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A Security Community –“If You Can Keep It”: Demographic Change and the North American Zone of Peace

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ABSTRACT

Usually, scholarly research on security communities focuses on the conditions and the consequences of their forming; rare are the works that examine how and why these arrangements might decay and perhaps even disappear altogether. This is hardly a surprise, given that in certain fortunate parts of the world, public and elites alike have come to accept that interstate conflict, at least in their neighborhood, is a vestige of the past. No matter how haphazardly managed relations among them might be, the dominant expectation is that their security community is virtually indestructible –or to put it in the vernacular, “idiot-proof.”

This article critically examines that perspective. Specifically, it explores the potential impact of ethnic (including for the purposes of this project, religious) diasporas on continental security. The issue is framed from the point of view of the U.S. debate, not only because that debate has so many implications for the United States’ northern and southern neighbors, Canada and Mexico, but also because in a real sense, it is those two neighbors who, for different reasons, are increasingly stylized in the U.S. as the source of the problem.

Key words: homeland security, security communities, North America, terrorism, immigration, Canada-U.S. relations, Mexico-U.S. relations.

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INTRODUCTION: TWO FRANKLINS AND A FRANKLYN

The story has it that as he was leaving the federal constitutional convention that had gathered in Philadelphia midway through 1787 to design a new political framework for the fledgling American republic, Benjamin Franklin was asked what he and the other delegates had brought into existence through their heated deliberations. Franklin's cautionary response was, "a republic –if you can keep it." So, too, might we conceptualize a challenge facing the three North American countries in the twenty-first century: namely, the preservation of what, in historical terms, is a fairly new (i.e., twentieth century) dispensation: their security community, or "zone of peace."

A recent report of a high-level task force commissioned to study the community-building prospects of Canada, the United States, and Mexico contained among its series of recommendations one major proposal: that the three countries establish, by 2010, a "North American economic and security community" (Haass, 2005). The chairs of this 31-member task force were John Manley, William Weld, and Pedro Aspe, respectively from Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. Their work was sponsored by the New York-based Council on Foreign Relations, in conjunction with the Canadian Council of Chief Executives and the Consejo Mexicano de Asuntos Internacionales. Not surprisingly, given the ambitious nature of many of the report's recommendations, some of the task force's members were moved to append a dissenting, or otherwise modifying, view to the set of proposals.¹ What is surprising, however, is that none challenged the contention that the three countries should be working toward the construction of a *security* community.

Why this is surprising is that it really does misstate the problem, at least in the realm of security: it is generally conceded –though there are some skeptics, as I discuss below– that for nearly three-quarters of a century, Canada, the U.S., and Mexico *have* constituted a security community. The real challenge is whether, given the variety of threats they face in this new century, they can preserve what is already built. By security community is meant an order in which the use of force as a means of conflict resolution among members of the group has simply become inconceivable; i.e., they neither go to war against one another nor even consider doing so. Instead, they undertake to resolve peacefully whatever problems inevitably arise among them. With neither organized armed conflict nor the threat of such conflict playing a part in the resolution of intra-group problems, policymakers and other policy elites are able to entertain "dependable expectations" that peaceful change will be the only kind of change that occurs (Adler y Barnett, 1996: 73).

¹ These were gathered in a special section of the report and published under the heading, "Additional and Dissenting Views" (pp. 33-39).

As noted above, some dissent to the contention that a North American security community already exists can be encountered, usually in the case of the U.S.-Mexican dyad.² However, with respect to the Canada-U.S. tandem, one also confronts occasional skepticism on the part of those who really do believe that organized armed force might be employed by one country against the other. For instance, one Kingston, Ontario-based peace activist (an American expatriate from Maine) managed to publish a book in the early 1990s during the first Clinton administration purporting that the choice of nearby Fort Drum in upstate New York as the base of the U.S. Army's 10th Mountain Division bespoke aggressive designs on Canada! (Rudmin, 1993). Even prior to the Clinton administration there had been some in Canada who worried about a U.S. invasion, perhaps motivated by a desire to snatch oil or some other precious commodity, and at least one Canadian novelist dined out fairly regularly on this thesis during the early 1970s (see in particular Rohmer, 1973).

Today, a few policy analysts (including one prominent member of a recent Liberal government) can be found fretting that a U.S. siphoning of Canadian water has the potential to disturb the continental peace; while others (Conservatives, this time) imagine that the disagreement over the status of the Northwest Passage—is it or is it not an international strait?³—could escalate into armed conflict. This last concern managed to figure into the rhetoric of the most recent federal election campaign, when Conservative leader Stephen Harper promised on December 22, 2005 to use military means if necessary to defend Canada's claims to sovereignty in the Arctic. As one observer has wryly commented, taking this pledge seriously could result in the "insanity" of Canada's having to launch depth charges from an ice-breaker onto an *American* nuclear-powered submarine (Griffiths, 2006: A21).

