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Patricia Pérez Ramírez

Cover
Rivelino, "Our Silences," October 2011.
Photo by Patricia Pérez Ramírez

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Our Voice

The word "cyclical" seems to describe and at the same time contain what is repeated in the trajectory of human beings, their individual or collective actions, and also the tangible phenomena that their different civilizations have attempted to explain in order to understand the universe. From time immemorial, then, our rituals for closing out one year and beginning another continue to be essentially the same, since, regardless of their form, in essence, we use them to look over our achievements and failures, wish each other good fortune, and, above all, utilize them as an act of aspiring to recover a sense of order amidst the chaos surrounding us.

Thus we begin the first *Voices of Mexico* of 2012, the first months of which will see increased importance of federal electoral campaigns in both Mexico and the United States, since every 12 years, the two processes coincide. In this context, our being neighbors takes on particular significance given the interdependence of our relationship, asymmetrical as it is in favor of the strongest actor.

With the critical problems Mexico is facing in terms of violence, insecurity, and corruption, issues around which many of Mexican citizens' demands center, it is a fact that conservative U.S. forces are taking advantage to double up their battle against the Democratic administration, politicizing sensitive topics on the bilateral agenda. Undocumented migration, border controls, and transnational organized crime have been amalgamated in the eye of the U.S. public thanks to the anxiety among large sectors of it who are suffering the effects of the global economic crisis. As a result, and in accordance with the CISAN's mission, our regular readers will see a parade of articles in coming issues of *Voices of Mexico* about the electoral vicissitudes both countries are facing, always putting first and foremost the need for objective, plural reflection.

In this issue, we emphasize one of the core questions characterizing Mexico's as yet unfinished electoral norms: the ominous influence of the mass media. As Giovanni Sartori said in his *Homo Videns*, politics in my country has been shorn of all content and the political parties have been weakened. Roberto Gutiérrez's article reports that half of Mexican citizens trust the mass media, while only one-fourth trust political parties. This alerts us to the *de facto* power of the media and their owners, given the submission of political actors. While we must recognize that censorship was historically a characteristic of the period of the state party, it was followed in the era of transition to democracy by advances in access to the media for diverse political forces and the quest for formulas for equity. However, even today, the monopolistic concentration of power in the media makes it necessary to regulate them to favor strengthening democracy.

Also in the "Politics" section, we are apprised of the importance of ensuring that the millions of Mexicans living abroad with voting rights have full access to suffrage. Absentee voting was only instituted six years ago, with scant participation, which is why this year attempts

are being made to modernize the procedures. This does not satisfy Patricio Ballados, however, who writes in his contribution that the existing model is not inclusive. It should be pointed out that Mexico has benefited from the work of its citizens abroad, mainly through the remittances they send home; in the public debate this argument contrasts with the point that every ballot cast abroad costs the country 150 times what a vote costs the public in Mexico.

The enormous majority of Mexicans living abroad have left to improve their living conditions. Elaine Levine's analysis makes this clear, at the same time that she points out that even though the huge majority of undocumented emigrants to the United States are poor, insecurity has forced many middle and upper-class families to leave the country. The impacts of the fact that the migratory flow from Mexico to the United States constitutes the world's largest migratory corridor are multidimensional, touching even on public health in both countries. Camelia Tigau enriches our perspectives by reviewing the loss of skilled talent that Mexico experiences. Under the protection of criteria stipulated in the North American Free Trade Agreement to favor the mobility of businesspeople, investors, and experts in general, Canada and the United States have benefited from the arrival of Mexican professionals, and the global economic crisis does not seem to have stemmed this trend.

In this issue we present Pablo Cabañas's reflections about the risks drug trafficking and the power of the cartels pose for the electoral process, and Armando Rodríguez evaluates what the public thinks about the fight against this scourge. In contrast, we publish a contribution by the Auditor General of Mexico, Juan M. Portal, who describes the country's advances in promoting transparency, accountability, and the fight against corruption through auditing.

Mexico is at a crossroads that implies the need for more actions based on conscientious analyses of prospects and forging a vigorous will and civic vocation to come to agreements to favor a generous nation that for years has warned that indifference, profligacy, and ambition were beginning to wreak havoc, a situation we would eventually have to face.

The future is here, and it is putting us to the test. How can we recover confidence? How can we foster a culture of commitment among the new generations to encourage them to put down roots in the country?

Evading problems seems to be a characteristic of many young people —but we will deal with that at another time. Even though in this issue you will find contributions about tequila and pulque, their approach is limited to reflecting about both beverages as part of our people's historical-cultural heritage.

Silvia Núñez García
CISAN **Director**

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The Media and the 2012 Elections

Roberto Gutiérrez L.*

Cuartoscuro

The role of the media in Mexican political life, particularly during elections, has become a topic of growing importance since reforms made a truly competitive party system possible. The fact that the era of the hegemonic or "practically single" party came to an end in the late 1980s brought to the table the discussion of the kind of rules that would be necessary for party competition to take place in acceptable conditions of equity and transparency. Obviously, the central chapter of those debates was and continues to be the participation of the media, particularly the broadcast media, in forming political preferences.

The importance of the debates and legal reforms in recent years, the most recent of which was in 2007,[1] can be understood using Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio's statement that the difference between an authoritarian and a democratic system is not the existence or absence of elites, but that in authoritarian regimes, those elites are imposed, while in a democracy, they are proposed.[2] This seems simple enough, but its many implications range from issues related to procedures and the institutional design of the political regime to the broad topic of civil liberties and citizens' rights, without which a democratic election is merely fictitious.

This hypothesis allows us, then, to ask what the construction of political representation and that of government bodies has looked like in the framework of the democratization of Mexico over the last few decades, a process in which the media have played a fundamental role. That is, how has the social, cultural, and political pluralism that today distinguishes Mexican society been recognized and processed by our electoral system, proposing to the citizenry options capable of competing openly, transparently, and equitably?

With a view to the 2012 federal elections, we can say that even today, despite the reforms, there are still grave deficiencies in this area. That is, neither social nor political pluralism have been fully taken on board in what would be a truly democratic model of competition, and a large part of this deficiency is expressed in the role played by the media.[3]

As is almost unanimously recognized today, the media are not neutral intermediaries between the sphere of political society and the world of the citizenry. They do not necessarily broadcast news or put out editorial content from an ob-

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The Federal Electoral Institute's job of monitoring broadcasts has contributed strategically to achieving equitable access to air time; it has made it increasingly difficult to deal in a biased, unbalanced way in favor of one political force or another.

jective, balanced viewpoint. Rather, they are political actors themselves, in the full sense of the word, with specific agendas and interests, sometimes with explicit, hidden ties to those formally in power and those who aspire to power.

In fact, the way the democratic transition unfolded in Mexico showed that opening the media to political pluralism —not to mention social and cultural pluralism, where the gap has been even greater given the media's duopolistic structure—[4] would have to be imposed by public demand and the strength of partisan competition itself, moving ahead against enormous resistance and torturous negotiations. Different studies, outstanding among them Raúl Trejo's,[5] show how in the 12 years from 1988 to 2000, news coverage of the main competitors began to be more equitable and impartial, and party messages became a permanent fixture in the mass media.

Thus, the decisive factor in this transformation has been, more than the democratic convictions of the main broadcast frequency license-holders, the body of legal reforms, without which the legitimacy of electoral processes could not have been maintained, particularly at critical junctures, not to mention the credibility of the media themselves, increasingly under public scrutiny and the demands of political diversity. The Federal Electoral Institute's job of monitoring broadcasts has contributed strategically to these attempts to achieve equitable access to air time; it has made it increasingly difficult to deal in a biased, unbalanced way in favor of one political force or another.

Trends show advances that have helped in de-commercializing electoral competition and in introducing a public criterion for the use of air time by parties and electoral authorities. However, they have taken place in the context of a relationship of forces that is adverse for the Mexican state's bodies and institutions, as well as of insufficient comprehensive legal regulation of the social communications regime. This deficiency has meant it has not been possible to stop the expansion and concentration of the media, or to slow their political ambitions. Paradoxically, parallel to the attempted reforms in the sphere of electoral competition, the resources and influence of the big media consortia have grown; this has created a problematic convergence of legal norms and extra-legal practices that has fostered a *sui generis* relationship among parties, elections, and media, in which the legal parameters of political action are continually eluded and twisted by informal agreements and deals that will have a powerful impact —perhaps a decisive one— on the course and outcome of the 2012 balloting.

Dug in behind the argument of freedom of expression, the media have not stopped rebelling, ignoring, and breaking the letter and the spirit of the law, without paying any price for it, depending on the loopholes in electoral norms, on the fears or ambitions of the parties themselves, on the structural weakness of state authorities, and on the corresponding absence of a long-postponed regulatory framework. The impunity with which the media ignore or just delay even paying the fines levied on them by the electoral authorities for not having fulfilled their legal obligations is sufficient indication of why in Mexico they are, until today, effectively a *de facto* force, a Fourth Estate, which is not regulated democratically.

Actually, the role the media are playing in the electoral process and the successful way they have implemented their own political agenda (this includes blocking structural changes in this area, building presidential candidacies,[6] creating "tele-caucuses,"[7] boycotting and slandering the reforms they think infringe on their interests, and even resisting accepting deadlines for receiving and broadcasting party messages) make it clear that there is a major problem. And this problem is an expression of the fact that the construction of the Mexican state, at least in the last half century, has been structurally altered by the parallel, though not independent, development of a force capable of challenging it and frequently subordinating it. The logic of decision-making processes is systematically riddled with this power, as are the drafting of laws, the socialization of information and political culture, and even the selection of government personnel. All this is accompanied by unbridled economic power, used, among other things, to pressure the different political actors, reduce the possibilities of their eventual competitors, and violate the rights of audiences and even of their own employees.

So it is no surprise that in the specific arena of electoral competition, this estate constantly attempts to impose its own codes and interests, taking advantage of the weakness and lack of credibility of the parties themselves, which should be charged with fostering the structural changes to make it pos-

sible for the media not to act so abusively and with as much impunity as they have until now. In historic perspective, even in the sphere of trust, the broadcast media have won the competition with the parties and the formally instituted political regime.

To cite just one example from the most recent National Survey on Political Culture, carried out by the Ministry of the Interior, today, 50 percent of citizens trust the media; only 25 percent trust the political parties. This is in a context of the disillusionment of the majority with the performance of politicians and the functioning of democracy, as the most recent Latinobarómetro poll shows.

Thought about carefully, then, the electoral process currently underway is a curious mix of formal and informal rules in which heterogeneous logics and forces converge, something that distorts not a few of the parameters for competition. In effect, legal deadlines, available resources, the machinery needed for imposing sanctions, candidate selection, the socialization of information, and the opening up of spaces for political debate are all variables in which it does not seem possible to be completely sure that some of the main central principles guiding the democratic contest are actually operating. In the current situation, neither certainty nor equity is guaranteed, and this introduces a destabilizing factor for the process as a whole.

In the midst of the electoral process, the weaknesses of the political forces start to show up in all their glory. Getting in the good graces of the media at any cost is beginning to be an obsession for the majority of the presidential hopefuls. To differing degrees and in different ways, what they serve up to the media is actually offensive to anyone who aspires to truly subdue this fourth estate, justly dubbed by jurist Luigi Ferrajoli "savage."

Nothing paints a better picture of the politicians' prostration before the media than what National Action Party (PAN) presidential hopeful Josefina Vázquez Mota recently said at a meeting with businessmen from the Chamber of the Radio and Television Industry. To paraphrase, she let them know that just as they had made her feel at home in that event, she hoped to be able to make them feel at home when she occupied Los Pinos as Mexico's president.

The metaphor leaves nothing out and shows the degree of structural complicity that has come about by traveling the road of mutual favors. In the case of Enrique Peña Nieto, the symbiosis is so radical that it seems hard to differentiate the candidate from the media that promote him, and that have displaced the PRI as the authentic platform for a campaign that is as long as it is immune to prosecution, doling out IOUs that will have to be paid off in the medium and long terms. Even the candidate of the PRD, Andrés Manuel López Obrador, has substantially changed his critical discourse about the television networks, accepting a "fresh start" with them, publicly appearing on Televisa's main news program to display his new "friendly" attitude.

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Thus, if the very protagonists of the electoral process are incapable of valuing what is at stake, if an ultra-short-term, pragmatic vision of the need to construct a state policy in this area is what has the upper hand in their thinking, then the 2012 political change-over will imply that possibilities will only increase for frustrating the attempts to fully overcome this pending task in the Mexican democratic transition.

It should be remembered, however, that the 2007 reform was already an advance that undoubtedly would have to be refined and corrected in some respects.[8] However, that reform did make it clear that the cohesion of the political forces could at least relatively successfully deal with the onslaught of the big consortia. Also, the Supreme Court ruling on what came to be called the "Televisa Law," which attempted to indefinitely prolong the privileged treatment for the big licensees, as well as its decision on what was called the "analog blackout" and its implications in terms of concentrating broadcast signals, have shown that it is still possible to overcome pressures from business. There are also sectors of the main parties, social organizations, academia, public media, and communicators who have made diagnostic analyses and formulated very well-argued, detailed proposals for legal reforms that, taken as a whole, constitute a platform for political action that cannot easily be ignored. That is, a context of pressure and demand has been constructed that should be channeled and taken advantage of to accompany this electoral process with a critical, reasoned reflection about its dynamic.

Of course, the media are already making their own calculations and bets. They will try to pressure as much as pos-

sible to ensure their traditional interests and impact the definition of the rules for the future use of new communications and information technologies. The dispute over the regulatory framework has begun and is already one of the tradeables on the electoral market.

In this context, one priority is to document the actions of the hegemonic media, the way they evade their obligations with biased handling of information and their editorial positions, as well as their reticence to be transparent and their lack of public responsibility. As has been the case for more than two decades now, the results of this electoral process will undoubtedly be evaluated in the light of the political dynamic it generates and its effects on the competing actors, the institutions, and the citizenry. The way in which the need for a new reform will be put forward, its orientation and its scope, will depend on the reading that is done from now on of the form and content of the electoral contest, in which not only who will govern Mexico in coming years is at stake, but also what kind of checks and balances will exist for them to do it. VM

NOTES

[1] The most important aspect of this reform was the ban on parties and individuals' purchasing television and radio time, making the Federal Electoral Institute the only entity that can manage and distribute state spots for party use.

[2] See Norberto Bobbio, *The Future of Democracy: A Defence of the Rules of the Game* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).

[3] The democratic playing field requires a component that is still deficient in Mexico: the "pluralism of counterposed informational sources and openness to different currents of opinion and ideas, [since they] guarantee citizens the possibility of pondering different and even counterposed opinions," as Enrique Cuna and Alberto Escamilla write in their article "Reforma electoral, medios de comunicación y partidos políticos. Implicaciones y desafíos ante las elecciones de 2009" (Electoral Reform, Media, and Political Parties. Implications and Challenges for the 2009 Elections), *Fepade difunde* 16 (Mexico City), 2008.

[4] Today, Televisa and TV Azteca continue to be the almost exclusive owners of open broadcast bands with national coverage. In fact, these two companies control more than 80 percent of TV channels. In addition, Televisa owns 51 percent of Cablevisión, the most important paid television company.

[5] See mainly Raúl Trejo, *Democracia sin mediaciones* (Mexico City: Cal y arena, 2001).

[6] The visibility on TV screens of the PRI presidential hopeful, Enrique Peña Nieto, has been so overwhelming in recent years, violating all principles of equity, that it is no wonder that he is the "best positioned" candidate among the citizenry.

[7] This is the name that has been given to the group of federal deputies openly promoted by the television networks and that is loyal and disciplined defenders of their interests.

[8] Above all, modifications are needed with respect to the excessive use of party "spots" on the air, making the sound bite king; these changes could allow for longer time slots to present more substantive party proposals.

Absentee Voting in Mexico
Too Little of a Good Thing?

Patricio Ballados V.*

Iván Stephens/Cuartoscuro

In July 2005, after the approval of the right to vote for Mexicans residing abroad, the media published a picture of Luis Pelayo, a migrant leader from Chicago, waving the Mexican flag in the Chamber of Deputies.[1] This was a picture-perfect image of a historic step for Mexican migrants, who had fought for over a decade for the recognition of their right to political participation. The picture symbolized a revolution to come. More than 10 percent of Mexico's population would now be able to influence the political establishment, which, in a significant number of cases, was the source of their flight to search for better opportunities away from home. Seven years later, it seems that —for the second time— it will not happen.

The 2006 electoral process demonstrated the naiveté of the claim: 56 749 citizens registered to vote abroad in the first exercise of their right to participate. After a further decrease due to legal limitations, 33 000 were able to vote. Nevertheless, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) thus demonstrated that it was technically feasible to organize balloting abroad complying with the highest technical and legal standards.

Five years later, as the deadline approaches, it seems that there is going to be little difference between the citizens registered in 2006 and in 2012. The graph of weekly applications received shows little difference between the two processes. If we model the probable final outcome based on the 2006 balloting, the IFE will end up with a maximum of 65 000 applications. Based on current trends, the figure will be smaller than in 2006.

The result so far, by any measurement, is not positive. It seems that, unfortunately, we have lost the opportunity to change the outcome. I will deal with the main reasons behind this adverse result.

Legislation

In 2005, Congress was caught up in a classic game of "hot potato" regarding overseas voting. It had very few promoters

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APPLICATIONS IN 2006 AND 2012 ARE HIGHLY SIMILAR



Source: IFE, Coordination for Mexican's Voting Abroad as of 2 February, 2012. Updated information can be found at http://www.votoextranjero.mx/es/web/ve/solicitudes-recibidas.

and many silent dissenters. However, the political cost for any party not supporting the legislation was considered unacceptable. The Chamber of Deputies approved an unfeasible bill, in the hope that the upper chamber would not pass it and consequently pay the political cost of denying this human right. In turn, the Senate made significant amendments to the original bill, forcing the lower chamber to take or leave the modifications without being able to modify the bill. Finally, Congress opted for highly restrictive legislation.

The electoral model has four main elements that restrict participation.

1. *Voter registration*. Citizens residing abroad are required to have a voter registration card that can only be obtained in Mexico. This prerequisite excluded the vast majority of migrants.
2. *Postal model*. The legislation requires interested would-be voters to register over five months in advance. They have to send their application form via registered mail (in 2006 this cost over US$10, required going to a post office instead of dropping the form in a drop box) and provide proof of address (a sensitive requirement for paperless migrants).
3. *Voter Identification Verification*. To vote from abroad, it is necessary to send an application form with a signed copy of the official voter registration card to the IFE.
4. *Campaigning abroad is prohibited* due to the impossible task of keeping tabs on political party spending in other countries.

The rules for registering voters proved sound because of the strict checks provided for in Mexican electoral legislation. Unfortunately, they made for huge transaction costs in time, money, and logistics.

These rules leave out the majority of migrants, since only a small proportion have a voter registration card, and, of those who had registered and received theirs, few took it with them when they left the country.

The rules for registration proved sound because of the strict checks provided for in Mexican electoral legislation. Unfortunately, they made for huge transaction costs in time, money, and logistics. Following Mancur Olson, this explained a further decrease in potential voters.

Finally, the fact that political parties were not able to campaign abroad left the IFE with the task of single-handedly promoting participation. Electoral literature clearly establishes that parties and candidates are the main levers for promoting a higher turnout in democratic processes. Notwithstanding all of this, Congress failed to produce better legislation over the following five years. The same restrictions thus remain in place.

Electoral Organization

After evaluating the project, the IFE produced a white paper presenting recommendations for improving legal, technical, and organizational aspects of the process. Additionally, the main external criticism centered around the cost of the project. Given the limited participation, the resources utilized were deemed excessive.

The IFE did not follow the recommendations for maintaining an active public policy to preserve and enhance its relations with the project's main stakeholders. Thus, an important opportunity was lost. When its General Council was renewed, the new authorities lacked a strategy for taking advantage of previous efforts.

In preparation for the 2012 elections, the budgetary aspect was given a great deal of weight. The president of the General Council stated in meetings with migrants that one of the IFE's main objectives was to implement the project not to maximize participation but to spend less.

This decision can help explain the low registration rate. In 2006, it was not until the IFE carried out an ad campaign in the United States that the numbers of registered voters started to increase. This lesson was not taken into account. It is not that such a campaign would necessarily produce massive registration rates. But taking into account the rest of the IFE Office for Voting Abroad's current efforts, and the better internal regulation, it would probably have led to more migrants registering.

Another aspect that would help explain the outcome so far has to do with the degree of attention given to the project by the General Council. The IFE was without a third of its members for more than a year, which meant that each sitting member had to tackle a higher load of the Council's affairs. Furthermore, the 2007-2008 electoral reform increased the General Council's attributions, and it ignored the interest in the overseas voting planning and execution. A good example of this fact was that while the IFE was in the middle of its 20-week window for promoting registration, its Council, along with the Kellogg Institute and Notre Dame University organized a forum on overseas voting reform. That is, it seems that the electoral authorities were more preoccupied with providing arguments for a future reform than with promoting registration in the current electoral process.

> Over 10 percent of Mexico's population resides abroad. This Diaspora will continue to be denied, overall, the basic human right of political participation.

Opportunities still remain ahead. In 2006, over 14 000 registration applications were denied. It is likely that new internal regulation and organizational efforts will enable more citizens to cast their vote for president.

The 2012 process will also permit the IFE to pinpoint likely voters. For example, given the data from the 2006 election, it seems that potential voters include citizens with immigration papers, particularly students and professionals posted overseas. If corroborated, stakeholders will have better resources to carry out an electoral reform to include more migrant groups and to better target the existing participants.

Lastly, the IFE has the opportunity to prove once again that many politicians' fears about the likelihood of electoral fraud being committed in overseas balloting are unfounded. The process for sending the ballots to registered voters, receiving the votes cast, and tallying them on election night will be crucial.

Challenges

The construction of a system that permits millions of Mexicans who have left their country but retain strong bonds with their families and communities remains one of the central challenges of the state. This is a complex task involving social, economic, and cultural aspects. In electoral terms, as long

as there is still the possibility to take into account the vote of even a few migrants, stakeholders will be able to improve the legislation, rules, and organization. Valuable lessons will come out of 2012.

Meanwhile, the fact remains: over 10 percent of Mexico's population resides abroad. This Diaspora will continue to be denied, overall, the basic human right of political participation. Half way into the electoral process, challenges remain for the electoral authorities, migrant organizations, and legislators.

The IFE has two main tasks. It has to ensure that the citizens who registered to vote be able to do so, and prove once again that it is as safe to vote inside Mexico as abroad. This will provide arguments for asking for the existing strict rules to evolve into a more comprehensive model. It then has to provide legislators with a white paper on the process, including recommendations that complement those given in the 2006 study.

Following the presidential elections, it is paramount that migrant leaders and organizations start lobbying for a change in the model. There has to be a way for the Diaspora to register to vote abroad in order to be able to support the idea that there is really a right to political participation. The method for casting ballots has to be changed as well. It will be vital to study the outcome of Mexico City's overseas voting model, which provides for Internet voting, in order to establish a sound precedent for allowing technological tools to be used in the next federal elections.

Finally, the next Congress has the duty to pass new legislation. It has to come to terms with the fact that, given the current rules, the political participation of more than one-tenth of Mexicans will continue to be almost absolutely denied, even if their remittances make up a significant percentage of our GDP. At least until our *paisanos* choose —or are forced— to return home. VM

NOTES

[1] See the photo at www.terra.com/fotos.

Mexico: Presidential Elections, Drug Trafficking, and Corruption

Pablo Cabañas Díaz*

Enrique Ordóñez/Cuartoscuro

Mexico is currently gearing up for the 2012 presidential elections, and the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), the ruling party from 1929 until the end of 2000, is leading in the polls. Apart from a new president, 500 federal deputies, 128 senators, four governors, 561 mayors, and 434 local deputies in 11 states will also be elected.

The "war on drugs" launched by Felipe Calderón's government is entering its sixth year; it has divided the army, plunged the economy into a crisis, and increased insecurity. Thousands have been killed and Joaquín "El Chapo" Guzmán, founder of the Sinaloa cartel, reigns supreme and even made the *Forbes* list. The elections are also taking place with a backdrop of a humanitarian crisis and constant human rights' violations affecting civilians, particularly the most vulnerable, such as women and migrants, victimized by the authorities and organized crime alike.

Public support for the "war on drugs" is waning since the violence began to surpass the 1910 Mexican Revolution in terms of fatalities; 50 000 have been killed at the time of writing; this, added to an economy facing adverse international headwinds, can severely hurt the electoral prospects of the ruling National Action Party (PAN). Meanwhile, Felipe Calderón's government argues that the violence is due to the cartels having previously been left to grow unchecked, whereas his administration is taking them on. In this context, the *New York Times* reported that U.S. law enforcement agencies like the DEA had recently infiltrated Mexican cartels with secret informants, supplying enough information to lead to the capture or take-down of at least about 20 medium-level and high-ranking drug traffickers.[1]

In July 2012, violence will still be intense. Threats to public officials' safety, especially at a local level, are set to increase.

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Attacks on national and foreign companies will be a latent risk. Everything suggests that cartel-related violence, especially in the border region, will make it increasingly dangerous to travel to the United States. These trends are the result of the "war" declared by President Calderón, whose main aim was to legitimize a questionable victory in the 2006 presidential elections.

Calderón believed that to consolidate his presidency, it would be enough to crush the Mexican drug cartels in an easy, quick, and cheap offensive. He badly miscalculated. At the end of his term in office and after thousands of deaths, the president has failed to finish either the cartels or the consumption, sale, and distribution of drugs, with Mexico continuing to be a stable market.

Although the PRI lost the presidency to Calderón's party in 2000, and despite its tarnished reputation as a political force that kept itself in power through arbitrary methods and high levels of corruption, some voters consider that it could still reduce the level of violence. Broad sectors of the population believe that the violence seen today did not exist during the PRI's time in office. Mexico's president was even quoted in the *New York Times* as saying that the PRI negotiated with drug traffickers, stirring up a scandal 11 days into the electoral process.[2] In a press release, the president's office denied that Calderón had told the newspaper that the PRI would make deals with the cartels should it win the elections.

Prior to the 2006 presidential elections, the political atmosphere was poisoned by mutually defamatory accusations leveled by the various political parties and candidates. The election was marked by violence and tension among political groups. Some hailed Andrés Manuel López Obrador as a savior, yet his opponents in the PAN perceived him as a threat to Mexico. The Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), which had enjoyed prestige and legitimacy as an independent constitutional body created 20 years ago to organize elections and count ballots, has been plagued by contradictions and divisions since 2006. It is missing three councilors and its reluctance to perform its duty properly as electoral referee is keenly felt among the political elite.[3]

The executive's concerted efforts to stop the PRI from regaining the presidency in the upcoming elections has led the opposition to demand that it must quit meddling with the electoral process. Even members of the PAN itself complain about the president's interference in the workings of his party and the continuation, in the presidency, of authoritarian schemes redolent of the PRI.

To be fair, during its first four decades in power, the PRI managed to boost Mexico's economy and resisted the dictatorial tendencies seen elsewhere in Latin America, especially in Central America, during World War II and the Cold War. However, its last administrations (José López Portillo [1976-1982], Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado [1982-1988], Carlos Salinas de Gortari [1988-1994] and Ernesto Zedillo [1994-2000]) brought on strong devaluations of the peso that caused widespread unemployment.

After two PAN governments, if Enrique Peña Nieto of the PRI succeeds in capitalizing on the July 3, 2011, midterm and local election results and on Mexicans' displeasure with the current government, he should have no great difficulty in winning the presidency and returning his party to the position it occupied until a few years ago in Mexican politics. *Financial Times* correspondent Adam Thomson summed up his candidacy best by describing that the months leading up the elections appear "more like a minefield than an open highway to the presidency of Latin America's second-largest economy."[4]

The Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) has been significantly weakened as a political leftwing opposition force. Its internal schisms are such that they threaten its very survival. Given this scenario and the PAN's fading fortunes during its most recent six-year term in office, the PRI is considered an alternative. Mexico's current political situation is highly complex and demands effective government, a clear direction, continuity in public policies, and a positive attitude among citizens.

THEY SHALL NOT PASS: CONTROVERSIAL ALLIANCES

In the July 4, 2009, elections, with a turnout of almost 39 percent, new local deputies were elected in 14 of the 32 Mexican states, along with 12 governors. The PAN and PRD's decision to form coalitions in several places and their attempt to also incorporate the Labor Party (PT) and Convergence, traditionally associated with the PRD, created a scenario that is harder

to explain ideologically than it is electorally. This controversial alliance was created between the party of government and the leftwing opposition in five of the 12 states where governors up for election.[5] This alliance or marriage of convenience, formed in the states of Durango, Sinaloa, Puebla, Hidalgo, and Oaxaca, was as unusual as it was electorally successful. Oaxaca was the clearest example of this great electoral alliance between the administration and opposition parties.

Risks for Democracy

With this development, the PRI has found a rich political vein to mine, portraying itself as the victim of a colossal conspiracy whose sole aim is to keep it from power at all costs, and suggesting that democracy is the real victim of such a strategy. It therefore seems obvious that in political terms the electoral debate must center on the economy, security issues, and respect for human rights.

At other junctures in Mexican history, political parties have acted as guarantors of the country's security and stability. This no longer seems to be the case, except if we talk about the PRI, with, of course, reservations. For example, Humberto Moreira, former governor of the state of Coahuila, ran up debts of US$350 million during his term in office by using false documentation. Given this amount of debt, Standard & Poors downgraded Coahuila's credit rating from A+ to BBB-. Today the state has the highest level of per-capita debt in the country: Mex$11,633. And in absolute terms, it is the fourth most indebted state, with liabilities of Mex$32 billion as of the third quarter of 2011.[6]

In 2012, Mexico will be one of Latin America's least dynamic economies, with poverty levels rising significantly and family incomes contracting 12 percent just in the last two years. Poverty, unemployment, and families' loss of purchasing power continues to grow, and that helps the PRI. The widespread drug-related violence and kidnappings keep the issue of public security at the top of the political agenda. Also the legal system, after the PAN's 12 years in government and just as it was during the PRI's rule, continues to be highly problematic.

With the PAN, attempts to bring to justice those responsible for human rights' violations have failed. Many people in socially deprived communities, particularly the indigenous population, continue to suffer discrimination, and their economic, social, and cultural rights continue to be violated.

> Calderón believed that to consolidate his presidency, it would be enough to crush the Mexican drug cartels in an easy, quick, and cheap offensive. He badly miscalculated.

Within this complex economic and social context, as mentioned above, the leading candidate in the polls is the State of Mexico's former governor, Enrique Peña Nieto: he has strong media backing, especially from Televisa, and is an experienced governor who addresses the people directly, inspiring trust and security.

The PAN's future looks gloomy for two reasons: first, given the natural fatigue from their period in office, especially since they were under constant suspicion of only borrowing the presidency; and, second, due to their failure to achieve economic successes in a country where the economy will be the key to the elections. And the party's prospects are also damaged by its lack of a clear leader.

In the 2009 elections, Andrés Manuel López Obrador rejected making any pact with the PAN, so the media portrays him as the only viable left candidate. While the PAN and PRD leaderships defended their support for a coalition, López Obrador outlined his vision on core national issues —the failure of the so-called war on drugs, privatizations, and the *de facto* powers— and he has approached the 2012 elections by differentiating his stance from other leftwing positions. Unfortunately Mexico's left is riven by a deep internal crisis, and its divisions have caused fights as fierce —if not fiercer— than those the left as a whole wages against its right-wing opponents. VM

Notes

[1] *New York Times*, October 25, 2011.
[2] *New York Times,* October 18, 2011.
[3] The three missing councilors were finally seated December 15, 2011, after this article was submitted. [Editor's Note.]
[4] *Financial Times*, October 18, 2011.
[5] The difficulty in understanding this type of alliance lies in the right-wing nature of the PAN, whose ideological spectrum even includes far-right groups, such as the Yunque, whose ranks include some well-known PAN leaders. [Editor's Note.]
[6] *Reforma*, July 29, 2011.

Tequila
Endangered Cultural Heritage

Bernardo Olmedo Carranza*

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Introduction

Ancestral knowledge is part of any people's cultural heritage. There is increasing concern about the protection of this traditional knowledge and wisdom linked to national, regional, and even local history and socio-cultural identity of societies the world over.

This has become a more and more important item on the international agenda, particularly because of the endangerment of this kind of knowledge, especially that produced by underdeveloped societies and the most vulnerable peoples whose cultural riches are at risk of disappearing and/or being privatized.

Some elements for analyzing this are associated with concepts like "appellation of origin" (AO), involving ownership and territoriality, and official norms. These are linked to specific characteristics that define the quality required for certain products to be considered part of traditional knowledge, but also to other kinds of attributes identifying them as a people's material and intangible cultural heritage.

The study of tequila gives rise to results that are both interesting and disquieting when we add the concept of cultural landscape (surroundings) to the idea of a society's cultural heritage.

Tequila, an Emblematic Mexican Beverage

Tequila, a traditional alcoholic beverage originating in Mexico, is already entrenched as part of the national, regional, and local socio-cultural identity. Considered an ethnic nostalgia product, given its characteristics and attributes, it is emblematic internationally, and highly appreciated both in

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Mexican migrant markets and by foreigners alike.[1] Linked to different cultural manifestations of Mexican society, it has become a symbol of Mexicans' identity.

It is produced using the *Tequilana Weber* blue agave plant native to Mexico. Originally made during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries using artisanal processes, by the nineteenth century it was being made industrially using the old procedures. However, its origin, nature, and unique characteristics have changed over the years. Although since 1974 it has had a appellation of origin (AO), and since 1994 has been regulated by an Official Mexican Norm (NOM), both have undergone modifications. Its being exported and the way that is done have become mechanisms for altering and adulterating the beverage.

On the other hand, in 2006, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) declared what it called the "agave landscape," covering thousands of acres of agave fields, the old industrial facilities, the distilleries, the haciendas, the towns, and their traditions, a World Heritage Treasure.

Originally, it was made by family-run agribusinesses established fundamentally in the state of Jalisco. Since the 1960s, some factories have partnered up with capital from the rest of Mexico and abroad. The importance of international capital in the Mexican tequila industry is derived from the fact that, today, they own 9 out of the 10 most important brands (determined by quality, price, prestige, and age). This includes the production, bottling, and distribution, the brand names, and even part of the "agave landscape." The truth is that the attributes of tequila have changed, and there is a risk that foreign private business will appropriate the traditional knowledge used in its production.

Appellation of Origin (AO)

A specialist in the field states, "The alcoholic drinks we consume in our country, whether our own or adopted, distilled or not, have profound experiential histories….They are culturally and historically regulated. At the same time, they are the product of their places of origin, part of those places' identity; it is no exaggeration to say that beverages are cultural condensations of times and spaces….Things, just like people, have their own biographies."[2]

In this sense, tequila is a product firmly linked to the original territory from which it derives its AO, but that has also broadened out its territory. It has its own "anchor" that includes the cultivation, manufacture, commercialization, and even the people involved in each process, "as well as the significance of all of this for the collective memory."[3]

> Today, most tequila is adulterated legally because, under the law, a spirit is considered tequila if it contains up to 51 percent alcohol derived from the specific agave, and up to 49 percent from other sugars.

One first aspect of the process of de-naturalization and alteration of tequila's originality and quality is its native territorial anchorage and the changes that has undergone; this is concretized in an AO that no longer expresses that territorial originality located in only four municipalities of Jalisco —the name of the original beverage is actually derived from that of one of these: Tequila.[4]

The concept of AO is derived from a guideline established by the Union for the Protection of Industrial Property (UPIP).[5] The Lisbon Agreement (1958) defines it as "the geographical denomination of a country, region, or locality, which serves to designate a product originating therein, the quality or characteristics of which are due exclusively or essentially to the geographical environment, including natural and human factors."[6] Mexico participated in and signed these agreements, but its government did not carry out the necessary procedures for the origin of tequila to be recognized at that time —the government delimited the territoriality of the production of its raw materials only in 1974— and the UPIP could not internationally recognize an AO for tequila.

