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Our Integration Beyond Walls
Rector Enrique Graue Wiechers

Trump: The Anti-immigrant, "Mexicanophobic" President

Financial Deregulation And the Dodd-Frank Act

Maternal Health and Mortality in Mexico and the Border Region

Redefining Mexico-U.S. Relations to Enhance North American Prosperity

"Haitijuana," a Photografic Essay By Hans-Maximo Musielik

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Our Voice

Coming out in summer 2017, this issue of *Voices of Mexico* is significant for two reasons that I want to mention to our readers. First and foremost is that Dr. Enrique Graue Wiechers, the rector of the National Autonomous University of Mexico, has consented to contribute an outstanding article. I want to thank him for that and for supporting my tenure at CISAN. Rector Graue's article expresses his profound humanist vocation and commitment to working for young people, revealing the range of qualities that have placed him in a position of leadership in our university.

His article heads up this issue, alerting us to the main challenges Mexico is facing in its relations with the United States. He recognizes their complexity, underlining the growing mobility of human beings, not only from South to North, but also encompassing all its manifestations in Mexico (our own Diaspora, the transit and reception of migrants into our country) that situate it globally as a huge migratory hub.

With these elements, our distinguished author weaves numbers and ideas together to argue the decisive issue: the need for education to tear down all manner of walls and stereotypes.

I want to take this opportunity to briefly underline certain emblematic elements of the Development Plan currently guiding our endeavors. Proposed by Rector Graue, it began to link up the UNAM's three fundamental goals in late 2015: teaching, research, and the dissemination of culture.

This important document recognizes our institution's activities as key pieces in fostering our country's development. It defines education as an inalienable human right and public good and points to knowledge as an essential part of freedom and justice. It ratifies its public, secular, plural nature and commits the UNAM to continuing to educate the new generations. Rector Graue's actions have shown that, while the acquisition of abilities and new knowledge is decisive in fulfilling the university's mission, communicational skills and ethical values are also inescapable requirements for a quality education. That is why I invite all those interested in a deeper understanding of higher education to visit the website at https://www.unam.mx/resultados?as_q=rector.unam.mx%2Fdoctos%2FPDF-2015-2019.pdf to appreciate the scope and depth of the document that guides our institution's activities.

This very special issue also includes a selection of articles on the extremely current matter of Mexico-U.S. relations and their resulting link to the third actor in the region, Canada.

Outstanding among the contributions are those of distinguished UNAM academics who have dedicated a large part of their careers to raising public awareness of these links. Sergio Alcocer, an eminent engineer who has made significant interdisciplinary inroads into the field of foreign policy, reflects on the cooperation between Mexico and our neighbor to the north. Taking NAFTA as one of his central axes, he argues that its proposed renegotiation must include a deeper commitment to issues such as education, scientific and technological innovation, and shared infrastructure to optimize its regional impact.

Mónica Verea deals with the human tragedy facing undocumented Mexican migrants who may be deported from the United States and are harassed and persecuted by the Trump

administration. She concludes that the damage extends to both countries since it promotes animosity between U.S. Americans and Mexicans.

This issue adds an encouraging element: it combines the work of experienced pens with that of young researchers who explore new strategic horizons like the financial sector or the role of sub-national governments in regional governance. Claudia Maya and Roberto Zepeda, respectively, contribute not only new interpretations, but also a rich approach to the complex interwoven reality of North America.

Thinking about our region leads us inevitably to observe other latitudes; and it is precisely in doing so that we note the article by our Finnish colleague Mervi Leppäkorpi, who has lived among us for a year and who, as a specialist in migration, speaks to us about the migrant experience in three European cities.

For faithful readers of *Voices of Mexico* —as well as those who are reading it for the first time—, the "Splendor of Mexico," "Art and Culture," and "Museums" sections will continue to delight the senses. In this issue, they delve into the traditions and customs of the Huichol people, the beauty and perfection of textiles and clothing made on the indigenous looms of Oaxaca and other regions of the country, and the many hopeful smiles depicted in a series of photographs of the Haitians who saved their lives in their massive surge toward Tijuana, on the Mexico-U.S. border, in search of a better future. These three articles reveal the iron will to struggle and resist of vulnerable communities, which will continue to be an example of the importance of human transcendence.

It is by no means an accident that I have left to the end the second reason this issue of *Voices of Mexico* is significant and that I should share with you. Almost eight years after having the great honor of being designated as the director of the Center for Research on North America (CISAN) by Dr. José Narro Robles, then rector of the UNAM —and I want to take the opportunity here to thank him for his confidence in me—, the relentless passage of time dictates that this will be the last "Our Voice" that I will address to you in my current capacity as the magazine's director. Allow me to also underline my recognition of Rector Enrique Graue for his openness to the CISAN and his stouthearted interest in making the networks of readers of this valuable English-language publication grow.

After 18 issues, I will undoubtedly miss the experience of diving into the wide variety of its contents and at the same time enjoying the exceptional quality of its color sections on art, traditions, and the museums of my beloved country.

My understanding of time has at its center the recognition that we are finite beings and that life is an adventure worthy of being told and celebrated, without excluding farewells, since these take place uninterruptedly. *Voices of Mexico* will now begin a new era that everyone in the center's community will warmly welcome. The central pillars of this magazine are the countless voices and efforts expressed in the contributions of its authors, the photographers, our editorial team, the graphic designers, the translators, and the many others who work together so that you, the readers, will close the virtuous circle that has kept this UNAM publishing project alive since another summer, but of 1986.

I am eternally grateful to all of you!

Silvia Núñez García
Director of CISAN
June 2017

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Our Integration beyond Walls

Rector Enrique Graue Wiechers*

Adrián Orozco Arceo

A group of Dreamers visiting the UNAM.

Contemporary migration is a reflection of the globalized world we live in today. The exchange of information through new technologies and the geographical dissemination of production processes have demonstrated that borders as physical or figurative obstacles are at the very least a porous construct, and that in certain instances of the modern world their once ominous symbolic relevance seems to have vanished altogether. A growing rate of mobility and exchange in terms of data, goods, and services —indeed, neoliberalism's hard currency— entails a proportional rate of mobility for people. In the midst of this, a consequent surge in protectionist and nationalist ideology stirs the global political climate, bringing to the fore a marked reluctance from governments to accept the reality of migration.

Mexico has become one of the main actors in this debate. Donald Trump's presidency in the United States came with the promise of building a wall along Mexico's northern border, scuttling NAFTA, and enforcing the deportation of almost six million Mexican nationals. With all the outrage they may have sparked, these measures forced our government to re-examine its social, political, and economic strategy within the North American region. The fundamental conflict in understanding migration as a problem is that it confines our assessment of an extremely complex phenomenon to the logic of causality. There is no "solution" to migration; rather, there is an opportunity for cultural enrichment, an invaluable source of human resources, and an instrument for social development, all enveloped in this defining phenomenon of contemporary reality

Mexico is one of the few countries where migration is lived through in all its forms. As a key point of departure, transit, and return, it is the home of more than one million international citizens.[1] It has also become a kind of mandatory stop-over for more than 300 000 migrants, mostly Central Americans, who courageously set out on the grueling journey from their homelands to the United States every year.[2] The border, about 3 100 kilometers long and crossed by more than 13 million people yearly,[3] is the world's busiest.[4] Moreover, Mexico

* Rector of the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM).

is the country with the second-highest migration outflux, and the United States the one with the highest influx.[5]

The extent of the migratory relationship between our two countries is deeply rooted in Mexico's open economy and a regional initiative in favor of open markets between these neighboring nations that is some 30 years in the making. In 1980, before the expansion of free trade, the Mexican state had substantial centralized control over the economy, which relied heavily on local production. At the time, 8.8 million people of Mexican origin lived in the United States.[6] Today, 23 years after NAFTA came into effect, the United States is home to more than 37 million people of Mexican origin, 12 million of whom are first-generation immigrants.[7]

The *de facto* integration of immigrants throughout recent years, especially in border states, is palpable in all aspects of social and cultural life all along the neighboring territory. Both north and south, around 83 million people live in all 10 border states.[8] The United States has its largest Mexican populations in California and Texas.[9] As a result, Los Angeles is the second city with most Mexicans in the world, and Houston, where the Latino population grew 33.2 percent while the white population dropped 37.2 percent between 1970 and 2010,[10] is arguably the most diverse place in the country. In perspective, 98 percent of Mexican migrants go to the United States.[11]

Beyond the macro-demographic panorama, the specific profiles of migrants are a key factor for understanding the phenomenon. Their age, schooling, and the kind of work they perform, among other things, give us a more detailed picture of the challenge facing our two countries. Over 42 percent of Mexican migrants in the United States are between the ages of 18 and 39.[12] This means they are fit to work, but it is worth remarking that many are sound candidates for higher education precisely because of their age. Despite this, a significant portion of them, around 44 percent, have 10 years of schooling or less.[13] Most of them are employed in low-paying jobs and, as undocumented aliens, receive no benefits.

The migrant population in the United States is approximately 47.15 percent women and 52.85 percent men.[14] Half of all female Mexican migrants work in the hospitality, leisure, health, or education sectors; the men work mainly in construction and manufacturing. Although their working conditions are often precarious and they get paid significantly less than U.S. citizens, remittances constitute an outstanding source of income for Mexico, which is among the four countries that receive the most earnings from migrants abroad.[15]

Having grown up with a bi-national, bilingual, and bicultural perspective, first- and second-generation young migrants have tools that are fundamental for today's world.

However, as much as the profile of migrants in substandard working conditions, with low levels of schooling and income, might represent a large demographic, it is not the only one. Twenty percent of immigrants living in the United States are qualified with high-level technical or professional education.[16] To put this figure into perspective, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) notes that, in 2015, only 16 percent of adults in Mexico had received higher education.[17] In comparison, 37.3 percent of migrants had received between 10 and 12 years of schooling, the equivalent of a high school diploma in the United States. If we look at our domestic figures, the average Mexican has only finished middle school.

This implies that immigrants in the United States, particularly young ones, are a sector of the population that could easily perform better-paying jobs and benefit greatly from access to quality higher education. Although migration is often motivated by poverty, a large number of well qualified migrants in the United States represent enormous human resource potential and could become an even greater asset to society if they had access to better academic and professional opportunities or simply to a better quality of life.

In addition to that, their eclectic educational backgrounds also make up a valuable resource: having grown up with a bi-national, bilingual, and bicultural perspective, first- and second-generation young migrants have tools that are fundamental for today's world. Their intimate familiarity with both countries gives them a unique dual perspective of inclusion, plurality, and multiculturalism. Undeniably, these are all characteristics that could work in favor of economic, social, and cultural bonds that tie both countries together.

Among the first-generation young immigrants who embody this profile are those who have lately been referred to as "Dreamers." The term was coined in 2010, when Senate Bill 1291, the Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act (Dream Act) was halted in Congress by a margin of only five votes. This bipartisan bill would have meant that undocumented students could pay the same university tuition as resident students, instead of the tuition international stu-

dents typically pay, which can be up to three times higher. The bill would also have allowed immigrants to get a temporary residence visa, valid throughout the duration of their degree programs, and opt for permanent legal residence after graduating. The Dream Act would have allowed about 65 000 undocumented students graduating from middle school to adjust their status to legal residency for a minimum of six years.

Given the Dream Act's unsuccessful outcome and the subsequent failure of the immigration reform, President Barack Obama announced an executive action that would temporarily act as a placeholder for the act. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) protects undocumented young immigrants from deportation for a certain period of time, offering them benefits such as work permits. From 2012 to 2016, DACA received 861 000 requests for review (not including renewals), of which almost 76.6 percent came from young people of Mexican origin.[18] Today, estimates put the number of Dreamers who could potentially benefit from DACA at two million. However, the current U.S. administration hostility toward what DACA represents puts it in imminent danger of being revoked if not altogether quashed.

What prevailed throughout the political and legal upheaval arising from the Dream Act and later DACA —note that this is what should ultimately be stressed— is the active role played by groups of young migrants who fought relentlessly for rights they considered basic. In light of this, we must begin by paying heed to the day-to-day struggle of those who have fought hard and long to access higher education: young migrants who have completed university degrees and who have all too often done so despite highly adverse circumstances. The hardships they face can be traced back to the socio-economic context they grew up in and ran away from; but often these hardships are aggravated by the many ways in which they face discrimination in their families and communities on a regular basis.

Dreamers are a symbol of the way immigrants craft projects for their future; how they strive to improve the conditions of their own generation and of those to come. And it is precisely in this moment, as this happens, that education must become a pivot for change: governments and higher education institutions in both Mexico and the United States must realize and activate the potential this has to strengthen the ties that bind us. Dreamers represent a small portion among millions of people seeking to reinforce their academic profiles and become ever more qualified. Their efforts must stand as an example of the values that societies need to foster if they are to thrive in the contemporary world.

Dreamers are a symbol of the way immigrants craft projects for their future, how they strive to improve the conditions of their own generation and of those to come.

From this point of view, the phenomenon of Mexican immigration in the United States is first and foremost an opportunity for growth, not a problem to be solved. These immigrants live and breathe the intercultural, dynamic setting from which they emerged and which has shaped who they are. They are living proof that Mexico's future as a country and North America's fate as a region cannot be limited by the constraints of physical borders. Cataloguing migrants or migration as a problem presupposes the need to overcome, vanquish, or eradicate it. Incorporating this vision into any political stance impedes a natural process of integration, which, despite some immediate practical shortcomings, will certainly yield a more plural, wholesome, tolerant future for our societies. The sensibility required to let this happen, however, is something newly instated powers-that-be have proved devoid of.

Migrants themselves understand better than anyone the challenges and complexities of this increasingly intertwined world: they experience them every day. It is they who are truly aware of the tools needed to deal with contemporary globalization; and with the passing years, they have honed their comprehension of the dual dynamic they embody. Beyond any kind of crimp that might seek to put the brakes on the engines of migration, it is necessary to come up with strategies that support integration. Considering the incredibly wide diversity of Mexican migrants in the United States, it is clear that the best way forward is through education.

As an effort to initiate one such strategy, the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) decided several decades ago to wager on internationalization, with the United States as one of its main points of focus. In 1944, the UNAM opened its first outreach center abroad, at Trinity University in San Antonio, Texas. Today, the UNAM has another outreach center in Chicago and three Mexican Studies Centers: one at the California State University at Northridge, one at the University of Washington in Seattle, and another one at the University of Arizona in Tucson. Moreover, the UNAM has 91 ongoing agreements with 67 U.S. institutions and organiza-

The National Autonomous University of Mexico decided several decades ago to wager on internationalization, with the United States as one of its main focuses.

tions dedicated to higher learning.[19] This year the UNAM will join forces with the Carlos Slim Foundation and the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH) in a project designed to inform, educate, and prepare Latinos who are eligible for U.S. citizenship, beginning by offering ten workshops at UNAM's outposts in the United States.

This should be seen as an invitation for institutions of higher education, international agencies, civil society, the private sector, and governments on a global scale to reflect and act together for education in diversity. This commitment must be rooted in strategies that are in line with the demands of our present world. For this reason, it is crucial to open a dialogue on issues that extend beyond our borders in such a way that we may face them from an international perspective, with a humanist, tolerant, and respectful approach.

Twenty-three years ago, Mexico, Canada, and the United States decided to join forces in the creation of what was to become an area for the economic integration of the comparative advantages each country had, reducing tariffs on imports, benefiting the mobility of factors of production, and lowering costs of goods and services for the North American region. Over the past two decades, NAFTA has had its peaks and troughs. As of September 11, 2001, there has been a heavy reinforcement of U.S. borders, and the 2008 financial crisis required tremendous budget adjustments for each of the countries involved in the agreement. In addition, the massive increase in violence since Mexico began waging the so-called War on Drugs in 2006, along with the consequent illegal influx of weapons into Mexico and the unrelenting demand for narcotics in the United States, have become destabilizing factors in the delicate balance needed to maintain both nations' security and economy.

The current political climate in North America has found considerable resonance in Europe through the rising tension around the issues of migration and refugees. Thus, it should hardly come as a shock that a growing number of European countries are notoriously echoing the chants of protectionist xenophobia and racial intolerance championed by the rising conservative right-wing factions in the United States. The answer to the problem will not be found in erecting walls or tightening borders. When it comes, it will come from understanding ourselves as part of an ongoing process, a global, fluctuating, ever more interconnected world. VM

Notes

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Trump: The Anti-immigrant, "Mexicanophobic" President

Mónica Verea*

Handout/Reuters

Since the presidential campaign, the immigration debate has been very racially and ethnically offensive in general, but it has also been particularly anti-Mexican. Donald J. Trump stood out as the most "Mexicanophobic" of the Republican candidates, with our country becoming one of his favorite targets. In addition to repudiating NAFTA, he characterized Mexican immigrants as criminals, drug smugglers, rapists, and generally "bad hombres." This atmosphere turned into fertile ground for the racists to come out of their closets, hurling their insulting attitudes and discourses against migrants, who have been irreversibly damaged by the now-president's hate-speech.

A few days after his inauguration, Trump took three executive actions that have directly affected these Mexicans:

1. Border Security and Immigration Enforcement Improvements

This January 25 decree orders the construction of a wall along the southern U.S. border, as well as the detention and deportation of unauthorized foreigners, speeding up the paperwork for undocumented immigrants waiting to hear about their eligibility to remain in the United States, and the hiring of more Border Patrol personnel.

Trump has threatened Mexico with making it pay for the building of the wall, which the Mexican government has repeatedly refused to accept. Trump has proposed different mechanisms to this end: imposing a 20-percent tax on exports from Mexico, another on remittances,[1] and through undocumented workers' social security payments. Any of these alternatives would have very negative consequences for our country, particularly any interference with remittances.

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Fortunately, a growing number of members of Congress, including some Republicans, have come out against the wall, arguing that it is very expensive, is not a solution for national security issues, and that it would severely affect the environment and have a negative impact on bi-national relations and property rights. Estimates put the total cost of the wall at US$22 billion, taking 3.5 years to build.

It is unnecessary to continue building the wall. Trump seems not to realize that the trends in undocumented Mexican migrant flows have changed, dropping substantially since the 2008 economic crisis. According to PEW Hispanic Center data, the total number of undocumented migrants has stabilized at 11.3 million from 2008 to 2014, after reaching an all-time high of 12.2 million in 2007. In 2014, there were 5.8 million undocumented Mexican migrants, half of the total, but at least 1.1 million fewer than in 2007, when there were 6.9 million.[2]

Mexican migrant flow has become "zero net" migration, something Trump seems to be unaware of. He also is unaware that 4.5 million (42 percent) of the undocumented migrants who were in the United States in 2014 were "over-stayers" and not entrants without inspection (EWIs), as he supposes. I believe that those who will get rich from building the wall, in addition to construction companies, will be migrant smugglers, who will up their rates even more than they already have.[3] Even before putting up the first foot of wall, it has already seriously affected relations between border states and the two countries.

Trump proposes speeding up arrests of people suspected of breaking federal or state laws and finishing up the "catch and release" process. This is not a new policy: Barack Obama deported 2.7 million undocumented migrants and G. W. Bush, 2 million, both using the Secure Communities policy, in effect between 2008 and 2014 and replaced in 2015 by the Priority Enforcement Program.

Trump's deportation program includes the need for hiring 5 000 new Border Patrol agents to add to the 19 828 already in place. He has already ordered the immediate hiring of 1 700 border officials, prosecutors, and judges at a cost of US$1.2 billion.[4] The program also proposes improving or, if necessary, building more detention centers for undocumented immigrants close to the border and assigning more immigration judges to those facilities.

Deportation hearings are enormously backlogged: by February 2017, approximately half a million cases were backed up in 58 immigration courts. With 352 judges, those immigrants wait an average of 677 days for a hearing;[5] this is why Attorney General Jeff Sessions has announced that 50 more judges will be hired this year and 75 next year.[6]

Trump seems not to realize that the trends in undocumented Mexican migrant flows have changed, dropping substantially since the 2008 economic crisis.

The executive branch wants to strengthen the E-Verify program, which checks the immigration status of job applicants. Employers registered in the program increased from 24 000 in 2009 to 500 000 in 2016. Actually, in the last decade and a half the number of deportations has risen substantially, but seldom have those who hire undocumented workers been penalized. While more than 2.7 million undocumented migrants were deported between 2009 and 2016, only 1 337 employers were arrested in the same period for "illegal" hirings, tax evasion, and/or money laundering.[7]

It is true that the number of Central Americans detained in recent years has increased, and very often people who say they are Mexican but are not are deported to Mexico. In the February 22 memorandum, the White House stated that undocumented migrants will be returned to their place of entry, regardless of their home country, even when they are awaiting legal proceedings in the United States. If a non-Mexican migrant has made an asylum request, he or she must wait in Mexico until his/her U.S. hearing date. Secretary of Homeland Security John Kelly is also considering an initiative that would separate children from their parents if the latter enter the U.S. "illegally."[8] This is a clear violation of their human rights that the Mexican government must clarify and negotiate bilaterally.

2. Enhancing Public Safety in the Interior of the United States

In another decree also issued January 25 to complement the previous one, Trump ordered the reinstatement of the Secure Communities program and the hiring of 10 000 immigration officials to deport undocumented migrants. The decree also states that the 287g program must be revitalized, allowing state and local police officers and officials to cooperate with federal immigration officials. It proposes that the jurisdic-

tions that do not comply with federal law —what have been called "sanctuary cities"— will be punished and no longer receive more federal funds than those stipulated by law. In fact, in the budget he sent to Congress, Trump proposed a cut-back on reimbursements to uncooperative states, which would have very negative consequences.

3. *Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry into the U.S.*

In the first version he issued, the January 27 decree, Trump argued that new measures had to be established for issuing visas to ensure that applicants are not associated with terrorism and do not have violent or hostile attitudes toward the country. This travel ban decreed the temporary (90-day) suspension of the entry of persons from Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, the Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. It also suspended the Refugee Admissions Program for 120 days and the entry of Syrian refugees indefinitely. James Robart, the federal judge in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington state in Seattle, blocked this action, arguing its unconstitutionality because it discriminated against Muslims for reasons of their religion.

In the second version of the decree, issued March 6, 2017, Trump proposed blocking the entry of visitors from six of the seven countries mentioned, leaving out Iraq. Like the previous version, the newer decree reduced the admission of refugees from 110 000 to 50 000 a year. This time, two federal judges from Hawaii and Maryland temporarily blocked the decree, both finding reasons to consider it unconstitutional because it discriminated against Muslims. In the face of this second set-back, Trump said the Justice Department would fight in the courts to defend the decree.

The three decrees require that the relevant bodies present regular reports on the social and economic costs incurred because of immigrants, without comparing those numbers with the benefits they contribute to the economy and society. The undeclared intention is to constantly bombard the public with rumors about supposed crimes committed by migrants, with the cruel, xenophobic aim of nurturing a negative perception of them.

Fortunately, a growing number of members of Congress, including some Republicans, have come out against the wall, arguing that it is very expensive and not a solution for national security issues.

Reflections Given an Uncertain Future

In this conflict-ridden atmosphere, the prospects for comprehensive immigration reform are poor. However, in his first speech to Congress on February 28, Trump surprisingly said that he would be willing to analyze a policy for the entry of skilled workers and the undocumented least likely to require federal assistance or to compete with native-born U.S. citizens for low-paying jobs.

He called on Democrats to work with Republicans to reform the immigration system, making it merit-based, instead of having family reunification as the priority, the reason 63 percent of the one million immigrants admitted legally every year are granted entry.

Until now, Trump has not eliminated the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA), as he had promised to during his campaign. He has only asked that those with criminal charges filed against them be removed. However, the "Dacamented" are terrified that immigration authorities will eventually use their registered information to deport them.

The construction of the wall has become an iconic issue that is tremendously offensive to Mexico, which has repeatedly rejected it. I think Trump's construction plans will meet with serious obstacles, and he will only continue them to please the voters who supported it to retain their support in the time running up to his reelection bid in 2020. Many members of Congress question its usefulness and are not willing to cut other budget items that they consider fundamental in order to fund it.

Despite the fact that detentions increased before the 2016 presidential elections, in 2017, they have decreased significantly due to potential migrants not wanting to take the risk or spend more to cross the border. This decrease can mean that "the real wall" may be internal, with a mounting hunt for undocumented migrants whether they are criminals or not. In fact, the executive actions mentioned above broaden the universe of the "deportables," allowing us to expect an increase in round-ups on the streets and entries into people's homes, their workplaces, schools, churches, etc., creating an atmosphere of harassment and fear such as migrants have not experienced in a long time.

The U.S. President has not eliminated DACA as he had promised to during his campaign. He has only asked that those with criminal charges filed against them be removed.

Today, our undocumented compatriots are trapped by their fear of being found, detained, and deported, whether they have committed a crime or not. They feel much more unprotected and vulnerable due to the constant fear of being separated from their families. All this has caused serious damage to the migrant community and the violation of their human rights.

It is true that in previous years, thousands of migrants had been deported without causing a big reaction in the United States or in Mexico. This may have been because they were justified by the idea that the economic crisis had made many of the jobs undocumented workers usually held disappear, and some people even returned voluntarily. The difference is that today, the deportations are being publicized more and they are perceived as a witch-hunt being carried out for ethnic and racial reasons.

Since the entry process is considered basic to security, immigration officials are authorized to review the content of telephones and computers, regardless of the interests of foreign citizens, who can be returned to their place of origin if they do not comply with authorities' demands, a situation that is both unprecedented and alarming. At the same time, tourists from some countries are forbidden to bring with them electronic equipment, except cellular phones, if they have flown on certain non-U.S. airlines.

Mexico is a country of emigrants, immigrants, and migrants in transit, and is facing great challenges due to the first two decrees mentioned above. Our government has made important efforts on our southern border apprehending Central Americans (392 000 in 2014) attempting to cross our country in search of the "American dream."[9] This means it is doing an expensive, painful job to satisfy the needs of the U.S. government that is not necessarily acknowledged in the framework of bilateral cooperation.

At the same time, our northern border has become an increasingly conflicted, problematic area, given that many Central Americans, Mexicans, and people from other countries are there as deportees or waiting to enter the United States. This is why the Mexican government must demand that when the Trump government deports undocumented migrants to Mexico, it must first verify whether they are Mexican or not and also stipulate the crime they committed, showing that they have received due process in a court before being deported.

Trump's "Mexicanphobia" has thrown Mexico-U.S. relations into crisis. The damage to Mexicans both here and there is clear. It is possible that in the face of this sentiment, anti-Americanism could resurface in Mexico, a nationalist reaction that has been latent at other times in our history and that could increase bilateral tensions. VM

NOTES

[1] Remittances sent to Mexico came to US$26.97 billion in 2016, an all-time high. An estimated 1.4 million households in Mexico receive them. Juan José Li Ng, "En 2016 las remesas alcanzaron su máximo histórico," BBVA Research, February 1, 2017, https://www.bbvaresearch.com/publicaciones/mexico-en-2016-las-remesas-alcanzan-su-maximo-historico-26-970-md/.

[2] Ana Gonzalez-Barrera y Jens Manuel Krogstad, "What We Know about Illegal Immigration from Mexico," *Factank, News in Numbers*, Pew Research Center, March 2, 2017, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2017/03/02/what-we-know-about-illegal-immigration-from-mexico/.

[3] In November 2016, smugglers were charging about US$3 500 per crossing. Starting in January 2017, the price rose to up to US$8 000. Aline Corpus, "Elevan polleros cuotas y abusos," *Reforma* (Mexico City), March 12, 2017, http://www.reforma.com/aplicacioneslibre/articulo/default.aspx?id=1055304&v=3&md5=5e615698e22ce9111a58f7e7a891a2f7&ta=0dfdbac11765226904c16cb9ad1b2efe&pc=102.

[4] Bill Theobald, "Trump's Budget Directs $2.6 Billion to Border Wall and That's Not All," *USA Today*, March 16, 2017, http://www.king5.com/ext/news/nation-now/on-immigration-trumps-budget-calls-for-far-more-than-a-wall/281/nationnow/trjuNh7CjmwSqI6qMA8sG.

[5] Madison Park, "By the Numbers: Why Immigration Cases Take So Long," CNN, April 12, 2017, www.cnn.com/2017/04/12/politics/immigration-case-backlog-by-the-numbers/.

[6] Morton Keller and Julian E. Zelizer, "How Much Space Does Trump Have for Bipartisanship?" *The Atlantic*, April 10, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/history-bipartisanship/522450/.

[7] Cindy Cárcamo, "Trump's Crackdown Focuses on People in the U.S. Illegally, But Not on the Businesses that Hire Them," *Los Angeles Times*, March 20, 2017, http:/www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-immigration-employers-20170320-story.html.

[8] Mahita Gajanan, "Homeland Security Chief Says He's Considering Separating Immigrant Children from Parents," *Time*, March 6, 2017, http://time.com/4692899/homeland-security-john-kelly-separate-children-parents-immigration/.

[9] Ernesto Rodríguez, "Migración centroamericana en tránsito irregular por México: nuevas cifras y tendencias," *Technical Report*, Research Gate, Canamid Policy Brief Series, PB14, CIESAS, December 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314279166_Migracion_centroamericana_en_transito_irregular_por_Mexico_Nuevas_cifras_y_tendencias.

Desperation, Ambitions, and Challenges
Mexico and Canada in the Trump Era

Oliver Santín Peña*

Trump's Victory among Mexico's Governing Class

On November 8, 2016, we witnessed in real time one of the most interesting events of recent history: the victory of Donald Trump. Around midnight, on all the world's news programs, the U.S. electoral map was turning a Republican red, sweeping aside the tremulous blue of the Democrats and their failed candidate.

The media immediately began to disseminate post-truth neologisms in a pitiful attempt to offer an explanation of the unexplainable: How was the traditional wisdom of the U.S. political class pushed aside by the unfettered emotions of the masses?[1] Those same masses who, it should be added, in frank rebellion, dealt a heavy blow to the paradigms of the U.S. political oligarchies and —why not add?— those of a large part of the world.

One of the issues that worked best for Donald Trump for questioning the establishment was free trade, and more specifically, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), when he called it the worst agreement his country ever signed.

That position immediately caused collateral damage among the Mexican governing elite, which, injected since the 1980s with the steroids of liberal rhetoric spouted by their young economists, graduates of U.S. and British universities, saw the very ideological pillars of the Mexican neoliberal model shaken.

The grave problem lay in the fact that this national technocracy had used NAFTA as the example of the good health of relations between Mexico and the United States, shoring up the idea that such complex levels of institutionality had been reached that their functioning was practically guaranteed by inertia. However, the fallacy faded away because the

Chris Wattie/Reuters

North American free trade model had been harshly questioned by the new occupant of the White House, leaving NAFTA in a moment of redefinition with a prognosis of a patient in unstable condition in the short and medium term.

This deceptive certainty that free trade in North America was irreversible made the Mexican technocracy smug, satisfied with the country's macro-economic benefits, most of them obtained thanks to NAFTA. And it was precisely this attitude that allowed them to scornfully maintain extremely low wages for Mexican workers, who were offered up from the very start as the cheap labor of the "North American integration" project. To this adverse scenario should be added the current complex technification of production processes, something not completely favorable for workers, not only in Mexico, but also in the United States and Canada.

This irresponsible scornfulness and indifference on the part of the national technocracy and an important segment of Mexico's political class —not to mention a business community enthralled with its profits— were the cause of the fact that by late 2016, Mexico had the lowest minimum wage in all of Latin America, surpassed only by Cuba and Venezuela, while the IMF rated our country as the world's fifteenth largest economy and projected that it would be among the top ten by 2020.[2] These figures should be unacceptable and shameful for any government and society.

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The certainty that free trade in North America was irreversible made the Mexican technocracy smug, satisfied with the country's macro-economic benefits, most of them obtained thanks to NAFTA.

For this reason, the alternative scenarios —along the lines of George Orwell's novel *1984*, in which his two protagonists' minds are broken and adapted to a stifling reality— seem to be the style adopted by the Trump administration to strike at Mexico and NAFTA: every time he needs to, he manipulates reality —or uses post-truth "facts"— to convince his unreflective supporters.

This strategy has put the Mexican government in a very bad position; completely devoid of any self-critical outlook, it stands naked before the public, since many of Trump's alternative scenarios ended up by creating disquiet and sparking questions among Mexico's population. This is particularly true with regard to how beneficial it had been for the country to bet national development on a single trade mechanism for more than two decades.

Therefore, its first response was to implement a dubious strategy of getting closer to Washington, with Minister of Foreign Relations Luis Videgaray as the main spokesperson.

The Effects for Difficult Mexico-Canada Relations and Immediate Challenges for the Canadian Government

Now, as all this was happening in Mexico, the Canadian government swiftly implemented a strategy of getting closer to Trump, based on the two countries' similar living standards, wages and their long history of bilateral accords of all kinds. In the context of these negotiations, it is easier to understand Prime Minister Justin Trudeau's comments that he was open and happy to renegotiate NAFTA as soon as the U.S. Americans wanted to.[3]

Considering this and the welcome Trump gave him in February 2017 during his visit to Washington, it is clear that the United States measures its two neighbors and partners differently. This is nothing to be surprised at: what is new is that it is only now that this double standard is made visible without friendly diplomatic gestures being brandished at the same time.

This entire scenario has created confusion, anxiety, and instability in the Mexican government. It sees that its Canadian counterpart is suspicious, but at the same time practically begs for a strategic alliance with it to deal with the United States in the NAFTA negotiations. As I pointed out above, regardless of speeches and meetings between Videgaray and his Canadian counterpart Cristina Freeland, the Mexican government is aware that Canada enjoys a different status with Washington and that it will not endanger itself to defend Mexico. In fact, the prime minister has yet to make a clear statement about the construction of the wall between Mexico and the United States.

The Mexican government's big problem is not that Canada has taken too long to express its empathy or solidarity with Mexico, a country that it perceives as corrupt, violent, and unstable; what is truly serious has been the Mexican government's manifest inability to offer a positive image of the country internationally. Since the National Action Party (PAN) administration of Felipe Calderón, its image has been terrible because of the unmitigated corruption galloping through all spheres of national life.

As a result, the Mexican authorities have not found a way to get Canada to publically take a frank position with Mexico and with regard to the future of NAFTA: it is not clear what position Canada will take in the negotiations. By contrast, Mexico could be expected to demand clarity from its Canadian counterparts. It can and must do this given the fact that the two countries enjoy very active trade that puts each one among the other's three main partners, following only the United States and China.[4]

Taking this into account, everything seems to indicate that trilateralism is about to sleep the sleep of the just with regard to different regional issues, at least for a while. This is because it seems that that is the scenario that is most convincing right now for the U.S. and Canadian governments; and this is without saying that it is something the Canadians have been pushing for with Washington for years. One example of that are the Wikileaks cables released in 2011, in which U.S. officials reported to their government their Canadian counterparts' anger and frustration at the Mexican authorities being incorporated into discussions on North American issues.[5]

Therefore, Mexico has to make an effort to manage its losses at the lowest possible cost. Canada, meanwhile, will attempt to insure that its pragmatism and the express sympathy of the Trump administration not expose the profound contradiction of welcoming controversial projects like the conclusion of the Keystone XL pipeline, which seriously

compromises the image around climate change and the environment that Canada harvested after the Paris accords.