Needless to say, should what Franklyn Griffiths brands as "insanity" come to pass, we can all dismiss the Canada-U.S. security community as a relic of the past. But as I will argue below, Canada-U.S. armed conflict in the far north is not a very real prospect; if we *are* to see any significant weakening of the Canada-U.S. security community, it will not be as a result of tensions in the Arctic, and Benjamin Franklin's implied question will not derive its contemporary security-community significance in the scenario sketched by Griffiths. So, with Benjamin Franklin's query in mind, we might want to ask, bluntly, whether the North American zone of

² For a dissenting view, namely that the U.S. and Mexico are "still a long way from a deep or tightly coupled Deutschian security community," see González and Haggard, 1998: 326.

³ Though there is not much foreign objection to Canada's claim to sovereignty over the Arctic archipelago, things are different when it comes to the waterways separating some of the islands in the region, specifically the seven channels that link the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean, and that collectively bear the name, Northwest Passage. See Charron, 2005: 831-48. For a discussion of the legal issues involved in determining whether a body of water is an international strait, see Haglund, 1989: 609-29.

peace really is “idiot proof,” in the sense that nothing can be imagined that would return any of the countries to their prior condition of having been bad instead of good neighbors.

I use the term “good neighbors” advisedly, for it speaks to the historical period during which the North American security community got established, namely a span of years covering the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt. Though it is sometimes argued that the Canada-U.S. portion of North America constituted the world’s first security community, the reality may be otherwise, with two Scandinavian states, Sweden and Norway, disputing the honors (after their peaceful, though far from friction-free, breakup in 1905).⁴ As for Canada and the U.S., to the extent planning for military action against one’s neighbor can be taken as evidence of the nonexistence of a regional security community (conveying, however *sotto voce*, a credible threat to employ force in conflict resolution), then not until such time as the two abandoned this kind of activity can we say that they had established a security community. In the Canadian case, it was not until the early 1920s that plans for military operations against the U.S. ceased to be developed; while for the U.S., it would take until 1937, when the War and Navy Departments discarded the obsolete “RED” plans (red being the color code for the British Commonwealth and Empire) in favor of the new “RAINBOW” plans directed at Germany, Italy, or Japan, or all three together (Morton, 1960: 12-22). By contrast, the Scandinavians kicked the habit a few years earlier, during the 1920s (Ericson, 2000).

Certainly with respect to the continent’s southernmost dyad, the U.S. and Mexico, there can be no question about their contending for the title of world’s first security community –not with Mexican irregulars invading New Mexico (as did Pancho Villa in March 1916) or U.S. regular forces counterattacking on Mexican soil (as General John Pershing did later in the same month).⁵ Still, the Mexican-American dyad was not far behind the other two, as we can say that their security community also took shape during the interwar period, when a) the Mexican Revolution had consolidated to such a degree that no further insurrectionary raids into U.S. territory were easily conceivable, and b) U.S. foreign policy toward the country’s Latin American neighbors finally incorporated a commitment to refrain from the use of force against any of them. Both conditions were fulfilled during these years, the first being the consolidation of the revolution under the “Northern Dynasty” of Alvaro Obregón during the 1920s, and the second, Washington’s formal renunciation of a right

⁴ For the argument that the two security communities arose at more or less the same time in the early twentieth century, and eventually merged into one transatlantic security community, see Lebow, 1994: 271-72. On the events leading to the rupture of Norway’s union with Sweden a century or so ago, see Stolleis, 2005: 35-48.

⁵ For these cross-border incursions, see Cline, 1963: 176-81.

to intervene militarily in Latin America, made at two Pan-American conferences in 1933 and 1936 (in Montevideo and Buenos Aires, respectively) (Gellman, 1979).

Recently, some have asserted that the heavy militarization of the U.S.-Mexican border constitutes *prima facie* proof that the security community has come to an end. Those who make this argument confuse border controls with something else, namely a state's intention to do those things that would put an end to the security community, such as plan or instigate armed conflict against the other. Tightened borders might be regrettable, all things being equal, but they can no more be said to signal the demise of a security community between sovereign countries (what Karl Deutsch and his colleagues would term a "pluralistic security community") than can the presence of an armed Ontario Provincial Police be said to vitiate a security community *within* a sovereign state, in this case Canada (what Deutsch et al. call an "amalgamated security community") (1957).

There are those who even argue that the *failure* to militarize the United States' southwest border will jeopardize its national security, and by extension the security community, by allowing into the country vast hordes of Mexicans, many of them said to be bent upon the demographic *reconquista* of territories lost to Mexico more than a century and a half ago. Those who do invoke this argument, such as Patrick Buchanan,⁶ are making implicit reference to the concept of societal security, a concept that can be expected to figure increasingly in discussions about the future of the North American security community. And though it may be incorrect to dispute the existence today of a security community between the U.S. and Mexico, it remains to be seen whether that community will emerge unscathed from the emotional debate attending illegal immigration into the U.S. from its southern neighbor.

SOCIETAL SECURITY: "MEXICANIZATION" OR "CANADIANIZATION"?

