil-rich areas and describe in certain detail some important examples that confirm Tamaulipas's fossil wealth. They are worth studying since this puts in perspective the region's climatic changes and the current distribution of organisms. Nevertheless,

more systematic studies should be carried out in order to expand knowledge and design policies to preserve this patrimony.

THE FAUNA OF THE HUIZACHAL CANYON

In the Huizachal Canyon, located 20 kilometers south of Ciudad Victoria, remains of fauna from the early Jurassic Period (approximately 180 million years ago) have been found; to date, this is the oldest site in Mexico where land vertebrates have been discovered. Its existence was first announced in a publication in which Clark and Hopson described a Trytilodontid (a mammal-like reptile), called *Bocatherium mexicanum*.¹ This sparked the start of a research project that after several years resulted in the gathering of a significant collection of vertebrate remains, some of which are still under study. The fauna includes two types of sphenodontian (a kind of reptile), *Cynosphenodon huizachalensis*,² the more common variety, and *Zapatodon ejidoensis*, a dwarf sphenodontian;³ a burrowing

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Carapace of a glyptodont found in the San Lázaro *Ejido*.
Photo: René Hernández.

reptile, *Tamaulipasaurus morenoi*;⁴ crocodiles, some dinosaurs and several types of mammals in different stages of evolution that testify to the diversity of the mammals present at the end of the early Jurassic period.⁵ Lastly, there is the so-called *Dimorphodon weintraubi*, a flying reptile or pterosaur,⁶ a uniquely well preserved specimen. The preparation of this specimen took six years, after it was found in 1985 and transferred to the lab during the field seasons of 1986-1988, because of the delicacy of its bones and the hardness of the matrix it was encased in. The specimen consists of an articulated partial skeleton that includes the back part of the cranium and the first four cervical vertebrae, part of the right wing, the distal portion of the right back leg and other postcranial elements.

Thanks to the preservation of this specimen, it has been possible to reconsider the hypothesis about the way the basal pterosaurs moved. Previously, it had been supposed that primitive pterosaurs walked on their two hind legs, using their toes, and that they were able to run. After analyzing the hind leg of the Tamaulipas specimen, specialists came to the conclusion that they supported their weight on the entire foot, and that the curved claws suggested that they could climb and hold onto branches, which contradicts the original hypothesis.

THE SAN LÁZARO *EJIDO*

In 1994, the discovery of elephant remains in one of the streams at the San Lázaro *Ejido* Collective Farm in Villagrán municipality was announced. Among the vertebrate fossil remains found in the area were the carapace of a glyptodont and turtles from the end of the Pleistocene epoch.⁷

The remains of the glyptodont include an almost intact carapace and postcranial elements like the ulna, shoulder-blades and humerus, among others. The glyptodonts were a group that originated in South America and arrived in North America after the Panamanian bridge was established almost 3.5 million years ago. Their bodies were covered with bony, circular plates that formed a carapace; on their heads they had a shield, and their tails were covered with rings of bony plates and spikes, giving them the appearance of a tank. In Mexico, most of the extant glyptodont remains are isolated plates, and very few carapaces have been recovered and described.

However, one noteworthy fact is the number of turtle remains found in this area. Three almost complete carapaces of different ages have been recovered, one of which preserves the cranium and the forelegs. The study of this material concludes that it was a new species of giant land turtle belong-



Cranium of the *Tamaulipasaurus morenoi* found in Huizachal Canyon.
Photo: James M. Clark.

ing to the *Gopherus* genus.⁸ The discovery of the presence of this new species of turtle in the area helped explain the far-flung distribution of land turtles in northern Mexico.

THE EL ABRA CAVE

The El Abra Cave was frequently visited by scientists studying bats in the 1940s. But, toward the late 1960s, it began to be explored for vertebrate

fossil remains, thanks to which fragments of travertine were discovered containing animal remains. The fauna recovered was made up of small, night-prowling mammals, reptiles and birds like mice, bats, *tlacuache* marsupials, frogs and lizards. The explanation of this very one-sided group of fauna is that the remains come from the regurgitations of the owls that lived in the cave, that is, the species found there had been captured outside the cave itself. Some of these species still live in the area; others are extinct; and yet others are found hun-



Left: Cranium of a tryliodontid found in the fields of Huizachal Canyon. Photo: James M. Clark. Right: Forelegs of the pterosaur *Dimorphodon weintraubi* found in Huizachal Canyon. Photo: Michael Ellison.



Wing and foreleg of the flying reptile *Dimorphodon weintraubi* collected in Huizachal Canyon. Photo: James M. Clark.

dreds of kilometers away. The study of this fauna revealed that during the late Pleistocene, the area must have been much more humid than it is today.

OTHER SITES AND FAUNA

Research has shown that the Los Matutes Valley, located in the municipality of Xicoténcatl, was very rich in mega-fauna from the Pleistocene: mammoths, bears, camels, bison and horses, among others. The first reports of this region's wealth date from the late 1950s. Unfortunately, however, the site has been plundered.

Another interesting fossil find is a mosasaur (a marine reptile) found in the town of Rayón in González municipality during exploration for oil in the 1920s. Aligned vertebrae were found, in addition to pieces of cranium, ribs, parts of the extremities, teeth and a section of mandible. The mosasaur lived mainly in the sea during the Cretaceous Period. These animals had long, thin bodies with a wide, flat tail that they used to swim. Their feet were fin-like and their powerful mandibles had wide, sharp teeth. In Mexico, marine reptiles are practically unknown and therein lies the importance of this find, despite the fact that today, the whereabouts of this specimen is unknown.

All these specimens and finds give an idea of the paleontological wealth of the state of Tamau-

lipas. Their scientific value is unquestionable, which is why it is important to contribute to their conservation and systematic study. **MM**

NOTES

- ¹ J.M. Clark and J.A. Hopson, "Distinctive mammal-like reptiles from Mexico and its bearing on the phylogeny of the Trytilodontidae," *Nature* 315, 1985 (London), pp. 398-400.
- ² V. Reynoso-Rosales "A Middle Jurassic *Sphenodon*-like sphenodontian (Diapsida: Lepidosauria) from Huizachal Canyon, Tamaulipas, Mexico," *Journal of Vertebrate Paleontology* 16 (2), 1996 (Lawrence, Kansas), pp. 210-221.
- ³ V.H. Reynoso and J.M. Clark, "A dwarf sphenodontian from the Jurassic La Boca formation of Tamaulipas, Mexico," *Journal of Vertebrate Paleontology* 18 (2), 1998 (Lawrence, Kansas), pp. 333-339.
- ⁴ J.M. Clark and R. Hernández, "A new burrowing diapsid from the Jurassic of Mexico," *Journal of Vertebrate Paleontology* 14 (2), 1994 (Lawrence, Kansas), pp. 180-195.
- ⁵ M. Montellano, J.A. Hopson, J.M. Clark, D.E. Fastovsky, "Mammals from the Huizachal Canyon Middle Jurassic," *Journal of Vertebrate Paleontology* 15 (3), Supplement 43A, 55 Meeting of the Society of Vertebrate Paleontology in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1995 (Lawrence, Kansas).
- ⁶ J.M. Clark, J.A. Hopson, R. Hernández R., D.E. Fastovsky and M. Montellano, "Foot posture in a primitive pterosaur," *Nature* vol. 391, 1998 (London), pp. 886-888.
- ⁷ M. Montellano, "A New Rancholabrean Vertebrate fauna from northeastern Mexico," VII North American Paleontologist Convention in Berkeley, California, June 26 to July 1, 2001.
- ⁸ V.H. Reynoso-Rosales and M. Montellano-Ballesteros, "New giant turtle of the genus *Gopherus* (Chelonia; Testudinidae) from the Pleistocene of Tamaulipas, Mexico and its bearing on the phylogeny and biogeography of gopher turtles," *Journal of Vertebrate Paleontology* (Lawrence, Kansas), at press.

From Semi-Desert To Jungle The Ancient Peoples of the Tamaulipa

Gustavo A. Ramírez Castilla*



Tamaulipas has a rich and varied range of natural resources, which explains why it has been inhabited by different human groups from very ancient times. It has three contrasting ecosystems: the semi-desert, the forest and the jungle, the backdrops for the evolution of three cultures that, despite reaching different levels of technological development, co-existed without altering each others' specific way of life for 1,500 years and even exchanging products. With the arrival of the Spaniards, first the Huastecs and then the hunter-gatherers would suffer a common fate, the end of their culture.

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All photos courtesy of Gustavo Ramírez.
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THE PEOPLES OF THE SEMI-DESERT

North of the Tropic of Cancer lie the immense semi-desert plains of northeastern Mexico and Texas, which were once home to groups of humans adapted culturally and anatomically to surviving in this hostile environment. To this place of arid soil, thorny bushes and burning temperatures arrived small bands of hunter-gatherers 12,000 years ago. These groups had inherited carved stone technology, which allowed them to make simple tools and weapons, from their predecessors, who arrived via the Bering Straits. The first weapons were used for hunting and slaughtering animals like the mammoth and other giant species that became extinct about 10,000 B.C. due to severe climatic changes. This forced humans to change the basis for their subsistence to collecting vegetables, supplemented by the meat of animals like deer and other mammals, reptiles, birds and insects.

Traditionally, these groups have been characterized as being at a low cultural stage and are labeled as barbarians or savages; in reality they were successful societies whose life style and implements were perfectly adapted to the rigors of their environment. For example, they lived in small bands and moved cyclically throughout a specific territory to collect seasonal vegetables and hunt local wildlife. They carved arrows and knives out of stone for hunting or war, scrapers for curing skins, punching tools for making clothing, etc. On medium-sized stones rounded by flowing river water, they made mortars to grind seeds with which they made flour, dough and *atole* (a beverage made from ground seeds and water). Some groups lived in the wild while others made temporary shelters and even portable houses. They generally went

nude, covered only in skins or grass skirts. They decorated their bodies from head to toe with thin blue stripes.

One of their known ceremonies (handed down to us by observers from the colonial period) was the *mitote*, which consisted of a gathering of up to 700 individuals who danced, drank peyote wine and, on occasion, devoured the bodies of enemies captured during wartime.

The fierceness of these tribes, plus the hostility of the semi-desert, inhibited the Spanish conquest of their lands for more than 200 years, until 1747, when José de Escandón developed a plan to colonize them, which would end up by displacing and re-grouping and, in the worst of cases, exterminating, all the indigenous in Tamaulipas's semi-desert.

About 300 mountain villages have been found in Tamaulipas, of which only two can be visited, Balcón de Montezuma and El Sabinito.



Balcón de Montezuma's characteristic circular buildings, made up of great slabs of calcite.

THE FOREST PEOPLES

The central part of the state is dominated by two large mountain ranges: the Eastern Sierra Madre and the Tamaulipas Mountains. There, amidst pine and holm oak forests, a civilization emerged around 1500 B.C. that spread an immense network of stone villages possibly all the way to the Querétaro Sierra Gorda mountains, 600 kilometers to the southwest. Nothing is known about who these ancient mountain inhabitants were or what language they spoke, but it is believed that they were descendants of the first farmers who inhabited the La Perra and Diablo Caves 3,000 years before.

This civilization characteristically erected circular buildings with great slabs of calcite placed on top of each other with nothing to cement them.

