

VOICES of Mexico

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Trump's Presidency Domestic and International Consequences

Paz Consuelo Márquez-Padilla
Manuel Chavez
Roberto Zepeda
Elisa Dávalos

COLLABORATIVE DOSSIER Views from the Borderlands Arizona Scholars Reflect On Mexico-U.S. Connections

Colin Deeds and Scott Whiteford
Celeste González
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Teodoro González de León Renovator of Mexican Architecture

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SPECIAL SECTION Immigrant Farmworkers In the U.S. Northeast

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ISSN: 0186-9418



9 771234 567003

ISSUE 102 AUTUMN-WINTER 2016-2017 MEXICO \$50 USA \$12 CANADA \$15

www.revistascisan.unam.mx/Voices/

Universidades

Año LXVII · Nueva época · núm. 71 · enero-marzo, 2017.

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
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La Unión de Universidades de América Latina y el Caribe como parte fundamental del Centro Cultural Tlatelolco

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Centro Cultural Universitario Tlatelolco, Ciudad de México, 06995



ISSN 0186 • 9418

Voices of Mexico is published by the
Centro de Investigaciones sobre América del Norte, CISAN (Center for Research on North America) of the
Coordinación de Humanidades (Office of the Coordinator of Humanities), Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México,
UNAM (National Autonomous University of Mexico).

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
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VOICESTM of Mexico

Issue 102 Autumn-Winter 2016-2017



Juan Nader Sayún

Alexandra Aktories, *Emerge and Surprise*.

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OUR VOICE

At this writing, a few days before President Donald Trump's 100-days-in-office report, not only the United States but also many other nations of the world are in political ferment. Cases in point are Venezuela, Turkey, France, and Great Britain, where the sources of the tension may be specifically domestic, but also all have in common a citizenry clamoring to get out from under the interests of political leaders and/or parties.

In this sense, the future of democracy is undoubtedly one of the uncertainties facing humankind. That's why we are taking advantage of this space to remember the eminent Italian political scientist Giovanni Sartori, who passed away last April 4, leaving a huge intellectual legacy in this field.

For this philosopher, democracy cannot be explained as a function of what is aspired through it or in the sense of how things should be, but as a symbiosis with what it actually is, thus amalgamating a prescriptive-descriptive definition. We can simplify by saying that for Sartori, democracy is simultaneously an ideal, a principle of legitimacy, and a system for managing power.¹

We should also remember that U.S. democracy is characterized, among other things, by having given rise to the first political parties and by remaining influential until today. Currently, the Republican and Democratic Parties are in serious internal disarray, clearly shown by Trump's entry into the White House.

Given the importance of this for Mexico, most of the contents of this issue directly or indirectly center on analyzing topics of special importance.

We begin with the splendid contribution by our colleague Paz Consuelo Márquez-Padilla, who was the director of the CISAN between 1997 and 2001. She very succinctly presents the key social, political, economic, and cultural elements underlying Trump's victory, framing her argument in the profound significance that both federalism and checks and balances have for the U.S. political system.

For a comprehensive view of the kick-off of the new administration, we have an article by renowned media and communications expert Manuel Chavez. His contribution about the strategy Trump used to distort reality and gain followers by discrediting the traditional press and television media, together with his intensive use of Twitter to attack and revile his opponents, and, above all, to retain his captive followers, is obligatory reading. It is interesting to note that 28 million people currently follow the president of the United States on Twitter.

It is certainly surprising that when carefully reviewing the difficulties in Mexico-U.S. relations given the hostility of an administration that disqualifies any reciprocity or contribution on Mexico's part, the reality is that the bilateral agenda items remain unchanged: security,

¹ See Giovanni Sartori, *Elementos de teoría política* (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1987), Chapter 4.

trade, immigration, and energy. However, the new facet of this relationship is that NAFTA will be renegotiated in the coming months; this is why we include two articles on its effects to illustrate the complexity this process will present.

Elisa Dávalos presents us with the quintessential case of the auto industry: linking it up through value chains spanning the whole North American region has favored its recovery in the United States and has catapulted Mexico to ninth position worldwide in this important industry.

To contrast points of view, international relations specialist Roberto Zepeda illustrates the role of Midwestern unionized workers in electing Donald Trump. Displaced by globalization, technological innovation, and even financial markets, blue collar workers opted for the Republican candidate, trusting in his promise to recreate their jobs.

Two factors come together here: one, Mexico's successful positioning in the auto industry, and the other, the loss of jobs of this kind in the United States. Trump manipulated both to attract followers with the win-win argument of recovering jobs for U.S. workers and completely rejecting NAFTA if necessary.

Any of our regular readers will immediately note that this issue offers something different: a dossier with fascinating contributions from six U.S. academics from the University of Arizona, dealing with important aspects of the Sonora/Arizona border area. We invite you to look over the dossier's contents to discover their value added for *Voices of Mexico's* traditional fare.

Our "Special Section," edited by Canadian researcher Kathy Sexsmith, an expert in immigration and development, brings together several articles by members of a new generation of researchers. They concentrate their attention on undocumented agricultural workers settled in the U.S. Northeast. Their forceful, well-documented arguments demonstrate the exploitation by employers, the enormous risks women and teenagers face at the hands of organized crime networks, and the tensions between workers and owners. What stands out in all the contributions is the authors' activism and solidarity with vulnerable immigrants. Their commitment is not limited to informed, erudite denunciations, but includes accompanying, advising, and creating social capital to empower undocumented migrants through collective action.


I want to take this opportunity to thank our CISAN colleague Teresa Jiménez for her care in selecting the materials for the section on the diversity and wealth of the art of illustration in Mexico. Our "Art and Culture" section looks at this field of endeavor, with its rich history dating all the way back to the indescribable beauty of the pre-Colombian codices.

I would venture to say as a corollary that the true "Splendor of Mexico" resides in the very soul of our nation. Despite the increasing difficulties and problems we face, our country continues to reproduce a unique artistic sensibility materialized in the vitality and creativity of our architects, sculptors, painters, writers, poets, illustrators, and artisans.

In this issue, we celebrate the genius of architect Teodoro González de León and the aesthetic contributions of Mexican women artists like María Eugenia de la Garza and Alexandra Aktories.

I send our readers an ode in thanks.

Silvia Núñez García
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
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The Paradoxes Of Donald Trump's Victory

Paz Consuelo Márquez-Padilla*



The 2016 U.S. presidential elections must be analyzed in a broader context if we want to understand the outcome. I will look at two levels of that context: the international scene and the U.S. domestic panorama. In accordance with one dominant international trend, countries are defined as exclusionary, protectionist, nationalist, populist, and anti-globalization, or, on the other hand, inclusionary, pro-migration, and pro-globalization. As examples of the former, Hungary, Bulgaria, Slovenia, and Slovakia have built walls or fences. At the same time, right-wing populist political parties have risen to importance in England, where Brexit was voted in; in Italy, where Lega Nord and Forza Italia have won several local elections; in France, where Marine Le Pen is the front-running candidate; and in Poland and Turkey, dominated by authoritarian governments.

We cannot deny that globalization has created winners and losers. But, above all, since no international governance regulates and imposes normative limits on large multinational corporations, the world's wealth has concentrated in the

hands of one percent of its population, the “Lords of the Universe,” mentioned by Piketty, Chomsky, and Stiglitz. This has created fear of globalization and sparked the emergence of populist movements.¹

In the U.S. domestically, three factors are important: the economy, politics, and the cultural-technological sphere. With regard to the economy, I should underline that the 2008 crisis clearly showed that wealth has been concentrating enormously in U.S. society. According to Joseph Stiglitz, 40 percent of the wealth in the United States is in the hands of 1 percent of the population, while in 1979, that 1 percent only owned 9 percent of the wealth.² During the crisis, U.S. Americans realized that the costs and benefits of social cooperation were not equitably distributed and that the gap between the elites and the masses was growing.

We should remember that globalization spurs big companies to seek new markets to be more competitive; this has led capital to emigrate in search of countries where they can pay lower wages, like Mexico and China. This has happened mainly in Ohio, Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, the so-called “swing states,” where unemployment has reached 9 percent.³ Paradoxically, Trump stole the narrative of the

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Democrats, who have traditionally led the anti-migration, anti-trade-deal discourse, and whose party rank and file was made up of the big unions.

We must not forget that Trump increased his public profile as the celebrity reality-show host of *The Apprentice*, and as someone very familiar with the media, he knows that it does not matter if the news report is good or bad: what matters is that they talk about you. This got him free publicity in the media, which could never stop publishing the scandalous news he generated, since they have lost a great deal of the market to the social network boom. So, paradoxically and unintentionally, they helped Trump win even though today he considers them his enemies and disparages them.

The Internet has made possible a degree of communication with the masses that was unthinkable in the past. As a result, power has been decentralized, as Moisés Naim has pointed out: new actors emerge very rapidly and take on great importance due to the power of the web.⁴ Trump is a master of the social networks, and, through Twitter, he maintains direct contact with the masses, allowing him to create a strong populist movement.

On the level of politics, we can see what Fukuyama calls “repatrimonialization,” which means that the economic elites exercise disproportionate power over government.⁵

In the 1960s, when minorities were beginning to demand equal rights, a huge divide began to emerge in U.S. society, a divide that rapidly increased during the 2008 financial crisis and on the election of Barack Obama, the first African-American in the White House. The fragmentation has risen to such a degree that between one sector of society and another, very different ideas exist about what the nation is; and, in this context, the liberals are becoming more liberal and the conservatives more conservative. When analyzing the ideological trends, we can see that 53 percent of Republicans consider themselves conservative and only 34, moderate. Among the Democrats, 53 percent describe themselves as liberal, and 31 percent, moderate.⁶ The traditional consensus that favored centrist positions has been broken, as has the dialogue between these two large social sectors. Thus, the imaginary of the kind of society that each one conceives of is not only different, but diametrically opposed.

John Budis argues that in the United States, populist movements emerge periodically when a political crisis is looming: “They signal that the prevailing political ideology isn’t working and needs repair, and the standard worldview is breaking down.”⁷

Obama’s signing into law of the Affordable Care and Protection Act and the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 prompted more mobilization by the right’s most conservative groups. The Tea Party movement rapidly emerged, becoming the Republican touchstone, giving a new face to the conservative movement as it was defined as right-wing populist, anti-elitist, fiscally conservative, and characterized by the tendency to hark back to philosophical and constitutional origins. It is populist to the extent that its narrative sees ordinary people as a noble group and the elite as selfish free-loaders,⁸ and in addition, it offers simplistic solutions to complex problems. For example, when it pointed to Mexican immigration as the big threat and cause of all woes, its proposal was to put the brakes on it. These groups’ concerns feed on anxieties around issues of the ethnic and racial changes taking place in the United States, particularly in places where Hispanic migration had not been significant before.

In his analysis of the United States, Samuel Huntington also pointed to Mexican immigration as the main problem due to what he said was this minority’s trying to protect Spanish, therefore putting in danger one of U.S. nationalism’s bases: the dominance of the English language. Also, by becoming the largest minority, with 34 million Hispanics and their high growth rate,⁹ they threatened the dominance of whites.¹⁰

This conservative movement opposed taxation and immigration. A 65-or-older, scantily educated, unemployed worker who had lost his job due to technological advances or to globalization saw immigrants as a clear threat. He believes that immigrants enjoy the benefits of the welfare state, making his taxes go up, and that their demands for social assistance put white workers at risk.

The narrative of Trump’s campaign was clearly populist: he championed an anti-establishment, anti-media, anti-elite, anti-corruption, anti-globalization, anti-NAFTA, anti-TPP movement; the return of jobs to the United States;¹¹ tax cuts and fewer regulations; and reducing the number of migrants, especially Mexicans and Muslims. In short: he offered change. That is, he knew how to listen to conservative malaise and, due to the fear of change stemming from globalization and the cultural change caused by immigration, was able to unify white

The world’s wealth has concentrated in the hands of one percent of its population. This has created fear of globalization and sparked the emergence of populist movements.

Trump stole the narrative of the Democrats, who have traditionally led the anti-migration, anti-trade-deal discourse, and whose party rank and file was made up of the big unions.

Republican and Democratic males. People voted for that change despite all the insults he proffered in his campaign: white females (42 percent), educated white males (58 percent), Latinos (29 percent), and Asians (29 percent).¹²

As president, Trump is fulfilling his campaign promises. To date, he has issued several executive orders to set government policy, with important consequences that have disturbed some sectors of the population, but have met with approval from his voter base.

Benedict Anderson defines a nation as the imagined political community. It is imagined because even the members of the smallest nation never know all the other members. Despite the differences among its members, the nation is conceived of as a horizontal, profound brotherhood that goes beyond social classes: citizens are capable of dying and killing for that imaginary creation, since, in the last analysis, we must underline the cultural roots of nationalism. While nationalism inspires love and the will to sacrifice oneself for the nation, it also creates fear of and hatred for the “other,” the different. The idea of nation brings together the conception of a past and a future, of the history and the destiny of a community.¹³

In an era when people are talking about globalization, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism, surprisingly, there is a resurgence of nationalism in the United States. Paradoxically, a member of the elite, of the so-called “1 percent,” used a national-populist, isolationist narrative to convince the electorate that he would work in favor of the interests of the masses. When looking at the U.S. social context today, we could conclude that two very different types of political culture have been consolidating there.

In an attempt to capture its essence, we can say that the Republicans’ political culture is attempting to involve religion in public life, and the Democrats are the guardians of the separation of church and state: not only do they defend the individualism they profess, but they are also concerned about a more egalitarian distribution of wealth, and therefore, favor higher taxation on the rich to create safety nets for the poorest sectors of the population. The Republicans, for their part, argue that taxes slow economic growth; Trump has already offered a big tax cut for business. The Democrats are

demanding that corporations be socially responsible. Trump promised to eliminate 75 percent of regulations on corporations.

The Democrats have taken on board the idea that global warming is the threat of this century and are pushing for environmental protection. The conservatives do not believe in climate change. This includes Trump, who issued an executive order to build the gas pipeline to Canada that had been slowed due to ecological concerns.

The Republicans say that the government should not be restricted in its struggle against terrorists and are against recognizing terrorists’ human rights. Trump has come out in favor of torture and extreme, wider-ranging interrogation methods; he has criticized international institutions in general and multilateral negotiations in particular. The conservatives are against abortion, same-sex marriage, and the recognition of transsexuals’ rights.

Positions are clearly diametrically opposed with regard to the Supreme Court. The Republicans are more originalist in their interpretation of the Constitution; that is, they argue for a literal application of the law, while the Democrats think the law should be reinterpreted to make amends to the minorities. So, we can see that the liberals’ imaginary community is inclusive, multicultural, in favor of human rights, women’s rights, the lesbian-gay community, the Afro-American minority, immigration, bilingualism, and redistribution of wealth, and seeks to create a more just society and world. In short: they are for dialogue among countries and the supremacy of soft power.

Basically, we can only explain the Democrats’ electoral loss as perhaps due to their moving away from their social base by presenting an image that was too liberal for the average U.S. American. That is, this imaginary community is the image created by a super-liberal elite that stopped listening to the voice of its social base.

For its part, the imaginary community of Trump and his followers is an exclusionary society that fights for the dominance of WASP values, to afford no privileges to minorities, to put the brakes on Muslim and Mexican migration, return to protectionism, give big advantages to the big corporations, bring back industries that had lost importance due to technological advances, and establish the primacy of the United States in a world by threatening with hard power.

If culture is the root of nationalism, it is obvious that these two political cultures have two very different narratives in their imaginary communities. Not only are they incapable of establishing a dialogue, but they are complete opposites.

The narrative of Trump's campaign was clearly populist: anti-establishment, anti-media, anti-elite, anti-corruption, anti-globalization, anti-NAFTA, calling for the return of jobs to the United States, taxcuts, and reducing the number of migrants, especially Mexicans.

Therefore, the nationalism growing in one of them seeks to impose the model of its imaginary community on a very different real society. This division was clearly expressed during the last election campaigns: Donald Trump won the Electoral College, but Hillary took the popular vote by three million ballots.¹⁴

Times of great uncertainty are approaching for U.S. democracy and the world. The traditional checks and balances of the U.S. political system may be rather ineffective over the next two years. Congress is dominated by the Republicans and the Supreme Court, by conservatives.

We should remember that democracy does not assure us that the best option will be chosen, but rather that the most popular candidate has been elected. In the case of the complicated U.S. electoral apparatus, it does not even assure us that the winner was the one with the most votes. However, legitimacy emerges from the confidence in the role of the Electoral College, backed by the population, while, according to the rules of its federalism, it gives similar weight to all states, big and small.

Paradoxically, although Founding Fathers Jay, Madison, and Hamilton designed an Electoral College to prevent a demagogue from manipulating the masses, it was precisely that institution that gave Trump the win because social phenomena always bring with them unexpected consequences. However, that federalism is also the force that has begun to act against some of the president's executive orders: governors and mayors have already resisted obeying the ones they think violate the Constitution.

U.S. District Court Judge James Robart, a Republican from Seattle, struck down the ban on citizens from seven Muslim countries from entering the United States. He argued that, according to the Constitution, no one can be discriminated against for religious reasons. Civil society, for its part, has begun to organize and to demonstrate against some of President Trump's decisions. Spearheaded by women, a movement has emerged defending the interests of environmentalists, women, Afro-Americans, Mexican immigrants, Muslims, and the lesbian-gay community, and against protectionism, among

many other issues, although there have also been pro-life demonstrations in support of the president.

As democrats, we hope that what prevails domestically and among the international community will be the deliberative and fruitful dialogue in favor of a consensus that every society needs for its own benefit. I think that it is precisely in the framework of federalism that the conflicts derived from the desire to impose a contrasting imaginary community will be expressed most sharply. This is because that system protects diversity, minorities, and the states *vis-à-vis* the federal government and is an important guarantee of the checks and balances of the U.S. system.

John F. Kennedy wrote *Profiles in Courage*, a book that underlines the importance of making certain difficult decisions even if you must go against the dictates of your own party, as long as you do the right thing. Checks and balances work when you have leaders with the courage to respect them. ■■■

NOTES

¹ Thomas Piketty, *Capital in the Twenty-First Century* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2014); Noam Chomsky, *Who Rules the World?* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2016); and Joseph Stiglitz, *The Price of Inequality* (New York/London: WW Norton & Company, 2012).

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The Election Campaign And Trump in the White House Lessons and Implications

Manuel Chavez Marquez*

The unprecedented election of Donald J. Trump as the forty-fifth president of the United States is a clear lesson on many fronts. Lessons will emerge from an abrasive political strategy that swiftly responded to attacks, spread half-truths, communicated directly with the voters, oversimplified complex issues, discredited the traditional media, and offered no significant policy formulations. Above all, the simplicity of Trump's campaign, which seemed to work, is summarized in isolationist, protectionist, and xenophobic proposals to "Make America Great Again."

As 2017 begins, U.S. Americans, Mexicans, and citizens from other nations are bracing themselves to see how the Trump presidency will take shape and how he will honor campaign promises—and threats. Given this scenario, the primary intention of this article is to examine the initial evidence of Mr. Trump's electoral success, including his use of social media, and to outline what that means for binational relationships, especially for Mexico.

Trump won the Electoral College by pushing an astonishing unconventional campaign that surprised many, including pollsters, media, analysts, and even members of the Republican Party. His campaign had many targets, including Hillary Clinton, Washington's political swampland, border security, especially with Mexico, immigration involving Muslims and Mexicans, and the "aggressive" trade practices of countries like China and Mexico. His statements brought up Mexico many times—no other country was mentioned as often or as intensely. In his speech to announce his candidacy on



June 16, 2015, he included Obama's health care, trade, unemployment, drugs, Saudi Arabia, economic decline, and terrorism.¹

So, first the facts: Hillary Clinton obtained 232 Electoral College votes while Trump won the Electoral College by 306 votes (270 guaranteed a win). However, Trump lost the popular vote by more than 2.8 million votes. The U.S. Electoral College follows a process established in 1779 in Article Two of the U.S. Constitution to settle presidential elections by Congress and by popular vote. Under this format, a candidate can lose the popular vote and still win the presidency through the Electoral College. This was the case of the 2016 election. Trump was able to win the battle states like Ohio, Wisconsin, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Florida, and Iowa, securing him sufficient electoral votes.

The initial announcement of his candidacy in summer 2015 received no significant political traction; rather, it was viewed with suspicion and revolt in the Republican Party, since he was accused of not being a genuine conservative, and with scorn from the media and political analysts. As 17 other Republican candidates emerged before the 2016 primaries, the press and many pundits did not believe Trump

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Trump has used his tweets as a way to deliver edicts, threats, and distortions of information. He repeatedly changes, dismisses, and switches facts to favor his positions.

would win the party's nomination. His unconventional style and unexpected, consistent attacks on women, minorities, immigrants, and gay communities increased conventional skepticism; however, that rhetoric had no impact on his rising popularity. Many analysts and the press overlooked the broad discontent that Trump successfully tapped into, including the strong, white anti-Obama sentiment.

The key to understanding this is that Trump was appealing to and seeking the support of a predominantly uneducated, conservative white population, including Evangelical Christians, who did not vote consistently. Moreover, many of Trump's statements, the topics he dealt with, were primarily sacrilegious because of political correctness, stimulated in a way, over the years by the Democrats. He simply broke that tradition, attacking any topic and all and sundry, to the delight of those conservatives. For many, he represented a breath of fresh air as an unconventional political figure who publicly said what many voters thought in private but did not dare to say openly.

Another element that was very effective for Mr. Trump was the direct linear communication through social media—for free—, specifically through Twitter, where he offered opinions and very simplistic statements. He used his tweets to provide information about his ideas, to attack his political targets, and to discredit the traditional press. When the traditional media, whether print or broadcast (*The New York Times* and CNN in particular), presented information that Trump considered negative about him, he persistently and systematically called them the “dishonest media.” Yet, what has been evident is that Mr. Trump distorted, twisted, and spun facts and truthful information into discrediting attacks, in a public relations strategy to respond to media messages by changing their meaning. It is a textbook case of political propaganda and demagoguery. Given that this election has included far more engagement on Twitter than the 2012 election and that Obama's victory was credited largely to his social media presence, it is not unreasonable to assume that Trump's Twitter activity had a similar effect on his campaign.

Two months before the election, Trump had more Twitter followers than Clinton, with 11.6 million vs. 8.88 million respectively.² However, it was clear by then that Trump was

wining the social media war and that he was directing the news in his favor—for free at no cost, as he paid nothing for his Twitter account (@realDonaldTrump). His dominance of Twitter and how it helped his campaign is shown simply by his reluctance to use conventional methods of political communication and to rely instead on the free, immediate, visceral social media platforms. In a way, he let millions of supporters make his case for him and deflect the controversies he provoked.³ Just simply, the Twitter “likes” for Mr. Trump came to 776 000, while Mrs. Clinton received 578 000, a difference of nearly 200 000 or 34 percent more than the Democratic hopeful.⁴ During the campaign it was normal to expect a tweet at 3 a.m. about anything he wanted to communicate, causing a disruption of the normal news cycle.

The characteristics and factors involved in Trump's successful use of a one-way system of communication will be the subject of future research by political scientists and communications scholars. It is unclear how, as president of the United States, he will communicate with the U.S. public. What is clear now is that he has used his tweets as a way to deliver edicts, threats, and distortions of information. He repeatedly changes, dismisses, and switches facts to favor his positions. He discredits the media, public officials, corporations, and President Obama when they come out with information that does not support his political perspectives.

An initial analysis of Trump's tweets confirms he writes mostly in an angry mode. Trump owns an Android phone, which helps determine which tweets he wrote himself and which were put out by his campaign manager. One analysis of Trump's tweets shows that he writes with more “emotionally charged” words, like “badly,” “crazy,” “weak,” or “dumb.” He is also less likely to use hashtags, photos, or links in his tweets.⁵ *Politico Magazine* published an interesting graphic analysis of his Twitter history, focused on the 10 top words he used. Not surprisingly, they are: “I. You. Great. Trump. My. @realDonaldTrump. #Trump2016. He. We. Thank.” Also, the analysis shows that the words “great,” “weak,” “failed,” “nasty,” and “light-weight” were some of the adjectives most used in his tweets.⁶

Slate Magazine also analyzed Trump's tweets for patterns and to explain his strategies. It identified a mode of persuasion that initially appeals to logic, followed by an appeal to his own credibility, and then a strong appeal to emotion. The tweets are structured as a statement of fact (which may not be true), followed by an insult (usually), and are loaded with emotional appeal. Another of Trump's tactics is to put him-

self at the center of every issue by creating the impression that he is critical to every aspect of life.⁷

Something unclear is the role of Steve Bannon, who has extensive experience in manipulating information into “news” and creating what is called “fake news.” Bannon is the past director of *Breitbart News*, a far-right website source of conservative information, opinion, and commentary that uses a model to show untruthful or false information as real. During the election, fake articles like “The Pope Endorses Trump,” “Hillary Clinton Bought \$137 Million in Illegal Arms,” and “The Clintons Bought a \$200 Million House in the Maldives” circulated first on this website and then around Facebook getting thousands of likes, shares, and comments. He has been appointed President-elect Trump’s chief strategist, and we can expect there the same level of information manipulation that Mr. Bannon is known for. The implications, however, would be more dramatic and have a greater impact.

Breitbart News is a website used as a platform for the “alt-right.” The alternative right or “alt-right” is a conservative movement that has been identified with white supremacy, racism, nativism, anti-feminism, homophobia, and neo-Nazism principles and followers. The site’s qualitative content consistently displays the style used by Mr. Bannon and his team, which, again, is expected from the Trump administration. Also, Google and Facebook have been accused of being responsible for letting fake news expand during the 2016 presidential election. After the balloting, Google announced it would ban websites that peddle fake news from using its online advertising service. Similarly, Facebook updated its Facebook Audience Network Policy, which already says it will not display ads on sites that show misleading or illegal content, including fake news sites.⁸ How both companies will be able to monitor information coming from the administration and/or U.S. government agencies under Mr. Trump remains to be seen.

