THE MEXICAN TRANSITION

Héctor Aguilar Camín

For Luis González

Towards the end of last February, the Second Symposium of Contemporary Mexican History was held in Querétaro, organized by the Department of Historical Studies, the Autonomous National University's (UNAM) Institute of Social Research, and the Metropolitan Autonomous University's (UAM) social science departments. The text published here was read as an inaugural paper to the wide-ranging works included in the symposium. It is a rapid summary of different themes of a book to be published this year.

There is a paradox and a certain professional absurdity in undertaking the task of writing the history of the immediate past, a past which we can almost remember as part of our lives. By definition, the historian's material is the past, what has happened. But we are now putting our modest weapons of retrospective prophets to serve the cause not of what has happened, but of what is happening at the present. There will be historians of the past generation and of our own who will be unable to understand our efforts.

Even at the end of the 1960s, in the College of Mexico, what was considered to be historic material did not go beyond the collapse of Porfirio Díaz' regime. No one was prohibited from investigating post-1910 revolutionary history, but those who dared to do so were kindly persuaded to look for a sociology or political science professor to act as a thesis advisor. With a few worthy exceptions, institutional historians dedicated themselves strictly to the past—which at that time was, above all, colonial history—and not to the present, which was considered to be what came after Don Porfirio's tears on the *Ypiranga*.

Shaken to its roots by the magnitude of the change, our present becomes the past with ever greater speed

Director of *Nexos* magazine

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Barely 20 years have passed since those transparent days at the College of Mexico, and the frontier between past and present, between what is properly historic and properly contemporary, has been blurred or relaxed enormously in the minds of most historians. The armed conflict of the Mexican Revolution appears to many historians today as something as remote as the colonial past seemed to some of us at the end of the 1960s. We want more and better history of recent times. I attribute this compulsion to the fact that as a society we are living an epochal change that is converting realities that only a few years ago were our most irrefutable present into things of the past. Shaken to its roots by the magnitude of the change, our present becomes the past with ever greater speed.

Albert Camus once said that a defect of contemporary wisdom is the supposition that the present is the most interesting of times. At the risk of falling into the similar error, I believe that without a doubt the Mexicans of the second half of this century have been given the privilege of experiencing one of the more profound historical transitions of their country, equivalent in its long-term effects to the Bourbon reforms of the 18th century.

This has been recorded with unsurpassed smoothness by Luis González:



A market in downtown Mexico City: reminiscent of pre-Columbian trade
(Photo by Marco Antonio Cruz)

Every present gives the impression of being a break with the past, but the present in which we live today is perhaps not so typical because it manifests some extraordinary cracks. There are many easily observable symptoms of the cultural crisis. Judging by what is barely visible, the present revolution is no less devastating than the changes of the 16th or 18th centuries. During the century of the Conquest, the values of our indigenous and Spanish ancestors came into crisis, giving way to the culture of our mestizo fathers. During the Enlightenment, baroque culture entered its death throws as modernity took shape. From about the middle of this century, the galloping decrepitude of the beliefs and customs of modernity is palpable and the hint of something still without a name arises. We inhabit the ruins of one culture and the site of another in construction.[1]

Historical Transition

Luis González' litany announces the end of our ancient and venerable rural-based society with its agricultural and peasant heart. It was a pre-industrial, Catholic, corporative, slow-growing and dispersed society raised in stagnant regions under provincial peculiarities preserved by the territorial disarticulation of uses, customs and markets. It was the society of barely yesterday, before the clinic and public health came in the scene. It was prudent and austere, monogamous and macho. Politically pyramidal in structure, that society placed a great emphasis in authorities and strong elites. Meanwhile, the unlettered masses, at the same time enduring and turbulent, were raised on the stoic foundations of an ancestral culture of poverty.

The nature of the historical transition in which we find ourselves is precisely the theme underlying these comments. What direction is it taking? What are its characteristics? Who are its actors? I believe that the direction of this transition is constituted by eight basic tendencies, four of which are structural—"civilizational" or "long term" as Braudel would have it—and four which are superstructural in character, that is to say, middle-term changes in the system of political domination.

The four structural transitions are:

1. the evolution from a rural to an urban country;
2. the shift from an acute centralizing process to the constitution of a descentralized periphery;
3. the consolidation of a new phase of integration into the economic, technological and financial realities of the global market; and,
4. the change to a new concentration of inequality.