The issue of building oil pipelines in Canada is enormously polemical among environmentalist groups, academics, native communities, and students. Despite that, survey results announced in early March 2017 show that almost 50 percent of Canadians are in favor of building them, while 33 percent are opposed; in the United States, 50 percent of those polled are opposed.[6] These numbers show that the traditional paradigm of the Canadian as a defender of the environment seems to be giving way to the pragmatist who puts more emphasis on his/her economic well-being. It might well be worthwhile to ask ourselves when this change took place in the collective imaginary of a large part of Canadian society. The answer seems to lie in the effects of nine years of government by former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper, a conservative evangelist who, supported by his country's energy industry, promised to change the face of Canada when he finished his administration. He seems to have kept his word.

To this must be added, of course, the current Liberal prime minister's greater flexibility on energy issues. Justin Trudeau has not only welcomed the completion of the Keystone XL pipeline that Trump requested through his January 2017 executive order, but openly declared himself a supporter of this and other pipelines in his country. In fact, in a late-2016 interview with the British daily *The Guardian*, he justified his support for new pipeline projects in Canada and even said he was aware that the issue stirred up passions in his country. However, he added that if people did not have the opportunity of having a decent job to feed their children, they would not be concerned about protecting the air they breathed or the water they drank.[7]

Having said all this, we must recognize that the current scenario is not simple for the Trudeau government either. He will owe a debt for the rest of his term on environmental issues due to the exploitation of tar sands in Alberta and its terrible consequences for the environment. Added to that is the construction of pipelines to the Pacific, the Northern Gateway, that will import natural gas from Asia and export oil from Alberta's tar sands. This project includes the construction of 1 177 kilometers of gas and oil pipelines.[8]

In terms of domestic politics, the Trudeau government will have to deal with the non-compliance with the reforms to the Canada's polemical first-past-the-post electoral system; he committed himself to the idea that the 2015 general elections would be the last to be held under this format, but he has reneged on this promise, arguing that there is no national consensus around it. However, the fact is that it will not happen because it would mean a profound democratization of Canada's political system, which has operated for 150 years in favor of a duopoly of Liberals and Conservatives. That is, changing it would open up the doors to the New Democratic Party or even the Green Party broadening out their weight in Parliament because the voting system would be more equitable. And that would mean that those two parties would have more political assets for negotiating their agendas with the Liberal and Conservative elites that control Canada's Parliament.

> Regardless of speeches and meetings between Videgaray and his Canadian counterpart Cristina Freeland, the Mexican government is aware that Canada will not endanger itself to defend Mexico.

Democratizing the Senate is undoubtedly yet another debt Trudeau will have to carry. These and other issues undoubtedly threaten the continuity of a majority Liberal government beyond the next general elections in 2019; and to that has to be added the Trump factor and his chameleon-like personality.

Challenges for Mexico *vis-à-vis* Trump's Administration

The following is a list of some of the tasks Mexico should undertake given the current situation:

1) Reconsider the Mexican government's traditional submissiveness with regard to the United States around different bilateral issues, and dare to negotiate intelligently with Washington in order to sensitize the U.S. Americans to the need to maintain good relations. In this sense, Mexico could take advantage of the political moment created by the proposal to legalize consumption and limited cultivation of marijuana in Canada. This could be a very good bargaining chip for the Mexican authorities in their discussion with their U.S. counterparts;
2) Make public the negotiations with the United States, as well as the steps taken, eliminating the discretional, hermetically-sealed style characteristic of Mexican Foreign Relations Minister Luis Videgaray;

3) Grow up and diversify our trade and cultural relations with the rest of the world, giving preference to the European Union, Great Britain, Asia (especially China), and, of course, the rest of Latin America;
4) Reestablish Mexico's strategic position in Central America, which has gradually been eroded;
5) Take actions to ensure jobs in the event of the forced return of deportees;
6) Stimulate the domestic market as the driving force of development;
7) Redirect productive investment to the countryside to recover food security; and,
8) Above all, take advantage of the overall moment today in which the hegemon is confused and its institutions are concentrated on containing an out-of-control executive branch.

And Mexican academia could

1) Reinforce now more than ever the study of English on all levels, but also foster the learning of other languages, such as Mandarin, German, or Korean, just to cite a few, at the level of higher and middle education in an organized, systematic way;
2) Reevaluate the way in which mathematics is taught, since it is a shame that thousands of students choose certain majors based on the fact that they do not include math courses;
3) Energize both public and private universities and institutions of higher learning, considering them the natural seedbeds of development and innovation;
4) Take advantage of the potential of being the country with the largest number of Spanish speakers to increase the voice and presence of Mexico in international forums; and,
5) Strengthen the use of Spanish in academia, putting to one side the trend established by those in power of giving priority to products written in English in order to achieve more economic benefits, both for institutions and for individuals.

By Way of Conclusion

In the end, beyond the tragedy that the renegotiation of NAFTA has represented for Mexico's governing class, we should reconsider the current moment as an unbeatable opportunity for the country to reinvent itself and take on new, more pro-active positions.

The government must assume its historic role, reposition itself, and design more equitable development programs that are less exclusionary for the most vulnerable sector of society. This is the only way it can put the brakes on its other great nightmare: what those in Mexico's circles of power point to with a flaming finger as "populism," considered a great threat to the country.

While recent governments and their hordes of technocrats have never stopped alerting the population to the risk of populism, neither have they dared to offer concrete proposals or even thought about the living conditions of the most vulnerable sectors of society. Those are the people that the class in power in Mexico have abused and cynically cheated for decades. VM

Notes

[1] The *Oxford Dictionary* online defines "post-truth" as "Relating to or denoting circumstances in which objective facts are less influential in shaping public opinion than appeals to emotion and personal belief: 'in this era of post-truth politics, it's easy to cherry-pick data and come to whatever conclusion you desire. . . . Some commentators have observed that we are living in a post-truth age,'" https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/post-truth, accessed April 28, 2017. [Editor's Note.]

[2] For more information, see International Monetary Fund, "Mexico and the IMF," https://www.imf.org/external/country/MEX/index.htm, accessed in March 2017.

[3] Jesse Winter, "Trudeau 'Happy to Talk' about NAFTA with Trump," thestar.com, https://www.thestar.com/news/canada/2016/11/10/trudeau-happy-to-talk-about-nafta-with-trump.html.

[4] Carlos A. Heredia, "La relación Canadá-México en una configuración latinoamericana y transpacífica," in Alex Bugailiskis and Andrés Rosental, eds., *México y Canadá, la agenda pendiente* (Mexico City: Comexi/CISAN, 2012), p. 220.

[5] Steven Chase, "Sorry, Amigo: WikiLeaks Shows Canada Prefers Meeting U.S. without Mexico," *The Globe and Mail*, March 2, 2011, http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/politics/sorry-amigo-wikileaks-shows-canada-prefers-meeting-us-without-mexico/article569094/.

[6] Nicole Gibillini, BNN News, "Half of Canadians in Favour of Keystone XL Revival while U.S. Support Declines: Poll," http://www.bnn.ca/half-of-canadians-in-favour-of-keystone-xl-revival-while-u-s-support-declines-poll-1.691251.

[7] Ashifa Kassam and Laurence Mathieu-Léger, "Justin Trudeau: Globalisation Isn't Working for Ordinary People," *The Guardian*, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/dec/15/justin-trudeau-interview-globalisation-climate-change-trump.

[8] For more about the Northern Gateway project, see http://www.gatewayfacts.ca/, accessed in March 2017.

Donald Trump, NAFTA, and Mexico

Pablo Ruiz Nápoles*

Carlos Jasso/Reuters

Trump's Anti-Mexico Discourse

In his campaign for the U.S. presidency, Donald Trump aggressively denigrated Mexico. First, he declared that many Mexican immigrants were criminals, and they must be deported. To support this effort, he also proposed Mexico would pay for a wall built to keep its people from pouring over the border to take U.S. jobs. Second, he called for a renegotiated North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to benefit the U.S. more.

Some analysts shrugged off these statements suggesting they were simply typical campaign rhetoric in present-day U.S. America. They said they were exaggerated, "populist" statements aimed at securing votes of people who had lost manufacturing jobs over the past couple of decades. Donald Trump was appealing to some of the basest feelings of middle America. He was speaking to those who felt betrayed not only by the political establishment in its dealings with Mexico, but also by its lack of restraint in handing out money to undeserving people, among them illegal immigrants from Mexico. They also believed they were under attack by a seemingly unstoppable flow of job-grabbing illegal immigrants and mind-numbing drugs that were streaming across their nation's southern border.

Many analysts believed that Trump would tone down his rhetoric if elected president. Congressional support for two key initiatives (immigration and protectionist trade reform) would eventually be required. They believed that the Republican Congress that would emerge from the election would instead support free trade and the low-cost labor that accompanies immigration, especially that of illegal aliens.

But the pundits seem to be wrong. Donald Trump's tone and aims have not changed much. In his much-lauded State-of-the-Union Address, with its considerably moderated tone, his core ambitions for Mexico and Mexicans persisted. Meanwhile, Congressional leadership has at least put up the front that the Republican Party is unified, and, thus, supports the president's views. But after swiftly approving his rather radical cabinet, it is not acting quite as quickly to pass some of the president's campaign ideas that require legislative reform, such as a replacement for Obamacare. Certainly, lobbyists are pressing Congress to support each initiative that emanates from the Oval Office. Still, U.S. corporations, which are enjoying the present terms of NAFTA, are similarly sending out lobbyists to prevent any proposed changes from being passed untouched by the U.S. Congress. So, while it is clear that we cannot currently know the precise outcome of this process, we *can* be sure that any proposed changes to NAFTA will on balance favor the U.S. at the expense of Mexico. There will be no win-win outcome as neoliberal policy-makers have tried to make us believe on both sides of the border.

Now, while U.S. firms, especially those big corporations that could be affected by Trump's new rules, like the automotive industry, have strong lobbyists in Washington, D.C.,

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NAFTA has not benefited Mexico very much. Perhaps the strongest piece of evidence is that migration to the U.S. has not stopped.

Mexican immigrant workers do not, and that makes a big difference.

So far, NAFTA has not been beneficial to Mexico and unfair to the U.S., as President Trump argues. I will briefly show heres that NAFTA's outcomes have been quite the opposite. I recognize, despite the logic I shall present, that many U.S. citizens, will still *feel* the prejudices against Mexicans that Trump exudes. This kind of "post-truth" is tough to counter. We can only hope that hard data will counter the "alternative facts" they already believe.

NAFTA and Migration As Seen from Mexico[1]

Unemployment and Migration in Mexico

Every year in Mexico nearly a million new people go out looking for jobs. Job creation within our nation and migration to the U.S. combined have not kept pace. The result is an *informal sector* that represents about 60 percent of Mexico's labor force and that produces about 25 percent of nation's GDP. Still, widespread unemployment and poverty remain evident.[2] NAFTA is not to blame for this, but rather the lack of jobs paying a living wage.

Unemployment has been an acute problem in the Mexican economy for a long time. As a result, migration to the U.S. is a long-standing tradition; and NAFTA has not stemmed the tide. In fact, some analysts found it surprising, as exports boomed and GDP grew in the immediate wake of NAFTA, that migratory flows to the U.S. also increased precipitously. A most startling piece of information on this post-NAFTA migration stream was the sizeable share of migrants who were skilled and fairly well educated.[3]

According to Mexican official (Conapo) and unofficial (El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, or Colef) sources, there also has been a northward migratory march within Mexico; in 2007 the count was approaching 2 million people. Unofficially, close to 50 percent crossed over to the U.S. that year. The rest remained in Mexico near the border. By 2014, the tide of northbound migrants ebbed to something closer to 700 000 annually, about a quarter of whom made the border crossing. Anti-immigration policies applied by the U.S. are credited with reducing the cross-border migration flows.[4]

Why NAFTA?

So why did Mexico opt to participate in NAFTA? After all, its economy was buoyant thanks to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (today's World Trade Organization) and the most-favored-nation trade status granted by the United States.

The Mexican economy's performance from 1982 to 1993 proved that the new strategy for growth based on exports, by means of opening the economy, depreciating the currency, and reducing the role of the state to a minimum,[5] was failing in terms of economic growth, job creation —to prevent migration to the U.S.—, and the trade balance. It seemed that the strategy needed some adjustment. This came as a complete reform of Mexico's law on foreign investment.

So, the president of Mexico negotiated with the U.S. to sign NAFTA. He promised change, particularly for laws that allowed U.S. companies to import inputs from anywhere in the world and to produce exports. Preferential trade through NAFTA was clearly better for Mexico than simple free trade. To the Mexicans, he promised, "We are going to export goods not labor."

Besides, since Mexico had successfully grown economically and to some degree industrialized the economy in a period of about 40 years before 1981 under what was called a "state-led growth strategy," the risk that any new president would be tempted to return to this strategy was high, so NAFTA was interpreted as a political lock for all the neoliberal reforms.

Results of NAFTA for Mexico

Table 1 shows the annual average growth rates of three key economic indicators for Mexico across three periods covering 45 years: gross domestic product (GDP), exports, and employment. During the first period under the state-led growth strategy (1970-1981), according to these indicators, Mexico's economy flourished. Under the practice of neoliberal reform, the other two periods, it has performed less well. The NAFTA period (1994-2015) has been better for Mexico than the years when neoliberal reforms first got underway (1982-1993).[6] Regardless of this, performance of these indicators remains below that achieved under the state-led growth strategy.

NAFTA produced a big change in trade as illustrated in Figure 1. Mexico's trade balance within NAFTA, mainly with

Table 1: GDP, Exports, and Employment Average Annual Growth Rates			
	1970-1981	1982-1993	1994-2015
GDP (constant pesos)	6.9	1.7	2.6
Population	3.2	2.1	1.4
Real per capita GDP	3.6	-0.4	1.2
Exports (constant pesos)	11.9	6.1	8.4
Employment	4.8	2.0	1.4

Source: Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/bie/.

the U.S., has been positive since the start, reaching about US$122 billion in 2015. But the trade balance with the rest of the world (ROW) has moved in the opposite direction, with a net deficit of US$147 billion in 2015. Mexico's net overall trade balance in 2015 was a deficit of US$25 billion. It is important to note that this deficit is close to what existed prior to NAFTA. While most of Mexico's trade surplus is with the U.S., most of its deficit is with Asian countries, mainly China. In any case, exports represent more than 30 percent of Mexico's aggregate demand, and imports also represent more than 30 percent of its aggregate supply.

We can safely say that NAFTA had been favorable to Mexican exporters. Many of these are foreign multinational corporations, mostly U.S. firms. But foreign firms that export to Mexico also have benefited since NAFTA's inception. And, while most of these firms are exporting from Asia, they, too, are multinationals based in the U.S. So, U.S. capitalists clearly benefited from NAFTA. The so-called "rules of origin" of NAFTA never applied.

Labor in Mexico under NAFTA

In another article, I showed that, in fact, right after NAFTA's implementation in 1994, the share of the labor force linked to exports (including maquiladoras) was about 15 percent of all people employed in Mexico.[7] Unfortunately, the absolute level of total labor did not change much. This means, as I showed in yet another article,[8] that as new exporting plants and firms hired workers, other firms that were producing for both local markets and exporters shed workers as their production was displaced by imports. So, the net gain in jobs was, in fact, nil.

In particular, just prior to NAFTA (1988-1993), the so-called *displacement coefficient* (imports divided by total supply) was close to 50 percent in industries producing vehicle engines and parts and transport equipment. This suggests

U.S. corporations, which are enjoying the present terms of NAFTA, are sending out lobbyists to prevent any proposed changes from being passed by the U.S. Congress.

that half the supply in these industries was imported, products that might have been produced locally.

NAFTA for the U.S.

Okay then, but why did the U.S. let Mexico join NAFTA? Practically speaking, we must understand that at that time, the U.S. perceived North America as just two countries: the U.S. and Canada. Mexico not only was no exporting powerhouse but, at that juncture, had lost all power at the trade negotiations table, having joined GATT; that is, it was already open to free foreign trade.

To answer this question, recall that prior to NAFTA negotiations, Mexico heavily restricted foreign investment. Indeed, in some economic sectors and geographic areas, foreign investment was forbidden altogether. These were called "strategic sectors" and "strategic areas." Outside these strategic sectors and areas, foreign investment could make up to 49 percent of firm ownership. So, foreign investors needed a Mexican partner who could own a majority of shares. Prior to NAFTA, the entry of U.S. capital was limited to so-called "runaway plants," "offshore plants," or "maquiladoras" that could produce with 100 percent foreign capital, but using only Mexican labor. They could import all inputs from abroad and sell the result abroad, but they could not sell in local Mexican markets. So, unfettered investment was a very important motive for U.S. interests to get Mexico to the NAFTA negotiating table; the other was the low cost of labor (even skilled labor) to the south. For U.S. firms, Mexico's labor legislation and labor unions were comparatively weak. The general availability of semi-skilled labor, lower tax rates, a cheaper water supply, and other available public infrastructure also made Mexico worth courting from the perspective of U.S. firms.

On the other hand, the large migratory flows from Mexico were unacceptable to the U.S. government and exorbitantly expensive for both governments to stop along their nearly 3 200-km border. (Indeed, even today they have only the ability to stop illegal entries along 200 km.) Despite some discussion, it was clear for political reasons that NAFTA could

FIGURE 1: BALANCE OF TRADE (1994-2015)
(billions of US dollars)



Source: Developed by the author with data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), http://www.inegi.org.mx/sistemas/bie/.

We *can* be sure that any proposed changes to NAFTA will on balance favor the U.S. at the expense of Mexico. There will be no win-win outcome.

not include rules to regulate migration. Negotiating officials from both the U.S. and Mexico hoped that the rush of private U.S. investment flowing into Mexico would create enough jobs south of the border to slow migration flows to a trickle.

NAFTA Results for the U.S.

From its inception, U.S. labor unions felt NAFTA gave Mexico an "unfair" competitive edge on two counts. One pertains to environmental protection rules; the other involves labor rights.[9] Initially, the three NAFTA countries agreed to establish strict common rules for all parties involved and enforce their application. But by 2008, it was clear that exporting firms established in Mexico enjoyed more relaxed labor and environment rules. The result was that NAFTA at least gave the appearance of hurting U.S. workers. Evidence was clearest when U.S. firms opened plants in Mexico before —or not long after— closing them in the U.S. They did so to exploit both low Mexican wages as well as free trade agreements enjoyed by Mexico that enabled lower-cost imported inputs from abroad. Plus, production technology was also less expensive since, environmentally speaking, Mexico was a relative pollution haven. The confluence of these conditions made for higher profits on each unit produced. These profits have been returning to the parent corporation in the U.S. or shown as reinvested in Mexican plants. But even then, it increased the value of capital for the investing multinationals. In any case, the true winners in this game are capitalists, both executives who suggested relocation and stockholders in the multinational corporations that own the plants relocated in Mexico.

So far, we have almost exclusively discussed semi-skilled labor and manufactures. We have not mentioned agriculture, for which U.S. negotiators crafted some protections within NAFTA for U.S. farmers —though none for Mexican peasants. The reasons for this have been thoroughly analyzed by Timothy Wise.[10]

Despite President Trump's clamoring, is trade with Mexico actually threatening or damaging the U.S. economy? Table 2 shows that in 2016, China produced 61 percent of the

TABLE 2: U.S. TRADE IN GOODS AND SERVICES BY SELECTED COUNTRIES (billions of US dollars)

	Exports		Imports		Balance	
	2015	**2016**	**2015**	**2016**	**2015**	**2016**
China	165.145	169.818	499.226	479.574	-334.081	-309.756
Mexico	267.337	262.125	325.276	323.850	-57.939	-61.725
Canada	337.765	321.588	331.647	313.495	6.118	8.093
Japan	108.315	108.608	163.701	164.951	-55.386	-56.343
Germany	79.821	80.389	157.102	148.146	-77.281	-67.757
United Kingdom	123.462	121.188	111.454	106.571	12.008	14.618
Subtotal	11 081.845	1 063.716	1 588.406	1 536.587	-506.561	-472.870
Total	2 261.163	2 212.079	2 761.525	2 712.639	-500.361	-500.560

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, https://www.bea.gov/newsreleases/international/trade/tradinfo.htm.

total trade deficit of goods and services in the U.S., and Germany is second at 13 percent. Mexico and Japan fill out the top four, each comprising about 12 percent of the U.S. trade deficit (a deficit for the U.S. is a surplus for these countries). So, it seems the U.S. has greater balance of trade concerns than those with Mexico. Mexico also spends most of its surplus by buying goods from Asian countries like China.

CONCLUSIONS

I believe I have shown that NAFTA has not benefited Mexico very much. Perhaps the strongest piece of evidence is that migration to the U.S. has not stopped. While Mexico's exports to the U.S. have grown, imports from the other side of the Pacific Rim have grown equivalently. Moreover, exports have not spurred robust economic growth in Mexico, and for certain, job growth has been less than sanguine. In fact, free trade and NAFTA have hurt domestic capitalists in manufacturing and domestic farmers and peasents in agriculture. In this way, they may have aggravated and not solved our nation's unemployment and poverty problems.

The fact that Mexico is seen as the backyard of the U.S. and that its government behaves that way makes it vulnerable to verbal, political, and commercial attacks, without a proper response. But the real competition for the U.S. is not Mexico, but China and, in second place, Germany. We shall see what they have to say in the coming meetings between their leaders. VM

NOTES

[1] This section and parts of the rest of the article were taken from Pablo Ruiz Nápoles, "Neoliberal Reforms and NAFTA in Mexico," forthcoming in *Economía UNAM* no. 41, May-Aug 2017.

[2] Mexico's National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (Coneval) estimated the population living in poverty in Mexico at 46 percent of the total, that is, 52 million people. Consejo Nacional para la Evaluación de la Política de Desarrollo Social, http://www.coneval.org.mx/InformesPublicaciones/Paginas/Publicaciones-sobre-Medicion-de-la-pobreza.aspx.

[3] Wayne Cornelius, "Impacts of NAFTA on Mexico-to-US Migration," in E. J. Chambers, and P. Smith, eds., *NAFTA in the New Millennium* (La Jolla, California: The University of Alberta Press/Center for US-Mexican Studies, 2002), pp. 287-304.

[4] J. J. Li and J. L. Ordaz, "Evolución de la migración México-Estados Unidos. El TLC a 20 años. Una amplia reflexión," BBVA Research (Mexico City: Facultad de Economía, UNAM, 2014),

[5] Jeffrey D. Sachs, "Trade and Exchange Rate Policies in Growth-Oriented Adjustment Programs," Working Paper No. 2226, NBER Working Paper Series (Cambridge, Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research, April 1987).

[6] The NAFTA period also includes subsequent free trade agreements with Central America, the European Union, EFTA (Iceland, Lichtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland), Japan, Israel, Colombia, Peru, Chile, and Uruguay.

[7] Pablo Ruiz-Nápoles, "Exports, growth, and employment in Mexico, 1978-2000," *Journal of Post Keynesian Economics* vol. 27, no. 1 (Fall 2004), pp. 105-120.

[8] Pablo Ruiz-Nápoles, "Liberalisation, Exports and Growth in Mexico 1978-1994: A Structural Analysis," *International Review of Applied Economics* vol. 15, no. 2 (2001), pp.163-180.

[9] David A. Gantz, "Labor Rights and Environmental Protection under NAFTA and Other U.S. Free Trade Agreements," *The University of Miami Inter-American Law Review* vol. 42, no. 2 (Winter/Spring 2011), pp. 297-366.

[10] Timothy A. Wise, "Agricultural Dumping under NAFTA: Estimating the Costs of U.S. Agricultural Policies to Mexican Producers," Report 7, *Mexican Rural Development Research Reports*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010.

Financial Deregulation And the Dodd-Frank Act

Claudia Maya*

Reuters

Donald Trump's campaign promises to cut taxes, increase spending on infrastructure, and undertake financial deregulation are happening and have contributed to a partial hike in U.S. consumer confidence levels and the markets. Specifically, the prospect of financial deregulation helps explain why, since the election, the New York Stock Exchange has risen more than 10 percent and made huge profits for financial firms, reaching historic highs, such as in the case of the Dow Jones Industrial Average, which topped 21 000 points in March of this year. However, the effects will be felt again in the not-too-distant future and, as Cornell University legal expert Saule Omarova says, "Financial reform is like a big onion. The more layers you peel off, the harder you cry."[1]

Last March, Trump signed an executive order telling the Treasury Department to review and assess current financial regulations, including the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act signed into law by Barack Obama after the 2007-2008 financial crisis. The idea is to investigate whether these rules are reasonable and operational for participants in financial markets. The critics of Dodd-Frank see this as a good thing. They consider it an obstacle that limits and smothers the U.S. economy, particularly their profits. However, we should remember that the law was created due to the speculative excesses by large financial corporations that had been operating almost completely unrestrictedly in the markets. Its aim was to reduce risky practices and increase capital requirements for banks and the liquidity cushions they had to maintain for greater security. This law attempted to regulate and sometimes limit operations with derivatives, monitoring the dangerous intertwining of financial institutions, in addition to scrutinizing and regulating the largest, most complex institutions. In general, Dodd-Frank attempted to reduce the interdependence of U.S. financial institu-

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The regulating-deregulating process is basically a political power game of interests. We must not forget that some of these episodes led to grave financial crises in which society as a whole was seriously affected.

tions, limiting banks' exposure and credit risk through their subsidiaries.

The regulating-deregulating process is basically a political power game of interests. I should mention that the attempts to deregulate are by no means new in the history of U.S. financial services. We must not forget that some of these episodes led to grave financial crises in which society as a whole was seriously affected and the government had to implement huge bailouts of the big banks through the Federal Reserve (the Fed) on the taxpayers' dime at a high social and political cost.

Review of the Deregulation Process

This is why it is pertinent to briefly review that process in the United States, to understand its motivations, nature, and the interactions of the increasingly deregulated, integrated financial markets and the commercial banking system.

After the 1929 crisis, the main concern of U.S. financial system regulators focused on maintaining the health of financial institutions and the stability of the financial system as a whole. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 prohibited commercial banks from underwriting securities and other investment activities and/or to merge or affiliate with brokers-dealers; it clearly separated commercial banks (that offered credit) and investment banks (that dealt in financial markets). However, over the years, the competition among the different institutions and sectors began to change these two political objectives, since tensions managed to gradually erase the distinction between institutions and products.

Starting in the 1970s, the emergence of huge financial corporations accelerated as their participation in the domestic financial market increased as did their operations overseas. The process of concentration of these large organizations began to intensify in the mid-1980s with the threat of the failure of a banking giant, the Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company. This brought into question the way in which the regulatory institutions had been operating, in particular the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). The center of the controversy was whether or not to rescue the non-banking financial assets that form a large part of commercial banks' balance.

Deregulation, globalization, and the concentration and consolidation of financial services were the result of the development of financial innovation, more flexible legislation in this area, and sharpened competition between commercial banks and other institutions in the sector. We should remember that banking regulation has always been a power play among banking regulators. This is how the sector moved toward financial conglomerates and the creation of banks that were "too big to fail."[2] It also transited toward the consolidation of a large financial services industry with close links among the different companies and commercial banks moving outside their traditional business areas without regulations acting as an obstacle.

Gradually, bank holding companies (large financial corporations) were allowed to issue securities, including bonds. But it was beginning in the mid-1980s that the Federal Reserve and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency began to relax restrictions to allow full participation of commercial banks in investment and insurance activities. This led to the consolidation of this financial system and the creation of the "too-big-to-fail" banking giants. The problem this posed was the potential failure of these financial conglomerates, consolidating in the mid-1980s with a wave of mergers and acquisitions with the help of the FDIC.

This financial concentration brought into question the effectiveness of this institution's regulatory activity and alerted to the potential financial disaster if any of these huge conglomerates failed. Jane D'Arista mentions that in those years less than 1 percent of all banks and insurance companies held 50 percent of all financial sector assets.[3] This tendency to concentrate did not stop; quite to the contrary, in later decades, the number of mergers actually rose, particularly because banking failure regulatory practices, "supervisory mergers," forced institutions in trouble to merge with other larger institutions.

During the 1980s, financial markets became a source of liquidity and profits through new financial instruments. Investment banks' strategies fostered the growth and domination of these markets, thus contributing to changes in the financial structures of the U.S. economy, which went from handling credit to the use of financial markets.

The consolidation of financial services took place as a function of a change in regulations that facilitated a way of

increasing profits and dealing with competition. Many of the changes in this system in the U.S. were led by the development of financial markets and, to a lesser extent, due to changes in economic policy. These developments included technological progress, innovations, and improvements in financial conditions, excess capacity in some markets, and the consolidation of markets through deregulation and institutional change. The lifting of restrictions on banking and financial competition was a powerful force behind the consolidation of services, and also transformed the way the markets and institutions operated to seek higher profits.

The dividing line between commercial banks, investment banks, and insurance companies began to disappear long before Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999.[4] The integration of commercial banking with investment banking created a very significant market force; nevertheless, consolidation and integration also increased systemic risk[5] and expanded safety nets significantly at a high cost to taxpayers.[6]

The Glass-Steagall Act maintained the separation of commercial and investment banks. In 1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed it to allow the merger of financial institutions of different kinds, under pressure from politicians, regulators, and bankers who were all fighting for their own interests. Companies like Merrill Lynch pressured for the New York Stock Exchange to relax its rules and allow its members to go public to raise new capital. The 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act came into being after a decade of undermining local control and formally allowed banks to open branches in more than one state. The gradual elimination of Glass-Steagall regulations and the establishment of quite permissive regulations gave rise to the proliferation of what have been termed "esoteric" activities, that is, hidden, or at the very least non-transparent and presumably illicit financial activities.

Although some believe that self-regulated, competitive markets inhibit risk, we can observe the precise opposite: financial asset markets have shown a growing tendency to create perverse incentives to assume huge risks and achieve high yields. One example of this is the inordinate growth of derivatives, which are part of the aforementioned financial innovation: complex instruments that circulate almost exclusively in a closed circuit of large conglomerates and are handled mainly by investment banks, hedge funds, and multinational corporations very closely tied to each other through their balance sheets.

I will look more closely at the case of Lehman Brothers. Despite being one of the world's largest investment banks, in September 2008, it failed, considered the biggest failure in history, when it declared US$613 billion in liabilities and about US$700 billion in assets. This scandal is comparable to the Enron crisis and reached to the highest levels of the White House. Lehman Brothers was hard hit by the sub-prime mortgage crisis. Its huge exposure brought it gigantic losses that it tried to hide through an accounting mechanism that involved listing toxic assets (which cannot be sold after exposing their holders to massive losses) as normal assets to ensure their accounts did not reflect US$50 billion in "bad assets" or "junk bonds." Its failure set off the biggest financial crisis since the 1930s.

The integration of commercial banking with investment banking created a very significant market force; nevertheless, consolidation and integration also increased systemic risk.

Conclusions

The big banks, investment funds, institutional investors, and, in particular, investment banks have been fundamental agents in the transformation and development of capitalism led by finance and based in deregulation. These organizations operate according to a logic of growing profitability and constantly evolving financial innovations, like derivatives, which require deregulation and scanty supervision.

Furthermore, financial speculation is linked to the growth of global financial conglomerates and shadow banking associated with the credit rating agencies. Traditionally, commercial banks had been the main providers of liquidity, but over the last three decades, deregulation has meant that institutions based in financial markets have participated in this big business.

Shadow banks have the ability to create liquidity similar to the way commercial banks do, although without being regulated. Shadow banks include a wide variety of leveraged financial intermediaries that participate in the process of creating liquidity through their access to financial markets and the instruments they handle, particularly unregulated derivatives. This makes them particularly and exponentially dangerous.

The establishment of quite permissive regulations
gave rise to the proliferation of what have been termed "esoteric" activities,
that is, hidden, or at the very least non-transparent
and presumably illicit financial activities.

Regulations like Dodd-Frank get in the way of these actions and operations. That is why some people are interested in revoking it. Nevertheless, financial innovation implies an unfettered rise in liquidity through banks' increased capacity to create money in their quest for profitability with no thought to the risks. This is the main reason banking and financial activities must be regulated.

Finally, Trump's mandate to revoke Dodd-Frank will certainly speed up another crisis of even more devastating scope and consequences than the last one. In fact, problems are already reemerging in the banks that are highly exposed in derivatives, and that is what caused the 2007-2008 financial crisis. VM

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Notes

[1] Saule Omarova, "The Quiet Metamorphosis: How Derivatives Changed the Business of Banking," *University of Miami Law Review* vol. 63, 2009, pp. 1041-1110.

[2] These are large banks considered important for the entire financial system due to the risk that their failure could represent. This was the case of the financial collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 16, 2008.

[3] Jane D'Arista, "Financial Concentration," Wall Street Watch, working paper no. 3, August 2009, http://www.wallstreetwatch.org/working_papers/Financial_Concentration.pdf.

[4] The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLB), also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of 1999, repealed the Glass Steagall Act.

[5] The effects of systemic risk can impact risk for individual systems, particularly those of large institutions with credit or liquidity difficulties, and transmit it to the rest of the system. If an individual institution's risk is high, it increases the possibility of its failing or not complying with its payment obligations, exposing other institutions to the risk, runs on banks, or problems in the stock market.

[6] Competition among banks and other financial institutions was limited by certain restrictions on the kind of financial services that each bank could offer, such as insuring deposits. In addition to insuring deposits, the FDIC federal safety net includes federal intervention to head off crises or the failure of the banking system.

Monitoring Maternal Health Among U.S. Hispanics On the U.S.-Mexico Border

Jill A. McDonald*

Introduction

Maternal health is one of the best indicators of the overall health of a country. Maternal health is measured by rates of maternal morbidity and mortality, but also by the occurrence of certain birth outcomes, such as adolescent birth and preterm birth. These outcomes are also, of course, detrimental to infants' health. Having healthy mothers giving birth to healthy babies is a strong foundation for the overall health of a population.

Maternal health among U.S. Hispanics is therefore an indicator of the overall health of the U.S. Hispanic population. Hispanic women accounted for over 900 000 births in 2013, 23 percent of all U.S. births.[1] Unfortunately, many signs indicate that maternal health is generally poorer for U.S. Hispanics than for other groups. For example, birth rates for Hispanic teenaged women 15-19 years of age are higher than rates for whites or blacks and more than double the rates for non-Hispanic white teens of the same age (41.7 births per 1 000 as compared to 18.6 births per 1 000 in 2013, respectively). In addition, among Hispanic youth under age 15, who are at the highest risk for poor pregnancy outcomes, the birth rate disparity is even greater (0.5 per 1 000 as compared to 0.1 per 1 000 among non-Hispanic whites).

Low birth weight (babies less than 2 500 grams at birth, about five and one half pounds) and preterm birth (less than 37 weeks gestation) are other examples of the maternal health disparity among Hispanics. Both low birth weight and preterm birth are associated with increased risk of acute health conditions, lifelong disabilities, and chronic diseases in mothers and infants.[2] In contrast to the overall decline in low birth weight in the U.S. since 2006, the low birth weight rate in the Hispanic population, historically lower than that of the U.S. population overall, has increased and is now at 7.1 percent of births as compared to 7.0 percent for non-Hispanic white births.[3] Preterm birth is also now more common in births to Hispanic women (11.3 percent) than in births to non-Hispanic white women (10.2 percent).[4]

Since 1990, Caesarean birth, which leads to adverse maternal and infant health outcomes when performed electively and repeatedly,[5] has surged above the 10-percent to 15-percent level that the World Health Organization recommends as optimal[6] in U.S. Hispanics and non-Hispanic whites.[7] Further, the proportion of live infants delivered via Caesarean section in U.S. Hispanic women (32.2 percent) surpassed that in non-Hispanic white women (32.0 percent) for the first time in 2013.