One of the contemporary ironies of discussions about borders within North America has been the growing frequency with which one encounters references to the "Mexicanization" of the Canada-U.S. border.⁷ In the following section I am going to address why the United States' northern border should, of late, have emerged as an object of physical security concern to many in Washington. In this section, I wish to start by noting the irony associated with the current U.S. anxieties about societal security, for in some respects they echo concerns first raised in the late nineteenth

⁶ In comments made on the television show, "The McLaughlin Group," a weekly policy discussion aired by the Public Broadcasting System and chaired by John McLaughlin, 31 March 2006.

⁷ For a good discussion, see Andreas, 2005: 449-62.

century as a result of virtually unchecked immigration from Canada (and elsewhere) into the U.S. Thus from the point of view of societal security, we might more accurately depict the current debate as representing the “Canadianization” of America’s southern border.

There is certainly nothing singularly North American about the concept of societal security; in fact, the concept has figured largely in the work of certain European scholars associated with the “Copenhagen School” of international relations theory. Nor is there anything odd about Europe’s being the source of so much scholarly thinking on the topic, as recent developments connected with the growing (and substantial) immigration flows to Western Europe from Islamic countries testify. For societal security is all about “identity,” those values and practices held in common by a people who see themselves making up a distinct (even if not unique) society. The menace in this case, then, is said to be to the *collective* identity of a people.⁸

For theorists associated with the Copenhagen School, there are three principal threats to societal security: 1) migration in such volumes that a country’s identity and values are held to be at risk of profound alteration (much of the current European angst today, especially in the Netherlands, would fall under this category); 2) “horizontal competition,” meaning the linguistic and cultural pull exerted by a powerful neighbor on one’s own identity (as evidenced, for instance, in longstanding Canadian anxieties about American cultural weight); and 3) “vertical competition,” with the threat here coming from within a country, where one collective identity with a regional base sets itself apart from the dominant identity (again, a familiar story in Canada, given the never-ending discussion over Quebec’s place in the federation).⁹

But if the concept may not be specific to North America, there can be no gain-saying that concerns for societal security have a lengthy pedigree on this continent, and not just in the U.S., either. However, since it is the U.S. whose sense of societal insecurity frames so much of the current debate about the North American security community, it is on it that I focus in this section. What strikes the analyst who follows the vocal discussion currently going on in the U.S. over illegal (and even some legal) forms of immigration is how unoriginal many of the concerns are, save that the first time that Americans debated whether their national identity was being eroded by demographic pressure, it was often to the north not the south that they turned their gaze.

Consider the following demographic trends of an era that displayed all the hallmarks of what would later be termed “globalization”: the last decades of the nine-

⁸ On this concept, borrowed by students of international relations from the sociologists, see Eisenstadt and Giesen, 1995: 72-102.

⁹ For a thoughtful analysis of societal security within a broader conceptual framework, see Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde, 1998: 119-40.

teenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century, a time that began, to some, to look like the “Americanization” of the world.¹⁰ Although it might appear that the dominant fact of that era was the outward projection of American economic and military power, it was also a moment when the world –or at least what would later be termed the “Western” world– was coming to the United States. One western country’s population was especially showing up in U.S. cities and states: Canada’s.¹¹ One chronicler of the population flow across the Canada-U.S. border during the second half of the nineteenth century notes

[W]hile the population of the Republic was little more than tripling in fifty years, and that of Canada was being multiplied by less than two and a half, the little Canada south of the boundary line saw the number of its inhabitants multiplied by eight. Of all the living persons of Canadian birth in 1900, more than one-fifth were settled in the United States (Moffett, 1972: 10).

Though the process being limned by the above author was said to be “Americanization,” the statistics he deployed testified to a “Canadianization” redolent in more than one respect of contemporary U.S. discussions of inflows from Mexico. First there was the sheer magnitude of the phenomenon. In addition to the native-born Canadians living in the U.S. at the turn of the last century (some 1.2 million), there were another half million born in the U.S. of two Canadian parents, as well as three-quarters of a million born of one Canadian and one American parent. Adding all these groups together, one finds that “there were in all 2 480 613 persons in the United States of at least half Canadian blood, which is more than half the number of similar stock in Canada.” Indeed, of the top ten provincial/state jurisdictions in North America measured in terms of their Canadian “stock,” *half* were located in the United States, and Massachusetts was outranked as a “Canadian” sub-national jurisdiction in 1900 only by Ontario and Québec.¹²

Secondly was the qualitative dimension, and while it may strike us as odd today, there were more than a few observers of immigration flows from Canada to the U.S. a century ago who worried about the prospect of American identity being changed, and for the worse. In ways that bear similarity to Samuel Huntington’s contemporary suspicions regarding the assimilability of the United States’ large and growing His-

¹⁰ As one British observer styled it; see Stead, 1902.

¹¹ More accurately, it was a case of the intermingling of peoples. See Lee Hansen and Bartlet Brebner, 1940; and Bukowczyk et al., 2005.