However, the Mexican government has entered into negotiations in this area in its different free trade agreements and with the World Trade Organization to achieve recognition of origin for tequila as an exclusively Mexican product, but not its original national territoriality, which has meant that "tequila" is produced in other regions of the world.

Official Mexican Norm (NOM)

Today, the tequila AO (which has undergone three modifications, in 1977, in 1999, and in 2000) recognizes as Appellation of Origin Territories (AOT) 181 municipalities in five

In 2006, the "agave landscape" was registered on the UNESCO's Cultural Heritage List, including the old tequila industrial facilities, the haciendas where it was produced yesterday and the places it is made today, the agave fields, and the Jalisco communities where it originated.

states of the country: Guanajuato, Michoacán, Nayarit, Tamaulipas, and Jalisco. In addition, its quality is open to discussion because of an element that impacts the process of de-naturalization of tequila: the Official Mexican Norm (NOM), which has changed under pressure from the large national and multinational tequila producers.

The 1949 NOM —precedents exist as far back as 1943— recognized as tequila the spirit distilled from 100 percent *Tequilana Weber* blue agave.[7] This original natural quality underwent adulterations to favor the economic interests of the businessmen who produced the spirit and the abundance or scarcity of the raw material. The state did nothing to regulate this, making this the second element in the process of de-naturalization, in addition to the AO.

Today, the beverage is adulterated legally because, under the law, a spirit is considered tequila if it contains up to 51 percent alcohol derived from the specific agave, and up to 49 percent from other sugars, according to the current NOM-006-SCFI-2005, in effect since 2005.[8]

CULTURAL HERITAGE AND RISKS

Two additional factors have influenced the process of tequila's de-naturalization: the increasing weight of foreign companies among producers and exports in bulk, without their original bottling, and the creation of the Tequila Regulating Council (CRT).

Because it is a cultural, ethnic, emblematic product of Mexico, tequila has generated growing demand in recent years nationally and internationally. Today, more than half of national production is exported and sold in about 120 countries, although 80 percent goes to the United States. This is due to the importance of the Mexican migrant market, which represents almost 75 percent of that country's Latino market, or about 30 million people, equivalent to 30 percent of the current population of Mexico.

However, not all the tequila exported is made from 100 percent agave. Because of the changes in the NOM, the quality of tequila has changed over time, due, as I already mentioned, to pressure from the companies that produce it, among which foreign companies have taken on more and more weight since the 1960s.[9] They have become owners and/or partners in the most important companies and brand names, and their growing presence has undoubtedly played an outstanding role in the CRT, practically led by businessmen.

The CRT was created in 1993 with the aim of "promoting the culture and quality of this beverage that has won an important place among the symbols of national identity." In order to ensure quality, it is accredited as the verification unit and certification body, with the approval of the Ministry of the Economy's General Norms Office (DGN), the same body that determines the NOMs.

Thus, tequila production is regulated by business owners, a sector that is trans-nationalized. In the 1970s, two of Mexico's main tequila manufacturers, which represented 40 percent of total production and were the two main exporters, were in the hands of multinational companies (Sauza, then in the hands of the Domecq consortium, and today in the hands of another foreign company; and Casa Cuervo, owned by Hublein Co.). By 2002, after mergers and takeovers of medium-sized and small producers, multinationals represented more than half of all tequila production, a proportion that declined slightly when Cuervo was re-acquired by national capital.[10] However, that bump in the road was soon overtaken by the continual acquisitions by other important tequila production companies, like the sale of Herradura, one of the most prestigious producers of quality tequila, five or six years ago to Brown-Forman. And it looks like Cuervo has already entered into negotiations to cede its trademark to the multinational Diageo in 2012.

Of all tequila exports today, about 25 percent are actually made from 100-percent agave in all its categories (white; young [or gold]; reposado [rested]; anejo [extra aged]; extra anejo [ultra aged]; and special reserve).[11] According to CRT figures, while the proportion exported in bulk has declined and that of the bottled spirit has risen, among the latter, the amount of non-100-percent agave, that is, adulterated tequila, has increased. Five years ago, it was said that about 90 percent of exported tequila had not complied with the bottling aspect of the appellation of origin. These products are bottled at their destinations, above all by foreign companies, particularly in the United States, the destination of 80 per-

cent of all tequila exports, an amount similar to that of all the tequila consumption in Mexico's domestic market. This means that more value-added is not incorporated into these exports in Mexico.

To the contrary, according to studies, tequila exported in bulk is sold as 110-proof, to be watered down to 76-proof, and even as low as 70-proof, for final consumption.[12] This means that tequila is even more de-naturalized through this form of sale and that it is difficult for "Mexican authorities" (in reference to the CRT) to control the quality of "tequila" sold in this way; it is well-known that it is also sold in bulk to restaurants and bars in the United States to make mixed drinks and cocktails, which is a way to disguise the adulteration of the spirit.

One more element must be added to all of the above. On August 27, 2006, the "agave landscape" was included and registered on the UNESCO's Cultural Heritage List. This includes, as I already mentioned, the old tequila industrial facilities, the haciendas that were the birthplaces of what is now this agribusiness, the places where the current manufacturers have their plants, the agave fields, and the towns, municipalities, and communities in the state of Jalisco where tequila originated.

The agave landscape has historical and cultural value, and only includes a few Jalisco municipalities: Amatitlán, Arenal, Tequila, and Teuchitlán. These are the places where tequila really originated; it is there that the old industrial plants, the agave fields, the distilleries, haciendas, and towns exist that are an example of what the UNESCO calls traditional human settlements in the world.[13]

The multinationals, which have either purchased or partnered up to become owners of the companies, their trademarks, designs, their tangible and intangible assets, as well as their captive markets, are now to a large extent the owners of the agave landscape, too. The agave landscape is made up of the knowledge, culture, tradition, and ethnic aspect of the society and indigenous communities where tequila originated, and by extension, of Mexico, given the emblematic nature of this beverage, considered part of the nation's heritage. And it seems there are no official regulations dealing with this.

FINAL THOUGHTS

What this article puts forward refers us to the imperious need for strict regulation by the Mexican government to recover tequila's territorial origins and conditions for quality. This is in order to deal with the risk of an eventual transnationalization of the agave landscape, which is the cultural heritage of the creators of tequila and the Mexican nation.

What is of concern, however, is the almost complete absence of national policy in this area, whether regarding tequila or other Mexican ethnic products. This endangers traditional knowledge, which is part of Mexico's social, cultural, and identity heritage. Mexico has never been precisely an example of the protection and preservation of its heritage through legal means offered in legislation on intellectual and industrial property. VM

NOTES

[1] See Bernardo Olmedo Carranza, "Latin American Markets in North America 'Ethnic and Nostalgia' Products," *Voices of Mexico* 86, September-December 2009, pp. 57-60.

[2] Camilo Contreras Delgado, "Introducción," Camilo Contreras Delgado and Isabel Ortega Ridauro, comps., *Bebidas y regiones. Historia e impacto de la cultura etílica en México* (Mexico City: Universidad Autónoma Agraria Antonio Narro/Universidad Autónoma de Yucatán/Consejo para la Cultura y las Artes de Nuevo León/Plaza y Valdés, 2005), pp. 9-10.

[3] Ibid., p. 10.

[4] "De-naturalization" is understood as the way in which the original beverage has undergone changes in its original, natural character, both with regard to its place of origin (AO) and to its original chemical composition; this is the way in which a cultural, ethnic good is stripped of its natural, original attributes and characteristics.

[5] Rogelio Luna Zamora, "Disyuntivas del patrimonio del tequila en la era neoliberal," Contreras Delgado and Ortega Ridauro, comps., op. cit., pp. 29-30.

[6] World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), http://www.wipo.int/lisbon/en/general/. In his text, Luna Zamora, op cit., refers to the book by José Luis Muría, *El tequila. Boceto histórico de una industria* (Mexico City: Universidad de Guadalajara, 1990), p. 30.

[7] Luna Zamora, op. cit., p. 22.

[8] Consejo Regulador del Tequila (CRT), Mexico City, http://www.crt.org.mx, accessed December 4, 2011.

[9] Rogelio Luna Zamora, *La historia del tequila, de sus regiones y sus hombres*, Chapter 7 (Mexico City: Conaculta, 2002),

[10] Luna Zamora, "Disyuntivas del patrimonio," op. cit., p. 36.

[11] CRT, op. cit.

[12] Luna Zamora, op. cit., pp. 35-36.

[13] See "Puede llevar el nombre, sólo si tiene sangre azul," *Excélsior*, Mexico City, August 29, 2006, p. 2. However, in my opinion, the real agave landscape is even larger than what the UNESCO currently certifies; to that definition should be added elements like the way in which the raw materials are cultivated, the ancestral, artisanal processes for making tequila; the brand names, some of which are centuries old; the bottle designs, in some cases true gems of craftsmanship; the foods that include tequila as an ingredient; and an endless number of diverse cultural manifestations intimately linked with the beverage (mariachi bands, *charro* rodeos, clothing, films, iconography, etc.).

Supreme Auditing In Mexico Today

Juan M. Portal M.*

Courtesy of the Supreme Audit Office of Mexico

The presentation of the report on the supreme audit of the 2009 federal government budget.

Since Mexico became independent, mechanisms for supervising that public resources are utilized for the purposes they were earmarked for have been considered indispensable. In a representative regime divided into different branches of government like Mexico's, the legislative branch, where popular sovereignty is deposited, determines and monitors the amount and distribution of public resources. Meanwhile, the executive branch is in charge of proposing, spending, and being accountable for those resources. However, because of Mexico's incipient development of both democracy and institutions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, for society, monitoring public spending and government action lacked all impact and substance.

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Origins of Supreme Auditing in Mexico

The very first Constitution (1824) stipulated the examination and detailing of the federal budget under the auspices of the Chamber of Deputies' Controller's Office. Over the years, given its limited structure and the political, economic, and social conditions prevalent in the country, the Controller's Office only achieved the rank of a department in charge of verifying that the public accounts presented by the executive tallied with the authorized public budget, and, that, only for internal purposes of the administration in question.

A transcendental change took place in 1999, when Congress reformed the Constitution to create a new federal supreme audit institution, with greater faculties for reviewing federal public finances. Based on that, in 2000, the Federal

Supreme Audit Law was passed, creating the Supreme Audit Office of Mexico (ASF) as the Chamber of Deputies' watchdog, with the technical and operational autonomy to carry out its functions and organize itself internally.

Supreme auditing makes it possible to foster best practices in government, to detect areas of opportunity for improving public administration, and to generate an attitude of service, in which satisfying the citizen is the main objective.

A New Era for Supreme Auditing

Today, as part of our democratic system's checks and balances, the ASF acts as the body that examines the annual government budget. It is in charge of the external oversight of the use of federal public monies by the three branches of government, institutions stipulated as autonomous by the Constitution, the states and municipalities, and even private citizens and bodies when they receive federal public funds.

The audit process begins when the ASF receives the public accounts presented every year by the Ministry of Finance and Public Credit to the Chamber of Deputies. That report summarizes all transactions, operations, and expenditures incurred with federal resources, based on the items authorized in the federal government spending budget. The ASF's audit work must be carried out annually (that is, the accounts of a particular fiscal year are reviewed) and *post-factum* (after the expenditures have already been made). That is, the ASF does not have the faculty to review either on-going projects or programs, or expenditures that have not been reported in the public accounts.

To proceed in an orderly fashion and ensure that the audits center on the most important aspects of public administration, the ASF determines autonomously an annual program of audits. These reviews make it possible to verify that operations are registered correctly, that government actions conform to legal and regulatory provisions, whether goals are met, the performance of the bodies audited, and in general the efficiency, effectiveness, and economy in the use of public resources. These reviews seek to achieve the greatest possible impact in terms of the budget amounts allocated or their strategic importance.

Once the report of the public account supreme auditing has been prepared, it is presented to both the Chamber of Deputies and the public. It contains the findings and observations derived from the audits carried out, and, if any irregularities are not resolved by the audited bodies by presenting additional information, the ASF can undertake three kinds of action, depending on the nature of the irregularity: it can propose that the corresponding internal control body levy administrative sanctions; it can propose establishing the responsibility for recouping the damages, which implies the return or reimbursement to the federal treasury of the incorrectly-used resources; or it can press criminal charges before the public prosecutor.

The ASF's faculties to levy sanctions have the aim of discouraging public servants from wrongdoing, thus decreasing the moral risk that society assumes when it entrusts them with managing its goods. The dissuasive effect of external auditing —although this is not its main attribute— helps reduce the obscure areas, where situations can arise leading to corruption.

We should not forget that supreme auditing is essentially a corrective method of the state to qualitatively improve its administration, to rationally manage the resources at its disposal, and to define strategies and policies that can be perfected using an objective analysis and evaluation of their results. Supreme auditing also makes it possible to foster best practices in government, to detect areas of opportunity for improving public administration, and to generate an attitude of service, in which satisfying the citizen (as the recipient of government goods and services) is the main objective of government action.

Among other results of fostering the responsible and transparent handling of public funds, it is important to underline the decrease in the discretional use of monies; the free flow of information about obtaining and allocating resources; the adoption of international standards and practices of good government; the active, open participation of society; and the timeliness in the presentation of the information needed to make decisions in accordance with social needs. Another contribution is the definition of budget management indicators that make it possible to set objective parameters for measuring governmental performance. The result is better quality expenditures because evaluation, control, and accountability to the citizenry are facilitated both inside the executive and *vis-à-vis* the legislative branch itself, ensuring that the budget no longer focuses on inputs but on results. The ASF's contri-

Since the many oversight bodies have not acted with common, concerted objectives and methods, their usefulness has been limited in offering authorities, and the citizenry, a sufficiently detailed panorama of the public administration.

bution is not linked to evaluating or generating public programs and policies since that is not one of its attributions.

VALUES AND PRECEPTS OF AUDITING

The correct exercise of supreme auditing is linked to a series of values and precepts. While some of them are absolutely necessary for supreme auditing to be feasible, others are the responsibility of the institution. We are talking here about concepts such as the autonomy of the body in charge of supreme auditing, the impartiality with which its work should be carried out, and the transparency and accountability it seeks to promote and that it must observe in its own performance.

Full autonomy is a concern not only in our country, but worldwide. Subjecting some of these supreme audit institutions to influence and pressure from the executive branch —something frequent in Mexico's states— does not allow for truly effective auditing practices.

In 2007, the nineteenth Congress of the International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions (INTOSAI) issued the "Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence."[1] This document demands the establishment of basic conditions for the free practice of supreme auditing without political, administrative, financial, or legal obstacles, as well as the public disclosure of its results to guarantee the objectivity in the audit findings, the supreme audit institutions' (SAI) credibility, the transparency in the processes, and the possibility that these observations will be translated into preventive or corrective actions to improve governments.

In Mexico, we have advanced qualitatively toward achieving this goal since the creation of the ASF. However, it is an area in which more can always be done, since a supreme audit institution with greater autonomy will get better results. This should be accompanied by a commitment to impartiality in order for the institution to exercise its faculties without considering any type of vested interest or bowing to any outside directives, since the basis for credible audit results is that the process be carried out through a serious, professional investigation based on documentary evidence. Its neutrality must be its main asset; only verifiable, transparent, and technical criteria can orient the institution's endeavors. The planning processes for audit programs and their execution must be above all suspicion.

Another important feature for supreme auditing is transparency. This must be seen as a basic element of the new culture in public administration, not as a burden, but as an inherent obligation for exercising public service. Transparency in managing public resources must not be subject either to the whims of the authorities or conceived of as some extra effort on the part of the bodies entrusted with managing public resources. Rather, it must be a basic condition of governmental responsibility.

TOWARD A SYSTEMIC APPROACH TO ACCOUNTABILITY

In Mexico, a considerable number of control and auditing bodies exist both inside and outside the public administration's different institutions. The Ministry of the Public Function and the federal public administration's internal control offices, the state and municipal controller's offices, the Superior Audit Office, the local supreme audit institutions, the internal controller's offices of the legislative and judicial branches of government, and the bodies declared autonomous by the Constitution should all have the capacity to keep constant, appropriate watch over the performance of public institutions.

It should be recognized that until now, since these many oversight bodies have not coordinated appropriately or acted with common, concerted objectives and methods, their usefulness has been limited in achieving their objective of offering authorities, the citizenry, and the audited institutions themselves a sufficiently detailed panorama of the real situation of public administration. Its experience has shown the ASF that the isolation and disparity in the efforts to oversee the use of public resources on a municipal, state, or federal level has not made it possible to fully shed light where murky operations exist, to put a stop to discretionary use of funds, or to stop corrupt practices.

It is possible to distinguish three different dimensions that we must make sure to operate harmoniously in order to decrease and even eliminate the isolation of efforts by the differ-

The Supreme Audit Office of Mexico in Mexico City.

ent bodies linked to accountability, so that we can qualitatively improve supreme auditing in our country. These dimensions are timing, contents, and the people responsible.

The ASF carries out its auditing duties according to the principles of performing them annually and after the budget has been spent. This limits it to reviewing the accounts provided for a single fiscal year after it has concluded, issuing a single report that limits effective communication with the general public and creates a vacuum in terms of the SAI's presence for the rest of the fiscal year. This means that the time that passes between the report on the federal government's public accounts and the auditors' review makes it practically impossible for their conclusions to have any immediate effects on budget planning for the following fiscal year or even on how the following budgets are exercised.

In terms of the contents, it should be noted that supreme auditing requires being able to use either the public accounts or the results of the action of the audited entities' internal control bodies. However, additional mechanisms must be applied to guarantee the validity and trustworthiness of these inputs when, at the end of the day, they should be sufficiently standardized in all areas and levels of government and should reflect the best existing international practices in this matter.

The third dimension mentioned, that of those in charge of carrying out audit processes, involves something a little less tangible: the capacity to act objectively regardless of the circumstances, strictly following a code of ethics and without allowing interested parties or group interests to intervene in the fulfillment of their duty.

The first two dimensions, timing and contents, could be integrated harmoniously by making the relevant changes in legal structures and the scope of the mandates of the institutions involved, as well as through greater harmonization in the application of standards and methodologies.

> The "Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence" demands the establishment of basic conditions for the free practice of supreme auditing without political, administrative, financial, or legal obstacles.

A systemic approach to accountability may be a very important factor for contributing to the eradication of practices prejudicial to the public interest. For that to happen, the different efforts that have been going on parallel to each other need to converge toward a common end, which is making accountability one of the bases for government administration. Cooperation among the internal control bodies and supreme auditing is one of the ASF's strategic objectives, since the two practices are intimately linked to one another. The idea is that the complementary nature of the different review and control instruments and mechanisms make it possible for a wider and deeper coverage, offer a clearer diagnosis, and therefore put forward corrective and preventive actions that get to the root of the problems they detect.

Coordination also implies establishing a series of formal commitments to achieve a common objective. On the initiative of the ASF, the basis has been created for establishing a national system that will allow for organized action by the relevant institutions at all levels of government. The ASF is fully aware that what has been done up to now in the country regarding accountability is very important but that it represents only one stage in a longer term project. We can see with optimism that the moment for harmonizing what exists, in order to achieve effective coordination and greater coverage, has arrived. The remaining auditing tasks will require continual commitment, important development of the administration, and more professional, solid participation of all parties involved. VM

Notes

[1] See "Mexico Declaration on SAI Independence," http://www.intosai.org/en/documents/intosai/general/declarations-of-lima-and-mexico/mexico-declaration-on-sai-independence.html. [Editor's Note.]

Mexico's Pending Human Rights Agenda for Children and Adolescents

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Marco Polo Guzmán Hernández/Cuartoscuro

Introduction

In June 2011, Mexico passed a constitutional reform on human rights to strengthen their promotion and protection. Undoubtedly, this was a legal and institutional advance of major importance both in the area of human rights and that of broadening out individuals' opportunities. However, while it is true that this reform is the result of an evolving normative-institutional process to create constitutional guarantees and instititutions and policies for the observance of human rights in our country, the agenda for effective compliance is still pending. This is because structural and practical social and institutional conditions persist that impede the full enjoyment of rights by broad sectors of the population.[1]

As part of this evolutionary process of the human rights regimen, for a little over two decades, both official discourse and public policy design have recognized the vulnerability in which certain social groups live in the country, such as the indigenous, persons with disabilities, seniors, persons living with

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HIV-AIDS, young people, recent migrants and persons with a different sexual orientation, as well as women, little boys and girls, and teens. These are groups of the population who suffer discrimination and are excluded from opportunities because of their gender, ethnic group, health, sexual orientation, or age, a situation that tends to sharpen because of precarious socio-economic circumstances. In this context, it has become increasingly necessary to strengthen or create public policies, as well as earmark public budgets to attend to the needs of vulnerable groups, given broad evidence of the unequal, inequitable treatment that still characterizes Mexican society.

With enormous challenges both for the present and the future, our country has begun to move toward a model of governmental and social intervention based more on a vision aimed at respect and guarantee of the rights of persons than on a perspective of solving social problems. This new vision has used the need to create agendas that have a direct effect on the enforcement of human rights and the generation of institutional changes that have a positive effect on public policy design. This represents a formidable challenge for both government and society.

In the case of the rights of children and adolescents, a substantive improvement in their circumstances can be seen. However, many tasks remain to be fulfilled to effectively and fully ensure the rights of the more than 36 million little boys, little girls, and adolescents who live in Mexico. This population universe is as large as it is diverse, as are its needs specific.

Brief Diagnosis of the Current Status of Children and Adolescents in Mexico

For more than two decades, positive changes have taken place in the condition of Mexican children. For example, child mortality rates have fallen and there is greater coverage of schooling and health care services. Social expenditures have brought visible results. According to data from the "Informe de México: avances y desafíos en materia de derechos humanos" (Mexico Report: Human Rights Advances and Challenges),[2] malnutrition among children under five has fallen 94.4 percent since 2000, while the infant mortality rate dropped from 18.3 percent in 2001 to 14.2 percent in 2010. Educational coverage is almost universal for primary school, and gender inequality in education has gradually been eliminated. These

For more than two decades, positive changes have taken place in the condition of Mexican children. For example, child mortality rates have fallen and there is greater coverage of schooling and health care services.

figures put Mexico on its way to fulfilling the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) before 2015.[3]

Despite this positive advance, children and adolescents still represent a broad population group excluded from development opportunities. According to Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) figures, for example, in Latin America and the Caribbean, little girls and boys, plus women, were the hardest hit by the 2009 economic crisis.[4] In Mexico, this situation is indicative of the extreme vulnerability of children and teens. In 2010, of all children under 18, 53.8 percent were registered as living in poverty, compared to 42 percent of the adult population. This is sharpened even more when looking at indigenous children: about three-quarters of the indigenous under 18 live in condition of food poverty.[5]

In the area of education, while the trend toward its being universally accessible as a right has been maintained, deficits in indigenous communities continue, as does the need to make pre-school available for children 3 to 5 years of age, and high school education available for the population of 16 to 18. In 2010, these grades registered 79.1 percent and 64.4 percent coverage, respectively.[6] Together with this, it will also be necessary to erradicate child labor, which makes it difficult for almost three million children and adolescents to attend school; to cut drop-out rates;[7] and to ensure students stay in school and graduate, to prevent the "*ninis*" ("neither-nor") phenomenon, which is what Mexicans call teens and young people who neither attend school nor have any other occupation, something that affects women disproportionately.[8] Given this situation, the challenge remains of offering not only a quality education, but also the conditions needed for boys, girls and adolescents to have the tools for effective learning and to develop the skills set and social abilities that will allow them to improve their opportunities for development, overcome poverty, participate in society more, and achieve personal autonomy.

GRAPH 1
NATIONAL COVERAGE OF PRIMARY EDUCATION BY SEX 1995-2010 (SELECTED YEARS)



Source: SEP, "Sistema educativo de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Principales cifras. Ciclo escolar 2009-2010," http://www.sep.gob.mx/work/models/sep1/Resource/1899/1/images/principales_cifras_2009_2010.pdf, p. 26.

CHALLENGES FOR THE NEW HUMAN RIGHTS REGIMEN

As I pointed out in the introduction, Mexico is still moving toward a legal-institutional regime that includes compliance with human rights based on respect for them and their promotion and protection. This transition must be understood in the context of the democratization the country has experienced in recent decades, in which opportunities for people have increased and new institutional and programmatic frameworks to achieve that have been formulated. This is also happening because of Mexico's interaction with the exterior and its acquisition of human rights commitments upon signing international treaties. The June 2011 constitutional reform is the result of this process and is a step that gives significant impetus to this universalist vision. But challenges still remain.

According to the new wording of Article 1 of the Constitution, all persons will enjoy the human rights recognized in that document and the international treaties that the Mexican state is party to, giving priority in every instance to the broadest protection. Also, authorities, whether federal or state, have the obligation to promote, respect, protect, and guarantee human rights according to the principles of universality, interdependence, indivisibility, and progressiveness. This wording implicitly recognizes the human-rights-based-approach (HRBA) promoted by the United Nations System whereby international human rights law guides development policies. Thus, it introduces into the community of nations' development debate the obligation on the part of the state (the duty-bearer) *vis-à-vis* the rights of persons (the right-holders), at the same time that it implies the need to ensure that the latter are empowered and/or appropriate their rights.[9]

Children and adolescents are still a broad population group excluded from development opportunities; for example, in Latin America and the Caribbean, little girls and boys, plus women, were the hardest hit by the 2009 economic crisis.

In this context, the existing national normative framework for the promotion and respect for children's rights must be strengthened with the change in the Constitution. It will give greater weight to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, consolidating the binding nature of this international legal instrument ratified by Mexico in 1990, which recognizes the rights of survival, full development, protection, and participation for little girls and boys and adolescents.

Since the year 2000, Article 4 of the Constitution has recognized the state's responsibility for fully guaranteeing the rights of children using the principle of the child's best interest. With that, little boys and girls must be considered under the law as having rights. The challenge is in changing institutional and social patterns so that children and adolescents are actually placed in that category, particularly given the persistence of adult-centric models that undervalue both children's needs and their rights.

While it is true that since the 1990s, important efforts have been made in the country to integrate approaches that favor equality, such as mainstreaming gender equality, for example, a great deal of work is left to be done to ensure that these kinds of methodologies permeate public policies and take

GRAPH 2
NATIONAL COVERAGE, SECONDARY SCHOOL, BY SEX 1995-2010 (SELECTED YEARS)



Source: SEP, "Sistema educativo de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos. Principales cifras. Ciclo escolar 2009-2010," http://www.sep.gob.mx/work/models/sep1/Resource/1899/1/images/principales_cifras_2009_2010.pdf, p. 26.

hold in the mind of decision-makers. Strengthening the capabilities of government authorities and creating awareness in society are two tasks that remain on the agenda to favor children and adolescents. The work the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) has done is outstanding; it has lobbied with the main governmental and political actors to include new public policy perspectives oriented to strengthening institutional capabilities for favoring children.

The assignation of public monies is still a pending task on the pro-children agenda, particularly regarding the evaluation of its impact. A recent study points out that Mexico makes an appropriate sized investment for protecting children's rights, specifically regarding food, health, and education. Between 2007 and 2010, 6.24 percent of the national GDP was earmarked for children, around Mex$697 billion. However, little is invested in programs aimed at rights related to promoting children and adolescents' participation or protection against violence, abuse, or exploitation, issues that are not yet firmly included on the agenda and in public policies.[10] As Susana Sottoli, UNICEF's representative in Mexico, points out, it will be necessary to ensure the efficiency, impact, but above all the equity in these budgetary efforts in order to insure real equality of opportunities for all little boys and girls and adolescents, particularly those living in marginal or vulnerable situations.[11]

Thus, including the rights-based approach or a gender perspective in public policies, and assigning and evaluating the budget oriented toward human development will still continue to be pending tasks on the public agenda regarding children and adolescents. VM

NOTES

[1] For a detailed analysis of the June 2011 constitutional reform, see the articles in the book compiled by Miguel Carbonell and Pedro Salazar, *La reforma constitucional de derechos humanos: un nuevo paradigma* (Mexico City: IIJ-UNAM, 2011).

[2] Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, http://mision.sre.gob.mx/oi/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=516&Itemid=145&lang=es (Mexico City: SRE, 2011), p. 359.

[3] "Informe de Avances 2010 de los ODM en México," http://www.objetivosdedesarrollodelmilenio.org.mx/ODM/doctos/Inf2010.pdf.

[4] "Panorama social de América Latina 2009," http://www.eclac.org/cgi-bin/getProd.asp?xml=/prensa/noticias/comunicados/5/37835/P37835.xml&xsl=/prensa/tpl/p6f.xsl&base=/tpl/top-bottom.xsl.

[5] Coneval, "Pobreza 2010. Porcentaje de la población en pobreza según entidad federativa, 2010 Estados Unidos Mexicanos" (anexo estadístico), http://www.coneval.gob.mx/cmsconeval/rw/pagesmedicion/Pobreza_2010/Anexo_estadistico.es.do.

[6] SEP, "Sistema educativo de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, principales cifras. Ciclo escolar 2009-2010," http://www.sep.gob.mx/work/models/sep1/Resource/1899/1/images/principales_cifras_2009_2010.pdf, p. 26.

[7] For a detailed review of the situation of children and adolescents in Mexico, see UNICEF, *Los derechos de la infancia y la adolescencia en México. Una agenda para el presente*, 2010; and the UNICEF information system, infoniñez.mx, http://www.infoninez.mx/.

[8] See the Ministry of Public Education survey, "Los jóvenes y la educación. Encuesta nacional de la juventud 2010" (Young People and Education. Nacional Survey of Young People 2010), http://www.sep.gob.mx/work/models/sep1/Resource/2249/1/images/vf -jovenes-educacion-ninis.pdf.

[9] For a greater understanding of the human-rights-based approach, see véase http://hrbaportal.org/the-human-rights-based-approach-to-development-cooperation-towards-a-common-understanding -among-un-agencies.

[10] UNICEF, "Inversión pública en la infancia y la adolescencia en México, 2007-2010," http://www.unicef.org/mexico/spanish/InversionBAJAfinal.pdf.

[11] Susana Sottoli, "Reto 2012: invertir en infancia," *Reforma* (Mexico City), January 4, 2012.

Public Opinion, Organized Crime, and National Security In Mexico

Armando Rodríguez Luna*

Rashide Frías/Cuartoscuro

Mexico will be holding federal elections July 1, 2012, including the balloting for the presidency. So, public opinion polls as a means to ascertain what political issues interest the population will become more important in the coming months. Also, debates about matters important in national life are beginning to develop, and one is the discussion on security. There is no doubt that the fight against organized crime has been the distinguishing issue of President Felipe Calderón's administration. Also, both in Mexico and the United States there are those who affirm that the fight against the drug cartels will continue to steer cooperation between the two countries no matter who the next president of Mexico is.

The aim of this article is to review Mexican society's perceptions about federal actions against crime and their effects on democracy and the rule of law. To do that, I will use the results from the "Survey on Citizenship, Democracy, and Drug-Trafficking-Related Violence" (Cidena, 2011), carried out by the Collective for the Analysis of Security with Democracy (Casede), Intelligence Systems in Markets and Opinion (SIMO), and the Panamerican Institute of High Entrepreneurial Leadership (IPADE) Study Center for Institutional Governance (CEGI). In that exercise, 7 416 people were surveyed, both nationally and specifically in the states of Chihuahua, Mexico, Guerrero, Jalisco, Michoacán, and Nuevo León, and in Mexico City's Federal District.[1]

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Graph 1
How much do you approve or disapprove of the government's actions to fight drug trafficking?



Source: Cidena, "Encuesta de ciudadanía, democracia y narcoviolencia" (Mexico City: CEGI/ Casede,/SIMO, September 2011), p. 85.

Graph 2
How safe or unsafe do you feel in the presence of the army (not at all safe, not very safe, somewhat, or very safe)?



Source: Cidena "Encuesta de ciudadanía, democracia y narcoviolencia" (Mexico City: CEGI/ Casede,/SIMO, September 2011), p. 80.

The Fight against Organized Crime

In the five years the strategy against organized crime has been in place in Mexico, people in different intellectual circles have questioned its efficacy and even its very nature.[2] For some, the strategy has failed because it is based on the intensive use of the armed forces, and, year after year, this has caused an increase in violence expressed in the number of homicides linked to organized crime, which totaled about 50 000 in December 2011. For others, the strategy is oriented to attacking the structural causes that generate that violence, that is, the dispute over territorial control among drug cartels, and in this area, the government has gotten important results, if we take into account the number of capos captured.

Broadly speaking, the strategy has been based on deploying the armed forces in states like Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Baja California, Nuevo León, Michoacán, and Veracruz. The army has mainly carried out public security tasks and, in some cas-

Broadly speaking, the president's strategy has been based on deploying the armed forces in states like Chihuahua, Sinaloa, Baja California, Nuevo León, Michoacán, and Veracruz.

es, like Tijuana and the rest of Baja California, investigative activities. Despite the arguments that government actions have sparked an explosion of violence, Graph 1 shows that public opinion tends to approve them for the fight against drug trafficking. At a national level, 54 percent of the population approves these actions a great deal or somewhat, while 25 percent disapproves strongly or somewhat.

GRAPH 3
WHICH OF THE FOLLOWING OPTIONS DO YOU AGREE WITH MOST?



Source: Cidena, "Encuesta de ciudadanía, democracia y narcoviolencia" (Mexico City: CEGI/ Casede,/SIMO, September 2011), p. 71.

GRAPH 4
DO YOU THINK THE FIGHT AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING SHOULD IMPEDE THE CONSOLIDATION OF DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO?



Source: Cidena, "Encuesta de ciudadanía, democracia y narcoviolencia" (Mexico City: CEGI/ Casede,/SIMO, September 2011), p. 89.

Graph 5

Some people say it will be necessary to lose some freedoms and rights in order to eliminate drug trafficking. Please tell me which of the following options you agree with most



Source: Cidena, "Encuesta de ciudadanía, democracia y narcoviolencia" (Mexico City: CEGI/ Casede,/SIMO, September 2011),

When asked whether the presence of the army increased a feeling of safety, 55 percent of those polled answered that they felt somewhat or very safe, while 30 percent said they felt not at all or not very safe.

When asked whether the presence of the army increased a feeling of safety, 55 percent of those polled answered that they felt somewhat or very safe, while 30 percent said they felt not at all or not very safe (see Graph 2). It should be added that in Nuevo León, 80 percent of those polled said they felt somewhat or very safe, the highest levels of this response. In the state of Guerrero, by contrast, 44 percent of the population said they felt not at all or not very safe.

The fact that this percentage is registered in Guerrero can be explained by historical factors that have very little to do with the federal strategy against organized crime. Since the 1960s, military personal deployed in that state, mainly in the mountains, have perpetrated abuses of power and violated human rights.

In other words, more than 50 percent of the population surveyed not only approved the actions of the federal government to combat drug trafficking, but they also felt safer because of these actions in the places where the deployment of the armed forces is key. In that context, 67 percent nationwide thinks the next president of Mexico should continue with the war against drug trafficking. It is worth mentioning that Michoacán has the highest and the lowest percentages in the responses to this question (see Graph 3).

Based on these figures, we can observe that in the realm of public opinion, the federal government's actions to fight organized crime and guarantee the population's security have more than acceptable approval levels. This is clearer in the states most affected by violence, like Chihuahua or Nuevo León, than in Mexico City's Federal District.

Democracy and the Rule of Law

Violence and the perception of insecurity often have negative effects in the population's political behavior. One of these is when they make their political decisions as a function of the primordial need to restore the levels of security needed to carry on daily life. Another is the isolation of the political community, out of fear or mistrust of it. In this kind of scenario, liberties and rights are structural victims because they have an impact on the individual and on society. In a country like

Mexico, where mainly institutional and legal deficiencies have made it impossible to consolidate democracy, the scenario of violence described above is a powerful factor for further impeding that consolidation.