Scholars have already begun academic research to better understand how and why Mr. Trump won the election; but also how Clinton and the Democratic Party lost track of their political message. It is difficult to grasp the notion that the Democratic Party’s traditional political influence on blue-collar workers, especially of those in manufacturing, was coopted and won over by Trump’s political machinery. As mentioned above, some of the apparent reasons are the high voting rate of disfranchised, white populations, which include traditionally Democratic, unionized workers. Also, it is important to understand how a billionaire like Trump persuaded working-

U.S. Latinos vote according to their personal interests, which are closely aligned with those of other U.S. Americans: health care, jobs, terrorism, and social security.

class U.S. Americans to vote for him, allowing him to win swing states like Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. It is essential to understand how those voters overlooked Mr. Trump’s major personal flaws and ultimately voted for him. Again, part of the explanation is what a reporter from CNN heard from a Trump supporter, who said that his news source was Facebook.⁹

The Latino factor is important to mention here. It was not, as many anticipated, the magic bullet for electing Clinton. As expected, Latinos voted for her, but in smaller numbers than they did for Obama in 2012, by almost 6 percentage points, 66 percent versus 71 percent respectively. So, more Latinos decided to switch political parties despite the insults and offenses Trump hurled at most of them. The reality is not hard to understand, and it is illustrated by Pew Research Center research: Latinos living in the United States, as U.S. citizens, vote according to their personal interests.¹⁰ And those are closely aligned with those of other U.S. Americans: health care, jobs, terrorism, and social security. The traditional Latino voter cannot be taken for granted in terms of loyalty toward the Democratic Party and Mexico.

Another important lesson to be learned from Trump’s success is the significance of good methodology for surveying likely and eligible voters all over the country and from all backgrounds. This election showed major flaws in almost all polls as they under-sampled large groups of voters including rural whites, who were decisive for Trump’s win. Their prediction models missed these voters’ opinions and attitudes. The same lesson should be learned by the news media, which concentrated most of its reporting and stories in urban areas that traditionally lean Democratic, avoiding large pockets of white towns. Journalists and reporters need to go the rural/agricultural areas, remote towns in the Rust Belt, the Deep South, the Plains, and the Southwest to do in-depth interviews and learn how people there live and think. The press needs to understand white populations better, those who have lost their economic compass since the 1980s and who have been hit hard by the 2008 Great Recession.

Moreover, another important lesson from the 2016 presidential election is that traditional or conventional assump-

This election showed major flaws in almost all polls, which under-sampled large groups of voters including rural whites, who were decisive for Trump's win.

tions about how the U.S. electorate votes have now been debunked. Unionized workers, Latinos, and other minorities cannot be taken for granted by the Democratic Party. White conservatives, who were reluctant to vote in the past, seemed to have mobilized. Suburban, college-educated U.S. Americans are not as liberal as many pollsters and the media assumed; in fact, evidence exists that many women with college degrees voted for Trump. Conservative values, personal economic conditions, and the fear of terrorism were more important in this election than party affiliation. Also, the unintended consequences of Obama policies like the Affordable Care Act (Obamacare), which increased medical insurance costs for the middle and working class, turned into a major liability for the Democrats.

Under these conditions, should Mexico brace itself for the worst? Yes, but not really. The major challenges will involve the undocumented Mexican immigrants now living in the U.S., who could be deported massively. This could have real consequences for the Mexican economy if it is forced to absorb millions of citizens who will need jobs. In terms of trade, Trump forgets that Republican members of the House and the Senate are pro-market, capitalism, and trade policies. The United States' considerable dependency on cross-border supply chains with Mexico, if affected negatively, would have harmful impacts all across the U.S. Yet, new investments in Mexico could potentially be reduced or curtailed, and if that happens, it will have another negative impact. Trump is not promising the penalization of Mexican companies; his threats have focused on U.S. corporations, and that will be a major government intervention in the market.

Could and should NAFTA be reviewed? Yes, absolutely, it should be updated and upgraded. This would offer Mexico an opportunity to influence negotiations and to seek remedies for imbalances and sectors that have been left out, such as energy. It is time to review manufacturing practices and all-partner benefits, border cooperation and collaboration, transportation, human rights and the environment. Mexico needs to take both border and regional security more seriously in order to implement the proper measures to become an actor and not a spectator. This is an opportunity to bring

to the table all the topics that affect the everyday interdependent relationship between the U.S. and Mexico, which Trump clearly does not understand.

The big thing everybody is wondering is how much of what Mr. Trump said during the campaign was pure political rhetoric and what the actual policies and governmental deliverables are. As of mid-February 2017, almost one month after Trump moved into the White House, many of his political campaign promises have been issued as Presidential Executive Orders. However, many of those have been challenged in court and placed under judicial stay. Confusion has resulted and the process of checks and balances has been set in motion to confirm their legal validity. ■■■

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The Role of Workers and Unions in Trump's Rise to the U.S. Presidency

Roberto Zepeda*



During the 2016 U.S. presidential elections, the Industrial Heartland states, now the Rust Belt, played a significant role in Republican candidate Donald Trump's victory. Surprisingly, he took states like Michigan, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, which ended up being decisive for his overall win. In addition, he received more votes of unionized workers than previous Republican presidential hopefuls. Trump's win was a surprise, as I mentioned, since all the polls predicted Democratic candidate Hillary Clinton would come out on top. This result represents a confused response by the U.S. working class to the negative effects of globalization and technological automation.

At least 270 votes out of a total of 538 in the Electoral College are required to win the election, and each state is assigned a specific number. It is a winner-take-all system with the leading candidate taking all the electoral votes in each state. Donald Trump totaled 306 electoral votes and Hillary Clinton, 232. However, in the popular vote, the Democrat

beat the Republican with 48.2 percent versus 46.1 percent. Trump won 30 states, while Clinton took 21.

The majority of the most serious projections were right about the results in most states except Florida, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Balloting in traditionally Democratic states favored the Republican, above all in the Midwest, which had gone to the Democratic Party in previous elections.

In short, Trump won through a surprising victory in states considered Democratic Party bastions. For example, Clinton lost in Florida, Ohio, Iowa, Michigan, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, which Barack Obama had taken in the 2008 and 2012 elections. In some of them, the margin was very narrow, while Hillary won by a comfortable margin in California and New York. That is, she got more votes than Trump, but his votes were distributed better.

Most of the states with unexpected results favoring Trump are part of the Industrial Heartland that has been affected by globalization and automation based on technological innovation. White workers have been faced with a discouraging panorama in recent decades, including the exodus of jobs to

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Most of the states with unexpected results favoring Trump are part of the Industrial Heartland, affected by globalization and automation based on technological innovation.

non-union areas of the country and other countries with lower labor costs. The number of manufacturing jobs dropped from 19.5 million in 1979 to 11.5 million in 2010, although there has been a slight recovery with an increase to 12.3 million in 2016.

Most of the job losses in manufacturing are due more to technological innovation than to free trade. Ball State University attributed approximately 13 percent of the job losses in this sector in the 2000-2010 period to the latter, and the rest to increased productivity due to automation.¹

Trump took full advantage of workers' malaise during his presidential campaign, promising actions to bring back the jobs that have disappeared in industry and manufacturing. Among his most outstanding proposals are building a wall on the border with Mexico to prevent not only the entry of immigrants but also illicit drugs and criminals; restricting immigration levels and deporting the millions of undocumented immigrants who were already in the country; and using a border tax to prevent U.S. companies, particularly auto manufacturers, from relocating abroad in countries with lower labor costs like Mexico and China. Nevertheless, even if Trump fulfills these promises, he will not be able to do anything against the automation stemming from technological innovation.

In the 1990s, Jeremy Rifkin warned about job losses in some industries that at the same time were becoming more productive due to technological innovation. In his book *The End of Work*,² Rifkin mentions that that recent decades have produced a big change in the employment structure, citing the fact that in the early 1970s, one-third of U.S. Americans worked in factories; but by the end of the 1990s, this figure had dropped to only 17 percent. Despite this, the United States continues to be the world's number one manufacturer. What is happening now is that the United States produces with fewer workers and more intelligent machines. Rifkin mentions the example of the case of US Steel, one of the country's most important employers. He says that in 1980, it had 120 000 U.S. workers producing steel; by 1998, that number had dropped to 20 000, but they produced more steel than the 120 000 had. That is, over the last three decades

of the twentieth century, technology did away with three-quarters of the labor force in the steel industry without affecting output. If we look at other industries, we can get a clear reading of how technological innovation has lowered the number of workers in the productive process.

The rapid technological advances of our time generate big hikes in production without needing to increase proportionately the number of jobs; this makes for job losses, in addition to precarious wages and labor costs. This trend may advance in other industries and jobs; for example, video cameras replace police and surveillance personnel; computer programs make a certain kind of office worker expendable; and robots replace workers in the auto industry, and, in the near future, truck and taxi drivers.

Different measures can be taken to facilitate workers' reinsertion into the labor market when they have been replaced by robots; for example, training programs, stronger unions, more public sector jobs, a higher minimum wage, a tax on high incomes, and more university degrees for the next generation of workers. However, Trump has not mentioned that he will implement any of these measures.³

Millions of U.S. blue-collar workers have become more frustrated and angry due to the impact of years of unfavorable conditions and the refusal of political parties in Washington to do anything about them. They did not believe it when President Barack Obama, supported by Clinton, said that the U.S. economy is not only better off than it was eight years ago, but that it is the strongest in the world, when most workers were facing a very different scenario: high unemployment and under-employment, unsafe working conditions, an increase in opiate addiction, and other social disasters derived from the moral and political crisis of capitalism.⁴

In this context, Trump's victory can be seen as a confused revolt of the working class that demonstrates the disgruntlement of workers from the industrial belt and the Great Lakes over the consequences of economic globalization and automation, which have sparked job losses in manufacturing and the creation of precarious jobs in the service sector. In addition, it represents the failure of the world's center-left parties, like the Democratic Party, which have adapted to neoliberal globalization with a social slant but could not reverse its negative effects like inequality, unemployment, and the expansion of contingent jobs.

As I already mentioned, unionized workers were key in this win, particularly in the Rust Belt states of the Midwest. Union leaders were unable to convince their members to vote

for the Democratic Party, as they did for Obama. This was the case of Ohio, Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin, all of which have been hard-hit by globalization and free trade. Exit polls showed that Hillary Clinton had more backing in union families nationwide: 51 percent (versus 43 percent for Donald Trump). However in 2008 and 2012, in these same sectors, Obama received almost 60 percent of the vote, with the rest going to his opponents. Therefore, in this sector, Trump surpassed his Republican predecessors' performance with 43 percent, a higher number than George W. Bush, John McCain, and Mitt Romney had received in the past (see Graph 1).⁵


Thus, unionized workers contributed significantly to Donald Trump's win in the industrial region that had voted for Barack Obama in the previous two elections. For example, in Ohio, Trump won the majority (54 percent versus 42 percent), according to exit polls, which also reveal the support he received in states with a strong presence of the auto industry.⁶

It is important to remember that the unions had opposed free trade accords like the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), and it

Trump took full advantage of workers' malaise during his presidential campaign, promising actions to bring back the jobs lost in industry and manufacturing.

was Donald Trump whose campaign promised to renegotiate the former and cancel the U.S. signature of the latter. Thus, his campaign proposals reverberated more in unions and among workers from those states than Hillary Clinton's.

It should also be underlined that union membership has been on the decline since the 1980s. This has made for a deterioration of workers living conditions: their wages and social benefits, such as healthcare, education, unemployment insurance, and pensions, have all suffered as a result. Despite this, workers voted for Bill Clinton in 1992 and 1996 and for Barack Obama in 2008 and 2012, but neither of these Democratic presidents managed to reverse the negative trend. In addition, concentration of income has accentuated since the 1980s, contributing to increasing inequality.



Source: Philip Bump, "Donald Trump Got Reagan-like Support from Union Households," *The Washington Post*, November 10, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/10/donald-trump-got-reagan-like-support-from-union-households/?utm_term=.a29fd36a31a2.

In this regard, Bernie Sanders has underlined that the 400 richest U.S. individuals own more wealth than the country's 150 million poorest people.

U.S. workers are facing a discouraging panorama and are angry about everything that is pushing them out of some industries and sectors. As a result, Industrial Heartland residents changed their vote in the hopes that it would improve their working conditions and bring back jobs. This reflects a crisis of representation of the unions and a breakdown of the alliance with the Democratic Party. Some Rust Belt states, like Indiana, Wisconsin, and Michigan, passed Right to Work Laws between 2012 and 2016, which are barriers to union affiliation and allow employers to fight unions. This encouraged the erosion of local union membership, which has negatively affected unions' financial circumstances and therefore their ability to attract voters to the Democratic Party, traditionally more supported by union members than by other workers.

However, instead of solving an unfavorable situation for U.S. workers, the Trump administration could make it worse. It has promised to reduce taxes on big corporations, which also heralds a cutback in social spending or even increased taxes on workers, or what in the United States is called the "middle class." It is unlikely that his cabinet, mostly entrepreneurs and millionaires, will be worried about dealing with workers being upset.

The election of the most reactionary president in the history of the United States is a threat for workers, for unions, for minorities, for women, and for young people. Trump has announced that he will deport between two to three million undocumented immigrant workers and that he will privatize


public services. This will affect union members in the public sector, which has the highest unionization rate in the United States: almost four out of every ten workers in this sector belong to a union, while only one out of every eleven in the private sector does.


Trump's victory is not only dangerous for the workers of that country, but for those of others like Mexicans. One of Trump's campaign promises was to return the jobs lost in the Rust Belt states and repatriate the automobile manufacturers with plants in Mexico, among them Ford and General Motors. The latter have already announced they will stop investing in new plants in Mexico and will move to states in the U.S. Industrial Heartland. As a result, Mexico could lose hundreds of thousands of jobs, at least in the auto industry, one of the most dynamic in the country. **MM**

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NOVEDADES







**SIRIA EN EL TORBELLINO:
INSURRECCIÓN, GUERRAS
Y GEOPOLÍTICA**
Coordinador: Gilberto Conde
Edición: 1a., 2017



**LA ANTROPOLOGÍA DE LAS
FRONTERAS DE TAILANDIA
COMO ESPACIOS DE FLUJO**
Coordinador: Jhon Marston
Edición: 1a., 2016



**DERECHOS HUMANOS
Y GOBERNANZA POLÍTICA
EN COLOMBIA**
Autor: Alexander Gonzáles
Edición: 1a., 2017



**MIGRACIÓN Y CIUDADANÍA.
CONSTRUYENDO NACIONES
EN AMÉRICA DEL NORTE**
Autores: Theresa Alfaro Velcamp,
Julián Durazo-Herrmann,
Erika Pani, Catherine Vézina
Edición: 1a., 2017

Informes: El Colegio de México, A. C., Dirección de Publicaciones, Carretera Picacho Ajusco 20, Ampliación Fuentes del Pedregal, 14110 Tlalpan, Ciudad de México, Tel. 54493000, exts. 3090, 3138 y 3295 ♦ Correo electrónico: publicolmex@colmex.mx
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Trump, Mexico's Auto Industry, And NAFTA

Elisa Dávalos López*

President Donald Trump's campaign statements against free trade and in favor of levying tariffs on U.S. companies that move production to other countries, particularly China and Mexico, have sparked a great deal of debate worldwide. The auto industry has particularly been in the eye of the storm because of Trump's statements against Ford's recent investments in Mexico.

In recent years, Mexico has been very dynamic in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) to the auto industry. The press has called it "the new Detroit,"¹ while that traditional U.S. auto center has been dubbed "Detroitosaurus wrecks."² The high FDI can be explained by the multinational corporations' global strategies to deal with the industry's difficult situation: mature markets with expectations of low consumption growth, productive capacity lying idle, dropping profit margins, increasingly strict regulations of polluting emissions, and the arrival on the scene of new competitors, particularly China. This scenario, together with the world crisis of the end of the last decade, have given rise to an important change in the auto industry: in addition to the 13-percent fall in world production overall in 2009, China has become the world's foremost car producer, while General Motors and Chrysler, historic icons of the industry, declared bankruptcy.³

This situation is reflected in the statistics published by McKinsey,⁴ showing that in 2007, the so-called BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India, and China —South Africa was added in 2010), together with the rest of the world outside of the U.S., Europe, Japan, and South Korea, accrued 30 percent of the industry's worldwide profits, but that by 2012, they had achieved 60 percent of all the profits from the auto industry, and that more than half of those went to China. And that's not all: the predictions are that by 2020, the emerging mar-



Reuters Staff

kets will obtain two-thirds of the world's profits from the auto industry and will grow three times as fast as the mature markets, with China heading the list, of course.⁵

The U.S. auto industry suffers from the same medium- and long-term problems that the other mature markets do. However, in addition, the bankruptcy of GM and Chrysler led them to take drastic measures to cut costs and, amidst an increasingly complex competitive environment and severe restructuring and adjustments as well as lay-offs, they have managed to eliminate idle industrial capacity and increase their profit margins notably. After going through this process, the U.S. auto industry reports that its earnings have recovered, rising from US\$9 billion in 2007 to US\$23 billion in 2012. This has not been the case, however, of the other mature markets like those of Japan, South Korea, and the European Union.⁶

Amidst this dynamic, the productive process has become increasingly fragmented and dispersed. As William Robinson has pointed out, since the 1990s, the world's auto industry has become a multinational spider web extending across the globe. Auto production processes become so transnationalized that the final products cannot really be considered national.⁷ This way of organizing production has been called global value chains or global production networks.

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Automobile production is increasingly complex, with a large number of suppliers who may be in different countries and who create the inputs that will be turned into a final good.

Timothy Sturgeon presents a very clear expression of the transformation of the productive process in global value chains applied to the North American auto industry. He points to a very accelerated trend toward outsourcing in the auto industry since the 1980s. He goes on to say that until 1985, employment in the industry was divided equally between assembly plants and auto-parts manufacturers, but that after that, jobs among the suppliers increased notably; and that this trend rapidly became generalized among the big assemblers, and some companies even carried out acquisitions and mergers to achieve greater capacity.⁸ Sturgeon points out that as the big suppliers have captured a growing percentage of the sector, they have also gained control over their own suppliers. So, the industry has organized itself in different tiers. The first-tier suppliers sell directly to auto manufacturers, who assemble the final product. The second-tier suppliers sell to the first-tier suppliers, and so on down the productive chain. Since the leading firms have delegated design details to their suppliers, the first-tiers have gained considerable control.⁹

Later, the modes of outsourcing became increasingly sophisticated since assembly plants sub-contract to tier companies, which provide already assembled modular systems that are then integrated into the system through 0.5-tier firms, who coordinate the different modular activities. This new 0.5-tier links up synergies of the different modular systems (integrated instrument panels, braking systems, etc.), becoming companies that integrate systems.¹⁰

Thus, we can see that automobile production is organized in increasingly complex ways, with a large number of suppliers who may be in different countries, and who participate in creating the inputs that will be turned into a final good. And the country that assembles that good imports a large quantity of parts and components with value added incorporated into them. This means that, for every car that Mexico exports, it imports a large number of parts whose value added was created elsewhere.

NAFTA has been key in creating an integrated auto industry in North America. Under this treaty, production has been relocated and the number of U.S. Big Three (or D-3) plants declined: in 1985, the trade area had 93 plants (75 in the U.S.,

4 in Mexico, and 14 in Canada). By 2005, 83 remained overall, of which 12 were in Mexico. Almost all the plants that closed had been in the United States.¹¹

The aim of all this was to achieve regional productive specialization in accordance with the multinationals' requirements and create economies of scale that would reduce costs. With this restructuring, vehicle production increased notably in the region, and Mexico managed to insert itself into the auto industry's global production circuits, increasing its output considerably, a high proportion of which is exported to the United States. This can be seen in the fact that, between 1985 and 2002, Mexico's auto industry went from being a secondary industry producing fewer than 400 000 units for the domestic market and with only 20 percent of output destined for export, to the world's ninth most important auto industry, producing almost two million units a year, with a strong tendency to export —around 75 percent—, the great majority to the United States.¹²

VALUE ADDED INCORPORATED INTO MEXICO'S AUTO EXPORTS

In the era when one country would produce a car from beginning to end, traditional statistics, which reported only the export of final goods, whether in volume or in value, undoubtedly objectively reflected each country's exports as well as its competitiveness in the industry. But it doesn't work that way anymore. Today, world trade in goods is increasingly an exchange of intermediate goods, which will be integrated into the productive process of a certain item, and less an exchange of final goods. World trade dominated by the exchange of intermediate goods is a reflection of the globalization of productive processes, and the car industry has pioneered this transformation.

Within the global or regional value chain for making the world's cars, some countries contribute more value added than others. Trade balance statistics report only the export of finished automobiles. However, to really know how much value the country sending the final good abroad is exporting and to have a more objective idea about trade flows, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and the World Trade Organization recently began publishing value-added statistics on trade. They allow us to see which countries are contributing more value added to auto industry exports.

How much value added is Mexico really incorporating into the cars it exports? Graphs 1 and 2 show the place in value added it occupies among the 20 main countries that add value to the world's auto industry for 1995 and 2011.

Graph 1 shows 1995, when the United States was in first place, followed by Japan and Germany. These three countries were by far the main contributors to the world's value added in this industry. They were followed by France, Great Britain, South Korea, and, in seventh place, Canada, while Mexico occupied thirteenth place.

Graph 2 shows the same data for the year 2011. We can observe a very important change in the structure of the industry: China heads the list, followed by the United States. Germany maintains its third place and Japan has dropped to fourth. Mexico has risen to seventh on the list, while Canada has fallen to twelfth place. We can also note that Mexico's value added in its exports has grown considerably and it has moved ahead four places in world participation.


China has made a surprising qualitative leap forward thanks to its government's strategies, which, using the power its enormous potential market gives it, conditions the big multinational corporations to transfer technology and know-how and set up joint ventures with the emerging Chinese auto companies. This has given rise to the development of its own industry, which has learned from the many years of experience of the world's big corporations. Moving ahead to the first

A protectionist U.S. policy would affect the mechanisms of the worldwide integrated auto production system, discouraging not only U.S. investment in Mexico but also that of companies from other regions.


place in the world's auto production in a few short years is very surprising.

FUTURE CHALLENGES

NAFTA and the globalization of the auto industry has spurred Mexico to produce more and more efficiently and with more value added in the global schema of the U.S. multinationals, but a protectionist U.S. policy would affect all the mechanisms of the worldwide integrated auto production system, discouraging not only U.S. investment, but also that of companies from other regions, such as Audi, Toyota, or VW, which invest in Mexico to use it as an export platform mainly to the U.S. market. We will have to see if the new U.S. president maintains his campaign promises; if he does, he will be facing strong pressure not only from the U.S. multinationals, but also from the governments of a large part of the world. The consequences of a protectionist policy today, when production has been globalized, would be considerable. ■■



Source: Developed by the author using data from the OECD and WTO at <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/measuringtradeinvalue-addedand-oecd-wtojointinitiative.htm>.



Source: Developed by the author using data from the OECD and WTO at <http://www.oecd.org/sti/ind/measuringtradeinvalue-addedanoecd-wtojointinitiative.htm>.

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Views from the Borderlands Arizona Scholars Reflect on Mexico-U.S. Connections



Photo courtesy of David Burekhalter

The main objective of the articles in this dossier is to underline the ambitious internationalization project undertaken by the UNAM in recent years. Its aim is to position our institution in the sphere of the construction of knowledge characterized by interactions on a global level to facilitate academic exchange and mobility. To that end, our institution took on the challenge of creating a network of operational offices in different parts of the globe. Outstanding among them are five in the United States.

With this dossier, we want to celebrate the close collaboration between the CISAN and the University of Arizona, carried out by our Tucson branch.

I must recognize here the work of Claudio Estrada, the director of that center, who has entrusted us with promoting work of researchers from the CISAN and our counterparts at the University of Arizona. In addition, I want to thank Scott Whiteford, the distinguished director of Mexico Initiatives at the same university, for undertaking the coordination of the work of the U.S. American researchers who have contributed their valuable knowledge to this stimulating dossier.

Today, reflecting on the specific characteristics of the Mexico-U.S. border, immersed in contradictions, huge challenges, and contrasts, is a priority responsibility of the CISAN.

Part of what our readers will find in this section is an examination of the geographical space along the Mexico-Arizona border, with a penetrating analysis and critical reflection of Trump's controversial wall, from the perspective of Colin Deeds and Scott Whiteford. We also offer Celeste González's review of the media influence of the political positions about the border taken by the new occupant of the White House, to which she has added an examination of similar historical events. William H. Beezley contributes a splendid narrative about the importance of the 100 years of Mexico's 1917 Constitution. And the dossier closes with articles by Jeffrey M. Banister and Luis E. Coronado Guel. Taken together, all the texts remind us that the Mexico-U.S. border is above all a space where people live intensely and are creating a culture of the meeting of two nations that should aspire to building shared prosperity.

Silvia Núñez García
DIRECTOR OF CISAN

The Social and Economic Costs Of Trump's Wall

Colin Deeds*
Scott Whiteford**



Photo by Colin Deeds

Public art display by Taller Yonke Artists in Nogales, Sonora.

Mexico and the United States have a long, complicated history of conflict, cooperation, and economic integration. Culturally, socially, and strategically the two countries are in many ways co-dependent and intertwined. Trade between them makes the border the second most important bi-national corridor in the world, with millions of jobs dependent on the production and trade networks that transcend national boundaries. The issues of migration and drug trafficking are complicated and cannot be fixed with a wall or a border policy that does not focus on the roots of each problem. Both countries share a responsibility to find answers to the respective issues that exacerbate the problems and cooperate in implementing solutions.