¹² The top ten “Canadian” jurisdictions were Ontario (with 1 858 787), Quebec (1 560 190), Massachusetts (516 379), Nova Scotia (435 172), Michigan (407.999), New Brunswick (313 178), New York (226 506), Manitoba (180 859), Maine (133 885), and Minnesota (114 547). *Ibid.*: 10-11.

panic (mainly Mexican) population (Huntington, 2004), so too was there anxiety in the U.S.—especially in New England, where Professor Huntington teaches¹³ about the strain upon America’s “creedal” identity that was emanating from culturally distinctive groups of immigrants hailing from the province of Québec. The quantity was ominous enough, according to nativists who thought like this: over the course of the century spanning 1840 and 1940, a total of 2.825 million Canadians would establish themselves in the U.S., some 30 percent (825 000) of them from Quebec. Most of the latter settled in New England, and at the height of the nativist anxiety over the “new” (i.e., non-Anglo-Saxon) immigration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,¹⁴ French Canadians constituted, at 575 000, 10 percent of the six-state region’s total population.¹⁵

But the quality of these immigrants was positively frightening to nativists convinced that American societal security was at risk, and possibly—who could say?—American physical security also. Initially, the Roman Catholic church in Québec looked dimly on the migrants who dared to make their lives in Protestant New England, but after 1880 or so a new spirit began to manifest itself among the ecclesiastical leaders in the province, for whom the diaspora raised the prospect of at least a spiritual re-conquest of the once-disputed territories,¹⁶ with perhaps even a political re-conquest looming in the bargain! This last was the dream of militants such as Jules-Paul Tardivel,¹⁷ who wondered whether “l’Amérique française” could be expanded to include at least the northeastern part of the U.S., with some Catholic extremists allowing their imaginations freer rein, and foreseeing an America that would be majority French within a century! (Weil, 1989: 30-34).

What was the dream of Catholic militants became the nightmare of some Brahmin intellectuals, who had been digesting ideas related to the theory of “Anglo-Saxon”

¹³ In 1894, members of Boston’s Brahmin elite formed the Immigration Restriction League; see Anderson, 1981: 56.

¹⁴ An anxiety admirably traced in John Higham, 1971.

¹⁵ This was when Quebec’s own French-speaking population stood at less than 1.2 million, meaning that some 30 percent of French Canadians were at the time living in New England.

¹⁶ After all, Samuel de Champlain had explored the coast of New England fifteen years before the landing of the Pilgrims at Plymouth, and for a brief time the region was known as New France. And for many decades, beginning with the War of the League of Augsburg in 1689 and ending when the Seven Years War did in 1763, France and England disputed portions of present day New England, with a savagery that at times matched anything seen elsewhere in the world during the contemporary era of so-called “ethnic cleansing.” For the French exploration of the New England coast, see Forbes and Cadman, 1929, 3: 1; for intercolonial warfare, see Pellerin, 2001; and Leckie, 1999. The entire period is ably chronicled in Havard and Vidal, 2003.

¹⁷ Jules-Paul Tardivel, a journalist who championed the cause of French-Canadian nationalism in the second half of the 19th century until his death in 1905, was ironically originally from the United States. He was born in Kentucky, of parents who immigrated to America from England and France. He was an ultra-conservative Roman Catholic (an ultramontane) who advocated an independent French-speaking (and Catholic) country within North America, hoping to advance the interests of the Church and of French Canadians in so doing.

supremacy that was at its height of popularity at the turn of the last century, a theory holding, *inter alia*, that all the worthwhile political values and institutions, including and especially those that gave substance to America's creedal identity, could be traced back to the "Teutonic" forests of antiquity, in which were to be encountered the first stirrings of democracy (Vann, 1958). Some worried that the Teutonic virtues carried in the genes of freedom-loving Yankees would not be able to withstand the onslaught from what was being styled by some the "Chinese of the East," teeming masses of French Canadians steeped in medieval religious mumbo-jumbo, speaking a different language, and willing to work at any wage, thereby throwing virtuous and proud Anglo laborers out of their jobs.

Things turned out well; in the end, the United States survived, Franco-Americans assimilated, and if New England's textile economy went into long and painful decline, that was hardly the fault of the Quebeckers. Not only did the region reinvent itself, but it remained an intellectual center of the country, its very "hub" for many New Englanders as well as other Americans. To be sure, the regional, and even national, identity had to have been affected as a result of the demographic flows that washed over the United States at the height of the new immigration, but it would be hard for anyone to make the argument that the country that would subsequently rise to global dominance had been hurt by the process. It was easier to sustain the opposite.¹⁸

And thus we might consider the current debate about the meaning of Mexican immigration for American societal security by thinking of it as a new phase of an established pattern. Obviously, that the nativist fears were proved wrong a century ago, when the continental focus was more on the United States' northern than its southern border, need not mean that the fears of today are invalid. Still, there may be merit in invoking the "Canadianization" analogy when we contemplate a possible societal security challenge to the North American zone of peace. For what is said by some to be at stake is a deterioration in the U.S.-Mexico relationship of such an order of gravity as to call into question the irenic *acquis* of the past 70 years, and open once again the prospect of either country planning or using force against the other.