Civil society and public opinion (as a manifestation of the former) should be aware of the effect this factor has for countering the violence through political practices. However, according to the results presented in Graph 4, perceptions are divided around whether drug trafficking can hinder the consolidation of democracy in the country. One outstanding point is that in Guerrero, 55 percent of those polled thought that it could, while in Chihuahua, 58 percent thought it could not. At a national level, the percentages are as follows: 46 percent think that drug trafficking does affect democracy, while 44 percent think it does not. However, it is clear that for the majority of the population in Mexico, the fight against organized crime and guaranteeing national security do not imply a sacrifice of liberties and rights (see Graph 5). It would seem that we are in the presence of a society that, while it does appreciate the freedoms and rights democracy offers, it is not aware of the way in which insecurity and violence affect it.

Perceptions are divided around whether drug trafficking can hinder the consolidation of democracy in the country. At a national level, 46 percent think that drug trafficking does affect democracy, while 44 percent think it does not.

CONCLUSIONS

The Cidena 2011 results presented here are only a portion of the 80 questions included in the survey. However, the graphs selected give us certain elements that could be interesting for understanding the context in which the electoral process is developing in Mexico, particularly with an eye to the presidential race.

In the first place, public opinion puts a positive value on the federal government's actions, but clear differences exist between states experiencing the violence and those that are not, which is reflected in the percentages from Chihuahua and Nuevo León, compared to Mexico City. This implies that the violence and the perception of insecurity are decisive factors in the population's political practices in at least two senses, based on what has been presented here.

On the one hand, the demand for security is also conditioned by immediate results. However, even if there is no drop in the perception of insecurity or violence, the demand for greater security ends up backing actions involving the use of force. On the other hand, this does not imply that any less importance is placed on liberties and rights sanctioned by the national legal system. In other words, support for government actions has the clear limitation of the need to respect individual guarantees and human rights.

Without any doubt, this difference is something that presidential hopefuls must have very clear for the July 2012 elections. It is not enough to include this in their political discourses; it is even more important that they include it in the formulation of concrete security policies that aim to strengthen democracy and not endanger its foundations, even despite public opinion. VM

NOTES

[1] This research was made possible thanks to support from the people of the United States through the Agency for International Development (USAID); its content is the responsibility of the institutions and academics in charge of it and does not necessarily reflect the point of view of USAID or the U.S. government, http://www.seguridadcondemocracia.org/encuestas/encuestas/encuesta-de-ciudadania-democracia-y-narcoviolencia-cidena-2011.html.

[2] About this, I recommend Fernando Escalante Gonzalbo, Eduardo Guerrero Gutiérrez, Alejandro Hope, Denise Maerker, Ana Laura Magaloni, Héctor de Mauleón, Natalia Mendoza Rockwell, Guillermo Valdés, Joaquín Villalobos, "Nuestra guerra: una conversación," *Nexos en línea*, http://www.nexos.com.mx/?P=leerarticulo&Article=2102417, as well as the articles by Joaquín Villalobos and Eduardo Guerrero published in the same journal from 2010 to 2012.

The Effects of Large-Scale Emigration on Mexico

Elaine Levine*

Laura Cano

For everyone alive in Mexico today there has always been a "North of the Border." Migration between Mexico and the U.S. began over 160 years ago when Mexico lost approximately half of its territory to its northern neighbor. However, the flow of migrants has increased significantly over the past three decades. Mexico is a country where a huge metropolis, Mexico City, and the colonial splendor of several cities coexist with widespread rural misery and urban squalor. Fifteen percent of the population lives in small rural communities of less than 1 000 persons. Thirty-seven percent of the population lives in localities of fewer than 15 000 inhabitants while approximately 20 million inhabitants, 18 percent of the entire population of 112 million, are concentrated in and around Mexico City.

According to the World Bank, the flow of migrants from Mexico to the United States constitutes the world's top migration corridor. Mexico has the largest number of out-migrants in the world today, and over 95 percent of Mexico's emigrants go to the U.S. Mexico is the world's third remittance-receiving country. However, in contrast to India, China, and the Philippines, other countries high on the list of remittance receivers, the vast majority of Mexico's emigrants are low-skilled workers with limited earning capacity. Surprisingly, though, in absolute terms, Mexico is an important provider of skilled labor to the U.S. In 2006, Mexico ranked second in the number of skilled immigrants working in the U.S. (462 000). Nevertheless that figure constitutes less than 5 percent of the total number of Mexicans in that country. Furthermore, it is not easy to determine the exact number of Mexicans currently living in the U.S. Undercounting may be considerable, and there is still a significant amount of circular migration despite stricter

* Researcher at CISAN.

Male absence is not necessarily empowering and liberating for the women left behind; most are dominated by traditional social structures and surveillance by in-laws.

border controls since 9/11/2001, which have led many migrants to remain in the U.S. for longer periods of time or even indefinitely. Pew Hispanic Center calculations based on U.S. Census Bureau data placed the number at about 12.4 million in 2010.

Approximately 11 percent of Mexico's population now resides in the U.S., and if we were to count all of the almost 32 (31.8) million persons of Mexican ancestry living in the U.S., that figure is equivalent to 28.3 percent of Mexico's current population. All states and almost all of the municipalities in each state have at least some emigration. Over 70 percent of those leaving Mexico in any given year are between 15 and 39 years old. Approximately 9 percent of the physicians trained in Mexico have emigrated, which is also the case for over 15 percent of the college educated population.[1] Recently many entrepreneurs and local politicians in the northern states have moved their families to the U.S. to escape from the increasing violence related to drug trafficking and organized crime in Mexico.

Nevertheless the overwhelming majority of Mexico's emigrants are poor and poorly educated, having completed at most nine years of schooling. All they need to get to the U.S. is enough physical stamina to make the trip. For most, the reasons for migrating vary from earning money to buy a stove or washing machine for a wife or mother, to having some money set aside in order to get married or saving enough to build a house or establish a small business in their hometown. Other motivations may be to pay off debts, unexpected family emergencies like illnesses, or special occasions and celebrations. For some young men the immediate goal may be simply to buy an expensive truck or a van as a symbol of status and success.

According to the National Population Council (Conapo) five of Mexico's 32 states showed very high international migration in 2000: Zacatecas, Michoacán, Guanajuato, Durango, and Nayarit. Seven more (Jalisco, Colima, Morelos, Guerrero, Aguascalientes, San Luis Potosí, and Hidalgo) showed high migration intensity. Even in the southeastern-most states of Tabasco, Chiapas, Yucatán, Quintana Roo, and Campeche, which have very low international migration intensity, there were few *municipios* with no migration at all.

Remittances from migrants, which reached a peak of US$26 billion in 2007, fluctuate between 2 and 3 percent of Mexico's gross domestic product (GDP) and represent the country's second source of foreign exchange after oil exports. The percent of households receiving these monies may be as high as 10 percent in some states and as low as 2 percent in others. Furthermore, the amount of remittances received does not necessarily coincide with a state's migration intensity. Almost 28 percent of all remittances registered in 2010 went to just three states (Michoacán, 10.1 percent; Guanajuato, 9.3 percent; and Jalisco, 8.3 percent). Altogether, 12 states received 73 percent of the monies sent and the remaining 20 states only 27 percent. It should also be mentioned that there are some important discrepancies between the Bank of Mexico's reports of remittances entering the country and the amounts reported by families in the National Survey of Household Income and Expenditures (ENIGH), which indicates either over-reporting by the Bank of Mexico or under-reporting by households, or some of both.

In addition to the fact that remittances declined significantly in 2008, some families in the poorest states like Oaxaca and Chiapas, who had bit of money saved up from previously received funds, actually sent money back to their relatives in the U.S., who had lost their jobs because of the economic crisis, so that they could remain there for a while longer to look for other employment. In many cases, remittances may constitute an important component of family or household income, as much as 30, 40, or even 50 percent or more. For some households the money sent home by an absent son or husband may be all the monetary income they have. Approximately 80 percent of the remittances received are spent on food and housing. This money may make the difference between going to bed hungry or not, having a cement floor instead of a dirt floor, and sleeping on a cot instead of on the floor. Sometimes remittances are spent on religious festivals or for a daughter's fifteenth birthday celebration. Money sent home may mean children will have video games to play with, but will not see their father for months at a time or even years in some cases.

Children left behind tend to experience sensations of abandonment and may become estranged from absent parents. When a parent or parents are absent for considerable periods of time their paternal authority tends to erode despite the fact that they may regularly send money for their children's upkeep. Female migration has increased significantly over the

past decade or so. Many women go to join their husbands in the U.S. However, more and more single women and single mothers are going to the U.S. on their own to find a means of supporting themselves and their children and often to escape from abusive family situations in Mexico.

Many migrants who have been away longer and have relocated their families to the U.S. will often build houses in their hometowns with the expectation of retiring there one day or for when the family might come to Mexico for vacations. These houses usually stand out from the rest of the dwellings in the area and also are generally unoccupied for long periods of time. Such houses are often referred to in the villages as "*casas solas*" or solitary houses. For those who are permanent residents of the U.S., and can therefore travel back and forth freely, the patron saint's day in their hometown is a time when many make return visits and occupy their houses for a few weeks each year. Often, work building, expanding, or repairing migrants' houses provides jobs for men who have not migrated or are between trips.

Male absence is not necessarily empowering and liberating for the women left behind. Some women do gain autonomy and are empowered by managing household affairs on their own, but most are dominated by traditional social structures and surveillance by in-laws. Younger women in particular often reside with their husband's parents in his absence, and remittances are often sent to the migrant's mother rather than his wife. When both spouses migrate, men are usually more willing to help out with certain household and child care responsibilities in the U.S. but usually revert to typically *macho* behavior and dominance upon returning to Mexico.

Women and children often assume the agricultural labors previously performed by absent men. Sometimes, if no one is able to work the land, agricultural plots are either sold or abandoned. Small-scale agriculture is no longer viable for most and educational and employment opportunities are scarce throughout most of Mexico's small villages and towns. In many places, there are no schools beyond sixth grade. Gangs and criminal activity are becoming more widespread for lack of other alternatives. Adolescents whose parents have sent them back to Mexico to keep them away from the influence of Latino gangs in the U.S. often establish or connect with already existing gangs in their home communities.

In some remote areas, people may be quickly incorporated into the digital age as a means of communicating with loved ones far away. Internet services have rapidly sprung up in many small villages. The way younger people dress may change. Means

Adolescents whose parents have sent them back to Mexico to keep them away from the influence of Latino gangs in the U.S. often establish or connect with already existing gangs in their home communities.

of transportation may vary for some. Eating habits have also morphed significantly in some places: tastes acquired in the U.S. for more processed foods and especially junk foods often have a negative impact on health. In general, women and children's psychological and emotional health has been greatly affected by family members' migration. One issue that has been widely commented on is the propagation of HIV-AIDS among women in rural areas. Another issue not so widely discussed is the fact that many women suffer from ailments commonly related to stress and anxiety because of the constant worries related to having their husbands far away, wondering if they will reach their destination safely, if they will find work, if and when they will send money home, whether or not they might establish a permanent relationship with someone in the U.S., and if and when they will have earned enough money to return to Mexico, which usually ends up taking longer than originally expected.

Some men eventually send for their wives and children to join them in the U.S. while others may form new relationships and new families north of the border. Circular migration, formerly quite common, has declined considerably because of stricter border enforcement conditions in the U.S. since September 11, 2001. Once the immediate problems of finding housing and employment have been resolved, migrants begin to socialize with others in similar situations. Soccer teams provide one of the most common forms of recreation and socialization. Some places boast female teams as well. Practically everywhere women organize the sale of food and beverages to those who come to watch the games.

As more migrants from the same sending community begin to settle in a particular place in the U.S., they often form hometown associations. These associations, in addition to sponsoring social and community activities in the U.S., sometimes provide collective remittances and finance projects in the sending communities. They may contribute funds for building soccer or bull fighting arenas, basketball courts, or other multipurpose recreational facilities. They often provide funds for paving streets, road construction, water works, or similar pub-

Women and children's psychological and emotional health has been greatly affected by family members' migration. One issue is the propagation of HIV-AIDS among women in rural areas.

lic works projects. Restoration of local churches is another type of project frequently taken on by hometown associations. They often contribute generously to patron saint's day celebrations or other religious festivities in Mexico, as well as to similar celebrations in the U.S. They may donate ambulances or school buses to their hometowns; sometimes they build community libraries that can end up poorly staffed and terribly under-utilized. In some cases, there are differences of opinion and conflicts between local residents in Mexico and those belonging to the associations formed in the U.S. about what collective remittances should be used for. In general, while these projects and donations may improve daily life for some in the sending communities they do not radically change the underlying circumstances that force people to leave in the first place.

The overall impact that such large-scale out migration has on Mexico and the Mexican people is a complicated and contradictory issue. Many aspects and facets of varying degree and intensity must be taken into account, along with both individual characteristics of migrants and their families and other more general socioeconomic factors. It seems clear however, that in spite of all the dangers involved in crossing the U.S.-Mexico border without proper documents, people are still willing to risk their lives for the mirage of the American Dream. In many villages and towns, from very early on, children do not daydream about doing, being, or becoming something in Mexico. They imagine themselves going to *el Norte* to make their dreams come true. When a father or mother migrates, it does not mean their children will not have to do the same when they grow up. In all likelihood, they will go, too; it just makes it a little easier for them to do so. When older brothers go, younger ones usually follow. For Mexico, emigration is not a planned and articulated development strategy; it is simply a self-perpetuating individual and family survival strategy. VM

NOTES

[1] Dilip Ratha, Sanket Mohapatra, and Ani Silwal, *World Bank Migration and Remittances Fact Book 2011* (n. p.: World Bank, 2010).

Mexican Brain Drain To the U.S. and Canada[1]

Camelia Tigau*

Francisco Guasco/Cuartoscuro

The Problem

Mexico's brain drain is caused not only by its economic conditions and insecurity, but also by its NAFTA partners' attraction policies. Most Mexican professionals who live abroad choose the U.S. and Canada as their countries of adoption due to better opportunities for professional development, more favorable life-style conditions in North American cosmopolitan metropolises, or personal circumstances. These are but a few of a wide range of reasons why a Mexican may prefer to live up north, even when the same individual could get a job in his native country.

Accurate statistics on Mexican brain drain are not available, among other reasons, due to the variety of motives for migration, as well as to the existence of undocumented professionals in the U.S. and of fake refugees in Canada. We know that the U.S. is the country of adoption for 90 percent of Mexican migrants. Estimates put the number of Mexican professionals in the U.S. at about 830 000.[2] We know that 1 056 Mexican professionals entered Canada in 2009, compared to 16 710 low-skilled Mexicans the same year. In addition, 2 755 Mexican students reside in Canada, all of them potential candidates for staying abroad.[3] In 2010, there were 3 866 permanent Mexican residents in Canada.[4]

Doubts about the Mexican Diaspora

Some journalists and scholars thought that the 2008 economic crisis would solve brain drain problems in emerging economies, including Mexico, due to economic problems in destination countries. However this prediction has not proved true. Skilled migrants were indeed affected by the economic recession, but the flows to the U.S. and Canada are still im-

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Given that massive returns are not possible, the Mexican government has launched several networking programs to use its Diaspora for development purposes.

portant, proving that professionals are an elite group that benefits from certain autonomy from economic instability.

Given that massive returns are not possible, the Mexican government has launched several networking programs to use its Diaspora for development purposes, similar to what China and India are doing. But do Mexican professionals in North America have enough organization capabilities? Are they professionally well-enough settled to be able contribute to their country's economic development? Is it valid to aspire to a country's economic, scientific, and technological development depending on its Diaspora, rather than on its domestic development? Is it not the same as aspiring for a country's economy to depend on foreign aid? Can the Mexican government compete with the U.S., Canada, and transnational companies on the international human capital market?

To answer these questions, I shall start by looking at the policies to attract talent in the U.S. and Canada; secondly, I will review Mexican government measures; thirdly, I will look at some opinions of Mexican professionals in the U.S. and Canada. Finally I discuss differences between the idea and the reality of a Mexican Diaspora.

NAFTA Labor Agreements

NAFTA, which came into effect in 1994, stipulates special visas for businessmen, investors, professionals, and experts in information technology and communication. While the U.S. has designed the TN visa to facilitate entry for Mexican and Canadian professionals, Canada has continued the same points system as before NAFTA. Mexico simply took advantage of the new conditions of emigration. The Mexican president at that time, Carlos Salinas, declared that the agreement would allow the country to export goods, not people. Nevertheless, the evolution of migration since then shows a significant increase in the migration of Mexican professionals to the U.S. and Canada.[5]

U.S. and Brain Attraction

The U.S. has an ¨alphabet soup of visas,"[6] a system criticized by the skeptics who say that U.S. employers make up the scarcity of national skilled workers to justify importing cheaper, younger migrants. The majority of skilled workers get into the country with the H1B visas. In the 1990s, about 65 000 workers entered each year with this visa.[7] In 2004, the number of H1B visas increased by 20 000 to include doctoral candidates.

With the crisis, applications for H1B visas decreased from 65 000 in 2008 to 45 000 in 2009. While the demand for U.S.-based skilled workers was stable, the demand for foreign skilled workers decreased. Nevertheless, returns where not massive. Some professionals such as those in engineering and health are still needed.

Compared to H1 visas, TN visas are attractive for employers as they are easier to get: they require less documentation and are cheaper than the former. Annual admission quotas are also bigger than for the H1. In 2005, 50 000 Canadians could be admitted on TN visas, compared to only 2 500 Mexicans. This difference is quite surprising, taking into account that the same year, Mexico had a workforce of 43.4 million, compared to only 16.3 million in Canada.[8]

Even during the 2008 world economic recession, TN visas for Mexicans showed a slow increase of 7.1 percent.[9] By contrast, the admission of Canadian professionals slowed down after 2007, due to the competition between the TN and the other visas.

Canada: The Points System

Canada accepts Mexicans on a point system introduced in 1993 and reformed in 2002. Points are calculated according to educational level, language skills, work experience, age, a job offer in Canada, and adaptability. Individuals who get more than 67 points on a scale of 100 are eligible for permanent residency. Despite the fact that the Canadian system responds to market needs, it attracts fewer skilled workers than the U.S.[10]

The Canadian economy was less affected by the crisis than the U.S. one. Canada is one of the few countries where no restriction was put on migration after the 2008 crisis. Jason Kenney, Canada's immigration minister at the time, declared that his country would continue its migration pol-

icy for economic areas that needed it, despite the crisis. He also said that migrants with extraordinary abilities would help Canada get out of the crisis. Therefore, the flows of skilled workers, including Mexicans, did not decrease.

In most cases, the crisis did not affect Mexican migrants in Canada. Canadian companies had signed long-term contracts that allowed them to weather the crisis, and the government helped with risk capital. One man even noticed that "there was a lot of capital investment in Canada and low taxes allowed many people to buy their own house."[11] Many Mexican families migrated to Canada, mainly Quebec, in 2008-2009 due to the insecurity Mexico is experiencing at present.

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Mexican Defensive Plans

Since 1991, the National Council for Science and Technology (Conacyt) has been in charge of the Program to Retain and Repatriate Mexican Researchers, with limited results due to the scarcity of academic positions. Most of the repatriated come from the U.S., France, the UK, Spain, Canada, and Germany. A new Program for Student Mobility in North America (Promesan) was launched in 1995, involving 348 academic institutions. This initiative was financed by the Ministry of Education in Mexico, the Fund for the Improvement of Postsecondary Education (FIPSE) in the U.S., and Human Resources and Skills Development Canada. Promesan was meant to validate studies and set up tri-national work teams.

In 2002, Mexico initiated its first plan of networking with the Diaspora. The Special Program for Science and Technology (PECYT) created that year stipulates the necessity of networking with Mexicans abroad.

In 2005, the Network of Mexican Talents Abroad (RTM) was created, with the aim of organizing the Diasporas and inducing them to cooperate with their home country. The project also benefited from cooperation with the Mexico-U.S. Foundation (FUMEC). During its six years of existence, the Network of Mexican Talents Abroad has been the Mexican government's main effort to organize its Diaspora. RTM now functions based on local associations called "chapters," distributed as follows: eight in the U.S.; three in Canada; and four in Europe. The link with Mexico is established through national institutions or "contact points" financed by bilateral projects. Even though the Network of Mexican Talents Abroad is an official initiative, its functioning depends on the civic organization of Mexicans abroad, who must show genuine interest in cooperating for the development of Mexico. This mixture of governmental and civic diplomacy is complemented by economic and educational institutions in the aforementioned national contact points. RTM is therefore a complicated plan with no serious competition from other associations of Mexicans abroad. Its most important results have been charity projects of the Houston chapter and business cooperation projects at Technology Business Accelerators in Michigan and Silicon Valley.

Mexican Diaspora in the U.S. and Canada

In-depth interviews with 50 Mexican professionals based in the U.S. and Canada, aged between 29 and 47, revealed characteristics of their situation in the countries of adoption. Almost all of those interviewed are part of some association. Most belong to the Network of Mexican Talents abroad or to the Ex-A-Tec Association (former students of the Monterrey Institute of Technological Studies). The problem is that most of the members of one association do not cooperate with the other. Project development is slow; as one migrant put it, "Since people at the RTM are too talented, they act too cautiously, with too much precaution, and they need too much time to start projects."[12] Even though this statement is a bit strong, it is true that the network has launched few bilateral projects. The most successful ones come from the U.S. and they explore business initiatives. This shows that Diaspora organization is a long-term process that needs funding and patience to bear fruit.

Love and Hate

The sampled group shows two opposing tendencies: 1) demystifying their circumstances, complaining about difficult living conditions and discrimination, or 2) praising excellent liv-

ing conditions and emphasizing the bad image of Mexicans in the U.S. and Canada. The bad image seems to damage the possibilities for development of all Mexicans, included highly skilled ones.

The ones who criticize the situation of Mexicans in the destination country mention labor discrimination and poor access to education. These are frequent problems for migrants with little time abroad and with a more precarious situation in the destination country. In contrast, the ones with a better work and economic position think that discrimination is relative. "Discrimination influences you, if you let yourself be discriminated against," says one migrant.[13] Some believe that discrimination is even stronger in Mexico, where racial prejudices are quite common.[14]

Another frequent topic is the comparison between the U.S. and Canada, above all for Mexican residents in Canada. Some appear to have chosen Canada because it is a society more open to migrants than the U.S. In Canada, they say, it is less probable that they will be discriminated against for being foreigners. This turns out to be a prejudice at times, when some of the individuals have never been to the U.S. but they still complain about it being racist.

As a matter of fact, the profile of migrants to the U.S. and Canada is different. There are almost no undocumented people in Canada, besides fake refugees. Most of the interviewees are proud to mention that Canada needs migrants and that therefore their social and moral status is higher than that of those in the U.S. On the contrary, some professionals in the U.S., above all the ones in New York, would sacrifice anything to live in this cosmopolitan city. It is they who need the city, not the city that needs them.

THE CRISIS

When asked about the effects of the 2008 crisis on their professional life, migrants in the U.S. and Canada mention budget cuts; higher costs of services due to the relation with the U.S. dollar; increasing competition with countries like France and Japan; rising working hours to boost productivity; the vulnerability of payment and of contracts for independent consultants; and staff reduction.

Only the ones in Canada mentioned governmental aid with risk capital to diminish the impact of the crisis; late impact of the crisis (in 2009); that the crisis was exaggerated by the media, sparking fear, but the results were not that serious.

New destinations in the U.S. and Canada help Mexican migrants fulfill their professional and private dreams. Incentives for return are not enough in the current context of insecurity and insufficient professional opportunities.

Migrants in the U.S. but not in Canada complained about the return of skilled workers to Mexico due to lack of jobs; their preference for more stable jobs as opposed to better paid jobs; companies going bankrupt; and higher living expenses.

THEY HAD A DREAM

New destinations in the U.S. and Canada help Mexican migrants fulfill their professional and private dreams. As one migrant put it, "We have dreams and this country helps us make them come true." At the same time, incentives for return are not enough in the current context of insecurity and insufficient professional opportunities in Mexico. This causes resentment and makes it difficult for migrants to cooperate with their native country.

Mexico has to compete with strong attraction factors in the U.S. and Canadian labor markets, due to their stronger economies and to NAFTA migration conditions. Taking into account previous diagnostic analyses that show that Mexico has not taken sufficiently advantage of the TN visas, the migration of professionals could even increase.

The Mexican government also uses its return initiatives to fight transnational companies that employ professionals on a global level. Mexico does not have a dynamic competition policy on the global market, such as promoting itself to attract foreigners and foreign investment; and it also expels "brains," a regular dynamic of globalization. At the same time, Mexico's scientific and economic policies are not attractive enough to seduce a significant number of foreigners to live in Mexico. The lesson from countries that are main migration destinations is that they always have an aggressive policy to attract talent, where human capital is equally or more valuable than foreign direct investment.

The government has chosen a defensive strategy of repatriation, return, and networking, but it is worth considering more active policies. For instance, Mexico has no plan for making use of the foreigners who receive graduate schol-

arships from Mexican universities or the Mexican Foreign Relations Ministry. On the contrary, migration institutions sometimes force these people to return to their own country when they get a job in Mexico.

Existing programs at economic, educational, migration, and political institutions for solving brain drain do not communicate, and therefore their efforts are minimized. The Institute for Mexicans Abroad and the National Council for Science and Technology are not the only ones that should attack the brain drain problem. There is need for an all-inclusive political effort to solve the country's problems, which will indirectly lead to better use being made of the Diaspora.

The Mexican government's efforts are limited when we think of transforming its Diaspora into economic elites. Even though it is good for the country to have economic, scientific, and technological elites that would eventually invest and cooperate with Mexico, elite formation depends on the professional and personal development of each Mexican professional and that is a problem that expatriate associations will solve only with difficulty.

A Final Thought

The recruitment of professionals has not stopped with the crisis; therefore, countries have to take into account long-term tendencies. On the one hand, factors contributing to expulsion are stronger than the those contributing to the return of Mexicans who choose to live in the U.S. and Canada. On the other hand, Mexico's Diaspora of professionals is still in the process of organization, and sometimes it does not have the economic wherewithal to contribute to the country's development. VM

Notes

[1] Excerpts from the presentation "Mexican Professionals in North America: between Social Vulnerability and Economic Independence," delivered at the Congress of the Confederation of Mexican Graduate Students and Researchers in Canada (Ceimexcan), Toronto, October 21-23, 2011.

[2] J. Díaz de León, "Migración calificada en América Latina: Desafío para las políticas públicas," lecture in representation of the Mexican Foreign Affairs Ministry, in Montevideo, Uruguay, August 19, 2011.

[3] Citizenship & Immigration Canada (2009). http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2009/index.asp, accessed March 20, 2011.

[4] Citizenship & Immigration Canada (2010). http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/resources/statistics/facts2010/index.asp, accessed March 20, 2011.

[5] "Between 1820 and 2010, over 75 million immigrants arrived in the United States. About half were from Europe, including a tenth from the leading country of immigration, Germany. However, only four percent of German immigrants arrived since 1980, compared with three-fourths of Mexican immigrants, which is why Mexico surpassed Germany as the leading country of immigration in 2007." P. Martin, "NAFTA and Mexico-US Migration: What Lessons, What Next?" vol. 11, no. 4, Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich (December 2010), p. 38.

[6] Lindsay Lowell, "Skilled Temporary Specialty Workers in the United States," vol. 7, no. 1 (1999), pp. 24-32.

[7] *Migration News*, April 2009.

[8] P. Orrenius and D. Streitfeld, "TN Visas: A Stepping Stone toward a NAFTA Labor Market" (November-December 2006), Dallas, pp. 10 -13.

[9] R. Cruz-Piñeiro and W. Ruiz-Ochoa, "Migración calificada de mexicanos a Estados Unidos mediante visado preferencial," vol. 16, no. 66 (October-December 2010), pp. 103-135.

[10] J. Doomernik, R. Koslowski, and D. Threnhardt, (Washington, D.C.: The German Marshall Fund of the United States, 2009), http://www.gmfus.org/publications/index.cfm.

[11] Engineer, 33; five years in Montreal.

[12] IT engineer, 47; nine years living in Canada.

[13] Chief of global strategy, 36; 12 years living in the U.S.

[14] Network engineer, 54; 26 years living in Canada.

Entrapment and (Im)Mobility On the U.S.-Mexico Border[1]

Guillermina Gina Núñez*
Josiah McC.Heyman**

Lucas Jackson/REUTERS

Introduction

U.S. immigration law enforcement policies are trapping increasingly large numbers of unauthorized or undocumented migrants and their families. This is especially pressing in the region near the U.S.-Mexican border, where law enforcement is concentrated, and where people are enclosed inside the country and prevented from moving around locally to access vital resources and reunite with loved ones. We conceive of this dynamic phenomenon as "processes of entrapment," in which police and other state agencies impose significant risk on the movement of undocumented people, as these individuals exercise various forms of agency by foregoing travel and covertly defying movement controls. In this perspective, people are not permanently grounded as they are partially and complexly impacted by the movement control system.

We first consider how recent U.S. immigration and border enforcement policies entrap people. We then explore how to operationalize this "macro" pattern in ethnographic research, making the conceptually and methodologically significant point that political-legal forces are only part of the many elements leading to entrapment and immobilization. Other entrapment factors include transportation constraints, poor health, lack of geographic knowledge, gendered roles and restrictions, etc. We also introduce the concept of "morality of risk" to help us understand how and why trapped people take severe risks to defy immigration policing. This article discusses the significance of entrapment for applied and ba-

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sic social science for the study of spatial mobility, enclosure, and inequalities of movement.[2]

Our main source of ethnographic material is research on the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, in particular from the lead author's research on *colonias* in New Mexico, focusing on issues of migration, farm work, and social and political processes of community formation.[3] This work is also based on ethnographic research (2006-2007) on access and barriers to health care among uninsured immigrants in urban and rural areas of El Paso County, Texas; entrapment plays a significant role in that study.[4]

Entrapment Processes: Broad Structures And Ethnographic Approaches

Advanced capitalist economies and transnational linkages drive vast flows of migration. At the same time, U.S. migration policy is divided, permitting both significant volumes of legal migration, and "illegalizing" other, equally large volumes of immigrants. The politics of migration is contradictory, resulting in the displacement of broader debates onto border enforcement "solutions." The end result is a disproportionate concentration of immigration law enforcement efforts at and near the U.S.-Mexico border. Indeed, this peaceful border has been gradually militarized. For undocumented migrants, the cost of crossing the border has risen and the risks of death and injury are higher, yet the enforcement effort has had little effect on the net migratory flow.[5] In short, we are witnessing the intersection of powerful social drivers of migratory movements with rigid and punitive policy responses, entrapping human communities in the middle.

In response, undocumented migrants from Mexico and Central America are reducing the frequency of their trips back and forth, and are remaining for longer periods inside the U.S. This national-level entrapment probably plays an important role in the growth of the U.S. undocumented population and the formation of contemporary immigrant communities and enclaves. The main impact for most populations in the interior is on relatively infrequent transnational trips, so that entrapment is not experienced on a daily basis; this pattern is changing, however, with intensified interior immigration enforcement. For communities near the U.S.-Mexico border, entrapment is an important feature of everyday life.

The specific geography of immigration and other kinds of law enforcement in the borderlands helps explain the regional intensity of entrapment processes.[6] First, federal immigration law enforcement (Border Patrol, military observation posts) are concentrated along the Mexican boundary. This makes return from Mexico costly and difficult, discouraging voluntary trips south of the border (e.g., to see sick relatives) and making return from deportation harder. Second, fixed Border Patrol checkpoints on all the main highways leading away from the border, at a distance of 25 to 100 miles into the interior, impede travel into the interior of the United States. A presumably large population (although of unknown size) is thus trapped between the boundary and the interior, in the cities and the small settlements along the borderlands.

> Increasingly large numbers of unauthorized or undocumented migrants and their families are enclosed inside the country and prevented from moving around locally to access vital resources and reunite with loved ones. We call this "entrapment."

Entrapment processes are not just a matter of people being enclosed snugly between the U.S.-Mexico border and Border Patrol checkpoints. Rather, Border Patrol, Immigrations and Customs Enforcement, and local police (who are sometimes *de facto* immigration law enforcers, as discussed below) regularly patrol the streets and roads of these trapped zones, parking at key intersections, outside houses, or alongside parks, health clinics, and other public spaces. Entrapment processes thus occur constantly in the zones we describe, although people find ways to hide and avoid this policing.

This situation has worsened in recent years, as the military (largely withdrawn from border law enforcement in 1997) returned in the form of large-scale deployments of National Guard troops. The Border Patrol continues to grow in size and technology, and 700 miles of physical and virtual border walls are in planning stages, in addition to existing walls in settled areas of California and Arizona. During 2006 and 2007, attempts at comprehensive immigration reform failed in Congress; the aftermath was even greater border immigration enforcement and renewed interior immigration policing including worksite raids. Local law enforcement agencies have entered immigration enforcement —by law, a federal matter— in some parts of the borderlands.[7] For example in Texas, the El Paso county sheriff in 2005-2006 operated roving checkpoints on roads leading out of rural communities while

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checking for license, insurance, and other automotive violations. These requests for identification from suspected undocumented immigrants led to their cornering, detaining, rounding-up, and trapping immigrants like cattle in what local residents refer to as "*redadas*," or round-ups.

In the U.S.-Mexico border region, recent migrants live in poorer neighborhoods and apartment complexes in the larger cities, and in settlements on the margins of cities and scattered in farm districts, including *colonias*. In urbanized areas, undocumented immigrants experience trapping processes, but do have the advantage of access to urban transportation, greater population densities, and the relative anonymity of the city. The smaller communities provide more seclusion, but the trapping processes are also exacerbated by limited transportation and options for commerce and services and bottlenecks in the road system that are used as traps by federal and local law enforcement.

ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK FOR ENTRAPPING PROCESSES

The aforementioned summary of entrapment processes emphasizes the impact of state activities and large-scale or structural forces more generally on mobility. However, when considering the individual's experience, and when doing research on mobility at the ethnographic level, many different impediments and barriers to movement overlap and interact. This work draws attention to the presence of multiple and simultaneous processes of entrapment, from personal-level phenomena (e.g., physical disabilities) to the regional and national-scale context (e.g., immigration and border policy) (see Figure 1). Many immigrant individuals or households experience several overlapping immobilizing factors at once (see Figure 2). Multiple processes of entrapment coexist and often interact, reinforcing each other and reducing the person's ability to escape the paralyzing web. We refer to this experience through an expressive if inelegant phrase: "multiple whammies." When multiple trapping processes become tightly interlocked, people who might solve one of them alone cannot resolve all of them at once and as a result suffer high degrees of anxiety and discouragement.

However, not all undocumented people in these zones are completely trapped without recourse. For example, people find ways to signal each other about the presence of im-

FIGURE 1: ETHNOGRAPHIC CONTINUUM:
ENTRAPMENT PROCESSES FROM MACRO TO MICRO

Macro
1) U.S. ideologies, politics, and economics
   a) Geographic patterns of immigration policing
2) Transportation barriers
   a) Isolated location
   b) Economics of transportation
   c) Personal transportation situation
3) Lack of geographical knowledge
4) Gender and other social-cultural restrictions on movement
5) Demands on time and effort in a fixed location
6) Fear and anticipation of risks
7) Physical disabilities

Micro



Figure 2: Overlapping Circles Illustrate Experience of Overlapping and Interacting Entrapment Processes



migration law enforcement and sometimes, unfortunately, hide from all types of law enforcement. They negotiate special circumstances that require taking risks crossing checkpoints and hiding and sheltering other sojourners. Trapping forces also give rise to amateur and professional human smugglers who operate throughout the United States moving people in and out of trapped communities and across interior Border Patrol checkpoints. Border-region immigrants often use humor, ingenuity, and resilience in their efforts to frustrate the authorities. The application of tactical knowledge and social organization to skirt arrest speaks both to agency and its limits in the state of permanent liminality.[8] Cellular and home phones enable people in networks to forewarn one another of the sporadic presence of Border Patrol and law enforcement agents.