As 2017 begins, a new challenge to the relationship between Mexico and the United States has emerged: a proposed

expanded border wall, the renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and threats of potential tariffs on Mexican trade (earmarked to pay for new security infrastructure). As a candidate, President Trump stated, “We will build a big beautiful impenetrable wall to divide Mexico and the United States, one that will be paid for by Mexico.”¹ Mexican President Enrique Peña Nieto countered that Mexico would never pay for the wall, while former-President Vicente Fox responded with even harsher words. *El muro* and the militarization of the border, but more importantly the stipulation by President Trump that Mexico pay for the wall, are deeply offensive to most Mexicans, who see the demand as a symbolic betrayal of the Mexican-U.S. partnership. For many U.S. citizens as well, these provocations appear inappropriate and misguided. A 2016 CBS poll found that a majority of U.S. citizens were opposed to extending the wall, especially without details on funding sources or total cost.² Startlingly, many U.S. Americans are not even aware that 700 hundred miles of barriers have already been built with their taxes. In this article, we review the history of mil-

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itarization of the border as well as the monetary and social costs of extending the border wall. While many U.S. Americans are concerned about the fiscal expenditures, most people are not aware of the potential social costs of border militarization, despite their potentially devastating effects. Social costs encompass the impacts on individuals and families from forced separation and the fear, anxiety, illness, and death that accompany the struggles to re-unify families.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE BORDER AND THE WALL

The first military outposts, checkpoints, and infrastructure along the border were established in the wake of the 1846-1848 Mexican-American War—or the American Invasion, depending on perspective. With the threat of a disruptive social revolution at its doorstep, the United States set up military bases along the border in response to the Mexican Revolution of 1910. Fears of German invasion during World War I provided the impetus for investing in even more military build-up and infrastructure along the border. Historically, xenophobic fears in the United States have intensified during times of economic hardship. A clear pattern can be traced of mass deportations following the Great Depression of 1929, the oil crisis in the 1970s, the dot-com bust of the 1990s, and the Great Recession that began in 2008. Scapegoating of migrants over the centuries is as much a part of the U.S. American fabric as are romantic notions of the melting pot. Whether directed against Germans in the eighteenth century; Irish, Italians, and Chinese in the nineteenth; Japanese in the early twentieth; or Mexican and Central Americans in 2017, U.S. citizens have found convenient and relatively powerless immigrants as “whipping boys” to blame for economic ills.

Times of economic turbulence and enhanced cooperation have also contributed to a rise in the militarization of the border. In conjunction with the 1986 Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) granting “amnesty” to millions of economic migrants, President Ronald Reagan stepped up deportations and workplace enforcement, along with the addition of new infrastructure. Although many associate these trends with conservative governments, it is important to remember that some of the largest investments in militarization along the border occurred under Bill Clinton’s presidency. In the run-up to the signing of NAFTA (which conveniently excluded regulations related to migration and labor), Clinton began an unprecedented build-up of security forces in urban areas

During the last 20 years, the borderlands have been transformed from open countryside and generally cooperative twin cities into areas of intensive surveillance.

of El Paso and San Diego, under the auspices of Operations Hold the Line (1993) and Gatekeeper (1994). Despite vigorously advocating a comprehensive immigration reform package in his campaign, President George H. W. Bush quickly retreated to a policy focused on security concerns in the wake of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. President Barack Obama deported more people (over 2.5 million) than any other previous president. In response to the events of 9/11, the U.S. Congress approved the Real ID Act, allowing the government to ignore 37 federal laws that protect land, air, water, wildlife, public health, and religious freedom, to enable construction of a border wall. This legislation constitutes the largest waiver of laws in U.S. history.

Many have called the U.S. immigration system broken. Yet the system has been fine-tuned over the years to create countless winners in our society, with relatively few losers beyond the migrants themselves (who cannot vote and do not have equal rights or protections under the law). Consumers in the United States enjoy lower-cost goods and labor in the marketplace. Corporations have access to cheap, expendable labor. For the Mexican government, out-migration creates a convenient pressure valve release for an economy that does not provide enough jobs for its citizens, as well as a much-needed source of revenue in migrant remittances. Mexicans living in the United States are active participants in the economy, pay taxes, and contribute to programs they will never benefit from, such as Social Security. Large banks profit from transferring remittances from migrants’ savings accounts. The last several decades have seen an exponential increase in the growth of the Prison-Industrial Complex, as the apparatus of police, lawyers, and prisons built to prosecute migrants has been increasingly privatized.

Immigrants’ impact in the United States cannot be quantified solely by their economic footprint without considering their social and cultural contributions. The fabric of U.S. American culture has been enriched by the language, cuisine, and art of newcomers to this country over the centuries. Migrants and their children contribute to society as civil servants, educators, health care professionals, and as overall productive members of the community.

THE ECONOMIC COST OF THE WALL
AND BORDER MILITARIZATION


Militarization and the definition of the wall have multiple meanings and interpretations. It is now understood by many as enhanced enforcement of the border, in the name of security, often at the cost of increased civil and human rights violations. During the last 20 years, the borderlands have been transformed from open countryside and generally cooperative twin cities into areas of intensive surveillance by 20 000 border patrol officers and high-tech equipment, including drones and other sophisticated military hardware.

President Trump and his followers seldom acknowledge that an extensive wall already runs over 700 miles along the border between the two countries. While it is uneven in coverage of the nearly 2 000-mile-long boundary, the United States has already invested more than US\$2.3 billion in construction alone, not including an annual maintenance budget of around US\$500 million.³

The cost varies by sector, ranging from US\$3.9 million to US\$16 million per mile,⁴ depending on terrain, cost of land, building materials, wall design, and scale of the barrier or barriers (in some areas, they are triple-layer fences). Although what exactly he is calling for is not presently clear, President Trump is on record proposing to raise the height of the existing wall and to extend it the full length of the border, at an estimated cost of around US\$12 billion (although a recent GAO estimate obtained by Reuters puts the cost closer to US\$21.6 billion).⁵

How the extension of the wall will be paid for is still being debated early in the Trump presidency. The president steadfastly maintains Mexico will pay for the extension of the barrier and has proposed policies that include taxing imports from Mexico at 20 percent, in effect transferring the burden to the U.S. American consumer/taxpayer. He has also suggested taxing migrants' remittances and has already encouraged the transfer of jobs from Mexico to the United States by publicly strong-arming manufacturers like Ford and Carrier.

THE U.S.-MEXICO BORDER FENCE SYSTEM TODAY



Source: Reveal Research, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, OpenStreetMap, Allison McCartney, in Michael Corey, "The Wall: Building a Continuous US-Mexico Border Barrier Would Be a Tall Order," Reveal Center for Investigative Reporting, <https://www.revealnews.org/article/the-wall-building-a-continuous-u-s-mexico-barrier-would-be-a-tall-order/>, accessed February 2, 2017.

Such measures are punitive, ineffective, and, in all likelihood, unconstitutional.

THE SOCIAL COSTS OF THE WALL

The imposing monetary cost of transforming the border wall or walls, coupled with more sophisticated electronic surveillance equipment and larger deployment of border patrol personnel, comes with a social cost. *Like taxes, not everyone pays social costs equally.* The negative social consequences of the wall and border enforcement are paid for by thousands of families living in U.S. cities and in communities throughout Mexico. As stated above, social costs encompass the impacts on individuals and families caused by forced separation as well as the fear, anxiety, illness, and death that accompany the struggles to re-unify families. International migration without visas, forced by violence, poverty, or the desire to be with family living in another country, implies a social as well as financial cost. When a parent or a child of a mixed-status immigrant household is deported in the middle of the night, all the family members, U.S. citizens and undocumented, are traumatized.

The wall in its current embodiment has forced many people desperate to be reunited with their families to migrate through the harshest terrain of the borderlands, leading to thousands of deaths and serious injuries. More than 2 533 migrant bodies were recovered in Southern Arizona between 1990 and 2014, reflecting the period of intensification of enforcement and the building of the wall. Most of the bodies were never identified.⁶ Meanwhile hundreds of missing person reports have been filed with the Colibri Center for Human Rights in Tucson, by families desperate for information on their missing relatives. Migrants who have survived the ordeal tell of being left in the desert by their guides and the tragedy of others who could not continue. The death toll rises by the hundreds every summer, taking the lives of members of Central American and Mexican families living on both sides of the border. The unstated goal of the militarization of the border is to reinforce this catastrophic image—so that only those migrants most desperate for family reunification will risk the high social cost of the crossing.

The imposing topographical physical barriers are not the only dangers migrants encounter on the journey through borderlands. Those who have found ways to cross the border into the United States also confront a gauntlet of potential violence, kidnapping, robbery, and abuse from drug cartels,

When a parent or a child of a mixed-status immigrant household is deported in the middle of the night, all the family members, U.S. citizens and undocumented, are traumatized.

bajadores (bandits), or even their *coyote* (human smuggler) guides. Women and children anxious to be unified with their families living in the United States are the most vulnerable. In one survey over 12 percent of them said they had been raped, beaten, or even forcibly disappeared.⁷

The possibility of apprehension by the Border Patrol, detention, and deportation looms large for every migrant. Those detained by Border Patrol encounter a system that uses a “prevention through deterrence” strategy.⁸ Before they are placed in detention they are stripped of all belongings except the clothes they are wearing. Their money, identity documents, cell phones, and medications are confiscated and stored until they are deported. Often these belongings are never returned, creating severe safety and communication problems after deportation. The whole process is intended to be psychologically devastating, regardless of age, gender, or nationality. The experience imposes an extremely high social cost on the entire family, whether migrants survive or not. A more militarized border with extended walls forces people to take greater risks and more dangerous routes, but not to abandon the trip.

Caught in the maze of migration, violence, and deportation are mixed-immigrant families, households that include both undocumented and legal residents.⁹ Although no exact figures exist on the demographics of American/Mexican mixed-status immigration households, estimates of their numbers are in the range of 15 million living in communities throughout the United States.¹⁰ The number of U.S. citizen children is over 5 million. In the United States, mixed-status immigrant household members pose a challenge to state policies that seek to neatly divide those who belong and those who do not.¹¹ At the same time, mixed-status families are the targets of Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) sweeps searching for undocumented people to deport, a pattern that is repeating itself with explosive frequency under the Trump administration. The nightmare of having family members suddenly arrested, placed in detention, and deported, puts children, working parents, and neighborhoods at risk. For these families, their supporters, and communities, this social cost makes the wall a symbol of fear and alienation, be they Mexican or U.S. citizens.

A more militarized border with longer walls forces people to take greater risks and more dangerous routes, but not to abandon the trip.



Photo by Murphy Woodhouse

Migrants at a soup kitchen in Tijuana, Baja California.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

The costs of building a wall along the U.S.-Mexico border are incalculably high in both dollar amounts and social costs, while benefits to the security and the economy of the region are unclear at best (and in reality very likely to have negative effects). Border myths are often used to distract voters from the real issues and provide a quick fix solution, while history and facts are disregarded. The sustained flow of people and drugs northward across the border illustrates that migrants and drug kingpins alike are capable of digging longer and deeper tunnels than any wall or police force can deter. It has never been more important that the United States and Mexico work together for the benefit of their over 440 million people,

all of whom are Americans in this hemisphere. Economic growth and prosperity depend on collaboration and working together as neighbors. Ensuring security and human rights are not contradictory, but interlinked. The economic and social costs of extending the wall and further militarizing the U.S.-Mexico border will create a heavy burden for everyone. An alternative route exists, one that has both humanitarian and economic benefits. At this crucial juncture the United States and Mexico must position themselves to build a new era of economic cooperation, improved standards of living on both sides of the border, and a deeper cultural appreciation of what citizens of both countries share as neighbors. ■■

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Politics, Media and The U.S.-Mexico Borderlands

Celeste González de Bustamante*

Since the rise of the penny press in the late nineteenth century, mass media in the United States have served to further nationalistic ideals and endeavors. The examples are too numerous to note in this article, but historically, when U.S. politicians wanted its citizens to unite against a “common enemy,” the news media were often willing to lend a hand. The bitter competition between New York newspaper owners William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer remains a classic example of the news media’s propensity to “rally ’round the flag.”¹ At times that enemy was across the Atlantic, and at others, the “enemy” was just south of border. United States imperial dreams and actions, more often than not, have been backed by “cultural authorities,”² that is, by members of the news media. The battle cries increased again in the fall of 2016, as the campaign for the forty-fifth president of the United States unfolded.

Donald Trump’s now infamous statement about Mexicans “bringing drugs, they’re bringing crime. They’re rapists...” was far from innovative;³ rather, it reflected a long-standing practice of politicians using fear to garner votes and to sway public opinion. In this case, as they have done in the past, national networks played right into the then-candidate’s hands, by allowing the now-president to spout vitriolic statements with little effort to fact-check or put the pronouncements into context.

The news media has by-and-large fulfilled its duty to “manufacture consent” among members of the public.⁴ The case of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands and how the region and its peoples are depicted by the news media historically and contemporarily provides a salient, albeit sobering,

explanation for why and how, despite the fearmongering discourse—or perhaps as a result of it—, more than 62.9 million voters cast their ballots in favor of a candidate who seemed ready at every turn to insult a wide range of non-white ethnic groups, practically any non-conservative community, and, in some cases, entire nations.

While Trump’s anti-immigrant discourse repulsed some voters, among a certain segment of the population, it reignited a fervor of animosity toward Latinos. In contrast to many Republican and Democratic candidates of the recent past, who chose to side-step the issue of immigration and the border, Trump made these two issues part of his *raison d’être*. Perhaps one of his most publicized messages included his demand to further militarize the U.S.-Mexico border: “I will build a great wall—and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me—and I’ll build them very inexpensively. I will build a great, great wall on our southern border, and I will make Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words.”⁵



For historians of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands, Trump’s fervent and sometimes hateful discourse was not new. Nor was it new for activists of Arizona or throughout the U.S. Southwest, who have been struggling against xenophobia for

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decades. Yet, as verbal battles ensued on Twitter (at times between leading politicians and candidates), and “fake news” appeared on social media like Facebook, journalists were challenged by new circumstances that changed the practice of traditional campaign coverage, signaling that there was something new about this wave of anti-immigrant sentiment, and this was not “politics as usual.” Consequently, journalists were forced to try to adapt to this new mediascape.

HISTORICAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEDIA AND POLITICS ALONG THE BORDER

Throughout the past century, anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S.-Mexico borderlands has ebbed and flowed, frequently linked to the country’s economic environment. During much of the twentieth century, when economic times were flush, the nation’s immigration policies remained lax; but during economic downturns, as in the 1930s and the mid-1950s, immigration policies toughened, along with the terminology that politicians, border patrol agents, and journalists used to describe migrants. To put it bluntly, during difficult economic times, the news media have functioned as a propaganda mechanism for political officials and government authorities such as border patrol agents, who, since the 1950s, have been calling for more personnel and resources to “stem the tide” of undocumented immigrants.⁶ In short, media and politics are closely related, at times producing negative results for underrepresented border populations, most notably Latinos and Native Americans. Furthermore, the communication technologies (from the printing press to social media) available to agenda setters influence the relationship between the media and politics.

The news media’s role in helping to generate support for militarization of the U.S.-Mexico border reflect a dominant “moral geography” of the region; one that has been defined by nationalism, nativism, and racism.⁷ The dominant moral geography provides an ethical map of sorts that establishes who has the “right” to be in the country, and who does not, and where and how borders should be constructed. Activists and border residents have the ability to contest the dominant moral geography, but the powerful structures in place, including the news media, often turn these alternative views into outliers, in conflict with mainstream perspectives.

Press coverage of the borderlands in the 1950s provides an apt example of how the news media helped to shape the

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region’s moral geography. By the 1950s, with the immigration exclusionary act of 1924 in place, the term “illegal alien” became entrenched in public discourse. This was partly as a result of the news media’s uncritical use of the term. Also, by this time, as Mae Ngai argues, racialized and inconsistent immigration policies, which did not include numerical quotas for Mexicans, resulted in relegating this ethnic group to being known as “the prototypical illegal alien.”⁸ Then, in 1954, with the country in an economic lull and with Mexicans viewed as the prototypical “illegal alien,” the government instituted a mass-deportation program, “Operation Wetback.” Newspapers throughout the Southwest frequently used the term without questioning its derogatory tone or impact. In June 1954, the *Los Angeles Times* published an article in which it stated, “A major war on wetbacks, employing a reinforcement of 491 immigration officers recruited from all parts of the country will be launched along the California-Mexico border next Thursday to send tens of thousands of illegally entered Mexican aliens back into Mexico.”⁹

The language of war that reporters used to describe an effort against a group of people with whom the United States had not declared an official conflict both demonstrates the need for journalists to generate interest in their reports, and their propensity to reaffirm dominant viewpoints. As a consequence, the news reports inflamed public sentiment toward undocumented people, mainly from Mexico. Over time, the racialized language of imperialism used to portray migrants in the borderlands helped further the project of political exclusion in the region.

Fifty years later, anti-immigrant sentiments spiked again.¹⁰ Perhaps one of the most notable studies on the news media’s treatment of the issue of undocumented immigration includes Santa Ana’s examination of news coverage of California’s 1994 Proposition 187.¹¹ Voters passed that statewide measure, backed by Republican Governor Pete Wilson, denying unauthorized immigrants public services like health care and education. Santa Ana illustrates how, through the use of animal and water metaphors, news coverage had the result of linguistically dehumanizing Mexican undocumented people.

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Phrases such as the border patrol “ferreting out” undocumented immigrants, and agents trying to stem the “tide”¹² of migrants coming across the border furthered stereotypes and strengthened a moral geography that had been under construction in mediascapes since the nineteenth century.

Another study shows that as the U.S. government began to increasingly militarize the border, and the border began to harden, so too did the images used in television news reports. During the 1990s, in El Paso, Texas, and San Diego, two of the country’s busiest border cities, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) implemented “Operation Hold the Line” and “Operation Gatekeeper,” respectively. These two programs included a large increase in staffing near the ports of entry and a build-up of security infrastructure. In 1994, after the border crackdowns in San Diego and El Paso, the agency intensified enforcement through “Operation Safeguard” in the Tucson, Arizona, sector of the U.S. Border Patrol. Melissa Johnson’s study on broadcast news demonstrates that between the 1970s and 2000s, network coverage of the border skyrocketed, and news reports increasingly used images of fences to denote the international boundary instead of rivers, which were often included in stories aired in the 1970s.¹³ The study found that “in the 1970s, only 21 percent of the decade’s coverage of the border included a graphic or photographic image of a fence . . . and by the 1990s, it jumped to 61 percent” of the sample.¹⁴ In addition, graphics in broadcast news began to use darker and thicker lines to depict the border, as a way to create a sense of danger along the international boundary.¹⁵

NEW MEDIA, NEW ADMINISTRATION,
NEW CHALLENGES

Thirty years after the great border build-up of the 1990s, despite studies that show that net Mexican immigration to the United States is hovering around zero,¹⁶ and despite conservative statistics that show that between 2001 and 2016, more than 2 500 bodies have been found in the Tucson sec-

tor of the border patrol alone, the new administration has called for even more militarization.¹⁷ Trump has called for another dramatic increase in border patrol agents and a “beautiful” wall, which he said “Mexico will pay for.” These demands have contributed to rising tension among people along both sides of the border and strained diplomatic relations between the United States and Mexico to a point not seen for decades.

The new president’s harsh tone represents only one characteristic that signals a departure from past relations among journalists and politicians in the borderlands. Some phenomena have been developing over time, while others are new to the media, politics, and the borderlands landscape. The first involves diminishing information access and transparency following the creation of the Department of Homeland Security after 9/11 in 2002. Since DHS’s establishment, it has become increasingly difficult for journalists to cover the activities of the third largest government agency. Prior to 9/11, journalists could schedule one-on-one interviews and “ride-alongs” with Border Patrol agents by calling the local Border Patrol offices. Today, these requests must be cleared by DHS personnel in Washington, D.C. Some freedom-of-information scholars argue, “We have reached a tipping point—a crisis situation—when it comes to freedom of information in this country.”¹⁸ This statement was made prior to the new administration moving into the White House. The adversarial relationship that the new president has created among members of the press does not bode well for the issue of transparency.

The second attribute that distinguishes current media/politics relations from the past involves the growing economic interdependence between the United States and Mexico. Prior to the implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994, the two economies were already becoming increasingly reliant on cross-national business and industry. Today, the level of interconnectedness among the peoples and economies is unprecedented. The isolationist policies that the Trump administration seems to advocate do not seem realistic in 2017, when both countries are so economically dependent on one another.

Finally, changing communications technologies and the manner in which politicians and the news media are using them present new diplomatic, political, and journalistic challenges. Social media have taken the role of gatekeeper and agenda-setter out of the hands of large and elite media and placed them in an unpredictable online universe. Not

only has this caused media conglomerates to look for ways to respond to a constantly changing digital environment, but the invention of new media platforms has big media searching for ways to monetize information in this new setting. To be clear, social media such as Facebook and Twitter have now become some of the most profitable providers of information. At the same time, the public and politicians can harness these digital tools themselves allowing them to bypass traditional diplomatic channels and the news media, so that they can disseminate their own messages for the world to see.



"This morning we informed the White House that I will not be attending the working meeting scheduled for next Tuesday with @POTUS [President of the United States]."

In January 2017, just days after Trump's inauguration, traditional media were bypassed when he and Mexico's President Enrique Peña Nieto traded messages on Twitter. Before the two heads of state were scheduled to meet in person in Washington, D. C., Peña Nieto sent a video message to all *mexicanos* via his Twitter account, in which he reaffirmed that, "Mexico does not believe in walls. I have said it time and again: Mexico will not pay for any wall." Trump then posted a Tweet stating that, "If Mexico is unwilling to pay for the badly needed wall, then it would be better to cancel the upcoming meeting." Shortly thereafter, Peña Nieto stated that, "This morning, we have informed the White House that I will not attend a working meeting scheduled for next Tuesday with @POTUS [President of the United States]." The online exchanges made it clear that U.S.-Mexico relations had entered a new phase, and as relations reconfigured, journalists scrambled to catch up without being caught in the fray of the Twitterverse.

Over the years, the news media have been criticized heavily for creating and perpetuating stereotypes and dehumanizing immigrant populations. Most professional journalists now try to avoid obvious stereotypes in their reporting,

though this may still occur from time to time. However, with new and emerging technologies, and a president who seems to relish being a non-traditional politician, reporters have additional obligations, one of which includes covering international diplomacy beyond 140 characters at a time. ■■■

NOTES

- ¹ Iliá Rodríguez, "News Reporting and Colonial Discourse: The Representation of Puerto Ricans in U.S. Press Coverage of the Spanish-American War," *The Howard Journal of Communications* no. 9, 1998, pp. 283-301.
- ² Barbie Zelizer, *Covering the Body: The Kennedy Assassination, the Media, and Shaping of Collective Memory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992).
- ³ CBS News, "30 of Trump's Wildest Quotes," <http://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/wild-donald-trump-quotes/9/>, ND, accessed January 30, 2017.
- ⁴ Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Books, 2002).
- ⁵ CBS News, op. cit.
- ⁶ Celeste González de Bustamante, "Arizona and the Making of a State of Exclusion, 1912–2012," in Otto Santa Ana and Celeste González de Bustamante, eds. *Arizona Firestorm: Global Immigration Realities, National Media, and Provincial Politics* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 2012).
- ⁷ *Ibid.*
- ⁸ Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2004), p. 71.
- ⁹ "Government Maps War on Wetbacks: 491 Additional Immigration Men to Join in Mass Roundup of Aliens," *Los Angeles Times*, June 10, 1954, p. A13.
- ¹⁰ This also happened in the 1970s, but for the sake of brevity, this essay concentrates on just a few of the moments in which anti-immigrant sentiments surfaced.
- ¹¹ Otto Santa Ana, *Brown Tide Rising: Metaphors of Latinos in Contemporary American Public Discourse* (Austin: University of Texas, 2002).
- ¹² *Ibid.*, p. 84.
- ¹³ Melissa Johnson, "Immigration Images: U.S. Network News Coverage of Mexican Immigration, 1971-2000," paper presented at the International Communication Association Annual Meeting in San Diego, May 23-27, 2003.
- ¹⁴ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁵ *Ibid.*
- ¹⁶ Jens Manuel Krogstad, "5 Facts about Mexico and Immigration to the U.S.," <http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/02/11/mexico-and-immigration-to-us/>, February 11, 2016, accessed January 31, 2017.
- ¹⁷ Kendal Blust, "Deaths per 10,000 Border Crossers Are Up 5 Times from a Decade Ago," *Arizona Daily Star*, http://tucson.com/news/local/border/deaths-per-border-crossers-are-up-times-from-a-decade/article_c1279aaf-4ad8-51c9-82d8-3143b836f52e.html, May 12, 2016, accessed January 15, 2017.
- ¹⁸ David Cuillier, "FOIA at Fifty: Has the Sunshine Law's Promise Been Fulfilled?" Testimony, United States Committee on the Judiciary, July 12, 2016, <https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/meetings/foia-at-fifty-has-the-sunshine-laws-promise-been-fulfilled>.

The Constitution of 1917 100 Years Making Mexico's Revolutionary Goals into Law¹

William H. Beezley*

Mexican delegates completed the Constitution that expressed their revolutionary goals for the nation in legal terms 100 years ago, on February 5, 1917, hammering out the most socially advanced constitution of the time. By putting forward social and economic changes to create an equitable society—more than just political reforms—they codified the world's first social revolution. The new Constitution served, for example, as a partial model for the Soviet Constitution that followed the October 1917 Russian Revolution. Its 1917 labor provisions generally became laws in the United States over a decade later as part of the New Deal. Fundamentally, the new Constitution represented revolutionary, socially committed, and populist-inspired laws for ruling the nation. All the provisions required enabling legislation and governmental enforcement to become the defining practices that, among other things, restored Mexican control of its human and natural resources. This article reviews the history of Mexico's revolutionary Constitution in retrospective, explaining how one of the most progressive political agreements in the twentieth century transformed social demands into concrete principles shaping the modern Mexican legal system.

President-by-revolution Venustiano Carranza determined that the Liberal Constitution of 1857 did not provide the legal framework for the populist programs required by the Revolution. He called for a constitutional convention to be held in Querétaro in 1916 to make the necessary revisions. He had

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Photo by Luis Coronado Guel

Original Constitution of 1917 on display in the main hall of the National Archives in Mexico City.

no intention of allowing his defeated opponents of the old Porfirian regime and of Pancho Villa's and Emiliano Zapata's rival revolutionary groups to have a role in remaking the Constitution. Only loyal Carrancistas could be chosen as convention delegates, elected by universal male suffrage.