How could this deterioration happen? The crux of the contemporary alarmism about societal security is found in the nightmare scenario of the nativists: to wit, of the United States becoming, in effect, the Disunited States, and doing so as a result of the replacement of a unifying assimilationist ethic by a divisive multiculturalist one. This vision has been adumbrated in fairly recent statements about the impact of ethnic politics upon the United States' future, especially by historian Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. (1998). In this fissiparous perspective, shared *inter alios* by Samuel Huntington

¹⁸ For a good survey of the impact of immigration on U.S. society, see Dinnerstein and Reimers, 1999.

and Patrick Buchanan, it is the Mexican diaspora that proves particularly troublesome, bent as it presumably is on a *reconquista* of lost territory in the Southwest, whose proportions could only have been the envy of the Tardivels of the nineteenth century.

But there is reason to doubt that this nightmare scenario represents much of a threat, after all. Firstly, it still needs to be shown why the United States of a century ago, with fully a third of its population foreign-born, should have been so thoroughly capable of preserving –indeed strengthening– its national unity, while the United States of today, with only a tenth of its population foreign-born, must succumb to the pressure of ethnic diasporas.¹⁹ Secondly, it needs to be demonstrated why fellow North Americans, which is what the Mexicans are, should prove to be more incapable of assimilation in the twenty-first century than were immigrants from the other side of the Atlantic –or for that matter, of the St. Lawrence!– a century and more ago. Indeed, some authors have argued not only that U.S. Latinos are at least as readily assimilated as, if not more so than, most previous ethnic diasporas, but that their growing presence in U.S. society gives the country a set of cultural (including linguistic) assets that will redound to its advantage in the future struggle for international influence, as well as market share, not only in the Western Hemisphere but throughout a world in which Spanish is exceeded only in importance by English as a global tongue. It is for this reason that one Brazilian academic writing in France could proclaim a dozen or so years ago (and not to French delight) that “the twenty-first century will be American” (Valladão, 1996).²⁰

On balance, the societal security dilemma that currently may (or may not) be affecting the U.S. is unlikely to do much to unseat the U.S.-Mexican security community.²¹ This is not to say that political developments in Mexico itself, in particular an electoral turn toward the kind of nativist populism on display elsewhere in Latin America (e.g., Venezuela and Bolivia) may not have a negative effect on the country’s relationship with the U.S., but that need not, and probably would not, put an end to the security community, should such an electoral turn come to pass in future. Instead, on the question of societal security and the North American security community, there is at least as much of a basis for an optimistic reading as for a pessimistic one –maybe more of a basis– and this because of the continuing power of assimilative factors even in a United States thought to be “multicultural”.²²

¹⁹ On the earlier tensions posed to, and surmounted by, the U.S. political order as a result of ethnic diasporas, see Gerson, 1964.

²⁰ Predictably, this book, originally published in Paris under the title *Le XXI^e siècle sera américain*, would soon occasion a direct rebuttal, in Biarnès, 1998.

²¹ For a guardedly optimistic view, see Tenorio Trillo, 2006: 567-87.

²² For optimistic readings of the United States’ ability to resolve whatever identity crisis the country may be said to face, see Lacorne, 1997; De Conde, 1992; Hall and Lindholm, 1999.

CANADA-U.S. SECURITY RELATIONS: A NEW FENIANISM?

If it is ironic to discover that today's American societal-security concerns stimulated by Mexican immigrants bear some resemblance to earlier anxieties about Canadian immigration, it is no less ironic to discover that U.S. policy elites have begun to regard their northern border, the much-ballyhooed "longest undefended border" in the world, with growing trepidation from the point of view of physical not societal security, i.e., the kind of security woes that were once thought to be exclusively related to the border with Mexico. This is why, as noted above, one hears more and more references to the "Mexicanization" of the Canada-U.S. border, as inaccurate as the imagery may be. For if it is true that from the standpoint of societal security it is clearly the U.S.'s southern frontier that is at the crux of the matter, the same does not apply when we turn to a discussion of the country's physical security.

For reasons I address in this section, U.S. policy elites have begun to regard Canada with a much more jaundiced eye than heretofore, even if for the great U.S. public, unencumbered as it is by much knowledge of its northern neighbor, Canada continues to be held in lofty esteem.²³ Nor is there anything new in a U.S. public's continually fawning over a people and a country that does not reciprocate the affection (see Freeman, 2005: A18). What Frank Underhill related nearly half a century ago remains true today: "Americans...are benevolently ignorant about Canada, whereas Canadians are malevolently informed about the United States" (Underhill, 1961: 256-57).

This is not to suggest that those Americans who actually know something about Canada, i.e., the policy elites, are harboring aggressive designs on a neighbor that has grown increasingly annoying to them of late, but neither is it particularly shocking to read that, for some of these elites at least, Canada is being adjudged a "security threat to the United States" (Sapolsky, 2005: 31). What analysts such as MIT's Harvey Sapolsky mean when they say this is that, starting at the middle of the previous decade and continuing down to the present, Canadian governments have made it their purpose to attempt to constrain U.S. power and influence, *inter alia* by leading campaigns such as those that resulted in the ban on antipersonnel land mines and the establishment of the International Criminal Court. Not only does this kind of critique understate if not ignore completely those many things Canada does that assist the U.S.,²⁴ but it also misidentifies the real challenge. To the (slim) extent that the

²³ An early 2006 Gallup national opinion survey found that the United Kingdom and Canada remained the two countries most favorably regarded by Americans, both eliciting positive scores of more than 80 percent (Koring, 2006: A17).