It is important to note that maternal mortality (death during pregnancy, childbirth, or within a defined interval after birth) is an exception to the general pattern of reproductive health problems among U.S. Hispanics. Despite the fact that maternal mortality is associated with poverty and reduced access to health services internationally and that U.S. Hispanic women as a group have less access to economic and health care resources than other U.S. women, Hispanics have a lower maternal mortality ratio (deaths per 1 000 live births) than other U.S. women. This is part of what is referred to more broadly as the Hispanic Mortality Paradox.[8] The apparent mortality advantage among U.S. Hispanics is well-studied, but the reasons for the paradox remain unclear and are beyond the scope of this article.

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U.S.-Mexico Border Hispanics

It is revealing to look for differences within the U.S. Hispanic population based on place of maternal residence. About 50 percent of U.S. Hispanics reside in the four border states. There, roughly one in six (18 percent) of all Hispanics, reside in the "border region." The U.S. section of the border region is defined as the narrow strip of land within 100 kilometers (62 miles) of Mexico that extends from the Pacific Coast in California to the Gulf of Mexico in Texas. The vast majority of Hispanics in the border region are of Mexican origin.[9]

Comparing rates for border Hispanics to those for other U.S. Hispanics shows that Hispanic mothers and infants living along the U.S.-Mexico border fare more poorly. Adolescent births are a case in point. About 60 percent of all U.S. Hispanic adolescent births occur in one of the four border states and one in six of those occur in a border county.[10] U.S. birth certificate data show that adolescent birth rates among Hispanics in Texas, New Mexico, Arizona, and California were higher in each state's border counties than non-border counties in 2009, the most recent year for which border data have been compiled. For most of the first decade of this century, birth rates among all U.S. Hispanics fell sharply (see Figure 1). But they fell just 19 percent in the border counties, as opposed to 28 percent in the non-border counties of border states.

Research indicates that sexual and contraceptive behavior, education, access to services and other economic factors all play a role in explaining higher fertility in U.S. Hispanic compared to non-Hispanic white adolescents.[11] Uneven distribution of these factors within the U.S. Hispanic population may contribute to higher birth rates among adolescents living in border counties, where educational attainment and income levels are generally lower than in non-border counties.

Interestingly, geographic birth rate disparities among Mexican adolescents living in border *municipios* based on Mexican birth certificate data are similar to those on the U.S. side of the border (see Figure 2), with the highest rates in border municipalities.

Birth certificate data also reveal problems with low birth weight, preterm birth, and Caesarean birth outcomes in the U.S.-Mexico border region (see Figure 3).[12] In U.S. border counties, 7.4 percent of Hispanic births were low birth weight in 2009, compared with 6.7 percent of non-border and 6.9 percent (not shown) of all U.S. Hispanic births. Because most low birth weight babies are born prematurely, the proportions of preterm births among Hispanic women in these geographic areas ranked the same way, with 12.8 percent of border, 11.4 percent of non-border, and 12.0 percent (not shown) of all US Hispanic births being preterm. Among Hispanic women who gave birth in the U.S. border counties, 37.9 percent had a Caesarean section, compared with 30.9 percent for non-border Hispanics and 31.6 percent (not shown) for all U.S. Hispanics.

In contrast to the higher rates for low birth weight, preterm birth and Caesarean delivery seen among Hispanics in U.S. border counties compared to other geographic areas, Mexican women living in border municipalities had lower rates for these outcomes in 2009 compared to other Mexican women in the six Mexican border states (see Figure 4). Higher rates of low birth weight and preterm birth among U.S. Hispanic women in border counties and Mexican women in non-border municipalities may in part result from the higher prevalence of elective Caesarean delivery in these areas.

To prevent adverse birth outcomes like low birth weight and preterm birth, it is important that women receive early and adequate prenatal care.[13] Prenatal care guidelines in the U.S. and Mexico both strongly support prenatal care,[14] but the guidelines appear to have less impact in the border counties and Mexican municipalities. The proportion of U.S.

Figure 1
Birth Rates among U.S. Hispanic Adolescents along the Border (2000-2009)



Note: The figure refers to the number of births among adolescents ages 15-19 overall, along the border, and in non-border counties of U.S. border states.

Source: Jill A. McDonald, Octavio Mojarro, Paul D. Sutton, and Stephanie J. Ventura, "Adolescent Births in the Border Region: A Descriptive Analysis Based on US Hispanic and Mexican Birth Certificates," *Maternal and Child Health Journal* vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2015), p. 128-135.

FIGURE 2
BIRTH RATES AMONG MEXICAN ADOLESCENTS ALONG THE BORDER (2000-2009)



Note: The figure refers to the number of births among adolescents ages 15-19, overall, along the border, and in non-border municipalities of Mexican border states.

Source: Jill A. McDonald, Octavio Mojarro, Paul D. Sutton, and Stephanie J. Ventura, "Adolescent Births in the Border Region: A Descriptive Analysis Based on US Hispanic and Mexican Birth Certificates," *Maternal and Child Health Journal* vol. 19, no. 1 (January 2015), p. 128-135.

FIGURE 3
LOW BIRTH WEIGHT, PRETERM, AND CESAREAN BIRTHS TO U.S. HISPANIC WOMEN (2009)



Note: The figure refers to women in U.S.-Mexico border counties and non-border counties in U.S. border states.

Source: Jill A. McDonald, Octavio Mojarro, Paul D. Sutton, and Stephanie J. Ventura, "A Binational Overview of Reproductive Health Outcomes among US Hispanic and Mexican Women in the Border Region," *Preventing Chronic Disease* vol. 10, August 15, 2013.

Hispanic women living in border counties who received late (third trimester) or no prenatal care during pregnancy was 82 percent higher in U.S.-Mexico border counties than in non-border counties (14.0 percent versus 7.7 percent) (Figure 5). In Mexico, late or no prenatal care is less common overall than it is in U.S. Hispanic women. However, the proportion of Mexican women who receive late or no prenatal care is still higher in border municipalities (10.1 percent) than in non-border municipalities (5.7 percent).

DISCUSSION

The availability of comparable birth certificate data for the United States and Mexico allows both a description of the U.S. Hispanic population and some instructive comparisons with recent experience in Mexico. Dividing the U.S. Hispanic population into those who live on the border with Mexico and elsewhere reveals some major internal differences in maternal outcomes. Clearly not all Hispanic births in the U.S. are the same, and the overall picture of maternal health in both countries to some extent reflects the poorer outcomes in their border regions.

Although adolescent birth rates are declining among U.S. Hispanics and Mexicans, progress is being checked to some extent by the slower improvements along the border. This is a critical issue because adolescent mothers and their offspring face multiple risks. Many of the pregnant Hispanic adolescents living on the border start prenatal care late or not at all (17.6 percent —data not shown), and roughly three in ten, most healthy and pregnant for the first time, deliver their baby via Caesarean section. A primary Caesarean makes Caesarean delivery much more likely in subsequent pregnancies and increases the risk of serious complications, including placenta previa, hemorrhage, and infection.[15] In addition, higher prevalence of preterm birth and low birth weight among Hispanic adolescents living in the border region also places the infants of these mothers at greater risk.

Another problem for U.S. Hispanics that must be addressed is the startlingly high rate of Caesarean birth, especially in the border region. This is an issue for non-Hispanic U.S. women as well, but the finding that Caesarean birth rates in the U.S. Hispanic border region, where most women are of Mexican origin, are intermediate between those in Mexico and those among U.S. Hispanics elsewhere suggests that cultural factors may also be influencing the rates associated with this

outcome. In addition, variation in the type of hospital ownership within the U.S. might contribute to this pattern. Private and for-profit hospital ownership has been associated with higher risk of Caesarean delivery in the U.S.[16] and in Mexico.[17] In the Texas border region, where half of U.S. Hispanic border births occur, a majority of hospitals are for-profit.[18]

As noted, higher rates of inadequate prenatal care in the border region could reflect the region's poverty and limited access to health care services, but they could also reflect a tendency for border women to receive care on both sides of the border.[19] Crossing the border for prenatal care in either direction could contribute to lower rates of prenatal care through disruption of health insurance coverage and could also lead to incomplete prenatal records for Mexican and U.S. Hispanic women. Consistent with findings from an earlier study of prenatal care in El Paso, Texas,[20] a smaller investigation of U.S. and Mexican women in active labor who crossed the border from Ciudad Juárez to El Paso seeking emergency medical services found that half of women had no record of prenatal care on their medical chart.[21] However, authors observed chart notations of prenatal care received in Mexico or prenatal care records in Spanish that were not recognized in the admissions summary of the El Paso hospital record.

FIGURE 4
LOW BIRTH WEIGHT, PRETERM, AND CESAREAN BIRTHS TO MEXICAN WOMEN (2009)



Note: The figure refers to the number of births among Mexican women along the U.S.-Mexico border and in non-border municipalities of Mexican border states.

Source: Jill A. McDonald, Octavio Mojarro, Paul D. Sutton, and Stephanie J. Ventura, "A Binational Overview of Reproductive Health Outcomes among US Hispanic and Mexican Women in the Border Region," *Preventing Chronic Disease* vol. 10, August 15, 2013.

FIGURE 5
U.S. HISPANIC AND MEXICAN BIRTHS WITH LATE OR NO PRENATAL CARE (2009)



Note: The figure refers to births to women in border and non-border U.S. counties and Mexican municipalities in border states.

Source: Jill A. McDonald, Octavio Mojarro, Paul D. Sutton, and Stephanie J. Ventura, "A Binational Overview of Reproductive Health Outcomes among US Hispanic and Mexican Women in the Border Region," *Preventing Chronic Disease* vol. 10, August 15, 2013.

Women who cross the U.S.-Mexico border for obstetric care in the U.S. are a population that we know little about. Among Mexican women who choose to give birth in the U.S., some reports have found more middle- and upper-income women than low-income women, suggesting that most such births occur to documented mothers.[22] In contrast, a national survey indicates that undocumented immigrant women of all countries of origin account for fully 8 percent of U.S. births,[23] while births to non-U.S. residents legally in the United States account for a much smaller fraction.[24]

Little is also known about the maternal and infant outcomes for Mexican women who give birth in the U.S. Mexican and U.S.-born women who gave birth in California had different patterns of maternal morbidity with neither group being clearly healthier than the other.[25] Mexican and U.S. residents who requested emergency medical transportation from ports of entry to hospitals in El Paso (about 0.2 percent of all El Paso births) appeared to have higher rates of preterm and low birth weight than those seen in the U.S. general population.

Overall, the health of pregnant Hispanic women and their infants varies greatly in the United States by geographic region. Prescriptions for addressing these health disparities need to be sensitive to geographic differences among Hispanic subpopulations. Prevention measures also need to be sensitive to country-of-origin differences among U.S. Hispanics, a topic

that could easily fill another article. Cuban-Americans, for example, are not the same as Mexican- Americans.

Future research has to consider both geographic and cultural differences, which are often difficult to identify with birth certificate data alone. Qualitative interviews with pregnant Hispanic women or new mothers are an essential complement to epidemiologic data. Some of this work has been done, but more is necessary. Quantitative and qualitative efforts together might help identify effective interventions to improve the maternal health of all Hispanic women. Ideally, in the U.S.-Mexico border region, public health workers would collaborate in binational, community-based efforts to disseminate such interventions. VM

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Medical Conditions Linked To Maternal Deaths in Mexico

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Myrna Souraye Godines Enríquez**
Esperanza Bautista Gómez***
Osvaldo Miranda Araujo****

Claudia Daut/Reuters

Maternal mortality is defined as the death of a woman during pregnancy, childbirth, or in the 42 days following the termination of pregnancy, for any cause aggravated by the pregnancy or as a result of the birthing process.[1] As a health indicator, it is measured as the number of maternal deaths per 100 000 live births. This measurement is generally used to evaluate the availability and quality of access to maternal health services.

Mexico accepted the UN Millennium Development Goals, which included reducing maternal deaths by 75 percent between 1990 and 2015. However, as mentioned in other contributions on this topic, our country has officially recognized that it did not meet this goal.[2]

The efforts to diminish maternal mortality in Mexico began in 1921, 100 years ago in 2021. Almost a century ago, then, at the first Mexican Congress on Children, the proposal was made to protect mothers. As a result of those agreements, in 1929, the Maternity House was established on the initiative of a visionary doctor dedicated to caring for women, Dr. Isidro Espinosa de los Reyes, after whom today's National Perinatal Institute was named in 2007. Once the institution was set up, in 1930, it reported a maternal mortality rate of 60 wom-

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Women of reproductive age
are the group with the greatest prevalence
of overweight and obesity in Mexico,
and these conditions increase risks of pathologies
like preeclampsia.

en per 10 000 recent live births (LB); and in 1944, when the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) was created, the number had dropped to 35 deaths per 10 000 LB.

During the 1960s and 1970s, very important efforts were made to harmonize medical care during birth, producing a drop in maternal mortality in the most advanced obstetrics hospital of the time, the Gynecological-obstetrics Hospital Number 1, which reported 15 deaths per 10 000 LB. In 1985, the figures were 110 to 120 deaths per 100 000 LB, and in 1990, the General Statistics Office reported 95 deaths per 100 000 LB. In an effort to review the evolution of maternal mortality, in 1997, an analysis of the previous 25 years was published, showing rates of 90.30 to 57.15 deaths per 100 000 LB. The last IMSS report for 2000 to 2005 shows a reduction from 39 to 27 deaths per 100 000 LB. Mexico's Ministry of Health Report for 2009 cited an evolution of maternal mortality from 2006 to 2008 from 62.58 to 50.8 deaths per 100 000 LB. Today in Mexico, the official rate is 38.3 according to the Maternal Mortality Observatory, which matches other sources very closely.[3]

The main causes of maternal deaths in Mexico between 2010 and 2012 were the so-called "indirect" causes (28.2 percent), preeclampsia (23.7 percent), obstetrical hemorrhage (17.5 percent), and those associated with abortions (8.9 percent).[4]

One matter of concern in these figures is that many of the reports indicate that marginalized groups such as women from low socio-economic strata, indigenous women, those who live in towns with fewer than 2 500 inhabitants, and teens are exposed to the greatest risk factors because they do not receive appropriate obstetric care. The hospitals of the Ministry of Health are responsible for care for this sector of the population since it is there that women without steady jobs go; and it is in their hospitals that the greatest number of deaths occurs. For this reason, maternal mortality in our country is a multifaceted public health problem since it is related to health-service coverage and quality, as well as socio-economic and cultural factors; this is why lowering both mortality and morbidity (illness) rates is a health challenge.[5]

The most recent change in the epidemiological framework of maternal deaths in our country is the increase in indirect causes: those linked to an illness that existed before pregnancy or one which evolved during pregnancy. The condition is not directly due to the pregnancy, but it is worsened by the process of the gestation. Among the most common indirect causes are infections, diabetes mellitus, chronic hypertension, cardiomyopathy, different kinds of leukemia, purpura, encephalopathy, asthma, and chronic liver disease.[6]

The influenza epidemic in Mexico in 2009 contributed to an increased number of deaths of pregnant women since they are one of the groups most vulnerable to the AH1N1 virus. Pneumonia due to influenza was the basic cause of 16.4 percent of the deaths registered in 2009, in contrast to 2008, when it was only cited as the cause of 1.4 percent of deaths. HIV also has an impact on maternal death rates. The importance of both diseases lies in the fact that they both make caring for women during pregnancy, the birth, or postpartum more complicated.[7]

Women of reproductive age are the group with the greatest prevalence of overweight and obesity in Mexico, and these conditions increase risks during a Cesarean birth or the probability of pathologies like preeclampsia, gestational diabetes, miscarriage, and different conditions that affect women's health before pregnancy. Some researchers have demonstrated that there is a greater risk of congenital malformations in babies born to obese women, including malformations of the neural tube or the heart. We also know that the children of obese women are more likely to present with obesity and later with diabetes mellitus, particularly if they were born prematurely.[8]

Obese or overweight women over the age of 40 constitute a special group that must be evaluated extensively before becoming pregnant. The reason is that they are seven times more likely to die due to causes linked to a pregnancy, particularly from indirect causes. In these pregnancies, appropriate birth control, pre-conception counseling, early identification of pathologies, and timely referral to specialized hospitals are the measures that can diminish the number of deaths.[9]

For many years hypertension associated with pregnancy was the primary cause of maternal death in Mexico and in many other places. It presents as a condition that manifests clinically after the first 20 weeks of pregnancy. A late diagnosis means that the patient does not have the chance to be referred to specialized medical services where she can be cared for in the serious phases of the disease. Its most common

form is preeclampsia, which manifests through hypertension, proteinuria, and systemic damage. When in addition to these symptoms, the patient suffers from convulsions, she has eclampsia. The possibility of a preeclampsia patient evolving to its more serious form is about 33 percent, according to national mortality statistics.

Eclampsia requires hospitalization in an intensive care unit; this may include assisted breathing therapies, neurological assessment, and continual care by experts in intensive care and hematology experienced in this critical condition. The main way to decrease the risks once the possibility has been detected that the patient may have it is to refer her to services specialized in clinical control using complex methodologies. The unpredictable nature of this condition makes it necessary to have measures for detecting it among all levels of the population.[10]

Another direct cause of maternal death, whose frequency is close to that of hypertensive disorders of pregnancy, is obstetrical hemorrhage. This can present from the third trimester of pregnancy until the late post-partum period; the latter is responsible for 50 percent of the cases. One study has shown that 88 percent of these deaths happen in the first four hours. This is the main cause of maternal morbidity in many parts of the world and one of the three main causes of maternal death, together with hypertensive disorders and sepsis.

Hemorrhage is defined as the loss of 500 milliliters or more of blood after birth or of 1 000 milliliters or more after a Cesarean, although this definition is completely subjective. Its prevalence varies widely depending on the criteria used, but it is calculated that it presents in from three to five percent of all births.

Unfortunately, 80 percent of patients with obstetrical hemorrhage do not have predictable risk factors. This means that the medical team and hospital units must always be prepared to deal with it.

Pregnancy is a period which offers the opportunity to have a positive impact in the life of a mother and her child. Many of the prenatal control programs already involve nutritional care as one of their mainstays, although it is important to underline that it is often underestimated by both health professionals and patients. Changes in maternal weight significantly influence the evolution of the pregnancy, the birth, and the newborn.

As a country of contrasts, Mexico is precisely attempting to carry out plans for nutritional health, but they are far from universal. However, every single doctor, health professional, and patient must take an interest in them. We have to remember that strategic measures like reducing sedentary lifestyles during pregnancy itself and an appropriate control of diet will have a positive impact on the health of our population 30 years from now, when those newborns have become adults.

As a country of contrasts, Mexico is attempting to carry out plans for nutritional health, but they are far from universal.

The fight against maternal mortality must be waged from different perspectives and with different strategies. Lack of access to quality health care due to the patient's location, the distance to a health center, and the lack of transportation is the main obstacle to reducing that risk. It is important to point out that 57.6 percent of maternal deaths occur in federal or state clinics or hospitals, and they are not always due to the institutions' lack of materials or resources.

At times, resorting to alternative and traditional medicine can impede or delay sending these women to health services that could identify the pathology and channel the patient to a larger hospital with the capacity to deal with the problem. In these cases, the delay in delivering highly specialized medical care to marginalized communities contributes to keeping maternal mortality high, particularly in cases of obstetrical hemorrhage and in emergencies like eclampsia, in which it is unlikely that women will arrive alive or without consequences to the specialized center with the trained personnel, equipment, and medications needed to deal with these kinds of complications.

Other barriers are the quality of care and the resistance to change and even the attitudes of medical staff regarding new technologies, equipment, and medications. For example, despite the effectiveness of magnesium sulfate in handling preeclampsia, several researchers have documented the fact that it is not routinely administered, but is used only in teaching hospitals. The unavailability of certain medications, of health professionals who know how to use them, and the costs are other obstacles.[11]

Maternal mortality is a problem that involves us all, and we have to make everyone aware on every level of the possibilities of decreasing the risk factors in a stage of life as vulnerable as pregnancy. The media must flood popular cul-

ture with information about the problem, and the government must strengthen already existing programs since we all have the right to health and no woman should die in childbirth.

To contribute to this objective, the UNAM School of Medicine has created a multidisciplinary group that has forged a strategic alliance with the Mexico City Ministry of Health and with other academic institutions to develop a program for care for pregnant women. In addition to better characterizing the conditions surrounding the care for these women in this part of the country, the idea is to contribute with inputs to design programs and public policies aimed at preventing complications during pregnancy. In addition, new preventive measures have been developed using ongoing clinical trials to manage preeclampsia and obstetrical hemorrhage. Some of them have produced very promising results.[12] VM

NOTES

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Redefining Mexico-U.S. Relations To Enhance North American Prosperity[1]

Sergio M. Alcocer*

Ferrán Paredes/Reuters

Texaco has recently opened gas stations in northern Mexico.

For an entire year, up until this writing, President Donald Trump has engaged in offensive, false, simplistic rhetoric about Mexico, Mexicans, and relations between our countries. The most dangerous and concerning underlying component of his tirades is racism. The central themes of his discourse have been the traditional issues (security, migration, and trade), which frequently are those that cause the most tension and disagreements between the two nations. While they are important, our relationship must not only be measured by these. It is indispensable, rather, that we underline and vigorously disseminate, among many indicators and data, that in addition to the million dollars a minute that we trade, more than one million legal crossings of our border take place every year; that the comprehensive security of the Northern Hemisphere is only achieved through the principles of shared responsibility and cooperation, which implies mutual interdependence; that one expression of migration is the more than 35 million inhabitants of Mexican origin in the United States, who contribute significantly to the local and national economies; and that we design and manufacture intermediate and final goods by cooperating in an increasingly integrated way.[2]

Simplistic, erroneous arguments and his disrespectful, arrogant attitude toward a large proportion of local and world leaders are the norm in the United States and are part of the context in which relations with our neighbor unfold. However, in recent weeks, President Trump has been forced to moderate his positions due to pressure and decisions by the legislative and judicial branches, pressure and recommendations from those with economic power, his cabinet members' understanding of reality attributable to their career service, and/or perhaps as a survival tactic.

Canadian Liberal-Party-member Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, by contrast, is very popular both domestically and abroad since, among other attributes, he stands for the West's main values such as solidarity, cooperation, democracy, and inclusion, values for which Canada has been internationally recognized.

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The forthcoming trilateral negotiations should develop a North American energy outlook that would evolve into a reference point for energy planning.

This article briefly discusses some of the challenges and opportunities for Mexico with regard to certain issues, aside from the traditional ones already mentioned: the domestic agenda, energy, infrastructure, education, innovation and research, and the border conceived as something more than security and migration. A recent document published by the Mexican Council for International Relations analyzes both the traditional and other topics and proposes ways of dealing with them.[3]

With regard to Mexico's domestic agenda, the current situation forces us to establish a medium-term vision to be able to deal with issues that have been pending for many years: incomplete rule of law, impunity, corruption, and inequality. Now is the time for our institutions of higher learning, particularly public institutions, to renew themselves internally to drastically improve the quality and pertinence of their activities. This requires vision, political will, and capability. To the extent that Mexico resolves these scourges, it will not only be dealing with the domestic agenda, but will also have greater political capital to negotiate and further its interests in North America.

At this writing, the positions of Mexico and Canada for modernizing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) are public. With regard to the United States, the only thing known is that it agrees it should be trilateral and modernized, but the scope and details of its position have not been announced.[4] In any case, hopefully, modernization will include more flexibility in order to be able to recognize how several issues have evolved, such as the case of the economic sectors based on exponential technologies as part of the Fourth Industrial Revolution, where digital, biological, and physical technologies converge.[5]

The North American region has abundant energy resources, both fossil fuels and clean energy, and an internationally competitive cost structure. In addition, its energy production is intensive, which implies the need to reinforce its energy security, understood as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at accessible prices. This is a principle accepted worldwide for countries to be able to meet their challenges.[6] While NAFTA deals with energy in its exceptions, rules for the case of liberalization, and rates, it was not until Mexico changed its Constitution in December 2013 that the creation of a regional energy system and market began to be conceived. The principles of this new market are increased energy security, diversification of the energy grid, and improved sustainability. In the case of Mexico, while the energy reform is advancing swiftly and successfully, many tactical problems remain to be resolved (for example, deregulation and regulatory simplification), and policies for strengthening government productive companies must be created, such as the creation of a legal framework to facilitate and protect decision-making by public servants.

In addition, developing national capabilities for competing in better conditions is urgent. This involves a policy and actions to foster engineering and high-value services that can be developed by Mexican companies, as well as protection equivalent to that received by foreign engineering firms in their own countries. Rapidly moving ahead in regulatory cooperation, matters such as the professionalization of regulatory bodies, and the harmonization of energy regulations, emphasizing a hybrid system that combines a prescriptive focus with one based on performance, is also indispensable. Given the country's high energy intensity,[7] Mexico must make enthusiastic energy efficiency efforts in North America, by developing and adopting minimum standards for energy performance. According to the International Energy Agency, the country's 2040 energy consumption will be concentrated in transportation; this is why this sector requires a special effort. It is also advisable for the trilateral negotiations to develop a North American energy outlook that would evolve into a reference point for energy planning, identifying investments, capacity building, and pinpointing regulatory improvements for the three countries.

A country's infrastructure is an indispensable means for sparking its development. This is why international institutions like the World Economic Forum rate the quality and scope of infrastructure as inputs for estimating a country's competitiveness.[8] In the case of North America, the competitiveness of each of the three country's infrastructures is very different: Canada is in fifteenth place of 138 countries; the United States, in eleventh place; and Mexico, in fifty-seventh place. With regard to the quality of the infrastructure, they are in twenty-first, twelfth, and sixty-ninth place, respectively. If we want the region to continue to be dynamic and competitive not just on the basis of low Mexican wages, which must be raised, North America, and particularly our country, needs

to substantially improve its urban and regional infrastructure.[9] This requires more investment as well as better planning, execution, operation, and maintenance of its infrastructure.

Given the asymmetries and its lower investment in infrastructure in recent years, Mexico must take advantage of the trilateral negotiations to attract more investors. Simultaneously, as part of its domestic agenda, it must develop its own capabilities similar to those pointed to above for the energy sector, and harmonize regulatory and normative frameworks. Mexico must aspire to quality, resilient, pertinent infrastructure equivalent to that of our trade partners, including the Europeans. This need was recognized in the 2014 Leaders of North America Summit agreements. One of those accords referred to developing and implementing a North American Transportation Plan that included establishing a joint prospect for the future and the design and implementation of infrastructure, equipment, and services with an urban and regional vision and multi-modal approach for freight and passenger transportation.[10] As in the European case, it would be desirable to set up an infrastructure development bank for the region to swiftly and efficiently foster and support world-class, priority projects that could positively impact urban and regional competitiveness and shared prosperity. The current North American Development Bank could be the basis for a new bank that would include the three countries.

The establishment of the U.S.-Mexico Bilateral Forum on Higher Education, Innovation, and Research (Fobesii) and the High Level Economic Dialogue in 2013 put human development and job skills training at the center of the Mexico-United States agenda.[11] Canada joined a year later, first bilaterally and later trilaterally. The results over these four years have been very encouraging. More cooperation agreements have been signed than ever before formalizing the thousands of exchanges of students and academics that take place every year. More than 100 000 Mexican students and academics have gone to the U.S. and over 7 800 to Canada, the vast majority from public schools, for academic stays of different length and scope. In addition, by bringing together companies, research centers and universities of our countries, bilateral and trilateral research and innovation initiatives useful for industry have been established. These alliances aim to establish long-term partnerships between industry and academia, to foster the culture of innovation among the Mexican research community, and to develop cutting-edge projects on science, engineering, and technology for the benefit of the regional economy.[12] Outstanding examples are joint centers and projects on advanced and intelligent manufacturing. Higher education, innovation, and research endeavors must continue and expand. It is indispensable for the three countries' private sectors to contribute resources and strategic orientation in forming a new generation of innovative, competitive talent committed to the social development of their countries and the region.[13] Long-term collaboration must also be stimulated to develop new knowledge and translate it into applications to benefit society. Academia in the three countries, particularly engineering, science, and medicine, must play an important role in this. To determine the central axes of training talent and generating knowledge, I suggest applying clusters of innovation as a platform for the cooperation of the quadruple helix of government, universities, companies, and professional associations.

The Mexico-U.S. border is the area that most clearly and forcefully expresses our relationship's vitality and complexity. The institutional architecture agreed upon by the governments has made it possible to deal with and gradually improve security and infrastructure conditions (crossings, water and sanitation, energy). However, it does not include joint actions for improving the quality of life and the sustainability of the border region. The present moment offers the opportunity for improving the linkages of the components of border governance and development, as well as dialogue among the stakeholders. This implies comprehensive planning of the border strip's social, economic, and environmental development, which would elicit positive impacts for security and migratory flows, as well as improving the management capabilities of state and municipal governments. In this effort, it would be very valuable to create consortia of the two countries' universities since, in addition to helping us better understand the phenomena involved and seeking solutions or methods for dealing with them, they would train specialized talent. In addition, they could serve as facilitators of dialogue among sectors and as disseminators of successes and opportunities.

Developing a U.S.-Mexico short- and medium-term plan for a modern, smart, and efficient infrastructure is also urgent. Among other things, the plan would aim to increase the pace of construction/rehabilitation/modernization of border infra-

For the region to continue to be dynamic and competitive not just on the basis of low Mexican wages, North America needs to substantially improve its urban and regional infrastructure.

structure; revise the financing system; mitigate the effects of natural and man-made hazards; incorporate the ample use of state-of-the-art technology; and establish an observatory of border infrastructure. The plan should consider border master plans and previous studies and information. This is the case of the study financed by the North American Development Bank aimed at proposing improvements in both countries' infrastructure planning methodologies. One of the border's most pressing challenges is the lack of communication.

The current situation offers Mexico an ideal window for speeding up the definitive solution of its age-old problems, and at the same time, for promoting, together with the United States and Canada, inclusive, sweeping economic growth for the well-being of our citizens. This would allow twenty-first-century North America to establish new global standards for trade, energy, infrastructure, education, innovation, sustainable growth, and the border. VM

Notes

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

The Two Faces of Migration: Mexicans in Texas

Camelia Tigau*

Lucy Nicholson / Reuters

Introduction

Many studies have outlined the growing importance of Latinos is the U.S. in terms of numbers, but also of economic innovation. A recent study by Caraballo, McLaughlin, and McLaughlin show that Latinos represent approximately 17 percent of the total U.S. population, about 50 million people, the majority of whom are of Mexican origin; they wield US$1.3 trillion in buying power and are geographically very easy to reach, since they are concentrated primarily in four U.S. States: California, Texas, New York, and Florida.[1]

One of the most outstanding contributions of this study is to show that Latinos in general, Mexicans included, have contributed significantly to the United States' competitiveness. According to the authors, Latinos have created businesses and jobs and had consumer buying power estimated at over US$1.5 billion as of 2014, a figure larger than the gross domestic product GDP of most Latin American economies. "Influence on corporate America is also growing, with more Latinos occupying senior management and board positions. Combined, all these elements indicate that Latinos are in a position to become the face of [U.S.] American competitiveness and innovation in the twenty-first century," they write.[2]

Using evidence gathered in the field in Texas, in this article, I analyze the contradictions between these contributions and the difficulties of integration and acceptance that Mexican professionals in the U.S. may still face. Paraphrasing from a novel on Chinese migrants to the "Promised Land," we may ask: How common is it to mistakenly identify all Mexicans in the U.S. as "those people who try to take live chickens buses and don't own real suitcases?"[3]

Mexicans in Texas: a Compromise Between Being Home and Abroad

Thirty-eight percent of all Texas residents are of Hispanic origin.[4] Of these, 87 percent are Mexicans;[5] that is, 9 million people of Mexican origin live in Texas. One-third of them

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Latinos in Texas have created businesses and jobs and had consumer buying power estimated at over US$1.5 billion as of 2014, a figure larger than the GDP of most Latin American economies.

(34 percent) are highly-skilled professionals, including first- and second-generation migrants (born in the U.S. or abroad).[6]

These statistics show us the numerical relevance of Mexicans among the Latinos. Of course, the presence of so many Mexicans is due to the historical bilateral relations and cultural and geographic proximity. Many migrants interviewed for this study said that being in Texas is a compromise between being abroad and also being close to family. Says one university professor of Mexican nationality interviewed for this article,

> Mexican families lived here before Texas was part of the U.S. Texans like to eat guacamole; they break piñatas for children's birthdays; this is cultural heritage from Mexico. . . . We were in Norway and I mentioned to my wife the possibility of applying for a job in Texas. She said, "Send it, right away!" [Laughs.] She obviously wanted to be closer to Mexico or return to Mexico. We actually tried returning to Mexico twice, but it didn't work. And Texas is very similar to Yucatán, where we come from. They got their independence the same year. Yucatán has been segregated from Mexico for a long time. In Texas, like in Yucatán, people greet you in the elevator; they ask you about your family; they open the door for you. (Civil engineer, PhD, university professor in College Station, Texas, 47-year-old man)

Mexicans as a "Monolithic" Group

Despite this proximity and a shared history of the region, many of the professionals interviewed still perceive the local population's resistance to accepting them. In particular, they are worried about Mexicans being stereotyped as people with no education and bad language abilities:

> From one migrant with over 20 years in Houston, we hear that here in the U.S., they have a preconceived idea that if you are Mexican, you have no education, you have no culture. In general, skilled Mexicans are not very welcome. That is to say, we are not treated well. I took a lot of math and physics for my doctorate, but I still have to face the question of how I can understand a problem so well if I'm not from India or China. People have a hard time understanding that we have the same skills; that's why I like to work at multinational companies, where they realize that it's not in their interest to have those types of prejudices. (Geologist, PhD, working at a petroleum company in Houston, 46-year-old man)

This type of preconception has previously been identified as a difference between *de jure* and *de facto* discrimination. That is, even when the law forbids discrimination, and it is not politically correct to be racist, native-born people may still have unsympathetic attitudes toward migrants. Accepting diversity is more a discourse than an actual fact, as a study by Matthew Gritter has previously proven.[7] Gritter believes Mexicans in the U.S. have been a group "*included* rather than *excluded* from the [U.S.] American polity." He writes,

> People of Mexican origin are a focus of immigration debates that characterize them as an "other," while antidiscrimination policy explicitly includes them. . . . However, they are often racialized and perceived as a monolithic group of outsiders. *De facto* rather than *de jure* segregation and ostensibly color-blind legislation and policy have been the prime state source of discrimination.[8]

Gritter points to the fact that Mexicans are all considered similar and part of the same group, despite the lack of homogenous origin, of different physical appearance, and cultural background, or the variety of native languages and citizenship statuses.