Some were as large as 15 meters in diameter and 4 meters high, with fan-shaped inset stairways. Each one of these buildings was the foundation for a circular house with walls of wooden staves and cone-shaped, palm roofs. Other smaller, circular or rectangular structures served as altars, while the large circular or square buildings held temples. Some eighteenth-century chronicles hint that the Olive, Pasita or Mariguan indigenous may have erected these magnificent mountain buildings.

Some towns reached considerable size, with as many as 1,000 houses set around circular plazas with walkways, passageways, water storage tanks and steam baths in the shape of igloos. Their utensils reveal a society based on agriculture and long-distance trading of secondary goods such as shell, semi-precious stone or ceramic ornaments. Out-

Of the many Huastec sites in Tamaulipas, only Las Flores, located on a hill overlooking the beautiful Chairel Lagoon, remains open to the public.



The Las Flores pyramid is now part of the urban landscape of the city of Tampico.



Amatlán sculpture.



Semi-desert landscape.

standing among the remains are clay pipes, that indicate that these people smoked. Representations of their gods are unknown, however.

About 300 mountain villages have been found in Tamaulipas, of which only two can be visited, Balcón de Montezuma and El Sabinito. The former is located 26 kilometers from Ciudad Victoria, the state capital. It is a small village with 90 circular foundations built around two plazas. In a very favorable location, atop a hill surrounded by Juan Capitán Canyon, it boasts a splendid landscape of palm trees and ancient holm oak groves. El Sabinito is located 95 kilometers from the capital, in the northern foothills of the Tamaulipas Mountains, near the flowing Soto la Marina River. Sabinito was a large village, possibly the center of political control, with more than 600 foundations built on terraces, corridors and plazas that testify to urban planning. Outstanding among its constructions is its circular, eight-meter-high pyramid, with slabs sticking out of its sides like the arms of a windmill. Here, the terrain is practically a tropical jungle, with suffocating heat and humidity.

For reasons unknown to us, but possibly because of a severe drought and the arrival of hunter-gath-

erer tribes, the mountain villages were definitively abandoned around A.D. 1200; with that, a civilization that dominated the mountain tops for more than 2,000 years disappeared forever.

THE JUNGLE PEOPLES

The extreme southern part of the state, called the Huasteca, has a tropical climate and important water systems made up of the Guayalejo-Tamesí-Pánuco Rivers and the Chairel-Champayán-Pueblo Viejo Lagoons.

This rich environment gave sustenance and a wide variety of raw materials to the pre-Hispanic peoples who settled there from 1600 B.C. on.

From their very origins, the Huastec indigenous were a complex ethnic mosaic, in which different groups like the Teenek, Nahuatl, Totonac, Pame, and Tepehua shared a single territory and a single cultural tradition, the Huastec. The Teenek or Huastec belonged to the Maya linguistic family from which they separated about 3,600 years ago, time enough for totally different languages to evolve.



The mountain peoples' civilization disappeared almost 3,000 years ago.



El Sabinito may have been a center of political control.

The Huastec culture is characterized by its cut-off, cone-shaped structures made of packed earth and covered with a thick sand and lime plaster. These buildings, together with long platforms and small earthen mounds made up their villages, distributed around semi-circular or rectangular plazas. But, better known than their architecture are their beautiful creations made of such diverse materials as stone, clay and shell. They carved sublime representations of their gods in thick and thin blocks of sandstone: Teem, the fertility goddess, with naked breasts, hands over her belly and a great semi-circular head-dress on her head; Mam, or "old god", related to the sun and fire, represented by a crooked old man with a walking stick; Ajactictamzemplab, or Lord of Death, represented by a man without flesh. They made ceramic receptacles with expressive human, animal and phytomorphic forms, decorated with complex brown geometrical designs on a natural background or combining red, maroon and black. They fashioned magnificent shell jewelry such as earrings, bracelets and pendants, and particularly great triangular necklaces carved with mythical scenes like the *ehcacózcatl*, or "jewel of the wind," a symbol of Ehécatl-Quetzalcóatl, one of their main gods.



Of the many Huastec sites in Tamaulipas, only Las Flores, located on a hill overlooking the beautiful Chairel Lagoon, remains open to the public. More than 20 enormous mounds built between A.D. 1000 and A.D. 1250 were originally discovered, but they were overwhelmed by the fearful urbanization of the first half of the twentieth century. Today, the only remains of their greatness is the so-called Las Flores Pyramid, located at Azahar Street and Chairel Avenue in Tampico's Las Flores neighborhood. The pyramid has a great circular foundation, 36 meters in diameter and 6 meters high. Superimposed on it are the bodies and stairways that correspond to six different stages of construction. This is a magnificent example—and the only one on display—of Huastec earthen, lime-plastered architecture.

In 1522, Hernán Cortés attacked the Huastec peoples settled along the banks of the Chairel Lagoon, conquering them in less than 20 days. This brought about the end of the indigenous Huastec culture, which would only re-emerge as a mestizo culture, incorporating European and African elements brought by the conquest and colonization. **MM**



Guerrero Viejo History Suspended In Time

Carlos Rugerio Cázares*

Antigua Ciudad Guerrero, better known as Guerrero Viejo, is a ghost town. Built during the colonial period on the border between what are now Tamaulipas and Texas, the city was abandoned in the mid-twentieth century and then submerged under the lake created by the International Falcon Dam.

Guerrero Viejo (previously known as Revilla) was founded as part of the colonization of Nuevo Santander (today known as Tamaulipas) by José

de Escandón in the mid-eighteenth century. For almost 200 years, the Spanish had not been able to penetrate the northeastern part of the land they conquered in 1521, a region inhabited by warring-hunting tribes in the Huasteca region. Even when they managed to create settlements in northern territories like Nuevo Reyno de León, Coahuila and Texas, most of Nuevo Santander remained outside their control. In addition to the problem of the local warring tribes, there was an external risk factor: during the second half of the eighteenth century, the French took over the Louisiana or Mobile territory, subjugating several indigenous tribes. This allowed them to penetrate

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Photos by Gustavo Ramírez.

Texas, part of New Spain, where they confronted the Spanish. This was of concern to the authorities in Mexico, who clearly saw the risk of losing Texas to the French. For this reason, the viceroy commissioned Colonel José de Escandón, the Count of Sierra Gorda, to “pacify and colonize” the Seno Mexicano coast. Escandón had distinguished himself in the military actions that procured the vicerealty control over Querétaro’s Sierra Gorda region.

In 1748, accompanied by more than 2,500 colonists from Querétaro, Nuevo Reyno de León and elsewhere and 750 soldiers, Escandón undertook one of the most fabulous colonizing efforts in the last years of the colonial period. Revilla, founded October 10, 1750, would be one of the six Villas del Norte (or “towns of the North”), together with Laredo, Hacienda de Dolores, Mier, Camargo and Reynosa, which marked Nuevo Santander’s real

border. The town was named after the then-viceroy of New Spain, Juan Francisco de Güemes y Horcasitas, the first Count of Revillagigedo. The town would change location three times until it was definitively established in 1754 on the right bank of the Salado River, very near to where it joined the Rio Grande.

At the end of the eighteenth century, groups of Indians from the North American plains, pushed by the advance of white settlers, put an end to the peaceful life of the Villas del Norte. Apaches and Comanches kept the population in check for more than a century, forcing the inhabitants to defend themselves. Thus, some ranches like San Ignacio (across from Revilla on the left bank of the Rio Grande) built fortifications.

Its geographical location encouraged thoughts of independence: far from the center of the vice-

One of the outstanding buildings is the Church of Our Lady of Refuge, which began construction in the last days of colonial times, and later incorporated elements from other periods and styles.



royalty, with no ports for communication or commerce and overwhelmed by taxes imposed by the regional criollo elites, the *villas* joined the national unrest that led to independence from New Spain. From that environment of unrest in Revilla emerged figures of the stature of the brothers José Bernardo and José Antonio Gutiérrez de Lara. The former was commissioned by founding father Miguel Hidalgo to negotiate with the United States for a loan to purchase arms and munitions. He also distinguished



himself in the insurgency in Texas while serving as the first constitutional governor of Tamaulipas. José Antonio, for his part, represented Nuevo Santander province in the first National Constituent Congress and was president of the Local Legislative Assembly that met in Padilla, Tamaulipas, which ordered the execution of the former emperor, Agustín de Iturbide. José Antonio was Iturbide's confessor.

After independence and the passing of the 1824 Constitution, Nuevo Santander became the Free, Sovereign State of Las Tamaulipas. In 1827, in an attempt to leave behind its colonial past, Revilla was renamed Guerrero and was recognized as a city.

When the country adopted a centralist regime, Tamaulipas and particularly the Villas del Norte were the seat of profound federalist feelings. The border towns saw the rise of a radical movement from 1838 to 1840, based in Guerrero. The northern federalists headed by José María Carbajal, Juan Nepomuceno Molano, Antonio Canales and Antonio Zapata (originally from Guerrero) sought support from Texas, giving rise to their movement being called separatist and accused of wanting to create a supposed Rio Grande Republic.

In 1839, federalist troops occupied Guerrero and a year later, set up a "provisional government of the eastern departments," presided over by Jesús Cárdenas, which published a government newspaper, the *Correo del Río Bravo Norte* (North Río Grande Courier). The northern federalists were finally defeated; Antonio Zapata was shot and his head exhibited outside his home as a warning to Guerrero residents.

For Guerrero, like the rest of the Northern District, the war of 1846 was an intense experience that included occupation by U.S. troops. The loss of the Franja del Nueces and the establishment of the new border along the Rio Grande had a profound impact on the region. The disproportion between the Villas del Norte and the new Texan towns on the left bank of the Rio Grande created a tense climate.

Plagued by high tariffs, distance and lack of communication with the country's center, residents insistently demanded the creation of a free-trade zone, which they achieved in 1858. This gave rise to heavy trade and a boom for Matamoros; the Villas del Norte were the natural inland area for the trade generated, while, at the other end, the city of Monterrey became the zone's marketplace.

Guerrero's prosperity of that period, when steamboats went up the Rio Grande to Mier-Roma, ended in the late nineteenth century when the railroad that joined Mexico City to Nuevo Laredo side-stepped the rest of the border towns.

Once again the site of clashes between federal and revolutionary forces, the town of Guerrero joined the great armed movement of 1910. In March 1914, General Gustavo Guardiola took over

Guerrero developed a characteristic architecture in sandstone, anachronistically using eighteenth-century styles in the middle of the nineteenth century.



Ciudad Guerrero, but shortly thereafter was defeated by Constitutionalist Generals Jesús Carranza and Antonio I. Villarreal.

In 1944, the signing of the Treaty of Borders and Waters by Mexico and the United States would seal Guerrero's fate: to regulate the Rio Grande, it was agreed that the Falcon International Dam would be built, flooding the city.