Entrapment consists of a complex set of processes and social relationships in which people negotiate their presence and mobility within heavily patrolled communities. Even with the severity of multiple trapping processes, our ethnographic approach pays attention to complex outcomes and the agency of trapped people. We document and analyze exactly when and how people choose to defy law enforcement, according to a specific "morality of risk." Morality of risk refers to different social-cultural frameworks for evaluating courses of action

Sheriffs' requests for identification from suspected undocumented immigrants led to their cornering, detaining, rounding-up, and trapping immigrants like cattle in what local residents refer to as "*redadas*," or round-ups.

amid serious risks.[9] In some cases, risks are taken *vis-à-vis* entrapment processes because of strong moral demands.

The morality of risk concept is linked to the literature on immigrant networks, in particular, support networks among kin and people from the same hometown or local area. Miguel Moctezuma delineates various ways undocumented Mexican migrants cross the U.S. border, and highlights the role of networks, trust, and interpersonal obligations in obtaining effective and less chancy modes of entry (such as personally known smugglers and non-professional helpers) under current border conditions.[10] These forms of assistance are not just immediate and practical, but come to be part of a cultural framework, following Vélez-Ibáñez's understanding of how people learn, practice, and give meaning to strong interpersonal obligations required for effective networks.[11]

An Ethnographic Narrative Of Risk and Entrapment

Ida Sánchez, a single mother, felt compelled to host a family of undocumented migrants on their northward journey. Sánchez's case exemplifies what the woman refers to as "moral duties" involved in helping *paisanos* seek a better life for themselves. Sánchez is a single mother with four children, who works the night shift at a local dairy. At one point, she housed seven other people in her home who had arrived from her hometown in Durango. The migrants had looked for work locally, while saving to pay for their *coyote*'s fees. Collectively, they were engaged in the immigrant experience as border crossers, temporarily living and working in the borderlands, while raising enough money to pay for their journeys up north.

In the meantime, these migrants had to rely on the assistance of a *conocida* (an acquaintance) from their home state of Durango, who offered them *posada* (temporary housing or asylum) on their journey north. Sánchez explained her commitment to her compatriots as a moral duty to assist immigrants

The morality-of-risk concept involves support networks among kin and people from the same local area, trust, and interpersonal obligations for obtaining less chancy modes of entry (such as personally known smugglers and non-professional helpers) under current border conditions.

in need by using the verb "*tengo*" as in "*tengo que ayudarlos, no hay de otra*" (roughly this translates to "I must" or "I have to help them, there's no way around it."). To her, taking the risk of aiding undocumented immigrants from her hometown is morally the right thing to do.

CONCLUSION

The study of entrapment processes has significant implications for applied social science in three areas: social analysis, public policy, and research methods and ethics. Studies of migration and mobility need to include in their analysis not only the barriers and fears involved in defying detention and deportation by state officials, but also the ways in which people protect themselves and obtain mobility, along with the consequences of such actions. It is important to conceptualize intersecting barriers to movement and various forms of agency (with major risks entailed) in order to operationalize the key concepts of mobility and enclosure in field research. Tougher immigration enforcement efforts and policies often do not suppress moral decision-making, and the subsequent defiance of the state. However, they do confront people with constant, terrible dilemmas, anxieties, and tensions, as well as significant risks of injury, robbery, and death. The personal cost of entrapment is enormous. We have come to understand that freedom and accessibility of movement is fundamental to people's well-being in the contemporary world. But not everyone has access to it. Recent scholarship sometimes overstates the ease, volition, and freedom of movement, especially for powerless populations.[12]

Movement inequalities originate from and interact in complex ways with other inequalities, such as nationality/citizenship, race and ethnicity, age, gender, and class. The modern state practices delineation of spaces through borders, identification of people through documents (e.g., passports), and surveillance of populations through inspections. Surveillance ("security") is treated as a positive addition to freedom, in this case the freedom to move openly near and across borders. It is a normal aspect of life for the documented. But there is also an "illegalized" population in the United States, lacking such documentation. These people move around the borderlands and across the international boundary deliberately avoiding surveillance, or are locked into place by entrapment processes; they are outside "normal" surveillance and freedom. VM

NOTES

[1] This article draws on work previously published in *Human Organization* vol. 66, 2007. We thank the Society for Applied Anthropology for permission to use elements of that text.

[2] For a more detailed discussion on public policy applications and research methods and ethics of researching trapped and hidden populations, see Guillermina G. Núñez and Josiah McC. Heyman, "Entrapment Processes and Immigrant Communities in a Time of Heightened Border Vigilance," *Human Organization* vol. 66, no. 4, 2007, pp. 354-365; and Josiah McC. Heyman, María Cristina Morales, and Guillermina G. Núñez, "Engaging with the Immigrant Human Rights Movement in a Besieged Border Region: What Do Applied Social Scientists Bring to the Policy Process?" *NAPA Bulletin* 31 (2009), pp. 13-29.

[3] Guillermina G. Núñez, "The Political Ecology of the *Colonias* on the U.S.-Mexico Border: Human-Environmental Challenges and Community Responses in Southern New Mexico," *Southern Rural Sociology* 24 (2009), pp. 67-91.

[4] "Health Behaviors and Access Barriers to Uninsured, Undocumented Immigrants in El Paso County: An Ethnographic Study," funded by the Paso del Norte Health Foundation, PI Nuria Homedes. We thank the foundation for its support; errors and misinterpretations are the sole responsibility of the authors and not of the foundation or other research team members.

[5] A good summary is the book by Joseph Nevins, *Operation Gatekeeper and Beyond: The War on "Illegals" and the Remaking of the U.S.-Mexico Boundary* (New York: Routledge, 2010).

[6] Ibid.

[7] Ibid.

[8] David Spener, *Clandestine Crossings: Migrants and Coyotes on the Texas-Mexico Border* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2009).

[9] Olivia Ruiz Marrujo, "Riesgo, migración y espacios fronterizos: una reflexión," *Estudios demográficos y urbanos* no. 47 (2001), pp. 257-284.

[10] Miguel Moctezuma Longoria, "El circuito migrante Sain Alto, Zac.-Oakland, Ca.," *Comercio exterior* 50 (2000), pp. 396-405, http://rimd.reduaz.mx/documentos_miembros/1817521.pdf.

[11] Carlos G. Vélez-Ibáñez, "An Impossible Living in a Transborder World: Culture, *Confianza*, and Economy of Mexican-Origin Populations" (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2010).

[12] Hilary Cunningham, and Josiah McC. Heyman, "Introduction: Mobilities and Enclosures at Borders," *Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power* 11, no. 3 (July-September 2004), pp. 289-302.

Rivelino

Mexican Sculptor Of His Time

Rommel Scorza Gaxiola*

Patricia Pérez Ramírez

"Our Silences," January-February 2011, London.

The sculptor Rivelino was born in 1973 in the state of Jalisco. This state has also given us other prominent exponents of Mexico's visual arts and letters, like painters Dr. Atl, José Clemente Orozco, and Juan Soriano, and writers Juan Rulfo and Juan José Arreola. It is also the cradle of certain expressions of national identity like tequila and mariachis. Like some of his fellow Jalisco natives, from a very young age, Rivelino has sought to communicate much more than that; he has tried to innovate without renouncing the place that gave him his first childhood visual and aural impressions.

When he was about 10, he moved to Mexico City, and from there reaffirmed his liking and knowledge of the pre-Colombian past and the cultures of Mesoamerica, which left an important mark on universal art. Through pre-Hispanic architecture and from what we can see of some extant art forms like the textiles, ceramics, and sculpture, particularly on a grand scale, these cultures found an excellent medium to transmit very direct messages to the very depths of their people. It is difficult to explain the exact meaning of these objects and the ideas they attempted to communicate, which is why we can say they are enigmatic. This is where Rivelino draws nourishment for his work.

Rivelino has successfully entered the spheres of monumental sculptural installation and public intervention, through which he has investigated the relationship between the viewer and the work itself.

From the capital city, he was able to observe the work by the artists in vogue at the time, particularly those from Oaxaca; given his links to artists from that region of the country, part of his work conveys the ochre colors and earth tones and textures. At the same time, in the early 1990s, he practiced in different laboratories and workshops, working in wood, clay, marble, restoring, and even metal. Around 1998, he entered the National Fine Arts Institute Ceramics School. So, both in a formal setting and as a self-taught artist, Rivelino has assimilated different traditional and contemporary artistic techniques to consolidate his own style; clay and metal are the materials with which he has expressed himself with the greatest plasticity and forcefulness.

The sculptor himself compares his work to the experiences that mark a person in life. For example, tracing a figure on

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Preceding page: "Our Silences."

Ivan Goite

"Our Silences," October 2011, Mexico City's Zócalo Square. Monumental sculpture installation that includes 10 three-dimensional, large-format sculptures (3.50 x 2.30 x 1.10 m), each weighing approximately one ton (cast bronze with a patina of white and ochre).

RIVELINO

Arturo González de Alba

a piece of clay or a metal plaque, whether pressing heavily, attacking the material, or delicately, protecting it, leaves a mark on those objects, a groove or a protuberance, just like the injuries and blows that life deals you. "We are full of hundreds of fragments inside us that leave marks that we usually forget about and that I try to reveal and make visible in a work, so that we remember what we're made up of, of thousands of experiences," he says.

Rivelino's art displays a purified technique characterized by the combination of different materials like cotton, ceramics, steel, bronze, and resins, among others. His pieces are noteworthy for their different recurring ornamental figures; for example, an enigmatic human face in bronze with a plaque covering its mouth; the *haut-* and *bas-reliefs*; small sculptures of chrysalises, butterflies, tortoise shells, hearts, seeds, arrows, and the indecipherable free-style calligraphy, all aesthetic elements that have become the stamp of his work.

With over a 15-year career, Rivelino has managed to integrate ample experimentation with materials and an ongoing aesthetic and emotional analysis of his work, as well as a personal relationship with his urban surroundings. He has based his work on the strength transmitted by the materials themselves, through which he interprets ideas, sensations, and themes of daily life like writing, time, human relationships, freedom, and silence, and he even utilizes segments of the

Inside Of, I, 27 x 26 x 26 cm, 2010 (bronze).

Inside Of, II, 33 x 22 x 22 cm, 2010 (bronze).

Rivelino has based his work
on the strength transmitted by the materials themselves,
through which he interprets ideas,
sensations, and themes of daily life like writing,
freedom, and silence.

Inside Of, VI, 60 x 26 x 26 cm, 2011 (carbon steel).

Photos on this page are by Arturo González de Alba.

Arturo González de Alba

Natural Dialogues, 320 x 600 cm, 2010 (bronze and carbon steel).

past and of history. For this reason, links to architecture, archaeology, history, sociology, and psychology can be observed in his works.

In the last three years, Rivelino has successfully entered the spheres of monumental sculptural installation and public intervention, through which he has investigated the relationship between the viewer and the work itself. This is the case of "Our Silences" and "Roots," recent presentations that I will touch on later. To date, he has participated in 60 collective and 35 individual shows in Mexico and abroad, and his work is part of the most important private collections in Mexico, Germany, Spain, France, Japan, Australia, Canada, the United States, and Central and South America.

For Rivelino, being an artist anywhere in the world is a complicated matter, but being one in your country of origin is three times more difficult. He considers it a heroic act, above all because you seem to have to prove too much. Although in his case, he is not pursuing that particular objective: his interest is in testing himself. Most of the time, he tries to listen to his inner voice and concentrate on his projects and what daily existence brings him, adapting and reformulating his creativity.

For this reason, Rivelino considers his work space more a laboratory than a sculpture workshop or an artist's atelier. A large part of his works are the result of constant experimentation; for example, when he sticks two materials together

Tracing a figure on a piece of clay or a metal plaque, whether pressing heavily, attacking the material, or delicately, protecting it, leaves a mark on those objects, just like the injuries and blows that life deals you.

with glue or resin; when he gets a certain texture in the clay; when he does an oxidation treatment on metals to accelerate the visual effect of time; when in the finishing process, whether opaque or shiny, trying to get a mirror effect; or when he tries to find a way to get a single piece to hold 100, 200, or 300 kilos. In short, Rivelino follows no instruction manuals. Usually, he goes by trial and error, and he stops the moment he gets, perhaps not the desired effect, but something he likes.

As a contemporary artist, he has managed to project Mexican art internationally, transforming a certain rather traditional image into a renewed, well-executed, open image, open in a global, more interconnected world, in which, paradoxically, it is more difficult to communicate. Testimony to this is "Our Silences," the most recent itinerant exhibit of monumental Mexican sculpture, conceived for display in eight European cities. From 2009, and after a two-year sojourn through important plazas, gardens, and main boulevards in Lisbon, Madrid, Brussels, Potsdam, Rome, London, Moscow, and Saint Petersburg, "Our Silences" arrived in Mexico City



Arturo González de Alba

Three Summaries, 130 x 100 cm, 2011 (fired ceramics, cotton, and carbon steel).

Rivelino's art shows
a purified technique characterized
by the combination of different materials
like cotton, ceramics, steel, bronze,
and resins, among others.



Arturo González de Alba

Playing with Fire, 125 x 90 x 10 cm, 2011 (copper, wood, and bone).

in October 2011. It brought with it the echo of all the success accumulated along the way, to be exhibited with great fanfare and to transmit its potent social message of free expression in the heart of the country, the capital's main Zócalo square, the most emblematic place of the nation's history and the world's second-largest public plaza, undoubtedly an epicenter of the expression of Mexico's diversity of voices.

"Our Silences" is made up of 10 monumental anthropomorphic sculptures, in white and ochre cast bronze (3.5m x 2.3m x 1.2m, weighing one ton each). The busts have both *haut-* and *bas-reliefs*, seeds, plants, traces of free interpretation, and the plaque covering their mouths, representing the importance of freedom of individual and collective expression. An eleventh sculpture, a two-cubic-meter steel "tactile box," holds four small-scale sculptures reproducing the life-sized ones.

In May 2011, after three years of absence from Mexico's exposition scene, Rivelino presented the show *Nomad Essence* at the Querétaro Art Museum (MaQro), in the Old Saint Agustín Monastery. The exhibition brought together 20 works that melded Rivelino's experience based on the many moves he has made as part of his artistic activity in the more than one dozen cities he alternated living in over two years while he worked on preparing and mounting "Our Silences." In his opinion, it was an honest exercise of emotional and intellectual self-reflection about his artistic career and work. In short, it was a reinterpretation of his own work to revisit certain themes and reformulate them in new pieces.

What can be observed, as a result, is a purification of certain elements, the refinement of the finishing touches, and the consolidation of colors. One example is the series of bronze "ossuaries." The cube form appears most frequently, as in the work "Inside Of," made of engraved carbon steel, in addition to the Querétaro show's title work, "Nomad Essence," a 100-piece polyptych that summarizes this "deterritorialized" way of living and working, which undoubtedly influences artistic creation.

In November 2011, Rivelino inaugurated the Ministry of the Economy's art gallery with the exhibit "Limits and Consequences," a series of 30 works that also summarizes the itinerant experience and the implications of making exhausting efforts and living on the edge. Outstanding among them

spaces and facades of different buildings of symbolic, patrimonial value, concentrated mainly in Mexico City's historic downtown area.

The installation is a novel, original visual image, a gigantic, 1.2-kilometer rhizomorphic sculpture, intermittently connected by large stalks, extending in waves like a tree through important plazas, branching invisibly or in an imaginary way

He has managed to project Mexican art internationally, transforming a certain rather traditional image into a renewed, open image, open in a global, more interconnected world, in which, paradoxically, it is more difficult to communicate.

Isaac Villegas

The National Art Museum in the Historic Center.

Isaac Villegas

"Roots," 2012, Mexico City.

The Palace of Fine Arts.

because of its chromatic and aesthetic impact and its size is *Natural Dialogues*, an intense red tryptych of 24 anonymous faces, first displayed in the World Expo 2010 Shanghai.

For the last few years of hard creative work and cultural promotion, Rivelino has had the great opportunity of looking inward and to the past, the personal, and that of his country, as well as deepening his exploration of social issues and analyzing the world scene of large-scale urban public intervention. This period translated into the preparation for his most ambitious project in recent years, "Roots," a huge, unprecedented installation of public art unlike any other ever presented before in Mexico. It is made up of a multiple, simultaneous public intervention that takes 24 hours to mount in 13 external

underground, to break through the surface in historic buildings of different eras and styles that have been architectural, emblematic icons of our development as a nation, sources of identity and depositories of cultural and artistic expression.

"Roots" is an homage to the city's architecture and art venues, a call to rediscover history, safeguard our patrimony, and strengthen society through culture. It is also an important collaboration between the Mexico City government, its Ministry of Culture, the National Council for Culture and the Arts, the National Autonomous University of Mexico, the Rivelino studio, and private business. For more about his work, see www.rivelino.com.mx and www.nuestrossilencios.com.mx. VM

María Jiménez/ Archivo Fotográfico Agustín Jiménez

Agustín Jiménez Espinosa, *Reclining Female Nude with Sphere*, ca. 1920 (silver on gelatin).

SUN AND SHADOWS IN MODERN MEXICAN PHOTOGRAPHY

Manuel Álvarez Bravo, Agustín Jiménez, and Luis Márquez

Ernesto Peñaloza Méndez*

The exhibition "Sun and Shadows in Modern Mexican Photography. Manuel Álvarez Bravo, Agustín Jiménez, and Luis Márquez" at the Old San Ildefonso College sought to construct a visual discourse that would prompt reflection about the meaning of our photographic avant garde and, in a way, bring two outstanding photographers who were world-renowned Manuel Álvarez Bravo's contemporaries out of his shadow.

Álvarez Bravo was undoubtedly the sun of a generation of photographers who radically renewed creative work. His quality, consistency, and particular style brought him great prestige nationally and internationally while most of his contemporaries were gradually left in the shadows of oblivion.

*Academic at the UNAM Institute for Aesthetic Research.

Photos by Manuel Álvarez Bravo courtesy of the Manuel Álvarez Bravo Archives, photos by Agustín Jiménez Espinoza courtesy of the Agustín Jiménez Archives, and photos by Luis Márquez Romay courtesy of the UNAM's Institute for Aesthetics Research.

AFMT/IIE-UNAM

Luis Márquez Romay, *Nude with Skull*, 1932 (silver on gelatin).

Álvarez Bravo was undoubtedly the sun of a generation of photographers who radically renewed creative work. His quality, consistency, and particular style brought him great prestige nationally and internationally.

© Colette Urbajtel/Archivo Manuel Álvarez Bravo, SC

Manuel Álvarez Bravo, *Good Reputation Sleeping*, 1938-1939 (silver on gelatin).

María Jiménez/ Archivo Fotográfico Agustín Jiménez

Agustín Jiménez Espinosa, untitled, from the "Tolteca" series, 1931 (silver on gelatin).

AFMT/IIE-UNAM

Luis Márquez Romay, *Stairway, Monument to the Revolution*, 1936 (silver on gelatin).

In the 1920s and 1930s, Mexican photography changed, as did other art forms like painting, sculpture, theater, cinema, music, and literature, and was renewed by figures like Manuel and Lola Álvarez Bravo, Emilio Amero, Raúl Estrada Discua, Arturo González Ruiseco, Agustín Jiménez, Eugenia Aurora Latapí, Luis Márquez, and Jesús Torres Palomar. They used as a starting point a tradition, and the subsequent break, and then were nourished and influenced by, as well as influencing the work of colleagues like Edward Weston, Tina Modotti, Sergei Eisenstein, Paul Strand, Henri Cartier-Bresson, and so many other foreign photographers who came through Mexico at that time, attracted by the landscape and a propitious, renovating environment astride an ancestral, indigenous culture and the avant garde impetus of the art so in vogue in Europe and the United States.

This period, when what we now call the "historic avant garde of Mexican photography" developed, is characterized by the incorporation of elements and objects into the visual universe that had not interested artists before, or by the reinterpretation of traditional genres in photography, like portraiture, landscapes, architecture, popular phenotypes, social struggles, and daily life. Abstract compositions, defamiliarization, interest in pure textures, reflections, shadows, and highlights, as well as the use of diagonals, distortions, repetitions, and vanishing points were also incorporated into their discourse. This made many of the images elevate Mexican photography to the international plane.

Manuel Álvarez Bravo was the one who mainly conferred artistic prestige on our photography. But, in addition to him, as mentioned above, an entire generation contributed to the



Manuel Álvarez Bravo, *Triptych Cement 2 (La Tolteca)*, ca. 1931 (silver on gelatin).

MANUEL ÁLVAREZ BRAVO

The "historic avant garde of Mexican photography" is characterized by the incorporation of elements and objects into the visual universe that had not interested artists before, or by the reinterpretation of traditional genres in photography.

"modernization" of Mexico's art of the lens, though most of its members are not very well known except to specialists.

Something else that should be taken into consideration is that this renovating movement had noteworthy precedents among certain photographers who worked in Mexico in the early twentieth century, the authors of "experimental" images that prematurely ventured into the sphere of the new photography. I am referring here, for example, to "Studies of Flowers" by C.B. Waite in 1907, and "Studies of Violin" by Jesús Avitia in the same year. Isolated shots by the photographers of the Revolution, like Agustín Casasola, and some images from photographic studios identified with the pictorialist current, like Librado García Smarth or Antonio Garduño himself, could also be included on this list. In addition to this "pre-avant-garde" precedent, even without a systematic study, we would have to add the work of amateur photographers like Juan Crisóstomo Méndez and his representations of the fragmented body, or the work of artists not identified as photographers, but who worked fleetingly with a camera with frankly modern results, like Roberto Turnbull, A. Toussaint, or Frida Kahlo herself. Recently, some of the photographs by Lola Álvarez Bravo's first students, like Guillermina Álvarez, Diva O. Foscade, Raúl Abarca, and Raúl Conde —this last a true revelation— have been brought to light that would also be included in the line of modern photography.

A great deal remains to be discovered about our avant garde photography. In that sense, "Sun and Shadows in Modern Mexican Photography. Manuel Álvarez Bravo, Agustín Jiménez, and Luis Márquez" proposes a different approach to these kinds of images.



María Jiménez/ Archivo Fotográfico Agustín Jiménez

Agustín Jiménez Espinosa, *Eisenstein with Sugar Skull*, 1931 (silver on gelatin).

These three artists were selected because they had several overlaps and common influences, above all at the beginning of their professional careers and during the consolidation of their personal styles in the late 1920s and the first half of the 1930s. All three worked for the Ministry of Public Education (SEP) and published their images in the same publications, like *Mexican Folkways*, *Revista de Revistas* (Magazine of Magazines), *Nuestro México* (Our Mexico), *Todo* (Everything), *El Universal Ilustrado* (Illustrated Universal), and *Excélsior*. They also came together in the collective show by sculptor Guillermo Toussaint and 11 photographers in the Modern Art Gallery, held in the National Theater in 1929. Together with Emilio Amero, they exhibited at the Civic Aviation Field in a show organized by the SEP's Fine Arts Department in 1931. Two years later, the three produced the photos that illustrated the book *Escuelas primarias de la Secretaría de Educación Pública* (Primary Schools of the Ministry of Public Education). Another thing they shared was their interest in film, where they participated as stillmen.

© Colette Urbajtel/Archivo Manuel Álvarez Bravo, SC

Manuel Álvarez Bravo, *The Day of the Dead*, ca. 1930 (silver on gelatin).

"The domain of photography as an art is no different from that of poetry: the untouchable and the imaginary. But revealed, and, in a phrase, filtered by what is seen." Octavio Paz

All three photographers can be appreciated from two standpoints: one, from a figurative point of view, that would analyze the themes that concerned the painters and artists of the time who were seeking representations of everything national and the national identity. In this sense, 11 brief thematic nuclei can be identified: thorns (with photographs of maguey plants), indigenous fiestas, crafts, religiosity, still lifes (compositions with jicamas by Álvarez Bravo and prickly pears by Jiménez), a carrousel, death, feminine nudes, fishes, children, and work. The second, more experimental and abstract standpoint is made up of other nuclei: tools, stairways, brewery fermentation tanks, reflections, the La Tolteca factory (a centerpiece in the show), and, lastly, exercises in shadows, curves, and diagonal lines.

The museography can be termed sober and effective, with the walls in light tones and a few counterpoints in green. The illumination was designed to be soft so as not to damage the old prints, although, of course, visibility is good. The exhibition begins with a phrase from the Spanish writer of the Golden Age, Baltasar Gracián, that Álvarez Bravo used in his 1945 exhibition at the Association of Modern Art, organized by Fernando Gamboa: "When the eyes see what they had never seen, the heart feels what it had never felt."[1] Another phrase, this time by Octavio Paz, is also writ large: "The domain of photography as an art is no different from that of poetry: the untouchable and the imaginary. But revealed, and, in a phrase, filtered, by what is seen."[2]

One interesting detail in this exhibition is that it includes two shots from an important photo contest held by the bimonthly magazine *Tolteca* in its August 20, 1931, issue, cosponsored by the daily newspaper *Excélsior*. Manuel Álvarez Bravo won first place, and Agustín Jiménez took home six prizes. The winning photos were exhibited for 10 days in the

LUIS MÁRQUEZ ROMAY

AFMT/IIE-UNAM

Luis Márquez Romay, *Masks of the Dead*, 1931 (silver on gelatin).

Civic Museum of the Fine Arts Palace, from December 5 to 15 of that year.

José Antonio Rodríguez explains the great importance of this for the history of Mexican photography:

> The images with which these members of the avant-garde took the country by storm were incomprehensible for the majority of photographers of the time. To a great extent, because they were made up of other reasonings. Among them are glimpses and traces of avant-garde currents like Russian constructivism, cubism, or the new objectivity, all intertwined; a form of aesthetic assimilation into the industrial age made possible by the spaces of the La Tolteca factory, which the other makers of bucolic images who had exercised their craft better in studio portraits or in nationalistic prints were very far from understanding.…For that reason, the result of the *Tolteca* [magazine] exhibition was the consequence and manifesto of modern times….In the end, with them, photography would pave new ways forward.[3]

Undoubtedly, the exhibition managed to establish a visual dialogue among the images of these three artists that show the treatment of common themes and coinciding forms as the aesthetic singularities that made them stand out in

AGUSTÍN JIMÉNEZ ESPINOSA

María Jiménez/Archivo Fotográfico Agustín Jiménez

Agustín Jiménez Espinosa, *Heart of a Maguey*, 1934 (silver on gelatin).

Foreign photographers came through Mexico at that time, attracted by the landscape and a propitious, renovating environment astride an ancestral, indigenous culture and the avant garde impetus of the art so in vogue in Europe and the United States.

Manuel Álvarez Bravo, untitled, *Magueys* series, n.d. (silver on gelatin).

Mexico's post-revolutionary culture. A first rendition of the exhibit was hosted by the Mexico Institute in Paris as part of the 2010 Month of Photography. In Mexico, the number of images was increased, bringing the final total to 75 photographs, 25 per artist, attempting to ensure the majority were vintage prints from the period.

The works come from the following collections: the Museum of Modern Art-National Fine Arts Institute, the UNAM Institute for Aesthetic Research, the Agustín Jiménez Archive, the Manuel Álvarez Bravo Association, the Windsor Gallery, and the Carlos Córdova and González Rendón family private collections. VM

Luis Márquez Romay, *La Valentina*, 1935 (silver on gelatin).

Notes

[1] One of Cratylus's lines in "El criticón: primera parte," by Baltasar Gracián, 1651. [Editor's Note.]

[2] "Prologue," *Instante y revelación* (poems by Octavio Paz and photographs by Manuel Álvarez Bravo) (Mexico City: Fonapas, 1982), p. 212. [Editor's Note.]

[3] José Antonio Rodríguez's article, "Una moderna dialéctica. La vanguardia fotográfica mexicana, 1930-1950," appeared in the *Huesca-Imagen* 2004 catalogue, published for the annual photography festival formerly held in Huesca, Spain, and which in 2004 centered on Mexico.

GERARDO SUTER

Mexico City

The Penultimate Region

Ery Cámara*

Looking through Gerardo Suter's eyes, the perception of the Mexico City horizon is limitless, like our expectations of possibly getting lost and meeting up again in that exploration. His approximations are perspectives that broaden the horizon, refracting it into faint fragments in which, crouched in the thickness of its layers, the atmosphere dresses in tonal suggestions, textures, and images that stroke our sense of touch as well as all the rest of our senses. These are surfaces whose irregularities challenge the domain of machines in printing images because they continue to feel the heartbeats of a gestation process. Whether lead or copper captivating the density of grays and blacks without blurring the horizon, or vinyl canvases converted into the reflection of those billboards blighting Mexico City's streets, Suter's photography makes the supports active elements in the birth of the light that breathes life into these images: they give each solution a singularity, as though they were the glue running through the intensities of that language, or, rather, the exhalations of those presences.

Like a living organism, the city grows in all directions without noticing the imbalances its excessive expansion, its threatening seismic territory, and the effects of climate change on its geography inflict. It traps us, and, like a flash of lightening,

*Curator and art critic.

Photos courtesy of the Old San Ildefonso College.

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Spacelapse series, 100 x 200 cm, 2009 (inkjet on paper with acrylic protection).

A horizon that cancels itself out at the same time that it engenders the need to re-situate itself, it opens up in front of us like an abyss that challenges our doubts.

challenges our imagination and creativity in this becoming that the photographer presents us:

> If we see that new strata emerge throughout the city uninterruptedly, and what we observe all the time is unfinished and in a continuous process of transformation, the presence of a penultimate region in Mexico City ends up being the rule and not the exception. A penultimate that appears in the surrounding areas, downtown, anywhere in between, with different characteristics, depending on the place, but always there.[1]

In his constantly transfiguring landscapes, just like in our social habits, glances are exchanged, sheens like mirages, reciprocal questions, indescribable doubts and rumors that palpitate or oscillate just like fireflies illuminating their own movement. An observer of the city's mutations, the photographer reveals and interprets this uninterrupted transformation that is sedimented in layers, strata, crumbling or peeling walls; structures that are abandoned or undergoing some indeterminate process; buildings or urban clusters that tell



Refoundation series, 240 x 80 cm, 2008 (inkjet on cotton paper).

Suter reveals and interprets this uninterrupted transformation sedimented in layers, strata; structures abandoned or undergoing some indeterminate process; buildings or urban clusters that tell us about the many cities that are amalgamated.

us about the many cities that are amalgamated and interpenetrate in every renovation or just irrigate the imagination. Silhouettes and specters with reminiscences winking out at us from their compositions of transcendental stylistic trends in the evolution of photography.

To reach the penultimate region, you have to cross over the enigmatic thickness of its clouds and the pollution that intensifies the details of the scenery, forcing us to focus how we perceive it differently. A horizon that cancels itself out at the same time that it engenders the need to re-situate itself. It opens up in front of us like an abyss that challenges our doubts and stretches out before our concerns as we explore its territory. A region diffuse by nature, it holds surprises that attract Gerardo's gaze and, through it is shot a creative sensibility whose culmination prefers to disappear among the subtle vibrations dissipated in the dynamism, the passion, and eloquence that emerges from the oeuvre. We are participants in the coming of the moment; the camera opens up a world whose heart looks, and its eyes reflect the awakening of the entire universe:

> The proposal points to revealing a city that has become a space trying to contain something uncontainable, growing in all directions, and that, when it touches any one of the four points of the compass, cancels its unfolding. And that is when the up or the down of Mexico City are spaces that can be colonized and turn into the penultimate region.

Through photography, Gerardo Suter excavates the urban landscape from perspectives that the new arrangement of the streets facilitates; he flies over its heights to diagram its scenarios, gaps, and horizons with an invisible grid. He brings the far-off close and distances what is near to discern their connections, their points of contact, or their intervals. Each of these scales is named by the author, and that is how they revive the complexity of meanings that their austere presence

acquires over multiple uses. Any attempt at definition or normativity flounders because of the unforeseen nature of the manifestations of its space. In the eyes of the artist, the megalopolis becomes a miniature without mutilating its qualities; it sleeps, it becomes huge, and it awakens blurred. Its dreams are restored going through the sieve of the sensations they spark.

Attentive to the reply, Suter knows that the outcome of a cataclysm cannot be foreseen. Its impact forces reconstructions, all charged with subjectivity. With his ability to strike the right note, dawn breaks over the region with a shuddering sun. His promenades are dialogues, relationships, frictions, social breaks that dig up unresolved conflicts and cracks, which will heal over who knows when. The scaffolding and towers, antennas, cables, and structures invade every direction and trace abstractions and geometries that from the rooftops cut a piece out of the sky. Bursts of lines shoot captivating ambiguities that glide without sails in the panorama with echoes and reflections that unravel the weave of the illuminating gaze.

To reach the penultimate region, you have to cross over the enigmatic thickness of its clouds and the pollution that intensifies the details of the scenery, forcing us to focus how we perceive it differently.

GERARDO SUTER

Scenario, 270 x 360 cm, 2008 (inkjet).

GERARDO SUTER

Refoundation series, 145 x 185 cm, 2010 (inkjet on paper).

The penultimate region promises nothing;
it only respects the eclipse of the gaze, the blind shot
that magnetizes the frame. Suter's images appropriate reality
to extract its essence and its paradoxes.

To the extent that the recognition of images advances, we are invaded by a feeling of witnessing a profound immersion that avoids the interferences of anecdote or pretext. The superposition of still and cinematic images, sediments of sound and of stimuli spread like the raging fog that makes an object of the repeated shot, invites us to peek into this new reality engendered by photography:

> It should be said that the relationship between conceptual and formal development in each of my projects is fundamental. Defining a theme like an urban landscape of Mexico City, and problematizing with it both the image-document binomial and its location in the architectural space allows me to open up two parallel paths for reflection that join with the artistic or aesthetic result. There is, then, a triple interest that envelops the project: the focus and aesthetic solution adopted for its production, and finally, the reflection about the language used for its representation in the specific space it occupies when it is exhibited.

Careful in selecting formats, textures, and the different supports that make up the photographic language of his images, Suter experiments with resources, and plays and tests

the descent into the charged vacuums created by uncertainty. The penultimate region promises nothing; it only respects the eclipse of the gaze, the blind shot that magnetizes the frame. Suter's images appropriate reality to extract its essence and its paradoxes. Like a latent consistency, an evanescent density that shelters itself in the enigmatic penumbra, indiscernible because it is, paradoxically, a petrified instant of a reality charged with the emotions that capturing it brought out, the penultimate region evaporates before the light and takes refuge in shadow. The shot seems to be an un-agreed-upon date in which what is surprising is the familiarity and fresh way the landscape invades us through the windows Gerardo Suter opens.

The sensations caused by his atmospheres, in which presences throb and the tracks of intangible human dreams whisper, burst from the clearings that our approach announces. They hint at the juxtaposition of their distribution, and their glazes unhinge any predetermined logic. The penultimate region, like the lake that lies beneath it, does not cleave to any form, any color; it is a space where under these sublimated glazes, history is thoroughly analyzed, its vestiges steal a look to attend to the excitements of memory and the imagination;

In his constantly transfiguring landscapes,
glances are exchanged, sheens like mirages, reciprocal questions,
indescribable doubts and rumors that palpitate or oscillate just
like fireflies illuminating their own movement.

Refoundation series, 120 x 120, 2009 (inkjet on paper with acrylic protection).



Downtown, 240 x 80, 2009 (video photograms).

The penultimate region is the architecture of a process of the destruction-construction-deconstruction of a space that can be turned into a discursive resource in the field of poetry.

GERARDO SUTER

Spacelapse series, 115 x 295, 2009 (inkjet on paper with polycarbonate protection).

layers begin to appear while others dissolve. On the surface, the photograph recovers the emotional breath that was exhaled at the moment it was taken. The breath of life, like a flash, impregnates the fog that says everything and hides nothing. The velocity convened in this meeting encapsulates time and freezes its advance. And that becomes a tangible document that vindicates its visibility and demands a dynamic vision. The penultimate region is the architecture of a process of the destruction-construction-deconstruction of a space that can be turned into a discursive resource in the field of poetry. A scaffolding of sequences and articulations that trace the ambiguity of this region that always presents itself as a promise.