Venustiano Carranza, circa 1916, standing by a train.

IWAH Online Photo Collection

Article 123 can be paraphrased
as a commitment to enhancing the quality
of life for workers and workers' families, restoring
the worker's dignity as a human being,
and providing him/her with a fair share
of national income.

The delegates assembled amidst the turmoil of Zapata's renewed resistance in the state of Morelos, Villa's attack on Columbus, New Mexico Territory, and U.S. President Woodrow Wilson's ordering of the Pershing Punitive Expedition into Chihuahua. Sitting the 220 delegates proved contentious, but was finally resolved. Overall, the delegates were young, committed to the nation, and determined to do what was best for their people by confirming the revolution. Indicative of the delegates' intentions was the election of the five-member Committee on the Constitution, with Francisco J. Mújica as its president. This committee reviewed the proposal for a revised Constitution submitted by President Carranza (after its preparation by a group of legal supporters) and rejected most of the moderate changes, choosing more revolutionary provisions.

The most immediately celebrated and excoriated constitutional provisions redefined the legal status of property, labor, and the Catholic Church in society. The most illustrative amendment explained property ownership, as it represents a fundamental character of the revolutionary society. Under Article 27, property ownership does not result from the individual's inherent right, but rather only as a social responsibility.

Property is defined in the agrarian reform amendment. This was the last amendment discussed by the delegates because of its momentous character. Moreover, agrarian reform, fundamental in a society that remained largely rural, continued to be slogan of Emiliano Zapata, one of Carranza's main rivals. Zapata's demand for land reform had begun in 1910 and was expressed in his famous Plan of Ayala, which ultimately could be succinctly stated as "Land and Freedom." Even though Zapata remained in revolt against Carranza, the

delegates recognized the absolutely essential need for land reform to achieve a revolutionary society. The extensive, significant statement included two themes that represent the revolutionary society, the restoration of *ejido* (village) lands and government regulation of natural resources.

The provision resulted from the work of an extra-legal committee, with *ex-officio* president Pastor Rouaix. He called on Andrés Molina Enríquez, who was not a delegate to the convention, but who in 1906 had published the seminal analysis of the agrarian problem entitled *Los grandes problemas nacionales* (The Great National Problems). The committee called on him for his expertise and ultimately Molina Enríquez wrote a draft of the article and the final form of its preface.

The amendment called for the restoration to villages of lands and resources seized from entrepreneurs and foreign companies. It also called for the restoration of lands to the the Yaqui and Mayo indigenous groups. This fundamental revolutionary law returned lands owned by the village, but worked separately by individual families; this is called the *ejido*. The delegates affirmed the Constitution's attack on vested interests and foreign exploitation. The provision stated, "Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have the right to acquire ownership of lands [or] waters . . . or to obtain concessions for the development of mines, waters, or mineral fuels." Foreigners could obtain land and mineral concession only by swearing before the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that they agreed to be considered Mexican citizens and not to seek the protection of their governments. Even with these statements, foreigners could not obtain land or concessions within the strips of land 100 kilometers along the borders and 50 kilometers from the coasts.

This statement against vested interests applied not only to foreigners and corporations, but also to religious institutions—for the most part this meant the Roman Catholic Church. The provision said that all properties of these churches, including the churches themselves, reverted to the ownership of the federal government. It also restored the ownership of all underground minerals, water, and other resources to the nation. This provided the nation with the inalienable



Andrés Molina Enríquez.

INAH, Online Photo Collection

In Article 3 on education, the delegates determined that primary education for all Mexicans would be free, mandatory, and secular.

sions, such as in Article 23 on property rights. Under attack was the Church as an institution, not the faith. That is to say, the delegates created a Constitution that is anticlerical, not anti-religion or atheistic. In various articles, the delegates confirmed marriage as a civil contract and removed all special status for religious figures, including priests. Public worship was prohibited outside of church buildings, and state legislatures were authorized to decide the maximum number of priests allowed within the state. All priests had to be native-born Mexicans and clergy was prohibited from forming political parties or taking part in political activities. Moreover, in Article 3 on education, the delegates determined that primary education for all Mexicans would be free, mandatory, and secular.

ownership of essential national resources. By 1964, this provision had led to the redistribution of 16 004 169 hectares of land, about 28 percent of all national territory and most of the country's arable land.

Article 123, concerning labor and social welfare, although not as monumental in 1917 as the one dealing with agrarian reform, quickly and over the years has become a singular statement. It can be paraphrased as a commitment to enhancing the quality of life for workers and workers' families, restoring the worker's dignity as a human being, and providing him/her with a fair share of national income. These goals were expressed in specific provisions for an 8-hour work day; a 6-day work week; equal pay for equal work for men and women and for Mexicans and foreigners; safe working conditions; and the right to organize, collectively bargain, and strike. Workers quickly asserted these rights; for example, during the six years of the Cárdenas administration (1934-1940), workers organized over 200 strikes a year. In 1944, workers went on strike a record 887 times. The most iconic strike was that of the oil workers in the 1930s that resulted in the March 18, 1938 expropriation of the foreign oil companies who had refused to comply with the constitutional provisions.

The third aspect of the Constitution that had immediate and lasting effects on society focused on the Roman Catholic Church. Some of the legislation appeared in other provi-

The result of the enforcement of the anti-church provisions ultimately resulted in the *Cristero* Rebellion, from 1926 to 1929. Regarding this critical episode in the history of the Revolution, recently there has been an effort to redeem the *Cristeros*, including the role of the Papacy in creating several as saints of the Church.



CEHM Collection

Original decree granting women the right to vote.



The five original Constitutions of Independent Mexico on display in Mexico's National Palace.

IWH Online Photo Collection

Since the Constitution of 1917 was completed, the history of Mexico can be seen as a struggle to implement its provisions in everyday life. Above all, this effort continues to use the Constitution to create an inclusive, humane society, set of laws, and culture. It has been a continuous struggle to achieve an equitable, humane, just society that guarantees the human rights of every Mexican. This has resulted in amendments to the Constitution; surely the most significant came in 1953, when President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines worked with Congress to modify Articles 34 and 115 giving women the right to vote.

Other amendments came in the 1990s, and some have been highly criticized. President Carlos Salinas, prompted in part by the popularity of the visit in 1990 of Pope John Paul II, initiated the restoration of political rights to priests and the recognition of the church as an institution. He did not change the status of church property, which continued to belong to the government.

Article 27 was also modified under President Salinas, giving individuals title to *ejido* lands and allowing them to be sold, rented, or mortgaged. This completely altered the nature of the *ejido*, one of the icons of the Revolution, but given the growth of the population, especially of families in the countryside, it can be argued that this modification was essential.

A far greater change came in 1992 in Article 4, which provided a definition of the Mexican people stating the population is “multicultural with an indigenous base.” This made

a clear statement of the essential nature of the multicultural society and the opportunity for indigenous communities to use their traditional rights and privileges to govern themselves.

Two significant enabling provisions strengthened the Constitution. The first was the creation of the Mexican agency to enforce anti-trust legislation and fair trade in the economy (this came 100 years after the U.S. Sherman Anti-Trust Law), with its goals of eliminating corruption in the marketplace and making competition possible. A second critical enabling law was the 1988 Law of Standardization and Metrology, updated in 1992. In this law, the government undertook an ambitious project to revamp its entire system for formulating product standards, testing, and labeling and certification regulations. This legislation provided for greater transparency and access by the public and interested parties to the standards development process. For example, under this law, tequila is defined by the percentage of blue agave required in its production—a surprising discovery is that tequilas not labeled as made with 100 percent blue agave may contain as little as 50 percent, with other sugars and additives making up the rest—, and mescal has much higher ingredient standards. Artisanal tequila and mescal continue to be the most Mexican of beverages.

Two final amendments to the Constitution should be mentioned. In 2011, Articles 4 and 27 were changed to stipulate that all persons are entitled to the food necessary for their well-being and earlier in 2005 an amendment passed banning capital punishment in all cases. These two modifications emphatically showed that the Constitution defines the human rights of the people of Mexico. The rights are the law. Of course, the Constitution has not been fully implemented, but every discussion about the rule of law is a discussion to achieve the human rights framed in the Mexican Constitution of 1917. It is the law. **MM**

NOTES

¹ For this essay the author consulted the Constitution of 1917; E. V. Niemeyer, Jr., *Revolution at Querétaro: The Mexican Constitutional Convention of 1916-1917* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1974); James W. Wilkie, *Federal Expenditure and Social Change* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968); Sarah Bowen, *Divided Spirits: Tequila, Mezcal and the Politics of Production* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2015); and the William H. Beezley and Roderic A. Camp interviews with Felipe Calderón, Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, and Jaime Serra Puche in the *Oxford Research Encyclopedia for Latin America*, <http://latinamericanhistory.oxfordre.com/page/videos/>.

Publisher without Borders

Journal of the Southwest

Jeffrey M. Banister*



The University of Arizona's Southwest Center has enjoyed a long history of collaboration with researchers from the National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) and with other institutions of higher learning across the border. Over the years, much of their work has appeared in *Journal of the Southwest* (*JSW*), the center's flagship scholarly publication. From ethno-botanical studies of Mayo River drainage and general surveys of northwest Mexico's flora and fauna, to the cultural geographies of food and the dynamics of immigration, *JSW* continues to make Mexican scholarship available to an Anglophone readership. For those of us who research and work in Mexico, the importance of

this kind of bi-national collaboration and publication is obvious. On a fundamental level, politics and society in Mexico and the United States are inextricably linked. Nonetheless, U.S. scholars, sometimes even within those fields that focus on Mexico and Latin America more broadly, can be woefully unaware of the vibrancy of Mexico's scholarly tradition. In its small way, *Journal of the Southwest* has attempted to address this unfortunate gap.

One of our recent issues (Autumn 2014) includes a translation of the book, *Between Yoris and Guarijíos: Chronicles of Anthropology* (*Entre yoris y guarijíos: crónicas sobre el quehacer antropológico*), by María Teresa Valdivia Dounce, published in 2007 by the UNAM's Institute for Anthropological Studies, where Valdivia is a researcher.¹ This article, based on my original introduction to the translated volume, provides an overview of Valdivia's experience in southern Sonora's Guarijía Mountains. It also briefly narrates the epic struggle

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Photos courtesy of David Burckhalter, photographer and writer. Tucson, Arizona.

Sierra de Nadie is an unflinching, frank assessment of institutionalized anthropology in Mexico. It is also a deeply personal account revealing the courage of a young *indigenista*.

of the Guarijío indigenous people for their land, ending with the present moment, in which they are faced with a new threat in the form of a dam now under construction on the upper Mayo River. Accompanying this article is a small selection of photographs by Tucson-based David Burckhalter, whose work has been featured in several magazines, journals, and books.

David and I have been working with Teresa (“Tere”) since late 2011, when I first approached her about the possibility of publishing a translated and edited version of her book in *JSW*. Years earlier, I had spotted a yellowing copy of her first publication, *Sierra de Nadie* (Mountains of No One) on a bookshelf at the Southwest Center.² *Sierra de Nadie* is an unflinching, frank assessment of institutionalized (“applied”) anthropology in Mexico. It is also a deeply personal account revealing both the naiveté and courage of a young, inexperienced *indigenista*, whose convictions led her to support the Guarijío people in a long and difficult struggle against exploitative landowners and corrupt government officials. That support certainly placed Teresa at odds with her superiors. On more than one occasion, it also led to death threats from private landowners. The circumstances in fact became so menacing that for a time Teresa took to walking around with a knife tucked into her belt for self-defense.

Teresa began her relationship with the Makurawe (Guarijío) people of southern Sonora and southwestern Chihuahua in 1978, contracted by Mexico’s National Indigenist Institute (INI) as part of a larger team of rural community development workers whose backgrounds ranged from agronomy to medicine. The institute’s core objective was to support indigenous people with a variety of social and cultural programs to bring them basic services and “development.” They had offices all over Mexico, particularly in the southern and more indigenous regions of the country. And at that time the Guarijíos needed all the help they could get.

When Tere arrived in Sonora, in her early twenties, she found most of them suffering from starvation and forced into near enslavement by several non-indigenous ranchers (whom the Makurawe and other indigenous groups of southern So-

nora typically refer to as “*yoris*”). She had never experienced anything like it before in her life. She was also ill-prepared for the harshness of the Sonoran landscape and climate. On top of it all, the institute’s approach was generally paternalistic and its objectives often vague. The INI was paralyzed by a conservatism that ensured survival in Mexico’s semi-authoritarian political culture of the time, and which often undermined the effectiveness and reach of its programs. Officialdom tended to view social activism of any kind during that period as the work of communist agitators. (Only ten years earlier the government, under President Díaz Ordaz, had initiated a campaign of brutal repression against university students and others, culminating in the murder of several hundred people in the now infamous Tlatelolco massacre of October 2, 1968.) Within bureaucracies, activism typically was met with some kind of discipline or even summary dismissal. Yet, in some instances, in some regions, the work of those associated with the now-defunct INI could also be transformative. In most of these instances, such transformation had as much if not more to do with the work of courageous individuals as it did with official programming. Such was the case with Tere in the Guarijía Mountains.

Teresa’s loyalty to the Guarijíos (in most instances, over the institute) showed them that people from outside the area cared about them, that there was broader concern for their plight. It gave them much-needed courage, and —just as important— a connection with a trustworthy interlocutor who could help them negotiate the labyrinth of bureaucratic *realpolitik*, paperwork, laws, and, in some cases, the horrors of official repression. Much of the work involved countless trips to the offices of the federal Agrarian Registry in Sonora’s state capital, Hermosillo, as well as numerous meetings with the Guarijíos, who came from remote villages, traversing the extremely rugged, arid, mountainous terrain of the Guarijía Mountains. Tere was no seasoned veteran of Mexican bureaucracy when she arrived. She was also one of very few women in a team made up almost entirely of male professionals. Nevertheless, her persistent efforts at organization helped the Guarijíos win several critical battles against the entrenched ranchers and their government allies, people who had no reservations about resorting to violent means when they deemed them necessary. Those victories ultimately allowed the Guarijíos to regain control over much of their ancestral lands, to build schools and health clinics, and to lift themselves, if only partially, out of the starvation conditions they had known for so long.



My colleague at the Southwest Center, Dr. David Yetman, had translated and used excerpts from this incredible story in his own volume, *The Guarijíos of the Sierra Madre: Hidden People of Northwest Mexico* (2002).³ Seeing this brief translation made me realize that Teresa's work needed to be available *in its totality* to Anglophone readers. The Guarijíos' struggle is a critical and largely unexamined dimension of the larger story of agrarian struggle and indigenous cultural survival in Northwest Mexico. The translation and publication of Teresa's research in *JSW* is important for another quite pressing (and related) reason: Since late 2010, state and federal authorities, working together with agribusiness interests and construction firms, have begun building a second dam and reservoir for the Mayo River (the first dam, located more or less between Navojoa and Alamos, was completed in the mid-1950s). The Mayo River runs through Guarijío territory. This new reservoir, when full, will inundate several of their fields

Teresa Valdivia's persistent efforts at organization helped the Guarijíos win several critical battles against the entrenched ranchers and their government allies.

and some of their communities situated along the flood plain, forcing relocation, or, in the case of floodplain fields, outright elimination. Work crews contracted by the state of Sonora have already cleared hundreds of hectares of tropical deciduous forest and begun building replacement villages. Others are busy constructing the reservoir's concrete "curtain" or wall.

Many Guarijíos are opposed to the dam. Others are in favor. To date, however, officials have made no sincere effort to openly and freely consult with them about this project, a process nonetheless required by law under constitutional reforms ratified in 2011, and in more than one instance, ordered by the courts. Instead, we have seen an organized campaign of intimidation and threats against anyone who dares to speak out, indeed, against anyone deemed by state officials and at least some regional business interests as standing in the project's way in any form or fashion. This is a situation that, unfortunately, characterizes large-scale infrastructure project across the planet. To oppose them, in many instances, is to put one's life at risk.


Once again Tere is in the thick of the struggle. She is part of a team of researchers and consultants assisting those Guarijíos whose voices have been squelched by the stridency and aggression of state and local officials, or of those with whom they have contracted. In August 2013, for example, authorities forced the Guarijíos' traditional governors to sign papers endorsing the project. They also forced the ouster of a traditional indigenous *gobernador* who had refused to sign, replacing him with another whom they had handpicked. He immediately provided his signature. Shortly after that, members of Teresa's team of consultants received threats by telephone and were forced to leave the state for several months. The systematic intimidation that we see today might make the Guarijíos' previous struggle seem quaint by comparison. The forces now rallied against them are indeed a juggernaut, and the construction project continues to advance despite legal and other challenges. Still, there would be no resistance today without those early efforts—there would be no land to protect at all, no memories of past victories to fuel the present will to resist.

For the 2014 translated special issue of *JSW*, I remained as faithful as possible to the style, rhythm, and tone of the original work, including to the more colloquial Spanish of an oral *testimonio*, a labor of love that led Teresa to spend countless hours tape-recording and taking notes in conversations with an important Guarijío leader, Cipriano Buitimea. Following Teresa’s brief introduction, the first essay of the volume comes from her teacher and mentor at the Veracruz University in Xalapa, Veracruz, Andrés Medina Hernández. “The Diffuse Line: Ethnography and Literature in Mexican Anthropology,” as the title suggests, is an in-depth, beautifully rendered exploration of the relationship between scholarship and literature in Mexican anthropology. This is the tradition within which he situates Teresa’s work. Medina’s essay is one of the few, if any, to ply this important line of inquiry. Next is Teresa’s *Sierra de Nadie*, originally published by the INI in 1994 but revised and republished in the 2007 work, *Entre yoris y guarijíos* (Among Yoris and Guarijíos). Following that is “Like a Painted Footprint,” the oral *testimonio* mentioned above. Teresa’s efforts here are exemplary. She pushed herself to develop a distinctive approach to ethnography and oral history that, in the final product, allows Cipriano’s language, so deeply rooted in Guarijío’s ways of knowing,

to ring powerfully and clearly throughout. Finally, we included a scattering of the originally published photographs, as well as those of David Burcklhalter’s portfolio, which together help the reader experience visually the terrain of the Guarijía Mountains, see some of the actors involved in the land struggle, and better understand the Guarijíos’ way of life in this isolated, “forgotten” region. This special issue of *JSW* is but a modest attempt to honor the Guarijíos and Tere, and all of those who continue in the struggle for life and livelihood in southern Sonora. The Southwest Center and its flagship publication, *Journal of the Southwest*, are enormously proud of this longstanding tradition of collaboration with the UNAM, and we remain firmly committed to the task of presenting critical Mexican scholarship to Anglophone readers. ■■■

NOTES

- ¹ María Teresa Valdivia Dounce, “Among Yoris and Guarijíos: Chronicles of Anthropology,” trans. Jeffrey M. Banister, *Journal of the Southwest* vol. 56, no. 3 (Autumn 2014), pp. 365-553.
- ² Teresa Valdivia Dounce, *Sierra de Nadie* (Mexico City: Instituto Nacional Indigenista, 1994).
- ³ David A. Yetman, *The Guarijíos of the Sierra Madre: Hidden People of Northwest Mexico* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2002), p. 270.



History through Musical Stories by Arizona's Young *Corrido* Composers

Luis E. Coronado Guel*



Art on the fence located at the overpass at 6th Avenue and the I-10. South Tucson, Arizona.

*Como la corriente de un río crecido
Que baja en torrente, impetuoso y bravío
Voz de nuestra gente, grito reprimido
Un canto valiente, eso es el corrido.*

*(Like the current of a swollen river
streaming down, impetuous and ferocious,
Voice of our people, repressed cry,
A valient song, that is the corrido.)*

*El corrido, performed by
Los Tigres del Norte¹*

Sylvana Acuña, a sixteen-year-old high school student from northern Tucson, won first place at the 2011 Bilingual *Corrido* Contest organized annually by the University of Arizona Poetry Center. Her *corrido* was dedicated to her personal hero's memory: her grandfather, who lived and died bravely struggling against leukemia. At first glance, this *corrido* bears no resemblance to those that tell bizarre stories about drug smuggling or mass killings, or that narrate the epic battles of the Mexican Revolution. *El corrido de Heriberto Acuña*, however, represents a people's aim of expressing feelings and beliefs: the universal human yearning for creating a memory and leaving a legacy. When in the 1960s historian Luis González wrote his masterpiece *Pueblo en vilo*

(Expectant Town),² many traditional historians mocked him as he proclaimed he had written the "universal history" of his little hometown, San José de Gracia, Michoacán. Unlike traditional historians, González's great contribution was to be willing to recover the forgotten stories that happened to common people in a town situated far from "broader" national history. The *corrido* has that very same function in everyday life for common people; it is a central feature of Mexico's popular culture and a legacy made up of musical stories. This article explores how today *corridos* represent a way in which music becomes an intangible cultural heritage that surpasses borders, languages, communities, and even generations.

The *corrido* has a long history in Mexico. According to Vicente T. Mendoza, the medieval romance is not only the precursor of the *corrido*; it was a *corrido* itself in archaic form.³ Yolanda Moreno Rivas argues that Bernal Díaz del Castillo made reference to traditional romances that the conquista-

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Photos courtesy of the author.

*A corrido claims to be about true stories,
and sometimes these tales allow people to deal
with their past in a more human way
than traditional written history.*

dors brought from Europe in his *True History of the Conquest*.⁴ Some debate exists, however, as to whether the *corrido* — practically as we know it today— began in the seventeenth century or just at the start of the national period around 1810.⁵ *Corridos* have been composed about practically every imaginable topic, on every level: individual, local, regional, national, or even international. *Corridistas* have written about many historical events and figures like Benito Juárez, Porfirio Díaz, Venustiano Carranza, Luis Donaldo Colosio, Emiliano Zapata, Francisco Villa, Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán, Michael Jackson, and even Osama Bin Laden. Nowadays, probably the two most prolific and well-known varieties of *corridos* are those that came out of the Revolution and those that emerge from the realm of drug trafficking.

The two classic approaches to defining the *corrido* were developed by Vicente T. Mendoza and Américo Paredes.⁶ The former defines it as a narrative in the first or the third person that usually flows from the beginning to the end from the lips of an eyewitness or a well-informed narrator.⁷ Paredes says that Mexicans call *corrido* their narrative songs, especially those with epic themes. They take this name from the verb *correr*, which means “to run.”⁸ According to Rosa Virginia Sánchez García, the *corrido* is simply a form of the great lyrical and musical tradition of Mexico that belongs to a specific musical lyrical-narrative system.⁹ It is basically a narration of facts that follows specific metrics and is generally written in the third or first person and attributed to an implicit witness of those facts.

Celestino Fernández argues that the *corrido* is part of Mexico’s oral tradition,¹⁰ but he observes that it has become a source of expression outside the country, too. Today it is known and performed wherever Mexicans and Mexican-Americans reside, including the U.S., particularly its southern border region. Fernández also argues that the *corrido*’s broader audiences come from the working class which he calls colloquially “el pueblo” (the people), while Maribel Ál-



Monument to Pancho Villa located at Veinte de Agosto Park,
donated by President López Portillo to the state of Arizona on June 30, 1981.
Congress Street and W. Broadway Blvd. in Tucson.


varez suggests that at the U.S.-Mexico border region, *corridos* are more than just songs; they are cultural artifacts. She writes, “They are social events rich in symbolism that lend themselves to a wide range of adaptations and appropriations by people with a variety of interests.”¹¹ Both Álvarez and Fernández stress the cultural significance of *corridos* as people’s stories. Fernández, however, says the *corrido*’s popularity is based on its narrative dimension, while Álvarez thinks it relies on its performative and cultural implications in everyday life. None of them mention its connection to the larger field of history, and to the instinctive human aim of leaving behind or creating memories.

Contrasting the concepts of history and memory illuminates the *corrido*’s most powerful cultural feature, which is its personal and emotional character.¹² Memory resembles more a personal attachment to the past, while history may be considered a more systematic, methodical, collective, and many times more controlled way to describe the past detached from personal feelings, fears, aspirations, and sentiments. This author considers the *corrido* essentially a commemorative act, which expresses feelings and thoughts in music and/or poetry, which may usually be consistent in terms of style and meter. This dimension of the *corrido* is what makes it so transcendent; it is more powerful than any other traditional, stylistic, or classification constraint of this musical genre. A *corrido* claims to be about true stories,¹³ and sometimes these tales allow people to deal with their past in a more human way than traditional written history. The evolution of *corridos* outside Mexico highlights the everyday dimension that creates connections rather than separation among bi-national or translational communities.

ARIZONA'S YOUNG *CORRIDISTAS*: EVERYONE IS ENDOWED WITH A MEMORABLE PAST

The transnational and trans-generational value of the *corrido* can be exemplified among younger amateur composers in the city of Tucson, Arizona, a proudly diverse community. The town itself is a prime example of multicultural roots and the transnational formation of communities. Located 60 miles north of the U.S.-Mexico border, the Tucson Valley sits on the last piece of territory Mexico lost in 1853 by selling it to the U.S. government. In fact, Tucson's historical formation reflects its unique character as a translational community, with a vibrant personality equally proud of its Spanish, Mexican, and U.S. American roots. This exciting mixture is evident in its cuisine, music, art, and urban design.

From 2000 to 2015, the Poetry Center,¹⁴ a literary institution based at the University of Arizona, organized a *corrido* contest among teenagers from the area. The High-School *Corrido* Contest was a state-wide competition for students to write original *corrido* lyrics for a chance to win cash prizes. Although the center no longer organizes this annual contest, they archived all the 15 years of rich production to preserve the material as part of Tucson's cultural heritage. In 2010 a group of scholars published an anthology of contest materials under the title of *A Decade of Young Corridistas: 2000-2010*,¹⁵ which includes the lyrics of contest-winning *corridos* written by Arizona students. These lyrics demonstrate the aforementioned human universal aim of leaving memories behind. In a 2011 interview, Jesús Hurtado Terán, the second-place winner of the 2011 Bilingual *Corrido* Contest, said a *corrido* is personally meaningful because “it tells a story that may happen at any time —past, present, or fu-



A Decade of Young Corridistas anthology and CD.