ARCHITECTURE AND MONUMENTS

The great drought that has plagued Mexico's Northeast for just over 20 years lowered the dam's waters considerably, revealing the ruins of a city that still preserves almost 1,000 extraordinary stone buildings. Isolated from Central Mexico, Guerrero developed a characteristic architecture in sandstone, anachronistically using eighteenth-century styles in the middle of the nineteenth century. Its facades are splendidly decorated with lintels, cornices, frames and carved stone sidewalks. Water fountains in the shape of baptismal fonts are veritable works of art and a contribution to Latin American architecture. Wrought iron was used to cover windows and balconies, create railings and protect tombs in the old graveyard. One of the outstanding buildings is the

Church of Our Lady of Refuge, which began construction in the last days of colonial times, and later incorporated elements from other periods and styles, giving the building strength, beauty and personality. Its 15 x 30-meter rectangular lay-out is like a basilica with three naves separated by columns linked by semi-circular arches above which rise the walls crowning the central nave. It was covered with a flat roof over wood beams, nine meters high in the main nave and 5.5 meters high in the side naves. Three doors crowned with semi-circular arches grace its beautiful facade. The central door is flanked by smooth sandstone columns reaching up to a long frieze decorated with triglyphs and a molded cornice. Atop this is a large belfry with three windows and sandstone voussoirs.

This church, originally dedicated to Saint Ignatius of Loyola is considered Tamaulipas's most important religious monument. In 1998 work was begun to restore it, the first step in the recovery of one of the most important areas of monuments in Mexico's Northeast. Other important monuments are the old market or *parián*, the graveyard, the home of the Gutiérrez de Lara brothers, the customs house and the Flores Hotel.

Today, Guerrero Viejo testifies to the greatness of the architecture of a town suspended in time. **MM**

The Huastec Culture Museum

Alejandra Sosa Florescano*



Reproduction of a Huastec priest.
The original is currently at the Louvre.
Photo: Elsie Montiel.

For historical and geographical reasons, Mexico's Northeast, and particularly Tamaulipas, have developed differently from the rest of the country. The lack of dominant cultures with monumental remains had limited both archaeological research and the dissemination of this state's cultural history. Nevertheless, recent archaeological discoveries have sparked the interest of a society that for years has demanded cultural outlets, with the

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Photos of the museum's interiors and pieces are reproduced by permission of the National Institute of Anthropology and History, Conaculta-INAH-Mex.

resulting recent creation of museums, theaters and galleries all over the state. Outstanding among them is the Museo de la Cultura Huasteca (Huastec Culture Museum), housed in the modern Metropolitan Space Cultural Complex on the shores of the Carpintero Lagoon, a piece of tropical jungle in the very heart of the cosmopolitan port of Tampico.

Tampico (meaning "place of otters") was one of the old seats of the Huastec culture. In and around the city there are still many remnants of the ancient towns built on the shores of the lagoons and rivers like the Pánuco and the Tame-sí. In the Chairel Lagoon, and in the rest of what is now the state of Tamaulipas, the battle that gave the Spaniards control over the Huasteca region took place.



The modern Metropolitan Space Cultural Complex on the shores of the Carpintero Lagoon houses the museum.

Elsie Montiel

Centuries later, at the time of the oil boom in the mid-1900s, Tampico became the center of attraction for the entire region, including the states of Veracruz, San Luis Potosí, Hidalgo, Puebla, Querétaro and Tamaulipas. With its avant-garde spirit, this important port attempted to offer a space that would make possible the appreciation of the millennia-old Huastec culture, showing through its creations, traditions and customs that the original foundations continues to be alive and well. Also, despite oppression and the changes it has suffered historically, cultural continuity has been maintained generation after generation, even though it is today threatened by poverty, marginalization and the migration of indigenous peoples seeking a better way of life.

A TOUR OF THE MUSEUM

In 1,200 square meters, the Huastec Culture Museum presents visitors with a representative range of archaeological and ethnographic pieces from Huastec territory, dating from 500 B.C. until the Spanish conquest and then from 1522 until today.

It offers the visitor a complete panorama of the entire region's cultural development, showing the area's natural diversity on a relief map, graphs and videos. Also outstanding is the variety of ethnic groups that share the Huastec cultural tradition, among them the Teenek or Huastecs, the Pames, Otomís, Totonaques, Tepehuas and Nahuas. The museum's different rooms combine archaeology and ethnography to underline the continuity of their traditions. The room of the cult of life and fertility stresses their religious activities. The sculptures of Teem, the mother goddess, and Mam,



Elsie Montiel

The art room displays creative and finely honed works including stone sculptures, domestic ceramics, toys and musical instruments.

the old sun god, represent the cult of fertility. A pitcher with flowers represents Paya, the moon goddess; other objects are part of phallic worship practiced in Hidalgo state's Huastec region until the early twentieth century. Gigantic *mojigangas*, enormous cardboard dolls, paraded in the Huastec carnivals represent the mixture of indigenous, Christian and pagan religion celebrating the cult of fertility in another way.


The art room displays creative and finely honed works including stone sculptures representing gods and ritual and domestic ceramics, toys and musical instruments. Two unique pieces stand out among all the rest: a jointed, bone doll representing a nude woman with a cone-shaped hat, and the exact reproduction of a Huastec sculpture of a priest, the original of which is currently on display in the Louvre after a French merchant living in Tampico took it to France in the late 1800s. Until only a few years



Tancol anthropomorphic vessel.
Photo: Gustavo Ramírez.



Jointed bone doll.
Photo: Gustavo Ramírez.



Elsie Montiel

The central piece in the room of death is the recreation of the high-ground double interment, discovered in 1999.



Black on white anthropomorphic vessel.
Photo: Gustavo Ramírez.

ago, this piece was unknown to specialists.

The room of death is dedicated to the belief current in the pre-Hispanic period that the dead make a journey to the underworld where they finally take up residence after undergoing several different tests. Graphs and a model show how the dead were buried at that time and today: rolling them up in a straw mat with their personal belongings, apparel and tools. The central piece in this room is the recreation of the high-ground

double interment, discovered in 1999 on the outskirts of the city. This burial is considered the most important example of its kind from the Huasteca region both because of its rarity and the richness of its offering. It is the burial of a woman of exalted lineage accompanied by her female slave or servant. The offering for the woman includes valuable objects like shell bracelets, a string of 56 copper bells and a necklace of gold and jade bells. The altar of the dead, a must in this museum, is the means of communication between

the world of the living and the world of the dead; the dead come and share with their relatives and friends for the brief period of Xantolo, or the day of the faithful dead, before returning to their dwelling place. The room of daily life exhibits the customs in food, clothing, personal ornament and day-to-day activities. This section includes an original Huastec house brought from San Antonio Nogalar, 100 kilometers north of Tampico, the last of its kind in the state. It also displays a variety of pre-Hispanic utensils: bowls, pots, plates and some surprising large clay spoons. The following room deals with labor, emphasizing productive activities like fishing, farming and commerce as the basis for the local economy. Different pre-Hispanic and modern tools for making textiles and ceramics, the techniques for making arrows and knives, clay weights for a fishing net, the remains of 5000-year-old basket-weaving and a nineteenth-century display case brought from a Potosí indigenous community, as well as a variety of modern crafts are all on display.

The room of the sacred space explains how the Huastecs transferred the cosmic planes to the earthly world, reproducing the cosmic order through the distribution of their buildings. Outstanding here is the life-sized reproduction of the great altar of Tamuín, from San Luis Potosí, decorated with stupendous murals depicting a procession of priests, gods and prisoners.

The center of the museum is dominated by a pole that represents the fundamental axis of the indigenous cosmos, surrounded by four walls representing the four directions of the universe. This room, which invites the visitor to rest and reflection, uses advanced technology to reproduce the dance of the flier,



Elsie Montiel

The room of the cult of life and fertility.

represented by the “Tamaletón fliers” from San Luis Potosí, the only place in the Huasteca where it is still practiced as a ceremony that summarizes the indigenous world view, the universal order and the fertilization of Mother Earth, to ensure the permanence of Man on Earth. **MM**



Ehecacózcatl.

Photo: Gustavo Ramírez.

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Gold necklace.

Photo: Gustavo Ramírez.



El Cielo A Reserve Teeming with Life

Alejandra Sosa Florescano*

Considered an ecological area like few in the world because of its bio-diversity, El Cielo is one of Mexico's main ecological reserves due to its extraordinary abundance of life and its still relatively undisturbed ecosystems. Its conservation is a priority for national and international bodies: the United Nations' "Man and the Biosphere" program has classified it as a World Heritage Treasure. In Mexico, El Cielo is classified as a protected natural area, under the heading of biosphere reserve.

*Archaeologist and contributor to the Tamaulipas Institute for Culture and the Arts and the National Institute of Anthropology and History (INAH).

BRIEF HISTORY

The area that today makes up the reserve was officially occupied in 1900 for private use: the Mexican government initially ceded 8,000 hectares to Dr. M. Cameron. He sold it in 1939 to Arturo Argüelles, who carried out intensive forestry there until 1960, thus encouraging the immigration of peasants from all over Mexico, who set up collective *ejidos* and small holdings. By 1965, the conservation of the area's environmental wealth began to be a concern. On July 6, 1965, Francisco Harrison, Juan Fidel Zorrilla and Francisco García San Miguel created an institution, El Cielo, S.A., with only 25 hectares of land, to study and preserve this important ecological niche.



Courtesy of Sector Tamaulipas

The elephant rock, one of the several points of interest in the reserve.

By 1975, the conservation efforts went public: the government of Tamaulipas state established a national park there, and in 1981, the Ecology Institute proposed creating a protected natural area classified as a biosphere reserve. Thus, after several meetings and accords with local inhabitants, finally on July 13, 1985, the Tamaulipas government issued a decree creating the El Cielo Biosphere Reserve.

THE ECOSYSTEMS

Several ecosystems can be found in a single geographical area, producing three different climates: 1) a semi-warm, sub-humid climate with summer rains on the eastern slopes of the Cucharas Mountains with vegetation typical of medium sub-caduceus jungle, jungle, mesophilic forest and stands of oak in the south; 2) a sub-humid, temperate climate with summer rains at the same level

as the previous climate, but at a higher altitude, with vegetation typical of a mesophilic forest, pines and holm oaks in the north; 3) a semi-dry, semi-warm climate in the northern part of the reserve, with vegetation typical of xerophytic brambles on the northwest slope.

FLORA AND FAUNA

El Cielo's vegetation is unique in its variety and the rare co-existence of contrasting species like tropical palms and North American pines, cedar, tropical orchids, acacias, willows, pink apple trees, magnolia trees, all kinds of cacti, begonias, pineapples, ferns, fungus, etc. There are several endemic species like monk orchids, poplars or *chamanillos*, as well as other trees less common in other parts of the country like the beech, fir and *cedrillo*.

The animal species are as varied as the vegetation because they live in different ecological



The reserve faces serious threats due to economic interests.

niches: jungle, forest and desert. Some species already extinct or endangered in other parts of the country still exist in the reserve, such as the jaguar, the ocelot and the puma, white-tailed deer and *temazates* or red brocket deer, the black bear and gray foxes. Two hundred fifty-five species of birds have been found permanently inhabiting the area, as well as 175 species of migratory birds. Specialists say this represents half of all the species found in the whole country.

As if this were not enough, there are 21 species of amphibians, 60 kinds of reptiles and 40 varieties of bats; and the reserve is an obligatory stop for the Monarch butterfly on its long trip from the frozen Canadian North to the temperate forests of the State of Mexico and Michoacán.

ZONES

As with other reserves in the country, El Cielo is divided into three zones, according to how restricted access is for local inhabitants and visitors alike:

- 1) Nucleus Zone 1 covers 28,674 hectares of mesophilic mountain forest and pine and oak forest.