A space catalyzed by a sensation of progressive expansion that intimidates our expectations and our aspirations. A place from where one always aspires to reach the ultimate region, where the denseness of the gaps envelops all the questions suggested in the transit of the will to the next goal. Incorporeal figures barely sketched by the haze that blurs everything, the facades of these buildings inscribe the passage of time and the light in the infinite. They awaken from the darkness, hiding the complexity of the confrontation of what remains and what retreats. The past revives and the future announces itself from their reminiscences. The public space absorbed in itself in this landscape multiplies its functions in the planes of this architecture of thought-cum-image. It is a mirror where the gaze cancels any similarity to appreciate the transmigrations and the incessant confluences that weave this epiphany. VM

Notes

[1] All quotes are from Gerardo Suter, "Palimpsesto," *Essais, chroniques et Témoignages. Artelogie* no. 2, 2012.

Pulque

Mexico's National Beverage?

Javier Gómez Marín*

Mexico's gastronomical culture includes a drink known as "pulque" (from the Náhuatl *octli*, meaning 'juice of the maguey'). As the name implies, it is prepared by fermenting the sap (aguamiel) of a variety called the *manso* (tame) maguey, belonging to the genus *Agave* ("agave" is from the Greek for "admirable," since the plant grows in very arid climates).

This may well be the oldest fermented beverage in the Western Hemisphere. Archaeological evidence has been found of its existence more than 2 000 years ago. The cultural value of this low-grade alcoholic drink (from six to eight proof, or three to four percent) lies in the fact that it is both produced and consumed in the same way as in ancient times. It is therefore said to have survived colonial domination, wars of independence, and revolutions; and today, in our times of globalization and world standardization, it continues to be part of Mexico's gastronomy, particularly that of Central Mexico, as it has for centuries, something unique in a world where everything loses its original characteristics when it is industrialized.

The Long Process

To make pulque, you have to wait from 8 to 12 years for the maguey plant to mature. Before it can flower, the flower stalk is cut, and you must wait six months for the heart of the plant to ripen. Then it is "scraped," which consists of taking out the center where the soft leaves grow, with a kind of a scoop, leaving a hollow. This makes the maguey plant release its sap, or aguamiel (honeywater), which gathers in the hole.

For almost six months, the plant will exude six liters of aguamiel a day, that is, more than 1 100 liters of raw material for pulque making. Because of this high productivity, the richest man during the presidency of General Porfirio Díaz

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Javier Gómez Marín

Vat with pulque from Chalma, 2011.

(1884-1910), Don Ignacio Torres Adalid, the so-called "model entrepreneur of the *porfiriato*," dubbed these magueys "green cows."

The aguamiel is collected manually twice a day by the *tlachiquero*, the person in charge of caring for the magueys. His trade is perhaps the oldest in the culture of the Americas. Once collected, the sap is taken to a cold room with very high ceilings called a "*tinacal*," or fermenting shed. There it ferments for two days, turning into white pulque, or "Mexican wine." Then, it is transported in wooden barrels for sale and consumption in *pulquerías*, which for centuries were very popular in the country's capital and today are regaining their popularity. It is said that in the early 1900s there were thousands in Mexico City; by 1968,[1] there were 1 024, and today there are barely 68;[2] however, the tradition is enjoying a revival.

By the seventeenth century, pulque had been added to Spaniards and mestizos' palates, and some of them made huge fortunes from the pulque haciendas, and then from the *pulquerías*.

C.B. Waite

Pulque shop, ca. 1906.

The History of Pulque

There is no data about when honey water began to be used to make pulque, but in the state of Puebla's Tehuacán Valley the maguey plant was already being cultivated in the year 6 500 BC. Naturally, this does not prove the existence of pulque in that period, but it is known that that region has been arid for millennia, making it logical to suppose that even in an-

Javier Gómez Marín

Anonymous Mexican painter, *The Discovery of Pulque,* ca. 1860. Sumuaya Museum Collection.

cient times local inhabitants would have sought alternative sources of moisture.[3]

The pyramid at the Cholula archaeological site, also in Puebla, has the oldest artistic representation of pulque: *The Mural of the Drinkers*, a fresco measuring almost 120 square meters, dating from AD100, depicting a group of priests in a ceremony drinking pulque.

Popular tradition attributes the discovery of pulque to Xóchitl, in the year AD997. According to Toltec mythology, Xóchitl noticed a rabbit drinking the transparent sap from the center of a maguey. She took some of it to her house and, two days later, realized that it had fermented and turned white. Xóchitl and her father, Papatzin, took it to the Toltec king Tecpancalzin, who liked it very much and drank it with his courtiers until they became inebriated. The king was not only won over by the pulque, but he also fell in love with the young woman's beauty, so he ordered her to be kidnapped and hidden in his palace. Then Papatzin stole into the palace, but when he realized that his daughter was pregnant, he cursed the king, saying that his son would bring down the Toltec empire. The son, Meconeztin ("son of the maguey") assumed the throne when his father died, but started a civil war that led to the destruction of the Toltec people.

The Vicissitudes of Pulque In the Culture

Before the Spaniards came to the Americas, pulque was a sacred beverage consumed moderately, with strict laws preventing its abuse. After the consolidation of Spanish colonialism, pulque was relegated to the background because it was said that, since it was an intoxicant, the indigenous used it to get drunk and forget their circumstances, which bordered on slavery. The new rulers tried to replace it with Spanish beverages like milk and wine, but they never managed to change indigenous and mestizos' taste for pulque.

By the seventeenth century, to the contrary, pulque had been added to Spaniards and mestizos' palates, and some of them made huge fortunes from the enormous industry of the pulque haciendas. After the War of Independence (1810-1821), pulque consumption was subjected to heavy taxes and regulations, generating high revenues for each government because of its popularity. It was not until the advent of the railroad in Mexico in 1866, however, that it could be swiftly transported in large quantities to the cities of Mexico, Puebla, and Pachuca. The tracks went right through the pulque haciendas, and from there to the *pulquerías*.

Frame of a *tlachiquero* with a maguey plant taken from the 1938 German documentary *Making Pulque in Mexico*, directed by Hubert Schonger. Javier Gómez Marín Collection.

Gabriel Vargas, cover of *La Familia Burrón* (The Burro[n] Family) comic book, year 6, no. 350, June 12, 1985 (offset). Javier Gómez Marín Collection.

Only six years ago, the *pulquerías'* regular customers were nostalgic seniors; today they have been invaded by 18- to 25-year-olds who are trying to recover part of their pre-Hispanic gastronomical legacy through pulque.

The *porfiriato* (the 30-years dictatorship of Porfirio Díaz) was the golden age of pulque, particularly the last 10 years (1900 to 1910). Great fortunes were amassed from its production, and with them emerged the "pulque aristocracy," that is, the owners of both haciendas, where it was produced, and the points of sale in the cities and towns. These industrialists grouped together in the Pulque Merchants' Company, the largest union of merchants who sold the beverage, who were also the owners of more than 300 haciendas that grew the pulque maguey.

Enormous efforts were made with large capital investments to industrialize the beverage, bottle, and export it to the whole world, as is done with beer. But no one ever found a way of stopping pulque's fermentation, and so it could not be bottled. However, in the early twentieth century, the country's capital filled up with *pulquerías*; there were said to be more than 2 000 establishments, one on every corner, since, at that time, 86 percent of the alcoholic beverages consumed in the country were pulque.[4]

Production dropped with the Mexican Revolution, but the revolutionaries did not touch the haciendas, since they were only interested in grain and cattle. It was not until the 1930s that President Lázaro Cárdenas split up the pulque haciendas as part of the agrarian reform into small plots that were never productive because the peasants could not afford to wait 10 years to harvest their crops. At the same time, the government began a campaign to ruin pulque's reputation and openly favor the country's large breweries. The evil legend of pulque began to circulate, according to which aguamiel was fermented with cow dung. Together with this, the beer industry began selling their product in transparent glass bottles to show consumers that beer was a clean, pure beverage, not "dirty" like pulque.

Beginning in the 1940s, the pulque industry began to decline, forgotten by government and entrepreneurs. Today, in the twenty-first century, thanks to young people who have re-acquired a taste for it, pulque is coming back from oblivion.

José Guadalupe Posada, *Pulque Shop at the San Nicolás El Grande Hacienda*, 20.8 x 32 cm (engraving).

Women drinking pulque out of a *xoma* bowl, ca. 1915-1920. Casasola Fund.

Pulquerías, a Legacy that Crosses Generations

Pulquerías were perhaps Mexico City's most attractive sales venues, and they used a myriad of marketing strategies to attract clientele. Today, the city is the country's bastion of pulque sales, with its 68 surviving *pulquerías*, plus six new establishments. Only six years ago, the *pulquerías*' regular customers were nostalgic seniors; by contrast, today they have been invaded by 18- to 25-year-olds who are trying to recover part of their pre-Hispanic gastronomical legacy through pulque.

One of the oldest operates in downtown Mexico City: La Risa (Laughter), located at 75 Mesones Street. It is worth visiting other *pulquerías* that preserve the old flavor, like Las Duelistas (The Women Duelists), at 28 Aranda Street, decorated with large, very Mexican murals. You can't miss the Salón Casino (Casino Room), at the corner of Lorenzo Boturini and Isabel la Católica; those in the know say it serves the capital city's best pulque. Other must-sees are La Paloma Azul (Blue Dove) on Popocatépetl Avenue and the Central Thoroughfare; La Pirata (The Pirate), between September 13 Street and December 12 Streets; Los Hombres sin Miedo (The Fearless Men), at 765 La Viga Boulevard; and La Titina, at North Thoroughfare 3 and Los Misterios Boulevard.

Pulque has survived colonial domination, wars of independence, and today, in times of globalization and world standardization, every pulque is different, and every *pulquería* has its own character.

Modernity has brought us alternative pulquerías, like Las Bellas Hartas (Fed-up Beauties), at 17 Cuba Street, whose publicity advertises it as "the world's first gay *pulquería*."

Drinking Mexican-ness

These establishments serve two kinds of pulque: white and "cured." White pulque is the unadulterated, natural drink; the "cured" pulque is white pulque with fruit and/or vegetable juices added. All *pulquerías* serve the beverage with free spicy bar-snack tacos on the side.

Modern music has filled these venues that used to be nostalgic, so you can drink Mexico's millennia-old national beverage, produced today only in the states of Tlaxcala, Hidalgo, Mexico, and Puebla, while enjoying rock, *Trova*, and electronic music.

G. Vuillier, *Pulque Worker*, France, ca. 1880 (engraving). Javier Gómez Marín Collection.

Patrons of a pulque shop, ca. 1930-1935 (photograph). Casasola Fund.

Globalizing monopolies are trying to standardize our gastronomical tastes, practically forcing us to consume their bottled drinks with the same flavor and "quality" in every country in the world. By contrast, every pulque is different; every maguey plant produces a different pulque; every *pulquería* has its own personality; and this drink has no trademark. Today, pulque is produced, distributed, and sold only by family-owned companies, and the huge multinationals cannot take part in this great tradition. Beer and distilled alcohol exist the world over; but pulque, only in Mexico. As the old saying goes, nothing is "more Mexican than pulque." VM

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Notes

[1] Unión Nacional de Propietarios de Pulquerías, A.C., *Directorio de pulquerías del Distrito Federal* (Mexico City: typed copy in the author's collection, 1968).

[2] Information from December 2011, from the "Our Pulque" Collective, a group that documents, counts, and photographs old but still operating *pulquerías* in Mexico City and surrounding areas.

[3] Arturo Soberón Mors, "El pulque, beber tierra generosa," Richard S. MacNeish and Douglas S. Byers, eds., *Prehistory of Tehuacan Valley* vol. 1, *Environment and Subsistence* (Austin and London: University of Texas Press, 1967), p. 29.

[4] Mario Ramírez Rancaño, *Ignacio Torres Adalid y la industria pulquera* (Mexico City: Plaza y Valdés/IIS/UNAM, 2000), p. 130.


BIENVENIDOS
AL
MUSEO
DEL
JUGUETE
MÉXICO D.F.
ESTACION
EXCLUSIVO PAR
Museo del Jugu
Antiguo México

Museum of Old-Fashioned Toys, Mexico (MUJAM)
Toys that Make History

Isabel Morales Quezada*

Mexico City, a neighborhood, and a street play host to this oasis in time and of memories and the echoes of childhood, where the word "museum" takes on a different meaning. As you walk toward it, all you see is an old building and a mom-and-pop store with the sign "Súper Dulcería Avenida" (Avenue Super Candy Store). But one thing catches your eye: a leprechaun-type figure poses next to a sign reading, "Welcome to the Toy Museum." Next to that, a narrow door and stairs lead up to the part of the building above the store. On the second floor, you have to knock on a gate to get in; you get the impression that you're in a kind of intimate space, like a friend's house where you might arrive unannounced, or perhaps after a long time. Finally somebody opens up, and you walk into another dimension.

An old photograph near the entryway might sum up the essence of this place: it's a black and white shot of street vendors selling toys on the Day of the Three Magi in Mexico City. It captures an age-old tradition that dictates that on January 6 every year, toys become the protagonists in thousands of stories that children spin with them. Just as the lens captured a moment, this place captures an age, and together with it, the memories and dreams of several generations; except that in this case, what we see is not an image, but the toys themselves brought out of the past.

This time capsule wouldn't make any sense if you couldn't access it, which is why the museum opened its doors in 2006. Its creator, Roberto Shimizu, architect by profession and collector by vocation, began amassing toys as a child, around 1955, although he prefers to say that "God gave him the gift of saving things." His parents emigrated from Japan and owned the Avenue Candy Store, and "La primavera" (the Springtime) Stationary and Book Stores, all located in the popular Doctores Neighborhood. Mr. Shimizu remembers the area's humble tenements, the solidarity of local residents, his trips on the little Chapultepec Forest Park train, and the Day of the Three Magi when he and his brothers helped his parents sell toys in the store.

Not only each visitor's memory is activated when he/she enters the museum, but also the collective memory: the exhibit represents Mexico itself, its culture and its traditions, some of which have changed or are on the brink of being lost.

* Staff writer.
Unless otherwise specified, photos by Patricia Pérez Ramírez.

"Remembering is reliving," is emblazoned on some of the display cases that hold the objects stirring visitors' memories. Many go with their children, telling them their childhood stories about favorite toys; what happens here is a kind of reunion with the toys they loved so much and that time had sent into oblivion. There are all kinds, from robots, collectable cars, a beautiful dollhouse, kitchen sets, to cardboard dolls and toys specially made of economical infused plastic in the shape of fashionable heroes like Superman or Mexican wrestlers, used to fill up piñatas.

Not only each visitor's memory is activated when he/she enters the museum, but also the collective memory: the exhibit represents Mexico itself, its culture and its traditions, some of which have changed or are on the brink of being lost, while others continue. Each piece sketches a nostalgic urban scene: a scale model of the Latin American a Tower, a symbol of the city; another of the Chapultepec Park Zoo; a jigsaw puzzle of a picture of University City's Central Library; a taco and sandwich cart that also boasts the sale of "delicious, fresh *tepache*-pineapple ade"; a little wooden Pemex oil truck; an enormous city bus with a typical bright-orange subway train car inside; a wrestling ring with a figure of the famous Santo el Enmascarado de Plata (Silver-Masked Santo); and even figures caricaturing an ex-president. These objects are not rigorously arranged, but you can construct a narrative based on them; what they tell us is part of the history and panorama of an innocent, vibrant Mexico of the second half of the twentieth century.

Manufacturers designed their own toys, reflecting the situation closest to them, like the Mexico of the time, particularly from 1930 to 1970.

Isabel Morales Quezada

Cortesía Mujam

These objects are not rigorously arranged, but you can construct a narrative based on them; what they tell us is part of the history and panorama of an innocent, vibrant Mexico of the second half of the twentieth century.

Most of the toys were collected during a time when the government almost completely banned imports, spurring the development of Mexican industry. Thus, without the globalization of our day, manufacturers designed their own toys, reflecting the situation closest to them, like the Mexico of the time, particularly from 1930 to 1970.

"This is why this museum is unique in the world," Mr. Shimizu proudly explains, because what can be found on the market today does not have the distinctive, "local" flavor of the toys found here. A large part of what collectors all over the world gather today, regardless of the nationality, is "Made in China." Besides that, they are not toys made for children, but created specifically for collectors. The owner of more than one million pieces gathered over his lifetime, of which "barely" 40 000 are on exhibit, emphasizes that this collection "is made more with human energy than with money or good taste," adding that it has been made by "carrying, arranging, and storing."

It has been a titanic effort that one step at a time has led to building this space that preserves the playful spirit of childhood; museography plays an essential role, avoiding any hint of solemnity. Designed and built by Roberto Shimizu, space ships, jukeboxes, boxes with lens through which visitors can look onto the brilliant universes inhabited by an endless number of toys, or a steel box with a circular, sub-

The owner says that this collection "is made more with human energy than with money or good taste," adding that it has been made by "carrying, arranging, and storing."

marine-type hatch break with the tradition of traditional display cases, making a huge contribution to changing the mood of both children and adults, as well as sparking their curiosity to find out what's inside them. Visitors' smiles and surprised faces are proof that he has achieved the desired effect.

When you finish the visit, the question arises: How is it possible that everyone finds his or her favorite toy? To answer that, we have to go back to the story of how this collection came about. Being born in Mexico City, and in the Doctores Neighborhood in particular, was very important, says Roberto Shimizu. Since the government prioritized centralization, a large number of items and toys came to the capital first, specifically to this neighborhood, where they were sold at accessible prices because most people, especially residents of this area, lacked the financial wherewithal to buy expensive or sophisticated toys. So a Mexican industry making low-cost items proliferated.

"I picked up what I found on the street, what nobody thought to keep because they placed no value on it." But,

Public spaces have been neglected and changed; this museum is important because it shows and reminds us of a time that continues to be part of Mexicans' memory.

the value of these objects is in the emotions they trigger. And another thing: these are toys conceived of for children to play with. "I kept everything that made us happy," he says. And that's why he wanted to exhibit them; so, he created a time capsule without seals, open to anyone who wants to visit it, and in its birthplace. When asked why he's reticent to change the museum site, he explains that if it's all moved to a better-off neighborhood, it wouldn't be accessible to the people who visit it now, and it would lose its essence. The pieces would be seen as objects to be venerated, like something exotic or extravagant; the reunion of the visitor and the toys would no longer be as natural. In addition, he is particularly fond of Doctores residents since his parents' shop was always very successful. He thinks that the museum somehow gives back a little of what it gave him.

Toys like the ones found here tend to disappear, explains Shimizu, since the country and the way of looking at the world have changed. For example, children used to go out onto the street to play with their toys, to be with other children and their parents, but today, those parents seem content to keep the children busy, distracted, and shut in, which is what happens when you opt for electronic toys. He also says that public spaces have been neglected and changed, like the sidewalks, that have gotten narrower, or disappeared altogether, to make room for cars.

In addition to relating part of the city's history through its toys, this museum is important because it shows and reminds us of a time that continues to be part of Mexicans' memory. The Shimizu family hopes that whoever goes to the museum will perceive and value the creative capacity of the hed Mexicans in all eras. The fabulous microcosms encapsulated in each display case nourished the imagination of thousands of children who, today, as adults, when they see these pieces again, tell their children stories they thought were lost. Perhaps this is why, once visitors are inside the museum, time stops and hours go by without their realizing it. VM

Cortesía Mujan

Museo del Juguete Antiguo, México (Mujam)
(Museum of Old-Fashioned Toys, Mexico)
Open to the public Monday through Friday, 9 a.m. to 6 p.m.; Saturdays, 9 a.m. to 4 p.m.; Sundays, 10 a.m. to 4 p.m.
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Phone: 52 (55) 5588-2100
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Elsie Montiel

Much More than an Extraordinary Editor (1956-2011)

Diego Ignacio Bugeda Bernal*





If anyone loved *Voices of Mexico* and gave it the best years of her professional life with complete conviction, it was Elsie Montiel. She was editor of this magazine, but she was much more than that. In its best moments, she was its soul, its inspiration. With enthusiasm and great vision, she always sought out issues, articles, and contributors for our "Art and Culture" section that were out of the ordinary, that would show us a different Mexico, far from the archetype, that would take us into other, often unknown, or sometimes little-appreciated but undoubtedly valuable, dimensions of its great cultural diversity and undeniable impetus for artistic creation; a very original Mexico, cast precisely in the manner of the lens and spirit of Elsie Montiel. And, of course, in *Voices of Mexico*'s difficult times, Elsie was also its support, the pillar that buoyed it up with a good idea, with an unexpected turn that brought it back into its readers and subscribers' realm of preferences: an agreement with the publicity agencies for Mexico's different states' tourism programs throughout the country, or with the cultural officials in important cities, breathing new life into our publication and allowing us to continue to show the English-speaking public our nation's inexhaustible marvels.

*Editor-in-Chief of *Voices of Mexico*.

With enthusiasm and great vision, she always sought out issues, articles, and contributors for our "Art and Culture" section that were out of the ordinary, that would show us a different Mexico.

Elsie was more than a very good editor. Over her years at *Voices of Mexico*, she also trained in other essential areas of publishing. Her undoubted commitment to the magazine prompted her to take many photography courses. The objective: not having to depend on budgets and red tape to get first-class photographic quality. The result was that in recent years, with her spirit trained in letters and sensitive to the essence of things, Elsie traveled the country, capturing stupendous images to illustrate the articles she commissioned and sometimes wrote. Her love for *Voices* and her adventurous spirit turned her into an extraordinary photographer and an intrepid traveler along the sometimes stormy roads of our country. I remember some stunning issues (one, for example, about "the other Mayas," or the one about the contemporary culture of the communities living along the route of the missions in Querétaro's Sierra Gorda mountains) that were grounded in that undoubted ability so her own of seeking and finding what was parallel, what was authentic, what was original in Mexico's culture, always refusing to accept anything that smelled of commercialism or that wallowed in the archetypical. That was the editorial philosophy she defended and implemented until the end.

Her love for *Voices*, and her adventurous spirit turned her into an extraordinary photographer and an intrepid traveler along the sometimes stormy roads of our country.

Elsie also contributed a great deal to production of books by the UNAM Center for the Research on North America, the institution that publishes *Voices of Mexico*. Just like photography, Elsie became completely immersed in the graphic design and practical aspects of publishing. Her contributions were legion and her availability and talent always recognized by CISAN's researchers and the other authors the CISAN published.

One of her colleagues, Cynthia Creamer, wrote that with Elsie, she learned to see things in a different way and not be satisfied with the first impression of anything. And, in effect, Elsie was never satisfied. She thought that every product could always be perfected, and she hated faking complacence with anything that was not well done. Like any good editor, she was obsessive and a perfectionist. She taught us to see beyond the obvious, it's true; and also to never take anything as a given. Above all, Elsie was a good workmate, always generous and quick to offer solidarity and help others, anyone who needed it; a good friend who would console us when some storm was devastating our existence; an upright, honest person who was always demanding, first and foremost, of herself.

The best homage we can pay her in the magazine where she worked and that she loved so much is to leave her in the company of some of the best photographs she took and that she also deeply loved. VM

NORTEAMÉRICA
ACADEMIC JOURNAL OF CISAN

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

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Cantar de espejos. Poesía testimonial chicana de mujeres

Claire Joysmith, ed.

These texts, "songs,...hymns to a rich oral and poetic tradition, heritage of a braid of (indigenous, mestiza, American, and other) roots and cultures," build a bridge defined by a complex hybridity that surpasses idiomatic codes. The selection, ranging from the Chicano movement until the twenty-first century, proposes a real and metaphoric cross, in a kind of cultural-linguistic smuggling of the poetics of the feminine Chicana identities.





La renta petrolera y la construcción de regímenes no propietales. El caso de Pemex

Rosío Vargas
Miguel Morles Udaeta

The adoption of the neoliberal model by Mexico's oil industry has undermined the structure and legal foundations of the state in order to support U.S. energy security. This has happened in a context in which Mexico only has 10 years worth of oil reserves, on which a considerable part of its budget depends, particularly the items earmarked for social security and education, among others.

Diásporas. Reflexiones teóricas

Nattie Golubov, ed.

The articles in this book use different disciplinary and comparative perspectives to reflect on the discourse of the Diaspora, one of the most debated discussions about international migration, on ethno-national identities and their relationship to the state, and on multiculturalism, cultural hybridity, and other issues that touch very closely on the matter of migrant communities.





Cooperación en Ciencia y Tecnología en América del Norte y Europa

Edit Antal
Fidel Aroche Reyes
editors

Despite expectations about NAFTA, Mexico's deficit in science and technology puts both its competitiveness and environment at risk. The book identifies the cooperation models in these fields in North America, comparing them with the successful European Union case. This helps the reader understand the scope of integration policy for promoting a regional technological change through an effort capable of combining public and private policies that can close the gap.

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September 11 Ten Years On

Pool New/REUTERS

Ten years have passed since the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States. During this decade, terrorism has come to be considered the principal threat to international security, displacing the debates that placed the development agenda at the forefront of international priorities in the 1990s. All of the work undertaken by the international community, especially through the United Nations-led summits on issues such as the situation of women and children, the environment, human settlements, social development, and so on, leading up to the 2000 New York Millennium Summit, went ignored after the following year's events, when the security agenda, and especially the struggle against terrorism, took precedence over all these matters.

In recent years, however, the United States has realized that many other scourges besides terrorism can represent equal or greater threats to its security. Examples include natural phenomena like Hurricane Katrina, an epidemic like the AH1N1 flu virus, or even the 2008 financial crisis. In fact, in allocating so many human and material resources to the terrorist threat, other issues were not dealt with, which has only made the United States more vulnerable as it faces serious difficulties in projecting leadership and guiding the world along the path of security and prosperity.

In the following analyses, leading specialists discuss aspects of the consequences the events of September 11, 2001, have had for Mexico, the United States, and the world, 10 years on.

The United States and the International Security Agenda
Counting the Cost, Ten Years On

María Cristina Rosas*

Russell Boyce/REUTERS

Bin Laden was one of the world's main security concerns over the last 10 years.

Ten years have passed since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States; the events spelled out the international security agenda of the following decade in capital letters. During this period, terrorism was characterized as the principal threat to international security, despite recognition that other scourges —such as natural disasters and epidemics or pandemics, to name just two— proved to be equally damaging to social wellbeing.

The first decade of the twenty-first century also marked a dramatic decline in U.S. hegemony, in part due to the appearance of defenselessness the attacks left in the popular imagination of a country that was the self-proclaimed winner of the Cold War and even "the one indispensable nation." Ten years on, and despite the fact that in May 2011 the alleged mastermind of the attacks, Osama Bin Laden, was captured and executed by U.S. troops, Washington does not appear to be regaining the upper hand, and in fact has seen its leadership role in the world greatly diminished by the 2008 financial crisis.

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Rosas's most recent book is *La seguridad por otros medios. La agenda de seguridad en el siglo XXI: lecciones para México* (Mexico City: Centro de Análisis e Investigación sobre Paz, Seguridad y Desarrollo Olof Palme A. C./UNAM, 2011).

Even now, with attempts by Barack Obama's government to change course, as demonstrated by the announcement that troops based in Afghanistan will be withdrawn by 2014 at the latest, it seems unlikely that this will restore his country to pole position as world leader, particularly given its performance in other countries. Nor does it appear that Washington will give up the use of force since, although it seems likely that terrorism will decline in importance following recent events, a perception exists that organized crime must be dealt with, and drug trafficking in particular, an issue of major importance for Mexico.

The U.S. is facing serious leadership problems, apparently related to poor administration of its power resources, but above all to the ascent of *the others*, countries that object to its preeminence as a world power.

Those in Decline and Those on the Rise

In his book on the decline and fall of the European Union,[1] journalist Richard Youngs considers that this group of nations, whose experience in integration goes back over 50 years, to the Treaty of Rome —or over 60 years, if we count the initiative by Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands to create Benelux in the middle of the World War II—[2] is in crisis and risks becoming irrelevant if it does not change its strategy. Youngs's analysis is important given the perception that the European Union (EU), long considered a world power to rival even the United States, is currently experiencing one of its worst moments in the new century.

For the United States this should, in principle, be good news, given that it will be some time before Europe can reassert itself and become a strategic rival to Washington. However, the country is facing its own serious leadership problems, apparently related to poor administration of its power resources, but above all to the ascent of *the others*.

Who are *the others*? Generally speaking, they are countries that object to the United States' preeminence as a world power, though it bears mentioning that none of them appears prepared at present to assume the role of world leader, especially given the costs this would entail. These nations include Russia, China, India and Brazil; Japan and the EU also belong on the list, though their recent performance has undermined this. Though these are highly diverse nations, they all possess certain power resources that give them room for maneuver and relative prominence in international relations.

In this scenario, the United States would be called upon to make urgent efforts to change its course, while the rest of the world, and in particular these emerging countries —which are not necessarily the same as the so-called emerging economies— would have to make a greater effort to contribute to global governability, though they would inevitably demand recognition from Washington for that contribution.

Terrorism, Security and Other Scourges: Where Do the Priorities Lie?

When the United States characterized terrorism as the greatest threat to its security following the events of September 11, 2001, it was clear that the psychological impact of the attacks inside its territory had been devastating. The country that emerged as the winner at the end of the Cold War —a kind of *globocop* who would ensure security and prosperity for the planet— had been attacked, and the images of the Twin Towers ablaze and then collapsing were significant not only for the human tragedy they entailed, but above all for the *message* they bore. These highly mediatized events fulfilled their purpose: to show that the United States could be vulnerable in its own homeland, and thus, that the country supposedly charged with maintaining security worldwide was not even capable of looking after itself.

U.S. authorities, realizing the significance and impact of the attacks, set about articulating an equally mediatized response that included, among other strategies, circulating the image of the alleged mastermind of the attacks, in order to point the finger at the organization responsible for carrying them out, as well as finding where it was based and who its supporters were. It was in this way that war in Afghanistan, then ruled by the Taliban, who sheltered al-Qaeda cells, became imminent and was initiated a month after the attacks. Osama Bin Laden was placed on the list of the most-wanted men in the world, and most nations showed their solidarity with the U.S., condemning the attacks and closing ranks with Washington in the so-called global war on terrorism. At that moment, terrorism was elevated to the rank of the foremost threat to global security and to that of the United States in particular.

For all that, al-Qaeda's greatest success lies in having succeeded in destroying the United States' credibility and leadership. No doubt this inspired others to follow in their footsteps, meaning al-Qaeda is not the only organization to present a danger of terrorist attacks on U.S. targets.

As such, it would appear that asymmetrical conflicts are to be the hallmark of the twenty-first century, above all while U.S. security forces continue to favor conventional conflict scenarios in the face of the versatility of terrorist and criminal organizations.

If all this had not proved a serious enough challenge to U.S. credibility and leadership, the global economic crisis of 2008, which began there, demonstrated its inability to lead the community of nations down the path of prosperity. The companies and financial institutions responsible for the crisis have failed to pay their dues, and it does not appear that the U.S. or any other government is going to call them to account or punish them for their behavior.

The Death of Bin Laden and the Other Terrorism

It is important to remember that the terrorist attacks attributed to al-Qaeda under the leadership and guidance of the late Osama Bin Laden never put the survival of the United States as a nation at risk. Certainly it has been the object of attack in the past, especially abroad, though rarely inside its own borders. So, when the airplanes struck, and it was later confirmed the attack came from abroad, the U.S. sought to inflict "exemplary punishment" of the alleged perpetrators with the aim of dissuading others from following their example. Over the past decade it is known that further attacks were planned, but the better preparedness and reinforcement of U.S. security and that of its allies have succeeded in reducing the international terrorist threat.

Nevertheless, the Obama government faces the consequences of the failure to live up to promises made by the George W. Bush administration with regard to its security doctrine. These included destroying al-Qaeda and other transnational terrorist organizations; transforming Iraq into a prosperous, stable democracy; democratizing the rest of the autocratic regimes in the Middle East; eradicating terrorism as an asymmetrical threat; and ending the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, the United States needs to reconfigure its security interests in more cogent terms while bearing in mind the limitations of its power.

One of the consequences of placing al-Qaeda at the center of security concerns is the implied assumption in the U.S. and in much of the rest of the world that terrorism is above all a technique used by Islamic fundamentalists. It was forgotten that the United States was the victim of a brutal terrorist attack on April 19, 1995, perpetrated by a U.S. citizen, Timothy McVeigh, a veteran of the first Gulf War and a security guard. He set off a truck-bomb filled with explosives that destroyed the Alfred P. Murrah Building in Oklahoma, killing 168 persons and injuring 680 more.

This implies that the global war on terror should not lose sight of the fact that there is an internal level of threat in the United States from anti-government citizens, who are capable of causing serious harm to their fellow Americans. For example, it is often forgotten that following the September 11 terrorist attacks, a series of deliberate attacks using packages of anthrax spores caused the deaths of five people and affected a further 17. In contrast to the speed with which al-Qaeda and Bin Laden were identified as being behind the Twin Towers attacks, there was no such certainty when it came to identifying those responsible for the anthrax attacks. Two suspects, Dr. Stephen Hatfill, recently exonerated, and Bruce Edwards Ivins, who committed suicide before his name was made public, were all the U.S. justice system could come up with. Despite initial attempts to link the anthrax to al-Qaeda, no proof was found, bolstering the hypothesis that it was an action undertaken by anti-government Americans.

The question of internal terrorism by anti-government individuals and/or persons opposed to the government of the day for whatever motive is an important one, if we are to judge by the July 22, 2011, Norway attacks, attributed to an individual linked to the far right, discontented with the incumbent, left-wing government.

The highly mediatized events fulfilled their purpose: to show that the United States could be vulnerable in its own homeland, and thus, that the country supposedly charged with maintaining security worldwide was not even capable of looking after itself.

Epilogue: The New International Security Agenda

If September 11 and the subsequent decade provide a lesson for the world, it is that terrorism was neither born nor died in this time frame, nor is it something that can be dealt with using brute force. As such, it is necessary to reassess and improve the work of the intelligence services, since it is they who are in a position to evaluate security threats. Greater cooperation among nations is needed to confront the scourges that present themselves. And, rather than seeking out new enemies and/or threats, a holistic view of the problem is required, in the understanding that terrorism, organized crime, and other challenges tend to be the outgrowth of problems whose root cause lies in the unequal distribution of wealth. Terrorism, when it comes down to it, is only a method, not the problem in itself.

Nevertheless, we should not lose sight of the fact that, given that both the United States and the world are getting used to living with the terrorist scourge, it will perhaps become necessary to identify new threats to the security of individual nations and the world, due to the requirements of the U.S. military-industrial complex. This makes transnational organized crime a strong candidate to emerge as the leading threat, in place of terrorism.

It is difficult to ignore the fact that in recent decades the use of the term "organized crime" to refer to the ensemble of criminal actions committed by an organization set up for such ends has been broadly disseminated in international treaties, the media, and, of course, among judicial bodies. Some attribute this phenomenon to the end of the Cold War, the collapse of the Soviet Union and of communism, as well as to the need on the part of a range of agencies and ministries charged with national security to identify new threats to the post-Cold War order. George Tenet, former head of the CIA, fueled this perception when he asserted in 1997 that the leading threat to U.S. national security in the twenty-first century would be international organized crime. However, the U.S. government did not invest what it needed to in this fight, as shown by the ease with which international organized crime is able to launder money or engage in the illicit arms trade. When we examine the economic, political, cultural, and social impact of organized crime's activities crime on societies and the criminals' intensive and extensive use of globalization networks to achieve their ends, it becomes clear that this is a complex problem demanding intense international collaboration to fight it effectively. Thus, at bottom, it would appear that the perception of the international community is that organized crime, especially in the age of globalization, tends to become or is presumed to be a threat to international security, particularly after the capture and death of Osama Bin Laden.

Rather than seeking out new enemies and/or threats, a holistic view is required in the understanding that terrorism, organized crime, and other challenges tend to be the outgrowth of problems whose root cause lies in the unequal distribution of wealth.