The four superstructural mutations are:

1. a descent in the relative weight of the state and an increase in the relative weight of society—the end of the era of state expansion;
2. an erosion in the corporative pact and the corresponding emergence of logic and actors of liberal, citizen sensibilities;
3. the transition from an absolutist presidential regime to a constitutional presidential regime; and,
4. the transition from a regime of one dominant party to one of a majority party.

Below are the essential traits of each of these tendencies with a short, final note about the social product that summarizes the process: the constitution of a new national majority.

From the country to the city

In 1960, for the first time in the country's history, the urban population was greater than the rural—the difference was 487,000. At that time 35 million Mexicans inhabited the nation. Fifty-one of every 100 lived in an incipient system of cities including Mexico City, with a little more than 5 million inhabitants, Guadalajara, with 850,000 and Monterrey, with 700,000. Twenty years later, in 1980, the 35 million had doubled: they were now 67 million, but the urban population had grown one and a half times—from 18 to 44 million—and now not 51 but 66 of every 100 people lived in cities. In 1980, Mexico City had 15 million inhabitants, Guadalajara had 2,200,000 and Monterrey had almost 2,000,000.

These figures summarize the most decisive civilizational change experienced by Mexico since the Conquest of the 16th century. In the course of the giddy decades of demographic growth of the second half of the 20th cen-

"In the last forty years, the most important cities have lost their size." (Photo by Arturo Fuentes)

tury, Mexico began not to be what it had always been: a rural country, tied to the earth and with an ancient way of organizing life and dealing with nature.

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There is no room for doubt regarding the tendency's vigor and irreversibility. If population growth remains at its projected rate, by the year 2000, Mexico will be a country of 103 million inhabitants, and seven of every ten Mexicans, or 70 percent will live in cities of more than 15,000. The latter conclusion should be underlined, because the rise of urban Mexico cannot be explained solely by the monstrous urban sprawl of the valley of Mexico, Guadalajara or Monterrey. We must take into account the qualitative transformation of what we continue to call "provincial" Mexico. This mythological place is no longer that of forceful and immutable essences, but of accelerating change. It is traversed by demographic abundance and the proliferation of universities, banks, shopping centers, radio stations, television stations, videoclubs, videostyles and parabolic antennas.

In the last forty years, the most important cities in the country have lost their provincial size. In 1940, there were only five cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants, but in 1960 there were 17, in 1970 there were 31, and in 1980 there were 64 cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants. There are 22 million people living in those principal cities, and they have stopped being economically simplified or immobile. At the beginning of the 1980s, the indicators of their economic diversity and labor stratification were substantially higher than in previous decades.[2]

The growth and diversification of the intermediate cities indicate a profound change in regional living conditions and above all, in centralizing tendencies.

From the center to the periphery

According to Enrique Hernández Laos, between 1900 and 1970, national wealth tended to be concentrated regionally. During the 1970s however, the tendency changed direction, although only in a marginal way. The area of concentration *par excellence*, the valley of Mexico, had lost in the 1970s a considerable portion of the national wealth that it had formerly won (7.4 percent less than the total). On the other hand, regions that had been traditionally slow and subordinate, such as the south and southeast, gained points without precedent in the new distribution (4 percent more than the total), the same held true for the central western, central northern and central regions (excluding Mexico City) which also gained a substantial percentage (7.8 percent more than the total).[3]

An equivalent change took place in the figures for production per capita. At the beginning of the 20th century, an inhabitant of the valley of Mexico produced 2.3

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times more than an inhabitant of the south or southeast. By 1940, the difference was 5 times and in 1970, 4.7 times. But by the end of the 1970s, this proportion had dropped substantially to only 1.8 times more production per capita.

The economic recession of the 1980s has produced different regional impacts that have probably favored and deepened the consolidation of our new "periphery." While these last years have seen poverty and a contraction in the budget of Mexico City, there has been progress in other areas of the country, such as the southeast, the Bajío and the north.

The symptoms of regional emergence are visible to any observer who has been in even superficial contact with the old Mexican provinces. Among other things, in the 1980s, we have witnessed the unusual phenomenon of strong state treasuries against a contracted and deficit-ridden federal treasury. We have seen the imposition of an acute decentralizing awareness—translated into government plans and programs—on the national consciousness. We have witnessed the most intense, regional, electoral agitation since the 1920s. This group of symptoms is referred to by journalist León García Soler as the "cry of regional independence." An unyielding return of the old regional spirit characteristic of the country's history that has found its felicitous intellectual formulation in the matriotic manifestos of Luis González.