- 2) Nucleus Zone 2 includes 7,844 hectares of sub-caduceus tropical forests. These two zones are closed to hunters and flora collectors in order to maintain optimum preservation of animal and plant species.
- 3) A buffer zone covers the area surrounding the other two zones, taking up 108,012 hectares, where hunting, fishing and restricted logging are permitted in order to maintain a rational, balanced use of El Cielo.

PROBLEMS

Despite its recognized ecological importance, the reserve faces serious threats due to the profound economic interests at stake in the exploitation of the timber, the hunting of species with quality or exotic pelts, and even the collection of orchids, cacti and other plant species. This means that the state government is constantly collaborating with municipal authorities and social organizations to improve regulations and management plans to ensure the conservation of the reserve's natural wealth.

At the same time, universities and national and foreign research institutions are carrying out impor-



Fulvio Eccardi

The animal species are as varied as the vegetation.
Some species already extinct or endangered in other parts of
the country still exist in the reserve.



Fulvio Eccardi

tant projects on the use of plant and animal species for medicinal and nutritional purposes and general improvement of the quality of life.

A VISIT TO EL CIELO

Anyone can visit El Cielo's buffer zone, since there are roads and pathways for going up, as well as facilities for camping or staying overnight. No special permit is required. The two nucleus zones can only be visited by accredited researchers.

During the trip up, starting off from Gómez Farías, the visitor passes several points of interest: 1) Altas Cimas, where the change in plant life begins; 2) Valle del Ovni (UFO Valley), which includes a pasture, located at the entrance to the reserve, where unidentified flying objects have


been reported; 3) San José, where the remains of trucks used in logging in the last century can still be seen; 4) La Gloria, the point where the so-called "fog forest" begins, and an ideal town for camping since fewer visitors come here than to San José; 5) El Elefante, an enormous rock that looks like an elephant; 6) Joya de Manantiales, the spot furthest away, a little town where impressive waterfalls can be seen at the end of the rainy season.

Natural underground chambers and caves can be visited throughout the reserve, although these excursions are risky, so they should not be undertaken without a guide and the appropriate equipment. The trips take the visitor to anywhere from 100 meters to 2,300 meters above sea level, making it advisable to use a four-wheel-drive vehicle and appropriate clothing since it rains constantly in the upper regions. **MM**

El Cielo is located in southern Tamaulipas on two slopes of the part of the Eastern Sierra Madre known as the Cucharas Mountains, an ecological transition area between the southern jungles and the northern temperate climate. It stretches for 144,530 hectares, occupying the municipalities of Gómez Farías, Juamave, Llera and Ocampo. It is accessible by two routes: the Jaumave-Ciudad Victoria Highway 101 and the Ciudad Mante-Ciudad Victoria Highway 85. El Cielo includes a series of small mountain ranges that run north-south and parallel to the Eastern Sierra Madre; among the most important of these are the San Agustín Mountains, the Maroma Mountains and the El Ocate, La Cuchilla de San Pedro, Santa Fe, El Duraznillo and El Magueyoso Mountains.



Fulvio Eccardi



Sebastián Saldivar

The Blood of Agrarian Martyrs (detail), Diego Rivera, 1923-1927, Riveriana Chapel.

Who Should Tell Me What to Eat? The Case of Transgenic Maize

Edit Antal*

One of the most controversial issues involved in trade and the environment is U.S. exports of transgenic maize to Mexico. Its impact, both the benefits and the risks to health, the environment, the economy and the culture, is under discussion. Despite at least four bills on bio-safety being before Congress, Mexico still does not have any legislation about

genetically modified organisms (GMOs). Regulation of transgenic foods is a very complex issue involving different bodies. Nationally, it is linked to environmental, agricultural, sanitation, health and security legislation, and internationally, to the World Trade Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Protocol on Biosafety.

From the perspective of science, development and multinational corpo-

rations, linking conserving genetic diversity and traditional agriculture is seen as negative, pegged to underdevelopment and poverty. The idea that traditional varieties are a kind of raw material that can be freely used to create modern crops—in this case transgenic—is directly counterposed to the indigenous, peasant notion of demanding control over their own traditional varieties. This is the key to the conflict behind important indigenous movements in Mexico

* Researcher at CISAN.

and the Andean region that defend a different vision about the use and value of genetic resources. The UNOSJO peasant union in Oaxaca's Northern Juárez mountains, among others, expressed their resounding rejection of local varieties of maize being contaminated by transgenic corn. On the request of these Mexican peasants, who want to continue to produce the same local varieties of maize that their ancestors selected and improved for 6,000 years, the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC), a trilateral body that came out of the debate about the environment during the NAFTA negotiations, has decided to write a report about transgenic maize in order to discuss its effects and make recommendations to the three countries' governments.

Mexico is a mega-diverse country and the original home of maize and *teocinte*, maize's close wild relative; today between 50 and 60 native corn varieties are planted on a million small plots throughout Mexico for producers' consumption. This only satisfies half the 18-million-ton demand for corn, however; another quarter of the demand is met by maize produced for the market, and the last quarter by imports. The crops are cultivated in two ways: industrial cultivation that uses purchased seed, and subsistence cultivation, that stores, exchanges and selects local seed.

NAFTA'S IMPACT

As everyone knows, international trade in seeds is a multi-billion-dollar business: U.S.\$30 billion to be precise. The United States is the world's main producer and exporter. Ninety-four percent of its exports go to Latin America. Seventy-five percent of Mex-

ico's agricultural imports come from the United States, followed by Canada with around seven percent.

Since NAFTA came into effect, Mexico changed its import rules, establishing a transitory quota for corn imports from the United States and Canada. The initial 2.5 million-ton quota was slated to increase three percent a year over 15 years until 2009, when trade in corn would be completely free. However, in practice, Mexico never demanded that the quotas be respected, which means that they have been far surpassed: by 1996, 7 million tons of corn were being imported a year.

More corn has been imported than quotas dictated because, in the first place, the Mexican government wanted to liberalize its agricultural sector in order to be able to offer cheap foodstuffs to its urban population and satisfy the needs of the flour and cattle industries.¹ This Mexican government policy trend predates NAFTA. Since the late 1970s, administrations were trying to solve the food problem by putting a priority on quantity instead of quality, acquiring cheap foodstuffs, thus supporting the urban consumer instead of production in the countryside.² For this reason, it is important to point out

that from the standpoint of biological diversity, the greatest danger is not transgenic maize, but poverty, a hostile economic and political environment and emigration.³

Approximately one-third of the corn imported from the United States contains some kind of genetically modified organism, particularly Bt and others resistant to blight and pests. According to current U.S. federal regulations, transgenic crops receive the same treatment as traditional crops because they are not considered a risk, which is why they are not separated from traditional grains. Actually, having to identify the genetically modified organisms, separating and labeling them would be an important cost factor in producing corn, which is already subsidized 20 or 30 percent.

Because of Mexican liberalization, which was not a provision of NAFTA but which has increased since the inception of the agreement, the price of maize has dropped 48 percent. As a result, the country's productive structure has changed: forest areas have been cleared to plant more corn, and production and yields have dropped slightly, by 4.7 and 2 percent respectively.⁴ This has brought with it a still

CHANGES IN MEXICAN MAIZE (1990s)		
	1994 vs. 1990	2000 vs. 1994
Consumption	+17%	+8%
Production	+25%	-3%
Area under cultivation	+16%	-8%
Area harvested	+12%	-13%
Yield	+7%	+6%

Source: Secretaría de Agricultura, Ganadería y Recursos Pesqueros (Sagarpa).



"Stop transgenic imports!"

undetermined degree of genetic erosion and the loss of varieties. The real danger is that peasants may lose their traditional knowledge about cultivating the earth because of economic and labor pressures. Migration and farmers simultaneously doing both agricultural and other kinds of work have been going on for decades, undoubtedly favoring deforestation and the risk of the biological diversity loss.⁵

The entry of transgenic corn into Mexico was never authorized but neither was it expressly prohibited. Since 1998, however, the planting of genetically modified maize has been banned. However, in 2000, the Bt gene was discovered in 37 percent of the grain in corn silos in Oaxaca and Puebla. This means that it has spread spontaneously.

A very significant and surprising fact can be observed in Mexico: despite the plummeting price of maize and even though it is unprofitable because production costs are higher than its commercial value, subsistence production continues to advance.

To understand this behavior, inexplicable scientifically since it does not follow the laws of the market, we need the help of anthropologists and sociologists; it must be examined in terms of security, jobs for family members and the cultural issues linked to values, the sacred significance and indigenous preference for corn. In the absence of public subsidies, it is actually the peasants themselves, particularly the poorest ones, who are subsidizing their own production. This is a reflection of indigenous people's desire and choice to

produce maize solely to be able to consume it.

RISK MANAGEMENT: SCIENCE OR CULTURE

Environmentalists talk about serious contamination; the scientific community is divided; and industry and its defenders minimize the consequences. How can we define the risk? Optimizing it, finding a balance between risks and benefits? Applying informed consent, giving those involved the ability to decide whether they accept the risk or not, offering information and, above all, alternatives? Or using the precautionary principle, sustaining the need for caution? Whatever the scientific focus, the need to share negative impacts and distribute the benefits of new technology, as well as labeling the product to ensure a right to choose, seem to be the obvious answers.


At the public presentation of the CEC's Joint Public Advisory Committee report on the biological, environmental, economic, social and cultural impact of transgenic maize production, we saw a real clash between two historic authorities: institutionalized science and peasant cultural resistance, two opposing worlds that apparently have incompatible values and objectives.⁶ Since not only uncertainty, but actual ignorance still dominates biotechnology, science has not been able to offer clear, understandable proof to peasants about the absence of health and environmental risks. While researchers have maintained that there is no scientifically based evidence to prove these kinds of risks, they have also had to recognize that neither can it be proved that they do not exist since there are no

studies in the context of the region's ecosystem and biodiversity. Much less are there studies that measure the long-term effects of transgenic maize. The effects on the health of animals were not even included in the presentation because there was no information about them or researchers capable of preparing a document on them.

Peasants have interpreted the sophisticated language used by scientists that avoided clear yes or no answers about the details of the controversial genetic flow from Bt genes to *teocinte* and native corn varieties as shameful hesitation by Western science, whose authority for supposedly speaking in the name of "Truth" has thus been brought into question. It has become clear that, based on existing data, the risks are unpredictable. However, the members of affected communities, basically indigenous communities, also made other queries questioning the authority of science. For example, who is paying for the studies being carried out today? The mistrust did not stop there. They also questioned the institutions of experts, like the CIBIOGEM consulting group and the government agencies that have never bothered to listen to peasants.

In fact, as peasant community representatives recognized, despite their speaking in two different languages (the language of science and that of practical experience), this was the first time they had sat down together to discuss the risks that genetically modified organisms imply in Mexico. Ironically, this happened precisely in a trilateral forum that came out of NAFTA. However, the fact of the matter was that the practically inviolable autonomy and public authority of science discussed face to face with peasants who, while ignorant of molecules and DNA sequences, were

GRAPH 1
MEXICAN MAIZE PRODUCTION AND IMPORTS FROM THE U.S. (1989-2000)
(MILLIONS OF METRIC TONS)



Source: FAO, SAGAR, Zahniser y Link 2002.

The quality and purity of foodstuffs
is not only a health issue, but also involves
culture and survival.

the possessors of ancient knowledge about their means of existence.