Two Kinds of Mexicans

This perception of Mexicans as a monolithic group negatively affects Mexican professionals in the U.S. and interferes with their social mobility and integration into their destination country. The aforementioned university professor from the city of College Station says,

> We see the difference between those who are here legally or illegally when we look at their social mobility. It's also a matter of principle. For me working as a professor was difficult, just like it is difficult for [Anglo] people to differentiate between both groups. This dual ideology of many conservative politicians

> in the state of Texas, who don't recognize immigrants, who separate "legals" from the "illegals," produces conflict. We've got students who graduate as engineers from Texas A&M but don't have legal immigration status, so they can't work at the very university they graduated from. (Civil Engineer, PhD, university professor from College Station, Texas, 47-year-old man)

This statement reminds me of the theoretical position of psychologist Farhad Dalal, who shows that "our societies are still driven by very real problems of marginalization of people perceived to be of a different kind. . . . Some 'kinds' of people continue to do less well than other 'kinds' in all arenas of life."[9] Dalal compares this type of *judgementalism* to a more objective judgment and believes that racism in general is due to power relations, rather than a product of ignorance. This is also difficult to change as it is reproduced by institutions that resist structural change —not necessarily consciously— and find ways of apparently complying with the egalitarian agenda without actually doing so. He identifies a double discourse toward migrants in general, which I believe may apply for Mexicans in particular. Dalal writes,

> The equality enterprise becomes converted into a paper exercise, the intention of which is to be seen doing good; the way that they have managed this is by stripping ethics out of the conversation and replacing it with bureaucratic procedure. Further, the diversity agenda has been hijacked by some corporations who purport to subscribe to the emancipatory project for justice but, in fact, exploit the notion of diversity to further enhance their profit margins. These, I contend, are the main obstacles to real change.[10]

This social demand for tolerance and political correctness may explain a shared opinion of many Mexican professionals who work for multinational companies and who believe that discrimination is counterproductive in such work environments. Being egalitarian is a matter of survival in such multicultural environments; therefore, many migrants choose them as places to work. This may also explain why certain Mexican professionals may declare they are not at all discriminated against since they are "educated" and they are integrated into multicultural organizations such as transnational companies, hospitals, or universities. However, almost all of them tend to acknowledge discrimination exists outside these environments, where the difference in education influences their integration into or exclusion from U.S. society.

Many of the professionals interviewed perceive the local resistance to accepting them. Particularly, they are worried about Mexicans being stereotyped as people with no education and bad language abilities.

The fact that the Mexican community in Texas is multifaceted also has implications in terms of its organization. It refers to certain tensions and conflicts among educated and non-educated Mexicans, between those with visas and the undocumented. It actually influences the way that the community organizes itself. One of the professionals interviewed told us,

> The Mexican community here is very divided. Many Mexican professionals who come here become successful; they shop at The Galleria and then become very conservative. They want to remove the undocumented. There is great division, very little solidarity, little help from the privileged Mexican sector that arrives here on work visas. This has its roots in the super-elitist Mexican society back in Mexico, where we split between those who studied at the Ibero and the "nacos" [a pejorative term for peasants], the ones who take the subway. It's the same here in the U.S. (Journalist, working as an independent interpreter/translator in Houston, 45-year-old woman)

Intolerance and Fear, Historically Rooted Feelings

A study by Feagin and Cobas refers to the racialization of Latinos, to their definition as a "non-white racial group" by Anglo whites, based on alleged physical and cultural characteristics, including phenotype, language, and family characteristics. According to their research, these have been excuses for justifying Latinos' low position on the social ladder, their oppression, and racialization.[11] Feagin and Cobas go on to state that the historical racialization of and discrimination against Latinos has interfered with their socioeconomic opportunities and has prevented them from acquiring various types of social capital.[12]

Other authors such as Maria Chavez share the same viewpoint: "As a Latino or Native American or any kind of minority, you're just another wetback or you're just another migrant

People of Mexican origin are a focus of immigration debates that characterize them as an "other," and they are often racialized and perceived as a monolithic group of outsiders.

farm worker or whatever."[13] Chavez appreciates that this recurring and stereotyping framing of people as "typical Mexicans" signals how powerful such ingrained racial stereotyping and other racial framing are.[14]

While the situation may have changed in some U.S. states and certain professional fields, many of the Mexican migrants interviewed in Texas for this article still prove that reasons exist for migrants to be afraid. One woman with dual U.S.-Mexican citizenship and married to a U.S. citizen says,

> Even though I love Houston and consider it my hometown, certain parts of Texas scare me; not in terms of my physical safety, but because of how conservative this state can be when you get out of the urban areas. My husband and I used to travel a lot by car around Texas, and in some areas there are signs on the houses that speak to tremendous religious intolerance and political points of view that we don't share. (Journalist, working as an independent interpreter/translator in Houston, 45-year-old woman)

She goes on to explain that in more remote areas of Texas, people may be more scared of immigrants even if they have not necessarily had a bad experience with them. They may even be more prone to believe the stereotypes of migrants as "rapists and murderers" and, accordingly, end up rejecting them.

Putting an End to Stereotypes: Mexicans as Working People

If discrimination is a matter of education, it does not depend only on the educational level of those discriminated against, but also on the individuals who may actually produce the racist discourse. As such, people exposed to more cultures and higher levels of schooling tend to become more aware of the existence of stereotypes and to try to avoid them, rather than reproduce them.

Are Mexicans lazy, big-mouthed, and unreliable? Not necessarily, recognizes one professor from Sri Lanka, getting her doctorate in Houston. She takes Mexicans to be people who have found a balance between a right amount of work and a good time in their lives and who can perform long periods of work when needed:

> My Mexican colleagues in the chemistry department are boisterous, talkative, very friendly, and outgoing people. I know these two Mexican sisters in the chemistry department. They are living in the same apartment. The older one is in a lab and she works so late at night that they almost don't get to see each other. (PhD student from Sri Lanka, Houston, 28-year-old woman)

Changing stereotypes may be a great challenge for the Mexican community and a matter of survival at times of political turmoil and discrimination against migrants, such as those after the 2016 U.S. presidential election. In this way, the image of migrants is not just a matter of having prestige, but a deciding factor in whether people do better or worse in life. Diaspora diplomacy has nowadays become a safety concern, vital for improving public opinion about migrants and for further influencing policy decisions. VM

Notes

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The Importance of Social Capital For Migrants' Integrating into Society Without Work Permits[1]

Mervi Leppäkorpi*

Introduction

An estimated 1.9 to 3.8 million undocumented migrants live in Europe (0.3 to 0.5 percent of all residents).[2] Important differences exist within Europe: for example, it is more common and accepted in southern Europe for undocumented migrants to be part of the work force. In northern European countries, irregular migration has been recognized and researched only relatively recently.

This article is based on research covering three northern European cities: Hamburg, Germany; Stockholm, Sweden; and Helsinki, Finland. An estimated 150 000 to 500 000 people reside without documents in these countries. Freedom of movement within the European Union (EU) allows people to move within the region, thus causing a variety of other forms of irregular residency. For example non-EU citizens with a residence permit in one country are allowed to travel as tourists for three months, but some stay more permanently. The European Union's Dublin Regulation, which determines where asylum applications are processed, creates irregularities when people move. Many irregular migrants are *de facto* in similar circumstances to those of undocumented migrants:[3] they lack status, access to public services, social welfare benefits, and the right to work.[4]

To meet their basic needs, migrants without the right to work depend on informal arrangements. Basically the alternatives are being supported by someone else or participation in the unreported economy. The integration of people without access to social and welfare services and formal labor is more and more current when migrants become bigger targets of marginalizing policies and practices in the aftermath of the 2015 "summer of migration."

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In this article, I analyze irregular migrants' labor based on 18 interviews from 2014 and 2016 as well as 8 interviews archived by the Museum of Work in Norrköping, Sweden. I look into the importance of social capital for the possibilities of working using data-oriented content analysis. Based on the data, I analyze the importance of social capital: first through the possibility of not having to earn any income at all, and then through the different positions of migrants in the unreported economy. At the end I ask what the role is of networks for being able to demand one's labor rights.

The Terms and Context

My focus here is on migrants without work permits residing in cities. The group most researched among these people is that of undocumented migrants, who have absolutely no status. Other irregular migrants in this article are third-country citizens who have a residence permit in one European country, but actually live in another. After the 2008 economic depression, many immigrants in Southern Europe found themselves in precarious conditions and left to find new opportunities. Their stay under these conditions is allowed; it only becomes irregular when they do not obey the conditions of that stay.

Irregular workers are definitely paid less than those with a formal contract. Salaries can be paid partially or not at all, and workers' negotiating position is bad.

In Germany, earlier academic research about undocumented migrants and labor has been produced by Dita Vogel[5] and Jörg Alt.[6] In Sweden, work-related research has been done by Niklas Selberg[7] and Heidi Moksnes.[8] In Finland, Jukka Könönen analyzes the labor market situation of precarious migrants.[9] Rolle Alho looks into the difficult relation between the trade unions and migrant workers without residence status.[10]

I use the term "social capital" inspired by James Coleman.[11] who defines social capital as existing individuals' social networks. Social capital is at the same time a resource for the individual and for the community. Coleman sees social capital as a combination of networks, their positioning in society, norms, and trust; the intensity of the relationships and belonging to this network is central.

People who work without a permit usually do so in the informal economy, which as such is legal, but they do not pay taxes or make social security payments. The unreported economy includes the informal economy, but also illegal activities. Some interviewees had experiences of being recruited for illegal activities, but they explicitly denied participating.

Income without a Permit

Almost all interviewees have been living and working in Europe under different legal-administrative categories, all of which include different sets of rights. This kind of status mobility is not uncommon for migrants in precarious circumstances.[12]

Working without a permit can have economic consequences for employers and employees. The employee can also be deported. Companies, for example, in the construction and restaurant sectors are subject to controls, which is supposed to guarantee workers' rights in the case of non-citizens by monitoring their right to work. However, most interviewees see this monitoring as a threat, which adds stress and anxiety, although the controls are supposed to protect people. Work can appear to be formal even when it is not. In Sweden many mention the possibility of continuing to work at an earlier job based on their former status as asylum seekers; controls have been tightened over the last five years. In Finland, in a case published in the main newspaper, both employer and employee thought everything was organized by the book, since all formal fees had been paid and the employee had an EU residence permit —until one day the police knocked at the door.[13]

Outside of Economic Activities

Some interviewees have been able to stay out of the economy. This is possible if a community exists, typically family, that supports that person. When economic security is bound to a romantic relationship, its end can be a risk since it is linked to a single person.

If an asylum seeker does not receive international protection status and the denial is seen as unjust, religious communities and political groups may support the person financially and in legalizing the stay. In these cases the supporters decide who "deserves" support and who does not. Religious or political affiliation, but also a vulnerable situation, can be grounds for support.[14]

The migrant activists interviewed who were not working had some kind of a community covering their living costs. In a tight community, support can be provided until one's residence status changes. Less united communities seem to provide rather short-term support. In some cases the support ended or there were threats that it would end if the migrant did not act as demanded. For example, continued participation in political activities or language-course attendance were the kind of expectations supporters had.

Some people chose to work despite having financial support. There were several reasons for this, such as gender roles ("A man must work") or work for its own sake. People also intended to legalize their stay through the employment, whether this was possible under local legislation or not.

Working

The interviewees used three strategies for finding work: a paid employment service, peer networking. and solidarity.[15] Employment services can be part of a human smuggling deal. In this case, a local contact offers employment and one's own social capital is not needed, at least at the beginning of the stay. In

the interviews I analyzed, examples of these deals exist, but not signs of human trafficking, although the risk is included.

Employment can be sought through acquaintances who know employers and can make recommendations. This requires knowing people who have access to the labor market. A contract or recommendation can cost money. The existing social capital becomes important when analyzing what kind of jobs migrants without work permits can find. In extreme cases, a worker can have a network of clients and run a company, formally founded by another person, and even legally hire other people to work for the company. This arrangement can work out unless the formal owner decides to end it. In Hamburg, around 2013, it became clear that recruiting sites existed for day laborers. Knowing these places requires some networking. Finding work through these recruitment spots does not require social capital similar to cases where people seek jobs through friends and acquaintances, but it is also very uncertain.

A job opportunity can be found through people who want to help. Solidarity-based economic activity requires one's own political activity or seeking help from groups and organizations. The people interviewed had different opinions about just how solidarity-based this arrangement was. Some saw the job offer as a favor that helped save their dignity in a difficult life situation. Others pointed out that the informal economy is always more profitable for the employer. Selling food, as a solidarity-based economic activity, is an example that is more like being self-employed than being someone else's employee. This requires networking with people who have economic resources for buying meals or hiring a catering service.

One person mentioned finding a job by knocking on the doors of companies and leaving his/her contact information. This is the only example of employment without any networks, social or paid, but it shows that it is possible to create job opportunities even without networking.

Working Conditions

Working without a permit is a good example of precarious work.[16] Work contracts are informal and short term, with no guarantees for job security. Irregular workers are definitely paid less than those with a formal contract. Salaries can be paid partially or not at all. Their negotiating position is bad, since workers can be replaced at any time. Interviewees worked in households or small companies. When people work for municipal or other public employers, they are subcontracted.

Workers have limited possibilities to demand their rights in conflict situations. Demanding rights can lead to deportation.

The salaries vary from one euro an hour to the equivalent of the sector's minimum wage standard before taxes. Jörg Alt shows the differences in wages based on the irregular worker's nationality in care and cleaning jobs in German households.[17] The differences have been explained for example by ethnic stratification.[18] The community's social capital may be an explanatory factor for the differences based on nationality. In Stockholm, for example, the rather good position of the irregular Latin American workers has been explained by the integration into society of Latin American refugees during the 1970s.[19]

Based on the data, ethnic stratification may be an explanatory factor, but it is not the only one. The interviewees report that their wages depend on their residence status: the worse the status, the lower the wage.[20] Annette Bernhardt, Siobhán McGrath, and James DeFilippis show that ending up in different low-paying jobs is based on a complex hierarchy influenced by gender, ethnicity, race, and networks within the communities.[21] Moksnes points out that also organizing in a union can have a positive effect on wages, but, on the other hand, it may make it more difficult to find a job in the first place.[22]

Demanding Rights

Workers have limited possibilities to demand their rights in conflict situations. Demanding rights can lead to deportation. In systems where the immigration control and labor courts have been separated, some migrants interviewed mentioned the risk of losing all future opportunities by getting a reputation as a difficult person.

In Europe, the trade unions have not tried to systematically include irregular migrant workers as members.[23] In Hamburg, some trade unions supported the group Lampedus Hamburg, which defines its members as migrant workers who are victims of war. Group participants became union members and the trade unions have supported them, although not unanimously or as equal union members. The union also hosts advisory services at certain hours of the week for undocumented migrants. In Stockholm, a similar advisory structure exists,

Trade unions can demand rights
by using soft methods, such as calling the employer,
but this kind of interference
can also give workers a "bad reputation."

originally inspired by the self-organized Papperslösa Stockholm group. Also this service is separate from other infrastructure.[24] Trade unions can demand rights by using soft methods, such as calling the employer, but this kind of interference can also give workers a "bad reputation."

The self-organizing of irregular migrant workers has been successful in Stockholm. Undocumented workers organized under the anarcho-syndicalist SAC as an independent group. Organizing in a smaller context does not allow the group to use institutional power.[25] Alternative strategies could include negative publicity for the employer[26] or threatening to make official complaints.[27] Strikes would also be possible if enough people are organized, such as in the case of the French Sans Papiers movement.[28]

Summary

The data confirms earlier research results about irregular migrants as a heterogeneous group. Social capital has been shown to be relevant for different aspect of migrants' lives. Based on this research, it is central in defining the need to work. High social capital can make it possible to stay outside of the economic system. Ideological or other support linked to the migrant "deserving" it has its limitations. One of them is how migrants fulfill expectations.

Integration into labor markets depends among other things on networks and their positioning. The higher social capital one has, that is, the better positioned one's community is and the better one is positioned within it, the better one's chances are in the labor market. Wage level is built as a combination of different factors. Working as a (one-person) company demands having enough clients with high enough incomes. This requires networking with people who can pay for services.

People without work permits are not a central target group for trade unions. Demanding their rights requires a different kind of organizing. Employers can be targeted through public campaigning or threatening with health or other inspections, but this can make it difficult for the worker to find a job later. VM

Notes

[1] A version of this article was originally published in 2016 in the Finnish journal *Työväentutkimus,* an annual publication featuring articles on working-class culture and the labor movement.

[2] Clandestino Project 2009: *Final report*, http://www.gla.ac.uk/media/media_147171_en.pdf, accessed May 22, 2017.

[3] In Europe, a distinction is made between undocumented migrants, who have no permits whatsoever, and irregular migrants who have the right to stay in Europe, but limited rights and access to social benefits.

[4] The right to work of non-EU citizens who have had a continuous residence permit for more than five years varies within the EU.

[5] Dita Vogel, "Menschen ohne Aufenthaltsstatus in der Erwerbsarbeit. Eine sozialwissenschaftliche Einführung," in Andreas Fischer-Lescano, Eva Kocher, and Ghazaleh Nassibi, eds., *Arbeit in der Illegalität. Die Rechte der Menschen ohne Aufenthaltspapiere* (Frankfurt/New York: Campus 2012), pp. 13-37.

[6] Jörg Alt, *Leben in der Schattenwelt. Problemkomplex "illegale" Migration* (Karlsruhe, Germany: Von Loeper Literaturverlag, 2003).

[7] Niklas Selberg, "The Laws of 'Illegal' Work and Dilemmas in Interest Representation on Segmented Labor Markets: À propos Irregular Migrants in Sweden," *Comparative Labor Law & Policy Journal* vol. 35, issue 2, year 7 (2014), pp. 247–288.

[8] Heidi Moksnes, "Papperslösa arbetare och möjligheterna för facklig organisering," in Maja Sager, Helena Holgersson and Klara Öberg, eds., *Irreguljär migration i Sverige: Rättigheter, vardagserfarenheter, motstånd och statliga kategoriseringar.* (Göteborg, Sweden: Daidalos, 2016).

[9] Jukka Könönen, *Tilapäinen elämä, joustava työ: rajat maahanmuuton ja työvoiman prekarisaation mekanismina*. (Joensuu, Finland: Itä-Suomen yliopisto, 2014).

[10] Rolle Alho, *Inclusion or Exclusion? Trade Union Strategies and Labor Migration* (Turku, Finland: Siirtolaisuusinstituutti, 2015).

[11] James S. Coleman, "Social Capital in the Creation of Human Capital," *American Journal of Sociology* vol. 94, 1988. pp. 95-130.

[12] For example, Bridget Anderson and Martin Ruhs, "Researching Illegality and Labour Migration. Guest Editorial," *Population, Space and Place* 16, 2010, pp. 175-179.

[13] Katja Boxberg, "Lupajärjestelmä sekoittaa päät-Baba Jabbi joutui jättämään työpaikkansa väärän työluvan takia," *Helsingin Sanomat*, March 14, 2014, http://www.hs.fi/kaupunki/a1394691659631. Last view May 22, 2017.

[14] See Mervi Leppäkorpi, "Oikeudettomassa asemassa olevat siirtolaiset kolmannen sektorin asiakkaina. Näkökulmia tapausesimerkin kautta," *Kansalaisyhteiskunta* no. 1 (2015), pp. 74-96.

[15] See also Alt, op. cit., p. 114.

[16] See Moksnes, op. cit., Könönen, op. cit., and Alt, op. cit.

[17] Alt, op. cit., 126.

[18] Among others. Alho, op. cit., p. 93.

[19] Moksnes, op. cit.

[20] See also Alho, op. cit., pp. 93-94.

[21] Annette Bernhardt, Siobhán McGrath, and James DeFilippis, "The State of Worker Protections in the United States. Unregulated Work in New York City," *International Labour Review* vol. 147, no. 2-3, 2008, pp. 135-162.

[22] Moksnes, op. cit.

[23] Moksnes, op. cit., and Alho, op. cit.

[24] Trade unions opened a similar service in Helsinki after I finished my field research.

[25] See Ulrich Brinkmann, Hae-Lin Choi, Richard Detje, Klaus Dörre, Hajo Holst, Serhat Karakayali, and Catharina Schmalstieg, *Strategic Unionism. Aus der Krise zur Erneuerung? Umrisse eines Forschungsprogramms* (Wiesbaden, Germany: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2008), p. 25.

[26] Moksnes, op. cit.

[27] Alt, op. cit.

[28] Neva Löw, *Wir Leben hier und wir bleiben hier. Die Sans Papiers im Kampf um Ihre Rechte* (Münster, Germany: Westfälisches Dampfboot, 2013).

Ritual Huichol Art

The Drum Fiesta and The Use of Body Paint

Ricardo Claudio Pacheco Bribiesca*

The Huichol indigenous people are known in Mexico and a large part of the world for the richness and diversity of their crafts. The majority of their very colorful yarn pictures, bead weaves, and textiles use a wide range of fearlessly contrasting hues.

They are comprised of geometric forms like a kaleidoscopic, with animals, flowers, plants, ritual objects, human figures, or mythical scenes parading through them, framed in plentiful scenes full of form and color.

This production is nourished by their tradition, but since it is made for the market, it is far from what we could call "genuine Wixaritari art." That kind of aesthetic expression is related to and created in the context and the praxis of the group's ceremonial religious life. Nevertheless, as Johannes Neurath states, "Pure ritual does not exist, nor does art that is only representation."[1]

In many cases, ritual art is the expression of the world of the ancestors, learned, recreated, and shared by people who have gotten close to the world of tradition and achieved "the gift of seeing," which is translated into visions. For this reason, it is not only the creation of individual human beings, but something handed down by ancestors and a way *par excellence* to relate to each other and honor those ancestors through offerings, dances, songs, paintings, and innumerable aesthetic expressions of the Wixaritari intellectual tradition.

I have covered the issue of body painting, its color and designs, in different publications.[2] But the drum festival is the ideal pretext for looking in detail at what comprises ritual art, an art that is the product of tradition, whose specificity and objective are human relations.

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Photos courtesy of the author.

Tatei Neixa, better known as the drum festival, is an agricultural cycle fiesta that combines seasonal rites of passage with the initiation rites for the life cycle of human beings.

Huichol crafts: yarn drawings and bead weaving.

The drum is a sacred instrument, the personification of the deer ancestor Tamatsi Kauyumarie.

Ritual art is the expression of the world of the ancestors, learned, recreated, and shared by people who have entered into the world of tradition and achieved "the gift of seeing."

This is a form of art in which symbolism is at the service of a collective aesthetic, in which the ephemeral is what predominates over the permanence that characterizes the aesthetics of craft work. The latter seeks to fix an idea; this contrasts with ritual art, in which the creation of images is temporary, and their production and reproduction are dangerous, subject to taboos. We are dealing here with an aesthetic devised deliberately to be observed and experienced solely in that moment and conditioned to not being reproduced with other ends and elsewhere.

Tatei Neixa, better known as the drum fiesta or festival, is a ceremony that the Huichol celebrate toward the end of the rainy season. It usually falls in the last weeks of October, when the crops are almost completely developed and about to be harvested. It is an agricultural cycle fiesta that combines the seasonal rites of passage with the initiation rites for the life cycle of human beings. In it, ears of corn and squash as well as newborns and children up to the age of five are central figures.

Identified with each other during the fiesta, corn, squash, and children are considered equal, or "unripe fruit." This means that for a certain length of time, the two vegetables and children are indistinguishable "beings." This identity has to do with shared morphological characteristics: due to the great similarity of their forms and bodies, a relationship is established between them; but in addition, they are attributed with common qualities such as humidity, softness, tenderness, and immaturity.

At the same time, they are considered children of the deities, beings with a common origin, that have a pre-existence before being handed over to human beings in the form of gifts. At first view, the children are the progeny of their biological parents, while the squash and the ears of corn are the product of growing in the fields that farmers have sown and worked. However, in the Huichol intellectual tradition, very little escapes the intervention of the ancestors. Thus, everything that human beings obtain is thanks to them. So, the fruit of the fields, before being the result of farm work, and children, the progeny of their human parents, are all children of the ancestors. Mainly, they are the children of the mother corn, Tatei Niwetsika, and the young eagle mother, Tatei Werika Wimari, who have given them the soul, or *iyari*, to be able to live.

In the Huichol intellectual tradition, very little escapes the intervention of the ancestors. Thus, everything that human beings obtain is thanks to them.

Participating in the drum fiesta for five consecutive years allows the children to stop being like vegetables, so they can move on to a more human condition, to become people; this also translates into the transition to another stage in which they will gradually take on the responsibilities of adults. Parallel to this, the squash and ears of corn are divested of the quality of being actors when they are sacrificed and cooked; this turns them into food, which will later be consumed at the end of the fiesta.

To differentiate the ears of corn, squash, and children year after year, during the drum festival, they are taken on a long trip through a wide geography of worship: it stretches from the Pacific Ocean to the desert. The objective is to introduce them and take them to visit the abodes of the ancestors who have given them life. Both the children and the corn and squash participate directly in person, while their souls or *iyarite* in the form of a ball of cotton on a string are transferred from one place to another by the *mara'akame* or shaman, who narrates the experience in his song.

White Rock, a sacred place, the dwelling of the mother goddess of the sea Tatei Haramara.

It is a journey in two stages, moving through land, sea, and air. In the first stage, beginning when the Sun reaches its zenith and ending almost at midnight, all of them, ears of corn, squash, and children, are taken airborne through the world aboveground, flying to Wirikuta in the East, to the desert where the myth says their father Sun was born, and they are then returned to their community.

In this flight, the children and their souls are described as winged beings: birds, butterflies, or bees, that accompany the drum played in the middle of the venue during the entire fiesta. Using their own wings or *wainurite*, the children journey together with a musical instrument considered to be the personification of the deer ancestor, Tamatsi Kauyumarie. During the mythical period, this ancestor helped the Sun rise to the firmament after he was born in Wirikuta by pushing with its antlers.

Through singing the *mara'akame* and the percussion, the drum passes through a metamorphosis, going from



Huichol child in ritual garb.

Salinas Hill in the high desert of San Luis Potosí.

Extracting *uxa* dye.

The children and their souls are described as winged beings: birds, butterflies, or bees, that accompany the drum played in the middle of the venue during the entire fiesta.

being an inert or flat object —as Philippe Descola would describe it, bereft of a soul or other personality traits—[3] to temporarily become an animated thing, a living subject.

As Fernando Santos-Granero points out, in indigenous intellectual traditions, the things or objects most likely to turn into subjectivities are the ones that enter into contact with the bodies of human beings when used or touched by them.[4] This is what happens to the *tepo* drum, which is infused with a soul through the direct action of many of the ritual participants through four actions: when it is painted and dressed; when fire or warmth is put inside it; when it is touched together with the beating of the children's rattles; and through the pleas of the *mara'akame*.

Its condition as a deer is expressed by the sounds it makes, a tapping or beat, which the listeners hear and perceive as the beat of the deer's heart and the pounding of its hooves. This piece consists of a hollowed-out tree-trunk dressed in a deerskin, whose trunk or body is painted with a series of drawings graphically depicting the mythical journey of that ancestor to the land of peyote, a trip that at the same time is materialized in the journey the children are making.

Usually, the paintings in yellow *uxa* on the drum include a combination of abstract and realist figures, among which can be distinguished the silhouettes of deer, peyote plants, stylized flowers, and dotted lines. Together, they depict the mythical journey of the deer ancestor Tamatsi Kauyumari to the Wirikuta desert, as well as his experience at the first dawn, where his tracks became peyote and he was initiated. Clearly, these are scenes and not individual, independent drawings; they are events that occurred in mythical times but are also occurring during the ritual itself.

Once they have arrived to Wirikuta, just like the drum, the children's bodies are painted with *uxa*, a dye extracted for a thorny bush (also called *uxa*) that grows in the high plateau of San Luis Potosí. It is yellow, the dye of Tayau, the father Sun, that leaves the mark of his rays on the face of the pilgrims who have traveled to the desert.

After the flight of their souls, with their faces painted, the children return to the community. However, their designs are less elaborate than the paintings on the drum; they are not like those of the adult *peyoteros*, or peyote-eaters, people with ritual responsibilities, who physically make pilgrimages

Peyote plants.

Uxa, a root used in ritual painting.

Deer track.

Face-painting of the children is not only a graphical and numerical indicator of the journeys their souls have taken, but also an abstract view of the Huichol universe.

Children's faces painted with *uxa*, representing peyote.

to the desert where they consume peyote in order to be initiated and have visions, which they will later paint on their own faces, as did the ancestors in the primeval times.

Usually, stains or dots of yellow color can be seen on the faces of the little ones, depending on the number of times they have participated. This means that babies only have a single dot on their faces, whereas older children or those who have participated in several fiestas, may have up to five.

Despite the big differences between the images on the cylindrical drum and the adults' face paintings, the yellow dots on the children's faces do achieve a certain degree of complexity, above all in the composition of the five points, distributed starting on the tip of the nose, the two cheekbones, the forehead, and the chin. This is an image that only children who have gone to five fiestas can wear. This design is related to the symbolism of the *tsik+ri*, a diamond-shaped cross that can be more clearly seen if you draw the imaginary lines between all the points, going for one extreme to the other through a center (which, in this case, would be the tip of the nose), and uniting all the external dots. The *tsik+ri* is a complex symbol that alludes to the directions of the universe; it is a three-dimensional design that not only marks a center and four edges, but also an upper and a lower plane. During the drum fiesta, it also appears as a woven cross hanging from a string, from which the cotton balls or children's souls also hang and through which they move.

Face-painting of the children is not only a graphical and numerical indicator of the fiestas and journeys that their souls

GLOSSARY

Wixarika, Wixaritari	The name the Huichol call themselves
Wirikuta	Place of worship in the San Luis Potosí desert, where peyote grows on the skirts of the Sierra de Catorce Mountains
wainurite	Wings of small children, described as invisible for most people
Tatei Neixa	Fiesta or ritual: "The Dance of Our Mother," also known as the Drum Festival
Tatei Niwetsika	Our Mother of the Corn, feminine deity and mythical ancestress
Tatei Werika Wimari	Our Mother the Young Eagle, feminine deity and mythical ancestress
iyari	Soul, heart, center, interior
iyarite	Souls (plural)
mara´akame	"Dreamer," shaman, healer, singer
Tamatsi Kauyumari	Our Older Brother the Deer, masculine deity, mythical ancestor
tepo	Vertical drum with a tripod base, used in rituals
uxa	Plant or bush that grows in the highland desert of San Luis Potosí, from whose root a yellow dye of the same name is extracted to use in rituals; with it the bodies of human beings, animals, plants and all manner of artifacts used in ceremonies are painted.
Tayau	Our Father the Sun, masculine deity, mythical ancestor
tsik+ri	Geometric design in the form of a diamond, which symbolizes mainly the cardinal points of the universe and appears repeatedly in rituals and even in crafts as a yarn cross held up by two sticks or poles

Design in *uxa* using dotted lines on cheeks and nose.

have taken, but also an abstract view of the Huichol universe, or world view, represented in a geometric figure in the form of the *tsik+ri* painted in the yellow dye of the Father Sun on their faces. An ephemerally painted, diamond-shaped cross that legitimizes the children's journey through the places and abodes that their ancestors inhabit, and that disappears when they return to the community, washed off with water before they go to sleep. Ritual and art, an indivisible pair on the road to initiation. VM

Notes

[1] Johannes Neurath, *La vida de las imágenes. Arte huichol* (Mexico City: *Artes de México*/Conaculta, 2013), p. 125.

[2] Ricardo Claudio Pacheco, "Ambivalencia y escisión en el concepto de persona *wixarika* (huichol): el ritual mortuorio y su búsqueda para lograr invisibilidad," master's thesis in Meso-American studies (Mexico City: UNAM-IIF, 2010); "Centros anímicos y pintura corporal en rituales *wixaritari* (huicholes)," Revista *Estudios Mesoamericanos* 13 (2013), pp. 67-74; and "La navegación del tambor y el vuelo de los niños: complejidad ritual" (Mexico City: UNAM-IIF, 2016).

[3] Philippe Descola, *La selva culta. Simbología y praxis en la ecología de los achuar* (Quito, Ecuador: Abyayala, 1996).

[4] Fernando Santos-Granero, *The Occult Side of Things. Native Amazonian Theories of Materiality and Personhood* (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 2009).



Haitijuana

Sergio Rodríguez-Blanco*

The first photograph Hans-Maximo Musielik (Pforzheim, Germany, 1974) took was with his father's old Canon when he was seven years old. Hans, the son of a German doctor and a Spanish pediatrician mother, remembers that he put a model boat in his bathtub at home in Germany and had fun trying to use the split-screen viewfinder. All the photos came out yellow, dark, and blurry. Since 2004, the social dynamics in Mexico and that "everyday ebb and flow," as he calls it, led him to settle here to do his work as a photographer.

Haitijuana is a documentary piece of images taken by Musielik in Tijuana between December 2016 and February 2017. The photos show the perspective of the Mexicans who have taken in the Haitian migrants who massively flowed into the border city starting in February 2016. At the same time, the shots bring to the surface the point of view of the Haitians themselves as those migrant actors of globalization, actors that have already been both visibly and invisibly incorporated into the daily life of almost every society on the planet.

Late capitalism has produced an undefined area occupied by the logic of conflict and the production of systemic violence. In social and economic terms, this area is effected by the precariousness of existence, and, according to Bertrand Ogilvie,[1] produces an institutionalized form of extreme violence: disposable lives. However, some local inhabitants do exist who deposit their grain of sand to reverse this trend, and some migrants, on their way, resist being represented —at least visually— in situations that make them victims.

This is what happens in *Haitijuana*.

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It is December 31 in Tijuana. It's cold and an intermittent rain is falling. In front of the façade of the Juventud 2000 shelter, a young Tijuana girl holds out her selfie stick and asks a group of young Haitians to pose with her. They are migrants and are wearing clothing just donated to them.

"You look great! This merits a selfie. [Click]".

It's not the first time that this young woman is at the shelter: her activist father brings the migrants basic items.

In the photo inside the photo, the Haitians flirt with the idea of knowing that they're on the young girl's social media. Hans Musielik captures here a meta-photograph in which the mechanisms of self-representation both of the migrant community and the receiving Tijuana community can flower.

When the Haitians arrive in Mexico, the National Immigration Institute (INM) gives them a 20-day permit to transit through the country. In that time, they mainly move toward Tijuana and Mexicali, where the INM, in coordination with U.S. immigration authorities, gives them a date for entering the country of the "American Dream." Many request a humanitarian visa to be able to remain in Mexico while they wait to enter the United States.

Marie Cookie was born in Guadalajara, Jalisco. Many people call her María Galleta, the Spanish translation of her last name, which she has kept from the years when she was married.

The border is just a few feet from the canal in the photo's background. For many years, migrants in transit slept on its banks. Across the street is the El Chaparral border crossing. Anyone going or coming from there has to cross in front of her little office, one room and a bathroom. Cookie opened an office on the Plaza Viva México called Deported Mothers and Families in Action to support migrants.

Before being an activist, she was a day laborer in the United States. She later married a U.S. soldier of Filipino descent, and, when she became a U.S. citizen in the 1980s, she began helping migrants and deportees with HIV on both sides of the border. Today, she works on the Mexican side. She keeps her office open with her pension and a few donations, offering Spanish and English classes as well as psychological support to deportees and migrants. The office also provides some clothing and basic personal hygiene items, and, of course, a haircut so that immigrants can make themselves presentable to look for a job. It's all free of charge.

▲ The same white wall that witnessed the selfie-stick scene is now painted with blue wings. It's January; the painting is unfinished, but was done by a local artist who used to live in the Juventud 2000 shelter. You go by this wall just before you get to the patio where the tents are pitched.

This is the only photograph this young Haitian would let Musielik take. He didn't want to give his name. What we do know about him is that he lived for a time in Brazil. The 2010 earthquake that killed 200 000 people and the cholera outbreak sparked a massive exodus of Haitians from their country. Most countries offered humanitarian aid, and one of them was Brazil, where the refugees worked on the construction of the infrastructure for the 2016 Olympic Games. When the political crisis broke out in Brazil and unemployment spiked, thousands of Haitian and African families decided to try their luck in the United States, asking for temporary protection status.

For this young man, it is as though the shelter wall had become a sanctuary where he can smilingly represent himself, with his technological tool in hand. That's how he wants to be remembered.