From the country to the world

In a similar way, this new internal regionalism in Mexico corresponds to a new phase of regionalism in the world. In recent years, Mexico has been at the mercy of the whims of the world market, its political pressures and its technological challenges.

In our preoccupation with our own problems, we tend to give little attention to the decisive importance of foreign affairs on our sorrow and fatigue. But the reality is that, notwithstanding our own responsibilities in the affair, we will soon reach the end of two decades in which the adverse movements of the international economy and political system have bludgeoned our development perspectives worse than our own internal errors.

Think, for example, of the abrupt suspension of economic growth which asphixiates us today. Of course, Mexico had its own particular way of falling into the brambles, but the disastrous result was so identically shared by other Latin Americans who were alien to our errors that it is possible to attribute our specific debacle to the laws of a wider process, not subject to our control nor at times, within our understanding.

At the end of 1983, Chilean economist Jaime Estévez, in a discussion in the magazine *Nexos,* spoke convincingly of this process:

> The abrupt end of consumerism and the traumatic awakening to the reality of the crisis experienced by the public in the first months of 1982, is not a phenomenon specific to Mexico. On the contrary, 1982 was a year of crisis everywhere in Latin America, the worst since the 1930s... (After a high growth rate during the 1970s, in 1981 the rate of growth of the regional domestic product was worrisomely low, only 1.5 percent, the lowest since 1940. (In 1982), the tendency towards stagnation turned into a recession and for the first time in forty-three years the regional product dimished. Eleven of nineteen countries suffered drops in their gross domestic products and the others registered gains so small that they could not keep pace with population growth.[4]

The technological question is no less important in its international impact on Mexico. At the beginning of the 1970s the world experienced a technological revolution comparable only with the invention of the steam engine and the birth of the Industrial Revolution. Among other things, this revolution makes obsolete that part of the industrial structure implanted in the postwar era and responsable in a large way for the industrialization that gave rise to the so-called "Mexican Miracle." A consequence of this breakthrough is, among other things, a new international division of labor and world trade whose most visible signs are the assembly plant belts in peripheral countries and industrial reconversion towards "soft" high technology in the center nations.

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Given the conditions of the brutal contraction of international credit in the 1980s the only road to financial self-sufficiency which might guarantee the development of countries like Mexico seems to be to export—that is, to tie ourselves to the global flow of production and merchandise. To persist with our industrial base from the last era in a protected economy oriented solely towards the overexploitation of the internal market is to condemn ourselves to productive obsolescence and the sole export of oil, a material that may be exhausted soon after the year 2000.

To open ourselves up to the outside world implies a new period of commercial, financial and technological dependence on the United States but also possible inclusion in the regional developments of the future—such as the Pacific Basin—and the modern diversification of our depedence through treaties of industrial updating and foreign investment with Japan, Europe and, along the way, with Latin America.

Inequality

Starting in the 1980s, the challenges of the outside world and the bankruptcy of the internal model have in-

itiated a new period of top-down modernization in Mexico. As with all top-down modernizations, a Mexican specialty since the Conquest, the one at the end of the 20th century will have—and it already does—a high social cost before realizing its possible benefits. A core factor of this modernization program was that of relative prices, that is, the equilibration of products and services with their real prices, making them competitive internationally. No other relative price has been adjusted as much as wages and salaries, whose fall varies according to the base year adopted to measure it, but whose fall could be estimated, without exaggerating, in the order of a 40 percent drop in real terms from 1983 to the present date.

Inflation-Speculation

The "adjustment," the term used to abbreviate this dramatic decline in living standards has taken place in particularly unfavorable conditions for the fixed income sectors, and the population in general. It occurred in the middle of an acute inflationary process and at the onset of general bankruptcy of public finance. Its recomposition includes the unprecedented restriction of subsidies and state social programs. The effect of these converging adversities is, of necessity, an extreme sharpening of social and economic inequalities.