The really new thing about the report was that it took into account the social and cultural risks implied in the existence of genetically modified maize in Mexico, putting them on a par with the physical and economic risks. The quality and purity of foodstuffs is not only a health issue, but also involves culture and survival. In the last analysis, the cultural norms and rules about food somehow reflect the distribution of power in a society. Since in a rural society, eating is intimately linked to existential notions like fertility, health and illness, and therefore, birth and

death, when peasant communities do not know what food is made of, it causes cultural confusion and engenders myths with the power to alter people's most basic notions. Some women in the communities expressed their fear that cultivating transgenic corn could make them give birth to children with several heads or other genetic deformations.

The peasants have not only rejected genetically modified maize, but also suspect that it is a new tool for colonization by multinational companies, who are creating a modern weapon to threaten their existence. Peasants say that genetic manipulation goes against their only resource for survival that,

despite everything, has been able to maintain itself down through history: their maize. In the light of this perception, it is clear that the resistance against genetically modified maize, perceived as a killer, is enormously strong.

At the meeting, the manifest risk of peasants' losing their identity contrasted with the notion of risk used in economics consisting of a series of rather bureaucratic procedures for showing how harmless the food is. The notion of quality, like the flavor, color and texture of a tortilla, clashed with risk measured quantitatively and monetarily.

The main lesson we should learn from the CEC meeting is not what the exact gene is that is being crossed with maize in Oaxaca and to what degree, which was never even clarified anyway. The main lesson is a reflection about the capacity of governments to regulate agricultural production in a rational, legitimate way given the people's enormous distrust and anxiety. The lack of credibility and trust in private and public institutions, whether they be universities, research centers or government agencies, was clear. It was shown that the peasantry has not participated in decision making about maize in Mexico, the country with the world's most diverse germ plasm, characterized by the large number of small producers in its agricultural system, by a complex agrarian history and by marked social polarization in which small peasants, who make up two-thirds of the agricultural sector, produce half of all corn output.

THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE

The risks and benefits of biotechnology and specifically the problem of ge-

netically modified foodstuffs creates big divides in all societies and is also one of the most controversial trade issues between Europe and the United States. For European governments, the rejection of transgenic foods is a response to the genuine concerns of their populations, while for the United States, it is simply an unjustified trade barrier. In Mexico, in accordance with the new slogan, "Without corn, there is no country," it is a powerful cultural symbol and, for many, a real means of survival.

Some changes are beginning to come about in the United States and Canada, too. In both countries, consumer demand for labeling is on the rise. In the U.S., 11 states have already presented bills to label transgenic foods,⁷ and Canada has a voluntary labeling process. Without a doubt, food biotechnology offers many benefits. Apart from increasing production, if political conditions permit, it potentially has the capacity to generate economic benefits not only for producers, but also for consumers, and to create better quality foods.

Mexican peasant communities also have the right to choose. Some of them, in 10 states, have already stated their preference for continuing to cultivate maize free of genetically modified organisms and for creating an alternative seed market.⁸

The report of the CEC's Joint Public Advisory Committee, the body that represents society, after stating that the risks and benefits that today seem to favor corporations and damage producers and the environment should be shared, makes several recommendations: correct the current imbalance in the advisory group that is heavily weighted with academics, industrialists and NGOs to establish an egalitarian proportion between scientists and

indigenous; apply the precautionary principle in the three governments' policies and create spaces for public debate; establish a moratorium on Mexican imports of transgenic maize until the risks for human health, for the cultural integrity of Mexican peasants and in general for the environment are understood. We still do not know what the CEC's final report will say, much less how the governments will respond. ■■■

NOTES

¹ Scott Vaughan, "Valoración económica y temas relacionados con el comercio" (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003).

² Kristen Appendini, Raúl García Barrios and Beatriz de la Tejada, "Seguridad alimentaria y 'calidad' de los alimentos: una estrategia campesina," *European Review of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 75 (October 2003), pp. 65-83.

³ Stephan B. Brush and Michelle Chauvet, "Evaluación de los efectos sociales y culturales asociados en la producción del maíz transgénico," Chapter 6, *Informe de la CCA sobre el maíz transgénico*, 2004.

⁴ Frank Ackerman et al., "Free Trade, Corn and the Environment: Environmental Impacts of U.S.-Mexico Corn Trade Under NAFTA," (working paper no. 03-06, Tufts University, Medford, Mass., 2003).

⁵ See the positions in this discussion of Gareth Porter, "Agricultural Trade Liberalization and the Environment in North America: Analyzing the Production Effect," CEC document, 2002, and Alejandro Nadal, *Environment and Social Impacts of Liberalization on Corn Production in Mexico* (United Kingdom: WWF/International OXFAM, 2000).

⁶ The public meeting of the CEC's Joint Public Advisory Committee took place March 11, 2004 in Oaxaca, Mexico.

⁷ Thanks to big biotechnology industry interests, only one of these states, Maine, has passed the bill.

⁸ "Exigen productores declarar 10 estados zonas de reserva de maíces criollos," *La Jornada* (Mexico City), 25 April 2004, p. 14.

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
Hugo Argüelles

The Magical Feeling of Life

Gonzalo Valdés Medellín*

To say that Hugo Argüelles' playwriting is one of the most up-to-date, varied, pro-active and authentic bodies of work that the twentieth-century Mexican theater has produced—even if it sounds reiterative or commonplace—is one of the great and just truths that have been said of one of our most prolific contemporary dramatists. To achieve a sincere, analytical focus for Argüelles's work, we must stick to the precept that I simplify here: By his pen and talent, Hugo Argüelles won an autonomous, irrevocable place next to other Mexican dramatists who have honored our country with universal resonance (Rodolfo Usigli, Sergio Magaña, Elena Garro, Jorge Ibarguengoitia, Federico S. Inclán, Emilio Carballido, Héctor Azar and Luis G. Basurto; or, in his generation, Vicente Leñero, Antonio González Caballero, Willebaldo López and Felipe Santander, primarily). As chronological precursors in the history of the Mexican theater, they explain the appearance of a playwright who is irreverent, iconoclastic and audacious in unfolding his passion for tracing experimental languages and their aesthetic confluences and verifications: Hugo Argüelles (born in Veracruz, 1932; died in Mexico City, 2003).

In the late 1950s, the young playwright already had a solid body of work with its own dimensions, totally authentic and diverse, practically unprecedented and unexplored on the national stage, that began a new period in our country's theater.



An enlightened writer and sharp thinker, Argüelles absolutely fulfilled his creative life project. He resolutely entered the—fortunately—undefeated terrain of the dramatic arts from his first *Trilogía rural* (Rural Trilogy): *Los prodigiosos* (1957) (The Prodigious), *Los cuervos están de luto* (The Crows Are in Mourning) (1958) and *El tejedor de milagros* (The Weaver of Miracles) (1960), all three masterpieces, examples of stylistic perfection, discursive maturity and categorical command of the form that, in this case becomes that of a virtuoso, constituting a series of guarantees and attributes that took no time at all for the public to assimilate

* Writer, journalist, dramatist, critic and stage director. Currently, he is a contributor to the *México en la cultura* (Mexico in Culture) supplement of the magazine *Siempre* (Always).

as genius. And, in effect, to speak of the genius of Argüelles' theater is no exaggeration. There is no reason to be afraid of words. There is genius in this playwright if by genius we understand he who shows an unlimited intellectual and artistic aptitude for creating, discovering and inventing. Argüelles created unparalleled work in the Mexican theater discovering with an acid sense of humor and loving, idiosyncratic inquiry, the magic of the popular soul in the Mexicans of today. Always close to his ancestral roots, Argüelles invented an ironic and sagacious way of looking at the world: the reverse of magic. The skin of reflection. Criticism, which Octavio Paz saw as simple, straightforward and substantially like a "vision and divination." For Argüelles, divination is humor and his vision, blackness, a combination that reveals his particular style: black

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humor that "was already there," as Rodolfo Usigli said, "but Argüelles had to arrive to find its essence," —as Luis Buñuel confirmed it— from the most vital platform, Mexican identity. However, Argüelles, the Lord of Black Humor (as he would often be called until his death), will always be beyond labels, even the academic, stiff confines of this or that theatrical genre, since breaks and anti-conventionalism were essential parts of his work.

And for this reason, Argüelles became a master of genres and styles. His comedies with intense tragic strands, the main example of which is *Los cuervos están de luto*, show this, as do his farces, *Los prodigiosos*, *El tejedor de milagros* and *La ronda de la hechizada* (The Round of the Bewitched) (1967), in which magic gives it the farcical tone and "the inexplicable" verifies day-to-day reality. Rhetoric? No. Paradox. Life is just that: an un-

avoidable paradox, as Denis Diderot pointed out in his celebrated treatise on comedy, *The Paradox of the Comedian*.

Reviewing Argüelles's vast repertory we can easily say that he dissected (in a zoological analogy for his universe, confronted and compared to that of men) time and time again the essence of Mexicans from different perspectives, but always betting on authenticity, transgressing truth, apprehending it. He bet on that and he won. Here is precisely one of this playwright's fundamental merits: his creations not only underline his truth as a human being and a creator, but a collective truth, latent and manifested in all Mexicans, in their historic journey and cosmic reaffirmations.

After almost 50 years of authorship, Argüelles wrote up until the very end; the day before he died, in a hospital bed, he continued to write one last farce, *Romance en el Mictlán* (Romance in Mictlán), part of his now posthumous work *Concierto para guillotina y 30 cabezas* (Concert for Guillotine and 30 Heads). Hugo Argüelles's work is an example of youth, vitality, transgression, criticism and a love of the evolution of the dramatic arts. That is his legacy as one of the most radical and combative authors of the Mexican theater of the second half of the twentieth century.

Argüelles taught by example and with an unbreakable capacity for struggle. He was a guide. He leaves behind the consciousness of being Mexican in our theater, beyond fashion and fatuously foreign-worshiping inclinations. If we can even speak of the Mexican theater it is thanks to Argüelles's profound ideological attitude in favor of it. That is why he was so popular; that is why he was so successful. Aside from the works already mentioned, among his important pieces are *El ritual de la salamandra* (The Ritual of the Salamander) (1981), a biting critique of domesticating, castrating Catholicism; *Los huesos del amor y de la muerte* (The Bones of Love and Death), produced by the author of this article in 1997 in the National Autonomous University of Mexico and published in the UNAM's *La Cabra* cultural series. It is his most personal piece, evidencing his poetic abilities with loving veracity and beautiful language

and an incisive anti-historical vision of Agustín de Iturbide's empire in Mexico. Another central work is *Escarabajos* (Dung Beetles) (1991), perhaps foreshadowed in Argüelles' first work, originally written in the 1960s, published in the magazine of the National Fine Arts Institute Theater School magazine under the title *La casa solariega* (The Ancestral Home). This symphonic poem destroys the institution of the family with iconoclastic vehemence, at the same time chronicling Mexican theater of the 1960s and 1970s in the monologues of Jaime, the protagonist, an actor preparing to do *Medea*, who, spreading his mother's ashes on his face, relives his life. In her book *Entretelones* (Behind the Scenes), critic Rosa Margot Ochoa writes, "Argüelles's treatment of this obsessive character is admirable, as he makes it jibe perfectly with the figure of the Greek wizard.... This work, *Escarabajos* (named after the insects that accumulate such an enormous quantity of filth that they are immersed in it) is without a doubt one of the best by Argüelles." This situates us in one of the fundamental issues of Argüelles's theater: the decline of the family, dealt with in *Los amores criminales de las vampiras Morales* (The Criminal Loves of the Morales She-Vampires) (1983); *La tarántula art nouveau de la Calle del Oro* (The Art Nouveau Tarantula of Gold Street) (1994); *El cerco de la cabra dorada* (The Fence of the Golden Goat) (1994); *La esfinge de las maravillas* (The Sphinx of Wonders) (1995); or *Fábula de la mantarraya quinceañera* (Fable of the Fifteen-year-old Manta Ray). All these works emphasize Mexican women's character and the bold exercise of their sexuality.