This is an issue of the greatest importance, if we consider the manner in which the United States opened hostilities on Afghanistan with the aim of decimating al-Qaeda and capturing its then-leader, reducing the country to chaos, arrested development, and drug trafficking. If the fight against transnational organized crime were to become the priority of the U.S. security agenda in the world, the affect on Mexico would be of the utmost seriousness. If we add this to the United States' decline as an economic power, the scenario Mexico is facing is still more complex, considering its enormous dependency on that country in terms of trade, investment, and remittances. Hence, the importance of Mexico looking to other latitudes in the understanding that, while its strategic relationship with the United States will not end, in order to deal with to the scenario of economic and financial crisis there, which will inevitably involve the Mexican economy, it is wise to be prudent and establish genuine alliances with the countries that are on the rise. This, naturally, does not excuse Mexico from insisting in its daily meetings with the United States on the importance of the development agenda to generate security, considering the symbiotic relationship that exists or should exist between the two countries. Given that security of the United States is dependent on that of Mexico, it is in the interest of the former to engage in all initiatives that may contribute to a more stable and prosperous environment. VM

Notes

[1] Richard Youngs, *Europe's Decline and Fall* (London: Profile Books, 2010).

[2] Benelux is an acronym formed from the first letters of the names of Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg. It is mainly used to refer to the Benelux Economic Union, in the context of the European Union. [Editor's Note.]

The Decade of Terror
Globalization under Surveillance

Leonardo Curzio*

Danny Moloshok/REUTERS

Ten years ago the international system was still displaying the optimism that flowered in the West after the collapse of the Communist world. President George W. Bush's proclamation that a new international order would follow the bipolar confrontation that dominated the second half of the twentieth century sparked great enthusiasm among broad layers of society. But it remained a mere proclamation.

People thought the international system, dominated by liberal democracies, tended to set up supra-national institutions and mandatory rules in the image of its national conflict resolution mechanisms to deal with differences and controversies among countries. This imaginary design also included the idea that the market economies would progressively form regional blocs, and the entire scenario seemed an inevitability for most countries.

The truth is that this optimistic reading did not include either the Arab countries or a large part of Africa, two regions that the hegemonic mind-set has not managed to situate or place in a dynamic of mutual understanding and collaboration. For some reason, however, harmony and prosperity was supposed to spread to other regions of the world, and so, all the peoples who had not arrived at "the end of history" would ready themselves to take that road.

Despite the fact that reality did not end up adjusting to the imagined scenarios, the advent of a new century injected optimism among the defenders of the project of a harmonious, cooperative globalization. However, the September 11, 2001, attacks brought that optimism to an abrupt halt. It is not necessary to go back over the details of what happened that ill-fated morning; we would just have to say that a good part of the suppositions that fed the dream of globalization collapsed. Let's look at some of them.

The first was the conviction, widely held in the last decade of the twentieth century, that national states were on the road to extinction because of the advance of globalization. After the al-Qaeda attacks, those states turned out to be the most adamantly demanded form of organization by a terrified populace. In effect, the hegemonic power and main driving force of globalization dredged up out of its institutional and linguistic archaeological sites the concept of "homeland" to

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Globalization has not stopped over these last few years. New globally inter-linked technologies, corporations, and communities continue to interact, although with growing restrictions.

define a basic protective shield for its territoriality and population. In the same way, borders returned to the most traditional of their definitions, that of limits and barriers, even when Mexico and Canada were, in addition to being neighbors, trade partners and allies.

The second supposition was that the U.S. government should have little influence in economic and social life; but events changed the paradigm, making way for a series of security agencies to begin to control and supervise economic life, movement, and even the cultural and religious interests of different communities.

The third supposition was that the basic norms of the rule of law are immutable and are the essence of a democratic republic. Reality showed that even a country like the United States could close its eyes to despicable practices that violated its own Constitution. Some excesses, like torture, clandestine jails, and the passage of special pieces of legislation (like the USA Patriot Act), were justified by Republican and Democratic legislators alike as "the lesser evil."

Globalization under Surveillance

It would be inaccurate to say that globalization stopped in 2001. But it seems to me indisputable that the United States' reaction was very disturbing for the world economy. In other words, neither the attacks nor the reaction to them managed to stop the economy's process of planetary expansion. Economic, technological, and cultural globalization has not stopped over these last few years. New globally inter-linked technologies, corporations, and communities continue to interact, although with growing restrictions. Trade has not stopped, but customs control devices, spending on technologies for following containers and GPS equipment, as well as constant scrutiny by security agencies are all part of a reality we are going to have to live with for a long time.

The same thing is happening in other areas like migration and tourism. People continue to move from one country to another for economic reasons, but also for recreational or cultural reasons, or just out of pure consumerism. Although travel is becoming more and more complicated, and countries are spending enormous sums of money on security equipment for detecting if a passenger is traveling with certain liquids or to figure out if a nail clipper can be turned into a weapon to subdue a flight crew, the flow of tourists has risen again, and in any case, if it drops, it is more for economic reasons that out of fear or the bother caused by security checks.

One of the most lasting consequences of the 2001 attacks is that airport controls —bureaucratic and extraordinarily slow at times— and body searches are now habitual in airports all over the world. In some cases, these checks are done with technologies that many have labeled as frankly invasive.

In the same way, labor markets have suffered from a rather crude form of securitization. Among other things, this has meant that migrants and potential terrorists are lumped together. Based on the hypothesis of universal risk, according to which everyone is potentially a terrorist, the checkpoints overlook what the numbers and the clear trends show and opt for very general revisions. It is common knowledge that thousands of Mexicans cross the border every day by land, whether with legitimate or illegitimate aims, but until now, no one has shown that porous border to be the appropriate place for the movement of terrorists. Undeniably, something could happen, but the fact that, after millions of crossings, no important terrorist activity has been detected situates us in a scenario in which the probabilities of it happening are extremely low.

Certainly, statistically, the risk of a terrorist attack is low. However, Mexico, like few other countries, has faced a security apparatus that in the name of the anti-terrorist fight has multiplied its controls and stigmatized an economic phenomenon like undocumented migration all because our neighbor to the north has classified it as a matter of national security. This means that, if there ever was the possibility of an immigration reform that included what Mexico wanted, that hope vanished on that September morning, as did the possibility of discussing a new institutional architecture in North America that would lead to a new kind of integration.

Distrust and Unilateralism

This kind of globalization under surveillance that encourages distrust is the most poisonous product of the attack by the group led by Osama Bin Laden. In addition to these restric-

Labor markets have suffered from a rather crude form of securitization. Among other things, this has meant that migrants and potential terrorists are lumped together.

tions, a multidirectional conception of risk gained ground among a large part of the United States' leading class and media, injuring the country's relations with a large part of its closest allies and also with the world's multilateral institutions. This is not the place to delve into lengthy explanations, but it is the place to cite the bilateral slights caused with Canada, France, and a large number of its NATO allies, as well as the ill repute brought upon the group of inspectors headed by Hans Blix.

Since the risk could come from any part of the world and in any guise, anyone could become a suspect without any founded, articulated incriminating evidence. This multidirectional vision of risk implied that the security system was permanently in a state of tension. There was no frontier, nationality, or flight that was not *a priori* considered potentially dangerous. Technological utopianism promoted the illusion that with devices, computers, data bases, scanners, and other gadgets, it would be possible to control anything and everything, and make sure that no fundamentalist would ever be able to take advantage of some crack in the armor to strike against the great power again.

This delirium of control of all movement, entries into the country, planes, trains, and ships —and the supposition that it could be done by throwing money and technology at it— implied making the experience in risk management relative. What does this mean? That if traditionally a factor or group had not represented a security risk for the country, like, for example, seasonal workers, there was no reason to recalibrate upward the probability that that factor or human group would become terrorists simply because a gang of radicals decided to crash a plane into New York's World Trade Center. However, that is what happened, and, as a result, in the last decade, millions of workers and tourists have been treated like dangerous extremists.

A large part of the shifts in the security paradigm and the doctrines stemming from it, used to act unilaterally and without clear rules, can be explained by the fact that the great power unilaterally took on a kind of legitimacy based on the irrefutable fact of being the victim. A country so viciously attacked adjudicated for itself the right to proceed as it saw fit, in accordance with the mood of a fearful, injured populace. To satisfy that mood, the George W. Bush administration did not hesitate to tamper with the proof, destroy reputations, or deliberately lie to further its aim of war with Iraq.

Over these 10 years, more than enough evidence has presented itself to say that the fact that the agenda for peace and security has been clouded by wounded sensibilities and an appetite for vengeance has become an enormous threat to the stability of the planet. The implications can be devastating for organizing the co-existence of nations, but also among the communities within a single country. That emotional and political predisposition spurred changes in the international system that 10 years later we have not been able to leave behind.

Some Lessons

After all this, in this decade, we have been able to draw some lessons that can be useful to us. The first is that in addition to killing innocents, terrorists also aim to destroy basic freedoms. How a government reacts to an attack is just as important as the attack itself; this is why it is an example to be learned from that countries like Spain and the United Kingdom have shown that a bloody attack can be responded to using the force of democratic values and the rule of law; that special tribunals are not needed, much less the suppression of spaces for freedom to be able to deal with the terrorists. It has become clear that good intelligence and special operations, like the one that put an end to the life of Bin Laden, are more useful than conventional wars that sweep away entire populations.

In addition, in the last 10 years, we have been able to see that promoting prejudices against other civilizations leads us to the blind alley of incomprehension and escalating violence, and, as a result, to back an ideology of hatred that actually encourages terrorists. And, last but not least, we have learned that underestimating certain risk factors to concentrate on counter-terrorism can be prejudicial in the medium term. The increased power and capabilities of drug traffickers in Mexico can be explained to a great extent by the relative neglect of U.S. security agencies, whose concentration on only one of the issues on their agendas changed the priorities. This was devastating for the stability of their southern border and Mexico. What is clear is that the twenty-first century began that September of 2001. VM

Saving the Homeland: Obama's New Smart Power Security Strategy

José Luis Valdés-Ugalde*
With Frania Duarte**

POOL New/REUTERS

The two U.S. presidents of the new era.

Barack Obama's election, along with a Democratic majority in Congress, was a historic opportunity to build a new security agenda that would also be central to Washington's foreign policy. This new agenda was not merely a response to the change in administration and party, but was deemed urgent and necessary given the precarious international situation in which the U.S. found itself after the imposition of hard power during the George W. Bush administration.

Obama faced the challenge of containing foreign threats and recovering the international legitimacy of the United States. This called for a fresh foreign policy strategy, based on the fundamental tenets of the theory and practice of smart power.[1] As Obama's current term of office draws to a close, discussions have centered on the feasibility of the strategy's progress and for him to fully implement the security agenda as originally put forward, measured against the high expectations raised by his proposal for a transformative change and given the restrictions imposed by the Republicans' winning a majority in Congress at the 2010 midterm elections. So far it has been possible to implement a part of this agenda given the need to recover the country's international legitimacy, since this strategy has enabled Washington to create the necessary conditions to develop a safe environment for itself.

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U.S. Security and the Bush Legacy

Bush's administration, along with the second generation of neoconservatives in power,[2] clearly represented a return to a realistic foreign policy. This coincided with, and became strengthened by, the 9/11 terrorist attacks. After that, the

administration focused its energy on fighting against global and state-sponsored terrorism. In this sense, the entire world, not just the United States, underwent a process of securitization, as a result of the reductive discourse brought about by this new war on terror. Bush warned the whole world, "Either you are with us, or with the terrorists." Ultimately, a global geopolitical design was being created, based on the transposing of borders.[3] New security frontiers were drawn, right up to the boundaries of the "axis of evil" countries: Iran, Iraq, and North Korea. This all combined to create a unilateral foreign policy and the application of the doctrine of preventive action, or the Bush doctrine.[4]

Bush overestimated the effectiveness of the use of force by thinking that his recalcitrant approach would reflect the United States' overwhelming power and that it would reinstate the nation as the global police force. However, it achieved precisely the opposite: Washington's credibility plummeted and its power was undermined; its traditional allies and public opinion were shocked by the United States' course of action, both in the invaded territories and with regard to its own image.[5] Moreover, the U.S. economy began to slip, and this was exacerbated by the cost of the war: up until 2008 the combined cost of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan was US$963 billion, while the budget deficit had reached US$459 billion.[6]

Topping it all, the United States had failed to create the security it craved both domestically and abroad, with the resulting threat for the country itself and its allies. Its international borders remained porous —organized crime has penetrated 232 cities, while the flow of immigrants, representing a threat to security according to the far right, dropped by just one per cent in 2008. Osama bin Laden was still alive, and al-Qaeda and the Taliban had not been defeated, and both Iran and North Korea continued their nuclear programs.

Obama and the Smart Power Strategy

On his arrival at the White House, Barack Obama faced a bleak situation, although this did not spell the end of U.S. supremacy by any means. Despite losing international legitimacy, the United States continued to be the world's leading economic and military power.[7] Its political authority had indeed weakened due to the straining of diplomatic relations with some of its traditional allies such as the European Union, and to the global financial crisis. Expectations were sky-high after Obama's election, both at home and abroad. He was not only seen as a politician with a different (progressive) approach, but as the first African-American president, he automatically represented a turning point in the country's history. Rather than the global situation itself, it appeared that the arrival of a non-establishment president was what truly marked the beginning of a new era.

The new strategy's substantial change was the recognition that the U.S. could not face the world's security problems alone, given the political and economic costs of such an approach.

But did this really mark a turning point that would change the direction of the security agenda for the U.S. and the rest of the world? Would it provide an effective guarantee of security, averting another 9/11 and dispensing with preventive action? The new strategy's substantial change was the recognition that the U.S. could not face the world's security problems alone, given the political and economic costs of such an approach. Obama's main challenge was not just to identify and tackle security threats, but also to regain the credibility lost. He needed an alternative strategy that would genuinely work, both in practice and politically, to the satisfaction of the majority; a plan that would position the country as a leading international player that still had a viable and necessary role in maintaining international order.

With a view to forwarding U.S. interests in the world,[8] security strategy was redesigned using the idea of smart power, "the skillful combination of both hard power and soft power."[9] Therefore, "to meet today's challenges, the United States must harness …[its] military, diplomatic, economic, information, legal, and moral strength in an integrated and balanced fashion."[10] By recognizing that "no one nation —no matter how powerful— can meet global challenges alone,"[11] the strategy favors soft power over hard power, with the latter used as a last resort in case diplomacy, the best means of resolving conflicts, proves ineffective. Therefore the United States sought to strengthen its commitments with traditional allies and even create new ones with key actors (for example, with the BRIC countries). This would show the world its new face, one of a country involved and interested in the common good by embracing the achievement of the *global good*. The ultimate goal was to expand U.S. influence, helping to legitimize its actions.

Domestically, the U. S. remains unable to protect itself from insecurity, its goal since 9/11. Obama is pressured from all sides, especially by the more radical elements in U.S. politics, currently led by the Tea Party movement.

Deploying Smart Politics: Toward a New Security Agenda?

The strategy that led to the war on terrorism did not produce the desired outcome. This fact, added to the critical economic and political situation facing the world and the United States, required an urgent and fundamental reformulation of the U.S. security agenda. Security could no longer be seen as a purely military issue, but also as an economic, political, and social one. Not only because the United States' international legitimacy had been damaged, but also because Americans themselves had become disenchanted with the Bush administration's predominantly dogmatic foreign policy and neglect of domestic politics.

Given Obama's recognition that "our prosperity provides a foundation for our power, it pays for our military [and] it underwrites our diplomacy,"[12] he has been cautious in dealing with foreign policy and security issues (Libya is a good example). He has chosen pressing matters that had spilled over into the start of his term in office from the Bush administration. Therefore he prioritized the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, fighting al-Qaeda, withdrawing troops from Iraq, recovering the United States' international respectability and leadership, all related to the rebuilding of the economy and promotion of American values abroad.[13]

There was still concern that weapons of mass destruction could fall into terrorist hands. Obama therefore modified U.S. nuclear strategy, which was complemented by the signature of the START treaty with Russia. This move helped defuse the tension created by Bush after he abandoned the ABM treaty and deployed the anti-missile shield, and it also subsequently facilitated Russian support in applying sanctions on Iran. He also displayed a cautious willingness to enter into dialogue with Iran and North Korea.

For Obama, the United States must still be defended against the threat of terrorism. But he broke with Bush's discourse of the war against global terrorism, so he applied a demilitarization policy principally focused on Iraq and Afghanistan.[14] In Afghanistan, he raised the number of troops by 30 000, and refrained from reporting on all his activities in Pakistan, which resulted in the killing of Bin Laden, hastening the troop withdrawal.[15]

Afghanistan is still in chaos and unable to develop a democratic regime as a failed state and given the Taliban's presence (although for now the U.S. government negotiates with them in order to bring an end to hostilities). After Bin Laden's assassination, Washington considers al-Qaeda to be on the verge of collapse.[16]

Obama's 2009 speech in Cairo showed his willingness to shore up relations between the United States and the Muslim world. And the Arab Spring presented an even greater opportunity to deepen the relationship with Muslim countries and to redefine U.S. policy toward the Middle East.[17] But while Muslim countries reacted favorably to Washington's newly conciliatory message, the U.S. position on the Israel-Palestine dispute has raised suspicions and caused discomfort among some actors in the region.[18]

Domestically, the United States remains unable to protect itself from insecurity, its goal since 9/11. Obama is pressured from all sides, especially by the more radical elements in U.S. politics, currently led by the Tea Party movement.[19] These sectors protest the lack of border security that in their view would contain the immediate threat to national security: immigration and organized crime. But they are not just protesting. Recently they have carried out specific measures to apply pressure (such as SB1070), in an attempt to challenge Obama, to show that an outsider cannot meet the responsibilities of being president. These political setbacks have entangled the United States in an economic and financial crisis along with the rest of the world. On the one hand, questions are being asked about the U.S. government's credibility in tackling economic issues; at the same time Obama's hands are tied to prevent him from effectively and fully deploying his smart policy on all fronts and international arenas as originally planned.

Final Considerations

The break with George W. Bush's foreign policy was not only a result of Barack Obama's type of political project, but also because of international events. The security agenda has been designed to prioritize conflictive issues, rather than conflictive relations, which help restore the United States' in-

ternational credibility. In this sense, U.S. security no longer depends solely on mounting a defense against traditional and cross-border threats, but also on the handling of foreign policy and the ability to persuade allies using solid arguments, and obviously on its domestic situation, too.

For the time being Obama's administration has been focused on a transitional period, to clear the way for Washington to start a process of returning and regaining its international standing. Smart power seems likely to remain a valid strategy, not just as a means to meet these objectives but also given budget cuts: the agreement to raise the debt ceiling to US$14.2 trillion dollars entailed a major cut (US$350 billion) in defense spending for the next decade.

Expectations were sky-high after Obama's election; both at home and abroad it appeared that the arrival of a non-establishment president was what truly marked the beginning of a new era.

Therefore, the next U.S. president will have to design his or her security agenda very carefully, especially if choosing to use hard power. This could be the opportunity for the country to consolidate its image-rebuilding exercise and to reap the fruits of Obama's smart power strategy that so far has shown more strengths than weaknesses. VM

Notes

[1] Joseph S. Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), and *The Future of Power* (New York: Public Affairs, 2011).

[2] Jesús Velasco Grajales, *Neoconservatives in U. S. Foreign Policy under Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.Voices behind the Throne* (Washington, D.C. and Baltimore: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010).

[3] This term is used to describe the virtual movement of frontiers by a state as it charts its global course, re-creating geopolitical spaces.

[4] According to this doctrine, the U.S. could launch an attack in anticipation of an enemy attack, should the enemy represent an imminent security threat.

[5] In a survey carried out in 25 countries in 2007. 49 percent of those interviewed believed that the U.S. was playing a negative role in the world, while 32 percent considered it positive. Over 50 percent disapproved of how Bush handled specific issues: Iran and North Korea's nuclear programs, the Iraq war and the Israel-Hezbollah war. See "World View of US Role Goes From Bad to Worse," BBC World Services, January 2007, http://news .bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/23_01_07_us_poll.pdf.

[6] Office of the Under Secretary of Defense, "National Defense Budget. Estimates for FY 2012," March 2011, http://comptroller.defense.gov/defbudget/fy2012/FY12_Green_Book.pdf.

[7] The U.S. has the world's largest economy with a GDP of US$14.5 trillion; it also spends the most on security and defense (US$698 billion, or 4.8 per cent of its GDP), according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). Sam Perlo-Freeman, Julian Cooper, Olawale Ismail, Elisabethsköns, and Carina Sol Miran, "Military Expenditure," *SIPRI Yearbook 2011. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security,* http://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2011/files/SIPRIYB1104-04A-04B.pdf.

[8] These interests are the security of the United States, its citizens, allies, and partners; a strong U.S. economy; an open international economic system; respect for universal values within the U.S. and around the world; and an international order advanced by U.S. leadership that promotes peace, security, and opportunity through cooperation. See White House, "National Security Strategy," May 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.

[9] For more information, see R. L. Armitage and J. S. Nye, *CSIS Commission on Smart Power: A Smarter, More Secure America* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/071106_csissmartpowerreport.pdf, and Joseph S. Nye, *The Future of Power*, op. cit.

[10] The White House, "Defense Guiding Principles", http://www.whitehouse .gov/issues/defense.

[11] White House, "National Security Strategy," op. cit.

[12] Quoted in Daniel Drezner, "Does Obama Have a Grand Strategy?" *Foreign Affairs* vol. 90, no. 4 (July-August 2011).

[13] White House, op. cit.

[14] Obama's announcement of a complete withdrawal of troops in Iraq for December this year is consistent with the agreement signed with Baghdad during the Bush administration in November 2008. However, the Iraqi prime minister intends to renegotiate for troops to remain, fearing the withdrawal will reignite insecurity in the country.

[15] "In June 2011 Obama announced a drawdown of 33 000 U.S. troops (10 000 by the end of 2011 and 23 000 by 2012), leaving 66 000-68 000 on the ground who will be withdrawn in 2014." See Kenneth Katzman, "Afghanistan: Post-Taliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy," Congressional Research Service, October 21, 2011, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row /RL30588.pdf.

[16] Greg Miller, "U.S. Officials Believe al-Qaeda on Brink of Collapse," *The Washington Post*, July 26, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/al-qaeda-could-collapse-us-officials-say/2011/07/21/gIQAFu2pbI_story.html?tid=sm_twitter_washingtonpost.

[17] White House, "Remarks by the President on the Middle East and North Africa," May 19, 2011, http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/19/remarks-president-middle-east-and-north-africa.

[18] Arab American Institute Foundation, "Arab Attitudes 2011," http://aai.3cdn .net/5d2b8344e3b3b7ef19_xkm6ba4r9.pdf.

[19] José Luis Valdés Ugalde, "The Ugly Right," *Excélsior*, August 24, 2011, p. 23, http://excelsior.com.mx/PlugIn/flipbook/periodico.php?seccion=flip-nacional&fecha=24-08-2011.

Dilemmas of Democratic Transition in Mexico, National Security, and 9/11 In the United States

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I still vividly remember the summer of 1994 when the emergence of the San Angel Group caused excitement and a glimmer of hope among certain sectors of society and public opinion.[1] The vacuum left by the regime dating back to the Mexican Revolution, the uncertainty felt by a group of Mexican intelligentsia and politicians following the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) uprising in Chiapas, the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, the presidential candidate for the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI), and the kidnapping of important businessmen made clear the need for political reform in late twentieth-century Mexico,[2] a country where power had never changed hands peacefully through elections.[3]

For these reasons, it is worth remembering that between 1988 and 1994 the opposition[4] had been emphasizing the need to creating a "genuinely competitive" electoral system,[5] and the Carlos Salinas de Gortari administration (1988-1994) had also set about this same task. This priority overshadowed what the opposition would need to do should they actually win office, or how the transition would be agreed upon and long-term considerations like a constitutional reform of the armed forces, the intelligence services, public security, foreign policy, and, of course, national security.[6] However, long-term strategies and a democratic and consensual national security program were almost entirely absent from political party agendas between 1988 and 2000.

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Democracy and the Challenges Of Regime Change

We should first consider that democracy, once implemented as a system of government, is neither permanent nor a panacea. The democratic state is the result of a long interlude of historical formation in Europe (fifth-century BC Athens and Rome) and, in the modern era, in North America (United States and Canada) that gives citizens a way of life, a political culture, and certain channels for dissidence and representability through solid institutional systems. One of its most emblematic models, albeit controversial, is the representative system institutionalized by the founding fathers of the United States through the legitimacy bestowed by elections.[7]

Democratic states, such as ancient Greece and Rome, can still disappear or become "despotic governments."[8] We must therefore link democracy to the type of political regime in question, as well as to its historical legacies. Authoritarianism is engrained in Mexico's political DNA, from Porfirio Diaz's dictatorship to the long-lasting regime born of the Mexican Revolution. In the United States, meanwhile, democracy has been expansionist or multilateral, depending on its leaders and the given historical and international juncture. Political regimes use such historical arrangements to create their national security visions or doctrines. Therefore, any change in a regime's nature is one of the toughest challenges for any political system.

Transitions to democracy at the end of the twentieth century in Europe (Spain and Portugal) and in South America

The U.S. crisis deepened rifts in Mexico and intensified confrontations due to individual interests and legacies from the past. Ten years on, the Mexican government still lacks consensus, instruments, and strategies to combat security threats.

(Argentina, Chile, and Brazil) can provide important lessons for the reform process in Mexico. To neutralize any threat to democracy that may arise from the authoritarian past, the constitutional reform of the armed forces and intelligence services becomes one of the most delicate points.[9] Indeed, constitutional reform and scrutiny of historical power structures lies at the root of any transition. As a result, the intersection between democratic transition and the inclusion of a new democratic national security doctrine in Mexico has been the Achilles heel for strengthening the rule of law, respect for human rights, and the proper response to combat security threats.

United States: the Decisive External Factor

The watershed in the relations between Washington and the PRI (a relationship that began in 1928) came with the Chiapas conflict and Luis Donaldo Colosio's assassination in 1994. The U.S. government shifted its approach away from its traditional support for the PRI toward promoting democratic transition in a move that benefitted the National Action Party (PAN). The U.S. was strongly in favor of the key actors in Mexico's transition creating the instruments for political change, such as the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE), which would give certainty and legitimacy to the elections. However, for some time the U.S. had already been cautiously helping Mexico break free from authoritarianism and accompanying its democratization process.

Bill Clinton's administration saw certainty in 1994 election results as more important even than the very continuity of NAFTA,[10] especially since the Democratic government's security priorities lay in promoting democracy and the free market, and because support for authoritarian governments was perceived as a kind of continuation of the Cold War. Nevertheless, the system's endemic corruption and the 1997 link-up of Mexican army General José de Jesús Gutiérrez Rebollo with drug-trafficking were among the factors that led to Washington switching its support over to the Alliance for Change, a political coalition headed up by Vicente Fox Quesada.

Security and Democracy

The president's national security advisor Adolfo Aguilar Zínser revealed in February 2001 that initiatives taken with regard to the sectors that helped shape the democratic transition since 1988 had not constituted a plan of government.[11] He even pointed to projects in Fox's administration and in the system itself that were contested for personal, military, and civilian reasons; each in their own way, these internal conflicts weakened the Mexican state and prevented constitutional reform, from the president down.

As an example, Mexico's foreign minister at the time, Jorge G. Castañeda, referred to the absence of security on Mexico's foreign policy agenda. "It was non-existent, not even in bilateral relations….So there was practically no discussion of foreign policy, not to mention national security."[12] Books written by the first leader of the democratic transition, *Vicente Fox a los Pinos* (Vicente Fox to the Presidential Residence Los Pinos) and *Fox propone* (Fox Proposes), clearly reveal this lack of policy in the president's priorities. At this time, even the round-table talks presided over by the leading figure of state reform, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo, did not touch on the subjects of intelligence services and the armed forces. Mexico's Ministry of the Interior (Segob) was firmly against any far-reaching reform of the Center for Research and National Security (CISEN), as had been proposed by Mexico's recently created Presidential Council for National Security.

9/11

At the time of the terrorist attacks on Washington, D.C. and New York, the Mexican state was extremely vulnerable. The risk/threat agendas had not been redefined in the national security apparatus, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (SRE) considered that the existence of the new security council in fact posed a serious problem. The SRE was vying with the Ministry of the Interior and the Congress to take the lead on foreign policy, governance, and national security in relation to the United States, issues that required the closest possible coordination and a joint approach by the Ministries of the Navy and National Defense to safeguard land, air, and sea

SOME DEMOCRATIC SECURITY PRINCIPLES

Principles	*General Aims*	*Key Criteria*
Loyalty to the republic (without party bias)	Protect • Citizens • Freedoms and rights • Institutions • Physical and cultural heritage	Orientation • Preventive • Lawful • Regulated
Respect for law and exercise of rights	Defend • Rule of law • Territorial integrity and borders	Ethical and technical consistency
Democratic conviction	Guarantee • National cohesion • Democratic coexistence • Social peace • Political balance and certainty	Interaction • Participatory • Cooperative and coordinated • Plural • Interlinked • Simultaneous
Vision of the future	Monitor and prevent • Economic risks • Political risks • Ecological and natural risks	Effectiveness • Relevant and permanent

Source: National Security Council Archives during the Vicente Fox administration, February 2002.

borders, as well as the Mexican state's natural and strategic resources. Instead the cabinet was divided.

These problems became exacerbated after the most significant attack on U.S. soil since Pearl Harbor in 1941 triggered a whole series of structural changes in the U.S. government and Washington's subsequent unilateral efforts to launch a global war on terrorism. However, the Fox administration, of its own conviction and at the request of various federal agencies, decided to dismantle the only significant effort toward democratic security, which had sought to set priorities, order, and begin work, from within, on a diagnosis of matters of vital interest to the Mexican state, to modify doctrines, and to create the legal framework required by the transition.

Despite passing in 2005 a national security law, Mexico allowed security threats to go unchecked, without a diagnosis or the right information; as a result, the country is now facing a genuine national emergency since Felipe Calderón declared his war on drugs in December 2006.

FINAL CONSIDERATIONS

The actors in the 2000 democratic transition proved ill-equipped to handle political change. Also, the terrorist attacks on the U.S. took them by surprise and sent tremors through both the U.S. government and Vicente Fox's incipient administration. George W. Bush responded by defying the international system represented by the UN, as well as international peace and security. This increased the resentment and division among some of the actors who supported the transition in Mexico, because they had contrasting attitudes to Washington and embodied positions that required a government position.

In short, the U.S. crisis deepened rifts in Mexico and intensified confrontations due to individual interests and legacies from the past. Ten years on, the Mexican government still lacks consensus, instruments, and strategies to combat security threats.[13] The momentum of the movement for democracy has largely been lost. Insecurity caused by organized crime

has severely torn the social fabric and weakened the Mexican state. However, the transition did enable proposals to be outlined for a democratic security that may chart a stronger course toward the future, and by the same token, may improve Mexico's relationship with the U.S. post-9/11, as well as with the rest of the world, in the context of which the Mexican state would be able to define a response in the national interest. VM

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Notes

[1] Criticism and doubts about its origins also abound. Its founding members included politicians from across the spectrum: Vicente Fox, Jorge G. Castañeda, Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, and Elba Esther Gordillo, and intellectuals such as Carlos Fuentes, Enrique Krauze, Elena Poniatowska, and Carlos Monsiváis, who entered into a frank dialogue with public figures like José Woldenberg, Santiago Creel, Manuel Camacho Solís, and Porfirio Muñoz Ledo.

[2] Sergio Aguayo Quezada, *Vuelta en U. Guía para entender y reactivar la democracia estancada* (Mexico City: Taurus, 2010), p. 126.

[3] José Woldenberg, *La construcción de la democracia* (Mexico City: Plaza & Janés, 2002), p. 22.

[4] Adolfo Aguilar Zinser, *¡Vamos a ganar! La pugna de Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas por el poder* (Mexico City: Océano, 1995), p. 187.

[5] Interview given by former Mexican President Carlos Salinas de Gortari, in Jorge G. Castañeda, *La herencia. Arqueología de la sucesión presidencial en México* (Mexico City: Alfaguara, 1999), p. 269.

[6] Jorge G. Castañeda, *Sorpresas te da la vida* (Mexico City: Aguilar, 1994), p. 145.

[7] Robert Dahl, *La democracia, una guía para los ciudadanos* (Mexico City: Taurus, 1999), pp. 7-23. The 2000 election of George W. Bush cast doubt on the legitimacy of the elections, whereas Barack Obama's election restored confidence.

[8] Jackson Turner Main, *The Antifederalists; Critics of the Constitution 1781-1788* (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961), p. 23.

[9] Felipe Agüero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy. Post Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995), p. 5.

[10] Interview with former Clinton official Arturo Valenzuela by the author in June 2002, Washington D. C.

[11] Adolfo Aguilar Zínser, "Los binomios de la democracia" (Binomials of Democracy), talk given February 8, 2001, during the series of lectures entitled "Democratic Transition and Protection of Human Rights," in Mexico City. Transcribed by the National Human Rights Commission (CNDH).

[12] Abelardo Rodríguez Sumano, *La urgente seguridad democrática. La relación de México con Estados Unidos* (Mexico City: Taurus, 2008).

[13] I identify the following obstacles for democratic security in Mexico: Mexico's type of political system; the regime and state's security situation; certain events linked to transitions to democracy; the legacy of authoritarianism; and the role of the armed forces and intelligence services.

Security, Terrorism, And Human Rights

Marco Vinicio Gallardo Enríquez*

Introduction

The question of the security of nations and their citizens in the face of terrorism is at the top of the international security agenda. The way countries, led by the United States following the September 11 attacks, have engaged in this struggle has had a negative impact on the defense and protection of human rights around the world.

Terrorist acts harm human rights on two levels. In the first place, because of the immediate victims themselves, whose right to life, safety, and freedom are affected. In the second place, they foster a struggle against terrorism, leading to a dynamic that impacts on the human rights of an in-

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Gary Cameron/REUTERS

In the name of the struggle against terrorism and of international security, the countries at the vanguard, most of which are democratic, are committing acts of aggression that violate basic freedoms and fundamental rights.

creasing number of innocent civilians, and produces immeasurable collateral damage, along with the fact that those engaging in the fight against terrorism are frequently wholly unaware of the minimum obligations deriving from international human rights law.

From National Security to The Security of the Individual

Correctly defining the term "security" is a complex task. It is the kind of concept that takes its meaning from the context in which it is being used, where different actors, interests, and ideologies interact. Indeed, the lack of consensus over the meaning of the concept, as much in academic spheres as among the leading players who use it every day, has led to a similar failure to reach consensus internationally over the meaning of "terrorism."

Up until the end of the Cold War, security had been defined almost exclusively in military terms because it was linked to war between the two dominant powers: the United States and the Soviet Union. In this context, individual security took second place to the security of nations, with priority placed on collective security and the common good.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall, new theoretical notions of security entered the academic and political debate. The appearance of new security agendas, together with human rights issues, environmental protection, and economic development, reflected a fundamental change in the nation-state's benchmark with regard to civil society and the set of basic national security (or sovereignty) values compared to the security of society or individuals.

Now threats to security are no longer solely military. They are the result of violent risk factors like terrorism, civil war, organized crime, drug trafficking, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, all of which transcend purely military issues, as well as influencing economic, social, and political matters internally and externally. The subjectivity of the concept comes to the fore when nations are obliged to define the meaning of security for their own agendas, as it is this that will establish what counts as a threat to security and the actions undertaken to counter them, whether military, economic, social, or political.

This has a direct effect on human rights. If security is considered in military terms alone, as is the case in the United States with its war on terror, and in Mexico with its war on drug cartels, this leads to an exponential increase in arbitrary detentions, extra-judicial execution-style killings, cases of torture, or lack of due process,[1] a situation worsened by the deaths of innocent civilians, so-called "collateral damage."

History tells us that purely military responses have had a negative impact on human rights. When security of the

Up until the end of the Cold War, security had been defined almost exclusively in military terms; individual security took second place to the security of nations, with priority placed on collective security and the common good.

state is the objective of defending security, there is the risk that the governing class will define the interests to be defended to the detriment of the security of individuals.