On the one hand, inflation and speculation have enriched the "haves" and impoverished the "have-nots." On the other hand, federal budget cuts has impeded the social program's distribution of part of the national income to the less protected sectors. At the end of this century we are faced with an environment of general impoverishment and, at the same time, of lacerating accentuation of privileges and inequalities. Calculations by the Barros Sierra Foundation give an idea of the intensity of the process by comparing the income of the top and bottom of Mexican society. If actual tendencies continue, and there is no indication that they will change much in the course of the new modernization, by the year 2000, the top 10 percent of the Mexican population with the greatest income will be 40 times wealthier than the poorest 10 percent. The difference will have more than doubled in the last fifty years. In 1950, the top 10 percent was 18 times wealthier than the poorest 10 percent, in 1970, 27 times wealthier, and in 1986, 36 times wealthier.[5]

"In 1960, for the first time, the population classified as urban was greater than the rural." (Photo by Marco Antonio Cruz)

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The social consequences of this process can barely be exaggerated. We are headed perhaps towards an unprecedented period of dual society, segregated internally, with modern sectors beseiged by misery, backwardness and crime. Some figures give a better idea. In 1982 there were close to 44,000 robberies reported in Mexico City's Federal District. In 1984 there were more than 73,000. The projected growth in criminality for minors is 50 percent from now to the end of the century for crimes against property such as theft, and 236 percent for non-felony crimes such as drunkenness, vagrancy and, public disorder.[6]

II

We shall refer now to the four superstructural or political tendencies of the transition:

The state's limits

I share with Lorenzo Meyer the impression that the 1980s may be thought of as the beginning of a new period in post-Revolutionary history. Its novel, main point, as Meyer himself says, is that "the interventionist state is contracting, is diminishing its presence in society and is leaving other forces to fill the space that remains behind. The contraction in and of itself is of no great magnitude... The important thing is that the period of expansion, initiated even before the Revolution and continued from then on, appears to have arrived at its culmination and begun a retreat."[7]

The date which, according to Meyer, initiates the new era of state's retreat is precisely that of its last historic expansion: September 1, 1982, the day former President José López Portillo nationalized the banks. It was the greatest act of state autonomy since the nationalization of

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the oil industry but also the limit of the legitimacy of the expropriatory powers of the state and, in particular, the president.

Mexico's bankruptcy—a link in the global chain of declining welfare states in the post-Keynesian era—took the form of a crisis in the foreign debt, recession, the impossibility of state subsidies, unproductivity, a protectionist crisis and an opening of the economy to foreign competition. As with the rest of the world, the instruments of bankruptcy administration consisted of reorganizing public finances, cutting the deficit and state investment, reductions in wages and salaries, privatization and deregulation of the economy. In short, the return to the free market.

At the beginning of the 1980s Mexicans received the news that state had reached its limit and that, distinct from previous transitions, the following modernization would not occur through expansion but rather through the contraction or thinning down of the state. It appeared to be more a proposal of society than of government, but it was perhaps only a government proposal based on the evidence inspired by the economy and the society.

We must admit that the state has organized and modernized Mexican society. Its most closely guarded contradiction is precisely this: it promotes a modernization that will go beyond its own self. A mature society, with an independent post-state spirit, has emerged from the saga of state-sponsored modernization. From all sides of the family, challenges and discontent rail against the too ubiquitous state paternalism. In particular, criticism mounts from within the state: the corporative pact that rooted it socially in the 1930s and whose erosion is already in evidence is clearly in disagreement.

A Faustian Pact

One by one the different sectors of the corporative pact of the 1930s—workers, peasants, the middle class, private enterprise—manifest change and resistance to state domination.

To begin with, let us take business and industry. The nationalization of the banks broke or finished breaking the symbiosis between the leaders of private enterprise and the government. One extreme political consequence of the break is the novel phenomenon we see today of business and industrial leaders seeking office as candidates of the opposition. The economic result can be seen in the very low indicators of private investment in recent years and the abundance of capital flight. The attempt to put the alliance back together through political concessions and economic aid led, at the end of last year, to a new cycle of loss of confidence, speculative impunity and the anticipation of another apocalyptic end of the presidential term.

Wary of the agreement and the rules of the game that once guided their contentious cooperation with the state, private enterprise today looks for political independence and ideological assurances, speaks with clarity, boasts its own oppositionist initiatives, conditions its support and acts in strict compliance with its own interests.

Labor Discomfort

The conditions of the official workers' world are no less difficult. The decline in real earnings has separated the official, corporative union leadership from the rank and file. The modernization program's offensive against the corporative interests of the labor unions, its rejection of subsidies ot the sweetheart contracts of another time—like the public works contracts that PEMEX used to give to its union, the rejection of labor leaders' political style and, finally, a presidential succession that guarantees the modernization program's continuity, all explain the discomfort and at times, disgust which the labor bureaucracy feels towards the government. It also explains labor's complaint that the government has abandoned the Mexican Revolution and labor's claim to be the last flagbearer and jealous guardian of the Revolution's legacy.