²⁴ For a useful corrective, see Sokolsky, 2006: 29-43.

Canada-U.S. security community will be put into jeopardy in coming years, it will have much less to do with any ongoing Canadian tendency to wish to pluck the eagle's tail feathers, and much more to do with a phenomenon that bears a resemblance to a security challenge that once dramatically affected security relations between the two North American neighbors. Let us refer to this phenomenon as the "New Fenianism."

As noted earlier in this article, the Canada-U.S. security community is one of the world's oldest. Emblematic of this North American zone of peace has been and remains a reciprocal commitment made by the two states, namely to regard each other's legitimate physical security interests as being virtually tantamount to their own. It is no exaggeration to state that this commitment underpins the entire apparatus of Canada-U.S. security cooperation. The commitment took shape at the same moment the security community was forming, during the crisis atmosphere of the late 1930s, when a war in Europe was looming, and when it seemed that American security might be imperiled should Canadian involvement in the European war make the Monroe Doctrine untenable.

We can call this norm the "Kingston dispensation," as it first was made explicit in an address delivered by Franklin D. Roosevelt at Queen's University, in Kingston, Ontario, during the August 1938 Sudetenland crisis. The president told his audience that the United States would "not stand idly by" were the physical security of Canada threatened by a European adversary, as a consequence of the country's participation in a European war. For his part, Prime Minister Mackenzie King, speaking a few days later (though not in Kingston), pledged that Canada would ensure that nothing it did would jeopardize the physical security of the United States. Taken together, the two leaders' remarks constitute the normative core of the Canada-U.S. security relationship: each country understood that it had a "neighborly" obligation to the other to demonstrate nearly as much solicitude for the other's physical security needs as for its own (see Fortmann and Haglund, 2002: 17-22).

The Kingston dispensation was not quite an alliance, but it would only take two more years before a bilateral alliance did get forged in North America, an alliance that remains the United States' longest-running bilateral security pact. Is there any reason to believe that this normative core could be subjected to severe challenge, so severe, in fact, as to put in jeopardy the North American zone of peace? Yes, though the chances of this occurring are extremely slight. Perhaps the only conceivable challenge to the security community resides in what Canada's former minister of transport, Jean Lapierre, termed his "worst nightmare," that of a devastating terrorist attack mounted against U.S. soil from Canada (cited by Allison, 2005: 717).

I include this scenario under the rubric the "New Fenianism" as a way of providing historical context via analogical reasoning. To be sure, analogies can never

be anything other than imperfect, and this one looks, at first blush, to be more imperfect than most. For to Canadian readers with historical knowledge, the New Fenianism conjures up an earlier threat to physical security that really was a Canadian nightmare: the prospect of the country's being invaded by swarms of Irish nationalists based in the United States and possessed of an abiding grudge, not so much against Canada as against Canada's then colonial ruler, Great Britain. For the Fenians of old, whose ranks in America had been filled by the massive migration triggered by the Great Famine of 1847, the most tempting target in the campaign for Irish independence was Canada; their *jihad* envisioned seizing Canada, and though this central pillar of their strategic campaign may have failed to secure Irish independence, it certainly played a considerable role in uniting the British North American colonies in the tense period following the U.S. Civil War (see Jenkins, 1969).

Conceptually, what Fenianism in the nineteenth century represented was a diaspora's bid to achieve world-order aims by attacking targets on North American soil. The Old Fenians cared about Canada, but chiefly as a means to get Britain out of Ireland. The "New Fenians" also have world-order objectives, the servicing of which could involve strikes on North American soil as a means of forcing the pace of developments elsewhere. In the case of the New Fenians, the aim is to dislodge the U.S. not from North America (a patent impossibility), but rather from the Greater Middle East.

But if the comparison might be an apt one in terms of objectives, does not the difference in scale (tens of thousands of Irish-American jihadists versus a necessarily unknown but definitely tiny number of contemporary Canada-based jihadists) render the analogy nugatory?²⁵ Ordinarily, one would hesitate simply because of these scale differences to suggest the analogy, except that in the case of modern terrorism, as the events of 9/11 showed, it does not require vast numbers to make a major impact on international security. Given the legitimate worry about terrorists acquiring weapons of mass destruction, small numbers can more than equal, in death and destruction, what in an earlier era would have required veritable armies to accomplish. As Robert Cooper notes, ideological groups can today make do with only a minuscule fraction of the warriors who used to be required: "Henceforth, comparatively small groups will be able to do the sort of damage which before only state armies or major revolutionary movements could achieve.... A serious terrorist attack could be launched by perhaps sixty people... 0.000001 per cent of the population is enough" (Cooper, 2004: ix).

²⁵ Consider that about 140 000 Irish-Americans fought for the Union during the Civil War, and while most of them had no desire actually to wage holy war against the object of their loathing, Britain, many did join the ranks of the Fenian movement, whose so-called "armies" could boast of a strength on paper of more than 7 000 men.