▲ In the background, behind the counter, is Linda. She's Mexican; she has one daughter and lives in an old trailer with her partner in the patio where all the migrants' tents are pitched. Linda is the first contact with the Haitians who come to Juventud 2000. They speak Creole French and need help with their documentation: anything from a request for a humanitarian visa to health issues. She's a strong woman. She's also efficient.

The woman with her back to the camera just arrived in Tijuana with her little girl to ask for shelter. Like many others, she has arrived on her way from Brazil and Central America. A few minutes before this photo was taken, Linda helped a Haitian man who had just received his Mexican humanitarian visa and wanted to ask for a job in a warehouse distributing goods; that's the same job he had done for the years he was a refugee in Brazil.

Tijuana is used to receiving migrants, but the wave of Haitians that began in May 2016 saturated the existing shelters and required that they be expanded and new ones opened up. By December, the waiting time for getting into the United States had extended from 20 days to 5 months.

By February, Chelet Thomas, the man in the window, had gotten his humanitarian visa and invested his small savings to open a Haitian kitchen in the front part of a little room a few feet from the Juventud 2000 shelter. Chema, the shelter's director, helped him with merchandising. His specialty is chicken with rice. Haitians don't like the smell of raw chicken, so they wash it several times with lime and water; then they let it soak for a while; after that, they spread a spicy paste over it and fry it. The result is dry, fibrous chicken with a neutral flavor. The rice is juicier. The food is served on plates that can be closed for take-out. One serving costs Mex$40, or Mex$50 with a soft drink.

In the picture, Thomas, who knows he's being photographed, smiles in satisfaction, with dignity in the middle of his work day.

▲ Many migrants volunteer in the shelter. This back-lit photo that almost completely erases the color of the migrants' skin shows the free food they will be eating the day it was taken. It is all made with donations from Tijuana residents and religious organizations. The shelters sometimes get support from the municipal and state governments, mainly medical services and a ride in an ambulance in the case of emergency. In Tijuana, you can count on one hand the shelters that are well-equipped, with legal and psychological counseling, rooms with bunk beds, showers, and bathrooms, to care not only for the 4 500 Haitians currently residing in the city, but the entire flow of migrants. It is common to find modest shelters and churches where the owners manage the donated resources and food to make it stretch for everyone.

◀ The light from a cell phone illuminates the face of one of the migrants, who sleeps in one of the 70 tents purchased by the shelter. The relationship the Haitians have with their cell phones is not very different from that of any smartphone user. In January, the municipal government donated the structure to put a roof over the patio. The federal government has given practically nothing.

Gustavo Banda Acevedes is the pastor of the Ambassadors of Jesus Protestant church. By February 2017, the church was hosting almost 300 migrants from Haiti, but in December, it had held more than 500. Some churches, both Catholic and Protestant, open their doors and spread a sea of mattresses in front of their altars to temporarily house the migrants. Banda Acevedes says that they need about 2 sacks of rice (about 46 kilograms each), half a sack of beans, 20 large cans of sardines, and about 8 boxes of chicken to feed this number of people. This all comes from donations and his and his wife's wages; so, when there isn't enough money, they manage with half of what they need.

The photo shows a ceremony in which the pastor is trying to give the man physical strength, in the presence of other members of the congregation; the enormous effort he is making can be seen on his face.

▲ Gustavo Banda Acevedes plans to build 10 cabins on church land that used to be a soccer field. The municipality of Tijuana has opposed their construction because the area is prone to mudslides, even though the entire area of the Alacrán Canyon and the canal, 300 feet downstream, where there are lots of buildings, is in the same potential danger. Seemingly, the situation has been legalized. Gustavo says the houses will be occupied by the Haitian migrants who want to live there. In the photo, the pastor and some Haitian men are helping build the second cabin.

The second house, the one under construction, is for Timothy, a married Haitian man who wants to stay in Mexico, at least for now. The cabin is made out of plywood with a gable roof. Timothy, wearing a t-shirt and cap with logos of U.S. cities, straightens up for the photo. If he eventually decides to leave, the cabin will be occupied by new migrants. ▼

In mid-February, 2017, Zaida Guillén, Gustavo's wife, took the Haitian children living in the Ambassadors of Jesus church to the beach. A wall of metal bars separates Mexico from the United States in the area known as Friendship Park, near the lighthouse. From the sand, it looks easy to swim and cross to the other side, but there's a double wall and the entire U.S. side is watched by the Border Patrol. Even so, some migrants have managed to cross over. Meanwhile, the children in the photo have fun climbing the border wall by the sea.

A few feet up from the beach, some Mexican DJs, one from Tijuana and the other from San Luis Potosí, finish writing a song criticizing Donald Trump's wall. They pose for Musielik in front of the wall painted with a U.S. flag, gazing out toward infinity. There's no smiling.

▲ Back at the beach, that same day, on a February weekend, 8-year-old Wilberlande Pierre enjoys the waves just feet from the United States.

Zaida Guillén tells us that a month later, in mid-March, Pierre crossed the border with his father. They have family there. His mother and two little sisters stayed in Mexico, housed in the Ambassadors of Jesus church, waiting for the news that they can join their family across the border. VM

Notes

[1] Bertrand Olgivie, *El hombre desechable. Ensayo sobre las formas de exterminio y la violencia extrema* (Buenos Aires: Nueva Visión, 2013).

The Work of Lucia Vidales

Painting that Inhabits the Depths

Tania José*



▲ *Gravediggers,* 140 x 170 cm, 2016 (oil on canvas).

If we look closely at Vidales's canvases, it is very noticeable that they are dealt with not only as material, but also as a result of a multiplicity of contradictions that question the "right" or "pure" way of producing and appropriating art.

Accumulations, variable sizes, 2016 (oil and encaustic on wood).

A host of colors come together on a canvas before our eyes. Greens, reds, and blues intertwine and swirl together. If you look closely, you can see a multitude of shades and hues not superimposed on each other but merged symbiotically. If you get a little closer, you can see at the extreme right of the canvas an almost human figure holding a kind of tool in its hands with which it works the scene of *Gravediggers* (2016), a painting in which Lucía Vidales Lojero (Mexico City, 1986) leads us through different densities, shades, and hues along the pathways of color as a pictorial material.

For Vidales, painting is not just a support; it is above all matter for experimentation and reflection on her artistic practice and what makes her work a visual invitation, seducing and simultaneously confronting the observer with other times, leading him/her toward worlds inhabited by fantastic, chaotic, noisy beings. At times, these beings that people her oeuvre make up scenes linked together by scattered phrases that make her work a road for witnessing the emergence of the depths through color and its materiality.

In addition to working as an artist, Vidales teaches in the design department at the Autonomous Metropolitan University (UAM), and one of her concerns has been to ensure her

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** Photos courtesy of Lucía Vidales.

students have the basic theoretical tools they need.

This concern can also be seen in her art, which includes painting, graphics, and sculpture. So, it is by no means a coincidence to find in her pieces the stamp of theoretical reflection materialized in their titles and the way she works.

Examining Vidales's oeuvre offers multiple aspects to choose from. One of the most obvious is perhaps the grotesque, not so much in her style as in an aesthetic that questions the hegemonic cannon of representation. At the same time, it is an option for generating other paradigms of visual representation present in their composition. Another aspect is children and the malice that these beings, idealized as pure and innocent, can harbor. This is very interesting since it makes it possible to appreciate the way in which the painter questions the relationship of human beings with evil and the "improper," transcending its mere destructive aspects to locate its subversive potential.

But the paths to deepening our understanding of this young artist do not end there. Another outstanding trait in her work is the question of deformity, present not only in the figures that wander through her canvases, but also in the use of different resources and her way of applying them, whether on wood, Masonite, or in oils. All together, they generate what she has called a kind of "pleasurable madness."

However, beyond these elements —or, we could even say, underneath them— lies another pathway, just as disquieting and questioning as the others: color, not only as an essential component of painting, but as a resource that makes more powerful the artist's themes, forms, and questions about the possibilities of painting as language in a context where it would seem there is no longer much to be said.

▲ *Take Me with You*, from the series "I Want to Go Home," 190 x 120 cm, 2012 (oil and encaustic on wood).

For Vidales, painting is not just a support; it is above all matter for experimentation and reflection that makes her work a visual invitation seducing and simultaneously confronting the observer with other times.

Painting as Body

When you visit Lucía Vidales's workshop, time is transformed. The topics of conversation hinge on the canvas, painting, and reality. This is a chaotic,

deformed reality of violent colors, on the one hand, and, on the other, the social, political, and artistic reality where her work is situated not as a mere object, but as a subject able to interact with the observer.

In this sense, Vidales says that painting as a support is not simply a plane or a thing, but that it "includes all the links that we are able to relate to it with." Perhaps for this reason, standing in front of one of her paintings, your attention is so focused that it becomes almost impossible not to want to get closer to discover the details, the nuances, the scrapes on the wood, or the reliefs produced by the layers of oils that spill off the surface and give the painting a body that comes out to meet you.

Vidales asks herself about the possibilities of painting beyond the canvas. These reflections, she says, are part of a still-unnamed project that seeks to bestow this material with a kind of body and turn it into a three-dimensional object constructed using what she calls "waste" or "scraps"; that is, the remainders of other paintings, pieces of acrylic or oils that, when manipulated, form irregular bodies, kinds of eyes, intestines, and mouths, adhered to windowpanes like stickers, or that are stuck together like different layers of translucent, multi-hued skin.

▲ *Landscape Like Skin*, 30 x 25 cm, 2017 (oil on canvas on wood).

When you observe these "scraps" or "waste" from other paintings, the first thing you notice is an element of play, of interaction with the material through manipulation that gives the work "life" and dynamism. Another thing that jumps out at the viewer is a concern with the support that abandons the canvas to make the oil or acrylic the pillar of the painting and make color the substance that provides different densities and transparencies. In the words of the artist, the project's objective is that when this painting made of "waste" interacts with light and space, it becomes a kind of living being, susceptible of transformations and changes.

Having gotten this far, beyond densities and transparencies, what is the role of color in the work of Vidales?

Another Order of Color

The artist's emphasis on color is one of the fundamental crosscutting themes of her work. If we look closely at her canvases, it is very noticeable that they are dealt with not only as material, but also as a result of a multiplicity of contradictions that question the "right" or "pure" way of producing and appropriating art in general and painting in particular. Vidales says, "Perhaps those colors that have been called pure . . . are that weightless light that goes from the grasses to the fire and from the fire to the clouds, with no weight or roots." However,

The Path of Contradiction, 150 x 240 cm, n.d. (oil and encaustic on wood).

▲ *I Thought I Shouldn't.*

In her canvases, the paint becomes a living material: the density of its layers of color has the necessary vitality that the artist raises in a singular fashion through a series of relationships, tensions, and questions that make her work a place in which depth overflows, becomes light, and ascends.

"another order of color [exists] that weighs and inhabits the depths." This other order, contrary to making a priority of the spiritual or the concept, is distinct because it makes pictorial matter —that is, color as such— evidence of the process of the construction of the work.

What does it mean in the case of Vidales's work to make the pictorial evident? In the first place, it means making painting clearly a process of human labor more than the result of divine inspiration or abstract, timeless genius. In this sense, her works have a direct relationship with a temporal category and, in particular, with the present. The references she makes to classical painters are a way of having her oeuvre dialogue with other times, not as a mere evocation, but as a resource for talking about the present.

Another way that the process of construction of each work is made evident is the materiality of the color. That is, the paint itself is a signifier: the multiple layers of paint from which the artist makes the black, red, ochre, and ultramarine hues emerge, which range from the shiny to the opaque, as well as the body-language of her strokes, glazes, shavings, or unfinished spaces that allow color to be a presence capable of inhabiting the depths. In her canvases, the paint becomes a living material: the density of its layers of color has the necessary vitality that the artist raises in a singular fashion through a series of relationships, tensions, and questions that make her work a place where depth overflows, becomes light, and ascends.

When you look at Vidales's canvases, you inevitably think about the way her painting is linked to reality. When attempting to define realism, the writer José Revueltas resorts to his experience during a visit to a leper colony in Guadalajara in 1955.[1] His experience, narrated using abundant images and references to classical painters who depicted deformation, monstrosity, and the grotesque in their works, leads him to say that "reality has its

Examining Vidales's oeuvre offers multiple aspects to choose from. One of the most obvious is perhaps the grotesque, not so much in her style as in an aesthetic that questions the hegemonic cannon of representation.

▲ *Fireflies*, 120 x 100 cm, 2016 (oil on canvas).

Another outstanding trait in her work is the question of deformity, present not only in the figures that wander through her canvases, but also in the use of different resources, whether on wood, Masonite, or in oils. All together, they generate what she has called a kind of "pleasurable madness."

The Strange Death of a Painter in 1986, 120 x 100 cm, 2016 (oil on canvas).

own internal movement, which is not that whirlwind that it immediately appears to be, where everything seems to be hurling in a thousand directions at once." Revueltas calls that movement of the interpenetration of contrasting elements, of accumulation and quantitative and qualitative transformation, the "tough-minded" or dialectic side of reality, which makes it possible not only to observe it, but to grasp it.

We can say that Lucía's works are situated in this terrain: more than evoking reality, they grasp it. What reality are we talking about? Without a doubt, the reality of a country beaten down by violence, turned into a grave from which bodies emerge every day that are not only that, but also evidence of a deformed system that "seems to be hurling in a thousand directions at once," chaotically and grotesquely.

More than images, Lucía Vidales presents us with painting of processes and other ways of understanding and grasping time; it is experimentation that reveals fragments of answers to questions about painting as reality, as material, as the result of human labor that questions the human in its multiple variations, where what has a name —and even what doesn't have a name but nevertheless exists— are all at home. VM

Notes

[1] José Revueltas, "A propósito de *los muros de agua*," in *Los muros de agua.* (Mexico City: ERA, 2014), pp. 7-23.

Miguel Castro Leñero

The Poetry of Images

Astrid Velasco Montante*

He is no poet who has not felt the temptation
to destroy or create another language.
Octavio Paz

▲ *Men Working VII,* 79 x 60 cm (collage and acrylic on workshop proof). Private collection.

Miguel Castro Leñero's personal archives

▲ *Out of Focus*, 92 x 80 cm each (triptych), 2013 (oil on canvas). Private collection.



Estudio Sagahón

▲ The artist working on his "Airplanes" series.

The work of Miguel Castro Leñero includes graphics, sculpture, and painting and reflects a unique perspective and great creativity. This is shown in how he unfolds the possibilities of a motif on the aesthetic, symbolic, and technical planes, the result of his very special way of grasping the world.

The artist collects the materials he works with, and in so doing, reveals the humanity of things. However, his collecting is at the same time construction, creation. Anyone who knows him knows that he is an avid urban wanderer. And I say this because what he does is to navigate the city, where everyday objects and scenes take on new forms that, in turn, create new possibilities. On his walks through his Escandón neighborhood, he discovers materials for creation and re-creation on different supports and with different items. Thus, his visual finds are behind the aesthetic and material re-framing of an exhaustive oeuvre done in series (dogs, airplanes, houses . . .).

In his work, the synthesis and symbolic development that the image goes through in one of his series, as well as the move toward other materials, turn the object or subject represented into poetry. It is sometimes almost like a haiku that is re-designed until it explores the diverse possibilities of a

Miguel Castro's search has become a daily activity: he compiles images and uses them to build and rebuild others, which he gives meanings to.

Miguel Castro Leñero's personal archives

▲ *Dog with Sign II*, 56 x 80 cm, 2014 (single-print engraving in ink and crayon).

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landscape. At other times, it is a complex allegory expressing itself with the simplicity of raised strokes on textures and, in the case of sculpture, in the volume and dimensions that the object acquires.

For Miguel Castro, his search has become a daily activity: he compiles images and uses them to build and rebuild others, which he gives meanings to that may be personal —a house as the representation of an individual corporeal reality, or of identity, or of a country, or of a world…—, or, on the other hand, may become universal symbols that touch all human beings, thus acquiring the substance of archetypes.

While representation in art is an action that happens in at least three stages (looking, conceptualizing, and expressing or capturing), in Miguel's case, this activity is central thanks

Where some see only a sign or a drain or a wire fence, Miguel sees an entire world: houses, dogs, airplanes, leaves, whales. And then, like a *mise-en-abîme*, his ability to attribute meaning to them sets up a game of infinite representations.

Miguel Castro Leñero's personal archives

▲ *Double House,* 30 x 40 cm, 2005 (ink, crayon, and graphite on paper). Private collection.

Estudio Sagahón

▲ View of the plate for *House with Cracks II,* 75.5 x 104 cm, 2016 (single print) in the artist's studio.

▲ *Brancusi's Eagle,* 73 x 24.5 x 13.3 cm (bronze).

to his ability to discover, both in the sense of the mere image and in the sense of its possibilities of symbolizing. Where some see only a sign or a drain or a wire fence, Miguel sees an entire world: houses, dogs, airplanes, leaves, whales. . . . And then, like a *mise-en-abîme*, his ability to attribute meaning to them sets up a game of infinite representations:

> I work with images of houses that represent the interior climate; it's raining or there are clouds. This way, the inventiveness that can emerge from these themes is endless, and even more so in the meaning of the house. In this sense, I construct images that develop autonomously. For me, one criterion is to know the material . . . . People who make interesting things don't do it because they have very sophisticated materials, but because they understand the materials they're working with.[1]

Thus, his representations, which display the approach he uses to capture his surroundings, show us the differing levels of readings and the various reference points that he shapes:

> He visually investigates areas that range from optical curiosity and the act of filing away or collecting apparently random visual information to the gathering of his most conscious motifs (always simple,



Miguel Castro Leñero's personal archives

▲ *House with Chairs*, 200 x 160 cm, 2014 (oil on canvas).

not encased in meaning, but graphically forceful or visually intriguing in formal terms). Cages, dogs, shadows of cars, projected or informal forms, details or textual left-overs of the urban landscape, symbolic motifs from notebooks or normally attractive, but decontextualized, schema allow him to make combinations that are more open to pleasure and formal —rather than narrative— interpretation.

In terms of process, Miguel pours all this onto the canvas, involving himself in an extensive process of reconversion. He investigates, cross-checks, compares, destroys, and uses these motifs as catalysts to find his theme. From a more poetic perspective, his oeuvre, whether figurative or not, is representative of a reflexive, process-based concept.[2]

One fundamental characteristic of his work has already been hinted at here: his series. When I look at them, the airplanes, the houses, the dogs . . ., I am surprised by another essential specificity of his pieces: their playfulness and warmth. This form of constructing underlines the value of his working process. What is more important than the finished canvas or sculpture is the development and exploration of the "mother image," to give it a name alluding to the original image that sparked the work. From there emerge its variations or possi-

Miguel Castro Leñero's personal archives

Rug Dog, 41 x 44.5 x 14 cm, 2016 (bronze). ▶

One fundamental characteristic of Castro Leñero's work are his series. When I look at them, the airplanes, the houses, the dogs . . ., I am surprised by another essential specificity of his pieces: their playfulness and warmth.

bilities: textures, framings, and lines, in addition to the change in techniques and materials.

The artist has reflected on the importance of representation and the emergence of symbols in human development:

> Part of my work involves seeing with Man's capacity for representation, which has also changed over time. That is, the creation of symbols develops new forms that are very linked to the evolution of technique; for example, with machines, with creating symbols, new signs that didn't exist before and that create a new one, which implies enriching our vision of the world. . . ; human beings, without intending to, without representing symbolically, have done this in many cases. To illustrate this, just think of the signs that people make spontaneously, where they draw a dog at the foot of a tree to remind their neighbors not to let their pets urinate there.[3]

Miguel Castro has expressed his admiration for designers, for design in general, and for how the beauty of an object sometimes resides in its function or in the synthesis it achieves, or in the aesthetic intelligence where it manifests itself. In that sense, he compares the construction of the image to poetry and, coincidentally, that is what he also achieves in his work. Finally, poetry is the construction of a new world on the basis of the day-to-day, a new world in which malleability and the beauty of language dominate. And that is what Miguel's work is like: out of what he sees and collects on his daily wanderings emerge images that he endows with symbolism and powerful beauty. Evoking the title of the novel by Bulgarian writer Iliya Troyanov, we could describe him as a collector of worlds. VM

Miguel Castro Leñero's personal archives

▲ *Woman with Hat,* 98 x 71 cm, 2015 (ink and graphite on a workshop proof).

Miguel Castro Leñero's personal archives

▲ *Man with Hat,* 98 x 71 cm, 2015 (ink and graphite on workshop proof).

Notes

[1] Leonel Sagahón, interview with Miguel Castro Leñero, in Miguel Castro Leñero, *Avión casa* (Mexico City: Nostra Ediciones, at press).

[2] Juan Iván González de León, "Mirada y movimiento," in Miguel Castro Leñero, *Avión casa* (Mexico City: Nostra Ediciones, at press), p. 10.

[3] Leonel Sagahón, op. cit.

Shoulder bag, María Isabel Grañén Porrúa Collection.

Weaving the World

The Oaxaca Textile Museum

Salvador Maldonado*

For wearing, for hanging, for adorning, for dancing, for dressing rituals, for talking about the world in textures and colors, more than 7 000 pieces of textile art, embroidered on cotton broadcloth, silk, cotton, wool, and vegetable fibers make up the Oaxaca Textile Museum collection.

In the Mexican tradition, textile work has always been not only extremely rich because it puts a stamp of identity on the different cultures, but also of great beauty. Thanks to the codices, we know that from ancient times the pre-Hispanic civilizations practiced different techniques, such as knotting or manual weaving, loom weaving, and dying with natural dyes, which certain indigenous communities continue to use, par-

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ticularly in southern Mexico. Just as it is pleasant to imagine that in that era the gods guided hands toward magnificent embroidery,[1] today we are proud to see that those hands learned the way, and this millennium-old tradition has been passed down generation to generation to culminate in enormously rich textile art.

Museum on the Inside, Museum on the Outside

Like other Mexican museums, this museum's building is truly an architectural gem. It is located in the Historic Downtown of the city of Oaxaca, only two blocks from the cathedral in an eighteenth-century mansion restored in 2007.

The museum is on part of what was the orchard of the old Santo Domingo Soriano Monastery, the second Dominican establishment in the Americas, founded in 1529. In the early seventeenth century, a series of earthquakes seriously damaged the monastery, forcing the Dominicans to rent out and later sell part of their lands to pay for reconstruction.

The first private owner was Don Miguel de Bustamante, who built a simple, one-story adobe house. Later, between 1764 and 1771, the property was owned by the Spanish hacienda owner and merchant Ángel de Antelo y Bermúdez. Don Ángel demolished the adobe house to build a typical baroque two-story home with a green stone façade and a carved door. For the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the building was known as the Antelo House.

In 2006, the Alfredo Harp Helú Foundation purchased the house and spent almost two years restoring it as part of a larger project to recover the architecture of the city of Oaxaca's Historic Downtown.

Quechquémitl (poncho), Octavia Schoendube de Boehm Collection.

In Mexico, textile work has always been
not only extremely rich because it puts a stamp
of identity on the different cultures,
but also of great beauty.

Cape, Humberto Arellano Garza Collection.

In the Mayan tradition, Ixchel, the goddess of the Moon, also called "the rainbow goddess," bestowed on women the talent for knotting or weaving.

The Textiles

From the start, the museum's collections have included important textiles from Oaxaca, Mexico, and the world. Today, the collection includes more than 7 000 pieces, many of which have been treated and in some cases restored for exhibition. These collections are very important not only because of the pieces themselves, which display the world view, the daily lives, the flora and fauna, and other elements of the imaginary of different indigenous cultures of Mexico, but also because of the context and the era in which they were collected. The following is a description of some of the most outstanding.

The María Isabel Grañén Porrúa Collection

Isabel began to collect textiles in 1998, and today has more than 500 pieces. Most come from the collection of Don Crispín Morales, a store owner in Oaxaca's 20 de Noviembre Market. Don Crispín started out in business selling shawls from Chilapa, Tenancingo, and Santa María del Río to Oaxacan women who traditionally wore them. Later, he also began to sell *huipiles* (typical square blouses without sleeves), blouses, and other indigenous textiles for tourists. For several decades, he put aside pieces he liked because of their quality and beauty; thus, between 1960 and 1990, he gathered a representative

collection of indigenous clothing from Oaxaca and neighboring communities of Guerrero state. In addition to Don Crispín's clothing, María Isabel Grañén acquired numerous pieces from the well-known gallery owner and textile promoter Remigio Mestas Revilla and also purchased noteworthy pieces directly from indigenous weavers in different communities. This collection documents the changes in the textile traditions in many Oaxacan communities in the second half of the twentieth century.

The Madeline Humm de Mollet Collection

In April 2005, Oaxacan artist Francisco Toledo acquired this important collection, which he donated to the Oaxaca Textile Museum. Swiss-born Madeline Humm lived in Mexico and traveled throughout the country and Guatemala, where she collected textiles in different communities. She was self-trained as a photographer and ethnographer. In addition to the clothing she collected, she also documented the local architecture, markets, and fiestas of Mexico. Her collection includes one indigenous piece from the viceregal period, the *tlamachtentli*, a fragment of a *huipil* that allows us to recreate the use of feathers in textiles; and some pieces from the early twentieth century. However, the vast majority are from the period between 1950 and 2000.

Blouse, Alejandro de Ávila Collection.

Shoulder bag, Ernesto Cervantes Collection.

From ancient times, the pre-Hispanic civilizations practiced different techniques, such as knotting or manual weaving, loom weaving, and dying with natural dyes, that certain indigenous communities continue to use.

The Ernesto Cervantes Collection

Alejandro de Ávila donated this collection after inheriting it in 1986 from his great uncle Don Ernesto Cervantes Morales. Born in the city of Oaxaca around 1905, Don Ernesto migrated to Mexico City in the 1920s, where he was part of the same milieu as José Vasconcelos, Diego Rivera, Tina Modotti, and other artists. Encouraged by them, he began to sell serapes from Teotitlán del Valle in the intellectual circles of the time. Later, he created a workshop to make cotton table linens in Xochimilco. The House of Cervantes became one of the country's main promoters of traditional Mexican textiles. His collection includes more than 500 pieces from all over the country, including numerous nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century pieces. Examples are two *huipiles* from Santiago Choapan, a Zapotec community in northern Oaxaca, which kept alive the technique of weft wrapping and two varieties of discontinuous weft. Despite their age, almost all the pieces have been beautifully preserved.

The Alejandro de Ávila Collection

In addition to the Cervantes Collection, when the museum was founded, Alejandro de Ávila donated almost 700 textiles that he had gathered between 1970 and 1980. He himself documented most of them in the field in two major regions: Mexico's Northeast (San Luis Potosí, southern Tamaulipas, and southern Nuevo León), and the Southern Sierra Madre in western Oaxaca and eastern Guerrero. This collection includes a few kinds of textiles that do not seem to exist in other museums and private collections. A large number of them date from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. They are also examples of techniques that had not been previously

logged in Mexico, such as the *urdimbre transpuesta* (transposed warp) weave. Several of the pieces are quite worn due to their long use in their communities of origin and have required extensive work by both the Manuel del Castillo Negrete National School of Conservation, Restoration, and Museography in Mexico City and the museum's own conservation laboratory.

The Humberto Arellano Garza Collection

A little before the museum opened its doors on April 19, 2008, the Alfredo Harp Helú Foundation acquired a collection gathered by Monterrey gallery owner Humberto Arellano Garza. Born in 1913, young Mr. Arellano participated in a cultural campaign in indigenous areas, sparking his lifelong interest in folk art. Although we do not know how he gathered his collection, apparently he purchased most of the textiles before 1960. In 1983, he sold it to Porfirio Sosa, an engineer, who in turn passed it to the foundation in 2008. It is made up of 700 pieces from all over Mexico, including a group of nineteenth-century samplers, quilts, and serapes. Several of them are the earliest known examples of textile traditions from some areas and provide fundamental data for clarifying the history of textile art in Mexico. They also include two weaving tech-

Huipil blouse, Madeline Humm de Mollet Collection.

Museo Textil de Oaxaca
(Oaxaca Textile Museum)
Callejón Hidalgo 917 Centro,
68000 Oaxaca, Mexico

Open to the Public:
Monday to Saturday, 10 a.m. to 8 p.m.
Sunday, 10 a.m. to 6 p.m.
Free Admission

niques not previously registered in Mexico. At least some of these pieces —even perhaps most of them— belonged to Fred Davis, a U.S. American merchant and designer who established himself in Mexico City around 1910 and created the first and perhaps largest collection of Mexican folk art known to date.

The Octavia Shoendube Collection

This collection was created in the 1960s and the early 1970s by Octavia Schoendube de Boehm. In that same period, Doña Octavia opened the Dih-kan-dih Gallery at Mexico City's San Ángel Saturday Bazaar, concentrating on Oaxacan indigenous arts, particularly textiles. Doña Octavia and her husband Don Federico traveled throughout the state, purchasing many of the collection's pieces directly in the communities where they were woven. Other pieces were acquired from local merchants specializing in textiles, like Herminia Villafañe and Lucila Franco in Pinotepa de Don Luis; Francisco Ortega in Tehuantepec; and Federico Jiménez and Mr. Nicodemus in Oaxaca city, among others.

* * *

The Oaxaca Textile Museum offers an ongoing program of temporary exhibitions dealing with subjects related to the art of textiles, including the materials, the techniques, the geographical areas, and contemporary proposals that dialogue with traditional textile art. These shows have spawned an exchange of experiences between researchers and artists of the loom and the needle, giving rise to new textile art proposals. Among them are the workshops in which artists from Oaxaca and other parts of the world share their knowledge, abilities, and experiences with the public and other textile artists. The museum, then, in addition to housing more than 7 000 pieces of textile art, is a meeting point for people, traditions, design, and contemporary art. VM

Notes

[1] In the Mayan tradition, for example, among other things, Ixchel, the goddess of the Moon, also called "the rainbow goddess," bestowed on women the talent for knotting or weaving.

Sub-National Governments In North American Governance

Rebecca Cook/Reuters

The international relations of sub-national governments in North America are crucial for the region's governance because important decisions are made at the sub-national level. The dynamics of regional governance embrace not only trade relations, but also other kinds of links that have emerged and developed out of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), including agreements to cooperate in specific areas. Sub-national governments' international activities strive for economic development by promoting investment and exports, but they also attempt to forge cooperation agreements in the fields of education, the environment, labor, and tourism, among others. In the United States and Canada, sub-national governments have seen their power and influence grow in a context of federalism and decentralization that have given rise to new forms of governance. They have also emerged as international actors, becoming the avenues for solutions and proposals for the most serious, complex global problems in the early twenty-first century.

In Canada, some provinces have established extensive international relations, both with the countries of North America and with those of other regions. Quebec is an outstanding case as the province that has earmarked the most resources and personnel for international activities. But Alberta and British Columbia have also ventured into these waters. Mexico's states have increased their international relations, too, particularly over the last 20 years, as the result of different political and economic developments. Some have even attracted foreign investment and linked their production to that of other states or provinces in the region, forming value chains. For all these reasons, I think it is fundamental to examine and assess these dynamics of governance.

Roberto Zepeda
GUEST EDITOR

NAFTA and Strengthening Relations Between Mexican and U.S. State Governments

Earl H. Fry*

corneliomontano.com

Governors Doug Ducey from Arizona and Claudia Pavlovich from Sonora met to sign several bilateral accords.

Introduction

The 2016 U.S. presidential campaign was regrettable in terms of rhetoric aimed at Mexico-U.S. economic relations. The anti-North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and anti-Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) stances among leading Republicans and Democrats were reminiscent of the 1928 presidential campaign when Herbert Hoover emerged victorious. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed the most protectionist piece of legislation in modern U.S. history, the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which helped plunge much of the world into the Great Depression.

Donald Trump's diatribes against undocumented Mexican immigrants, Mexico's trade policies, and NAFTA, buttressed by his insistence on building an impenetrable 2 000-mile great wall along the shared border, added insult to injury.

Thankfully, the bilateral economic relationship and NAFTA in general continue to move forward and north-south linkages on the North American continent have been proliferating. This article will demonstrate the importance of strong economic ties between the two neighboring countries and why governments in the 31 Mexican states and Mexico City can benefit from engaging directly with their counterparts in the 50 U.S. states.

NAFTA

On June 29, 2016, Presidents Enrique Peña Nieto and Barack Obama, hosted by Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, literally joined hands in Ottawa and trumpeted the positive contributions of NAFTA. The Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement went into effect in 1989, and after a request from the Mexican government, was expanded to include Mexico in 1994. NAFTA was primarily negotiated in the U.S. by the Republican George H. W. Bush administration, but after Bill Clinton defeated Bush in 1992, it was concluded by the new Democratic administration.

Some of NAFTA's major contributions are highlighted below:

1. It has created the largest free trade area on the planet. bringing together the world's largest, tenth-largest, and fifteenth-largest national economies.[1] It produces significantly more each year than the European Union (EU), which has 509 million people, compared to NAFTA's 484 million;[2]
2. The U.S. and Canada have had the world's largest bilateral relationship through most of the post-World War II period, and the U.S. continues to export more goods to Canada with its 36 million people than to the entire EU;

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3. Mexico, which lost half its territory to the U.S. in the nineteenth century, emerged from its nationalist economic shell in the 1980s and sought better ties with the U.S. This contrasted sharply with previous decades when many Mexicans lamented that their nation was "so far from God and so close to the United States." Today, Mexico is the second leading destination for U.S. exports, with Mexicans purchasing more than twice as many U.S. products annually as the Chinese do;
4. Unlike the EU, NAFTA is a limited trade arrangement that does not permit the free movement of workers from one member country to another. Each nation uses its own currency and is free to negotiate its own political and economic deals with the rest of the world;
5. Since 1989, U.S.-Canada trade in goods and services has almost tripled, and since 1994, U.S.-Mexico trade has quintupled.
6. The strengthening North American economic relationship goes beyond trade linkages. Corporate supply chains have been solidified and U.S. direct investment has poured into its two neighbors, with U.S. multinational companies providing 1.36 million jobs in Mexico and 1.19 million in Canada in 2013.[3] That same year, Canadian companies provided 554 000 jobs to workers in the U.S., and Mexican companies, 74 000 jobs;[4]
7. The three countries are also the chief destinations for each other's tourists. Canadians and Mexicans are the leading visitors to the United States and spent US$41 billion there in 2015.[5] U.S. Americans are overwhelmingly the leading foreign visitors to Canada and Mexico. U.S. visits to Mexico hit a record-setting 25.9 million in 2014, in spite of periodic State Department travel warnings linked to regional violence, and the fact that only 38 percent of U.S. Americans held passports allowing them to leave the United States;[6]
8. The North American continent is becoming a dominant energy supplier. Canada, and not Saudi Arabia, is the number one foreign supplier of oil and other energy products to the United States. Trilateral agreements will lead to greater cooperation on issues such as climate change and energy. New cross-border transmission lines will also bolster the use of electricity among the three NAFTA members;
9. Undocumented immigration remains an issue of concern to many U.S. Americans, as exemplified by the harsh rhetoric used during the 2016 U.S. presidential election campaign. In 1970, fewer than one million Mexican immigrants had settled in the United States. This number peaked at 12.8 million in 2007. However, between 2009 and 2014, 140 000 more Mexican migrants actually left the U.S. than entered it, and unauthorized immigrants were down from 6.9 million in 2007 to 5.6 million in 2014.[7] Mexicans, of course, love their country and want to stay as long as decently-paying jobs are available. NAFTA has helped in providing some of these jobs and almost half of Mexican households are considered, by some research groups, to be part of the "middle class";[8]
10. Finally, NAFTA goes beyond economic issues. In part because of growing North American linkages, in 2000, Mexico ended its autocratic political system, which had dominated the country since 1929. Relations between the U.S. and Mexico have improved significantly and in spite of worries about drug trafficking and undocumented immigration, the NAFTA countries live in a relatively safe "neighborhood," in contrast to recent developments elsewhere in the world. NAFTA is far from perfect, and U.S. security policies enacted in the aftermath of 9/11 have hindered growth in several economic sectors. However, in contrast to the Brexit saga in the United Kingdom, NAFTA has generally made a positive contribution to the well-being of most residents in the three member countries.