The emptying of the peasant organizations is also significant. Everything has grown politically and economically in the Mexican countryside except for what we continue to understand, with legendary and demagogic pride, as the peasant. Each and every one of the actors that we could call "external" to the old historic countryside has won space, power and wealth during the sad history of the decline of the traditional, rural society—the modern farmer as well as multinational agribusinesses, the government agencies as well as the cattle associations. The attempt in the 1970s to revitalize peasant organization and production led to a new process of bureaucratization and tutelage. In dispute are the *ejido* and its historic viability and the advantages of the idea of guardianship and the usefulness of bureaucratic extensionism in the countryside. Today's struggles often center around the modern factors of production: credits, prices and market conduits.

The middle class' exasperated desertion from the instruments and resources of traditional domination is another scene, perhaps the decisive one, of corporative erosion. Nowhere else is the demand for participation and democracy so well rooted as in these children *par excellence* of modernization, And no other sector of society speaks such an efficient language of inconformity and protest as do these contingents born from peace and economic development. Their demands, as Soledad Loaeza points out, have turned the state into a "hostage."[8]

A 1987 poll showed these sectors to be decidedly pessimistic about the future. After almost 20 years of democratic reforms, only 14 of every 100 members of the middle class polled believed that the country had changed. Although a substantial majority thought that the PRI would remain in power in Mexico, the great majority, close to 80 percent, attributed this predominance to negative factors such as a lack of democracy, electoral fraud, imposition of candidates, government complicity, lack of awareness and fear of change.[9]

Within the middle class' irritation we can find the causes for the critical climate of public opinion, the lack of credibility and the demands for change that hang over the two canonical pieces of the system and the last two tendencies on our itinerary: the president and his party.

From an absolutist president to a constitutional president

Mexico's presidential figure—an institutional adaptation of the colonial Viceroy and the 19th century caudillo—is

beseiged by the shadows of discredit and inefficiency. Including the current administration, Mexico will complete four consecutive presidential administrations that have terminated far from where they had promised to arrive. The inefficiency of their projects and instruments is apparent. Together they, form a now irremediable part of the public consciousness.

The presidential figure has consequently lost part of the magic and veneration that it used to inspire. It has also lost the capability to lead where it will the bureaucracy which has become harder to handle the larger and more centralized it has become. Finally, the presidency has lost the confidence of the citizenry in the succession process, the quintessence of presidential power. The president's faculty of electing his successor is material for much dispute and has permitted José Carreño Carlón to invent a happy analogy. Just as Obregon's death permitted and obliged the country to change from a caudillo regime to an institutional regime, so the congestions and crises of the system will permit and oblige, in this present political generation, the change from absolutist presidentialism to one that is simply constitutional.[10]

From a dominant party to a majority party

The transition that the state party is suffering is no less drastic. Its electoral loss of 21 percent in the voting over the last twenty years would have been enough in any other country to have made it lose the government.[11] It has been enough in Mexico to snatch away its hegemony in the key settings of modernity—urban Mexico—and in the regions of greater relative development—the north in particular.

In these settings, the Institutional Revolutionary Party has stopped being the hegemonic party and now competes, sometimes with difficulty, to become simply the majority party.

Clear historic signals have begun to show that the party is too small a house to process the long series of clientele, convictions and interests that form its fabric. At the beginning of 1986 I had, unknowingly, a prophetic idea. I wrote, "The habitual six year exclusions of political personnel is now showing some of the same effects as a demographic explosion. The revolutionary family of today has almost as many people outside as inside the house; and for those on the outside there appears to be no other future than to reaffirm their exclusion. The participatory temptations of this part of the family should not be underestimated and, in critical political moments, could be the detonator of a party split."[12]

The fissure is already there and it is called Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas. Since my first prophecy has been fulfilled, I shall try again. Since now it will be conscious and voluntary, it will surely fail, but here it is: from the breakup that the PRI is experiencing today, in less time than we imagine, a true system of parties will arise in Mexico, capable of offering the electorate real options and capable of disputing and beating the PRI in open, legitimate elections. The novelty that will permit this central change is the consolidation of a party with a social democratic orientation, but fed by profound national traditions.

III

In conclusion, I will say a few words about the transitional fact that perhaps summarizes and expresses all the rest:

"The galloping decrepitude of the beliefs and customs of modernity is palpable." (Photo by Marco Antonio Cruz)

social change brought on by development.