Mural at 485 N. 7th Avenue, Tucson.

ture—, and you can learn from it.”¹⁶ As we can see, a *corrido* is their ultimate opportunity to leave a good or a learnable memory for others.

Social memory is constructed through *corridos*, whether they are the officially sanctioned *corridos revolucionarios*, those of black-label *narcocorridos*, or those written by young students in Tucson. This is because *corridos* are one of the everyday ways that common people construct history. They are especially recognized as an expression of the truth that also grants voices to those without access to expressing themselves openly and freely, or simply, to those who are invisible among larger groups. These characteristics make *corridos* tremendously flexible, as they appeal to the universal human values of surviving, resisting, struggling, and expressing whatever is personally and emotionally genuine.

The “young Arizonan *corridista*” lyrics seem like tools for managing their past and for conveying their ideals about the people around them. They do not just narrate specific events; they refer to and reframe reality within feelings and perceptions that aim for plausibility, but also judgments. These lyrics seem to be consistent with basic principles of honor and personal values, so sometimes not all social groups accept them, as in the case of *narcocorridos*. In fact, this does not mean that *narcocorridos* have no values or sense of honor, but rather quite the opposite. The *corridos* are genuine because they are consistent not with a universal set of human

Social memory is constructed through *corridos*, whether they are the officially sanctioned *corridos revolucionarios*, those of black-label *narcocorridos*, or those written by young students in Tucson.

values, but with a universal human proclivity to live under specific values. Singing a *corrido* in many ways is personally and collectively a claim by people to define and defend their right to choose their own values.

An example of this is the construction of heroes or anti-heroes; in the *corridos*, we see how heroism is built on personal appreciations and idealizations of facts, people, conditions, or situations. In the *corrido* by Jesús Alan Hurtado Terán, the second-place winner of the 2011 contest, we can see he is narrating how his father abandoned their family some years before and never returned. But far from feeling rancor, the author attributes this event to God’s will and idealizes memories of his father. Thus, creating this *corrido* helped him build a better, more manageable past, as we can appreciate from the lyrics below:

Spanish Version
<p>El trabajo se le fue Sólo su miseria abrigó En busca de su futuro Huyó para estar seguro (...) Qué falta me hace mi padre A cada paso que doy Qué falta me hace mi padre Ya mi Dios se lo llevó.</p>
English Version
<p>He lost his job, His misery was the only shelter In search of a better future He ran away to be safe. ... I miss my father so much, Every step I take, I miss my father so much, Now my God took him away from me.</p>

This feature is also perceived in the *corrido* “Amargo trago” (Bitter Drink): a title that has a double meaning, in Spanish “trago amargo” is a metaphor used to express a hard event that one must swallow quickly to get it over with, like the death

of a loved one. In this case, authors Lizette Mendivil and Gabriela Contreras, the first-place winners in the 2000 *Corrido* Contest, narrate the death of their father who died because he drove under the influence of alcohol:

Spanish Version
<p>El veinticinco de octubre del año 97 Les contaré una tragedia Que yo la traigo presente El Sr. Efraín Mendivil Se mató en su camioneta A las dos de la mañana Fue a buscar unas cervezas Junto con dos compañeros Señores, qué gran tristeza Encontró luego la muerte Después de su borrachera (...) Sus familiares y amigos Pasan un gran dolor Pues este señor tenía Muy grandote el corazón¹⁷</p>
English Version
<p>October 25, of the year '97, I'll tell you about a tragedy That I always have in my mind. Mr. Efraín Mendivil Killed himself in his truck At two o'clock in the morning. He went to get some beers With two of his friends. Gentlemen, how sad, He met death that day Because of his drunkenness ... His family and friends Are in great pain Because this gentleman had A very big heart.</p>



Artwork by Chris Rush on 15th Street and Cherry Avenue, Tucson.

The musical dimension of these Arizona *corridos* also shows how these compositions transcend regardless of the rhythm, style, or instrumentation they are performed in. The organizers of the Annual Bilingual *Corrido* Contest used to grant the winners the opportunity of having professional musicians put their compositions to music. In 2011 and other years, musicians were not specialized in traditional mariachi or *norteño* styles, so the final musicalized versions sounded different from any other kind of *corrido* in Mexico. These *corridos*, however, kept all their emotional and commemorative spirit, regardless of whether they were performed in country style, jazz, or as a pop ballad. This adaptation shows the *corrido*'s enormous discursive strength and flexibility and confirms its potential for creating memory.



Tile artwork located at 6th Avenue & 26 Street, Tucson.

In summary, young Arizonan composers portray how *corridos* form a transnational and intangible heritage. Like elsewhere, *corridos* are cultural artifacts that people use for expressing their own feelings and beliefs. They often repre-

sent popular notions of justice, truth, and wisdom. A *corrido* is essentially a commemorative act, a last opportunity for anyone to be remembered or just recall something significant or ordinary, bad or good. This personal dimension makes it extremely powerful and long-lasting in time and space. That way, *corridos* can be carried beyond borders, languages, and musical styles. They are about people dreaming of being remembered in a good and gentle way; about people remembering an unfortunate past that is better in their imagination; they are about people exaggerating little victories, celebrating good and bad times, people who forget their bad past, and hope for a new future. *Corridos* are for people who, no matter age, race, condition, nationality, or language, turn their own stories into their own universal history. **VM**

NOTES

- ¹ Los Tigres del Norte, *Corridos prohibidos* (Mexico City: Fonovisa, 1989), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uAfgHMGwlOS>.
- ² Luis González y González, *Pueblo en vilo, microhistoria de San José de Gracia* (Mexico City: El Colegio de México, 1968).
- ³ Vicente T. Mendoza, *El corrido mexicano* (Mexico City: FCE, 1974), p. x.
- ⁴ Yolanda Moreno Rivas, *Historia de la música popular mexicana* (Mexico City: Océano, 2008), p. 32.
- ⁵ Ibid.
- ⁶ James S. Griffith and Celestino Fernández, "Mexican Horse Races and Cultural Values: The Case of 'Los Corridos del Merino,'" *Western Folklore* vol. 47, no. 2, April 1988, p. 129.
- ⁷ Mendoza, op. cit.
- ⁸ Américo Paredes, *With His Pistol in His Hand* (Austin: Texas Classics, 1958).
- ⁹ Rosa Virginia Sánchez García, "Los principales géneros líricos en la música tradicional de México," in Aurelio Tello, ed., *La música en México. Panorama del siglo XX* (Mexico City: FCE/Conaculta, 2010), p. 108.
- ¹⁰ Celestino Fernández, "Corridos: Stories of the People," in Frances Sjoberg, Celestino Fernández, and Maribel L. Álvarez, eds., *A Decade of Young Corridistas, 2000-2010* (Tucson: University of Arizona Poetry Center, 2010), p. 10.
- ¹¹ Maribel Álvarez, "The *Corrido* as Cultural Artifact," in Frances Sjoberg, Celestino Fernández, and Maribel L. Álvarez, eds., *A Decade of Young Corridistas, 2000-2010* (Tucson: University of Arizona Poetry Center, 2010), p. 15.
- ¹² For scholarship on memory see Jeffrey K. Olik and Joyce Robbins, "Social Memory Studies: From Collective Memory to the Historical Sociology of Mnemonic Practices," *Annual Review of Sociology* vol. 24 (1998), pp. 105-140.
- ¹³ José Pablo Villalobos and Juan Carlos Ramírez-Pimienta, "Corridos and la pura verdad: Myths and Realities of the Mexican Ballad," *South Central Review* vol. 21, no. 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 129-149.
- ¹⁴ Poetry Center, "About the Poetry Center," November 19, 2015, <http://poetry.arizona.edu/visit/about-poetry-center>.
- ¹⁵ Frances Sjoberg, Celestino Fernández, and Maribel L. Álvarez, op. cit.
- ¹⁶ Jesús Alan Hurtado Terán, interview by the author, Tucson, Arizona, April 2, 2011.
- ¹⁷ Lizette Mendivil and Gabriela Contreras, *Amargo trago* (Tucson, Arizona: University of Arizona Poetry Center, 2010), p. 32.

ROOTS AND WINGS OF MEXICAN ILLUSTRATION

Mauricio Gómez Morín*



▲ *Mayan Codex.*

Mexico is a visual country. Some countries are literary, like Argentina; others are discursive, like France; still others are musical, like Germany or Mali; but although Mexican culture expresses itself through different media and in many ways, it is a fact that Mexico is a predominantly visual country. Almost all Mexico's cultural expressions have strong roots in the field of the visual. Let us just mention, for example, the aesthetics and colorfulness of our cuisine: some dishes on the Mexican table have a true artistic touch, in addition to an exquisite taste; they look "yummy." The same is true of different forms of

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The codices were the first manifestations of Mexican art, and some of their elements have later been used as graphic references by different illustrators and visual artists, right up until today.



▲ Leaves 8 and 9 of the Dresden Codex.



▲ José Guadalupe Posada, cover of *The Disappointments of Bato and Bras, or an Amusing Scene*, 14.8 x 20 cm (photo-relief on paper).



▲ José Guadalupe Posada, *The Magical Boy*, 23.4 x 16.8 cm (burin etching on lead).

The popular nationalist illustrations of José Guadalupe Posada situate him as the precursor of the nationalist movement in the visual arts.

folk art, in which drawing and color concentrate the essence of their manufacture. It is no exaggeration to say, then, that what is Mexican is perceived through the use of color, of texture, through the patina, the contrast, a taste for the expressive that is overwhelmingly expressionist, and in a natural, idiosyncratic inclination for great expressive force, and —why not say so?— sometimes, paradoxical and contrasting manifestations.

Through a series of reflections on contemporary illustration in Mexico, I want to explore here the universe of this artistic activity, which is relatively recent —recent in terms of its being recognized as such, but not in terms of its origins—, but which has rapidly acquired presence and vigor in the pantheon of the Mexican visual arts. I want to explore, for example, where it comes from, its foundations, and where it has taken flight to, the impetus that has projected it even beyond our borders: the roots and wings of Mexican illustration.

THE HANDS THAT FIRST DREW MEXICO

In a diachronic sense, we can ask ourselves about the first images depicting Mexico. They were drawn by the inhabitants of Mesoamerica, whose declared communicational intent was to put forward their knowledge and world view, describing their surroundings through images in what have been called codices.¹ The pigments used were extracted from coal and certain plants, and the illustrations were then made on pieces of cured skins or on parchment made out of tree bark, called *amate*. The codices were the first manifestations of Mexican art, and some of their elements, like glyphs, fretwork, shades of color, or profiles, have later been used as graphic references by different illustrators and visual artists, right up until today.

In this introductory article, it is not my intention to do an entire historical review of illustration. However, the visual discourse, just like any other narrative, emerges as it interacts with the historic events of any specific time, which imprints its canons on it. The predominant artistic references during the colonial period were European, classical, and for the most part religious, while those stemming from the pre-Hispanic tradition moved into the background, latent, like watermarks, behind the visual veils imported from Europe. With the arrival of the first printing press to Mexico in the mid-sixteenth century, print shops proliferated, and the town criers who sang out the news were replaced by broadsheets, gazettes, and newspapers, where illustrations were introduced to accompany the texts: thus was born the illustrated periodical.

AN IMAGE IS WORTH MORE THAN A THOUSAND ILLITERACIES

As images stopped being merely “ornaments” to accompany the texts, that is, at the moment that the visual discourse became autonomous, illustration began to play an important role in transmitting ideas and political criticism and social denunciations in a country with an extremely high illiteracy rate and a tumultuous political scenario. In this context, as the expression of a time and era, we must mention two notable precursors

Covarrubias was an international,
multi-faceted illustrator,
but above all,
he was profoundly Mexican.



▲ Miguel Covarrubias, Jacket painting for the book *Mexico South: The Isthmus of Tehuantepec*, 1946.

of Mexican illustration, who exercised enormous influence in our country's graphic repertoire: José Guadalupe Posada and Miguel Covarrubias.

José Guadalupe Posada (1852-1913) was a master of black and white, a shrewd commentator on his times, the turbulent early twentieth century. He began his graphic career at the age of 15 and, after a brief stint at the Aguascalientes Municipal Academy, entered the "El Esfuerzo" (The Effort) workshop as an apprentice to master printer José Trinidad Pedroza. Soon, he was using his sketching skills to make socially critical caricatures that he published in the *El Jicote* newspaper.² Posada consolidated his career in Mexico City, where he used engraving on metal with printer and editor Antonio Vanegas Arroyo, editing gazettes, broadsheets, comic books, and *corrido* lyrics, as well as publishing in 20-odd newspapers. His work depicted national events, symbolizing with his sketches the values and contradictions of the society of his time.

The popular nationalist illustrations of José Guadalupe Posada situate him as the precursor of the nationalist movement in the visual arts, headed up by Diego Rivera and José Clemente Orozco, among others.

PRODIGIOUS SKETCHES

Equally outstanding is the work of Miguel Covarrubias, nicknamed "The Kid," a contemporary of Diego Rivera, and whom Diego himself considered the best sketch artist of the time. Extremely well-versed in pre-Hispanic art, which he admired enormously, Covarrubias began his graphic work at the age of 14, illustrating articles in a newspaper. His versatility means that we can find his sketches in cartoons, illustrations for books, newspapers, and in stage scenery. Outstanding among his multiple illustrations are those for Ministry of Public Education textbooks; this is important because they constitute an entire narrative promoting Mexican identity, and with his illustrations, Covarrubias underlined national aesthetic values.

In addition to his work in Mexico, he was an illustrator in the United States for prestigious publications like *The New Yorker* and *The New York Times*, to mention only two. With that penchant for exploring popular culture, when he was in the United States—specifically in New York—he became very interested in African-American culture and made several illustrations dealing with this topic; these works contributed to more value being placed on the expressions of African-American culture. Covarrubias was an international, multi-faceted illustrator, but above all, he was profoundly Mexican.

Both these artists are considered precursors of graphic art and points of reference for the genre; they are unequivocal representatives of Mexican identity, the renewed value of which has been time and again, at different moments, the touchstone of illustration in Mexico. **MM**

NOTES

¹ After the Spanish Conquest most of these documents were destroyed; those that were recovered like the *Dresden Codex* or the *Aubin Tonalamatl Codex* are now in European museums and libraries, except for the *Colombian Codex*, now part of the National Anthropology and History of Mexico library collection.

² This newspaper published only 11 issues because it was censored by the state governor.

A GALLERY OF MEXICAN ILLUSTRATION

Fabricio Vanden Broeck*

FABRICIO VANDEN BROECK



▲ *In the Underworld*, 2016.

Considering abstractly and interpreting the essence of ideas and communicating them through visual language is the origin and objective of illustration, an activity that is becoming more and more important in the world of publishing and anywhere that images speak for themselves. But it has not always been that way: at the beginnings of modern illustration in Mexico at the end of the nineteenth century, this activity was a craft carried out by painters and engravers as something that complemented their art, with a few exceptions like José Guadalupe Posada. Illustrations were only conceived of as an adornment for whatever was said with words, as though the only discourse capable of communicating was the written word. Even today there are those who see illustrations as a series of lines and forms that enliven the text. Fortunately, however, fewer and fewer voices defend the hegemony of one discourse over the other. Actually, the two ways of transmitting ideas, sensations, and emotions have no reason to compete with each other; the two discourses move on parallel planes.

Here, the work of important artists gives us a sample of how illustration has been thought about and sketched in Mexico in recent years, the pathways taken until we

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CLAUDIA DE TERESA

arrive at what has been called the era of the image; its sources of inspiration, its communicative intent, and the resources available for tracing its artistic universe.

We can situate the first generations of contemporary Mexican illustrators beginning in the second half of the 1970s. In part, this is due to the illustration projects for the Ministry of Education's textbooks and for the magazine *Colibrí* (Hummingbird) edited by photographer Mariana Yampolsky. To a greater or lesser extent, these projects dealt with the issue of cultural identity, the leitmotif permeating Mexico's art and thinking after the victory of the 1910 Revolution.

In this context, illustrators searched in their own cultural roots to construct a personality that distinguished them from the one coming into Mexico from Europe and the United States.

From my point of view, of the members of the first contemporary generations, emerging in the 1960s and 1970s, Felipe Dávalos's work displays an aesthetic exploration that contributes a great deal



▲ From the book *Los temblores* (Earthquakes) (Mexico City: SEP-ADN, 1997).



▲ From the book *Apalka* (Mexico City: CIDCU, 1992).

FELIPE DÁVALOS

Interpreting the essence of ideas and communicating them through visual language is the origin and objective of illustration. In the beginning, illustrations were only conceived of as an adornment for whatever was said with words.

MAURICIO GÓMEZ MORÍN



▲ *La grieta.*


Illustrators searched in their own cultural roots to construct a personality that distinguished them from the one coming into Mexico from Europe and the United States.

to the concept of Mexican illustration. It is undoubtedly nourished by his prior work as a sketch artist for *National Geographic* magazine, an experience linked to the visual and symbolic languages of the pre-Colombian cultures and those who admire their visual communications tradition. The ideas of the pre-Colombian peoples endure in Dávalos's illustrations.

Bruno González is another outstanding member of that generation, who managed to establish his own language, but with a mark that owes a great deal to the textural work so typical of Mexico's artists and artisans.

The second generation appeared in the mid-1980s. Here, the work of illustrator Claudia de Teresa reminds us of the decorative colonial art of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, with notable Spanish and Moorish influences. Gerardo Suzán's work, for its part, stands out for its colors in all shades, undoubtedly inspired in one of the most important representatives of Mexican art, Rufino Tamayo. The images of Mauricio Gómez Morín also clearly reflect the intention of creating an identity along the lines of the tradition of the Popular Graphics

ALEJANDRO MAGALLANES



▲ From the book *101 Adventures in Reading* (Mexico City: Artes de Mexico, 2009).

RICARDO PELÁEZ

Workshop, while the work of Fabricio Vanden Broeck —this author— reveals a search for recovering the textures and patinas characteristic of the Mexican visual universe. For that generation, experimentation, structuring a personal language, and the references of the Mexican visual universe have been central concerns in their work.

It is important to mention that, of that generation, not all the artists came on board for the adventure of seeking a national aesthetic repertoire; some, in an attempt at universality, preferred to perfect techniques that allowed them to become part of the mainstream and even rid themselves of any shred of the local culture.

But in general, we can say that that period was marked by the still-vibrant nationalisms, and that the poles of localism versus universalism frequently came under discussion.

Things began to change gradually beginning at the end of the 1980s with the opening of markets and globalization; these two phenomena began to impose unifying criteria not only in consumption and in day-to-day habits, but also in the country's aesthetic.



▲ *Early Morning*, taken from the *Catalogue of Illustrators* (Mexico City: 2004).

ENRIQUE TORRALBA



▲ From the book *O último conto* (*The Last Story*) (Belo Horizonte, Brazil: Aletria, 2013).

MARIANA VILLANUEVA



▲ *Woman with Deadpan Expressions.*

Corporate logic and massification took over the planet, often to the detriment of diversity. And the work of the next generations of Mexican illustrators began increasingly to look like the dominant expressions in illustration, particularly those from Europe and the United States.

In this context, a third generation of contemporary Mexican illustrators emerged with very diverse interests, more influenced by work from abroad, and not necessarily concerned with the issue of identity as a source of artistic inspiration.

Less sensitized to the Mexican visual universe, this generation seeks to dialogue with its counterparts from other horizons and become part of the international dynamic.

One example of this is the work of illustrator Manuel Monroy, whose aesthetic is inspired in European proposals from the 1950s; another is the work by Alejandro Magallanes, inspired in the French collective Grapus, with its Dadaist influence, and 1970s Polish graphic art.

A fourth generation, which emerged during the first decade of the twenty-first century, is characterized above all by greater group awareness and less interest in seeking their roots and their own reference points. Their proposals, diverse from each other, are the result of a decided influence of global trends, with a particular accent of the Asian currents, like mangas, and the use of digital techniques.

LUIS SAN VICENTE



▲ *Monstrous Diversity.*

JUAN PALOMINO



▲ From the book *Monos, mensajeros del viento* (Monkeys, Messengers of the Wind) (Mexico City: Tecolote, 2015).

In the middle of the XXI century's second decade, a new generation of illustrators emerged, whose main characteristic is the exploration of unconventional supports.

GABRIEL PACHECO



▲ From the book *The Adventures of Pinocchio* (Mexico City: Nostra Ediciones, 2013).

MANUEL MONROY



▲ *The Cristero War.*

This generation focuses on personalizing trends created elsewhere, adopting, for example, a color palette unusual in Mexico. The work of this generation includes the use of digital possibilities more or less intensely both in constructing their proposals and in disseminating them on social networks.

Outstanding in this generation, among many others, are Enrique Torralba, Ixchel Estrada, Ricardo Peláez, and Luis San Vicente, with work that is not only very personal, but also radically different from one another.

In the middle of the twentieth-first century's second decade, we are beginning to be able to discern a new generation of illustrators, whose main characteristic is the exploration of non-conventional supports. This is motivated in part by the increasingly meager demand from Mexico's publishing industry, dominated and formatted as it is by globalization and the big publishing corporations, which impose criteria and tastes based more on potential commercial value than on quality.


Today, globalization has meant that all illustrators in the world tend to look like each other; wherever they are they make up a supranational tribe that drinks from the waters of the Internet.

ADRIANA QUEZADA



▲ *Social Responsibility.*

IXCHEL ESTRADA



▲ *Soup for the Fly*, from *Luci's Flight* (school notebook) (Mexico City: FCE, 2012).

These unconventional supports include, of course, everything the social networks make possible, but, above all, supports previously considered marginal, such as tattooing and graffiti, as well as three-dimensional supports: toys, games, ceramics, etc. Gabriel Pacheco, Juan Palomino, Richard Zela, and Mariana Villanueva are just a few of the many illustrators who belong to this new trend.

Naturally, this brief review of the recent history of Mexican illustration has no pretensions of being exhaustive and only mentions as examples a few of the protagonists of a long and diverse list, as a sort of gallery of Mexican illustration.

Today, globalization has meant that all illustrators in the world tend to look like each other, wherever they are. To start with, their work reflects in general a more or less intensive use of design programs like Photoshop or Illustrator. As a whole, they make up a supranational tribe that drinks from the waters of the Internet —almost exclusively— and disseminates their work through the social networks.

However, in light of recent events, which reflect a profound, generalized questioning of globalization and its paradigms, we should take another look at our professional practices as illustrators and members of a culture rich in diversity, aesthetics, and colors. We should try to preserve that culture and revitalize it based on our own work, since, to paraphrase Mauricio Gómez Morín, “without roots, there are no wings.” **MM**

RICHARD ZELA



▲ *The Tower of Babel*.

MEXICAN ILLUSTRATION FOR CHILDREN'S PUBLICATIONS THE CASE OF EL ILUSTRADERO

Abril Castillo Cabrera*

ENRIQUE TORRALBA



▲ Illustration from the book *O último conto* (The Last Story).

Not every drawing is for children, nor are all children's books illustrated. What makes a book suitable for children? Are there basic rules for illustrating for children?

Some authors reflect about their own poetics from the point of view of their creative activity, but above all it is critics, promoters, and specialists who decide today's canons for literature for children and young people. Many of them also decide what is pub-

lished and which titles are included in school curricula or end-of-year lists.

More than approaching this question by offering up some abstract recipe or what "should be," we should note that the expansion of the publishing market for children and young people means that many diverse proposals are made every day, and we can study each of their specificities, be surprised by their novelty, and also be bored with replications, copies, the hackneyed, and moralizing, empty discourses.

*Editor, writer, and illustrator; havrill@gmail.com.



SANTIAGO SOLÍS

▲ Poetry.

We wanted to generate an international tool for publishers and illustrators to put the Ibero-American identity on the map.

What makes a book be a children's book? The topics, the images, the language used, the colors aimed at each age group, the readership? Seemingly this kind of analysis, which works just fine when applied to reading, kills the art of creation. It is by no means the same thing to take apart a watch to understand how it works and to follow the same rules to create a work of art. As they say, poetry is from heaven when you read it and from hell when you try to explain it. Because art does not have a single function, and there are no instruction manuals for mov-

ing people. The best art is universal, timeless. The best children's books are not only for children; they are for any reader.

The role of illustration in the world of children's books and of books in general has changed enormously in recent years. Illustration is a discourse that has always been at the service of text, subordinated and minor. But today it is undeniable that illustration is a discourse that increasingly asks less of the other discourses; that illustrators are complete artists—even though they always have been—, perhaps

ABRIL CASTILLO



▲ *Don't Forget Me.*

today even more because the milieu recognizes them as such. For decades, people have created picture books without any text at all; in congresses and conferences, some illustrators are called “authors” without every one saying that they exclusively draw; adults consume illustrated books; and publishing houses put out picture books and graphic novels for the general public.

Mexico has a long tradition of illustration for children’s books, initially for textbooks, but also for books not used in schools. In the last two decades, illustration for children has taken on a very important role: we can say that, while not the only reason, the Children’s and Young Persons’ Book Fair, which this year is celebrating its thirty-seventh year, has been a determining factor in fostering this activity.

MY EXPERIENCE

Despite having studied Spanish-language literature, I had also painted from the time I was a child, and the

moment came when it was time to put my affinity for the graphic arts into practice. A girlfriend recommended I take an illustration diploma course called “Processes and Contexts,” still given today at the UNAM University House of the Book, coordinated by Guillermo de Gante and Enrique Torralba. I went with a portfolio full of paintings that weren’t illustrations and a resume that set me apart from my fellow students who had studied the arts or design. I will always be thankful to my first teachers for accepting me in a field that, starting out, was not mine, and which became my central passion, even today.