In this brief account, it is impossible not to mention *El cocodrilo solitario del panteón rococó* (The Lonely Crocodile of the Rococo Graveyard) (1982); *Los caracoles amorosos del burdel del cementerio* (The Loving Snails of the Cemetery Whorehouse) (1988); *Águila Real* (Golden Eagle) (1992); *Los coyotes secretos de Coyoacán* (The Secret Coyotes of Coyoacán) (1999); the expressive, lyrical beauty of *Alfa del Alba* (Alpha of the Dawn) (1993); the hilarious expertise of his *Concierto para guillotina y 40 cabezas* (Concert for Guillotine and 40 Heads), the predecessor of his

posthumous work, originally produced in the 1990s by Francisco Peredo; or his impressive, moving vision of the Nazi Holocaust in *La noche de las aves cabalísticas* (The Night of the Cabalistic Birds) (1993).

Other important works are *Doña Macabra* (Madame Macabre), *La dama de la luna roja* (The Lady of the Red Moon), *Valerio Rostro, traficante en sombras* (Valerio Rostro, Dealer in Shadows), *El gran inquisidor* (The Great Inquisitor), *Las hienas se mueren de risa* (The Hyenas Are Dying of Laughter), *El retablo del gran relajo* (The Big Hubbub Tableau), *La boda negra de las alacranas* (The She-Scorpions' Black Wedding), *El vals de los buitres bicéfalos* (The Waltz of the Two-Headed Vultures). And, his final project which he never finished: the rewrite of *La primavera de los escorpiones* (The Spring of the Scorpions), one of his screenplays that was a resounding box-office success in the 1970s.

Space is getting short. Much should be said of a man, a tremendously alive, human writer like Hugo Argüelles. Fortunately, his work has been published in more than 20 volumes, at everyone's disposal, and in the UNAM series of recordings read by famous actors, *Voz viva de México* (Mexico, A Living Voice).

There are many videotapes of his productions; we have his work as a script writer, including *Las pirañas aman en cuaremas* (Piranhas Love During Lent), *La primavera de los escorpiones* (The Spring of the Scorpions), *Las cenizas del diputado* (The Deputy's Ashes) and *Los amantes fríos* (The Cold Lovers); we have his adaptations for the screen of *Los cuervos están de luto* (The Crows Are in Mourning), *El tejedor de milagros* (The Weaver of Miracles) and *Doña Macabra* (Madame Macabre); and the books about his work and thought. And we have the main thing: the testimony of those of us who can corroborate the enormous humanity, the great sensitivity and spirituality that he had, and his unceasing generosity. Hugo Argüelles reveals the magic feeling of life to us through his work, his thought and his example. His work, an avalanche of enjoyment and reflection, will endure. ■■■

The Bones of Love and Death (Fragment*)

by Hugo Argüelles



Drawings by Gabriel Macotela

* Published originally in *Los Huesos del amor y de la muerte*, Textos de Difusión Cultural Collection, *La Carpa* Series (Mexico City: UNAM, Dirección de Literatura/UNAM, 1991).
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Jailed by order of Agustín de Iturbide, two insurgents, husband and wife Leobardo and Lucinda, await death in an imprisonment that takes them on a journey to madness, to the rediscovery of their erotic passion and the rectification of their ideological and existential convictions. Filled with poetry and a language that recovers the popular feelings of the Mexican people, *Los huesos del amor y de la muerte* (The Bones of Love and Death) digs into Mexico's history and its idiosyncrasy, desacralizing both.

* * *

Suddenly they look at each other and stop crushing bones. They are almost covered in pieces of bone and dust; hair mussed, sweaty, almost pathetic and grotesque. They look at each other a moment, as though taking it in.

LUCINDA: Leo... Just look at us! If anyone saw us, they'd say, "This is a perfect pair of poor devils!"

LEOBARDO: (*Going to open the curtain.*) After all is said and done, I still think what we did was heroic! I still think so, despite how we lost our composure in doing it!

LUCINDA: I'm grotesque! (*Laughs.*)

LEOBARDO: So am I, but grotesque is the flip side of heroic.

LUCINDA: (*Cautiously closing the curtain and the window and shaking out her dress.*) I really don't seem to care what happens to this dress. A rag full of graveyard dust...

LEOBARDO: No, Lucinda, it's not a rag anymore: it has been magnified (*Opens the curtain.*) Look at it in its true light; it has become part of a transcendental rite!

LUCINDA: That's true! Once again...it's your way of discovering what's true about things. (*She*

no longer dares to close the curtains and now she seems to assume the inevitable.)

LEOBARDO: (*To himself, as he drinks.*) Like us,...incorporated by these elements into a different dimension, beyond everything immediate and material...

LUCINDA: (*Midway between resigned and amazed.*) Yes, go on Leo. (*Briefly, quickly and avidly.*) I love listening to you!

He smiles. He sidles over to the window and says suddenly, roguish and playful.

LEOBARDO: (*Suddenly.*) Wouldn't you like to make believe that we're two joyful skulls?

LUCINDA: What do you mean?

LEOBARDO: Yes, two *calacas*, two death's-heads having a good time because they know they are two...happy Deaths.

LUCINDA. But... (*She looks at him and starts to smile.*) Again, your internal music! Oh, Leo!

LEOBARDO: It just came to me...and all I'd have to do is use this plaster covering our faces now and paint a black circle around each eye... and a corn cob over our mouths to look like teeth!

LUCINDA: Of course! And we would become our own skeletons seemingly anticipating their own death!

LEOBARDO: Or mocking it!

LUCINDA: What a great idea! Wonderful, my love!

LEOBARDO: Bring me my paint box, then! I'll create a couple of pastel skulls!

LUCINDA: I have never understood why they call that technique "pastels" when you use chalk.



It sounds as absurd as if I made “plaster candies.”

LEOBARDO: Because you get “pastel” colors! The ones you and I will sport, like two death’s-heads that people decorate and make into ornaments on the Day of the Dead!

Lucinda smiles and enthusiastically enters the bedroom.

LEOBARDO: *(To the bones.)* To die by her side and she with me... And to die together, enjoying ourselves! *(He caresses the powder and spreads it almost with devotion on his face.)* Yes, and be-

cause death is too real, we have to meet it with fantasy. And of course, to also feel above its power! *(Laughs.)* We will be two fantastic lovers who play with their own death, making it joyful. *(He opens the curtain and shouts out at it, challenging and mocking.)* Thank you, then, Agustín! This will be another victory over you!

He withdraws, looking decided. Enter Lucinda with a box of paints. Leobardo takes out pastel sticks and begins to draw the skull on Lucinda’s face; then he indicates that she should draw black circles around his eyes. She does. As they make each other up, they kiss and laugh, having fun. Then, Leobardo opens other boxes with colored chalk



—which in the play can be lipsticks— and indicates to Lucinda that she should use them to continue making him up.

LUCINDA: Are we also going to use all of these?

LEOBARDO: Yes, Lucinda! We said two festive death's-heads and that's what ours will be like! But also, it will seem like a synthesis of the love we have for each other! (*Laughs.*) So rich in words and colors! So...! (*He makes her up even more.*)

LUCINDA: You'll tell me any crazy thing...like before when we used to play at telling our dreams...
LEOBARDO: And you will answer with what-

ever comes into your mind at the same time that you paint me with any color you like; this is my death mask! (*Drinks.*)

LUCINDA: So it can be a colorful death!

LEOBARDO: And I'll decorate yours in my own way! Ready?

LUCINDA: (*Agreeing, very excited.*) Leo... please...like in those games of ours, make this one into a...delirious ritual.

LEOBARDO: (*He agrees at the same time that he makes her up.*) You remember? Come, my love, it

seems that the time has come to close ourselves off...

Close ourselves off, one and the other, from the world.

Close ourselves one inside the other;
close ourselves tightly, forming
a single burning closure.

LUCINDA: And consume ourselves in it: closing ourselves up.

She begins to make him up.

LEOBARDO: Joined...like a succession of echoes...or of reflections that multiply when they meet...

LUCINDA: Carried above this reality... *(She continues to make him up.)*

LEOBARDO: Become part of everything we have... *(She makes him up more.)* experienced.

LUCINDA: And that returned to us... *(They look at each other, increasingly fascinated.)*

LEOBARDO: As we really are. *(Drinks.)*

LUCINDA: And as we always were. *(Drinks.)*

LEOBARDO: As we always knew we were. *(They caress.)*

LUCINDA: In this meeting, this dream, this daring... *(She makes him up.)*

LEOBARDO: This knowing ourselves and enjoying ourselves as never before... *(He makes her up.)*

LUCINDA: This feeling and more feeling, mad with joy... *(She drinks.)*

LEOBARDO: *(Turning.)* And you and I...turning with the dust and the symbols...in a spiral with complicated, accomplice turns...like all secrets! *(He laughs, drinks and kisses her enthusiastically.)*


LUCINDA: You and I...beyond...more and more and closer and closer together...time and time again...in an interminable, continual spree!

They turn. Both are, in effect, festive, "fantastic" skulls.

LEOBARDO: Like a shuddering gallop among torn-apart clouds!

LUCINDA: Like sonorous laughter or warm memories!

LEOBARDO: Don't you feel as if we were leaving our bodies...and yet...as if both of us...were even more joined together?



LUCINDA: Yes! I feel you beyond what I can touch in you!

LEOBARDO: That's right, my darling. We're leaving and where we already are, I know that I can love you even more!

LUCINDA: Now I know! This is like a lasting brilliance!

LEOBARDO: The nearness of our death...gives us this happiness. *(Drinks.)* And its presence...a banquet of rejoicing!

LUCINDA: Like a flock of lights illuminating themselves...

LEOBARDO: So others, more fleeting, can blossom! *(Laughs.)*

LUCINDA: Or it's like the dream of a dream...

LEOBARDO: That finds itself asleep without knowing it! *(Laughs.)*

LUCINDA: Or that knows it's a dream and doesn't want to ever wake up!

LEOBARDO: *(Laughs.)* A dream that you drink. *(Drinks.)*

LUCINDA: *(Drinks.)* And spills and makes us believe all the fantasies it invents! *(She makes herself up even more with different colors.)*

LEOBARDO: Or the emotions it plays with...until making them delirious! *(Also making her up more.)*

LUCINDA: Like now! *(She kisses him.)*

LEOBARDO: And it takes us and joins us and breaks us! *(Laughs.)*

LUCINDA: And launches us into space!

LEOBARDO: Like two streamers in a knot!

LUCINDA: You and I!

LEOBARDO: And this joyful interior dance!