What we call today the "Mexican Miracle" was an efficient mix of traditional political domination—paternal, authoritarian, clientele-based and centralized—placed at the service of a particularly successful economic project which was modernizing, industrial, urban, and capitalist. At the time of its initiation in the 1940s, the familiarity of the mix made Cosío Villegas sacrilegiously remember Porfirio Díaz and launch himself on an exhaustive thirty year exploration of the model denied him. Four decades after that moment, the air of family may also be perceived in another way. As during the era of Porfirio Díaz, the modernization begun in the 1940s has transformed Mexico to the point of giving birth to a new society, that, like the Porfirian society, is too narrow or confining for the methods and instruments that created it.

> As Carlos Fuentes wrote recently:
> The revolution urbanized and industrialized Mexico, sending millions of children to school. The result is a new civil society, lettered, energetic, made up of professionals, bureaucrats, technocrats, businessmen, industrialists, intellectuals and women. The new civil society asks the system for the same thing that the system taught society: social justice with democratic freedoms, progress and reform.

"Silent subversions" is what historian Francois Xavier Guerra called the accumulated changes of the Porfirian era that became manifest in their magnitude in the Revolution of 1910. The social children of 20th century Mexican modernization are also, as were their Porfirian

ancestors, a "new people," a new sensibility, a new social majority. It is no longer the old Indian majority of the colonial world nor the explosive rural majority that brought the Mexican Revolution to life. Nor are we dealing with the spiritual majority of a Catholic people nor the popular majorities that were the basis for the corporative pact of the 1930s.

We are talking about the majorities of urban Mexico, its middle class, its bourgeois liberals, the mass society jammed into our cities, movilized by desperation and poverty, trapped by the severity of the present but already without roots or nostalgia for the old Mexico, molded instead by the future. They are at the same time illusory and real, offered up by the mass media which sprinkles it with the same breath of expectations and consumerism.

To conclude, I return to Luis González:

> The reasonable thing is to listen without getting upset to the indicators of the immediate future, because you can already hear the footsteps of a new appreciation of the body, of intolerance to physical pain, of contempt for bourgeois phariseeism, of the return to nature, of ignoring history and Mexico's peculiarities, of rejection of texts without images, of the sterility of science without art or humanism, of a new humanism and new religious attitudes. Pushing its way into this country is a new way of feeling and a new way of thinking. We are seeing the creation of a New Man.

Thus said, we arrive at the end of the paradox that is implied in the pretense of writing the history of the immediate past. Given the profound transition alive in its breast, the history of the immediate past that we propose, if it will truly be one, will also be the history of our immediate future. □

[1] Luis González: "Las tradiciones se despiden", in *Nexos* No. 100, April 1986. Also in *México mañana* Océano, México, 1986; p. 10.

[2] See María Eugenia Negrete Salas: "Diversificación económica y sistemas urbano regionales en México: un estudio exploratorio", in *El desarrollo urbano en México. Problemas y perspectivas*. Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, México, 1984. (Programa Universitario Justo Sierra); pp. 65-81.

[3] See Enrique Hernández Laos: "La desigualdad en México, 1900-1980", in Carlos Tello and Rolando Cordera (coords.), *La desigualdad en México*. Siglo XXI, México, 1984; pp. 155-192.

[4] "La crisis de México", in *Nexos* No. 67, July 1983.

[5] Ana Irene Solórzano, Irene Martínez, Antonio Alonso: "Foro México 2010. Escenario base común". Mimeo, México, Barros Sierra Foundation, September de 1985; chart 13.

[6] Nora Lustig: "Balance de sombras. El precio social del ajuste mexicano", in *Nexos* No. 106, October 1986. The projection of the growth of delinquency in *La Jornada*, July 20 1987, p. 12.

[7] Lorenzo Meyer: "Los tiempos de nuestra historia", in *Estudios*, No. 7, summer 1986. México, Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México, 1986.

[8] Soledad Loaeza: "Las clases medias mexicanas y la coyuntura económica actual", in Pablo González Casanova y Héctor Aguilar Camín (ccords.): *México ante la crisis*, II. El impacto social y cultural-Las alternativas. Siglo XXI Editores, México, 1985; pp. 221-237.

[9] Encuesta sobre actitudes de clases medias, Instituto Mexicano de Opinión Pública, March 1987. Mimeograph.

[10] José Carreño Carlón: "La sucesión presidencial", in *Nexos* No. 116, July 1987.

[11] See Juan Molinar: 'El México electoral", in *Nexos* No. 85, January 1985.

[12] Héctor Aguilar Camín: "El canto del futuro", in *Nexos* No. 100, April 1986. Also in *México mañana*, op. cit., p. 61.