That year, Jorge Mendoza and Anabel Prado, two of my fellow students who had a studio called Triveroquio together with Mario Rosales, organized a stand at the Children and Young Persons’ Book Fair (FILIJ) at the National Center for the Arts. Since this quickly turned into a collective, a group, a guild, it needed a name, and we dubbed it El Ilustradero (The Illustration Place). Triveroquio invited Enrique Torralba and Cecilia Varela to the group. In my mind, I couldn’t belong because I wasn’t an illustrator. I was just start-

ing out. But in that milieu, I realized that we can all belong to illustration, in contrast with how people behave in literary circles. I offered them help on the editing side of things, and so Roxanna Erdman and I joined what would be the first organizing committee of El Ilustradero.

That first year there were 37 of us illustrators; we created a box of illustrated postcards, each of us contributing three images that would later be narrated by four writers—all women. We invited El Ilustradero members to take their personal products to the stand: dolls, T-shirts, fanzines, buttons, coloring books, reproductions. During the day, we held live drawing sessions. The professional illustrators sat at the stand and gave away their drawings to the children and visitors to the fair who asked for them.

The next year, we planned a publishing project to include unpublished illustrations. We made a book of predictions that we called *Destinario* (Recipient), which could tell your fortune through images and words. That year, the stand at the FILJ was once again

accompanied by an exhibition, and we also went to the Guadalajara International Book Fair for the first time.

In 2009, our stand grew, as did the number of participants, who now came to more than 100 and were not limited to Mexico. We began to create networks that spread by way of book fairs and the Internet. That year, the director of the Astrid Lindgren Memorial Award offered us the chance to be part of the Mexican jury. The sphere of illustration was expanding rapidly internationally.

In 2010, as part of El Ilustradero, we decided to create our own prize for illustrators on this side of the world, because the viewpoint always seemed to be from Europe or the United States, from Japan or from Arab countries. But it wasn't clear what was going on in Latin America, and there was no vision from inside out, from our point of view.

The *Catálogo de ilustraciones de publicaciones infantiles y juveniles* (Catalogue of Illustrators for Children's and Young People's Publications) already ex-

CECILIA RÉBORA



▲ *We, the Others.*

isted in Mexico, organized by the National Council for Culture and the Arts (today, the Ministry of Culture), as well as the “At the Edge of the Wind” Picture Book Prize, awarded by the Fondo de Cultura Económica publishing house. What we wanted to do was to generate an international tool for publishers and illustrators to put the Ibero-American identity on the map, enriching it over time, an idea that is united by the language and the culture, but can also be recognized in an image.

That is how the *Catálogo Iberoamérica ilustra* (Ibero-America Illustrates Catalogue) was born, the idea for which we presented at the SM Foundation and the Guadalajara International Book Fair. Since 2010, the three institutions have made it possible to compete for this prize free of charge; the eighth annual competition will take place at the end of this year. A

five-member jury is picked representing the entire region every year. Among the Mexicans who have won the prize are Santiago Solís and Santiago Robles, Adriana Quezada, Cecilia Rébora, and Juan Carlos Palomino.

On another note, over the last ten years, Mexico’s presence in the world of illustration has grown. Many people are aware of the Mexican market’s limited presence in the world. But certain publishing projects that are betting on Ibero-America, like *La Caja de Cerillos*, *El Naranjo*, *Cidcli*, *Tecolote*, *Ideazapato*, just to mention a few.

In addition, book fairs are opening up more and more spaces for the development of this profession with workshops and also with illustrators’ conferences, congresses, a salon for illustrators at the Guadalajara International Book Fair, and a solid program for

Children’s illustrations
have won an increasingly solid place
in the world of books. Illustrators conceive
of themselves as complete authors.

JUAN CARLOS PALOMINO



▲ Illustration from the book, *Jaguar, Heart of the Mountain*.

SANTIAGO ROBLES




▲ *What a Hurdle!*

professionals at the Children and Young Persons' Book Fair.

One exemplary case is the Mexican publishing house Petra Ediciones, headed by Peggy Espinosa, was honored as the best publishing house in Central and South America in 2014. The following year, the Guadalajara International Book Fair awarded the Merit for Publishing Award to the same company for its 25 years of activity. This made it the first children's book publisher to be given this award.


In the 10 years since its foundation, El Ilustradero has changed: only Jorge Mendoza, David Nieto and myself are left. Together, in addition, we started up an independent publishing house that we have dubbed Oink Ediciones; currently, we have the beginnings of a catalogue with ten books; all, of course, are illustrated.

Today, children's illustrations have won an increasingly solid place in the world of books. Illustrators conceive of themselves as complete authors. Publishing houses publish for child and young readers, but their books are beginning to be read by a broader audience. The quality of the work is better and better, although there are also more and more illustrators. Illustration is gaining ground in the world of books, and Mexico is beginning to be recognized internationally; it is devoutly to be wished that this contributes to the profession also being more highly valued domestically, as well as prompting more sales of rights, beyond book purchases; more domestic production of picture books; more places for new illustrators to be trained; and the permanence and consolidation of the programs, prizes, groups, associations, and spaces created to date. **MM**



▲ *As the Stars Rise*, 80 x 170 cm, 2016
(oil on linen).

INTO THE DEPTHS OF AIR**



THE PICTORIAL UNIVERSE OF VIRGINIA CHÉVEZ

Pura López Colomé*



▲ *Air*, 120 x 245 cm, 2015 (oil on linen).

A voice is hidden somewhere
 in the wings of raw material. It is never
 satisfied. It seeks itself in a grayish *yes*,
 in a blackened *no* of its own nights,
 its own deaths.

I try to discover identity and find only absence. I pursue matter that presents itself alone, all alone, before my eyes and suddenly, I am no longer there. I awake in a place of *linen* on the banks of a river whose name can almost be transposed thereby, *Nile*, and I discern what is at the core of that original plant, or perhaps that original word, from which a true creation in resonance hopes to emerge. Although for now, it shows itself solely as a timeless blankness: blank eyes, blank mind. Once born, it breathes among dense substances, encouraging through oils, through pure and impure waters that hope to become a hue, that may aspire to elevation and thus, transform our individual way of seeing things.

A voice is hidden somewhere in the wings of raw material. It is never satisfied. It seeks itself in a grayish *yes*, in a blackened *no* of its own nights, its own deaths. It believes it has found itself and comes to an end in the mirror that has created it; it wants to reverse itself because it needs other eyes to rest upon it, hummingbirds immobilized in an instant, avian pupils that bear away the reds, the eyes of blood, to other destinations. It is the voice that conveys. It does not feel comfortable traveling down a single path, and so it is forked through a scratching, a modifying among strange syllables in Sanskrit, or perhaps in modern languages of ductile riverbeds, transcribed and blurred, or in the solidity of facts, of indivisible unity: spells for a single season of the spirit. In that world,

* Poet.

** Translated by Tanya Huntington, writer.

All photos by Gabriel Figueroa and Marco A. Pacheco, courtesy of the Casa Lamm Cultural Center.

what seems to be a word can be read. It hurts to pierce it like a lance with one's gaze, causing its color to burst open, feeling the spring of a nameless mountain, an amorphous reality that is very much alive.

I am at the same time spectator and witness. An elongated surface is broken into symmetry. Another binds the senses together in an oval, a circle, half-moons floating over a pristine, amniotic lagoon. I choose then to put my hands to work, to open what seems to be a screen in search of recognizable silhouettes, of sanity bit by bit, because I know—my personal salvation—that all great abstract art is figurative deep down: and yet behind the veil, I find myself in a closed chamber, *camera obscura*, *hortus clausus*. I try to straighten out what appears to be upside down and end up singing a syllable, very long, in sharps and flats. A syllable or stem cell that that puts everything in place, each separate shard of this spiritual kaleidoscope. Compassionate.

Does the artist sustain this event born of canvas, this emblem that an embroidery needle has perforated to leave its mark, a metaphor that multiplies its meanings? "The art of oil painting— / Daubs fixed on canvas—is a paltry thing/



◀ *Waves*, 68 x 110 cm, 2016
(oil on linen, wood).




Waves 2, 68 x 110 cm, 2016 ▶
(oil on linen, wood).



◀ *Perhaps Everything Is Wanted*,
140 x 140 cm, 2016 (oil on linen).

I see in the art of Virginia Chévez
the primordial clay of an idiophone,
a unique instrument with a sound of its own.



Deep Is the Air, 140 x 140 cm, ▶
2016 (oil on linen).



▲ *Circle of Peace*, diameter 90 cm, 2016 (oil on linen).

Compared with what cries out to be expressed," Milosz claimed as a young man. Words he would later repent. Because nothing is static, all is *perpetuum mobile*. Because it saw the clay of our origins among its hues and folds. And as he rectified later in life: "It would seem I have been summoned / to celebrate things because they exist [...] The soul has its scruples." As for me, I see in the art of Virginia Chévez the primordial clay of an idiophone, a unique instrument with a sound of its own, given that its body *is* both resonating and resonant matter, no strings attached, or membranes, or columns of air...

If the search for the divine may be carried out within oneself, accompanied by an irrepressible desire to reverse and reveal, there is no better way than art. And that includes everything granted by the creator of flesh and bone, equivocation and accuracy, virtue and pettiness, plague and aroma, beauty and misery: hence, the work-entrails will appear beneath the spotlight of the great theater of the world, an ancient linen as it were, but cast in a more recent mold. The artist, aware of being on the verge of exhibiting what some may consider to be imperfections, starts "to scratch, to dirty, and to write... to weigh down the work." To light a fire as a form of expression, to "make it hot," so that it may succeed in inhabiting the depths of air. **MM**

ALEXANDRA AKTORIES VENERATING WATER

Magali Tercero*



▲ *Liquid Obsidian.*



▲ *Reaching the Limit* (clay and glaze).

The sound of water, of unexpected smoothness and almost musical chords, has impregnated the talk with Alexandra Aktories. As I listen to the recording, a two-hour interview with this artist of water, as I think about it while I write, I begin to feel moved. I don't know why. Is it the criss-crossed sounds of the water coming from the many pieces of ceramics that inhabit her studio? Is it the forms —almost always curved— of her sculptures with water.? At a certain point, Aktories goes to get some tea, and I stay behind, immersed in a silence crossed solely by this sound poem she has built from a precise, almost scientific intelligence. She has lived a certain area of her existence amidst numbers and architectural projections of buildings near the sea. And I would venture to say that even with the memory of water in her ears, this has led her to the magnificent task of sculpting ceramic containers for water.

“The idea was framing a trickle of water, something as minimalist as a self-contained trickle of water,” she says about her piece *Free Fall*. A concept that comes from India, *asana*, is essential to Aktories. To her, this is not a yoga pose, but a platform for the deities. In India, each deity is placed on an *asana* so that he or she does not touch the ground.

*Writer and journalist; mtercero2000@yahoo.com.mx.
Photos by Juan Nader Sayún.

“I think of art in water like someone who thinks about mobiles: Alexander Calder, for example, whose work retraced the traditional paradigms of static visual forms. Here, we were dealing with objects in movement, works that existed in time. While my sculptures don't have the same kind of movement as Calder's, activated by the air, they do contain movement and a feeling of temporality. They are pieces that require time and invite the viewer to contemplation: their apparent stationary nature falls apart when you are calm enough to see how the form submits itself to the course of the water.”



▲ *Eruption from the Depths*.



▲ Detail of *Road to the Heart*.

“I have a strong propensity toward the smooth, the soft, the round; simple, clear lines; that’s why I spend so much time on the process of ‘integrating’ the form (smoothing out the material). Here the hours go by imperceptibly and concentrating on the sense of touch makes it so that the only thing that exists is the present. Perhaps that’s why this is one of the moments of greatest enjoyment for me.”

Her sculptures —*Vigil, Water: The Gentle Breeze from Its Top, Emerge and Surprise*, to mention a few— give water its *asana*: “You venerate it; you love it. This piece is a platform for honoring a trickle of water.” Her words are exciting. Alexandra Aktories reveres nature with absolute dedication. She says simply, “I offer the sculpture to the water, and it contributes the magic. I feel this very profoundly. The sculptures are also an *asana* for venerating the water.” There’s something very spiritual about it.

Aktories says that she does ceramics to be able to work with water. From a very young age, she learned to make useful ceramics with her teacher Nemesio Hernández when she was studying philosophy at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Later, she began to work with wood, a material she considers has noble qualities. She abandoned ceramics for many years until an intuition and a desire, at a time when she was working intensely with wood, led her to change directions: “It



▲ *Road to the Heart* (clay and glaze).




▲ *Emerge and Surprise* (clay, glaze, and stone).

“I very much like the idea that I’m making a ‘co-production.’ I don’t work alone. I have a partner. While the water cannot be present as I’m building the piece, every part of it is conceived to hold it and offer it the space so it can expand and play.”

was a compulsion. I said I want to do something with water; I want the water to cover the pieces.” And so, after thinking and thinking about water’s volumes and how it falls, she returned to ceramics. To be able to do something with water, she said, “I betrayed wood.” The water guided her because it required a container that wood could not offer. The artist had never worked with water, but she observed how it has different ways of falling and moving. “It’s like this little stream,” she explains, moving a piece. The sound changes according to the position. It is instantly transformed and produces fast-flowing music.

The interview takes place in her two workshops. One, tiny and perfectly organized, is in the Nápoles neighborhood where she is in residence; the second has been set up in her own home. After showing the pieces underway in the first atelier, Aktories goes to the other, spacious and bright, with a view of the garden. The works are placed so as to be heard, to manage the light, so their creator can study whether they are producing the effect she sought. “The first thing that occurred to me was to create stones out of clay. The process of conceiving of things until you make it in clay is very interesting.” In the face of this kind of concert of sounds, I ask her if she



▲ *Internal Strength* (ceramics, stone, and glaze).

“In this art, the kiln is an implacable critic; it judges any ill-considered technical move: too heavy, too humid, lack of union, extensions that are too wide; all that can open up a crack that’s unacceptable because water takes every opportunity to filter through.”



▲ *Refuge and Resonance* (clay, glaze, and stone).



▲ *Crossing the Mind Sideways*.

has considered making sound art. The answer is a joyful “yes,” tempered by the awareness that she does not yet feel prepared to do it.

The water can fall, it can gush, and then it does something that this writer had never imagined: it clings to the material. “You think that it’s going to gush, but it doesn’t. It slides on the surfaces clinging to them.” The process includes practice: this is the most mundane part. All water in movement needs a pump. The sculptor works with the golden ratio: “How would water move backwards? From where to where would it fall? Can it slide?” Other questions are practical: How do I ensure that the wire from the pump that requires electricity is not seen? She called the inner workings a cable trap: “It’s a little crazy of me to want everything to be invisible, it has to be seamless.” On the outside, her pieces are minimalist, as can be seen in the illustrations for this article, poetically clean-cut. On the inside, they are a tiny reflection of the industrial and architectural worlds. Form and function. Architects who have access to her work often ask if she is an architect by training. This amuses her. But there is some truth to it because every architect works the exterior of his/her buildings thinking of their function, making sure that everything imagined is expressed from the inside out.

Amidst the joy in this almost aquatic space (due to its sounds), a kind of illusion of the senses cre-

ated by the music of the water, more questions emerge: Is Aktories inspired by Arab fountains, by Japanese culture, or perhaps in the work by Kyoto Ota, a Japanese artist who has lived in Mexico for the last 40 years? I tell her about a piece of his that “froze itself” in a museum in the 1990s. Ota works in “inhabitable sculptures,” so called because the strips of wood allow light, air, and human beings themselves to move through them. As far as she knows, nobody she knows does anything similar.

She has recently begun to exhibit. For several years, the pleasure was in creating the pieces. Suddenly she felt the need to show them. That’s why she has had exhibitions. The most recent was “Tactile Water,” and she is preparing another now. “Water rules me,” she repeats. Right now, she’s repairing a piece owned by an architect. That possibility always exists because the subtle engineering of this work makes it possible. There are also curtains of water, whirlpools, textures that change the water’s course. I cannot resist the impulse to touch a slender, minimal waterfall that emerges from a piece with the smoothness of a stone polished by the sea. Alexandra Aktories likes my gesture. It’s about that, too. **MM**



▲ *Khufu* (clay and brass).


“I feel honored to work with an element as magical as water; in addition to purifying in the symbolic sense, water also has the properties of refreshing and fertilizing.”

▼ *Diluted Uprisings*.



The Permanent Ephemeral in the Art of María Eugenia de la Garza

Gina Bechelany Fajer*



◀ *Some Memories Are Left Up in the Air*, 90 cm, 2008 (digital print on encapsulated clear film, nylon thread, and box of light).

At first glance, it is no easy matter to draw a line connecting María Eugenia de la Garza's different artistic proposals. This Mexico-City-born visual artist is the creator of a body of work as extensive as it is original, including photography, interventions, performance, corporal, and even mental art. However, there is a —not always visible— thread running through it all, linking up her artistic production; that thread, or the fine weaving called “memory,” is her central axis.

Seeking the origins of Maru de la Garza's art necessarily returns you to the self, an interior space peopled with experiences, yearnings, absences, and presences, celebrating what is no longer here; sometimes festive-

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ly, sometimes in a disquieting way. Her art is an inseparable part of an internal process that is pushed out into the light by memory and finds expression in different supports, such as video, photography, installation, or a happening. The artist herself is a field for exploration; that is why it is irrelevant whether her work is ephemeral or permanent, instantaneous or an entire process, because this is not simply bringing into the present memories from the past, but rather re-signifying the experiences to transform them into new experiences.

WHAT OR WHOM IS THE ARTIST LOOKING AT?


María Eugenia de la Garza's subject matter ranges from a new encounter with her daily surroundings to daydreams of remote places: from different times and facets of her own person to unknown, anonymous characters; from pleasant memories to distressing absences; from incontrovertible facts to philosophical musings. In this process of exploration and transformation of the object, we have to say that De la Garza turns everything she "touches" into art. The following are good examples:

Raúl and I (2003-2004) is a prolonged performance piece. For a year, the artist played, developed as, was at one with, and merged with Raúl, reviving him, based on the intervention into several objects, including her own body. De la Garza managed to give life to the absent father, non-existent not only in reality but also in her memory:

Facing the fact that I didn't know what had happened to Raúl, my father, upset me again when I became a mother. When I looked at a photograph in my album again, I decided to do something with that loss. . . . As a little girl, I used to imagine that I ran across Raúl casually, in the street, in a car, or in a crowd. One day I discovered that I could find him. I used my own body as subject and object of my photographs, through mimesis. That's how I was able to take him to the cemetery, to church, to the countryside, to the garden, to the stadium, to have a cup of coffee, and to get to know his tastes, his moods. That meant I could have him close to me.

This experience gave rise to a series of photographs that the artist later used to make a book, in which the ephemeral was recorded on paper.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Zove7offltw>



▲ *The Skin of Memory*, 2007 (video installation and performance).

María Eugenia de la Garza's subject matter ranges from a new encounter with her daily surroundings to daydreams of remote places.



▲ *Fragmentation 01*, 38 x 32 cm, 2011 (print on self-adhesive vinyl).

Female Episode (2006) is the record of an action the artist took after seeing her mother come out of the operating room. In this sequence of videos, De la Garza plays the leading role in the symbolic mutilation and reconstruction of a breast, which concludes with a rain of milk over her body. The artistic action is not a mere reaction to a painful experience; it is a reason to use art to delve into issues like feminine identity, illness, and the primordial maternal link: the milk that comes

from breasts, the milk that nourishes, but also the milk that protects and comforts.

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=o8KQQyo_nlg

**Her art is an inseparable part
of an internal process
and finds expression in different supports,
such as video, photography, installation,
or a happening.**

The Skin of Memory (2007) is made up of several forms of art: sculpture, video-installation, acrylics, and performance. The origin of this piece is a self-referenced experience, an episode forgotten by the artist. It was only the memory of others that made it possible to reconstruct this experience, not merely by recounting the facts, but as a way of submerging herself in her own identity. She says of her artistic experience:

My body open to other names and other secrets. With this video-performance-installation I want to talk about the relationship



▲ *Feminine Episode*, 2006 (videograms).

between the public and the private, the representation of art as therapy, and the representation of an identity that is configured as plurality, as reconstruction of the self in the experience of the other. My memory is resolved in my flesh through an aesthetic experience, to which I add the pleasure of discovering myself as myself, using photographs of the hands of 20 women who told me their experiences when they were caring for me in the hospital.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gi1awqzhDcw>

Stringing Things Together (2008). But the object of María Eugenia's work is not always the same self. Her art sometimes also extends to the re-signification of the experiences of others. In this case, it is the experience of 17 senior citizens who shared their memories; an intervention project that took place in Mexico City's Nonoalco-Tlatelolco Housing Project. According to De la Garza, it is "an analysis that reflects on the day-to-day experiences and loneliness of seniors living in a common space, such as the housing project. It is an intervention delving into the individual situation of older people in the emotional sense, as social individuals." This project throws into relief the play between individual and collective memory, between public space and the individuality of each of the inhabitants. After filming the seniors' accounts, the artist produced a monumental video-projection on the façade of the housing project's buildings.

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nxYpWbqmwvww>

Fragmentation (2011). The protagonists in *Stringing Things Together* not only shared their memories through words, but they also opened their photo albums to the artist, who intervened into them, deconstructing and reconstructing them, "with the intention of reconfiguring a memory, a moment," to give movement to an encapsulated instant, to make the ephemeral permanent in the memory.

Despite being self-referenced art, María Eugenia de la Garza's pieces abandon their epicenter to spread out to other territories, to the territory of anyone who is seeking to re-signify what has been experienced or not experienced, what has been lost or what has been recovered. Is the work of this artist perhaps a re-signification of forgetfulness or a resurgence of memory? **MM**



▲ *Stringing Things Together*, 2008 (intervention in a specific site: Tlatelolco).

The object of María Eugenia's work is not always the same self. Her art sometimes also extends to the re-signification of the experiences of others.



▲ *Fragmentation 2*, 38 x 32 cm, 2011 (print on self-adhesive vinyl).





Pedro Hiriart

TEODORO GONZÁLEZ DE LEÓN RENOVATOR OF MEXICAN ARCHITECTURE

Isabel Morales Quezada*

Goethe said that architecture
is frozen music,
but I think it is petrified music,
and cities are symphonies of time spent,
concerts of visible forgetfulness.

HOMERO ARIDJIS

Just as they say that a book only comes alive when someone takes it down off the shelf, opens it up, and starts to read, we can also say that architecture only comes alive when it is lived in, when it is walked through and enjoyed; when it becomes beloved and dear to us. For Mexican architect Teodoro González de León (1926-2016), passion and emotion were essential when designing a new project. Perhaps that is the main reason it is impossible to go through one of his works and remain indifferent.

González de León's relationship with the architecture of Mexico City began with his studies at the National Autonomous University of Mexico's National School of Architecture,

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All photos are courtesy of Teodoro González de León's architectural firm.

◀ Teodoro González de León
and Abraham Zabludovsky,
El Colegio de México
(The Mexico College),
Mexico City, 1974-1976.



which used to be housed downtown. For Teodoro, this would be one of his best periods: it was there that he rubbed shoulders with artists, painters, and sculptors, for at that time the School of Architecture was in the same building as the School of Visual Arts, the San Carlos Academy.

It was during his student days that together with two schoolmates he developed the first project for University City, today a World Heritage Treasure, built in 1950. He was very attached to Mexico City, where he was born in 1926, and was a disciple of Le Corbusier, one of the twentieth century's main proponents of modern architecture. Undoubtedly, this period was a determining factor in creating a concept of architecture in which beauty and simple spaces are fundamental.

PUBLIC WORKS

González de León's experiences in France with Le Corbusier and his knowledge of Mexican and pre-Hispanic cultures came together in the first important buildings that he designed. One of these is headquarters for the Institute of the National Workers Housing Fund (Infonavit), which he designed jointly with architect Abraham Zab-ludovsky. He also collaborated on other works with Zab-ludovsky, such as El Colegio de México (The Mexico College), the remodeling of the National Auditorium, and the Rufino Tamayo Museum.



Camila Cosío

▲ Teodoro González de León, El Colegio de México Library (detail), Mexico City, 2015.



▲ Teodoro González de León and Abraham Zabludovsky, Rufino Tamayo Museum, Mexico City, 1981. Remodelling and Expansion by Teodoro González de León in 2012.

Architecture only comes alive when it is lived in, when it is walked through and enjoyed; when it becomes beloved and dear to us.

González de León was a cultured man who enjoyed designing public buildings more than private homes; he was aware that knowledge and culture were essential to the life of a country, and in this case, of Mexico City. Those who knew him speak of his love for reading and art, as well as painting, and sculpture, which he practiced himself and incorporated into his oeuvre.

But, what is exciting about Teodoro González de León's architecture? No self-respecting denizen of Mexico City has not been in one or another of his creations. A place like Mexico City changes every moment; it is in constant movement. Designing the spaces required for a city with so many millions of inhabitants is no easy task. González de León resolved every one of his by combining the open, monumental spaces so characteristic of pre-Hispanic architecture with elements of modern architecture.

The huge esplanades and interior patios are two characteristics that define his work. One of Mexico City's emblematic buildings is the National Auditorium. A large esplanade welcomes us to it; from afar, from Reforma Boulevard, it is imposing. A large fountain invites visitors to approach and climb the stairs even if they are not planning to go into the auditorium. The huge open space calls out to passersby, compelling them to experience a walk along that rough but at the same time warm material, the chiseled exposed concrete so characteristic of González de León's buildings.

A warm, rose-colored tone emanates from the huge walls of El Colegio de México (Mexico College), one of our country's most important educational institutions. The large patio welcomes you as you walk in. For this architect, patios are not contemplative

spaces only perceived from afar and at a distance, but places for coming together, for crossing paths, for movement that imprints dynamism on the building. They are places that connect people. Architecture, in this sense, even though static, facilitates the movement of those who inhabit it.