LUCINDA: From our kisses...looks...!

LEOBARDO: Colors...and words!

They look at each other: they are two marvelous, richly decorated skulls. They turn, arms around each other, laughing and kissing. Suddenly, two shots ring out, brutal and surprising. They bend over. They look at each other. They both put their hands to their hearts. They look at them: they're dripping blood. They approach each other and as they do, very slowly, they start to laugh as they embrace.

LUCINDA: It was the... ones spying on us...

LEOBARDO: Yes, Agustín always wanted to mock my dreams...but now I've beaten him... *(He smiles ironically.)*

LUCINDA: Did you know? Did you know that they would kill us?

LEOBARDO: *(Nodding his head yes.)* But I picked going together.

LUCINDA: So did I. And without saying anything to you.

They look at each other. They laugh.

LEOBARDO: Me, too. How crazy!


She nods yes. They laugh. Two more shots are fired.



Leopoldo Zea

Universal Mexican Philosopher

Mario Magallón Anaya*



Leopoldo Zea Aguilar was born in Mexico City, June 30, 1912. He spent his childhood during the upheavals of the revolutionary struggle and the first period after the Revolution. From his earliest youth he had to help support his family, and in 1933, he got a job as a messenger at the National Telegraph Company. From that time on, he began to write his first critical essays, contributing to the well known daily newspaper *El hombre libre* (The Free Man). Around the same time,

he renewed his studies, finishing junior high and high school, overcoming many difficulties, and went on to university. He studied law in the morning and philosophy and letters in the afternoon, working the night shift at the Telegraph Company. His first inclination was for letters; however, when he attended a course given by Samuel Ramos about Ortega y Gasset in 1939 and with the arrival of the Spanish exiles and particularly José Gaos, who would be Zea's mentor all his life, he leaned toward a vocation in philosophy.

In his studies, he followed Spanish, French and German masters, as well as Mexicans and Latin

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Americans: José Ortega y Gasset, José Gaos, Joaquín Xirau, Luis Recasens Siches; Descartes, Jean Paul Sartre; W.F. Hegel, W. Dilthey, Max Scheler, Martin Heidegger, Antonio Caso, José Vasconcelos, Samuel Ramos, Eduardo García Maynez; and Simón Bolívar, Andrés Bello, Sarmiento, Alberdi, Echavarría, Martí, among many other Latin American thinkers. All these authors would allow him to construct an intercontextual and intercultural dialogue. In this way, his philosophical work was done from Latin America and, particularly in the Mexican historical-philosophical vein. He developed his national and regional vocation in the context of Western culture, but from an inclusive outlook that

Zea thought that philosophy emerges from concrete, historical human problems and that, therefore, totalizing, exclusionary “universal Eurocentric” truths should be critiqued.

sought the liberation of all human beings. However, Leopoldo Zea would ponder and question systems of thought based on reason, particularly those of European origin that seemed to perpetuate cultural colonialism.

In the early 1940s, Zea published work in two magazines, *Cuadernos Americanos* (American Notebooks) and *Filosofía y Letras* (Philosophy and Letters), both put out by the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). His prose was already essayistic, and he was beginning to be recognized for the depth of his ideas. His philosophical work would be an outstanding example of Latin American thought. In this same decade, he established fraternal relations with distinguished Latin American thinkers and philosophers like Francisco and José Luis Romero, from Argentina; Vaz Ferreira and Arturo Ardao, from Uruguay; Cruz Costa, from Brazil; Enrique Molina, from Chile; Guillermo Franco-vich, from Bolivia; Miró Quesada, from Peru; Benjamín Carrión, from Ecuador; Germán Arciniegas and Danilo Cruz, from Colombia; Mariano Picón

Salas, from Venezuela; Raúl Roa, from Cuba; and many others.

On the prompting of historian Silvio Zavala, distinguished Latin American historians and philosophers, among them Leopoldo Zea, joined together to carry out the research project called History of Ideas in Latin America, under the aegis of the Pan-American Institute of Geography and History. Zea would be in charge of that project for the rest of his life.

José Gaos saw in Zea a great deal of promise for philosophy. In an open letter to him, Gaos said that “he was condemned to writing the philosophy of Latin American history.” Under Gaos’s guidance, Zea wrote his master’s thesis on *Positivism in Mexico* in 1943, and his doctoral thesis that complemented this work, *Birth, Rise and Decline of Positivism*, in 1944.

One of the distinctive features of Zea’s philosophical thinking is that he followed an assumptive process, in dialogue with historical circumstances. The study of Mexico’s and Latin America’s past revealed to him the existence of the Latin American philosophical legacy. He considered that only peoples who have not assimilated their histories feel threatened by domination and colonialism because, he wrote, “history is not made up of just events, but of the consciousness we have about them.”

In 1944, he began his academic work at the Mexico College, where he taught introduction to philosophy, and at the UNAM School of Philosophy and Letters, where he replaced Antonio Caso in teaching the philosophy of history. In 1947, in the UNAM, he founded the Seminar on the History of Ideas in Latin America, which he would head up until his death. He was also the main promotor of Latin American studies at the UNAM and the founder of the Latin American Studies Coordinating and Dissemination Center and the School of Philosophy and Letters’ College of Latin American studies. With a profound vision of world events and a mature understanding of national and Latin American experience, Zea was able to link up Latin American thought in a context of “simply philosophy,” which constitutes a contribution to a way

of viewing universal philosophy and its relationship to Latin American philosophical production.

Zea dedicated himself to recovering the Latin American intellectual legacy and in 1949 published the book *Dos etapas del pensamiento en Hispanoamérica* (Two Stages of Thought in Latin America). In 1976, a corrected version of the same book appeared with the title *El pensamiento latinoamericano* (The Latin American Mind). Here, he was able to problemize and criticize the different colonial processes in our America, which can be seen in his first works: *Conciencia y posibilidad del mexicano* (Consciousness and Possibility of the Mexican) (1952), *América como conciencia* (America as Consciousness) (1953), *Filosofía como compromiso y otros ensayos* (Philosophy as Commitment and Other Essays) (1953) and *América en la Historia* (America in History) (1957).


In 1952 his most important concern was studying the bases of the “philosophy of the Mexican and the American.” The same concern would then bring together the individuals who would become his disciples because later most of them would go into other fields of Mexican and Latin American philosophical research. Particularly outstanding among them were Emilio Uranga, Jorge Portilla, Luis Villoro, Ricardo Guerra and Joaquín Sánchez Macgregor. This group would call itself the *Hiperión*, meaning “between heaven and Earth.” From that time on, Zea’s philosophy’s influence in academic and non-academic work spread in Mexico and Latin America. He had many followers, outstanding among whom is the also recently deceased Abelardo Villegas.

Leopoldo Zea wrote untiringly about the process of political, economic and cultural globalization of the 1960s. Along these lines, in 1960 he published a *Metodología de la historia de las ideas en América Latina* (Methodology of the History of Ideas in Latin America), as well as *América en la historia* (America in History), *América Latina y el mundo* (Latin America and the World); and *Latinoamérica y el Tercer Mundo* (Latin America and the Third World) in 1963. The overall study of relations among men allowed him to introduce into his discourse terms like “first” and “third world” and

“developed and underdeveloped peoples”, which, for him, as a consequence, led to the classification of “men and under-men.” Zea recognized in this terminology undeniable forms of colonialism. At the end of the 1960s he published his thoughts that would be the predecessor of liberation philosophy, in *La filosofía latinoamericana como filosofía sin más* (Latin American Philosophy as Simply Philosophy) (1969), a book of philosophical anthropology conceived from the point of view of a being situated in Latin American history.

Outstanding texts of the 1970s were *La esencia de lo americano* (The Essence of What Is Latin American) (1971), *Dependencia y liberación de la cultura latinoamericana* (Dependence and Liberation of Latin American Culture) (1974), and his extraordinary books *Dialéctica de la conciencia americana* (Dialectics of Latin American Consciousness)¹ (1976) and *Filosofía de la historia americana* (Philosophy of the History of the Americas) (1976). In this period, important historical-cultural events took place in our America: the repercussions of liberation theologies, their commitment to the poor and the revolutionary movement in Nicaragua at the end of the 1970s. In the 1980s, Zea published *Latinoamérica en la encrucijada de su historia* (Latin America at the Crossroads of Its History) (1981) and *Filosofía de lo americano* (Philosophy of What Is American) (1983). With his text *Discurso desde la marginación y la barbarie* (Discourse from Marginalization and Barbarism) (1988), in accordance with Zea’s own words in an interview I did with him in 1989 for the University of Pennsylvania, I think that he closed the circle of his enormous philosophical opus. A great many of these books have been translated into different languages, including French, English, Russian, Italian, Rumanian, Polish and even Serb.

In the 1990s, Zea published works that were not as far-reaching nor did they have the impact of his previous work: *Descubrimiento e identidad latinoamericana* (Discovery and Latin American Identity) (1990) and *El regreso de las carabelas* (The Return of the Caravels) (1993). However, one work deserves specific mention: *Filosofar a la altura del hombre. Discrepar para comprender* (Philoso-



Leopoldo Zea's legacy exemplifies a way of doing philosophy in an open, problemizing dialogue with different philosophical positions, in opposition to any form of colonialism and domination of the nations oppressed by the imperial countries.

phizing at the Level of Man. Disagreeing in Order to Understand), counterpoint to the ideas of our philosopher, which shows the broad strokes of his thinking and the critical reactions to his philosophical position over time on the part of different thinkers the world over.

It is important to point out that Leopoldo Zea also wrote innumerable articles for publication in specialized journals and that he has a vast body of work as a journalist in which he constantly insisted on inserting the region's philosophy and thinking in Western "universality." He also sought to organize a cultural policy that would make these ideas the driving force behind the struggle for the liberation of our America.

We can say that Leopoldo Zea's legacy exemplifies a way of doing philosophy in an open, problemizing dialogue with different philosophical positions, in opposition to any form of colonialism and domination of the nations oppressed by the imperial countries. Zea rejected any single model of philosophizing because each nation creates its own model from its own historical horizon. Zea


thought that philosophy emerges from concrete, historical human problems and that, therefore, totalizing, exclusionary "universal Eurocentric" truths should be critiqued, reformulated and implemented for the philosophical study of our reality, where philosophizing and philosophy acquired a creative and original character. In this way, Leopoldo Zea's philosophical method is a dialectical discourse between praxis and theory, between social reality, history and philosophy, between the tasks and the being of human beings in a historical moment.

His arduous work on the philosophical, social, political and cultural problems of Latin America has led Leopoldo Zea to be considered one of the most outstanding shapers of contemporary Latin American philosophical thought. For Latin America, his recent death, June 8, 2004, represents the loss of perhaps the thinker most concerned with defining its identity and being in the world. ■■

NOTES

¹ Zea uses the adjective "American" in his titles to refer to "Latin American." [Editor's Note.]

Reviews



Migración, remesas y desarrollo local
(Migration, Remittances and Local Development)
Rodolfo García Zamora
Universidad Autónoma de Zacatecas
Mexico City, 2004, 271 pp.