To date, most of the Canadian jihadists involved in combat against the U.S. (and, when you think about it, Canada as well, given the involvement of the Canadian Forces in operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan) have acted outside of North American territory. One recalls in this regard the astounding saga of the Khadr family, made even more astounding by an early intervention of a Canadian prime minister, Jean Chrétien, to obtain the freedom from custody in Pakistan of the now-deceased patriarch of the family, Ahmed Said Khadr, the Al Qaeda operative who enrolled his four sons in the *jihad* that would eventually take his own life and severely mess up theirs. As Colin Freeze has written apropos of the Chrétien involvement in this case, “[t]he widespread chill and embarrassment caused by the prime minister’s intervention for Mr. Khadr a decade earlier still ripples through the Canadian government and its counterterrorism cases today” (Freeze, 2005: A10).

But there is the even greater embarrassment of one prominent jihadist who did attempt to strike a U.S. target (the Los Angeles international airport) from a base in Canada, Ahmed Ressam. Although the so-called “millennium bomber” failed in his plan, his arrest in December 1999 by U.S. border authorities in Washington state occasioned a great deal of concern on the part of U.S. security officials, and did so well before the heightened mood of anxiety resulting from the 9/11 attacks. Needless to say, Jean Lapierre’s “nightmare” remains one for the entire Canadian security apparatus, and should a devastating terrorist strike against the U.S. ever materialize from Canadian soil, it would be difficult if not impossible to overstate the severity of its impact, not just on Canada-U.S. relations, but also on the North American zone of peace.

At the source of U.S. security concerns regarding the Canada-U.S. border is the perspective that terrorists can easily slip into Canada, as did Ressam and who knows how many others, as a result of the country’s immigration policies, especially as they pertain to the processing of refugee claims. According to statistics compiled by the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (and published in its 2003 *Global Refugee Trends*), Canada had an acceptance rate for refugee claims of 49.1 percent, which translated into Canada *alone* accepting fully one-fifth of all the asylum seekers in an 18-state group of OECD countries (some 17 682 out of a total intake for the group of 80 219). The country’s intake was disproportionately high because its acceptance rate was so out of line with the western acceptance average of 15.1 percent, an average itself exceeded by only two other OECD states: the U.S., at 21.8 percent, and Italy, at 16.3 percent (cited in Collacott, 2006: 87).

Obviously, the overwhelming majority of these refugees constitute no threat whatsoever to Canadian or American—or anyone else’s—security. But it strains credulity, particularly in light of the empirical evidence in both Canada and the U.S., to imagine that no terrorists have slipped and are still slipping through the net.

After all, most of those who struck New York and Washington on September 11 had been residing *legally* in the U.S., and even those terrorists whose visas had expired had initially possessed valid entry documentation. This leads to the not unnatural suspicion among U.S. security officials about Canadian policy and administrative practices, the logic being that if the U.S., as the target of the terrorists and therefore taking security more seriously than most other states, can be so ineffective at keeping out those who mean it harm, then how much less attentive to security must Canadian authorities be?

But it is not just the patently illegal aspects of the New Fenianism that remain a constant source of concern for security experts in the U.S., as well as in Canada. There is also a completely legal aspect of the phenomenon that itself carries with it implications for the quality of the Canada-U.S. relationship. Again, the analogy is instructive, for while most of the Irish diaspora did not, in the end, take part in the *jihād* against Canadian targets, that large diaspora did contribute to keeping Anglo-American relations from developing into a strategic partnership until it was almost too late. The Irish-Americans were hardly the only diaspora group in the U.S. to delight in urging politicians to tweak the tail of the British lion (the even larger German-American community also encouraged the pastime), but their presence, especially in major urban centers of the Northeast, was a constant reminder to political leaders of the danger in working too closely with America's fellow democracy across the seas, Great Britain.

So, the way in which current immigration sources and patterns in Canada might have an effect on the evolution of Canadian-American relations bears pondering, given that considerable numbers of new arrivals hail from parts of the world that are hardly sympathetic to the U.S. or its purposes, in this new century, dubbed by some the "anti-American century" (Sweig, 2006). To be sure, as noted earlier, anti-Americanism in Canada hardly needs off-shore diasporas to stoke it; an electoral campaign and a well-publicized trade wrangle seemed to be all that was required to turn Paul Martin into Hugo Chávez, with the former prime minister attempting, unsuccessfully, to secure re-election in early 2006 by running against George W. Bush. But there is a difference between the variety of anti-Americanism as it is articulated in those parts of the world where the United States is seen as an implacable cultural and political enemy—parts of the world from which growing numbers of immigrants keep arriving in Canada—and the anti-Americanism bubbling up in parts of the world where the U.S. is still considered an ally and a partner, albeit an occasional annoyance.

If Canada's traditional so-called anti-Americanism is of the "lite" (Naím, 2003: 95-96) and opportunistic variety (call it "Martinism" after its latest iteration in the aforementioned federal election campaign), it remains to be seen what the longer-

term impact of immigration flows betraying a rather less salubrious form of anti-Americanism will be. If the U.S. experience during the first half of the twentieth century in developing a stable partnership with Britain is any indication, one might expect the imported anti-Americanism of new immigrants to render the fashioning of a mature and rational “America policy” in Ottawa more challenging, all things being equal.