The Terrorist Phenomenon and Human Rights

Terrorism is as old as injustice itself and has been a concern to the authorities of numerous regimes. The origin of the term lies in the state of terror imposed by Robespierre during the French Revolution after 1789; a common definition has been sought ever since.

Modern terrorism emerged during the second half of the twentieth century, especially in Europe where armed independence movements appeared including ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna)[2] or the Irish Republican Army (IRA) in Ireland. Meanwhile, in Latin America, during the so-called dirty wars unleashed by various authoritarian regimes, some armed movements engaged in kidnappings, torture, and the assassination of public figures to achieve their ends. In the 1980s the FARC (Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) emerged, making use of mass kidnappings and bombings in public places. In the Middle East, the conflict between Israel and Palestine exacerbated ideological extremism, which, together with the dominant nationalist and socialist ideologies that arose from the independence of several Arab countries, led to the emergence of armed groups that resorted to the kidnap and murder of political figures, especially foreigners, usually seen as enemies of Islam. With the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, Afghanistan became the ideal place for the training of terrorist cells protected by the Taliban regime.

The September 2001 al-Qaeda terrorist attacks on U.S. targets radically changed the dynamics of world security. From that moment on, terrorism was identified as a threat to the survival of the state and to international order and security. The United States and its allies declared terrorism their highest security priority, once again placing the security of the state above that of the individual, and out of this there emerged a new strategy, one that presented a great risk to the protection of human rights: preventive attacks.

According to this premise, the United States, rather than awaiting further terrorist attacks, launches preventive strikes anywhere around the globe, which have led to numerous civilian deaths. This is matched by the frequently arbitrary detention of civilians of all nationalities with no attention to due process.

Nowadays, specialized sources offer over 100 definitions of terrorism, all of which agree on one fundamental aspect: such actions are always aimed at spreading terror. For Sohr, terrorism is "a classic form of struggle of the weak against the strong and may be applied to organizations from across the political spectrum, states, criminals, and fanatics of all kinds. The terrorists' objectives define the nature and scope of their action. This may be part of a war, an emancipation struggle, a repressive act, the work of criminals, or attacks carried out by unsound minds."[3] For the International Council on Human Rights, terrorist actions are those aimed at leading to the deliberate deaths of civilians (or taking hostages) with the aim of instilling terror among the general population and forcing political leaders to take a particular course of action.[4]

As mentioned, the international community has not reached agreement on a definition of terrorism, above all when it comes to defining the parameters of nations' obligations in relation to international law. Where progress has been made is in identifying certain acts of violence as terrorist acts, including hostage taking, hijacking and destroying civilian aircraft, attacks on the life, physical integrity, or freedom of internationally-protected individuals, including diplomats, and, in the context of armed conflict, acts or threats of violence the principal aim of which is to instill terror in the civilian population.[5]

From the viewpoint of human rights, treatment of alleged terrorists should be in strict accordance with legal norms and those of international human rights law. However, throughout its history the U.S. government has switched between periods of defending human rights and others of hostility toward them. The torture and arbitrary detention of Afghanis and Iraqis in the prisons of Guantánamo and Abu Ghraib by U.S. troops make clear how the struggle against terrorism escaped international human rights controls.

Responding to terrorism with vengeance provokes a endless spiral of violence. In the name of the struggle against terrorism and of international security, the countries at the van-

guard, most of which are democratic, are committing acts of aggression that violate basic freedoms and fundamental rights. The lack of clarity in the definition of terrorism, especially when it becomes a strategic issue at the top of the security agenda, can lead to grave errors when it comes to dealing with it. This is something that has not only affected the United States, but impacted the security agendas of a number of countries.

The International System of Human Rights Protection as a Control In the War against Terrorism

The tragedy, pain, and suffering caused by World War II led the international community to create an international system of human rights protection.[6] Human rights treaties principally function to establish the rights of individuals and the obligations of nations, all of which are valid in the international sphere, where the former may be protected and the latter supervised. This corresponds to the notion that the international community has understood the fundamental importance for the peace and security of all of establishing a world order based on the agreement that all human beings are equal in dignity and in rights.[7]

On September 11, 2001, the same day as the terrorist attacks, the Inter-American Democratic Charter was signed in Peru, the purpose of which is to foster solidarity among the hemisphere's countries when democracy seems threatened. The September 11 acts, followed by the March 11, 2004, bombings in Madrid and the July 7, 2005, attacks in London demonstrated with increasing urgency the need to close ranks against terrorism; however, it cannot be forgotten that this struggle can only take place in a context of respect for human rights. Unrestricted respect for human rights, or for rights not legitimately suspended in a state of emergency, must play a fundamental role in any anti-terrorism strategy.[8]

International human rights law obliges states to adopt measures to avoid acts of terrorism and violence, but also to engage in the necessary actions to safeguard the security of their populations, which includes the obligation to investigate, try, and punish acts of violence and terrorism. Furthermore, nations are bound to adopt anti-terrorism measures that comply with their international obligations under international human rights law and humanitarian law.[9]

International policies must attack terrorism at its root, that is, the great inequalities and problems of the world, placing the individual and not the security of the state at the center.

However, despite international efforts to fulfill the premises of international human rights law, empirical evidence tells us that the reality is very different. Since September 2001, many governments have developed legislation that contradicts international human rights standards, principally infringing on the aforementioned right to due process and protection of those accused of carrying out terrorist offences.

Conclusion

When human rights are violated and the rule of law is threatened, the likelihood is greater that anti-terrorism measures will be less effective, meaning it is not appropriate to ignore these norms when confronting terrorism.

The lessons of the war on this phenomenon, as spearheaded by the United States, tell us that it is not enough to engage in military-style measures, nor is it correct to create legislation that impacts negatively on human rights. Such actions have done little to protect citizens from terrorist actions, while the causes that lead to such actions go untreated. For this reason, it is important to implement international policies that attack these movements at their root; that is, the great inequalities and problems of the world, placing the individual and not the security of the state at the center.

The international system of human rights protection faces great challenges in the near future. In the context of the so-called "war on terror," the international community can make new inroads in discussing instruments of international humanitarian law relating to conflicts between states and non-state agents. There should also be discussion of the permissibility or otherwise of so-called preventive military strikes as a defense against perceived terrorist threats, which over the last decade have attacked the right to life of the civilian population of countries presumed to support terrorist activities.

The struggle against terrorism should not be seen as a war in Clausewitz's sense of two nation-states confronting each

other in defined territories and with established armies and military strategies, but should instead do away with weapons and the armed forces and grant greater importance to the faculty of reason that characterizes us as human beings. This would be a reaffirmation of the democratic rule of law. The best anti-terrorist weapons are the preservation of freedom and security, respect for human rights, and the quest for peace. VM

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NOTES

[1] *Due process* is a keystone in the protection of human rights; it is the guarantee and indispensable requirement *par excellence* for the existence of the democratic rule of law. This right is embodied in the principal international human rights instruments. The general principles of due process cannot be suspended as a result of declaring a state of emergency. Its main characteristics include the presumption of innocence, the right to be informed of the crimes one is accused of, to be judged by a competent court, to be detained in duly-recognized detention centers, to be granted suitable means to defend oneself, to be assisted by a defense attorney, not to be compelled to testify against oneself, not to be tortured, and for the legal process to be public.

[2] An expression in the Euskera language meaning "Basque Country and Freedom." This organization was established in the Basque Country in 1958 in opposition to the Franco regime. [Editor's Note].

[3] Raúl Sohr Biss, *Claves para entender la guerra* (Santiago de Chile: Mondadori, 2003), p. 171.

[4] International Council on Human Rights, "Talking about Terrorism. Risks and Choices for Human Rights Organisations," 2008, http://www.ichrp.org/files/reports/35/129_report_en.pdf.

[5] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, "Report on Terrorism and Human Rights," 2002, paragraph 15, www.cidh.oas.org/Terrorism/Eng/toc.htm.

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[7] Cecilia Medina Quiroga, "Las obligaciones de los Estados bajo la Convención Americana de Derechos Humanos," *La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, un cuarto de siglo: 1979-2004, San José Costa Rica 2005*, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/libros.cfm, p. 209.

[8] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, op. cit., paragraph 5.

[9] Ibid., paragraph 33.

A Post-September 11, 2001, Decade And U.S. Anti-Immigration Imaginaries

Claire Joysmith*

What has come to be known as the post-September 11, 2001,[1] era could well be considered a decade later a new historic border emerging at the dawn of the twenty-first century. Chicano academic Francisco Lomelí describes it as "the moment when U.S. history parted as did the Red Sea in the Bible,"[2] and renowned Mexican poet José Emilio Pacheco summarizes it this way:

> One millennium began with Crusades.
> The other with two numbers:
> 9/11.[3]

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Different authors have observed that in this decade, racism and xenophobia against migrants and immigrants have notably increased, particularly against those who happen to have darker skins. Thanks to racial profiling as a norm, this has contributed to the construction of the terrorist as a character that now populates the U.S. imaginary.

According to French philosopher Alain Badiou, the term "terrorist" should not be used outside a specific historical context, such as when it was first hurled at the Jacobins and later at those who resisted the Nazi invasion of France.[4] Nowadays, the term "terrorist" is used to designate someone who commits mass murder, such as whoever attacked the Twin Towers in New York. although it is also applied to whoever bombed the Atocha train station in Madrid on March 11, 2004. That is, there is no *one* terrorism, but rather concrete situations. As Badiou would have it, the term "terrorist" is today a polyvalent, propagandistic term used jointly by governments and media.

In the language of the "war against terrorism," the subject labeled as "terrorist" is chameleonically transmuted according to the political agendas of the moment. In that sense, the figure of the "terrorist" takes on a multiple performative role in accordance with the context in which he/she is identified with and named *vis-à-vis* the U.S. racist imaginary.

Justin Akers Chacón and Mike Davis refer to this very clearly in *No One Is Illegal*, in the chapter titled "Inventing an Invisible Enemy: September 11 and the War on Immigrants." To paraphrase them: In a single flash, the tragedy of September 11 allowed the extreme-right to take back the initiative against the immigrants' rights agenda. Immigrant containment policy meshed with the domestic component of the zigzagging "war against terrorism," which shamefully singled out, restricted, and/or incriminated the presence of Arabs, Arab-Americans, Muslims, and others, profiling them as "possible terrorists." The omnipresent phantom of domestic terrorism seen through the imaginary of those "invading hordes" crossing the Mexico-U.S. border in fact spawned an opportunistic marriage between hawks and anti-immigrant restrictionists.[5]

That is, the term "terrorist" is linked by default to an imaginary that includes Arabs, Muslims, and anyone crossing the border, a stigma easily propagated in an imaginary that is under on-going construction. Performance artist Guillermo Gómez-Peña, who calls himself the "transgenic 'glow in the dark' mextizo in process of chicanoization," alludes to the racist U.S. imaginary using narrative strategies such as deliberate dislocation and hyperbolization in a xenophobic, everyday context, even as he counterpoints a humoristic image —a "comic relief" of sorts— by referring to a situation that is in fact devastating:

Tomas Bravo/REUTERS

The omnipresent phantom of domestic terrorism seen through the imaginary of those "invading hordes" crossing the Mexico-U.S. border in fact spawned an opportunistic marriage between hawks and anti-immigrant restrictionists.

> In a CNN town meeting on border issues conducted by anti-immigrant pundit Lou Dobbs, Republican Michael Macaul explained: "You know, after 9/11 the border is really a national security issue. We simply do not know who is coming into this country." The implication of his warning was clear: how can we tell the difference between a migrant worker and an Arab terrorist? Watch out *locos*! Godzilla in a mariachi hat could be an al-Qaeda operative.[6]

This is how Gómez-Peña underlines this media-propagated imaginary with racist tendencies, which reinforces the

idea of the Mexico-United States border as a space through which pain, fear, death, insecurity, chaos, and a threatening "otherness" filters in. On the other hand, this same imaginary disrupts the border as a *locus* that visibilizes solely the transgressive illegality of these characters, naming them all contiguously, thereby blurring other fundamental factors of differentiation. This is exemplified with great clarity in *We Are All Suspects Now*, a compendium of multi-ethnic-cultural post-September 11, 2001, *testimonios*, in which U.S.-Vietnamese author Tram Nguyen recalls the legal terminology that contributes to establishing the terrorist-transgressor-(im)migrant persona in the U.S. imaginary:

> In national security-speak, there's a catchall term for undocumented migrants, refugees and asylum seekers, drug and human smugglers, potential terrorists, all those who cross borders and transgress national boundaries without state authorization. The term is *clandestine transnational actors*.[7]

Branded as transgressors, (im)migrants are forced to share the very same stigma of "potential terrorist." So, in this imaginary, the real, the legal, and the imagined become performatized. This is how a stereotyped protagonist emerges, visibilized by ethnic and racial traits, the object of the systemic, institutionalized racial profiling that also targets other traits like nationality, country of origin, given name and surname, language, and social class.

Gómez-Peña renders his perspective of this reality without losing his characteristic sense of humorous irony:

> Since 9/11, the semiotic territory encompassed by the word "terrorist" has expanded considerably. First it referred strictly to al-Qaeda and the Taliban, then to Muslim "fundamentalists"; eventually it engulfed all Muslims, and then finally all Arabs and Arab-looking people. In 2003, when a Palestinian friend told me, "We (Arabs) are the new Mexicans, and by extension, you are all Arabs," I realized how easily the demon mythologies of the brown body transfer from race to race, from country to country….Color, like disease, is contagious.[8]

Famed Chicana-Latina writer Sandra Cisneros gives us another perspective when she writes,

> And I thought about how we look just like the Arabs, that in fact we are the Arabs, and we are the Jews, since we are Mexicans, or Mix-icans. A mix of this and that, of some any races.

The term "terrorist" is linked by default to an imaginary that includes Arabs, Muslims, and anyone crossing the border, a stigma easily propagated in an imaginary that is under on-going construction.

> And I've been pondering this a lot, since when I look in the mirror I look more like Osama Bin Laden than I do Bush. Osama looks like my tío Nacho. The Afghans look like my brothers. They are my brothers, my brothers with their 1001 Arabian Nights eyebrows and noses. MyfatherwithhisfaceofaMoor."[9]

It goes without saying that Chicanos and Latinos suffered from rampant racism long before September 11, 2001. For many decades and generations, intense polemics and continual anti-racist struggles linked to (im)migration have been decanted into a narrative that has sparked a response in cultural, political, social action, linguistic, and literary milieus, not only in the United States, but also in Europe and Latin America. It is these same Chicano and Latino communities and cultures (*chicanidades* and *latinidades*), when confronted with the racist, xenophobic post-September 11, 2001, ripple effect, that put forth in highly intelligent, perceptive, and sensitive ways a gamut of perspectives and visions that are indicators of the fact that the U.S. anti-(im)migrant imaginary of this last decade continues to mutate.

"Racialization," writes Demian Pritchard, is a historical process that utilizes "a rhetoric of division." And she adds,

> I am sad that while I saw (and see) people coming together as "Americans," I did not (and still do not) see enough discussion on race in America…one of the powerful lessons that we can learn from 9/11. The lesson of whiteness, whiteness —that is— as an historical structure of oppression and category of privilege, is that hierarchies are developed and privilege gained by defining what is "American" against what is "other"…foreign, wild, not to be trusted, above all to be feared.[10]

Gómez-Peña takes this up again from the perspective of racialized language, challenging attitudes that have emerged during this recent decade *vis-à-vis* the anti-(im)migrant imaginary. He thereby returns the debate to what nowadays takes backseat and touches on a very sore spot:

Gómez-Peña underlines the media-propagated imaginary with racist tendencies, which reinforces the idea of the Mexico-U. S. border as a space through which pain, fear, death, insecurity, chaos, and a threatening "otherness" filters in.

> Pay attention to the tone and language of the immigration debate and one cannot help but ask: Has America lost its compassion (or rather the mythology of American compassion) for the underdog and its tolerance for cultural otherness? At what point did white people stop calling themselves immigrants? And weren't they initially illegal too?[11]

Gómez-Peña deals with this head on, situating the axis of migration as a major global issue today:

> To me, the "problem" is not immigration, but immigration hysteria. Immigration is a byproduct of globalization and as such it is irreversible. One-third of mankind now lives outside their homeland and away from their original culture and language.[12]

The anti-(im)migrant imaginary has increased its sway among certain sectors of the U.S. public readily influenced by the mass media. As Gómez-Peña puts it,

> Immigration hysteria has always resurfaced in times of crises. It's an integral part of America's racist history. But this time it's different. What characterizes this immigration debate is an absolute lack of compassion when referring to migrants without documents.[13]

And he concludes forcefully,

> To me immigration is not a legal issue but a humanitarian and humanistic one. No human being is "illegal," period. All human beings, with or without documents, belong to human kind, our kind, and if they require our help, we are obliged to provide it. It's called being human. Period. In this context, nationality becomes secondary. Their pain is ours, and so is their fate.[14]

By evoking pain as a reference point for a form of solidarity in humanness and linking it to fate, Gómez-Peña crosses multiple semantic, psychological, and emotional borders that appeal to the future that is rapidly becoming the present. In this sense, renowned Mexican author Cristina Rivera Garza recalls Elaine Scarry's *The Body in Pain*, and refers to pain as political: "Pain shatters the world and, along with it, the idea of the world. Pain, therefore, is political."[15] That is how one names, Rivera Garza maintains, what loses essence and force once it is named; she alludes to pain as rupture, be it individual or collective, private or political. This is, in fact, an axiomatic issue that is perhaps footnoted, at best, lost among the surfeit of numbers in so many studies on migration.

Pain is recovered —at least to a certain degree— in narrations that convey their perspectives feelingly as well as intelligently, emphasizing the compassionate within the consciously politicized. What would remain a sob, a cry, or silence takes on a life of its own in the testimonial narratives mentioned above, such as in the Chicano and Latino Narrative. Perhaps even more so in this post-September 11, 2001, era.

As a response to the U.S. mass-media-influenced anti-(im)migrant racist imaginary fostered by "The Master Narrative of U.S. National Security (as written by the neo-cons in collaboration with the mainstream media),"[16] constructed with biased political intentions, this Chicano and Latino Narrative emerges in a variety of forms. Catherine Herrera, for example, opens up in her written *testimonio* the complexities of her own identity:

> As a U.S. Latina I have had to also see within me "the enemy," the racist, the hatred, and I believe that is eventually what the U.S. and its people must confront….
>
> As a U.S. Latina I have seen both sides of the coin, felt both sides of the pain, and perhaps from that, hope will arise from the ashes.[17]

Her vision deals head on with, accepts, and expresses her own dualities —or even multiplicities— as a subject and accepts pain as part of her personal/political and enrichening experiences.

Ariel Dorfman, a recognized U.S.-Latino writer, visualizes a more humane, globalized imaginary:

> I would like to think that a global tragedy such as [this] might also guide us towards a new global compassion and identification between peoples that has been sadly lacking in these [times] of terror, I hope…that in the years to come we can find ways of globalizing mercy and understanding with as much efficiency and energy as we have put into the globalization of war and violence.[18]

Chicana writer, poet, philosopher, and cultural theorist Gloria E. Anzaldúa has baptized this post-September 11, 2001, decade, this pained, fragmented era, as "*tiempos nepantla*" (times of the land in-between) and "Coyolxauhqui times."[19] Anzaldúa uses an image that enables her to "semanticize" and symbolize the complexities and traumas held in the body itself *vis-à-vis* post-September 11, 2001, pain.[20] She thereby resorts to an icon from ancient imagery that bodily bears and physically portrays the pain of dismemberment and rupture: the mythical Nahua goddess figure of Coyolxauhqui who becomes

> my symbol for the necessary process of dismemberment and fragmentation… for reconstruction and reframing, one that allows for putting the pieces together in a new way.[21]

In reconstructing this figure, which we might well call a performative character, Anzaldúa makes her plea to recall, reconfigure, resituate, and recreate both individually and collectively a Narrative that is more inclusive than exclusionary: "Like Coyolxauhqui, let's put our dismembered psyches and patrias (homelands) together in new constructions,"[22] in what she sees as "an ongoing process of making and unmaking," since, she concludes, "there is never any resolution, just the process of healing."[23]

Polemics and anti-racist struggles linked to (im)migration have been decanted into a narrative that has sparked a response in cultural, political, social action, linguistic, and literary milieus beyond the U.S.

The racist U.S. anti-(im)migrant imaginary that has taken center stage in this post-September 11, 2001, decade, has been responded to by many different communities, among them Chicanos and Latinos. Inherent to their complex genealogies, their narrative is constantly recreating itself, without any hegemonic, easy, predictable —and much less happy— ending. They have a great deal left to contribute as mediators of myriad realities and fictions, and they are still bound to surprise us with further insightful clarities. VM

Notes

[1] This lengthier term is deliberately used as reminder that other September 11s are historically significant.

[2] Francisco Lomelí, "Cibertestimonio sobre asuntos transnacionales: un ensayo autocrítico," Claire Joysmith, ed., *Speaking desde las heridas* (Mexico City: CISAN, UNAM, and Toluca and Monterrey: ITESM, 2008), p. 385.

[3] José Emilio Pacheco, "Milenios," Joysmith, ed., op. cit., p. 477.

[4] Phrases like "Homeland Security" and "Patriot Act" are fascist terminology closely resembling Nazi jargon. "Homeland Security" in German literally translates to the original name of the Nazi SS.

[5] Justin Akers Chacón and Mike Davis, *No One Is Illegal: Fighting Racism and State Violence on the U.S.-Mexico Border* (Chicago and Canada: Haymarket Books, 2006).

[6] Guillermo Gómez-Peña, "Border Hysteria and the War against Difference," Joysmith, ed., op. cit., p. 302.

[7] Tram Nguyen, *We Are All Suspects Now. Untold Stories from Immigrant Communities after 9/11* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2005), p. XIV.

[8] Gómez-Peña, op. cit., p. 302.

[9] Sandra Cisneros, untitled testimonio, Claire Joysmith, ed., *One Wound for Another/Una herida por otra. Testimonios de Latin@s in the U.S. through Cyberspace (11 de septiembre de 2001-11 de marzo de 2002)* (Mexico City: CISAN, UNAM/The Colorado College/Whittier College, 2005), p. 138.

[10] Demian Pritchard, untitled *testimonio*, Joysmith, ed., *One Wound* …, pp. 241-242.

[11] Gómez-Peña, op. cit., p. 305.

[12] Ibid., p. 311.

[13] Ibid., p. 304.

[14] Ibid., p. 305.

[15] Cristina Rivera Garza, "What I Couldn't Do," prologue to Joysmith, ed., *Speaking…*, p. 93.

[16] Gómez-Peña, op. cit., p.301.

[17] Catherine Herrera, untitled *testimonio*, Joysmith, ed., *One Wound…*, pp. 190-191.

[18] Ariel Dorfman, "Communicating across the Divide," Joysmith, ed., *Speaking…*, pp. 251-252.

[19] "*Nepantla*" is a word derived from the Náhuatl *panotla* ('bridge'). It translates into Spanish as "*tierra de en-medio*," and into English as "land in-between." According to the nomenclature Anzaldúa uses, it is "a psychological, liminal space…the *locus* and sign of transition." See Gloria Anzaldúa, "Let Us Be the Healing of the Wound: The Coyolxauhqui Imperative—La sombra y el sueño," Joysmith, ed., *One Wound…*, op. cit.

[20] Anzaldúa's seminal book *Borderlands/La Frontera. The New Mestiza* (1987) received the honor of being included as one of the books with the greatest impact in the twentieth century, particularly in the United States, by the renowned *Utne Reader* and *Hungry Mind Review*.

[21] Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands/La Frontera. The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1987), p. 99.

[22] Ibid., p. 102.

[23] Ibid., p. 100.

Post-9/11 Global Health[1]

Benjamín Ruiz Loyola*

Shortly after the September 11, 2001, attacks on the Twin Towers, letters containing anthrax spores were sent through the U.S. Postal Service. The FBI's Amerithrax Investigative Summary published on February 19, 2010 —yes, almost nine years later—[2] found that at least five contaminated envelopes were mailed to different recipients: Senators Thomas Daschle and Patrick Leahy, the *New York Post*, and NBC journalist Tom Brokaw. Twenty-two people were infected after handling these envelopes, 11 with cutaneous cases and 11 with inhalation cases. Five of the 11 people who inhaled the anthrax spores died as a result of the infection.

Investigations pointed to the guilt of Dr. Bruce E. Ivins, a military researcher and microbiology expert at the U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) in Fort Detrick, Maryland. Unfortunately, Dr. Ivins died before the trial. Some reports suggest that his workload and the pressure of the FBI investigations drove him to commit suicide,[3] while others (such as the online edition of the Moscow daily *Pravda*) attribute his death to the Israeli intelligence agency, Mossad.[4]

One of the immediate consequences both of the September 2001 attacks and the anthrax mailings was the 2002 Bioterrorism Act, which places strict controls on U.S. imports of agricultural products and supplies in order to prevent infected foodstuffs from entering the country. Yet despite these efforts, *E. coli* outbreaks have occurred on several occasions. In 2006, for example, an outbreak was detected in spinach produced in California, causing Canada to issue a health advisory on U.S.-grown spinach. Another outbreak of the same type, this time caused by infected onions, was recorded that same year in Taco Bell fast-food restaurants in the northeastern United States. A few days later another fast-food chain, Taco John's, was also affected by the same problem. The onions were traced to a farm in Southern California. Lettuces presumably infected by the same bacteria were also withdrawn from the market, but in October 2006 it was discovered that 250 cases of these lettuces had gone missing.

In 2011, Germany reported an outbreak of the same bacteria; initially it was announced that cucumbers from Spain were to blame, although this theory was later discounted. In early July, almost 4 000 people were reportedly infected, with over 50 deaths across 14 European countries, in addition to one case in Canada and six in the U.S., with one fatality in the latter. The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) issued a report this July, indicating that the contamination was found in vegetable sprouts (including mustard and fenugreek) from seeds acquired in Egypt between 2009 and 2010. And despite the 2002 Bioterrorism Act, the European *E. coli* bacteria did enter the United States, which suffered the most of all the countries affected.

One of the immediate consequences both of the September 2001 attacks and the anthrax mailings was the 2002 Bioterrorism Act, which places strict controls on U.S. imports of agricultural products and supplies.

In 2003 a relatively new, headline-grabbing disease was detected, and within months it had sparked a global alert: the so-called bird flu or influenza A(H5N1), yet to be eradicated. Although only identified in 15 countries, with today's global mobility the disease has required close epidemiological supervision. The initial outbreak was in Vietnam. The virus then spread to Thailand and cases of infections were later found throughout most of Asia. From the time of its appearance to June 22, 2011, 562 cases of infections have been reported; however, most alarming is the number of fatalities (329), a mortality rate of 58.5 percent. Cases and deaths have been reported in 2011 in Bangladesh (2/0), Cambodia (6/6), Indonesia (7/5), and Egypt (31/12).[5] Symptomatology asso-

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News services reported that the CIA, in its eagerness to collect DNA from relatives of Bin Laden, carried out a fake vaccination campaign in Pakistan, affecting a very low-income sector.

ciated with the onset of this disease is almost indistinguishable from that associated with human influenza and essentially consists of a cough, sore throat, muscular pains, and the development of eye infections, pneumonia, respiratory failure, and eventually death. The main cause of infection among humans is through contact with infected birds, especially poultry. It is easy to understand how this led to global trade restrictions on this type of meat coming from the countries involved.

A global alert was raised in 2003 on account of another respiratory disease originating in Asia: the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS). From China, it spread to several countries, infecting a total of 8 422 people globally, with 916 deaths, a rate of 10.9 per cent. Interestingly, the mortality rate was much lower despite the higher number of cases. These two diseases gripped the world's attention for some time. The World Health Organization (WHO) established that the SARS outbreak lasted from November 2002 through November 2003 and was mainly located in China, Canada, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Vietnam, although cases were also reported elsewhere such as Australia, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Romania, Switzerland, Thailand, United States, and the United Kingdom.

China took a wide range of measures to identify and control the pathogenic organism, from setting up quarantine zones at train stations and airports to even isolating entire areas —such as Hebei from April 21 to May 13, 2003—[6] by forbidding people to enter or exit without a government-issued safe conduct. The spread of the disease was finally checked, but it has not been eradicated and there is now another cause for concern: a team of scientists from Germany has identified a very similar virus which causes SARS in some bat colonies and in their feces, opening up a new route for this type of virus to spread.[7]

The global pandemic H1N1/09 influenza virus struck in 2009, with its origin traced to Mexico. First reported in March and April that year, in Mexico alone there were 72 000 recorded infection cases and 1 300 deaths caused by this disease; the states most affected (by number of infection cases) were Nuevo León (30 percent), San Luis Potosí (24 percent), State of Mexico (18 percent), and Mexico City's Federal District (12 percent). Over 18 000 people died in other countries, mostly in the United States and Europe (about 13 000).

Haiti suffered one of the most serious international epidemics during the period in question (2001-2011). A massive cholera epidemic broke out after the terrible earthquake that shook the country on January 12, 2010. In December 2010, 11 months after the earthquake, 93 000 cases had been documented, including 2 120 deaths, an average of over six deaths per day. A report by French epidemiologist Renaud Piarroux indicated that one of the possible causes for the spread of this disease was a group of UN Blue Berets from Nepal who had been assigned to the peacekeeping mission in Haiti. Some people accused of witchcraft related to the disease's spread were lynched, as were people actually infected; these attacks posed a high risk for the peacekeepers themselves. Mexico issued a health advisory for cholera in November 2010, and in April 2011 the disease was detected in a 10-year-old girl, the first case in several years. It is not known whether it was the Haitian or some other strain.

Various diseases that had been considered under control or effectively limited have spread around the word in the early twenty-first century: tuberculosis, whooping cough, measles, malaria, diphtheria, and viral hepatitis. In 2011, the measles outbreak in the United States and Europe put Mexican health authorities into a state of alert (as of June 2011, 127 cases were reported in the United States and 21 326 in 30 European countries).

Mexico's health minister, José Ángel Córdoba Montoya, indicated that a strategy was in place to respond to this alert, starting by training doctors how to diagnose and treat the disease, given that no cases had been reported in Mexico since 2007. In addition to training, this strategy also included vaccinations of Mexican customs personnel, flight crews, and health workers; modules in international airports were set up to detect infected passengers; information was given to passengers on immediate symptoms; and a vaccination campaign was launched for people aged between 12 and 39 who had not received their booster shots. This last measure posed a problem since official calculations suggested a population of around 1.8 million at risk of infection, and at the time (July 14) only one million vaccinations were available.

This disease can be prevented through vaccination, but the global vaccination situation has been complicated by some

recent and other not-so-recent events such as the research that alleged a link between some vaccines (the MMR shot against measles, mumps, and rubella) and autism in children. It later transpired that its lead researcher, Andrew Wakefield, was associated with a law firm that planned to litigate against vaccine manufacturers. Therefore, the *Lancet* magazine, where the original study was published, retracted, stating that it should never have published it in the first place;[8] Wakefield lost his license as a physician in the United Kingdom, though he continued to practice in the United States.

However, the damage had already been done. After the publication in February 1998, an intensive campaign was launched against all kinds of vaccines, causing a severe loss of confidence. Controllable diseases such as hepatitis and polio have reappeared relatively recently. In 2003, 784 polio cases were reported around the world, but in 2004 there were 793 in Nigeria alone. The numbers rise and fall, but the disease remains. Religious considerations are often cited as reasons to refuse vaccinations: in 2003 a religious group in northern Nigeria began to preach against vaccinations, arguing that rather than protecting children, these shots formed part of an undercover campaign orchestrated by Western powers to sterilize and kill children. Therefore, 2004 saw a sharp increase in the number of polio cases in Nigeria. This led United States President Barack Obama, to address the Muslim world in 2009 in an attempt to persuade them of his good intentions. At one point in his speech, Obama mentioned that he would start a new initiative with the Organization of the Islamic Conference to eradicate polio and increase its sponsorship in Islamic communities in order to promote mother-infant health as part of a joint initiative between the Muslim world and the United States.

Nevertheless some events still stand out. News services recently reported that the CIA, in its eagerness to collect genetic material (DNA) from relatives of Osama Bin Laden, carried out a fake vaccination campaign against hepatitis in Pakistan,[9] with the assistance of physician Shakil Afridi, who was later arrested. The most worrying aspect of this case was that it affected a very low-income sector. This leads to greater resistance to vaccination and the reappearance of diseases that should be controllable and on their way out.

Can we accept this double standard, the hypocrisy of the most powerful nation in its dealings with the rest of the world? Should it suit its interests, the U.S. would undoubtedly do the same again. So the question is: How many times have they done this before? This strikes us as an act with serious repercussions, although it is still too soon to be able to fully assess what these are, and that fills us with fear and indignation. The self-appointed human rights' crusader playing fast and loose with the universal right to health. What a fine example!

Religious considerations are often reasons to refuse vaccinations: in 2003 a religious group in northern Nigeria argued that rather than protecting children, these shots formed part of an undercover campaign to sterilize and kill them.

And as I mentioned initially, the U.S. anthrax attacks gave rise to a new bioterrorism act that has not prevented contamination originating within its own borders, yet which has obstructed its highly touted free movement of goods. This also clearly shows that, in health terms, we are no better off now than we were before September 11, 2001. The reappearance of diseases that were supposedly already controlled, the strong opposition (religious or otherwise) to vaccination campaigns that could help control this, added to the recently exposed lies, points to a complicated prospect in this area for at least the next few years. VM

NOTES

[1] My thanks to Jorge Benjamín Ruiz Gutiérrez for his help in writing this article.

[2] See http://media.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/amx-investigative-summary.pdf.

[3] See http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/i/bruce_ivins/index.html.

[4] See http://engforum.pravda.ru/index.php?/topic/146525-us-military-research-scientist-dr-bruce-e-ivins-murdered/.

[5] See http://www.who.int/csr/don/2011_06_22/en/index.html.

[6] Mark A. Rothstein, M. Gabriela Alcalde, Nanette R. Elster, Mary Anderlik Majumder, Larry I. Palmer, T. Howard Stone, and Richard E. Hoffman, "Quarantine and Isolation: Lessons Learned from SARS. A Report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention," Institute for Bioethics, Health Policy and Law, School of Medicine, University of Louisville, November 2003, http://www2.cdc.gov/phlp/docs/SARS_REPORT.Rothstein.pdf.

[7] Jan Felix Drexler, Victor Max Corman, Tom Wegner, Adriana Fumie Tateno, Rodrigo Melim Zerbinati, Florian Gloza-Rausch, Antje Seebens, Marcel A. Müller, and Christian Drosten, "Amplification of Emerging Viruses in a Bat Colony," *Emerging Infectious Diseases* vol. 17, no. 3, March 2011.

[8] See several articles published on different dates in *The Lancet*, http://www.thelancet.com/search/results?searchTerm=andrew+wakefield&fieldName=Authors&journalFromWhichSearchStarted=lancet. [Editor's Note.]

[9] See http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jul/11/cia-fake-vaccinations-osama-bin-ladens-dna, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/12/world/asia/12dna.html?_r=1.

Environmental Security In North America

Academic Debate or State Policy?

Mario Duarte Villarello*

To Gabriela Borjón Vital and Julia Duarte Borjón

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks, the way national and international security is conceived has undergone change in many countries, and with particular justification in the United States. These changes were nothing new, but rather a kind of *déjà vu* of the dominant security agenda during the Cold War.[1] Nevertheless, they were substantial and led to a distancing, or, we might say, a step backward, with regard to the achievements made by other agendas —such as the social agenda— during the 1990s.[2]

It is equally true that the devastating consequences of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005, together with the atypical, yet increasingly frequent snowfalls that in recent years have struck much of the U.S. have forced the government into public acceptance of "other" threats to national and international security besides terrorism. It is here that the notion of environmental security has found a foothold by which it may win legitimacy beyond that of academic discussion.