All three NAFTA countries have federal systems, and state and provincial governments are working more closely together to tackle cross-border problems of mutual concern.

Federalism and Economic Opportunities

All three NAFTA countries have federal systems, and state and provincial governments are working more closely together to tackle cross-border problems of mutual concern. In October 2015, a North American summit for Mexican and U.S. state and Canadian provincial government leaders was held in Colorado. Unfortunately, attendance was sporadic, but perhaps this will set the stage for greater collaboration among state and provincial governments in North America.[9]

Mexican states have an opportunity to expand their interactions with U.S. states in order to improve their economic development prospects. Figure 1 is my annual map of the United States, which puts in the name of countries instead of states. These countries produce slightly more annually in goods and services than the states which they have replaced, measured in nominal U.S. dollars. Some countries are repeatedly mentioned, such as Algeria, because, according to the World Bank, their gross domestic product (GDP) was the closest approximation to that of several U.S. states.

Notice that California has been replaced by the United Kingdom, which in 2015 had a slightly higher GDP than did California. However, because of Brexit and the subsequent decline in the value of the British pound, in 2016, California is likely to surpass the UK and become the fifth largest "national" economy in the world, trailing only the rest of the U.S., China, Japan, and Germany.

In total, in 2015, 2 U.S. states, California and Texas, ranked among the 10 largest economies in the world; 13 states among the top 25 national economies; 28 among the top 50; and all 50 states and the District of Columbia among the top 98 nation-states as measured by the World Bank.

As Figure 2 illustrates, Mexico is already a leading source of global imports for individual U.S. states. Mexico ranks only behind China in providing exports to California and was number one in 2015 in sending goods to Texas, Arizona, Kentucky, and Utah. In all, Mexico was among the top four foreign suppliers of goods to 37 U.S. states. It might seem surprising that Mexico is the second leading supplier to Michigan, which borders with Canada; but Mexico has quietly emerged as the fifth leading global manufacturer of motor vehicles and parts, so the supply-chain linkages between Detroit and the Mexican vehicle sector is quite understandable. The three leading goods exports from Mexico to the United States are motor

FIGURE 1
IF U.S. STATES WERE NATIONS, 2015 GDPS

FIGURE 2
MEXICO'S RANKING AS A FOREING SUPPLIER
OF GOODS TO U.S. STATES, 2015

Alabama 3	Montana 3
Alaska 7	Nebraska 4
Arizona 1	Nevada 4
Arkansas 4	New Hampshire 4
California 2	New Jersey 8
Colorado 3	New Mexico 2
Connecticut 4	New York 11
Delaware 6	North Carolina 2
Florida 2	North Dakota 3
Georgia 4	Ohio 3
Hawaii not in top 25	Oklahoma 3
Idaho 7	Oregon 6
Illinois 3	Pennsylvania 5
Indiana 4	Rhode Island 2
Iowa 2	South Carolina 3
Kansas 4	South Dakota 4
Kentucky 1	Tennessee 3
Louisiana 7	Texas 1
Maine 7	Utah 1
Maryland 4	Vermont 13
Massachusetts 3	Virginia 7
Michigan 2	Washington 8
Minnesota 3	West Virginia 4
Mississippi 2	Wisconsin 3
Missouri 3	Wyoming 3

Source: U.S. Census Bureau, "State Trade Data: Exports and Imports-The Top 25 Trading Partner Countries for Each State, 2015."

vehicles, motor vehicle parts, and oil and natural gas. The leading U.S. exports of goods to Mexico are motor vehicle parts, petroleum and coal products, and computer equipment, semiconductors, and other electronic devices.[10]

Without any doubt, a Mexican state strategy for exporting more goods and attracting more inward direct investment and visitors from the United States will favor the border states and the larger more prosperous states south of the border region. The border states of Baja California, Sonora, Chihuahua, Coahuila, Nuevo León, and Tamaulipas can take advantage of cross-border organizations such as the Border Governors Conference, the Border Legislative Conference, the California-Mexico Border Relations Council, the Arizona-Mexico Commission, the California Senate Select Committee on California-Mexico Cooperation, and the CaliBaja and AriSon Megaregion groups, plus other state-to-state or multi-state border organizations.

Mexico is already a leading source of global imports for individual U.S. states. It ranks only behind China in providing exports to California, and was number one in 2015 in sending goods to Texas, Arizona, Kentucky, and Utah.

On the other hand, state governments throughout Mexico can participate in the national or regional groupings of the U.S. Council of State Governments (CSG) and other related institutions. The U.S.-Mexico State Alliance Partnership involves a few U.S federal agencies, the CSG, the National Lieutenant Governors Association, the Woodrow Wilson Center, and other state-level organizations, with a mandate to work with as many Mexican state governments as possible. Individual Mexican state governments can also collaborate with their federal authorities in Mexico City and their own regional state-level organizations to orchestrate trade and investment missions to the United States. In addition, Mexico is the second leading destination for U.S. state offices or representatives, trailing only China. With 23 U.S. state offices or representatives located in Mexico, Mexican state officials may be able to arrange special projects with individual U.S. states that could be mutually beneficial.[11]

With growing political and economic uncertainty in various parts of the world, more U.S. companies are looking at Mexico as a destination for direct investment, both in the form of greenfield investments and mergers and acquisitions. Mexico offers political stability, an attractive currency, competitive wages, access to abundant energy and resources, a disciplined work force, and very close proximity to the U.S. marketplace. Global and regional supply chains are also expanding in North America and many of them offer special opportunities for small and medium-sized Mexican companies.

Tourism by U.S. Americans to Mexico can also expand beyond the relatively small number of destination resorts. In 2014, they made nearly 26 million visits there, ranking Mexico as their leading foreign tourism destination. Many U.S. Americans will be looking for new places to visit in Mexico for their return trips. Moreover, a vast network of U.S. universities, both public and private, are sponsoring residency programs in Mexico, and they are more interested in leading historical, cultural, and educational sites than in areas adjacent to resorts.

Finally, residents of the United States with Mexican roots now number about 36 million, up more than 400 percent since

With 23 U.S. state offices located in Mexico, Mexican state officials may be able to arrange special projects with individual U.S. states that could be mutually beneficial.

1980, and another 19 million have other Hispanic backgrounds.[12] In California and New Mexico, Hispanics in general now outnumber the so-called "white" population.[13] Individual Mexican state governments can work closely with their expatriate communities in facilitating a number of business, educational, cultural, and other cross-border initiatives. Furthermore, Mexican businesses can segment the vast U.S. market and target potential consumers based on geographical proximity, language, product preferences, lifestyles, and other factors.

In order to make progress, individual state governments need to be very blunt in assessing their relative advantages and disadvantages in penetrating the U.S. marketplace. They need action plans and indicators for ascertaining the success or lack of success of each potential initiative. In the past, the Oaxaca state government has worked with the large expatriate community in California, and other states have pursued fairly similar programs. What works and what doesn't? What have been the results of overall export, inward direct investment, supply-chain connections, and inward tourism initiatives on the part of individual Mexican states?[14] What can be done in the future to attract funding and cooperation from federal authorities, local business communities, and even expatriate groups in the U.S. that maintain close ties to individual Mexican states, cities, and even towns?

NAFTA has provided Mexican and Canadian businesses privileged access to the U.S. market, an access not available to any other nation-states in the world. The proposed TPP, which involves all three NAFTA countries, may reduce but not totally eliminate some of these advantages available to Mexico and Canada. In addition, Mexico now has favorable exchange rates for the peso versus the U.S. dollar in terms of exports and inward investment and tourism. The largest marketplace in the world measured in nominal dollars is right across the northern border. The time is propitious for Mexico to accelerate its pursuits linked to exporting, playing a greater role in supply chains, attracting new direct investment, and expanding its share of international tourists. With federalism emerging in Mexico as a reality rather than the twentieth century's window dressing, state governments can be expected to play a more pivotal role in facilitating these economic development activities. VM

Notes

[1] World Bank, "Gross Domestic Product 2015," measured in nominal U.S. dollars.

[2] Using the same World Bank estimates, the combined GDP of the NAFTA countries in 2015 was US$20.7 trillion versus US$16.4 trillion for the 28-member European Union.

[3] Sarah P. Scott, "Activities of U.S. Multinational Enterprises in 2013," *Survey of Current Business*, August 2015, p. 8.

[4] Rita Ismaylov and Ricardo Limés, "Activities of U.S. Affiliates of Foreign Multinational Enterprises in 2013," *Survey of Current Business*, November 2015, p. 9.

[5] U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, National Travel and Tourism Office, "Top 10 International Markets: 2015 Visitation and Spending," 2016, tinet.ita.doc.gov/pdf/2015-Top-10-Markets.pdf. In 2015, Canadians made 20.7 million visits to the U.S. and spent US$22.7 billion. That same year, Mexicans made 18.4 million visits there and spent US$19.7 billion.

[6] U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, "U.S. Passports and International Travel," 2015, travel.state.gov/content/passports/en/passports/statistics/html.

[7] Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, "More Mexicans Leaving than Coming to the U.S.," *Pew Research Center Report*, November 19, 2015.

[8] "Mexico's Middle Class 47 Percent of Households," *Mexico News Daily*, October 30, 2015. This is based on research by Euromonitor International, which defines annual middle-class household income in Mexico as between US$15 000 and US$45 000. Euromonitor International estimates that 14.6 million Mexican households were in the middle class in 2015, versus 9.1 million 15 years earlier.

[9] Earl H. Fry, "The Importance of the North American Summit," October 12, 2015, unpublished paper.

[10] M. Angeles Villarreal, *U.S.-Mexico Economic Relations: Trends, Issues, and Implications* (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Service, 2015).

[11] U.S. Council of State Governments and Earl H. Fry, "The Role of U.S. State Governments in International Relations: 1980-2015," *International Negotiation* (forthcoming). U.S. state governments with one or more offices or representatives in Mexico in 2015 included Arizona (2), Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin.

[12] Jens Manuel Krogstad and Mark Hugo Lopez, "Hispanic Population Reaches 55 Million but Growth Has Cooled," *Pew Research Center Fact Think Tank*, June 25, 2015.

[13] Renee Stepler and Anna Brown, "Statistical Portrait of Hispanics in the United States," *Pew Research Center Hispanic Trends Report*, April 19, 2016.

[14] Rafael Velázquez Flores, Earl Fry, and Stéphane Paquin, eds., *The External Relations of Local Governments in North America after NAFTA: Trends and Perspectives* (Mexicali: Autonomous University of Baja California Press, 2014).

Local Governments' International Relations In North America since NAFTA

Rafael Velázquez Flores*

Rebecca Cook/Reuters

Introduction

This article will analyze the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the international activity of the region's local governments, focusing particularly on the Mexican case. I will attempt to identify the patterns Mexican state and municipal governments have displayed in their links abroad, beginning with the signing of the treaty.

To do this, I have divided the article in two parts: first, I briefly describe local governments' links before NAFTA was signed. Secondly, I lay out these actors' dynamics on the international stage since the treaty came into effect. Lastly, I put forward some perspectives about their behavior in the medium and short terms, particularly since Donald Trump's taking office.

Local Governments before NAFTA

Traditionally and before the treaty's signing, local Mexican governments carried out little international activity. Since the country's foreign policy was practically exclusively the prerogative of the federal executive branch, governors and mayors did not compete with the president on international issues. Only border states, municipalities, and a few tourist destinations implemented on-going, but discrete, international activity.

The Mexican political system itself impeded greater independence on the part of local governments in international matters, given that power was concentrated almost exclu-

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Some state governments opened up diplomatic missions abroad to promote investments, foster trade, attract tourists, and protect migrants. Before NAFTA, this was uncommon.

sively in the hands of one person, the president. In addition, a single party controlled the executive branch, Congress, and all the governors' seats, as well as the immense majority of the municipalities. Governors and mayors disciplined themselves to the political boss, given that they aspired to posts within the system in the future. However, beginning with certain political moments toward the end of the twentieth century, local governments began to be more internationally active. In the first place, domestic changes in the country offered greater maneuvering room to these actors on global issues. The Mexican political system began to undergo significant transformations at the end of the 1980s.

In 1988, the official candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari, won the presidential election by a small margin and his legitimacy came under question due to accusations of voter fraud. For this reason, the Salinas administration approved reforms to Mexico's electoral system. The political changes made it possible for other parties to win elections for state and municipal governments. In 1989, for the first time in recent history, an opposition party won the governor's seat in the border state of Baja California. Quintessentially, local governments began to be more interested in playing a bigger international role independent of the central executive branch.

At the same time, the country began to experience grave financial crises at the end of the 1970s and the early 1980s. As a result, the Mexican government decided to make significant changes in its economic development model. From a protectionist, nationalist model, economic policy opened up and became neoliberal, emphasizing free trade and attracting foreign investments. With these reforms, local governments had more incentives to participate in external affairs given that they had a very specific interest in finding foreign markets for their local products and attracting investments from abroad to create jobs in their communities.

In the second place, certain changes in the international system allowed Mexican states and municipal governments to create better opportunities for having a presence in global affairs. The Cold War ended in the late 1980s and the early 1990s heralded the arrival of a new global order. Bipolar politics and other matters were a thing of the past, and new actors began to be more visible on the international agenda. Issues like economic development, technology, the environment, human rights, and migration, among others, began to be more important in international relations. At the same time, non-centralized actors began to have an impact on international politics, particularly local governments, since they had a big stake in the new items on the agenda.

At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, the world experienced growing interdependence and an even stronger globalizing trend. These two factors made it possible for non-centralized actors to have greater presence in the global context. The external had more influence on the local, and local governments sought greater presence in the external. In other words, globalization and interdependence were incentives for states and municipalities to compete internationally for greater investments and markets for their local products.

In this domestic and external context, the Mexican government decided to begin negotiations with the United States and Canada with the aim of signing a free trade agreement in the early 1990s. The process was finally successful on January 1, 1994, when NAFTA came into effect. What was the impact this treaty had, then, on Mexican local governments' international activity? I develop the answer to that question in the next section.

International Activity of Local Governments after NAFTA

When NAFTA came into effect in 1994, Mexican local governments began to take more interest in acting internationally. The internal political and economic changes in Mexico at the end of the 1980s and free trade in the North American region were big incentives for this. Starting then, both state and municipal governments began to open offices of international affairs. The first ones opened in the country's capital, Mexico City's Federal District, because of its political and economic importance. Other states, like Nuevo León, Baja California, the State of Mexico, Jalisco, and Chiapas, did the same.[1] Under the system centralized by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), states had had no interest in opening up this kind of office because in practice, the federal executive had the complete monopoly over foreign policy.

Along these same lines, some state governments also opened up diplomatic missions abroad, especially to promote invest-

ments, foster trade, attract tourists, and protect migrants. Before NAFTA, this was uncommon. That is, the free trade that began in the mid-1980s and surged ahead in 1994 with the treaty's entry into force fostered this activity among local governments. Also, several governors and mayors increased their visits abroad. Before NAFTA, these activities were also limited. The aim of these visits was both economic and political given that these officials sought to strengthen relations between their states and their counterparts abroad. Some of them resulted in the signing of collaboration agreements.[2] Many of these instruments dealt with issues like education, cultural policies, environmental protection, and sports, among others. One old practice was the signing of agreements to be sister cities or states. Before the 1990s, the number of these agreements was limited, but as free trade was implemented, they increased significantly.[3]

Before NAFTA, local Mexican governments and their Canadian counterparts had very limited contact. When the treaty came into effect, the links increased visibly. For example, the province of Alberta and the state of Jalisco signed a very successful collaboration accord covering work visas for Jalisco residents, the donation of ambulances, training in forestry, and other activities. That is, NAFTA made it possible to increase interaction between local Mexican governments and those of Canada.[4]

Despite the fact that NAFTA promoted links among the local governments at the end of the twentieth century, the events of 2001 affected the process. The terrorist attacks in the United States sparked changes in that country's security policies. That is, local interaction in the region was affected by Washington's more restrictive measures.[5] However, the contacts continued thanks to the growing economic interdependence of the region's three countries.

Conclusions

In effect, the signing of the North American Free Trade Agreement fostered greater participation of local Mexican governments in foreign affairs. However, Mexico's domestic political and economic changes are also explanatory factors. In other words, NAFTA became a driving force behind local diplomacy in the region. That was the trend that marked the end of the twentieth century. However, the September 11 attacks brought an adjustment in the process due to the United States' new security measures.

The province of Alberta and the state of Jalisco signed a very successful collaboration accord covering work visas for Jalisco residents, the donation of ambulances, training in forestry, and other activities.

Despite the fact that NAFTA has fostered these contacts, another change is threatening the continuity of the process: Donald Trump's inauguration in January 2017 is a turning point in the trend. In the first place, the new occupant of the White House has expressed his interest in renegotiating NAFTA and building a wall along the entire border to prevent the entry of workers without papers. These measures may affect free trade and be a disincentive to interaction among local governments in North America.

In this context, greater participation is needed by local public and private actors in the three countries to ensure that federal decisions do not affect the links among local actors in the region. Local governments in North America face many complex challenges, but the benefits accruing from this kind of diplomacy are greater than expected. VM

Notes

[1] In Chiapas, the Office for International Affairs opened due to the Zapatista Army uprising. Since the movement made the state visible internationally, the government decided to take advantage of the moment.

[2] Signing international treaties is a function reserved to federal bodies. However, with the passing of the 1992 Law on Celebrating Treaties, in the middle of the NAFTA negotiations, local governments were given a legal framework that allowed them to sign "inter-institutional accords" as long as they did not touch on issues reserved exclusively to the federal government.

[3] Detailed research on inter-institutional accords can be found in Jorge A. Schiavon, "Mexico's Sub-State Diplomacy *vis-à-vis* North America," in Rafael Velázquez, Earl H. Fry, and Stéphane Paquin, eds., *The External Relations of Local Governments in North America after NAFTA: Trends and Perspectives* (Mexico City: PIERAN, 2014), pp. 73-100.

[4] See Stéphane Paquin, "NAFTA and the Role of Canadian Provinces," in Rafael Velázquez, Earl H. Fry, and Stéphane Paquin, eds., op. cit., pp. 53-72.

[5] See Earl H. Fry, "The Development of Sub-State Cross-Border Interactions in North America, 1994-2012: The Impact of NAFTA and Post-9/11 Security Policies," in Rafael Velázquez, Earl H. Fry, and Stéphane Paquin, eds., op. cit., pp. 15-51.

Mexican Sub-National Governments' International Relations In North America

Jorge A. Schiavon*

Daniel Becerril / Reuters

Introduction

Traditionally, foreign policy has been controlled exclusively by nation-states, and its main objective has been to protect their sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity. The bureaucracy in charge of international affairs is responsible for determining and carrying out this policy in order to maximize the national interest and reduce the costs and increase the benefits of the state's participation in the international system. To attain this goal, national governments have to maintain a unified position *vis-à-vis* the exterior. As a result, the implementation of foreign policy has been a prerogative of the central government. As a matter of fact, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties establishes that heads of state or government and the ministers of foreign affairs are considered representatives of their states and, therefore, those who conduct foreign policy. In the case of Mexico, according to Article 89, Subsection X of the Constitution, foreign policy is an exclusive prerogative of the president, who coordinates it through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE).

However, in the last two to three decades, the federal executive's exclusive monopoly over international affairs has been increasingly challenged. In Mexico, the number of internal actors that participate in international issues has grown considerably, even though the president maintains the constitutional power to direct foreign policy and conclude international treaties. In particular, sub-national governments (SNGs), both at state and municipal levels, have challenged the federal government's monopoly over external affairs by significantly increasing their international relations. These external activities have dubbed the international relations of sub-national governments (IRSNGs) sub-national diplomacy, local diplomacy, federative diplomacy, or paradiplomacy. As a result, Mexico and the SRE face an important challenge: coordinating foreign policy and the IRSNGs, in order to conduct a unified, coherent foreign policy *vis-à-vis* the world, but representative of the aggregation of the different interests of sub-national governments.

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This article analyses Mexico's IRSNGs, with special emphasis on their relations with North America. It explains the causes of the increasing IRSNGs in Mexico, how they are conducted, the areas of international cooperation, and the external counterparts.

Sub-national governments, both at state and municipal levels, have challenged the federal government's monopoly over external affairs by significantly increasing their international relations.

Why Are Mexican SNGs Going International?

Globalization can be defined as the multiplication of international interactions as a result of the growing flows of information, goods, services, capital, and persons made possible by the reduction in the transaction costs of information, currency exchange, movement, and transportation. Its growth has significantly increased the costs of isolation for national governments in the international system. New actors with international influence have decreasing costs of participation in external affairs, generating incentives for SNGs to participate more actively in international issues. Specifically for Mexico, the last three decades have witnessed a remarkable internationalization of the country. As a result of the incentives generated by globalization and interdependence, Mexico changed its economic model and development strategy from a closed economy with strong state intervention and an import-substitution industrialization model, into an open economy that promotes economic development through integration into the international market and the promotion of exports. From 1993 to 2008, the sum of imports and exports increased from 30 percent to 65 percent of GDP. Economic liberalization generated incentives for greater competition among SNGs in the global market to place their exports and attract foreign direct investment to boost local development.

The international system's globalization and interdependence has been accompanied over the last 30 years by a wave of democratization and decentralization around the globe. The return to democracy in the developing world and the growing decentralization of power have provided the incentives for SNGs to participate in areas formerly monopolized by the central government, including international affairs. The democratic transition in Mexico in 2000 —and since 1989 at the state level when the National Action Party (PAN) won the Baja California governorship— opened up political space for a broader and more diverse representation of SNGs, while administrative decentralization gave these actors powers and resources to implement public policies closer to their preferences.

In sum, the increasing participation of the Mexican SNGs in the international arena corresponds to a combination of domestic (democratization, decentralization, and liberalization) and international (globalization and interdependence) variables. The democratization of the system, together with economic liberalization and decentralization, created the spaces and incentives for the SNGs to actively participate in international affairs, with the objective of advancing their particular interests and strengthening their local development. Considering this, it can be argued that, in the face of an open, competitive global market, with the existence of a more plural economic and political system in Mexico, Mexican SNGs' international activities will pursue three main objectives: 1) finding markets for their exports; 2) attracting foreign direct investment and cooperation for productive activities within their territory; and 3) strengthening ties with their emigrant populations to promote their protection and to encourage the flow of remittances and the productive investment of part of them.

How Much Internationalization Of Mexican SNGs?

Based on the institutionalization and the economic and political activities of Mexican SNGs, a Mexican Index (MI-IRSNGs) can be constructed to measure the changes over time of the country's IRSNGs.

Table 1 clearly shows that the IRSNGs in Mexico have increased considerably during the last decade. From 2004 to 2009, they rose by over 40 percent; and between 2009 and 2014, they grew almost 33 percent more, for an accumulated growth (using 2004 as the base year) in the decade from 2004 to 2014 of over 85 percent. By 2014, the majority of the states were at the high level of IRSNGs, while five had reached the maximum level of very high (Chiapas, Mexico City's Federal District, the State of Mexico, Jalisco, and Querétaro), carrying out every possible international activity

TABLE 1
MEXICAN INDEX OF SUB-NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS' INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Federal entities	Total 2004	2004 IRSNGs	Total 2009	2009 IRSNGs	Total 2014	2014 IRSNGs
Aguascalientes	0.90	Low-High	1.10	Medium-Low	2.40	High-Average
Baja California	2.00	High-Low	2.40	High-Average	2.60	High-Average
Baja California Sur	1.30	Medium-Low	1.80	Medium-High	1.80	Medium-High
Campeche	1.50	Medium-Average	1.70	Medium-High	2.30	High-Low
Coahuila	1.90	Medium-High	2.60	High-Average	2.60	High-Average
Colima	1.10	Medium-Low	1.10	Medium-Low	1.10	Medium-Low
Chiapas	2.00	High-Low	3.00	Very High	3.00	Very High
Chihuahua	1.50	Medium-Average	1.90	Medium-High	2.30	High-Low
Durango	0.90	Low-High	1.80	Medium-High	2.40	High-Average
Guanajuato	1.70	Medium-High	2.10	High-Low	2.80	High-High
Guerrero	0.90	Low-High	1.10	Medium-Low	1.80	Medium-High
Hidalgo	1.30	Medium-Low	1.90	Medium-High	2.80	High-High
Jalisco	2.60	High-Average	3.00	Very High	3.00	Very High
Mexico City	0.90	Low-High	3.00	Very High	3.00	Very High
Michoacán	1.30	Medium-Low	2.20	High-Low	2.60	High-Average
Morelos	1.10	Medium-Low	1.70	Medium-High	2.10	High-Low
Nayarit	1.10	Medium-Low	1.50	Medium-Average	1.50	Medium-Average
Nuevo León	1.90	Medium-High	2.80	High-High	2.80	High-High
Oaxaca	1.10	Medium-Low	1.30	Medium-Low	2.40	High-Low
Puebla	1.70	Medium-High	1.90	Medium-High	2.80	High-High
Querétaro	0.90	Low-High	1.30	Medium-Low	3.00	Very High
Quintana Roo	1.30	Medium-Low	1.90	Medium-High	2.60	High-Average
San Luis Potosí	0.90	Low-High	1.50	Medium-Average	2.30	High-Low
Sinaloa	1.10	Medium-Low	1.10	Medium-Low	1.90	Medium-High
Sonora	1.70	Medium-High	1.70	Medium-High	2.40	High-Average
State of Mexico	1.90	Medium-High	3.00	Very High	3.00	Very High
Tabasco	1.50	Medium-Average	1.70	Medium-High	2.60	High-Average
Tamaulipas	1.50	Medium-Average	1.70	Medium-High	2.10	High-Low
Tlaxcala	1.10	Medium-Low	1.50	Medium-Average	1.50	Medium-Average
Veracruz	1.50	Medium-Average	2.20	High-Low	2.80	High-High
Yucatán	1.10	Medium-Low	2.00	High-Low	2.60	High-Average
Zacatecas	1.10	Medium-Low	1.70	Medium-High	2.50	High-Average
Average	**1.38**	**Medium-Average**	**1.91**	**Medium-High**	**2.42**	**High-Average**

Source: Jorge A. Schiavon, "Una década de acción internacional de los gobiernos locales mexicanos (2005-2015)," *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior* no. 104 (May-August 2015), pp. 103-127. The MI-IRSNGs vary between 0 and 3; if Total = 3, then very high; if 2 ≤ Total < 3, then high; if 1 ≤ Total < 2, then medium; and if Total < 1, then low. Each category can be subdivided into three sub-categories; for example, if 1.67 ≤ Total < 2, then medium-high; if 1.33 ≤ Total < 1.67, then medium-average; and if 1 ≤ Total < 1.33, then medium-low.

TABLE 2
INTER-INSTITUTIONAL AGREEMENTS (IIA) BY FEDERAL ENTITY,
LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT, AND TYPE OF AGREEMENT

Federal Entity	IIA	% of Total	Level of Government				Type of Agreement			
			State	% Total	Municipal	% of Total	Sisterhood	% of Total	Other	% of Total
Aguascalientes	7	1.05	3	42.86	4	57.14	4	57.14	3	42.86
Baja California	14	2.10	6	42.86	8	57.14	4	28.57	10	71.43
Baja California Sur	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	0	0.00
Campeche	9	1.35	3	33.33	6	66.67	5	55.56	4	44.44
Chihuahua	28	4.19	22	78.57	6	21.43	4	14.29	24	85.71
Chiapas	74	11.08	62	83.78	12	16.22	7	9.46	67	90.54
Coahuila	9	1.35	2	22.22	7	77.78	7	77.78	2	22.22
Colima	1	0.15	1	100.00	0	0.00	1	100.00	0	0.00
Durango	15	2.25	13	86.67	2	13.33	2	13.33	13	86.67
Guanajuato	20	2.99	8	40.00	12	60.00	11	55.00	9	45.00
Guerrero	6	0.90	2	33.33	4	66.67	2	33.33	4	66.67
Hidalgo	17	2.54	10	58.82	7	41.18	7	41.18	10	58.82
Jalisco	139	20.81	90	64.75	49	35.25	43	30.94	96	69.06
Mexico City	38	5.69	38	100.00	0	0.00	15	39.47	23	60.53
Michoacán	37	5.54	11	29.73	26	70.27	25	67.57	12	32.43
Morelos	7	1.05	1	14.29	6	85.71	6	85.71	1	14.29
Nayarit	6	0.90	4	66.67	2	33.33	1	16.67	5	83.33
Nuevo León	39	5.84	7	17.95	32	82.05	28	71.79	11	28.21
Oaxaca	16	2.40	14	87.50	2	12.50	1	6.25	15	93.75
Puebla	21	3.14	8	38.10	13	61.90	12	57.14	9	42.86
Querétaro	15	2.25	6	40.00	9	60.00	5	33.33	10	66.67
Quintana Roo	23	3.44	6	26.09	17	73.91	16	69.57	7	30.43
San Luis Potosí	14	2.10	1	7.14	13	92.86	12	85.71	2	14.29
Sinaloa	2	0.30	1	50.00	1	50.00	0	0.00	2	100.00
Sonora	14	2.10	13	92.86	1	7.14	1	7.14	13	92.86
State of Mexico	49	7.34	17	34.69	32	65.31	33	67.35	16	32.65
Tabasco	6	0.90	5	83.33	1	16.67	0	0.00	6	100.00
Tamaulipas	6	0.90	0	0.00	6	100.00	6	100.00	0	0.00
Tlaxcala	2	0.30	2	100.00	0	0.00	0	0.00	2	100.00
Veracruz	15	2.25	1	6.67	14	93.33	13	86.67	2	13.33
Yucatán	11	1.65	7	63.64	4	36.36	2	18.18	9	81.82
Zacatecas	8	1.20	2	25.00	6	75.00	4	50.00	4	50.00
Total	668	100.00	366	54.79	302	45.21	277	41.47	391	58.53

Source: Jorge A. Schiavon, "Una década de acción internacional de los gobiernos locales mexicanos (2005-2015)," *Revista Mexicana de Política Exterior* no. 104 (May-August 2015), pp. 103-127.

Increasing participation of Mexican SNGs in the international arena corresponds to a combination of domestic (democratization, decentralization, and liberalization) and international (globalization and interdependence) variables.

measured by the MI-IRSNGs. Also, all the federal entities increased their international relations in these ten years, and none of them reversed in internationalization (the international actions carried out were institutionalized and maintained or increased over the decade).

International Activities of Mexican SNGs

Mexico's legal framework gives ample powers to Mexican SNGs to conduct international relations in those areas in which they have legal jurisdiction, through inter-institutional agreements (IIAs). These are the legal instruments through which SNGs conduct international relations with foreign governmental agencies, international organizations, and other private and public actors. The areas of cooperation they cover are to be strictly circumscribed within the faculties of the state or municipal actors. SNGs have to keep the SRE informed of their negotiation and conclusion, and if the latter determines that the agreements are legal, they are registered in the official record, the Registry of Inter-Institutional Agreements (RIIA), publicly available on the SRE web page.[1]

When we analyze the 668 IIAs signed by Mexican SNGs included in the registry,[2] we can understand their international activities and who their international partners are. First, the number of agreements signed by Mexican states and their municipalities vary considerably; the vast majority are signed by states with high or very high levels of IRSNGs (Jalisco, Chiapas, the State of Mexico, Nuevo León, and Mexico City). Second, there appears to be a balance in the IIAs signed by state and municipal governments, each signing approximately half. Third, due to Mexico's geographical location, it is not surprising that cooperation is centered in the Americas (North America, Latin America, and the Caribbean), which accounts for almost 60 percent of all IIAs. The states that share a physical border with the United States or Central America have significantly higher levels of cooperation than the rest of the Mexican SNGs with these regions. Fourth, in terms of countries, the highest degree of cooperation is with the United States (116 out of 668 IIAs), approximately one-fourth of all IIAs nationwide, but increasing considerably in the case of Mexican states that share a border with this country (over 50 percent in Baja California, Coahuila, Nuevo León, Sonora, and Tamaulipas). The degree of cooperation through IIAs is particularly intense with the U.S. state of Texas, which concentrates almost 10 percent of all IIAs; if it were a country, it would be third in cooperation, trailing only the United States and Spain.

Table 3
Inter-institutional Agreements by Area of Cooperation

Rank	Area	% of total
1	Education	59.79%
2	Culture	56.63%
3	Tourism	38.55%
4	Trade	33.28%
5	Science and Technology	29.82%
6	Human Resources	23.04%
7	Investment	22.89%
8	Environment	20.03%
9	Urban Development	18.41%
10	Security	8.68%

Source: Jorge A. Schiavon, "Una década de acción internacional de los gobiernos locales mexicanos (2005-2015)," *Revista mexicana de política exterior* no. 104 (May-August 2015), pp. 103-127.

Fifth, international cooperation is concentrated in areas in which the SNGs have legal powers (among the most important: education, culture, tourism, trade, science and technology, human resources training, and investment). Finally, sixth, Mexican SNGs concentrate their international activities in areas that promote local development and welfare, by strengthening human capital or generating well-being.

Conclusions

Mexican SNGs increasingly participate in international affairs as a result of a combination of domestic (democratization, decentralization, and liberalization) and international (globalization and interdependence) variables. With important variations between states, IRSNGs in Mexico have increased

over 85 percent in the last decade. During this period, all SNGs have bolstered their international relations, and none of them has reversed its internationalization.

International cooperation agreements are concentrated in SNGs with high or very high levels of IRSNGs. Almost 60 percent of international partners are located in the Americas and the highest level of cooperation takes place with the United States (with approximately one-fourth of all agreements); and Mexican states that share a border with the U.S. have higher degrees of cooperation with it. IRSNGs are concentrated in areas in which the SNGs have legal juristiction, like education, culture, tourism, trade, science and technology, human resources training, and investment, and they conduct these international activities to promote local development and well-being. VM

NOTES

[1] The web page is http://www.sre.gob.mx/gobiernoslocales.
[2] As of January 1, 2015.

Canadian Provinces' International Relations in North America

Roberto Zepeda*

Andy Clark/Reuters

This article examines Canadian provinces' international relations in North America and particularly the dimensions of the international activities of Quebec, Alberta, and British Columbia, looking at the number of offices and their objectives abroad. Although Quebec continues to be the Canadian province with the greatest international activity, over recent decades, the others have gradually increased their efforts beyond their borders.

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PARADIPLOMACY

The participation or involvement of sub-national governments in international affairs has been dubbed paradiplomacy. Subnational governments like those of Canada's provinces or the United States' states establish international relations in different ways: sending trade missions abroad, creating international offices, and signing cooperation agreements with international actors like countries, private companies, international agencies, and their counterparts abroad.

All Canada's provinces have established direct relations with states in the United States and other countries to resolve common problems, manage resources, promote economic exchange, attract investment, and foster exports. Quebec has the most prominent international relations program in terms of the funds and personnel dedicated to these activities; Alberta and British Columbia, for their part, have high levels of international links and I will be reviewing their experiences later.