However, just as Mexican anti-Americanism, another hoary phenomenon, is unlikely to spell the difference between the preservation and the termination of the North American security community—a community that took shape, it bears recalling, at a time when Mexico’s public was at least as anti-American as it is today—so too would it appear unlikely that a Canada becoming more anti-American *pari passu* with its becoming more “globalized” must be a Canada that lives at greater risk of seeing the North American zone of peace become a thing of the past. Its relationship with the U.S., politically if not economically, would likely worsen in the process, but countries can have fairly mediocre relations with each other and still constitute a security community. One thinks, in this respect, of U.S. relations with France: hardly the West’s most vibrant strategic couple, but still far from being enemies, alarms to the contrary notwithstanding.²⁶

The key to the preservation of the Canada-U.S. security community will be in controlling the illegal—both from the point of view of national and international law—side of the New Fenianism, and preventing jihadists from reaching targets in the United States, should that be their intent. For it is only this last prospect, of a Canada-based strike with significant casualties, that has the ability fundamentally to alter a security status quo that has been incredibly beneficial to Canadian, as indeed to U.S., interests.

CONCLUSIONS

Although some readers might judge what I have to say in this article as verging on the lugubrious, if not ridiculous, from the perspective of the query contained in the title, my conclusions are, nevertheless, rather upbeat. If no one should deem the North American zone of peace truly idiot proof (for there are things that could still go terribly wrong), the security community on the continent does remain a fairly robust entity. And though at times community-building enthusiasts in North America might show glimpses of “EU envy,” they would do well to reflect upon the reasons why some (not all) aspects of integration seem to be more fully developed in Western Europe than in North America.

²⁶ As, for instance, the one sounded in Miller and Molesky, 2004.

Simply put, the Europeans understood only too well, after the second global conflagration of the twentieth century, that they had best develop means of dealing with one another different from the oft-tried, painful methods associated with the European balance-of-power. So they aspired to create, through the process of economic and political integration, a zone of peace among themselves. And by and large, aided by a considerable injection of offshore resources and attention, to say nothing of a looming Soviet threat, they succeeded in erecting a regional security community, one whose preservation must always remain the uppermost concern of sentient policymakers, for whom the risk entailed by a stalling or, worse, reversal, of integration continues to be that of intra-European war.²⁷

By contrast, major war in North America has been a much more distant phenomenon, hence the felt need for community-building *à l'europpéenne* has not been as great. The Europeans erected their security community in the immediate aftermath of their last intra-European bloodletting, so for them it is never a distant memory that links integration and community-building with the preservation of peace. For the North Americans, on the other hand, the same easy linkage cannot be drawn between community-building and the avoidance of regional interstate war. They have, in so many ways, had a much luckier recent past than the Europeans.

Nor should anyone lament that good fortune. Still, from time to time, it is well to reflect upon the possibility that there need be nothing inevitable about the continuation of the North American zone of peace. This is why prudence is always desirable, and when it comes to national security, the symbol of prudence must remain efficient borders. Occasionally one hears discussions of a "security perimeter," either around the entire North American continent or just its northern half. Such discussions miss the basic point that it would be in no one's interest if, say, the physical security of the U.S. were to depend, in the last resort, upon decisions taken (or not taken) in Ottawa. It may once have been the case, as one student of Canada-U.S. security relations has claimed, that "no fences make good neighbors" (Shore, 1998: 333-367). But in the current era, styled by some the "Long War," it must remain the responsibility of U.S. borders to serve as the final barrier against those who would attack targets on American soil. It is simply unrealistic, the Kingston Dispensation to the contrary notwithstanding, to expect Canadian authorities to be able to provide that kind of barrier, even though they might wish to.

As for the issue of societal security, which is what is mainly at stake in the matter of the United States' southern border, here an efficient frontier has to begin with a serious discussion about the meaning of Mexican immigration to the U.S. Anyone

²⁷ This is the thesis starkly presented in Delmas, 1999, which despite its provocative title is an ardent plea for the continuation of European integration primarily via tight cooperation between France and Germany.

who thinks that Nirvana can only be attained once the last Mexican illegal (or even legal!) immigrant has returned home would be well-advised to watch Sergio Arau's film, *Un día sin mexicanos* (A Day without Mexicans), which details the disastrous impact on the California economy of the sudden disappearance of the state's 14 million Hispanics (Aznárez, 2004: 32). Contained in this far-fetched scenario is the kernel of an undeniable reality: that immigration from Mexico to the U.S. does bring with it benefits to the American economy, and one can argue, society.

As with all things, there is a downside, and in this case it is easy to establish that many criminals, including drug smugglers, have been operating along the U.S.-Mexican border. But to date no one has documented any "New Fenians" seeking to harm the United States from a Mexican base. There are reasons for this, perhaps the most obvious being that the societal context that in Canada, the U.S., and Western Europe can facilitate (willy-nilly) the growth of Islamist cells, namely the presence of sizable immigrant communities from Islamic countries, is absent from Mexico.

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