THE RISKY LEAP FROM SOCIAL TO PRODUCTIVE PROJECTS

As international migration has increased over the past several years, it has been accompanied by growing concern and debate about its impacts at both the sending and receiving ends. Even though the remittances generated are often considered to be one of the most important effects from the country of origin's perspective, they sometimes seem to have little long-lasting impact on the sending region's economic development. Rodolfo García Zamora proposes including elements such as migrants' savings and newly acquired skills as part of the analysis in an effort to visualize how these factors, along with the remittances, may constitute a more integral strategy of development for some

of the sending regions. His perspective is derived from contacts with, and knowledge of, projects being implemented by hometown associations from the state of Zacatecas, Mexico, as they move forward in a process he has described as "the risky leap from social to productive projects."

In his book *Migration, Remittances and Local Development* he maintains that these organizations, located in the United States, in conjunction with their communities in Mexico constitute a new bi-national entity that aims to move beyond the realm of philanthropy toward the implementation of productive endeavors that will have an impact on employment, output and incomes in their hometowns. In his discussion of this process, he underlines the significance of "collective remittances" as a qualitatively enhanced resource that can propitiate new development models. The author believes that the organizations in question have reached a stage of institutional maturity that opens up new spaces for political participation and the promotion of micro-enterprises that will enable them to thus participate in the construction of a new bi-national Mexican identity.

He is cautious enough to indicate that the existing migrant organizations will not be able to promote local and regional development by themselves. Such an ambitious task requires, as García Zamora recognizes, the combined efforts of local communities; the migrant organizations; local, state and national Mexican governments; educational institutions; nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and international bodies. However, the author is anxious to stress the importance that international migration has for Mexico and the potential that hometown associations have for promoting local development in states like Zacatecas, where the primary sector of the economy is affected by structural crisis, there is a chronic inability to create employment opportunities, and thus transnational migration has become the most important economic and social process.

The book contains papers presented by the author at various national and international fora held between Octo-

ber 2000 and October 2003, addressing the issues of international migration, the remittances it generates and the impacts it has on local development. He draws on his own academic research, that of his colleagues affiliated with the doctoral program in development studies at the University of Zacatecas and that of other experts in the field, as well as his direct contact and collaboration with the hometown associations of migrants from Zacatecas in California, Illinois and Texas. Some of the most recurrent themes are: the need to regulate remittances to eliminate the considerable losses suffered by senders and recipients and to achieve more security and lower costs; the potential market that migrants represent in the United States for products from their places of origin; the fact that many migrants are anxious to contribute to their hometowns' economic and social development but do not know how to go about doing so; the need the hometown associations in the U.S. have for organized and active counterparts in Mexico in order to be more effective in promoting local development; and the need for more systematic follow-up for all of the initiatives undertaken.

Other topics explored include the negative impacts of the North American Free Trade Agreement, which are perhaps most severely felt in the Mexican countryside where, as the author points out, the *campesinos* have clearly been excluded from the dynamics of neo-liberal capitalism. He proposes establishing micro-banks in remote rural areas in order to provide financial services and allow for transferring remittances, thereby creating mechanisms and an institutional framework for pooling and mobilizing the scarce but nevertheless existent economic resources.

García Zamora insists that local development policies are different from traditional industrial policies insofar as the center of attention is small and medium-sized or even micro-firms, and thus economies of scale are not a major concern. Emphasis must be placed on decentralization and the promotion of new productive and entrepreneurial endeavors that can provide for sustainable endogenous development, he maintains. The principal actors in this process must be the combined social forces existing at the local level, he explains, while at the same time recognizing the need for external help from governments, NGOs and international organizations.

The author is highly critical of the economic policies implemented in Mexico over the past two decades or more, and sees therein the underlying causes of the fact that so

many Mexicans consider migration to the United States their only alternative for a better life. Nevertheless, he seems to be quite optimistic about migrants' capacity—which he insists they have acquired through collective actions and organizations—for promoting integral and sustainable local development strategies in their communities of origin.

García Zamora analyzes the accomplishments and limitations of Zacatecas's 3 x 1 projects and provides some very useful guidelines for similar endeavors, based on those experiences. He maintains that alternative strategies for local and regional development require breaking away from the current mode of thinking which has undermined the role of public policy. He believes that the political administrative apparatus and public policies have a strategic role to play. He even refers to the need for bi-national policies to promote development in the sending communities, based on the fact that the migration taking place is a bi-national process.

The author admits that complete and fruitful participation of the entire population in a local development project, a necessary ingredient for success, will be extremely difficult to achieve, and even utopian to hope for. While he seems to be fully aware that such an enormous task is beyond the capabilities of the migrants themselves—even though collective organization and action can enhance their strength—he perhaps overestimates the willingness and interests of other actors and agents that would be required to accompany them in this endeavor.


For several generations, growing numbers of Mexicans have felt the need to change their destinies by migrating to the United States. García Zamora maintains that the time has come for migrants to begin to work collectively toward altering their communities of origins' destinies by making the risky leap from financing social projects to promoting and participating in productive projects in those localities, so that not migrating may become a viable alternative for future generations. A utopian proposal perhaps, but one that is already being attempted by some communities, as this book illustrates.

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Rise of the Vulcans
The History of Bush's War Cabinet

James Mann

Viking Penguin

New York, 2004, 426 pp.

In his article "Iraq's False Promises" in the January-February issue of *Foreign Policy*, Slavoj Žižek wrote, "If you want to understand why the Bush administration invaded Iraq, read Freud's *Interpretation of Dreams*, not the National Security Strategy of the United States." However, you should also take a look at President George W. Bush's red circle. That is what James Mann's new book is about.

The aim of this work by *Los Angeles Times* journalist Mann is the analysis of the relationship between Americans and the rest of the world for the last 30 years. The author focuses on the members of Bush's foreign policy team and the way their points of view have developed.

Mann uses the term "Vulcans," making an analogy with the Roman god Vulcan, for he believes this captures the image of President Bush's foreign policy team in the sense of power, strength, resistance and durability. It is no surprise, then, that once Bush became president, he turned to

a group of veterans to fill his highest foreign policy posts. Among the most outstanding are Donald Rumsfeld, Richard Cheney, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage, head of the Joint Command, and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz.

They have a long history and share a collective memory. In the same way, the two youngest members of Bush's foreign policy team, the president himself and his national security advisor, Condoleezza Rice, are strongly committed to the past. Bush's father became president of the United States after being director of the Central Intelligence Agency and vice president. Rice was the coordinator of U.S. policy on the Soviet Union during the first Bush administration; she was a protégé of Brent Scowcroft, the national security advisor to the first President Bush.

The relationship between academia, private capital and government is the first link that emerges from the history of the Vulcans, at least in the case of Paul Wolfowitz, who has served as a bridge among the three milieus. Condoleezza Rice, for example, was at Stanford's Hoover Institute and later worked for the oil giant Chevron.

In his book, James Mann maintains that disdain for Henry Kissinger and the policy of detente represented a change in U.S. relations with the world. Domestically, the issues and various focuses in the debate on foreign policy were causing a big change. Rumsfeld, Cheney and Wolfowitz played a very active role in these changes. During the Ford administration, the debate on foreign policy turned toward new questions. The main issue was the expansion of U.S. power. Was the United States declining after its military defeat in Vietnam? Was the public ready to abandon its efforts against communism and unnecessarily accept more cordial relations with the Soviet Union? Kissinger's foreign policy was based on a series of answers to these questions. He thought that after Vietnam, it was inevitable that Washington negotiate with Moscow. From the perspective of today's neo-conservatives, the United States was neither weak nor in decline. That was the moment to launch the offensive with the doctrine of preventive security.

For James Mann, that was when the Vulcans forged the building blocks of their foreign policy, that they would put into practice after the Cold War. The Republicans generally did better in matters of foreign policy and national security than the Democrats. This time was no exception. From his first months in the White House, Bush's foreign policy team made it clear that they would relate to the world in

new ways. Their style was a variation of that used during the first Bush administration. In the first nine months of 2001, the new administration adopted a more conflictive relationship with North Korea and China. It quickly pressed to develop the anti-missile system, despite European concerns. In addition, from the start it was clearly skeptical about the value of international accords and treaties.

After the September 11 attacks, the administration's new focus became more visible. A series of new doctrines and ideas were brought into play that broke with past foreign policy orientations and strategies. It was clear they would not continue with the policies of "containment" and "dissuasion" that had been fundamental pillars during the Cold War. In fact, according to the new doctrine, the United States could even begin a war with preemptive or preventive attacks. In the Middle East, where the Americans had worked with authoritarian regimes like the Saudis, they fostered the cause of democracy and of transforming the entire region. In the economy, the Vulcans have opted for leaving their country in the hands of private capital. Their focus is different from that of the presidency of William Clinton, when the National Economic Council was for a time even more important than the National Security Council.

These processes mean much more than a minor change of direction from one Republican administration to another. In fact, they represent a transcendental change: the emergence of a new vision of the United States' place in the world, with the consciousness that its military might is unequalled and it does not require commitments to any other nation or groups of nations. This new vision represents the culmination of the ideas and dreams of this group of Republicans.

James Mann catalogues the Vulcans as a new school in foreign policy. Perhaps this is a bit precipitated. However, the Vulcans focus basically on military power. In the second half of the 1970s, the aim was to build up the army and reconstruct it after Vietnam. In the 1980s and 1990s, their concerns centered on when to re-legitimize military might and how to use it. In the first years of the twenty-first century, they decided to put the new role of the United States in the world to the test in Afghanistan and Iraq. The Vulcans' generation serves as a bridge between the two periods of modern history: the Cold War and the post-Cold War. For them, the disappearance of the Soviet Union was only half a chapter in the story, not the end or the beginning. With the death of the Evil Empire was born a new vision, concretized in Pentagon strategy since 1992 as a world with a single pole.

James Mann aims to examine the Vulcans' beliefs and ways of looking at the world, analyzing the specific histories of its six members: Cheney, Rumsfeld, Powell, Armitage, Wolfowitz and Rice. He also wants to understand how and why the United States has related to the world in this way. Where did the Vulcans' ideas come from? Why did these six people reach the heights of the Republicans' foreign policy apparatus? What is there in their past and their experiences that led them to make the decisions they did when they got into the White House in 2001 and after the September 11 terrorist attacks?

To the satisfaction of some and the dissatisfaction of others, President George W. Bush is not the main protagonist in this story. In fact, he only plays a secondary role. Although he does not have the strategic capacity of a von Clausewitz or the creative imagination of a Rachmaninov, perhaps for that reason he did not participate in the design of international policy during the Cold War, the Gulf War or any of the international crises his country has faced. In short, Bush, Jr., has no past in foreign policy. He could not make the decisions if it were not for the options offered him by the Vulcans, nor could he formulate policies without the ideas they bring with them.

The work of journalists like James Mann, Bob Woodward, Tim Suskind and Richard Clarke makes it possible to piece together the puzzle of President Bush's war cabinet. Enrique Krauze says that history moves following trajectories and structures, acts of human will and freedom, but in "clouded times" of identity fanaticism and other theological hatreds,¹ of the paradoxes of U.S. power on the one hand and of soft power on the other, times of nebulous and nihilistic enemies, what are needed are prophets of peace, not of war, witnesses of truth, not of propaganda. The word "empire" only denaturalizes the real condition of the United States. Octavio Paz already said it: if the United States became an empire, it would lose its *raison d'être*. How can it be a democracy and an empire at the same time?

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NOTES

¹ Octavio Paz referred to the international political situation of the 1980s as "clouded times." [Editor's Note.]



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