Two other buildings complete the area: the Fondo de Cultura Económica publishing house and the National Pedagogic University. The former is very tall, but nevertheless, is integrated into the landscape and with the other two buildings soberly and beautifully. The concrete opens the way to glass, covering the concave space of a vertical construction; a green, tree-filled area surrounds the entire construction.

The Rufino Tamayo Museum is emblematic of Mexico City's museum architecture. Located in the Chapultepec Forest, it is an example of the influence of pre-Hispanic architecture in González de León's work. The building harmonizes with the landscape around it, and the use of plant-covered sloping platforms achieves a natural, friendly interaction with the surroundings. The esplanade once again welcomes visitors, inviting them in. It is impossible to resist: it seems like a different kind of air is breathed there; the open space envelops us, even though that sounds contradictory.

One of González de León's pieces of advice in an interview with architecture students was to constantly renew and never repeat oneself. He said that even if you were successful with a project, repeating the formula or copying it in your next work was not desirable. You had to be inventive, come up with different ideas, find possible solutions. Over time, he himself changed his way of doing architecture without losing the essence

González de León's experiences in France with Le Corbusier and his knowledge of Mexican and pre-Hispanic cultures came together in the first important buildings he designed.

Teodoro González de León,
University Contemporary Art
Museum (MUAC), UNAM
University Cultural Center,
Mexico City, 2005-2008. ▼



Pedro Hiniart



Pedro Hiriat

◀ Teodoro González de León,
Reforma 222 Complex,
Mexico City.

The Rufino Tamayo Museum is emblematic of Mexico City's museum architecture. It is an example of the influence of pre-Hispanic architecture in González de León's work.

that always characterized him, like using lasting materials and the importance he gave to the emotions that the spaces he created could evoke in people who visited them.

One example of this constant renewal is the University Contemporary Art Museum (MUAC), inaugurated in 2008 in the UNAM University Cultural Center. The museum was built on the site of a former parking lot, an area the architect used to create an esplanade welcoming the visitor to the Cultural Center.

Entering the museum is an experience difficult to forget, not only because of the exhibitions it offers, but because of the experience itself of moving through each of its spaces. If the visitor enters from the Cultural Center itself, he or she will first encounter the huge esplanade with Rufino Tamayo's *The Sprig*. Then, reflections compete with each other: reflections from the museum's enormous sloping glass wall and from the water that gently gives life to a mirror. The large exposed concrete building leans forward; a skylight leads the way to the entrance, and everything is illuminated. The six- to twelve-meter-high rooms allow for the needs of today's contemporary art, where some artists create large-format works. The architect had to think about all the possibilities and not be stingy with the dimensions. González de León was inspired by other con-

temporary art museums around the world. He was an architect who knew how to look inward, but also to enrich his work with references from without.

Moving through the MUAC's rooms is an experience in being enveloped in today's art, but it is also letting oneself be thrilled by the building's architecture. The interior patios are places for repose and contemplation. The visitor goes to them naturally. It is impossible to walk through the halls, encounter a glass door that the exterior peeks through, and not go outside, at least to satisfy your curiosity and admire the rocky and arid—but also tree-filled— landscape surrounding the University Cultural Center.

PRIVATE WORK

González de León's private work has also had a determining influence on Mexico City's new look. One emblematic work of this kind is the Forest Arches Tower I (1996), a skyscraper that is part of an eight-building complex, which people have dubbed "the pair of pants" because it is two enormous towers joined by a 161-meter arch. Today it is the symbol of the Santa Fe neighborhood, which concentrates one of the country's

Teodoro González de León,
Torre Virreyes (Viceroys Tower),
Mexico City, 2010-2015. ▼



Pedro Hiniart

Teodoro González de León
and Abraham Zabludovsky,
National Pedagogical University,
Mexico City, 1979-1981. ▼



Manuel Ariza



Pedro Hirrat

▲ Teodoro González de León, Francisco Serrano, and Carlos Tejeda, Arcos Bosques (Forest Arches) Corporate Office Building Complex, Mexico City, 1990-2008.

most important clusters of corporate offices. This work, created in collaboration with architect Francisco Serrano, uses mainly two materials, glass and white chiseled concrete. Even though from afar it is imperceptible, this preserves the Mexican tradition of using massive, strong, lasting materials.

Finally, one of his most recent works is the Reforma 222 mall. Located on Reforma Boulevard, one of the city's most important thoroughfares, Reforma 222 is made up of three high towers (measuring from 90 to 126 meters), designed for different functions. Tower 1 holds different kinds of offices, while Towers 2 and 3 are for residential use. This ensemble is also part of the new image of a city in constant change. The materials used are glass, steel, and chiseled concrete. Today, the modern tower that holds the shopping mall is a meeting place and point of reference for Mexico City inhabitants.

There is no doubt that Teodoro González de León's work in Mexico City is vast and imposing. However, it maintains that discreet, solemn, and at the same time monumental air of pre-Hispanic cities. His buildings dialogue with the history of the city and its inhabitants. Entering these places, even if they are exteriors, is a way of being aware of the space of a city where at times it is difficult to breathe. In the buildings designed by González de León, you give yourself time to breathe, to stop a moment and feel the freedom of movement that moving through this gigantic city sometimes denies you. This city is marked with the imprint of an architect who knew how to read it, to renew it, to leave almost imperceptibly but enduringly an impression and even a bastion of identity in the memory of those who have experienced it: the inhabitants of Mexico City. **MM**

His buildings dialogue with the history of the city and its inhabitants. Entering these places, even if they are exteriors, is a way of being aware of the space of a city where at times it is difficult to breathe.



THE MODERN ART MUSEUM

Christian Gómez*

At the end of the last century, art historian Michael Ann Holly co-edited the book *The Subjects of Art History. Historical Objects in Contemporary Perspectives*,¹ in which she put forward a provocative perspective: since our knowledge of the past is constructed without the benefit of the panoply of possibilities afforded by being present during the historical event, no final word or truth exists about it. Using a historiographic approach, she invited the reader, then, to think of the ways that the history of art has been written in different contexts, at different moments, and with different motivations. When reflecting on Sigmund Freud's persistent interest in ancient Rome and on the debate about a late-nineteenth-century work by Gustave Klimt, she said that, like ghosts, the structures of the past overlap and silently reverberate in the present and can become visible to anyone who tries to see them with a change in viewpoint.

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Photos courtesy of the Modern Art Museum, National Institute of Fine Arts.

To wend your way among spirits and ghosts, Holly's proposal consisted of a kind of history that dealt with the artistic in conjunction with its circumstances: working in narratives sensitive to the political, cultural, and intellectual context. Thus, the complex task of narrating the histories of somewhere like Mexico's Modern Art Museum (MAM) is situated amidst spirits and ghosts, amidst the works and their contexts, amidst the space and the view-point. More than half a century after its inauguration in 1964, a review of its legacy reveals its dynamism: far from an immovable history of art, it is a laboratory of narratives; and, in contrast with museum-as-depository, a space for the great renovations of art in our country in the second half of the twentieth century. Suffice it to note how its activity reverberates in the present.

A FACE OF MEXICAN MODERNITY

Like in the Julio Cortázar short story "Axolotl," in which the protagonist goes for interminable afternoons to watch



▲ Remedios Varo, *Roma Caravan*, 1955 (oil on Masonite).



▲ Frida Kahlo, *The Two Fridas*, 170 x 170 cm, 1939 (oil on canvas).

Far from an immovable history of art,
the museum is a laboratory
of narratives.

with fascination a Mexican salamander or *axolotl*, only to change places with it in an unsettling play of the gaze, visitors go to the Modern Art Museum to become involved with its most emblematic works. They update the suffering in *The Two Fridas* (1939); twist and turn like in Remedios Varo's *Disquieting Presence* (1959); share Rosa Rolanda's angst in her *Self-portrait* (1952). To do this, they enter a building with glass walls that at the same time merges with its surroundings: the Chapultepec Forest, Mexico City's urban park *par excellence*.

The MAM has blended in with its surroundings since September 20, 1964, when it was inaugurated under the administration of President Adolfo López Mateos. It was created simultaneously with other significant exhibition spaces (the Gallery of History and the National Anthropology Museum, all by architect Ramírez Vázquez) as part of the era's developmentalist, modernizing policies. This was part of a larger project to show "what is Mexican" to the world.

As historians Gabriela Álvarez and María García Holley write,

The Modern Art Museum (MAM) sought to offer a place to the new generations of artists and their novel expressions. Architects Pedro Ramírez Vázquez and Rafael Mijares set themselves the task of designing a museum without a program, a project that was open and flexible in terms of its possible uses, ways of circulating, and exhibition areas.²

And they add,

The museum's architecture reflected a total break with tradition: it was a new building with absolutely no carry-overs from the past; only industrialized materials were used and there was no place for visual integration.³

In these authors' opinion, the organic form of the museum, which used materials like marble, aluminum, and fiberglass, was also an exercise in experimentation in accordance with the artistic disciplines. In this sense, the glass façade sought to be a response to the landscape to reflect its content, but also to invite the public in. In the same way, initiating its activities with an exhibition of works by Rufino Tamayo, the museum opened the door to the renovation of artistic practices that was inescapable at the time.

BREAKS, FRACTURES, AND RENOVATION OF LANGUAGES

The number of artists from the first half of the twentieth century represented in the museum's collection is disqui-



Both due to the period the works cover, from the avant-garde artists of the early twentieth century until those from recent years, the whole collection poses big challenges such as rereading the works and establishing new perspectives.

▲ Juan O'Gorman, *Self-portrait*, 1950 (distemper on Masonite).



▲ Remedios Varo, *The Flautist*, 76.5 x 63 cm (oil and mother of pearl incusted on Masonite).

eting. More than 350 very important works have come from the ateliers of artists like Ángel Zárraga, Gerardo Murillo (Dr. Atl), Roberto Montenegro, Diego Rivera, David Alfaro Siqueiros, José Clemente Orozco, Frida Kahlo, María Izquierdo, and Rufino Tamayo. We cannot neglect to mention the photographic work by Manuel Álvarez Bravo, Tina Modotti, and Edward Weston either. Despite this, it is even more important to point to the close relationship between the museum space and the artistic practices carried out after it was created.

This allows us to underline the role of the MAM as a natural space for creative renovation. This is the case of the movements that emerged as a response to muralism and the Mexican school of painting. For this reason it is useful to underline the place that the artists of what has been called “the generation of the Break” occupy in the museum’s collection. This current saw abstractionism as a mechanism for distancing themselves from muralism’s politically committed realism, as well as a way of getting

involved in the international art conversation. Among them are Lilia Carrillo, Fernando García Ponce, Vicente Rojo, Pedro Coronel, Manuel Felguérez, and José Luis Cuevas. Other artists bent on renewal but unclassifiable also enrich the collection, among them Juan Soriano, Arnaldo Coen, Alberto Gironella, Gunther Gerzso, Mathias Goeritz, Carlos Mérida, Kasuya Sakai, and Vlady.

In addition, the museum has hosted more experimental practices, represented to a lesser extent. Some publications review specific cases in which the museum has accompanied the development of artistic practices, such as *La máquina visual: una revisión de las exposiciones del Museo de Arte Moderno, 1964-1988* (The Visual Machine: A Review of the Expositions of the Modern Art Museum, 1964-1988) by Daniel Garza Usabiaga.⁴

Others, like Rita Eder’s *Tiempo de fractura. El arte contemporáneo en el Museo de Arte Moderno de México durante la gestión de Helen Escobedo (1982-1984)* (Time of Fracturing: Contemporary Art in Mexico’s Modern Art Mu-

seum under the Directorship of Helen Escobedo [1982-1984]),⁵ examine how the museum has welcomed new practices. These include installation and performance art, the artistic setting of an ambiance, what has been called non-objectualism, and collective works by artists known as “The Groups,” with their critical consequences for the artistic system, the myth of the creative genius, and the art market. All these are precedents for contemporary artistic practices.

The museum later opened its doors to what has been called the movement of “neo-Mexicanism.” And then, as Daniel Montero documents in his book *El cubo de Rubik, arte mexicano en los años 90* (The Rubik’s Cube: Mexican Art of the 1990s),⁶ the Modern Art Museum also opened up spaces for the so-called “alternative artists,” many of whom would later be considered contemporary and would

participate in the process of renovating Mexico’s cultural institutions during the 1990s.

The last artists represented in the MAM collection reflect the heterogeneity of practices and interests: Gilberto Aceves Navarro, Enrique Guzmán, Helen Escobedo, Feliciano Béjar, Martha Palau, Julio Galán, Francisco Toledo, Germán Venegas, Francisco Castro Leñero, Gustavo Monroy, Fernando García Correa, Daniel Lezama, Patricia Aridjis, and Miguel Calderón.

The Modern Art Museum is facing the challenge of continuing to offer novel perspectives about its collections and to be a space for dialogue about the artistic production of different eras.



◀ Abraham Ángel Card Valdés,
The Girl in the Window.



◀ Agustín Lazo, *At School (Poetry 1)*, 1943.

Parallel to artistic practices no longer being conceived as uniform, chronological movements, in the last analysis, the discrepancies in the museum's collections indicate a process of institutional, social, and political transformations. This process at the same time reflects the interests of different leaderships, the changes in Mexican art, and the reconceptualization of an institutional cultural infrastructure after the turn of the new century, a change whose dimension is barely comparable to the one that the MAM was a part of in the 1960s.

REVISTA ARTES VISUALES


Edited by art historian Carla Stellweg between 1974 and 1981, *Revista Artes Visuales* (Visual Arts Review) was indispensable for the Modern Art Museum. Its 20-odd issues brought together the fundamental art critics and dealt with urgent topics related to the artistic practices of those years.

It published articles on art criticism, design, cinema, video-art, Latin American art, the sociology of art, biennials, Chicano art, and the Groups, all contributed by authors like Jorge Manrique, Juan Acha, Marta Traba, Carlos Monsiváis, Salvador Elizondo, Octavio Paz, Alaide Foppa, Jorge Romero Brest, Teresa del Conde, Marshal McLuhan, Lucy Lippard, Judy Chicago, Aracy A. Amaral, Damián Bayón, Helio Oiticica, and Felipe Ehrenberg.

The caliber of the contributions and the way in which the publication covered the development of artistic practices have turned this journal into a reference point for research about the decade.

NEW READINGS

The number of paintings, sculptures, photographs, sketches, and engravings in the MAM Collection comes to 3 000. Both due to the period the works cover, from the avant-



◀ Remedios Varo, *Vagabond*, 1957.

garde artists of the early twentieth century until those from recent years, the whole collection poses big challenges such as rereading the works and establishing new perspectives. Ongoing research plus curatorial work from new perspectives and with new selections have demonstrated that the works can always benefit from fresh readings and that their meaning is never fixed.

In 2015, for example, researcher Natalia de la Rosa developed the exhibition “Cineplastics. Film about Art in Mexico, 1960-1975.” In it, she evoked the concept of “film about art,” which emerged in Europe as a visual essay about the work of artists from different disciplines. The exhibition put forward an apparently simple exercise consisting of countering works from the collection with audiovisuals about the process for creating them. The result was a series of fresh approaches about well-known pieces; among them a work in which Frida Kahlo appeared in the shot challenging death, obligating viewers to pose her vulnerability and the power of her paintings in a new way. The way it was curated forced the public to look with different eyes. The research from different perspectives ended up restoring our gaze with a renewed point of view.

As in that case, the Modern Art Museum is facing the challenge of continuing to offer novel perspectives about its collections, of creating room for new proposals, and continuing to be a space for dialogue about the artistic production of different eras. As Michael Ann Holly has said, the structures of the past overlap and silently reverberate in the present and can become visible in different ways to anyone who tries to see them with a change in viewpoint. **MM**

NOTES

¹ Michael Ann Holly, “Spirits and Ghosts in the Historiography of Art,” in Mark A. Cheetham, Michael Ann Holly, and Keith Moxey, eds., *The Subjects of Art History. Historical Objects in Contemporary Perspectives*, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).

² Gabriela Álvarez and María García Holley, “Museos para la modernización,” in Rita Eder, ed., *Desafío a la estabilidad. Procesos artísticos en México 1952-1967* (Mexico City: UNAM, 2014), p. 350.

³ *Ibid.*

⁴ Daniel Garza Usabiaga, *La máquina visual: una revisión de las exposiciones del Museo de Arte Moderno, 1964-1988* (Mexico City: Conaculta-INBA-MAM, 2011).

⁵ Rita Eder, *Tiempo de fractura. El arte contemporáneo en el Museo de Arte Moderno de México durante la gestión de Helen Escobedo (1982-1984)* (Mexico City: UAM-UNAM, 2010).

⁶ Daniel Montero, *El cubo de Rubik, arte mexicano en los años 90* (Mexico City: Fundación Jumex Arte Contemporáneo, 2013).

Immigrant Farmworkers In Northeast Agriculture

Life, Labor Conditions, and Organizing for Change

Dairy farming occupies a special place in the U.S. agrarian imaginary, often associated with pastoral tranquility, family values, and laboring close to nature. However, the contemporary U.S. dairy farming sector bears little resemblance to these Jeffersonian ideals. After decades of industrial consolidation, fewer and fewer small family farms with grazing cattle dot the landscape. In their wake are large-scale automated facilities operating around the clock to milk hundreds—even thousands—of cows, multiple times a day. Increasingly, undocumented migrant workers from rural areas of southern Mexico and Guatemala have been hired to fill these undesirable, underpaid, dangerous, and exhausting milking parlor jobs.

This special section focuses on the lives of men, women, and teenagers who traveled from southern Mexico to seek better opportunities on the isolated dairy farms of Upstate New York and Vermont. The first article shows how neoliberal policies in the North American food system have driven smallholder Mexican farmers from their land and into waged dairy farm labor in *El Norte*. The second explores the daily lives of women farmworkers, who work long hours while also struggling to achieve food security for their children. The third analyzes the unique vulnerabilities of unaccompanied youth on dairy farms, who have no parental figure to help them adapt to a socially hostile environment.

A labor activist and former dairy farmworker shares in a fourth article his moving personal experience of why “unfortunately, when I got to New York, everything would be different from what I expected.” In fact, as discussed in the eye-opening fifth article, the northeastern dairy sector is no stranger to the serious crime of human trafficking; however, the political unpalatability of offering protection to undocumented migrants leads policy-makers to turn a blind eye to some of the worst forms of labor exploitation. The sixth and final piece explores in depth the fine line between support and control in paternalistic dairy farm labor systems and the work of the Cornell Farmworker Program in helping resolve tensions in these relationships.

All the contributors strive for social change through their research and outreach work in the northern borderlands of the U.S. It is a lonely landscape, but dairy farmworkers are not alone. The stories of activism and solidarity in the following pages inspire action and the belief that a better future lies ahead.



Michael Dalder/Reuters

Kathleen Sexsmith
GUEST EDITOR

“It’s Not What You Earn, It’s What You Send” Resisting Dispossession In Southern Mexico

Aaron Lackowski*

For more than a century, the border region that stretches across northern New York and Vermont has been known for its numerous dairy farms. Most of these have long been family owned and operated, often by farmers with French Canadian roots dating back to the large-scale Québécois immigration of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Yet despite the picturesque, even timeless, image that this region and its dairies evoke for the outside world, the dairy industry has undergone important changes since the mid-to-late 1990s, changes unknown even to many local residents. Up until then, local dairy farms relied exclusively on local workers; less than a decade later, a majority of hired dairy workers came from southern Mexico and Guatemala.

Agricultural migration from Mexico to the United States has a long history. However, its geographical expansion to the most distant, isolated, and ethnically homogenous frontier of the United States is worthy of reflection. What I have found in my research on the subject is that certain communities in rural southern Mexico and dairy farmers in the Northeast have formed a limited but growing degree of labor interdependency. For dairy farmers, this dependency has to do with downward pressure on prices from agribusiness; for migrant workers, who primarily come from rural southern Mexico, it stems from a much more extreme manifestation of the same problem. Undocumented labor, in this case, has become a precarious solution for both dairy farmers seeking to avoid bankruptcy and for migrant workers resisting the dispossession and displacement of their families.

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Over 100 people from the small village of San Isidro, Las Margaritas, Chiapas, have at times worked simultaneously in the dairy industry of Vermont and New York. Many of the new houses are built with dairy remittances.

This article is based on field research in both the United States and Mexico. In 2014, I conducted a 30-person survey in Franklin and Addison counties, Vermont, with dairy workers from Mexico and Guatemala.¹ Later that year, I did 28 qualitative interviews in three southern Mexican communities with particularly strong ties to the Vermont dairy industry. These three communities are quite diverse in certain respects: San José de Monteverde, Oaxaca, is a Mixteca indigenous community with cooperative labor arrangements; San Isidro, Chiapas, is a former coffee-producing *ejido* (collectively owned land) that has experienced great economic and environmental hardship; and Tres Bocas, Tabasco, is a former *ejido* now in environmental ruin due to oil and gas production. What they have in common is their new dependency on dairy remittances.

THE DAIRY CRISIS

Earl Butz, secretary of agriculture under Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford, was raised on an Indiana dairy farm. During his tenure, he initiated the push to eliminate supply management programs and maximize agricultural production. Butz famously said U.S. farmers should “get big or get out,” echoing the interests of agribusiness in securing a steady supply of cheap commodities. Tighter profit margins pushed producers to seek economies of scale, and, in the decades since, the country has seen a concentration and consolidation of milk production, in which family farms and small-scale producers have been decimated as reduced profit margins—often even negative profit margins—squeeze them out of business.²

Not only has milk production been concentrated among fewer, larger producers, it has also become highly industrialized. Even as small producers disappear at a precipitous rate (Figure 1), the number of cows has declined much more slowly (Figure 2). More surprisingly, milk production has actually increased (Figure 3) due to more intensive milking practices (three times a day instead of two) and to automation.

Growth and intensified production have allowed some dairy farms to survive, but what often goes unmentioned in the academic literature on the industry’s restructuring is the staggering degree to which this industrialization relies on migrant workers.³ The National Milk Producers Federation estimated that in 2009, 62 percent of the milk produced in the United States came from farms with foreign workers, and that the country hosts 57 000 foreign dairy workers, making up 41 percent of the national industry’s 138 000 workers.⁴ Indeed, these figures probably underestimate the real migrant population, as many farmers prefer not to reveal their workers’ nationality or immigration status. (The dairy industry is excluded from the H2A agricultural visa program because it is year-round work, and the vast majority of foreign dairy workers are therefore undocumented.) Between 2000 and 2005, the number of migrant workers on Vermont dairy farms grew to about 1 500, the same number as at present.⁵ According to estimates, between 2 600 and 2 900 migrant dairy workers live in New York,⁶ but the real number is likely much higher, due to the greater number of farms in the state as compared to Vermont.


Why have dairy farmers turned to migrant workers as a response to the social crisis they are facing in the industry? It is not necessarily a question of wages, though


migrant workers do tend to earn less than their U.S. counterparts on the farm. Rather, the issue is flexibility. Dairy work has a demanding schedule, with shifts that often begin at three in the morning and irregular breaks. Add to that the fact that it is a dirty, outdoor job in a region where winter temperatures are prohibitively cold, and most local dairy workers have opted for other low-wage jobs.

One Vermont farmer described his decision to hire migrant workers in this way:

We had two American elderly guys working on the farm and they both, at 65, said “I’m done.” And then I tried to advertise for help and look for help, and you get the guys that would come for a week or ten days, and “No, I don’t like this job,” or they don’t come in the morning, show up in the afternoon. And then somebody introduced me to another farmer who had Hispanic workers.⁷

Not enough local workers want to do the work required, at least not without significantly higher pay. Migrant workers, on the other hand, come to the United States in order to save money and are often more willing to make the necessary sacrifices. According to my 2014 survey, migrant workers in Vermont work an average of 66 hours a week and earn an average of US\$547 per week (many are paid by the hour, but





others by the week). This is many times more than they could hope to earn in rural Mexico, where paid work is scarce—and even then the going rate is equivalent to a few dollars a day.

**AGRICULTURAL MIGRATION
TO AVOID RURAL DISPLACEMENT**

Rural southern Mexico has seen the displacement of millions of people since the implementation of neoliberal economic and agricultural reforms in the 1980s and 1990s, the so-called “Washington Consensus.” These reforms included World Bank agricultural loans with political conditions; the liberalization of land markets and the *ejido* reform; the opening of the Mexican market to U.S.–produced corn and other products through NAFTA; and drastic cuts in the availability of agricultural credit. According to Mexico’s National Peasant Confederation (CNC), the liberalization of the Mexican agricultural sector has caused the displacement of 5 million people, 57 percent of whom are small-scale farmers with fewer than 2 hectares of land.⁸


In my survey, 93.3 percent of respondents indicated that they came from rural farming communities. Approximately 4.4 percent of migrant workers on Vermont dairy farms are from Guatemala and the remain-

ing 95.6 percent are from Mexico, the overwhelming majority from southern states (Figure 4).⁹

All respondents mentioned that their families produce food for their own consumption, mainly corn and beans. While many came from families that sold small amounts of these and other agricultural products, 46.7 percent reported that their families did not have any source of cash income other than the remittances they received from the United States or other parts of Mexico. This is the principal reason that so many people from their communities have gone to work in the United States. In San Isidro, Las Margaritas, a community in the state of Chiapas with a population of 711, residents who had worked in Vermont explained that consistently more than 100 people were working on dairy farms from around 2006 to 2009 (the number has dropped recently due to increased Border Patrol surveillance in Arizona). One interviewee in Chiapas explained how

this came about, beginning in the 1990s, when the first residents began migrating to the United States, due to a series of economic and environmental difficulties:

Some go to the fields of California. And then little by little they figured it out; they all found out where you had the best chance of getting money, where you could save money, because in the city, they say you spend more, and at the dairies they say you




don't. That's why everybody went up there to get money, to save for their families.