Notwithstanding this advance, to what degree has the purely academic debate around the formulation of environmental security policies in North America in general and the United States in particular gained ground?

North America, conventionally seen as comprising Canada, the United States and Mexico —though also taking in the territories of Greenland, Bermuda, Saint Pierre and Miquelon and even the tiny atoll of Clipperton— is a vast area in which all the world's climate zones are represented, including some found nowhere else.[3] In signing the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Canada, the U.S., and Mexico also subscribed to the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (NAAEC), which includes the following aims:



Kevin Lamarque/REUTERS

Another legacy of 9/11.

1. Foster the protection and improvement of the environment in the territories of the Parties for the well-being of present and future generations;
2. Promote sustainable development based on cooperation and mutually supportive environmental and economic policies;
3. Increase cooperation between the Parties to better conserve, protect, and enhance the environment, including wild flora and fauna;

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4. Support the environmental goals and objectives of the NAFTA;
5. Avoid creating trade distortions or new trade barriers.[4]

These objectives are in accordance with the nature of the NAAEC, an environmental cooperation agreement signed on the back of a commercial treaty, and as such make no direct reference to the security of the parties (or of the whole), let alone to environmental security. To achieve this would require at least two conditions: first, to negotiate a tri-lateral security agreement that incorporated environmental security, which is very unlikely for several reasons relating to the policies of each country; second, to modify the scope of the NAAEC to take into account environmental security considerations, which is doubtless also unrealistic, given that the agreement was not designed for such a purpose.

In any case, the debates around environmental security in North America remain restricted to academia and do not impinge upon the forums where decision-making actually takes place. Part Three of the NAAEC, in articles 8 to 19, establishes the Commission for Environmental Cooperation (CEC) as its executive arm,[5] charged, among other things, with undertaking cooperation projects drawn up by the parties to help them achieve the agreement's general objectives. Since it was created in 1994, projects have been negotiated at the CEC according to an annual or biannual operational plan,[6] on issues including, generally speaking, application and compliance in environmental law (regional initiatives on questions of applying environmental law); environmental information; the environment, business, and sustainability (projects favoring environmentally sustainable production, consumption and trade); pollutants and health (joint initiatives to improve the handling of chemical substances); and biodiversity conservation (actions to protect some of the most important species in North America and the habitats that support them).

As may be noted, no reference is made to remedying the impact of environmental phenomena on the security of the parties, whether due to natural or anthropogenic causes. The nearest thing to it involves the appropriate handling of chemical substances that could represent a health risk to the general population, though the notion of risk here is limited to health and does not cover the possibility of it comprising an environmental risk because it lacks the "potential scope"; this, in notable contrast to the assumption that a chemical terrorist attack would be seen as a security concern, though this returns us to the post-9/11 worldview, in which terrorism is the active subject.

The debates around environmental security in North America remain restricted to academia and do not impinge upon the forums where decision-making actually takes place.

Furthermore, in the specific case of the bilateral Mexico-U.S. relationship, the CEC is not the main instrument for regulating risks associated with chemical substances along the shared border and those derived from trade between the two nations. These are covered by the 1984 "Peace Agreement" which, despite its name,[7] does not refer to security in general either —much less to environmental security— between the two countries.

Apart from the CEC, Canada, the United States, and Mexico have significant differences with regard to important issues that can be more easily connected to environmental security, such as climate change. While Canada and Mexico both ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's 1997 Kyoto Protocol, the only two states not to have signed it nor to show any intention of doing so are the United States of America and Kazakhstan.

Meanwhile, continuing about the significant differences, the three countries have indicated their most important environmental vulnerabilities: Canada has one of the largest reserves of drinking water in the world, a fact considered a national security issue, meaning the advance and retreat of the ice covering its most northerly territories are considered a limitation on its economic growth. The United States has recognized that hurricanes, tornadoes, forest fires (caused by increasing drought), and floods are potentially harmful factors for its national security. Mexico, meanwhile, is the most environmentally-vulnerable territory in North America: along the Pacific, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Caribbean coasts hurricanes wreak havoc across considerable areas, together with other phenomena such as droughts, floods, and forest fires. Furthermore, due to the rise of its average level, the sea is making incursions into certain areas, threatening to submerge them, as is happening in the state of Tabasco.

While certain problems are shared by all three countries, however, the manner in which they deal with them is different. While Canada seeks to protect its freshwater supply, even by military means in an extreme scenario, the United States has accepted that environmental threats are to be taken

Environmental security is the state in which a directly-proportional relationship prevails among environmental equilibrium, development, and social welfare, which can influence national, regional, and international security.

into account, but does not place them in the "priority category" (where terrorism stands), but rather defines them as "isolated and atypical events." In the case of Mexico, given the country's experience, attention has focused on disaster prevention, meaning that it has been categorized above all as a civil protection concern, and to a lesser, though increasing, degree, as a national security issue.[8]

In none of these cases is there a national government policy anywhere in North America oriented toward responding to threats and risks to environmental security. This is simply because there is no agreed definition of what the term refers to, on the basis of which environmental insecurity could therefore be defined, and in turn would allow relevant indicators to be more easily catalogued, just as society in general and decision-makers in particular perceive other kinds of insecurity (economic, public, human). The absence of a national policy contrasts with the extensive academic debate around the issue, and it is precisely the lack of consensus that has not allowed an *ad hoc* policy to be drawn up.[9]

Elsewhere I have proposed the following definition of environmental security: "the state in which a directly-proportional relationship prevails among environmental equilibrium, development, and social welfare, which can influence national, regional, and international security. This relationship may vary on the basis of threats and risks to the environment, of both natural and anthropogenic origin."[10] For reasons of space, I will not seek to explain here how I arrived at this definition, but I can say that it offers the benefit of presenting environmental equilibrium as an essential element in national and/or international security, and also implies, axiomatically, that the better the balance, the better will be development and human wellbeing. In this sense it can, perhaps, contribute to generating the foundations for a national policy in countries in North America or elsewhere on the basis of the manner in which they are related to their component parts.

After the initial effects of 9/11 on how national and international security were conceived, which entailed placing terrorism at the top of the list of general security considerations, it is most likely that drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and people trafficking are what made it clear that terrorism is not the only security threat, while the recent famines in southern Somalia indicate the persistence of a food security crisis, and a human crisis in general, in certain parts of the planet.

Empirical studies are contributing to the debate with evidence that it is the serious and increasingly frequent droughts affecting North America, long attributed to climate change, as are floods and hurricanes such as Katrina and Rita, which have exacerbated the collapse of agriculture and livestock production. However, climate change is just one of several problems of global scope that threaten environmental security. All indications are that, beyond academic debates, everything is in place to begin generating national policies on environmental security in North America, which will moreover serve as an example to other parts of the world. Meanwhile, the clock is ticking. VM

Notes

[1] In this regard, see María Cristina Rosas González, comp., *Terrorismo, democracia y seguridad. 11 de septiembre: cinco años después* (Mexico City: UNAM/National University of Australia, 2006), pp. 47-48.

[2] In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, calls were made for the resources used in the arms race to be reassigned to the struggle against poverty, to education, health, and development in general. After September 11, however, these calls fell on deaf ears in the face of the supposed "urgency" of the war on terror.

[3] This definition of North America is found in *The World Factbook*, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/.

[4] NAAEC, Article 1, Objectives, at http://www.cec.org.

[5] Op. cit., NAAEC, Part Three, Articles 8 through 19, "On the Commission for Environmental Cooperation, Structure and Procedures."

[6] Until 2010, CEC operational plans were annual; from 2011 on, they have been biannual.

[7] The official name of the instrument known as the "Peace Agreement" is the "Agreement between the United Mexican States and the United States of America on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area," http://app2.semarnat.gob.mx/tramites/Doctos/DGGIMAR/Sirrep/AcuerdoPaz(1983).pdf.

[8] The following reading is recommended for the case of Mexico: Úrsula Oswald Spring, "Calentamiento global, conflictos hídricos y mecanismos de resolución," *Coyuntura* (Mexico City), November-December 2005; and Blanca Elena Gómez García, "Seguridad ambiental en México: hacia el fortalecimiento de un sistema nacional de prevención de desastres," in María Cristina Rosas González, comp., *La seguridad por otros medios. Evolución de la agenda de seguridad internacional en el siglo XXI: lecciones para México* (Mexico City: UNAM/Centro de Análisis e Investigación sobre Paz, Seguridad y Desarrollo Olof Palme, A. C., 2011).

[9] For a good introduction to the debate, recommended authors include Simon Dalby, Felix Dodds, and Jon Barnett, as well as work by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver.

[10] I have put forward this definition in my doctoral thesis, currently underway, as well as in lectures, papers, and articles.

The Ramifications of 9/11 For U.S. Energy Policy

Rosío Vargas*

September 11, 2001, marked the beginning of the deployment of the U.S. imperial agenda, with the launch of the "Project for the New American Century" (PNAC).[1] First conceived in 1997, this project constitutes the vision of dominance laid out by the so-called Neo-Conservatives ("Neocons"), government representatives including Dick Cheney, Donald Rumsfeld, Paul Wolfowitz, Jeb Bush, Zalmay Khalizad, Elliot Abrams, and Dan Quayle, all of whom enjoyed influential positions during the George W. Bush administration. Also part of this group are the Texas oilmen and the major transnational oil companies, involved in drawing up their country's global strategy.

Considering the importance of oil for this position of dominance and the leading role of the Middle East as supplier of crude for the United States and its allies, this region and Iraq in particular became important factors for guaranteeing its success. Hence, it is not difficult to establish a connection between the PNAC and the invasion of Iraq in March 2003. In fact, from the outset, the project began to exert pressure on the White House to take military action against Iraq. Parallel to this, in terms of U.S. foreign policy, we can observe the deployment and entrenchment of the country's military forces around the globe, the establishment of the Homeland Security guidelines, and "maximum production" policy with regard to oil-producing countries, together with pressure to open their oil industries to foreign capital.

Iraq, Part of the Grand Strategy

One day after the terrorist attacks in New York, the National Security Council met to discuss whether to attack Iraq or Afghanistan. Members of the Republican administration have revealed, however, that these plans were not new, but that the invasion was a long-term project.



Jason Reed/REUTERS

Part of Bush's energy strategy after 9/11 was the invasion of Iraq.

At the thrice-yearly Defense Department review held on September 30, 2001,[2] Donald Rumsfeld brought up access to key markets and to strategic resources, establishing a link between the intention to reinforce U.S. capabilities and the "projection of power" toward distant regions. Another report entitled "Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century"[3] was drawn up highlighting the problem of reducing the operating margins of the leading oil-producing countries to increase their production levels and cover world demand. The recommendations included a comprehensive set of policies covering energy, technology, and finance, taking into account geopolitical trends and security imperatives. A review of Iraqi policy was also recommended to ensure its oil con-

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The real reason for the invasion of Iraq was oil and the great business opportunity the Iraqi oil industry represented for international private capital.

tinued to reach world markets. Dick Cheney put together a working group charged with drawing up a report entitled "Reliable, Affordable, and Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future,"[4] which proposed replacing conservationist policies on energy use with a policy of maximum extraction in order to increase the supply within the United States and abroad. This was accompanied by the proposal to open up of new areas for oil exploration and production throughout the world including, of course, in the Middle East.

One of the last documents to propose such an objective was "The United States National Security Strategy" from September 2002, which established that the nation's overarching aim was to avoid the emergence of a regional power that would represent a challenge to its hegemony, attributing itself with the prerogative of using any means to avoid this, including military force if necessary. The regional power alluded to was Iraq. Rumsfeld had given the Pentagon orders to prepare maps of the Iraqi oil fields, together with a list of possible companies that could take charge of production.

Arguing that the Iraqi Ba'ath party had links to al-Qaeda and that the Saddam Hussein regime possessed weapons of mass destruction,[5] on March 21, 2003, U.S. and British troops invaded Iraq. Given this country's vast oil reserves, the real reason for the invasion of Iraq was very different from those put forward by international bodies and the Republican administration.[6] It was actually because of oil and the great business opportunity the Iraqi oil industry represented for international private capital.

Iraqi oil reserves, standing at somewhere around 115 billion barrels, are the second-largest in the Middle East after Saudi Arabia, but unlike the latter, are under-exploited, with reserves that are far from geological maturity, making them a highly profitable prospect. Another factor that appears to have been behind the invasion is that in 2000 Iraq began to price its oil exports in euros rather than dollars. A third factor involves the intention to replace a regime seen as hostile by the United States. Iraq had signed oil exploration and production contracts with a range of countries, but not with the U.S. or Great Britain, given their embargo of the Saddam Hussein regime. Therefore, these countries saw the need to install a regime favorable to their interests in order to recover the lead in oil contracts,[7] something achieved a few years later with the Hydrocarbon Law drawn up by the occupying power.

The Strategy

The United States sets itself up as the custodian of world oil reserves, on the premise that its fundamental task is to guarantee the flow of oil for itself and its allies.[8] Where do the origins of this premise lie?

As oil wells dry up, worldwide demand is increasing —it is estimated that by 2020 demand will stand at 110 million barrels per day— and U.S. dependency on imported oil is rising —it may reach 70 percent of its total consumption by 2020. This leads to the proliferation of increasingly severe conflicts. At a structural level, three factors explain the strategic character of oil reserves: the geographical distribution of proven reserves, which do not favor developed countries; the impossibility of finding a suitable substitute; and the dependency of diverse sectors of the economy on oil, including the military apparatus itself, whose consumption stands at some 340 000 barrels, or 53 million liters, per day.

In this context the invasion of Iraq makes sense. The United States takes the steps it considers necessary to take part in future conflicts associated with the shortage of conventional oil reserves. The most significant forerunner to this kind of strategic planning is found in the Carter Doctrine (1980), which also sought to guarantee access to Persian Gulf oil reserves. Carter defined the Middle East as a region of vital interest that he would be prepared to defend with military force if need be. Control of the Middle East is in itself an argument for military intervention, even more so when its strategic importance is increasingly closely linked to the preservation of U.S. hegemony.

Other oil-rich regions of the globe that are part of this strategic vision are Russia; the Arctic; the north of the Gulf of Mexico; the province of Kosovo, through which the pipelines carrying hydrocarbons to Europe from Central Asia pass; and the Caucasus, in particular the Republic of Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia. U.S. attention is also focused on eastern China, in particular the southern Yellow Sea. Although reserves are also to be found in other latitudes, the axis of competition for resources is drawn across

central-southern Eurasia, and, as such, the reasoning behind the invasion of Iraq also took into account the possibility of redrawing the geopolitical map of Eurasia to guarantee U.S. power and dominion over the region *vis-à-vis* its potential competitors.[9]

Competition with China and Russia over certain geographical areas increases this rivalry. With the former, competition for reserves threatens to reach conflict levels due to Taiwan, considered the factor that could trigger war with China. Russia concerns the United States because of its monopoly over natural gas supply to Europe, which it is challenging by building an alternative supply infrastructure that will eventually surpass it. The Russians and Chinese form a united front against U.S. power thanks to the Shanghai Cooperation Accords, which seek to minimize the latter's influence in the region. The two countries have made it clear to the U.S. that they will not stand for any kind of interference in Central Asia.

Homeland Security

As we know, Homeland Security policies were drawn up to protect critical infrastructure in the U.S. and worldwide from future terrorist attacks and reduce vulnerability and improve the capacity for recovery in the event of an attack. They were put in place after 9/11,[10] by generating solutions from a holistic perspective.[11] Insofar as energy is concerned, these policies cover the oil, natural gas, and electricity infrastructure, since the importance of supply sources is derived from dependence —currently around 66 percent— on imported crude.[12]

This policy is justified by alleged declarations made by Osama Bin Laden claiming he would attack critical U.S. infrastructure, of which energy is a fundamental part. Another factor reflected in the adoption of these policies is the increasing distance between oil production and consumption centers, which increases the importance of the connecting infrastructure. Also taken into account is the possibility of "terrorist" attacks and uprisings in Latin America that could interfere with supply.

Developed nations' increasing dependence on oil imports makes the international situation itself a central part of their energy security. According to U.S. projections, after 2010 most of the oil supply will be provided by a handful of countries, only increasing concern for ensuring they are under control.

> The United States takes the steps it considers necessary to take part in future conflicts associated with the shortage of conventional oil reserves.

Linked to Homeland Security policy is the fact that the United States views itself as the guardian of the world's oil reserves. The Pentagon considers war over resources central to its strategic planning and underpins this with the so-called war on terrorism, deploying its forces across NATO's North, South, African, and Central Commands,[13] the Fourth Fleet, the new Defense Department fleet, and escalated military support to other countries, all as part of its strategy for energy control.

Policy of Maximum Extraction

Far from viewing energy conservation as a virtue, the George W. Bush administration opted for a maximum production policy at home and abroad. This policy of maximum supply has sought to gain supremacy by searching out new areas with oil-producing potential to guarantee future supply. After September 11, President Bush consolidated this diversification project across Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, where oil reserves are estimated at between 17.5 billion and 34 billion barrels. The development of the oil fields was accompanied by supply infrastructure such as the Baku oil pipeline project to Ceyhan in Turkey. Africa also forms part of this strategy, with oil reserves that are estimated to reach production levels of 8.3 million barrels per day by 2020.

Likewise, this strategic vision includes integration agreements such as the one establishing the energy market in North America, and the Hemispheric Energy Initiative, which covers the rest of the Americas. These proposals seek to open up space for private investors through "liberalization" and openness to energy industries. Another of the stated objectives of the new energy governance, operating on the basis of energy integration projects, is the dismantling of state oil companies. To do this, it encourages involving foreign investment in local oil industries with the aim of increasing energy supply, above all from reliable suppliers, something that will allow the United States to increase its imports without running the risk of dependency, as foreign sources provide the

means to prevent its own wells from drying up.[14] Thus, the maximum extraction policy has served and continues to serve U.S. security aims, and its energy security aims in particular. VM

Notes

[1] http://www.newamericancentury.org.iraqclintonletter.html.
[2] See http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr.
[3] Edward W. Morse and Amy Myers Jaffe, "Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century. Report of an Independent Task Force," James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University and the Council on Foreign Relations, September 2001, http://www.rice.edu/energy/publications/docs/TaskForceReport_StrategicEnergyPolicyUpdate.pdf.
[4] The White House, "Reliable, Affordable and Environmentally Sound Energy for America's Future. Report of the National Energy Policy Development Group," Washington, D. C., May 2001.
[5] Only later did the argument emerge that the intention was to establish democracy in Iraq.
[6] See, for example, James Bamford, *A Pretext for War* (New York: Doubleday, 2004).
[7] The invasion turned out to be a business opportunity for all kinds of contractors. Once the war had been won, the U.S. Defense Department only granted licenses to major U.S. private companies to provide most services, such as restoring electricity supply, building schools and hospitals, and training Iraqi troops. Foreign companies were left out of this lucrative business. See Orr C. Robert, *Winning the Peace. An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), p. 265.
[8] Michael T. Klare, "The New Geography of Conflict," *Foreign Affairs* vol. 80, no. 3 (May-June 2001).
[9] Michael T. Klare, "The New Geopolitics," *Monthly Review* vol. 55, no. 3 (July-August 2003), p. 4, http://monthlyreview.org/2003/07/01/the-new-geopolitics, accessed June 2, 2004.
[10] The White House, "National Strategy for Homeland Security," Office of Homeland Security, July 2002.
[11] David Heyman and James Jay Carafano, "Homeland Security 3.0: Building National Enterprise to Keep America Safe, Free, and Prosperous" (Washington, D. C.: The Heritage Foundation and Center for Strategic and International Studies, September 18, 2008).
[12] "Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, Energy Sector, 2008," www.dhs.gov/nipp, accessed January 2009.
[13] Since 2001, NATO has indicated that the United States and Europe are prepared to engage in heavy combat operations. See NATO's website for the interview with Tom Lantos, U.S. Chamber of Representatives, "A manutencão da paz mais além. Notícias da OTAN," Fall 2007, www.nato.int/docu/review/2007/issue4/portuguese/interview2.html.
[14] Rosío Vargas, *La política energética estadunidense ¿Asunto de seguridad o de mercado?* (Mexico City: CISAN, 2005).

Reviews



Juego y revolución.
La literatura mexicana de los años sesenta
(Games and Revolution. Mexican Literature in the 1960s)
(Corrected and expanded edition)
Juan Antonio Rosado
Octavio Antonio Colmenares y Vargas, ed.
Libros para ser libres Collection
Mexico City, 2011, 168 pp.

When looking closely at a specific period of Mexican culture, the threads of an intricate weave come to light, but only someone who studies them with a keen eye can show them to us. In *Juego y revolución. La literatura mexicana de los años sesenta* (Games and Revolution. Mexican Literature in the 1960s), Mexican author Juan Antonio Rosado embarks on a journey of this kind as he explores the artistic movement of the 1960s, a voyage that defies rigid limits given the meandering, dynamic nature of the process, through which readers are guided with an open mind.

An analysis of the characteristics of a particular literary period cannot be restricted to the study of the actual written work; what defines it is how it reflects the social and historic era in which various disciplines interact with one another. In his book, Rosado presents a broad, multifaceted view that allows the reader to trace part of the origins of contemporary Mexican culture.

As clarified at the beginning of the book, the scope of the publication is limited, since a detailed investigation would take decades of research and also because the author studies those artists with whom he feels a certain empathy. Nevertheless, the essays in the book are committed, constructive, and, above all, honest and critical.

Until the 1950s, the 1910 Mexican Revolution was the central theme of much of Mexican literature, but as of the 1960s this trend was broken. Writers with different points of view began to experiment with other themes as well as language tone and structure. These changes signified a shift from the realistic and historic to the imaginative and fantastical. Although they coincided in some aspects, each writer proposed a different world; Juan José Arreola, Carlos Fuentes, and Juan Rulfo transformed and reinvented tradition. Meanwhile, bold, multifaceted artists like Alejandro Jodorowsky and Juan José Gurrola brought theater to life by fueling the imagination. The cultural movement of the1960s engendered the founding of magazines, important publishing houses (like ERA and the late, lamented Diógenes), and television series. Museums were inaugurated and forums were organized to promote culture.

Ironically, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) governments —disgraceful, undemocratic, and deceptive— triggered the rebellion of many artists against their yoke. Art became a vehicle for speaking out against repression, opening the way to new forms of expression and themes, like rock music, the city, drugs, and a sudden liberalization of sexuality, all through renewed, fun, informal language. The literary generation of provocative, rebellious writers began to evolve in the tradition of *En la ruta de la onda* (On the Road to Cool), as the ill-fated author from Orizaba, Veracruz, Parménides García Saldaña, called his third novel.

The focus on rural life was replaced by an emphasis on urban areas, and young writers like José Agustín, Gustavo Sainz, and Parménides García Saldaña discovered an open form of expression through the use of irony and colloquial language.

Just as narrative experienced great changes, many different languages coexisted in the world of poetry. Some of these outstanding poets, like Carlos Pellicer and Salvador Novo, belonged to the generation of the Contemporaries. While Octavio Paz experimented with his poem "Blanco" (White), Renato Leduc was noted for his humor. Jaime Sabines and Rubén Bonifaz Nuño stood out, as did the members of the "Workshop" group, such as Efraín Huerta. The so-called Half-Century Generation was at its peak. It included several women, like Enriqueta Ochoa, Rosario Castellanos, and Dolores Castro, who, although they already had long literary careers behind them, were only just beginning to win recognition. What is remarkable about this review is that Juan Antonio Rosado whets the reader's with eleatic appetite and incites our impulse to go beyond the apparent and choose kindred spirits amid this artistic torrent.[1]

Art became a vehicle for speaking out against repression, opening the way to new forms of expression and themes, like rock music, the city, drugs, and a sudden liberalization of sexuality.

Juego y revolución pays special tribute to several writers who are constant reference points in the author's formation, as well as in the development of his theme: Juan García Ponce, Salvador Elizondo, Inés Arredondo, and Juan Vicente Melo, members of the "Casa del Lago generation," which poet and writer José Emilio Pacheco was also part of. All of them are noted for their insightful prose, experimentation with themes like the sacred and eroticism, and their commitment to language.

The 1960s opened the way for a more cosmopolitan outlook, and the cultural movement was enriched by what was produced in other languages and foreign art influences, such as the Beat Generation. Essential publications, like the magazines *El corno emplumado* (The Plumed Horn) and *La espiga amotinada* (The Mutinous Stalk), were founded to promote both young and established poets. The Casa del Lago (the Lake House), in Chapultepec Park, was the most important cultural center of the time, becoming the forum par excellence for artists, and, therefore, for the dissemination of poetry, drama, music, and the arts. About that time, the university project "Voz viva de México" (the Live Voice of Mexico) also emerged, which made recordings of renowned works read by the writers themselves.

In the visual arts, muralism was shunned, while another, more personal type of painting emerged, also focusing on ontological research. In a crossover of disciplines, many wrote essays on art and cinema, both Mexican and international. During those years, the Andalusian Luis Buñuel directed several films in Mexico using Mexican actors.

In addition to observing artistic expressions, Rosado also looks at social changes and the transformation of important concepts, like eroticism. The years of the sexual revolution gave birth to the contraceptive pill and to publications like *Caballero* (Gentleman), a men's magazine devoted to exploring the theme, and which contributed to the cultural movement by bringing together celebrities of the time and publishing notable articles, reportage, and photographs.

Several very informative interviews are to be found in the book: one with Emmanuel Carballo on the founding and later disappearance of the Diógenes publishing house; and another with Juan Miguel de Mora, an unusual person who was a journalist, war correspondent, writer, critic, and India scholar, especially on its ancient medicine and culture. This interview opens a different perspective on the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre, as well as on the cultural and daily life of Mexico during those years.

Juan Antonio Rosado also pays tribute to two outstanding creative individuals: Carlos Valdés, writer, critic, and editor, who died 20 years ago, and who presented new aesthetic ideas to the narrative of the time; and the prolific musician Juan Antonio Rosado Rodríguez, born in Puerto Rico, who discov-

ered Mexico as a country where he could teach and compose daring, eclectic works that deserve to be better known. As well as providing a disquieting cultural journey, this book is a struggle against oblivion, and a rousing incentive to continue exploring and enjoying art. VM

Carlos López
Writer and editor

NOTES

[1] The Eleatics were a school of pre-Socratic philosophers at Elea (now Velia), a Greek colony in Campania, Italy. The group was founded in the early fifth century BC by Parmenides. [Editor's Note.]



REVIEWS

Ser migrante
(Being a Migrant)
Matteo Dean
Sur + ediciones
Mexico City, 2011, 186 pp.

THE DISASTROUS UNDER-RECOGNITION OF MIGRANTS

The late Matteo Dean's book of op-ed articles and essays, *Ser migrante* (Being a Migrant) starts with a crack. Until recently, Dean points out, according to the Royal Spanish Academy, the word "migrant" (*migrante*) did not even officially exist in Spanish. "*Inmigrado*" and "*emigrante*" existed, but not, simply, "*migrante*." A person could, then, in the official registers of the language, be entering or leaving a country, but between, in transit, or back and forth, there was a linguistic crack, a space of non-definition the migrant fell into. And what befalls a migrant in this crack —this interstitial space outside national protection or recognition— is the material of *Ser migrante*.

But the rather recondite linguistic analogy is not just limited to Spanish. In the United States as well, not only are migrants *not* guaranteed freedom —they seem rather to be guaranteed both violence and exploitation— they are not even guaranteed a respectful definition: routinely and pejoratively referred to as "illegals," "wetbacks," "tonks," or "aliens."

Our basic freedoms —the right to speech, freedom from oppression, fair trials, the pursuit of happiness— are defined and protected by our national constitutions. But where some countries do not guarantee these freedoms, or do not abide by their own guarantees, the International Declaration of Human Rights serves to extend them to all persons, especially those, like migrants —there are an estimated 212 million worldwide— who are liable to fall, as in Dean's linguistic example, into the unprotected spaces between the limits of national protection, into *the cracks*.

Reading Matteo Dean, you start to realize that there are cracks all around us.

Ser migrante is a collection of articles (averaging 3 short pages) most of which were originally published in Mexico's daily paper *La Jornada*, describing the many ways these 212 million migrants are exploited, abused, murdered, kidnapped, hoodwinked, encarcerated, enslaved, mistreated, misinformed, and altogether stomped on by the laws or lack of laws in Europe, Mexico, and the United States. By detailing these horrors abroad —most but not all of the essays concern migration in Europe— Dean sheds light on the horrors at home. That is,

by focusing as much on migration to Italy and Europe as on Mexico and the United States, the book shocks the reader at what at first sounds like foreign callousness and brutality, but which is frighteningly reminiscent of the migration policies of both Mexico and the United States.

On January 7, 2010, Dean reports, in the tip of the boot of the Italian peninsula, thousands of migrant workers poured into the streets of the small city of Rosarno (population, 15 000) to protest the miserable conditions in which they were forced to live and work. A drive-by shooting —shots were fired into a crowd of migrants— outside an abandoned factory where many migrants live incited them to take to the streets. The shooting was only one of a "long list of attacks" against the migrant communities in the region. The ensuing police crackdown was swift and firm. Most of the protestors were apprehended and trucked to a Center of Identification and Expulsion, and 16 were injured. The following night, January 8, Italy's Minister of the Interior Roberto Maroni declared that the scuffle was

Cracking down does not stem migration; rather, it forces millions of migrants, whose basic well-being and even survival is ever more precarious, to accept increasingly decrepit working and living conditions.

the "result of years of excessive tolerance of illegal migration, which is the basis for [Italy's] criminality and social degradation." Here we have an example of what Dean explains as the foundation-laying of "modern slavery." Tens of thousands of migrants live in this region of Italy and nearly four million countrywide. Cracking down, as Maroni went on to suggest, and in effect what is happening now in Italy (as well as across Europe, the U.S., and Mexico) does not stem migration; rather, it forces millions of migrants, whose basic well-being and even survival is ever more precarious, to accept increasingly decrepit working and living conditions, creating, in Dean's words, "an Army of human beings exposed to all types of blackmail."

The blackmailing goes like this: accept the racist inhuman conditions in which you live as an "illegal" person, or...

The "or" ranges from expulsion, breaking apart families, incarceration, starvation, general mistreatment, to deportation to violent countries of origin, etc.

So, not surprisingly, the migrants acquiesce —whether in Rosarno, Italy, Phoenix, Arizona, or Mexico City— to their frightening working and living conditions. They acquiesce to living in the shadows, to do our dirty work for a pittance, to zero job security, and to the constant fear of arrest and deportation.

This parsing of a mostly unheard-of protest in southern Italy is one of many ignored or poorly publicized migration matters that Dean touches on in the book. Here are three (of many) others:

1. The swiftly increasing number of climate refugees. Though the number is difficult to speculate, considering earthquakes, tsunamis, and other natural disasters, there have been estimations as high as 50 million.
2. Italy's under-the-table diplomatic relationship with the late Muammar Gaddafi and his Libyan regime, in which the Italian Coast Guard would wash their hands of migrants rescued from the Mediterranean, especially refugees from Eritrea, by shipping them to Libya, where they were interned and given the choice between "freedom," working in Libyan communes, or deportation back to the violence they were originally fleeing in Eritrea —here Dean ties the situation to the infamous aphorism, "work will make you free."
3. The concrete ties between European and North American human trafficking rings (Mexico's Gulf Cartel's connection to the Italian Ndrangheta mafia).

But the central question Dean repeatedly poses, through these specific, international, and varied anecdotes is simple: What does it mean to be a migrant?

Two hundred twelve million worldwide. That's about one in every 34 persons.

Dean himself was born in Italy. And, deported twice from Mexico before finally receiving permanent residency, he himself was a migrant. Despite Dean's unfortunate and early death —at 36, he was hit by a truck whose brakes went out— he has left us with a book, which, even if it does not completely follow through with many of the questions it raises, does open up new and international angles with which to comprehend North American migration policies.

It is absurd —and it seems even more so considering the international context— how obdurately we have tied a person's legal status to his or her location. Or, perhaps even more fundamentally insensitive, and a question that underlies many of Dean's essays, is our insistence on defining human beings based on notions of legality. Dean's diverse and often horri-

fying examples show us that the repercussions of this obsession of ours (illegalizing our fellow human beings) are real, widespread, and violent.

In his detailing of Frontex, a company based out of Poland that was allocated €2 billion between 2007 and 2013 by the European Union, which owns 116 ships, 27 helicopters, 21 planes, and 400 mobile radar system, all deployed to protect Europe from the influx of migrants, we feel the impact of how ridiculous the scare policies toward northward migration is on this continent, how wasteful the drones flying over the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, or how ludicrous the billions wasted on ineffective walls and sophisticated but useless borderwall technology are. In his report on the many Centers of Identification and Expulsion —not Dean's satiric nickname, but the official name of the detention centers— scattered throughout Europe, which the author caustically claims call to mind Nazi concentration camps (where not only "illegal crossers" are imprisoned but also those requesting asylum), we cannot help but think of the booming population of migrants (380 000 in 2009) locked up in private prison companies throughout the United States. Perhaps the biggest rivals of U.S. private prison companies (like Corrections Corporation of America) are actually the Mexican cartels, most of which have similarly taken to exploiting migrants' vulnerable condition, that is, locking people up for profit.

Indeed, as Dean points out, our insensitivities are injurious at best and murderous at worst. Recently, on December 4, in a meeting of the Pacific Alliance of Chile, Colombia, Peru, and Mexico, the first three proposed the free transit of citizens among the four allied countries. Mexico rejected the request, President Calderón claiming that there is "an enormous pressure on Mexico because it is a country of high transit of migrants on their way to the United States." But the high transit of migrants is exactly why they should be —to use this sad and bizarre qualification— "legalized." Despite Draconian political deterrence (walls, inhumane detention conditions, racist climates) and inhospitable routes and methods (dangerous seas or deserts), history has repeatedly shown that it is nearly impossible to stop human migration. So Calderón's statement is akin to saying that despite the large numbers of migrants who pass and will continue to pass through the country, Mexico will not offer them a hand and will not try to make their lives safer or more comfortable. Illegal presence in a country *de jure* prohibits and *de facto* denies a whole host of social services (even often including health care and police protection) and invites exploitation, kidnapping, rape, murder, etc. And the Mexican government, the U.S. government, and Fortress Europe governments continue to withhold support and recognition of migrants, even going so far as to criminalize them, making a better or more dignified life for millions not only illegal to have, but illegal to even want, that is, as Dean puts it succinctly, it is "illegal to be illegal."

One of the more telling examples Dean gives is of the drawn-out kerfuffle over the "Cap Anamur Case," in which three German citizens were arrested and tried for rescuing 37 Africans from a distressed boat in the Mediterranean. The Germans, along with their new 37 passengers, were denied entry for three weeks into an Italian harbor. Neither Germany, nor Malta (the closest country to where the migrants were rescued), nor Italy offered the least assistance during these three weeks. In the end, the boat was allowed into the harbor, but the 37 migrants were deported and the trial of the Germans lasted three years. In the final ruling they were eventually acquitted of all charges of human trafficking, but, as Dean points out, "since then, captains of ships, fishermen, or tourists who travel these waters will think twice about rescuing any migrants in distress." Similarly, United States citizens have gone to trial for transporting dying migrants to the hospital, or for leaving water bottles in the desert, and now, with increasingly malicious laws in Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, and Oklahoma —copycat laws are pending in 13 other states— certainly many U.S. citizens will think twice, considering the potential legal ramifications, before helping a fellow human being in need, especially if that human being has the look of an "illegal."

This is the kind of international frame Dean gives us in *Ser migrante*, shining, if not new at least more light on the inhumanity of our migration policies. I wish that Dean were around to give us more. And I hope that some of our lawmakers read this book and feel rightly ashamed.

Ser migrante is part of the Frontera Press series published by Sur +. John Berger's *Un séptimo hombre* (A Seventh Man), part of the same series, was reviewed in the Autumn 2011 issue of *Voices of Mexico*.[1] VM

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Notes

[1] *Voices of Mexico* no. 94, pp. 125-128. [Editor's Note.]