Quebec

Quebec has been the province most active in paradiplomacy. It has a department staff of about 500 and an annual budget of Can$100 million to deal exclusively with these activities. Since 1964, it has signed more than 700 international accords, 370 of which continue in effect, with 79 different countries. I should underline that Quebec has considerable presence abroad, with a network of 28 offices distributed in 17 countries of Latin America, Europe, Asia, and the United States.[1] Factors like the scope of its governmental jurisdiction and its unique identity inside Canada and North America have motivated Quebec to take on an international role for several decades now.[2]

Its activities are diversely focused: they promote Quebec's economic interests, defend its constitutional attributes, and participate in the defense of the environment. They also

Canada's provinces and U.S. states establish international relations in different ways: sending trade missions abroad, creating international offices, and signing cooperation agreements.

defend the province's identity by promoting identity paradiplomacy, through which it strengthens its standing as a nation within Canada.[3]

It has signed more than 200 accords and arrangements with U.S. state and city governments, as well as with other public organizations. It also actively cooperates with the states along its border and with other regions of its neighbor to the south. For example, it is a member of the Council of Great Lakes Governors (CGLG), of the New England Governors and Eastern Canadian Premiers' Annual Conference (NEG/ECP), and the Southeastern United States-Canadian Provinces Alliance (SEUS-CP).

Its need to reaffirm itself on the international scene has intensified as a result of the changes in the global context. For the Quebec government, the dynamics of North American integration include dealing with transnational problems like security, energy, and the environment.[4]

Its international offices pursue different objectives, offering services and counseling, and organizing activities adapted to the characteristics of the countries they are in, as well as the companies, creators, researchers, and institutions of Quebec.[5]

Table 1. Quebec's Offices Worldwide

North America	Europe	Asia	South America	Africa	In International Bodies
• Atlanta	• Barcelona	• Beijing	• São Paulo	• Dakar	• Francophone and Multilateral Affairs Delegation, Paris
• Boston	• Berlin	• Hong Kong			• UNESCO
• Chicago	• Brussels	• Mumbai			
• Houston	• London	• Seoul			
• Los Angeles	• Munich	• Shanghai			
• Mexico City	• Paris	• Tokyo			
• New York	• Rome	• Qingdao			
• Silicon Valley	• Stockholm				
• Washington, D.C.					

Source: Developed by the author using data from http://www.gouv.qc.ca/FR/Pages/Accueil.aspx.

The province has seven general delegations, located in Brussels, London, Mexico City, Munich, New York, Paris, and Tokyo; four delegations, in Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Rome; nine departments, in Barcelona, Beijing, Dakar, Hong Kong, Mumbai, São Paulo, Shanghai, Stockholm, and Washington, D. C.; six trade offices, in Atlanta, Berlin, Houston, Qingdao, Seoul, and the Silicon Valley (see Figure 1); and finally, two representations in multilateral agencies, the Francophone and Multilateral Affairs Delegation and the UNESCO.

Alberta

Alberta has its own Ministry of International and Intergovernmental Relations, whose main functions are domestic, but which also has important resources and personnel dedicated to international affairs. The province's main aim is to strengthen good relations with the United States, because that is where 80 percent of its exports go. In recent decades, Alberta has been very involved in Canada's international relations and has consistently attempted to influence Ottawa's negotiating position on energy policy, climate change, trade liberalization and agriculture. While maintaining this relatively positive relationship with the federal government, Alberta seeks to establish its own identity and represent its own interests internationally.[6]

The province has gradually increased its activities beyond the border over the last two decades. We can surmise that this increase is related to different factors and has different motivations. Alberta's prosperity stems mainly from oil and natural gas earnings since it is the world's third producer and exporter of gas, surpassed only by Russia and Norway, and more than 60 percent of its oil is exported to the United States. In addition, its energy companies have a presence in 118 countries.[7] On the other hand, its oil reserves, in the form of tar sands, are surpassed worldwide only by Venezuela and Saudi Arabia. And between 2010 and 2014, high crude oil prices sparked an explosion of investments to develop its deposits.

Table 2. Alberta's Offices Worldwide (2016)

North America	Europe	Asia
• Mexico City	• United Kingdom	• Beijing
• Washington, D.C.	• Munich*	• Guangzhou
• Chicago*		• Hong Kong
		• Japan
		• South Korea
		• New Delhi
		• Shanghai
		• Singapore
		• Taiwan

***Note:** Closed since 2015.
Source: Developed by the author using data from http://www.albertacanada.com/business/international-offices.aspx.

In 2016, Jalisco and Nuevo León were the Mexican states with the greatest number of inter-institutional agreements with Canadian provinces.

The province also has extensive international relations, with offices in Mexico, the United States, Europe, and Asia (the vast majority), and over the last 20 years, their number has doubled.

In mid-2016, this network was made up of 12 offices in 9 countries. In 2014, the province had 12 Canadian employees working abroad and 31 local residents working to promote its interests in the world.[8] These offices play a vital role in strengthening the province's presence abroad and establish important relationships through the promotion of trade and initiatives for attracting investment. In addition, they advise Alberta-based companies to be able to reach their business objectives.

Clearly, Alberta continues to look beyond North America. Its international accords cover a broad spectrum of fields, including trade, education, culture, research, and development. From 1998 to 2010, it signed nearly 175 international agreements, of which 43 (24 percent) were with Mexico and the United States.[9]

It also participates actively in regional cooperation conferences with states of the United States and other Canadian provinces, for example in the Pacific Northwest Economic Region (PNWER), which brings together Canada's British Columbia, Saskatchewan, the Yukon, and Northwest Territories, and the United States' Alaska, Idaho, Oregon, Montana, and Washington.

British Columbia

This province merged its trade and international affairs departments; that is, paradiplomacy has been subordinated to trade interests. The province has 11 trade missions on three continents, coordinated by a central office in Vancouver,

whose main objective is to promote international exports. British Columbia's exports are higher than the national average: in 2011, Canada's total exports grew an average of 10 percent, while BC's (notably lumber and wood products and those derived from coal and copper) rose almost 14 percent.

British Columbia's paradiplomatic activity focuses on a variety of topics, ranging from trade and fiscal issues to social and cultural questions. Although at times it fosters social or cultural issues internationally, the need to protect its economic position in an increasingly competitive global economy provides the most political impetus for participating in international activities.[10]

The province's international activities have increased considerably in recent years, focusing on setting up links with neighboring states in the Pacific Northwest; for example, with its U.S. neighbors like Washington and Alaska in the framework of the PNWER. Other examples are California, Oregon, and Washington with regard to issues like climate change and clean energy.

In general, British Columbia's paradiplomatic relations with states in the U.S. continue to be very important, although it seeks to expand its trade along the whole Pacific Coast. From 1992 to 2010, British Columbia signed 52 international agreements with different countries; the main country is the United States, with which it signed 24; but in the same period it also signed 12 cooperation agreements on educational issues with China and Korea.[11]

Cooperation Agreements With Mexican States

In early 2016, the specific cooperation agreements between states of Mexico and Canadian provinces came to 25.[12] The main areas of interest are health, education, science, technology, training, sports, the environment, pollution, the economy, industry, trade, tourism, culture, and agriculture. Jalisco and Nuevo León were the Mexican states with the greatest number of inter-institutional agreements signed with Canadian provinces, while the most active Canadian provinces were Alberta and Quebec.

All Canada's provinces
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Jalisco has agreements with Alberta and Manitoba that include a temporary worker program as well as other, safe, well-structured accords on migration.[13] The Jalisco government highlights cooperation projects in the area of fire-fighting. It has also set up the Center for Value Added, a modern, experimental plant with labs and company incubators to position agricultural products on the national and international markets, which has saved the state government more than 20 years of research. This state in Western Mexico also signed a cooperation agreement in 2009 covering diverse topics such as education, cultural industries, animation, the economy, tourism, and information technologies.

Nuevo León is another of the most dynamic states in Mexico; it has agreements with British Columbia on technology and forestry and with Quebec on education, culture, and the economy.

Conclusions

Clearly, nation-states are no longer the predominant actors in international relations; a variety of actors compete to make decisions, creating spaces for governance. Sub-national governments have become some of the increasingly important actors in global and regional governance.

International relations of Canada's provinces have increased not only in North America, but also in other regions. Along these lines, a very important network of relations exists between Canadian provinces and U.S. states. Cooperation between these sub-national governments has become institutionalized through conferences, forums, and alliances that meet regularly to make public policy decisions. Canada's paradiplomatic activity is most evident in Quebec, although this trend has been followed by other provinces, outstanding among which are Alberta and British Columbia.

Canadian provinces' international activities mainly center on economic interests like promoting exports and attracting foreign investment. However, they also include close cooperation with states in the United States, promoting solutions for common environmental, fishing, water management, health, transportation, security, educational, and science and technology issues.

For its part, some states in Mexico like Jalisco and Nuevo León have developed numerous international activities. How-

ever, it is clear that Canadian provinces have established more international relations, earmarking more resources to them than their counterparts in the United States and Mexico have.

The integration of North America has been threatened by Donald Trump becoming U.S. president. However, other forms of integration can move ahead through the activities by sub-national governments on several fronts that can foster economic integration through sub-national networks. VM

NOTES

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Quebec's International Activity In North America

José Luis Ayala Cordero*

The theoretical framework for the study of the international activities of sub-national governments like Quebec's is the debate between political realism and Robert Keohane's paradigm of interdependence. The former sees the sovereign state as the only actor in diplomacy, while the latter posits the existence of other political and economic entities that play an important role by influencing the global context, modifying it through their "paradiplomatic" participation, a neologism coined in 1988.

Keohane's arguments leave no room for doubt in thinking of Quebec as an international actor, taking into account complex interdependence as an ideal type and describing a world with three characteristics: 1) multiple channels between societies, with diverse actors, not limited to states; 2) the existence of issues not framed in a clear hierarchy; and 3) the irrelevance of the threat of use of force between states connected through complex interdependence.[1]

While this historic debate has not arrived at definitive conclusions since the 1970s, the existence of sub-national governments that plan and establish international relations using foreign policy and diplomatic tools traditionally used exclusively by central governments cannot be denied. In addition, international law does not categorically or decisively negate their international character either.

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Historic Differences between Anglophones and Francophones

With the Quebec Act of 1774, the English government recognized rights of inhabitants of the former New France colony, conquered in 1759, such as managing their lands, practicing Catholicism, applying the Napoleonic Civil Code, and speaking French.

In 1867, the provinces of Ontario, Quebec, and New Brunswick passed the British North America Act, creating the Dominion of Canada, a territory under the aegis of the English Crown. There, the Anglophones had a well-defined capitalist national project, whose political strategy was to concentrate federal economic power in Ottawa, with the Quebecois reaffirming their cultural difference from the Anglo-Saxon remainder.

From 1867 to 1960, Anglophones and Francophones coexisted. The former consolidated their national project and the Francophones, the *statu quo* giving them the space of their province, where the Catholic Church determined to a great extent education, political decisions, and the feeling of Quebec belonging as a distinct society.

That coexistence was broken in 1960 with the Quiet Revolution. At that time, a political and cultural Francophone awareness emerged that questioned the province's historic place in Canada and Quebecois sought more attributions and autonomy. Among the new strategies was opening offices throughout the world, signing agreements, and consolidating and exploring new international spaces, such as the United States in the 1960s and 1970s, and Mexico in the 1990s.

The province's basic doctrine is based on Gérin-Lajoie's premise, which dealt with the possibility of acting abroad based on the internal jurisdictions guaranteed to the province by the Constitution. This gave rise to a huge debate about who should be in charge of developing Canadian foreign policy, given the different needs and objectives of Anglophones and Francophones.

In 1982, the Canadian Constitution established equality among the provinces, despite the fact that, historically, clear differences had existed between the two founding societies, the Anglophones and the Francophones. The Constitution sought above all to shore up the new national project in the face of the reconfiguration of economic relations with the United States and the emergence of the free-trade paradigm. To counter this new set of norms, in 1987, Quebec held a referendum on the Lake Meech Accord, seeking constitutional recognition of its status as a distinct society, in order to make decisions about the future of its territory and its new role in the global context.

> Quebec put forward a new strategy for the trade opening in North America: relating to sub-national governments beyond its natural geographical space, the United States.

However, since the rest of the provinces refused to give it that recognition, Quebec consolidated its own "legitimacy" based on political, economic, and cultural elements. This is when the Bélanger-Campeau Commission was created to investigate the province's situation in order to become sovereign and an independent state through a possible referendum after 1990.

Quebec emphasized geography, since its location is strategic in North America with regard to traditional trade with the United States. It expressed interest in moving into the rest of the continent, in regions beyond its traditional sphere of influence.[2]

Quebec's International Behavior: Overall Reasoning

The study of geography, foreign policy, diplomacy, cooperation, and international relations after World War II was defined by sovereign states, recognized by political realism as rational entities operating in line with considerations of power and security. Naturally, this does not mean that regional or local studies were unimportant, but their impact was measured as a function of what was decided by the central government: local territory was pushed into the background.

After the 1970s, churches, cities, banks, municipalities, and sub-national governments began to have increased weight in the world. This was contrary to the orthodox supposition that all organization of international relations and all formulation of objectives took place in the secretariats and ministries of sovereign states for their implementation as foreign policy or diplomacy.

Robert Keohane's complex interdependence paradigm was not counterposed to political realism, but began to operate as a complement to it; it made it possible to explain the way in which sub-national governments create optimal geographical conditions outside the strict regulatory framework

Mathieu Belanger/Reuters

While Quebec's international activity is based on an element of identity that seeks to project the province beyond its local space, Mexico's states are trying to break with their historical link to the central government.

of central governments for exchange, agreements, cooperation, and development.

The historical logic of the behavior of international geography, foreign policy, and diplomacy is fragmented and operated to benefit local objectives and needs; this took place in regional structures represented very often by sub-national entities that had a government, a territory, and a population, all elements needed to implement cooperation strategies.

Quebec is an example of a sub-national government that, due to its geographical location, is part of Anglophone Canada's historical interest in wanting to create a unified state and not allowing in to be absorbed by the United States. This was the main objective of the British North America Act of 1867. After the break in 1960, Canada's federal government did everything in its power to keep the country together despite the 1980 and 1995 referendums.

On the other hand, Ontario continues to be Quebec's political, cultural, and economic adversary as the seat of the federal government that has implemented foreign policy since the 1940s. As mentioned above, with the Quiet Revolution, the Francophones defined their status, in which politics and economic, culture, and the French language became an important reference point that served as the basis for establishing their objectives: separating themselves from their peripheral position *vis-à-vis* Ottawa and the challenges implied in their relationship to the United States, whose intention has never been to see Canada divided.

Another stakeholder that strengthens the province's cultural identity project is France, helping it become an international actor since 1965. This gave rise to a power game in the face of Canada and the United States, who do not want a European country interfering in local affairs. Despite this, the French fostered Quebec's diplomatic career at the expense of their own interests, which were to achieve a position of influence in North America.

Thus, the province's battleground is its relationship with its traditional interlocutors with an eye to being recognized as an economic actor in the dynamics of regional trade and as an autonomous society. For its part, Canada allowed it certain leeway in coming to agreements with other actors and delegations abroad. It even allowed Quebec to participate in international bodies like the International Organisation of La Francophonie 1989 summit or the 2007 UNESCO meeting, with the certainty that its peripheral geographic position and its indissoluble relationship with the rest of Canada would be broken only if the United States recognized its independence.

Based on this premise, Quebec put forward a new strategy with regard to the trade opening in North America: relating to sub-national governments beyond its natural geographical space, the United States.

Quebec and Mexico's states are North American stakeholders, as a result of the very same integration that creates an advantage for anyone able to negotiate local policies.

From 1969 to 1978, Quebec established a presence in Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, Atlanta, and Washington, D. C., spaces "won" above all due to economic considerations. Later, Quebec saw the possibility of positioning itself in new local markets that could foster its identity objectives and then translate into economic and cultural interests. Thus, in 1991, it began taking a marked interest in Mexican states like Querétaro, the State of Mexico, and Mexico City's Federal District; later, after 2006, this extended to the states of Guanajuato, Jalisco, and Nuevo León.

This was naturally done cautiously in order to not challenge the central government, with which agreements were established in sectors like electrical energy, the environment, and technology. The Mexican government was an interlocutor that had to be respected, given its relationship with the Canadian government; that is why the establishment of a General Delegation in 1980 clearly was done along the lines of relations of cooperation without including the political aspect. This gave Quebec advantages in 1991 when the Mexican government allowed its states to establish inter-institutional accords with other entities or governments abroad.[3]

Thus, the similarity between Quebec and Mexico's states is that in both cases the idea is to break the barrier created by geography, although at the same time, that same geography allows them to explore possibilities in which international cooperation becomes a key tool for achieving their objectives.

While Quebec's international activity is based on an element of identity that seeks to project the province beyond its local space, Mexico's states and municipalities are trying to break with their historical link to the central government, decentralizing foreign policy decisions, diplomacy, or cooperation, without challenging the federal government's sovereignty, since neither sub-national government can take territorial control of the countries they belong to.

While Mexico's foreign policy principles continue to be in line with the new relations created, its states have created areas of regional influence located in strategic spaces like the North American SuperCorridor (Nasco). This has become a model and regional example of economic integration in which Quebec, Jalisco, Nuevo León, and Guanajuato have gotten out from under the sphere of strong, centralized dependence to more dynamically manage trade, logistics, and common problems arising from borders where conflicts exist due to migration and crime. The sub-national governments, then, have achieved this by passing local laws to make the movement of goods more dynamic, continuing to create possibilities for cooperation.

Quebec and Mexico's states thus occupy the North American space as stakeholders, as a result of the very same processes of integration that create an advantage for anyone with the real, operational capability to negotiate and harmonize local policies.

Finally, for the government of Quebec province, understanding its geography and all its elements for development has been important historically, both before and after the advent of free trade. But this is of key significance: North America makes it possible to obtain more advantages when Quebec's partners' strategies, such as investment, technology transfer, governors/prime ministers meetings, concretizing accords, and the proposal of new ideas for fostering new forms of cooperation, continue to improve.

For Quebec, the evolution of the space of North America continues to allow it to reinvent itself as a sub-national government in the context of the relations with its interlocutors in order to seek the best advantages. This poses important challenges, whether as an "independent country" or an autonomous province. VM

Notes

[1] Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (London: Longman, 1997), p. 240.

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Decentralized Local-Actor Cooperation In Querétaro's Aeronautics Industry

Alicia Alonso Ugarte*

Jagadeesh N. V./Reuters

According to Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, in a context of complex interdependence, new actors, themes, and ways of relating to each other emerge.[1] I will apply this idea to an analysis of the decentralized cooperation promoted by the Mexico's state of Querétaro to strengthen its industry and create the infrastructure and structure needed to develop an aeronautics industry connected to Bombardier's global value chain linking up Toronto, Montreal, and Wichita.

Decentralized cooperation can be more autonomous and focus on developing and improving the quality of life in states or municipalities; I will explain how this works in the case of Querétaro. Administrative decentralization redistributes authority and the responsibility for financial resources among sub-national bodies, thus slimming down the budget in rational managerial terms and facilitating citizens' participation in terms of a participatory democracy.

One important aspect for developing the economy is fostering capabilities in different ways: individual, social, and institutional. The first, individual capabilities, empower people through learning, and acquiring knowledge, techniques, and skills that facilitate their development. Institutional capabilities are created through efforts to strengthen public or private institutions by improving management ability, planning, and communications for developing human resources. Social capabilities strengthen society as a whole, by age groups, activities, or specific communities.

In Mexico's case, once the economy opened up and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed, legal reforms were made and President Carlos Salinas supported certain sectors like the auto industry, manufacturing, and small and medium-sized businesses; also, several regions of the country, particularly the North and Central Mexico, were given a special place.

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Decentralized cooperation can be more autonomous and focus on developing and improving the quality of life in states or municipalities.

The federal government proposed a more open, competitive form of industrialization internationally that would generate the currency needed by the productive sector and make economic development possible. The goal was to foster the creation of new industries that would incorporate advanced technology.

To adjust domestic legislation to the needs of NAFTA, a new law on international economic treaties was passed and published in the *Diario Oficial de la Federación* (*DOF*) (Official Federal Gazette) on January 2, 1992. It established two kinds of international commitments: treaties, which must be passed by the Senate; and inter-institutional agreements, arrived at by any federal, state, or municipal authority with foreign governments or international agencies. The law stipulates that when such agreements have been negotiated and signed, they must be reported to Mexico's Ministry of Foreign Relations, which will deliberate and decide on their legitimacy, and, if approved, include them in the register created to this end.

On December 27, 1993, the *DOF* published another law, this time on foreign investment, abrogating its predecessor, the 1973 law. The new legislation defines foreign direct investment (FDI) as foreign ownership of any percentage of the equity of a Mexican company. On September 8, 1998, the Regulatory Law on Foreign Investment was published, removing limitations on investment and creating the National Foreign Investment Registry (NFIR) to monitor participants.[2]

The NFIR has analyzed reinvestment and identified the most attractive economic sectors and the states that received the most FDI.

In 2002, the Law on Science and Technology was passed, and then amended in 2014. Its Article 1 establishes the law's objectives as follows:

1.1 To regulate federal government support for fostering, strengthening, developing, and consolidating scientific research, technological development, and innovation in the country;
1.2 To determine the instruments required;
1.3 To establish the mechanisms for coordinating government entities and federal public bodies;
1.4 To develop mechanisms for the coordination, link-up, and participation of the scientific and academic communities of the institutions of higher learning in the public, social, and private sectors to generate and formulate policies to promote, disseminate, develop, and apply science, technology, and innovation;
1.5 To link up educational, productive, and service sectors working in the fields of science, technological development, and innovation.[3]

National Council for Science and Technology (Conacyt) programs, like AVANCE (a Spanish-language acronym for High Value-Added in Business with Knowledge and Entrepreneurs), Innovation Networks, and Technological Parks, offer tax breaks for companies investing in research, development, and innovation. Several other funds also are in operation, such as the Institutional Fund for Regional Scientific, Technological and Innovative Development (Fordecyt), to support scientific institutions and universities in carrying out activities of technological development, research, and innovation. In the specific case of Querétaro, approximately Mex$100 million has been apportioned to the state-level Council for Science and Technology, the National Metrological Center (Cenam), the Center for Advanced Technology (Ciateq), and the Center for Engineering and Industrial Development (Cidesi) in recent years.[4]

Case Study: The Aeronautics Industry in Querétaro

The state of Querétaro is important for Mexico's industrial development. It has 22 industrial parks, and a large part of manufacturing is concentrated in the cities of Querétaro, San Juan del Río, El Marqués, and Corregidora. The workforce is made up of 772 000 people, 65.9 percent of whom are employed in the manufacturing, aeronautics, auto, electronics, transportation equipment, chemical, metal, rubber, and plastics industries, plus the services to those industries.

Industry accounted for 47 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP) in 2014, and in 2010, unemployment was 6.3 percent. The human development index is 0.8, 93.2 percent of the population is literate, and the average amount of schooling includes at least a technical high school certificate.[5]

The priority for Governor Ignacio Loyola Vera (1997-2003) was to encourage foreign assembly plants to set up shop in his state, particularly in depressed areas like the Sierra Gorda mountains, and to support the auto-parts and metallurgy sectors. To broaden out technical and professional training, he signed an agreement with the National College of Technical Professional Education (Conalep) to train technicians according to the needs of the state's industry. In 1999, Industria de Turbo Propulsores (ITP), the beginnings of aeronautics, set up shop in the state, and in 2004, construction began on the intercontinental airport.[6]

The 2004-2009 Querétaro Development Plan, established by Governor Francisco Garrido Patrón, sought to encourage emerging industrial sectors, like software, logistics, and aeronautics, and promote training of technicians and professionals for the industries that would be established in the state. Tax exemptions on imports of inputs and machinery were instituted to attract business.[7]

In 2004, Garrido Patrón promoted state government participation in trade missions to attract foreign investment from North American and take advantage of NAFTA; supported the development of industrial parks; and negotiated financing for the acquisition of machinery and technology through the World Bank or the Inter-American Development Bank. As a result, Bombardier, General Electric IQ, Carpenter Technology, Hyrsa, and Daewood Electronics, among others, announced they would open manufacturing plants in the state starting in 2005. In 2006, the Querétaro Aeronautical Industrial Plant was built in the municipality of Colón, and in 2007, the Querétaro National Aeronautical University was created.[8]

Governor José Calzada Rovirosa (2009-2015) created a solid foundation for comprehensive, sustainable development. He put forward goals and strategies like improving people's well-being; promoting the development of regions, currently divided into urban, industrial center, South, semi-desert, and mountainous; consolidating the state's educational, cultural, and research centers; attracting more Mexican and foreign visitors and businesspeople; improving infrastructure, roads, and highways; deregulating to attract capital for investment in high-tech products; consolidating local supply of small and medium-sized businesses so they could begin to export; fostering productive chains; creating incentives for companies' greater competitiveness so they could benefit from globalization; and generating spaces for international cooperation that facilitate Querétaro's positioning and its production facilities globally.[9]

The state of Querétaro is important for Mexico's industrial development. It has 22 industrial parks, and a large part of manufacturing is concentrated in four of its cities.

Governor Calzada promoted the state's participation in national and international fairs in the framework of both NAFTA and the Free Trade Agreement between Mexico and the European Union, with support from the Coordinating Committee of International Relations and Government Innovation, created by him.[10] Government officials and businesspersons also took part in trade missions to promote products from Querétaro and draft trade and local agreements with global partners. In addition, financing was obtained from the World Bank, the European Investment Bank, and the Inter-American Development Bank for training human resources, research, and generating technology and innovation in local businesses. Negotiations came to a felicitous end in 2014 for Mex$1.2 billion in FDI, 400 percent more than the average for previous years.[11]

The state boasts 126 institutions of higher learning to train qualified professionals and technicians. Among them are the Autonomous University of Querétaro, the Querétaro Aeronautics University, the Polytechnic University, the Technological Institute of Querétaro, and the Querétaro campus of the Technological Institute of Monterrey. They offer different options in the fields of industrial engineering, aeronautics of technology and innovation, materials, electricity, and electronics, which provide professionals and specialized technicians to more than 600 foreign companies.

The Querétaro campus of the Technological Institute of Monterrey and the Corcordia University of Montreal offer master's degrees in innovation in advanced manufacturing and have research centers for innovation with solutions for the aeronautics and auto industries.

The Querétaro Council for Science and Technology coordinates the activities of research centers in technological development and innovation such as the Center for Industrial Development, which supports students studying master's degrees in mechatronics. It is also building the National Center for Aeronautical Technology on land owned by the Querétaro Intercontinental Airport to solve problems and propose innovations for the country's aeronautics industry.[12] The state has U.S., Canadian, Japanese, and European companies that

The state's 126 institutions of higher learning offer options in industrial engineering, aeronautics, and technology and innovation that provide professionals and specialized technicians to more than 600 foreign companies.

use cutting-edge technology in their products and employ more than 50 000 people.

Birth of Aeronautics in Querétaro

In 2005, Bombardier Aerospace announced it was going to begin manufacturing in Querétaro with an initial US$200 million investment. In 2006, the manufacturing center began operating in the El Marqués Industrial Park, building fuselages, assembling horizontal and vertical stabilizers, and making and installing electronic cable harnesses for the Lear Jet 85.

The 18 851-square-meter Lear Jet 85 plant was built between 2009 and 2010. In 2011, Bombardier announced it was increasing its investment by US$50 million to be able to manufacture the rear fuselage for its new business planes, the Global 7000 and Global 8000. One thousand eight hundred workers make these structural components, plus those of the Q400 Next Generation turbo helicopter, the Challenger 605 aircraft, and the fuselage and other components of the Lear Jet 85.[13]

The Center for the Development of the Aeronautics Industry (Cedia) promotes the development of Mexico's aerospace cluster by analyzing data and proposing technical solutions for aerospace engineering. The Querétaro Research and Innovation Network (RIIAQ) was set up to bring together research centers and institutions of higher learning in aeronautics to foster high-level research, training of specialists, and certification of facilities for the aeronautics industry. Members of this network include the Querétaro Aeronautics University (UNAQ), the Center for the Development of the Aeronautics Industry, the Center for Advanced Technology, the Polytechnic University, the Center for Research and Technological Development in Electrochemistry (Cideteq), the Industry of Turbo Reactors (ITR), Solutions in Energy Savings Mexico (Saemex), and the Monterrey Technological Institute/Concordia University partnership.

The aeronautics cluster in Querétaro is made up of the following Mexican and foreign institutions:

a) Engineering and design: Bombardier, Aernnova, Kio Aerospace, Messier Services;
b) Manufacturing of fuselages, wings, harnesses, complex components, and engines: Bombardier, General Electric-IQ; Engineering and engines: SAFRAN; Advanced technology for the aerospace industry: ITR, Carpenter Technology, and Southwest United Canada.
c) Special processes and parts and spare parts suppliers: Hyrsa, Daewood Electronics, Delphi, and Galnik; metal processing: CRIO; engine parts: Elimco Prettl.
d) Universities: the National Autonomous University of Mexico in Querétaro, the Autonomous University of Querétaro; the Querétaro Aeronautics University, the Polytechnic University, the Technological Institute of Querétaro, the Technological Institute of Monterrey, Concordia University, Conalep, and the School of Engineers.
e) The Querétaro Research and Innovation Network (RIIAQ): Bombardier; Safran; ITR; Galnik; Hyrsa; Carpenter Technology: Navair; the global corporation LABTA with its high-tech laboratories; the research and development centers supported by Conacyt, CIDESI, CIATEQ, and CIDETEQ; and the Concordia Institute of Design and Innovation.

With the support of the Querétaro state government, which participated in meetings with U.S. and Canadian entrepreneurs in the framework of NAFTA, the investment begun by Bombardier in 2005 has given rise to that company's value chain. This includes research, design, and engineering in Montreal; engine manufacture in Toronto; making the fuselage, wings, and cable harnesses in Querétaro; and the final assembly in the Wichita, Kansas factory. The fact that it is assembled in the U.S. makes it a U.S. export, but clearly, the participation of Canadians and Mexicans in manufacturing Bombardier aircraft actually make them a NAFTA product.

The global companies and sophisticated components suppliers have matured their manufacturing processes; they have an enormous capability for job creation and the training needed to have an above-average work force. This will benefit other branches of industry and will allow them to be multipliers of economic development.

These productive chains organized in bordering countries with trade liberalization agreements become global value chains for high-tech, advanced industries supported by universities and research centers, and labor-intensive manufacturing like the aeronautics industry. They require a technically trained

work force with special skills that boosts the competitiveness of participating nations and raises the living standards of their populations. Today, Canadian, U.S., and Mexican experts are saying that the material, financial, and human resources exist for building an aircraft in Mexico. We will soon see.

This is how U.S. investors recognize the opportunities for doing business that Querétaro offers, and in their meetings with local businesspersons, in the NAFTA framework, they show interest in investing there. **VM**

NOTES

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JP Moczulski / Reuters

Sub-national Units And Agricultural Workers Programs In Canada

Ernesto Sánchez Sánchez*

INTRODUCTION

The Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP) has been a model of bilateral cooperation between Mexico and Canada since 1974. Its constant assessments make it possible to guarantee better working conditions for migrant workers and an orderly, legal, safe flow of temporary migration. This article contributes to the debate about this program by looking at sub-national units, local actors, and working conditions within this bilateral dynamic.[1]

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Origins and Dynamics of the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP)

While the program attempts to take advantage of the supply and demand for immigrant labor and in specific conditions it has served as a limited incentive for rural Mexican communities due to the constant increase in remittances, workers' working conditions are increasingly deregulated. This has left them vulnerable since the enforcement of the Low Skilled Workers Program (LSWP) in 2002.

In a country like Mexico, international migration has an increasingly complex, dynamic relationship with local development processes in both places of origin and destinations. In some regions of Mexico, governmental migratory strategies, carried out in conjunction with nationals organized in associations, fraternities, or clubs, are part of geopolitical strategies. These expand bilateral relations not only due to proximity or migratory tradition, such as in the case of the U.S., but also due to programs set up by countries and regions that report benefits to municipalities or provinces, such as in the case of Mexican workers in Canada. In contrast with the United States' 1942-1964 Bracero Program, Canada's, signed in 1974 through a Memorandum of Understanding, brought Mexico into the Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program (SAWP).

At the end of the 1990s, the Canadian government established a similar program to its Mexican one with Jamaica, Barbados, and Trinidad and Tobago, countries with a language affinity and whose work forces make up the majority of all Canadian temporary agricultural workers.

Since 2010, more than 10 000 Mexicans go every year to Canada under the SAWP to work on farms through bilateral agreements set up and regulated not only by the two countries' federal governments, but also by their sub-national governments. In 2015, Mexico's Ministry of Labor and Social Services' National Job Service facilitated the participation of 21 499 Mexican workers. Their main destinations were the provinces of Ontario, British Columbia, Quebec, and Alberta; they mainly came from the State of Mexico, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, and Puebla.[2] One outstanding sub-national agreement is the one between the state of Jalisco and the province of Alberta.

SAWP's consolidation is not only due to demand for labor, but also because of the crisis in the Mexican countryside. While the program is considered a model for successful international labor mobility that responds effectively to the demand for farm labor in Canada, I believe that it creates

In a country like Mexico, international migration has an increasingly complex, dynamic relationship with local development processes in both places of origin and destinations.

fewer conflicts in meeting Canadian employers' needs thanks to its flexibility. Some situate that flexibility in the fact that it uses rural labor and that, by gradually reducing Canadian government intervention in the process, it makes it possible for Canadian businesspersons to obtain higher profit margins.

This sub-national dynamic involves the supply and demand of labor, which can have positive results since the migrants activate their places of origin to differing degrees by sending remittances home. The 21 499 Mexican agricultural laborers placed in Canada in 2015 alone declared having sent home Can$225 052 091 in remittances.[3] This seasonal program shows that interaction has generated joint policies between governments and businesses. Although Canada's programs may not be as developed and coordinated as the U.S. case with the 3 x 1 programs, they are very dynamic and are based on criteria and principles that stem from the federal, municipal, or provincial level and generate sub-national effects.

This allows us to situate sub-national units among migratory issues as decisive scenarios for migratory and labor policies, as well as other elements that indirectly influence topics such as human rights and transit policies.

One key element for the continuity and consolidation of SAWP within the framework of sub-national units is that they center on institutional agreements. Through them, they manage and administer the flows of labor mobility based on an intergovernmental model, managed government to government, involving national and sub-national authorities of both countries, as well as the coordination with Canadian employers.

Undoubtedly, the Canadian business community has the specific weight that lends the program its operational efficacy. Canadian employers must supply housing for migrant workers in accordance with provincial standards, as well as food, air fare, and medical coverage. However, Ofelia Becerril, on the one hand, and Leigh Binford, Guillermo Carrasco, and Socorro Arana, on the other, showed that the employers recover a significant portion of that up-front payment through deductions to weekly paychecks to migrant workers.[4] This shows the need to create the administrative procedures as part of public policies of national and sub-national governments in

Since 2010, more than 10 000 Mexicans go every year to Canada to work on farms through bilateral agreements set up and regulated by both the two countries' federal authorities and their sub-national governments.

the face of possible violations of the work contracts of program participants.

A Description of Working Life

Undoubtedly, in the Canadian case, workers programs must be consolidated through continual assessments, pointing out the factors that can interfere with their operation. Given the exponential hike in regulated migration and the fact that programs linking sub-national units are being formalized guaranteeing the safety of migrant workers, this is even more necessary. This is the case of Tlaxcala, where these units become important because they offer labor and, in conjunction with the government bureaucracy and business agreements, they create synergies that can become incentives for the locale, but at the cost of migrants' working conditions.

The publications of Binford, Carrasco, and Arana, and of Becerril show how Mexican workers, mainly from states in Central Mexico like Tlaxcala and Puebla, are living in what amount to precarious conditions. They are paid only a few pennies over minimum wage; they receive no overtime pay or bonuses for seniority —recent arrivals earn the same wage as those who have been there longer; and therefore, the only way workers can increase their weekly wage is to increase the number of hours worked.[5]

More than one-third of the workers interviewed said that they had no days off, which is a violation of the contractual regulations of the program itself. Ofelia Becerril's study observes the workers in Leamington, Ontario, known as Canada's "tomato capital," and argues that transnational agricultural work by Mexicans in Canada ratifies the restructuring of production processes and new forms of organizing the workplace. She shows how patterns in the organization of work (the assignation of posts, tasks, working hours, and opportunities) are based on a strict sexual and ethnic division of labor, which is discriminatory and creates labor segmentation and segregation.[6]

Despite the fact that Mexico's Ministry of Labor stipulates that migrant workers have a certain level of skill, ongoing training, and experience in crops, in some cases, such as that of strawberry workers in Quebec, Canadian employers do not recognize their skill level or pay them accordingly.

This reinforces what Jonathan Molinet has stated to the effect that in sub-national units, in this case in destinations, asymmetries exist between workers and employers, showing different levels of control or management that should be formally presented through government administrations in the place of origin.[7]

The Deregulation of Migrant Labor

In the first half of 2002, the Low Skilled Workers Program (LSWP) was put in place to complement SAWP. The new program created more flexibility based on the migrant's place of origin, determining the skills the worker might have. A characteristic of this program is the absence of any direct participation by the Canadian government in the agreements between employer and worker, making the latter vulnerable in terms of working conditions. The program's main objectives are to recruit workers from any country, emphasizing underdeveloped nations, to carry out low-skilled jobs and create unmediated alternatives for hiring in different niches of agriculture.

Migrant workers hired under this program work for highly-monitored stays of one to two years. There is little supervision or regulation of their working conditions, in contrast with the SAWP, where consular structures dedicated to supervising them intervene. Employers, for their part, receive no Canadian governmental assistance in dealing with local public or private institutions in the case of labor disputes or early repatriation with the help of consulates. That is, despite shoring up the supposed dynamic of sub-national units in places of both origin and destination, no legal structure or institution exists to regulate or serve as intermediary in conflict resolution between workers and employers.[8]

The workers' vulnerability requires that both governments intervene together. If this worker program is to truly be considered under the law in the sub-national unit, the different levels of government must intervene to negotiate and politically administer it. And, if we really want to talk about sub-national units, they must considere public policies carried out by specific locations.

The LSWP does not necessarily include day-workers. We see here that labor relations are individualized between companies and their workers, leaving to one side any space for

The Seasonal Agricultural Workers Program sub-national dynamic involves the supply and demand of labor, which can be positive since the migrants activate their places of origin by sending remittances home.

negotiation and agreements among workers. Companies can decide what their needs are in terms of forms of work; this has important effects on relations between skilled and non-skilled labor, in which, for example, the unequal wages are made more unequal, with the disadvantage for workers without certified skills.[9]

What we see here is a lack of job security that, given their lack of union representation, undoubtedly minimizes workers' participation not only within the system of production, mainly in the distribution of work, but also in terms of their wage demands.

Strategies of labor flexibility come together in this form of regulating migration through practices akin to sub-contracting, and, as is already the case in some cases of U.S. H2B visas, inter-entrepreneurial relations are created in which workers join production with only minimal conditions of labor co-responsibility. That is, a triangular relationship is created that exempts companies from all legal responsibility *vis-à-vis* the migrant worker. This has sparked a huge number of advisories of violations of working conditions. Therefore, it twists the strategies of the programs and leads to the need to demand public policies managed internationally by sub-national governmental actors that would institutionalize them and at the same time provide social, economic, and political synergy. The idea, then, is to try to take advantage of opportunities abroad and that labor markets in Canada be instruments for local development.[10]

That is, we can see an injustice being committed with regard to workers' insertion into the labor market in Canada since a discrepancy exists between the policy and the practice of workers' labor rights. This is due to the restrictive character of work permits since the demands for getting a job and hiring practices can limit labor rights as protectionist measures. And, in this relationship of sub-national units, the bio-politics of destinations take advantage of the labor, but leave to one side the other dimensions of migrant workers' lives.[11] Despite the fact that in its 2007 Statement of Objectives, the Labour Mobility Working Group stipulated it would improve temporary workers programs and guarantee the protection of labor rights, it has not emphasized these issues and has only reinforced the schemes for new job opportunities.[12]

In Conclusion

Temporary migrant worker programs must go beyond the training of human capital and the creation of conditions to guarantee migrants' decent working conditions. They must produce an effect that makes both the places of origin and destination more dynamic. Therefore, it is necessary to ensure their operation from the point of view of the sub-national units where the coordinated regulation of the different levels of government makes possible the operation in a location and guarantees labor risks are minimized. Factors such as migratory patterns, forms of insertion, and the spatial distribution of the population are being restructured given that the central governments and sub-national units gradually stop regulating these labor relations. It is necessary to generate sustainable ways of living and working with working and hiring conditions that strengthen migrants and their communities of origin, establishing a synergy in regional development and ensuring that the benefits are reciprocal. VM

Notes

[1] I will use the term "sub-national units" to mean instrumental units based on the decentralization of governments that leads to processes of social and political integration in sub-national entities that implement bilateral practices. See Jacqueline Behrend, "Política subnacional y democracia," *Revista SAAP* vol. 5, no. 2, 2011.

[2] See http://www.canadainternational.gc.ca/mexico-mexique/eyes_abroad coupdoeil/MXICO2015SAWP.aspx?lang=eng, accessed October 10, 2016; and "Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas México-Canadá 2016 rebasa su objetivo: STPS," http://www.noticiasmvs.com/#!/noticias/programa-de-trabajadores-agricolas-mexico-canada-2016-rebasa-su-objetivo-stps-855, accessed October 10, 2016.

[3] See https://www.gob.mx/stps/prensa/inicia-stps-envio-de-trabajadores-agricolas-a-canada, accessed January 10, 2017. For more statistical data about workers in Canada, see *The Mapping Migration from the Americas Project,* http://www.mappingmigration.com/homeenglish.html.

[4] Ofelia Becerril Quintana, "Relación de género, trabajo transnacional y migración temporal: trabajadores y trabajadoras agrícolas mexicanos en Canadá," paper presented at the first international colloquium "Migración y desarrollo. Transnacionalismo y nuevas perspectivas de integración," in Mexico in 2003, http://meme.phpwebhosting.com/~migracion/ponencias/20_3.pdf, accessed October 4, 2016; and Leigh Binford, Guillermo Carrasco Rivas, and Socorro Arana Hernández, *Rumbo a Canadá: la migración canadiense de trabajadores agrícolas tlaxcaltecos* (Mexico City: Taller abierto, 2004).

[5] Binford, Carrasco, and Arana, op. cit.

[6] Becerril, op. cit.

[7] Jonathan Molinet, "Las unidades subnacionales y las políticas conjuntas en la agenda bilateral migración, medio ambiente, burocracia," http://lasa.international.pitt.edu/LASA98/Molinet.pdf.

[8] Luis M. Muñoz Carrillo, "Programa de Trabajadores Agrícolas Temporales México-Canadá: costos y beneficios," George Washington University, 2011, http://www.gwu.edu/~ibi/minerva/Spring2011/Luis_Munoz_Spanish_version.pdf.

[9] Francisco Zapata, "El trabajo en la vieja y en la nueva economía," in Enrique de la Garza Toledo, Jean-Marie Harribey, and Julio César Neffa, comps., *El futuro del trabajo. El trabajo del futuro* (Buenos Aires: CLACSO, 2001).

[10] Mariana Calvento, "La inserción Internacional de los actores subnacionales: análisis de un proceso contemporáneo," *Interações* vol. 15, no. 2 (July-December 2014).

[11] Camelia Tigau, "Migrantes buenos y malos; biopolíticas de selección de trabajadores extranjeros en América del Norte," in Bernardo Bolaños Guerra, *Biopolitica y migración. El eslabón perdido de la globalización* (Mexico City: UAM, 2015).

[12] This group is coordinated by Mexico and Canada's federal governments. The participants are Mexico's Ministry of Labor and the Foreign Relations Ministry; and Canada's Ministry of Citizenship and Immigration and Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. Its function is to encourage the flow of temporary workers in an orderly, legal, safe manner.

Understanding Drug Policy in the United States: Sub-national Trends

Jonathan D. Rosen*

Jerry Lampen/Reuters

In November 2012, two states in the United States, Washington and Colorado, legalized marijuana for recreational purposes. On November 8, 2016, voters in four states, Massachusetts, Maine, Nevada, and California, decided to follow suit. Moreover, 28 out of the 50 states in the United States have legalized medical marijuana. This is despite the fact that marijuana usage is illegal at the federal level. This article examines the recent trends in marijuana legalization in the U.S., highlighting the complex relationship between the states and the federal government in the U.S. For a variety of reasons, states have decided to legalize marijuana, albeit in various forms. Many advocates of legalizing marijuana in the U.S. argue that this would help reduce drug trafficking and drug-related violence in producing and transit countries. The article begins with a discussion of the U.S. drug war and the consequences of such policies. It then discusses the increasing number of people incarcerated in the U.S. as a result of the drug laws, followed by a discussion about the legalization debate and another on the power of

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the states and states' rights issues. Before a brief conclusion, I discuss the role of states as a model for public policy.

The U.S.-Led Drug War

The U.S. has seen an evolution in the number of laws designed to combat drug consumption, production, and trafficking. For instance, in 1937, the U.S. Congress passed the Marijuana Tax Act, which, as the name implies, made marijuana illegal at the federal level through taxes. The 1952 Boggs Acts and the 1956 Narcotics Control Act created mandatory sentences for individuals violating drug laws. In fact, people found guilty of violating the marijuana laws for the first time faced between two and ten years in prison.[1]

Former U.S. President Richard Nixon launched the "war on drugs" in 1971. While Nixon maintained the need to combat the supply of drugs, he also understood the necessity of investing resources to reduce the demand for them. The argument is that drug traffickers will continue to traffic drugs and other illicit commodities as long as the demand for such products exists. However, other scholars contend that the U.S.-led drug war really began over 100 years ago with the passage of the Harrison Act of 1914, which taxes individuals who import, produce, manufacture, or traffic coca and opium.[2]

The U.S. has spent billions of dollars on counter-narcotics initiatives with the goal of combatting the supply of drugs. For example, Washington allocated US$10 billion to Plan Colombia from 2000 to 2015, with the initial goal of reducing drug cultivation, production, and trafficking by 50 percent. In addition, the U.S. has spent US$2.5 billion on the Mérida Initiative to combat drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico. Critics of such supply-side strategies have contended that countries in Latin America would not have problems with drug trafficking if such high levels of demand did not exist in the U.S., the number-one drug-consuming country in the world. Thus, the argument is that drug trafficking should not only be viewed as a security issue, but rather a public health problem.[3]

Moreover, critics of the drug war and supply-side strategies have maintained that such policies have resulted in high levels of violence.[4] Mexico, for example, witnessed extreme levels of drug-related violence during the Felipe Calderón administration (2006-2012), as more than 100 000 people died during this period. Drug traffickers fight among each other for control of routes and territory. In addition, the Mexican governments' campaign to combat drug traffickers resulted in a war between the states and these illicit actors, which led to high levels of violence and bloodshed.

Many advocates of legalizing marijuana in the U.S. argue that this would help reduce drug trafficking and drug-related violence in producing and transit countries.

The U.S. government has sought to combat drug usage by incarcerating drug users. As a result, the prison population has multiplied over time. For instance, the number of individuals incarcerated for non-violent drug offenses spiked to 400 000 in 1997 from 50 000 in 1980.[5] The prison population has increased by more than 500 percent over the past 40 years. Today, 2.2 million people are in jails or prisons in the U.S., which means that the U.S. incarcerates more people than any other country in the world.[6] Moreover, over half the people in federal prisons are there for drug-related crimes. In 2015, law enforcement officials arrested 643 121 people for breaking marijuana laws.[7]

The Legalization Debate

The legalization of drugs has been a matter for intense debate. While there are those in favor of the complete legalization of all drugs, the legalization of harder drugs such as heroin and cocaine has been a more difficult sell and a controversial issue, as they are very dangerous and viewed as suicidal drugs. However, the U.S. has seen public opinion change over time with regard to the legalization of marijuana. In 1969, for example, 12 percent of the population favored marijuana legalization, compared to 36 percent in 2005. By 2009, 44 percent favored legalization. As of October 2015, 58 percent of the U.S. public believed that this substance should be legal. A Pew Research poll found that 57 percent of people favored the legalization of marijuana in the U.S. in 2016, compared to the 37 percent of individuals who did not approve.[8]

Several arguments are made for legalization for recreational usage, while other individuals contend that marijuana should only be legal for medical purposes. Marijuana has some positive medical benefits. For instance, it is often given to individuals with glaucoma to reduce ocular pressure, and it is

known to reduce pain levels in people with cancer. Furthermore, some argue that more people die from other legal substances, such as alcohol, yet marijuana remains illegal. Thus, some contend that it is hypocritical for marijuana to be illegal while cigarettes and alcohol are legal. Other people argue that the legalization of marijuana would lead to lower profits for criminal organizations, such as the Mexican drug cartels, who traffic this substance. In addition, some people, particularly Libertarians, believe that everyone should have the individual liberty to consume whatever they want. Libertarians contend that the government should play a limited role in individuals' decisions. Others, however, believe that the government should regulate and tax the distribution of marijuana. Currently, eight states tax and regulate marijuana in the U.S.: Washington, Oregon, Nevada, Massachusetts, Maine, Colorado, California, and Alaska.[9]

However, opponents of marijuana legalization argue that it could result in individuals using other harder substances (i.e., marijuana is a gateway drug). Critics also contend that marijuana can have negative health repercussions, such as memory loss, and, therefore, could impact the performance of students. Moreover, some individuals argue that marijuana could result in increased criminal activity as well as accidents (i.e., driving while intoxicated).

The Federal System and States' Rights

The U.S. is a federal system comprised of states that have their own constitutions, laws, and governments. The states in the U.S. have tremendous power compared to the federal government. In other countries with federal political systems, such as Mexico, power is concentrated in the federal government. Moreover, the 50 states in the U.S. are quite different: New York and California, for example, are more liberal than Texas and Nebraska. Individuals and leaders in these states often fight for states' rights issues. The legalization of marijuana in some states has created various challenges since it violates federal laws outlawing marijuana. Furthermore, this is complicated by the fact that the U.S. pushed hard for and signed various international treaties that prohibit drug legalization (for example, the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961).

Critics of the drug war and supply-side strategies maintained that such policies resulted in high levels of violence, for example, in Mexico.

Some individuals, such as Ethan Nadelmann of the Drug Policy Alliance, have argued that the movement to legalize marijuana has similarities to the legalization of gay marriage. In June 2015, the United States Supreme Court ruled gay marriage to be legal at the federal level. Thus, states refusing to recognize gay marriage were in violation of the law. This Supreme Court ruling did not happen overnight, but resulted rather from grassroots social movements and years of litigation. In 2003, Massachusetts began to allow gay couples to marry, followed by Connecticut in 2008 and Iowa in 2009. Thus, the decisions of the states to legalize same-sex marriage led to lawsuits that eventually changed the federal law after a ruling by the highest court. Similar to the gay rights movement, more states will likely continue to legalize marijuana, which could eventually result in a Supreme Court case.

As of January 2017, marijuana remains illegal at the federal level, which presents various challenges for states that have legalized it. For example, an individual can enter a medical marijuana dispensary in Colorado and purchase various forms of marijuana from liquids and edible snacks to cannabis that can be smoked. However, businesses cannot deposit their cash earnings in banks because they are ensured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and banks cannot accept cash from clients who earn money from illicit endeavors. This creates various problems for businesses since they could be more likely to be robbed for having such large amounts of cash on hand.

States as Experiments

A unique thing about the federal system in the U.S. is that states can function as experiments. In other words, a state can implement a certain policy and the results can be studied to determine its consequences. New policies in certain states can serve as a trial. Such incremental changes have several advantages, since designing a policy based on theory could present various challenges. Often, policies that are intended to be carried out in a particular manner face obstacles during implementation. A gradual approach allows practitioners to make changes to enhance the policy's efficiency. Thus, les-

sons can be learned about what elements of a particular law, policy, or activity work efficiently and what aspects could be improved. Thorough analysis of the results allows practitioners to apply the lessons learned in other states. Moreover, the implementation of a policy in one state will not have major consequences if it is not effective. Occasionally, some initiatives that look great on paper end up failing. However, a failure in several states will have less of an impact than if a particular initiative was implemented in all 50 states.

The big fear for opponents of the legalization of marijuana is that crime and accidents could increase. Furthermore, some worry that substance abuse will spike. The legalization of marijuana for recreational use is a relatively recent phenomenon, which means that in-depth studies over significant periods of time are not yet possible. More research must be conducted in the future to determine the impact of legalization on crime, accidents, and addiction in the states where marijuana is legal. However, a study by the CATO Institute found that the legalization of marijuana in Colorado has not led to large increases in marijuana usage.[10]

Conclusion

The U.S. has seen a breakdown —or at least a "partial breakdown"— of the prohibition regime over the past few years. The recent trends in the U.S. with regard to the legalization of marijuana show that public opinion about marijuana laws has shifted over time. The changes in drug laws are in part due to grassroots movements in the U.S. that have pushed for their modification for a variety of reasons. Thus, neither the states nor the U.S. government promoted changes to these laws, but, rather, people mobilized and placed these issues on the agenda at the ballot box. Advocacy organizations, NGOs, and other leaders have been instrumental in helping shape the legalization discourse. Some academics and researchers have played important roles in studying drug policies and advocating for alternatives based on sound scientific research and policy analysis.

Many proponents of the legalization of marijuana believe that the benefits outweigh the costs. Some highlight the large number of people who are arrested and incarcerated for violating drug laws. Others contend that the legalization of marijuana in the U.S. will reduce the profits of organized crime groups operating in places like Mexico, which could help decrease levels of drug-related violence.

The legalization of marijuana in the U.S. also demonstrates the role and power of the states. The lesson of marijuana legalization for medical and recreational purposes is that many states do not agree with current U.S. federal drug laws. Thus, people in a variety of cases have acted in an effort to voice their dissatisfaction. As previously mentioned, many states are currently in violation of U.S. federal laws. If more states continue to legalize marijuana, it is likely that the Supreme Court will receive cases about this issue. However, it is not possible to determine how the court will rule. VM

Notes

[1] Thanks to Marten Brienen for his helpful comments. For more see Angela Dills, Sietse Goffard, and Jeffrey Miron, "Dose of Reality: The Effect of State Marijuana Legalizations," *Policy Analysis* no. 799, CATO Institute, September 16, 2016.

[2] Bruce Michael Bagley, "The New Hundred Years War? US National Security and the War on Drugs in Latin America," *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* vol. 30, no. 1 (1988), pp. 161-182; Ted Galen Carpenter, *Bad Neighbor Policy: Washington's Futile War on Drugs in Latin America* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003).

[3] Connie Veillette, *Plan Colombia: A Progress Report* (Washington, D. C.: Congressional Research Service, 2005); Ted Galen Carpenter, *The Fire Next Door: Mexico's Drug Violence and the Danger to America* (Washington, D. C.: Cato Institute, 2012); Bruce Bagley, *Drug Trafficking and Organized Crime in the Americas: Major Trends in the Twenty-First Century* (Washington, D. C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2012).

[4] Ted Galen Carpenter, "Drug Prohibition Is a Global Folly," *CNN*, October 4, 2013.

[5] "A Brief History of the Drug War," *Drug Policy Alliance*, http://www.drugpolicy.org/facts/new-solutions-drug-policy/brief-history-drug-war-0, accessed December 28, 2016.

[6] "Incarceration," The Sentencing Project, http://www.sentencingproject.org/issues/incarceration/, accessed December 28, 2016.

[7] "Drug War Statistics," Drug Policy Alliance, http://www.drugpolicy.org/drug-war-statistics, accessed December 28, 2016.

[8] Jeffrey M. Jones, "In U.S., 58% Back Legal Marijuana Use," Gallup, October 21, 2015, http://www.gallup.com/poll/186260/back-legal-marijuana.aspx, accessed December 28, 2016; Abigail Geiger, "Support for Marijuana Legalization Continues to Rise," Pew Research Center, October 12, 2016, http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/10/12/support-for-marijuana-legalization-continues-to-rise/, accessed December 28, 2016.

[9] For more on the legalization debate, see Jonathan P. Caulkins, Angela Hawken, Beau Kilmer, and Mark A.R. Kleiman, *Marijuana Legalization: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012); Alain Joffe and W. Samuel Yancy, "Legalization of Marijuana: Potential Impact on Youth," *Pediatrics* vol. 113, no. 6 (2004): e632-e638; Andrew A. Monte, Richard D. Zane, and Kennon J. Heard, "The Implications of Marijuana Legalization in Colorado," *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA)* vol. 313, no. 3 (2015), pp. 241-242.

[10] Angela Dills, Sietse Goffard, and Jeffrey Miron, "Dose of Reality: The Effect of State Marijuana Legalizations," CATO Institute, September 16, 2016, https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-analysis/dose-reality-effect-state-marijuana-legalizations.

Instrucciones para salir del limbo: Arbitrario de representaciones audiovisuales de las fronteras en América del Norte
(Instructions for Getting Out of Limbo: Anthology of Audiovisual Representations of Borders in North America)
Graciela Martínez-Zalce
CISAN, UNAM
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

Perhaps not since the signing of NAFTA has what is happening in Mexico's North caused so much concern. In the last decade of a tumultuous century, we observed our northern border with growing expectation and not a few misgivings about globalization, which was presented as synonymous with progress. Today it is clear that the promise of free transit between countries has only been for goods; in contrast, for individuals, geography has been broken apart and borders have become a "limbo," that is, an edge, a temporary or permanent liminal space with its own heterogeneous characteristics. Molded by the friction between cultures, the borders of North America became extremely complex spaces that have not gone unnoticed by cultural industries like the cinema and television.

In this book of essays, Graciela Martínez-Zalce studies the audiovisual representations of border spaces in North America at the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries. It is an anthology that aims to —and manages to— be selective rather than exhaustive. The most significant antecedent to this work is perhaps Norma Iglesias's pioneering study about the cinema of the Mexico-U.S. border, *Entre yerba, polvo y plomo* (Amidst Grass, Dust, and Lead) (1991), whose definition of the border genre is still valid. However, it is clear that the list and quality of the films dealing with this issue have increased considerably. Given the need for new approaches, Martínez-Zalce's book takes a critical look at the cinematic and television representations of this region which, in fact, has been paradigmatic in its transformation during the globalization process.

The introduction goes into how the space is configured in audiovisual formats. Based on Luz Aurora Pimentel's narratological theory, Martínez-Zalce explains the way in which the space is inherent to the story and asks herself, in the manner of Doreen Massey (*For Space*, 2005), how the human experience is conceptualized. These reflections seek to pin down the importance of films in the creation of national identities. Tim Edensor's answer in his book *National Identity* (2002) is that they take shape around an illusory concept of nation that is commonly accepted as natural and not a construct. Thus, if the nation's image is created by repeating symbols that in the end represent its origin and uniqueness, cinema and television are industries that systematically repeat and configure those symbols. Later in her introduction, the author defines the "border genre," a concept that will be indispensable in the book's six chapters, based on Norma Iglesias's observations:

a film is about the border when it takes place on the border, when it refers to border characters or towns, or when its plot deals with problems of national identity. The definition is perfectly pertinent for the films that make up the body of this book.

In the first chapter, "Fronteras (y géneros) que se cruzan…" (Borders [and Genres] that Cross Each Other), the author analyzes seven films whose characters change on the highway: *Sin dejar huella* (Without a Trace), *Bajo California* (Underneath/Lower California), *Born in East L.A.*, *Highway 61*, *Blue State*, *Niagara Niagara*, and *Ciclo* (Cycle). The protagonists of these road movies subvert the stereotypes that usually abound in this kind of film and start trips that move them closer to or distance them from the asymmetrical boundaries of the United States: both its southern border, ringed by a river, a desert, and now a wall, and its northern border, one of the world's longest and for a very long time one of its least guarded. And even though moving always presupposes a search, the reasons for the trips could not be more different: running from persecution, by accident, evading the past or the future, or just for love of the journey. These seven films crisscross the entire North American region at the same time that they shape it in the viewers' imaginary.

Then, in "Fronteras que se viven" (Borders Experienced), the author studies four films directed by women. From different parts of North America, they portray the daily life of families headed by single mothers: *El jardín del Edén* (The Garden of Eden), by Mexican María Novaro; *Gas Food Lodging*, by U.S. American Allison Anders; *Bordertown Cafe*, by Canadian Norma Baily; and *Frozen River*, by U.S. American Courtney Hunt. In all these films, the border space is portrayed as a place of passage the characters are trying to get away from.

The chapter "Fronteras que se erigen" (Borders Erected) deals with two products from U.S. popular culture: the films *Canadian Bacon*, by Michael Moore, and *South Park Bigger, Longer and Uncut*, by Parker and Stone. Both take ironic looks at national values to demystify them. They make way for a reflection about the constitution of national identities based on opposition; that is, the process whereby the enemy, or the "other," is constructed. They also make it possible to interpret the paradox in which the concept of border is situated today.

The TV series *The Border* merits an entire chapter to itself: "Fronteras que se vigilan" (Borders Watched). Here, Martínez-Zalce analyzes how stereotypes about migration exist in Canadian public television. Throughout this White Pines-produced series, we watch episodes about terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, slavery, or the sale of human organs. Despite the seriousness of these issues, we can recognize a not-so-veiled stereotyping: Muslim terrorists, bloodthirsty Mexicans, or U.S. Americans with hidden agendas ravage multicultural, cosmopolitan, twenty-first-century Canada.

But not everything is about geographic boundaries. The chapter "Fronteras de los géneros" (Gender Frontiers) studies two movies whose protagonists are border beings because they are transexual. *Le sexe des étoiles* (The Sex of the Stars) and *Transamerica* subvert the notions of sex and gender. In both films, one Canadian and the other U.S. American, borders are erased and an attempt is made to cross them when the characters face their identity in the male-female dichotomy and from two points of view: transexuality and transgender identity.

Finally, "Fronteras simbólicas" (Symbolic Borders) deals with border representations created as dystopias. The animated short *Borderlines/Territoire* and two science fiction films, *Cube* and *Upside Down*, portray a border space as a fundamental textual element both thematically and visually. And, although none of these situate their protagonists in a specific time period, they do reflect on the significance of the dividing lines between genders, countries, and worlds.

The book concludes with two important contributions: a commented filmography and a large specialized bibliography. Graciela Martínez-Zalce's book is a valuable, pertinent update on border film studies at a time when we need to rethink everything that has been said about North America's borders —complex, fascinating spaces that they are—, which, given the encounters and clashes there, have become true contemporary limbos. VM

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Meridiano cero. Globalización, prácticas culturales y nuevas territorializaciones simbólicas
(Meridian Zero. Globalization, Cultural Practices, and New Symbolic Territorializations)
Nattie Golubov and Rodrigo Parrini, eds.
CISAN, UNAM
Mexico City, 2016, 278 pp.

This book deals with the reification and commercialization of culture, the symbolic representation of the center and periphery, the tension between gentrification and the appropriation of public spaces, and the history of health tourism, reaching all the way to self-help circles and books, forms of male subjectivation through risk and conflict in car races, the spatial-temporal experiences of videogames, and cultural practices determined by the migratory experience. Nattie Golubov and Rodrigo Parrini present us this entire range of topics in *Meridiano cero. Globalización, prácticas culturales y nuevas territorializaciones simbólicas* (Meridian Zero. Globalization, Cultural Practices, and New Symbolic Territorializations).

"The zero meridian is the imaginary axis that traverses the planet Earth from North to South and divides its into segments of space and time," the back cover of the book tells us. And the axis that traverses each of its chapters is marked by tension between the global and the local, the spatial and the temporal. Using the warp and woof of a piece of cloth as a metaphor, Golubov and Parrini present their work pointing to culture as the fabric of meanings, materialities, and practices that leave their mark on subjects. In addition, they say that culture is at the center of the work's reflection, present as though it were a battlefield, in addition to being an integrating element that offers explanations and interpretations, making social and symbolic worlds intelligible. Culture, territorialization, subjectivities, technology, everyday life, global, local, and symbolization are some of the categories they reflect on and that can be found in the warp of the social, the economic, and the political.

In that sense, some of the texts compiled here emphasize one matter more than another; but none of them, even perhaps unintentionally, escapes economic, social, and political determining factors, and above all, the present time and the way in which individual and collective relationships manifest themselves today in late capitalism. In the sphere of culture, with all its tensions and contradictions, it seems impossible —and this is shown by the texts in this book— to speak of de-globalization. However, a form of symbolic territorialization is added today, as can be observed in the chapter "Iconología del desastre latinoamericano: de *Blade Runner* a *Elysium*" (Iconology of the Latin American Disaster: from *Blade Runner* to *Elysium*), by Nelson Arteaga Botello, and the chapter "Odisea del (otro) espacio. Experiencias espacio-temporales de videojugadores en Bogotá, Colombia" (Odyssey of the [Other] Space. Spatial-temporal Experiences of Videogamers in Bogota, Colombia), by Nina Cabra.

Arteaga's article was especially interesting to me because it invites reflection not only about symbolic territorialization, but about its ideological construction and the way in which an increasingly close, tangible dystopian world is represented. Based on his analysis, it is possible to study a large number of cinematographic cultural products whose ideological mechanism is to divide humanity around culturally constructed differences and in which diversity and multi-culturality are synonymous with chaos.

Everyday life and different forms of subjectivation are present in this book; I would underline the chapters that emphasize these processes: "Identidades fragmentadas, identidades narradas. Autoempleo y subjetividad en el turismo de salud" (Fragmented Identities, Narrated Identities. Self-employment and Subjectivity in Health Tourism), by Daniela Oliver Ruvalcaba; "Círculos de mujeres: el cuerpo femenino como espacio de significado espiritual" (Women's Circles: The Female Body as a Space for Spiritual Meaning), by María del Rosario Ramírez Morales; "Cuando amar es sufrir: manejo emocional en el grupo Mujeres que Aman Demasiado Anónimas (MADA)" (When Loving Is Suffering: Managing Emotions in the Group Women Who Love Too Much Anonymous [MADA]), by Johana Pardo González; "El libro, mi confidente" (Books, My Confidants), by María Alicia Peredo Merlo; and "Cultura juvenil: conflicto y riesgos en las carreras ilegales de autos y motos" (Youth Culture: Conflict and Risk in Illegal Car and Motorcycle Races), by Leila Sollberger Jeolás.

These chapters reflect on female and male subjectivity. It is important to underline that these analyses arrive at similar conclusions in that these processes of subjectivation reinforce the idea of individualization, of the construction of the female and male identities, in turn based on the reinforcement of the dominant hetero-normative ideologies like the naturalization of what is feminine, the myth of romantic love, and the exaltation of male values like bravery, aggressiveness, strength, and risk.

The reification of culture, gentrification, and the appropriation of space are three themes present here. The chapters "Pacto por México, reorganización capitalista y cultura: ¿hacia la implementación nacional de las industrias creativas?" (The Pact for Mexico, Capitalist Reorganization, and Culture: Toward the National Implementation of the Creative Industries?), by Alma Rosa Alva de la Selva, Irma Portos Pérez, Enrique Quibrera Matienzo, and Florence Toussaint Alcaraz; "La revitalización del Centro Histórico de la Ciudad de México frente a la memoria de un barrio comercial. El caso de La Merced" (Revitalizing Mexico City's Historic Center in the Memory of a Commercial Neighborhood. The Case of La Merced), by Montserrat Núñez Ortiz; and "Creadores y territorios musicales en la Ciudad de México. Redes de colaboración y procesos creativos" (Mexico City's Musical Creators and Territories. Networks for Collaboration and Creative Processes), by Luis Alberto Hernández de la Cruz all center on these issues.

The commercialization of culture and the so-called "creative industries" as government policy, about which we have heard little or nothing; the tension between gentrification and the resistance to it, but at the same time that resistance is in conflict —and therefore creates tension— with the need to modernize, as another form of resistance to the commercialization of culture, of creative processes: the book reflects on all of this and on other forms of cooperating and producing culture through collaborative networks.

As we can see, *Meridiano cero. Globalización, prácticas culturales y nuevas territorializaciones simbólicas* offers us a large number of reflections, perhaps all quite different from each other, but that have three elements in common that make its reading indispensable: culture, new forms of subjectivation, and new forms of territorialization. In addition, it is necessary to reflect on these processes in light of the historical, political, and economic determining factors that make them possible. What is interesting about this work is that it constantly presents the tensions and internal contradictions not only of the objects (subjects) of study, but between them and today's late capitalism, which is debating between globalization and de-globalization, which at one time presupposed complete de-territorialization, and which now transcends to the symbolic, virtual plane. This makes this work fundamental reading for anyone interested in understanding the tensions between the local and the global; the different forms of territorialization, some virtual, some symbolic, and others more ideological; and new and diverse forms of subjectivation constructed as forms of resistance and

even subsistence in everyday life (for example, through women's groups and self-help groups and books).

I should mention that the richness of *Meridiano cero. Globalización, prácticas culturales y nuevas territorializaciones simbólicas* lies in the fact that the majority of the chapters mentioned use language that is not particularly formal or academic. The reader can infer diverse ways of getting at the heart of the phenomena studied here through qualitative methodologies like in-depth interviews and participatory observation. Some chapters even utilize a tone that is rather unusual in academic texts, like narration and the use of the first person to refer to research results, momentarily putting the author at the center of the piece. This makes it quite easy reading with no ill effects for the rigor of the research.

Finally, a central point that this work demonstrates is that culture, and therefore the elements associated with it, such as identity and subjectivation processes, are not static. They change with time and —and why not say it?— from one space to another. What is more, they change in accordance with the historical, political, and economic determining factors within which that change occurs. This is very clear in two articles: "La revitalización del Centro Histórico de la Ciudad de México frente a la memoria de un barrio comercial. El caso de la merced" (Revitalizing Mexico City's Historic Center in the Memory of a Commercial Neighborhood. The Case of La Merced), by Montserrat Núñez Ortiz; and "Las prácticas culturales de los mexicoamericanos de Mission District, San Francisco, California, en torno al Día de Muertos" (Cultural Practices of Mexican-Americans on the Day of the Dead in the Mission District, San Francisco, California), by Paola Virginia Suárez Ávila.

Both these articles allude to the gentrification of traditional spaces and the way in which this process affects traditional inhabitants of certain big city neighborhoods and places in two different latitudes. But specifically, Suárez Ávila's article portrays a very interesting phenomenon that she defines as "the construction of new identities, determined by the migrant experience and not a national or ethnic identity." This leads us to reflect on the fact that, one way or another, we all can become migrants. And it makes me think of our situation today, when we have millions of returnees in Mexico about whom we have thought very little regarding the construction of their identity based on their migratory experience or on their experience as return migrants. VM

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Problemas del DESARROLLO

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

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