This explanation, repeated by nearly all interviewees in Chiapas, Oaxaca, Tabasco, and Vermont, gets at the heart of dairy's newfound importance in agricultural migration. It would be inaccurate—or at least incomplete—to conclude, as neoclassical macroeconomic theories of migration might indicate,¹⁰ that the labor crisis in the dairy industry simply absorbed the effects of a social crisis in rural southern Mexico, which had provoked massive displacement. There is nothing mechanical about these linkages, although the difficulties faced by smaller-scale producers in both countries have roots in the corporate-driven industrialization and commercialization of agricultural production over the last several decades. Rather, migrant workers have specific reasons for migrating to dairy farms as opposed to other agricultural jobs. By making these family decisions, they assert their agency, not just in their own lives, but also in shaping agricultural labor markets.

Almost all interviewees for this project emphasized that the economic advantages offered by dairy work motivated their choice to come to Vermont. Unlike most other agricultural jobs, dairy work is year-round; the boss generally provides rent-free housing, which cuts down on costs; and the isolation of farms means that there are painfully few opportunities to leave the farm and spend any money. While this makes for serious quality-of-life problems, it does allow workers to save money much faster than they would in other industries. On average, surveyed workers sent US\$341 of their weekly pay (62 percent of total earnings) to their families in Mexico, a far greater sum than would be possible in most other low-wage U.S. jobs. As one former dairy worker in Tabasco explains, “It’s not what you earn; it’s what you send.” And dairy work allows them to send more money to Mexico, because “many of the employers give you housing. If you work in construction, you have to pay rent and transportation.” A Oaxacan dairy worker reiterates that on a dairy farm “they give you more working hours; you don’t pay rent; you don’t pay for electricity or water. The boss pays for that, and the work is steadier; you’re not struggling to get it.” Another person from the same town emphasizes that the effect on their community in the Mixteca region has been undeniable: “From 2000 to today, things are starting to change here in

FIGURE 4
STATE OF ORIGIN OF
MIGRANT DAIRY WORKERS IN VERMONT (n=172)



Source: Migrant Justice, “Milk with Dignity Survey,” 2014, <http://migrantjustice.net/sites/default/files/FinalSurveyMay2015.pdf>, accessed February 2, 2015.

Monteverde now, because most people go into dairy. And that’s where jobs are steady and you earn more. So, then you come back, you build your house, you buy your car, and now you can live more or less a little better.”

Compounding the physical and social isolation of dairy work is the active presence of the Border Patrol in the region, often making workers fearful to leave the farm. Many farms are located within 100 miles of the Canadian border, where U.S. Border Patrol has jurisdiction and a great degree of legal autonomy to profile and detain Latino farmworkers to meet deportation quotas.¹¹ Local and state police also collaborate regularly with the Border Patrol, and Border Patrol agents monitor police radio for traffic stops and 911 calls, then rushing to the scene to offer their services as “translators” for Spanish speakers—only to detain them.¹²

This dynamic, in which Latino workers put up with isolation and persecution to save money as fast as they can in order to support their families back home, has made for a notable gender division of labor. Approximately 94 percent of migrant workers on Vermont dairy farms are men who work for two to five years there before returning home.¹³ All but one of the interviewees for this project regularly sent money to their families in Mexico or Guatemala, and it is typically women—sisters, mothers, or wives—who receive this money and distribute it to family members in the community of origin, in addition to taking care of children, cooking, and often helping with agricultural production. Immigration scholar Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo notes that these transnational family strategies do not always indicate cooperation or fam-

ily unity; they also often reflect hierarchies of power, authority, and resources.¹⁴

MIGRANT NETWORKS: A PRECARIOUS SOLUTION TO THE PROFIT SQUEEZE

Sixty-three percent of workers surveyed for this project have built, are sending money to build, or plan to build a house in their community of origin. In other words, migration is often a strategy to avoid displacement. This is not unique to the dairy industry, but the greater opportunity for remittances in dairy work have led some communities to re-orient their migratory networks toward the farms of Vermont and New York and away from more traditional, seasonal agricultural migration routes.

In my Vermont research, I asked interviewees where they had previously worked in the United States and in which states they currently had family or friends, in order to get a sense of this labor market's relationship to agricultural migration nationally. Upon mapping these connections statistically, there turned out to be strong ties between Vermont dairy workers and the eastern United States—and to a lesser extent the West Coast—but by far the strongest correlation was with New York State: 16 of 30 Vermont workers had worked in New York, and 28 of 30 Vermont workers had family or friends there. In other words, the northeastern dairy industry is a destination unto itself. When I mapped data on the general Mexican-born population living in the United States, I found that comparatively few Vermont dairy workers have spent much time or have many contacts in the southwestern United States, despite having crossed the border there.

The geographic specificities of these networks are not accidental; everyone interviewed for this project had contacts in Vermont when they arrived, and most made the journey with a loan from a friend or family member to cover the prohibitively expensive cost of crossing the border by land. (Costs averaged from US\$2 500 to US\$3 000, but were often much higher when considering transportation on either side of the border.) Although a number of *contratistas* in Vermont recruit Latino workers for dairy farmers, many farmers rely heavily on their own employees to invite friends and relatives when a new worker is needed, in this way cutting out the intermediary. Both farmers and farmworkers see some benefit in this arrangement: farmers essentially outsource recruiting costs to farmworkers themselves, while farmworkers can some-

times reserve jobs on the farm for their friends and relatives. In this way, workers take a more active role in expanding their networks to the benefit of their families and communities. Nonetheless, the practice of hiring through social networks also reflects the precariousness of both farmers and migrant workers in an agricultural industry where less and less profit makes it back to producers; farmers and workers look to squeeze more income out of their employment relationship rather than from the corporations whose pricing strategies pit farmers and farmworkers against each other.

CONCLUSION

The industrialization and commercialization of agriculture throughout North and Latin America has generally driven down profit margins for small-scale producers in all sorts of rural settings, thereby intensifying a particular transnational labor dynamic in agriculture: the displacement—or migration to avoid displacement—of rural producers in Latin America, many of whom go on to work in U.S. agriculture. This keeps down costs for U.S. producers who find themselves in varying degrees of economic hardship. Nonetheless, this cycle of “exclusion and exploitation” does not advance mechanically according to labor-market pressures,¹⁵ even if its effect on small agricultural producers has been almost universally devastating. Agricultural workers' particular responses to their own exclusion from profitable production in Latin America reflect their specific interests as families and communities. Migration to the Vermont dairy industry is one such response, where migrant workers have carved out space in a labor market that allows them to send more remittances to Mexico and Central America. ■■■

NOTES

¹ Subjects were selected based on demographic criteria from previous surveys with larger sample sizes.

² Dennis A. Shields, *Consolidation and Concentration in the U.S. Dairy Industry* (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2010).

³ Notable examples include John A. Cross, “Restructuring America's Dairy Farms,” *Geographical Review* vol. 96, no. 1 (January 2006), pp. 1-23; and Harry K. Schwarzweller and Andrew P. Davidson, eds., *Dairy Industry Restructuring* (Bingley, UK: Emerald Insight, 2000).

⁴ National Milk Producers Federation, *The Economic Impacts of Immigration on U.S. Dairy Farms* (Arlington, Virginia: NMPF, 2009).

⁵ Walcott MacCausland, interview with the author, St. Albans, Vermont, July 22, 2014.

⁶ Thomas R. Maloney and Nelson L. Bills, “Survey of New York Dairy Farm Employers 2011” (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, 2011).

⁷ Vermont Folklife Center, anonymous interview, “All the Fears Went Away,” <http://goldencageproject.org/voices/index.htm>, accessed January 1, 2015.

⁸ Imtiaz Hussain, “NAFTA, Agriculture, & Mexico: As Tears Go By,” in Imtiaz Hussain, ed., *North America at the Crossroads: NAFTA at 15 Years* (Mexico City: Universidad Iberoamericana, 2009).

⁹ Migrant Justice, “Milk with Dignity Survey,” 2014, <http://migrantjustice.net/sites/default/files/FinalSurveyMay2015.pdf>, accessed February 2, 2015.

¹⁰ John Harris and Michael Todaro, “Migration, Unemployment, and Development: A Two-sector Analysis,” *American Economic Review* vol. 60 (1970), pp. 126-142; Arthur Lewis, “Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of Labor,” *The Manchester School of Economics and Social Studies* vol. 22 (1954), pp. 139-191.

¹¹ Spencer S. Hsu and Andrew Becker, “ICE Officials Set Quotas to Deport More Illegal Immigrants,” *Washington Post*, March 27, 2010.

¹² Lisa Graybill, “Border Patrol Agents as Interpreters along the Northern Border,” Immigration Policy Center Special Report, September 2012.

¹³ Migrant Justice, op. cit.

¹⁴ Pierrette Hondagneu-Sotelo, “La incorporación del género a la migración: ‘no sólo para feministas’—ni sólo para la familia,” in Marina Ariza and Alejandro Portes, ed., *El país transnacional: Migración mexicana y cambio social a través de la frontera* (Mexico City: Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, UNAM), pp. 423-451.

¹⁵ Blanca Rubio, *Explotados y excluidos: los campesinos latinoamericanos en la fase agroexportadora neoliberal*, 4th ed. (Madrid: Plaza y Valdés Editores, 2012).

More than Money: Understanding Farmworker Food Security

Teresa Mares*



Teresa Mares

INTRODUCTION: THE MANY MEANINGS OF FOOD SECURITY

In April 2014, my research assistant and I arrived at the door of Elena’s trailer on a rainy spring day. Elena is the mother of an especially precocious young daughter, and over the two previous years we had gotten to know her family well through our work with Huertas, a collaborative kitchen gardening project that works to increase food access for migrant farmworkers in the state of Vermont. We were there to discuss

what she would like to plant in her garden that summer and to begin a series of in-depth interviews examining food access within farmworker households. We knew from our previous visits that food security was no simple matter for Elena and her family. Coming from the state of Chiapas, Elena is one of the few Mexican women in Vermont who has found regular work in the dairy industry, which was her original purpose for migrating. She has lived in Vermont for almost seven years now, and in that time, she has contributed in important ways to her household economy as she has raised her daughter

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**For farmworkers and other workers
along the food chain, food insecurity
is a serious problem
with significant consequences
for health and well-being.**

within an isolated rural environment that she describes as “beautiful” and “tranquil.” Explaining her decision to migrate simply, “Because there in Mexico, there’s no work for women; only the men work in corn and beans,” Elena has created a new life for her and her family, though it is a life where insecurity and irregularity continue to shape their access to basic needs. Amidst all of this, Elena also regularly sends money to support her extended family in Mexico.

This was our first visit to Elena’s new home, a small but tidy trailer where she, her husband, and her daughter are kept company by the constant stream of Spanish cartoons and *telenovelas* streaming from their television. Working seven days a week, she and her husband Gregorio spend what little free time they have doting on their daughter, preparing home-cooked meals, and on rare occasions, visiting with her niece, Juana, who lives on a different farm in the same northern county.

Juana is a mother of four, with two children being cared for by family members in Mexico, and has also found work in Vermont’s dairy industry. However, her work schedule and earnings have been more sporadic, in part because of her husband’s opposition to her working outside the home and the need to care for their two sons under the age of five. What unites Juana and Elena, beyond kinship, is their shared love for gardening, their love of Mexican food, and their deep love of their children. Sadly, they also share continual anxiety about leaving their homes given how close they live to the U.S.-Canadian border, long histories of being exploited in food-related work, and ongoing difficulties in accessing basic needs. Neither woman has a driver’s license or a registered vehicle and both are continually dependent on a third party to access food for their families, a dependency that often results in inadequate supplies of fresh and healthy produce.

In this article, I draw upon Juana and Elena’s stories to explore the multi-valent meanings of food security for undocumented workers, who are currently upholding both Vermont’s agricultural economy and the U.S. food industry as a whole. For farmworkers and other workers along the food chain, food insecurity is a serious problem with significant

consequences for health and wellbeing. This disparity points to a serious case of injustice: specifically, that those who put food on our tables are disproportionately experiencing food insecurity in their own households. As I will argue, the injustices of food insecurity are compounded by the methodologies used to measure it and the narrow meanings used to define it. As social scientists have long argued, the very meaning of food security, the alternative terms to describe it, and the best way to measure it, remain points of contention, especially cross-culturally.¹

The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) currently defines food security as “access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life.”² Every year, statistics on food insecurity reveal the startling disparities in food access that persist in the United States. The most recent figures collected by USDA researchers show that 14 percent of people in the U.S. experienced food insecurity at some point in 2014, with nearly 5.6 percent experiencing “very low food security.” For “Hispanic” households, the incidence of food insecurity in this same year was 22.4 percent, with 6.9 percent experiencing very low food security.³ Researchers have repeatedly documented the severity of food insecurity and other inequalities in food access among farmworkers.⁴ Collectively, these studies reveal that the incidence among farmworkers is as high as three to four times the national average, with a disproportionate number of households experiencing “very low food security with hunger.” These reported numbers are not only higher than the national average, but also higher than the average for “Hispanic” households writ large.

LABORING ALONGSIDE THE BORDER

As the U.S. state with the highest dependence on dairy production for agricultural revenue, Vermont has experienced significant shifts in the labor force toiling amidst the rolling hills and red barns that still dominate the pastoral working landscape. Once a bastion of small-scale family farms, the state’s dairy industry has been subjected to the same industrializing and consolidating pressures that pervade the entire U.S. food system. Over the past 75 years, Vermont has lost more than 90 percent of its dairy farms, yet continues to produce milk at record levels. The increased production of milk, which comes at significant ecological and social costs, is directly facilitated by Latino/a farmworkers who migrate in search of employment and the chance at a better life for their families.

Vermont has seen a steady increase in the number of migrant farmworkers since the late 1990s, and of the estimated 1 200 to 1 500 Latino/a migrant dairy workers in the state, the vast majority are undocumented men from central and southern Mexico. As one of the least racially diverse states in the nation, these demographic changes have not gone unnoticed, particularly given the proximity of many dairy farms to the U.S.-Canada border and the active presence of immigration enforcement in these rural areas (see the article by Aaron Lackowski in this issue). Significant disparities in access to basic needs are compounded by the anxieties and fears that farmworkers experience while working and living alongside the federal border.

ACCESSING BASIC NEEDS IN THE BORDERLANDS

Both Juana and Elena live and work within the 25-mile expanse along the border known as the “primary operating domain” for ICE personnel. For both women, accessing food, healthcare, and other basic needs is necessarily and almost entirely mitigated by third-party actors. These actors include farm owners and managers who provide groceries using poorly translated lists of foods, unscrupulous pizza delivery men charging a premium for their services, and a patchwork of entrepreneurial men and women who bring Mexican goods from locations in distant cities. Juana and Elena are not alone in this regard, and for the majority of families and individuals that I have met in the northern counties, this is the daily reality of accessing food.

Despite the lengths they must go to as they secure food for their families, neither Juana nor Elena is categorized as food insecure according to the results of the USDA Household Food Security Survey Module (HFSSM). This survey, specifically designed to rapidly assess food security at the household level, inherently narrows the actual experience of food access to a series of pre-determined, decontextualized choices and narrow categories. Even more problematic for Vermont’s farmworkers is the exclusive emphasis it places on the linkage between access to money and the presence or absence of food security. For example, on the three-stage version that we use, all of the preliminary questions rest on one assumption: that food security is measured merely by the proxy of having enough money. While there are very real economic challenges confronting farmworkers in the state, dairy workers

receive relatively higher wages as compared to seasonal farmworkers in other agricultural sectors. Yet, both women have described the significant challenges they experience in providing culturally familiar foods to their families, particularly foods that are fresh and obtained through dignified and fair means.

The plight of dairy workers has only recently begun to attract attention from activists and scholars, whereas the working and living conditions of farmworkers in other sectors, deplorable as they often are, have long been scrutinized. My preliminary experience in conducting the HFSSM has revealed to me its significant weaknesses in understanding farmworker food security. In addition to the narrow focus on available cash reserves, the survey module pays little attention to the cultural relevance of foods that households can access, the time they must spend on securing food, or even how they define families and households. For migrant workers who may be supporting household economies on both sides of the border, the concept of “household” itself demands deeper inquiry. For example, Juana and Elena’s households in the United States are helping to support family members who still live in Mexico by sending regular remittances. Because of these methodological inadequacies, in my research I take care to triangulate this quantitative assessment of food security rates based upon the HFSSM with richer and deeper ethnographic research.

In my research, I have seen the continuation of, yet differentiation between, the food insecurities that workers confronted in their countries of origin and the insecurities they experience in Vermont. These factors and the risks that workers face as they migrate are particularly gendered. For all of the workers I have interviewed, factors related to poverty, unemployment, and the need to provide for their families led them to come to the United States. For many, Vermont is only the most recent stop in a long pattern of migration, more often than not following other employment in the agri-food sector. Juana and Elena, for instance, previously worked on farms and in restaurants in other states, including California, Kentucky, and New York. Yet, unlike the single young

The United States Department of Agriculture defines food security as “access by all people at all times to enough food for an active, healthy life.” Statistics reveal the startling disparities in food access that persist in the U.S.

Significant disparities in access
to basic needs are compounded
by the anxieties and fears that farmworkers
experience while working and living alongside
the federal border.

men that make up the majority of Vermont's foreign-born workforce, these women have had to balance reproductive work, particularly caring for their children, with their obligations in the workplace.

FOOD SOVEREIGNTY AND
THE QUESTION OF CHOICE

During a recent interview with Juana, she reflected upon the differences between accessing food in Mexico and in the United States, saying,

Well, I have to think about what I have here, because if I don't have things, now that I can't go to the store whenever, I have to cook with what I have.... In Mexico there are many stores nearby, so if we need something, we go buy it, but here, no. Here I have to buy 15 days' worth, and if we run out of ingredients, I have to do what I can.... here we can buy the food that we want. The problem is that we cannot leave.

While Juana's family regularly enjoys meals that remind them of home, the lengths that they must go to as they access food through third-party providers and the premium they must pay for food present entirely different complications compared to the poverty they experienced in Mexico. Furthermore, given Vermont's small Latino population, the availability of culturally appropriate foods, particularly fresh vegetables, fruits, and herbs, is especially limited.

What I have learned in my ethnographic research has regularly been enhanced and expanded through my collaborative and applied work with the Huertas project. In the summer of 2015, Huertas worked on 44 farms across the northern half of Vermont, planting kitchen gardens with farmworkers in a collaborative effort to increase access to culturally familiar vegetables, fruits, and herbs, as well as staple crops. As Huertas has expanded over the last few years, we have become increasingly guided by and committed to a food sovereignty framework.

As defined at the 2007 Forum for Food Sovereignty, food sovereignty is defined as "the right of peoples to healthy and culturally appropriate food produced through ecologically sound and sustainable methods, and their right to define their own food and agriculture systems. It puts those who produce, distribute, and consume food at the heart of food systems and policies rather than the demands of markets and corporations."⁵ The promise of a food sovereignty framework stems from its bottom-up perspective that demands a deeper conversation about rights, control, and choice. Perhaps most importantly, food sovereignty moves beyond a focus on food security to advocate for a deeper connection to food that challenges a narrow consumer-commodity relationship. As I am now well aware, this narrow relationship is all the dominant food security instruments seek to measure.

Through these experiences, I have had the good fortune to witness how farmworkers and their families claim a sense of agency and a connection to meaningful meals in a borderland region that is far from welcoming. I have also observed the challenges of working toward greater autonomy over one's sustenance in an environment beset by so few choices. It is my ultimate goal to both document these cases of food injustice and disrupt them through designing better research tools that are more attuned to the lived experiences of migrant workers and their families and to contribute to applied solutions designed with the many meanings of food access in mind. **MM**

NOTES

¹ Laurie DeRose, Ellen Messer, and Sara Millman, *Who's Hungry? And How Do We Know? Food Shortage, Poverty, and Deprivation* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998).

² Alisha Coleman-Jensen, Matthew P. Rabbitt, Christian A. Gregory, and Anita Singh, *Household Food Security in the United States in 2015*, ERR-215, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, September 2016, http://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/err215/err215_summary.pdf.

³ Alisha Coleman-Jensen, Matthew P. Rabbitt, Christian A. Gregory, and Anita Singh, *Household Food Security in the United States in 2014* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, 2015).

⁴ Sandy Brown and Christy Getz, "Farmworker Food Insecurity and the Production of Hunger in California," in Alison Alkon and Julian Agyeman, eds., *Cultivating Food Justice: Race, Class, and Sustainability* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2011), pp. 121-146; and Laura Anne Minkoff-Zern, "Knowing 'Good Food': Immigrant Knowledge and the Racial Politics of Farmworker Food Insecurity," *Antipode* (Online First), 2012.

⁵ *Declaration of the Forum for Food Sovereignty*, Nyéléni 2007, February 27, 2007, Nyéléni Village, Sélingué, Mali, <https://nyeleni.org/spip.php?article290>.

The Transnational Lives of Migrant Youth on New York Dairies

Kathleen Sexsmith*



Under the Obama administration, the legal obstacles faced by young undocumented immigrants brought to the U.S. as children and raised in local communities and schools have finally received the attention they deserve. The Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) initiative, announced by President Obama in 2012, provides temporary work authorization and deportation relief for young undocumented immigrants who have completed or enrolled in a formal education program in the U.S. The experiences and politics of these young-adult “Dreamers,” self-named for their eligibility for the currently stalled DREAM Act,¹ has ignited public debate about the rights and responsibilities of those who feel themselves to be U.S. Americans but, in technical, legal terms, do not belong. This debate centers on a moral question with deep resonance for U.S. citizens: if that high school valedictorian or soccer captain is *just like my son or daughter*, but an undocumented immi-

grant through no fault of their own, shouldn’t they also enjoy basic rights like living without fear of deportation and aspiring to the career they desire?

Thankfully, U.S. media and voters are paying more attention to this extremely important topic. Nevertheless, the experiences of another group of undocumented youth, whose transitions to adulthood are different from those of the Dreamers, remain largely overlooked. They are the undocumented youth who came to the U.S. of their own accord as teenagers to work in so-called low-skill jobs to support families living in poverty in their home countries. These youth never had the opportunity to integrate into U.S. schools. Rather, from a tender age, they have worked long hours under arduous conditions in agriculture, construction, and other socially denigrated jobs. With limited knowledge of U.S. society and under the constant threat of deportation, they are isolated from the mainstream and live in a transnational social field that is intensely oriented toward their home countries.²

This article focuses on the experiences of young undocumented Mexican farmworkers who live and work on the

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isolated dairy farms of Upstate New York. A 2009 survey suggested that at least 2 600 Latino workers labor on New York dairies, 24 percent of the hired labor used by the industry.³ There are no databases collating workers' current ages or their ages at the time of their migration to the U.S., but my 5 years of ethnographic research with more than 60 dairy farmworkers in central, western, and northern New York suggest that a significant share arrive in their early or late teens. I use here the results of my interviews and participant observation to describe the migration experiences of these young "birds of passage,"⁴ focusing on the difficult decision to migrate, their transnational lives in the U.S., and the ways they express agency in the workplace despite the extremely difficult circumstances they face.

THE DECISION TO MIGRATE

Many of the young farmworkers I met had decided independently to travel to the U.S. in order to support families living in poverty conditions at home. Arturo,⁵ 22, from Chiapas, Mexico, left school at the age of eight, after completing just two years of primary school, to earn money to help his parents provide for his seven siblings. From age 9 until age 14, he worked packing sweets in a candy factory for 50 pesos (less than US\$5) per day. At age 14, Arturo migrated completely alone—not even with friends—against his parents' wishes. As he describes it, "I had no money; I was so poor. That's why I came here." He spent 15 days traveling, including a terrifying 4-day walk through the Arizona desert, finding determination in his extreme sense of economic need. Arturo had decided on his own at the early age of 14 to improve his and his family's lives by finding work with cousins already established in the dairy farming industry of Upstate New York. In this way, he made his transition to adulthood under particularly trying conditions.

Not all young migrants make the decision to move with such maturity, but rather out of a youthful sense of adventure. They make life-changing and potentially life-threatening decisions with little information about the possible consequences. Brenda, 21 at the time of our interview, left her home in rural Veracruz at age 16 with a large group of extended family members (not including any siblings or parents). Brenda says that within a span of only 20 minutes, she had received and accepted the invitation to travel with them, starting her journey toward the desert on a whim. "I was still a child. . . .

Arturo, 22, from Chiapas, Mexico,
left school at the age of eight, after completing just
two years of primary school, to earn money
to help his parents provide
for his seven siblings.

I didn't have any idea what this thing was. It's as if I said to you, 'Okay Kathy, come to visit me,' and you come just like that, without anything, without thinking about it." Once Brenda got to the Sonora desert and fully realized the danger of the border crossing on foot, she says she immediately regretted her decision and "begged God that [U.S. immigration officials] would catch her." She eventually made the passage safely and arrived to New York dairy farms with family, where she continues to live and work.

Brenda, Arturo, and others like them are child migrants, with varying degrees of adult maturity upon arriving to the U.S. However, they receive no special protections in the Upstate New York dairy belt. They work there in exhausting and low-paid milking parlor jobs without a parental figure to support or guide them.

WORKING ON NEW YORK DAIRY FARMS

Miguel, 20, was born in a small village in the highlands of Veracruz, Mexico. He migrated to the U.S., directly to an Upstate New York dairy farm, at 14. Miguel couldn't find a job for the first three months after he arrived; dairy farmers resisted hiring him due to his youth. Eventually, a farm-owner whose business was suffering from rapid labor turnover took him on. Miguel quickly discovered why this farm had been losing workers when he didn't receive a single cent of his pay for six months. The farmer claimed that he couldn't process his paycheck because Miguel had no form of identification. Indeed, Miguel had no one to help him gain access to the illicit documents these young migrants must present to employers in order to be hired. One week after he finally obtained these "papers," as migrants call them, the farmer took him to the bank to cash a US\$7 000 check for his back pay.

Miguel found his next job on a small dairy through a *contratista* (labor contractor). There, he was the only immigrant employee and he lived alone. His work commitments were excessive, often reaching 16 hours a day over a 7-day work week. The contractor regularly took a US\$100 or US\$150

cut from his bi-weekly paycheck for “food” deliveries, which usually consisted of nothing more than a few cans of beans and soft drinks. When Miguel eventually asked him to stop, he was forced to leave the farm—and therefore was also thrown out of his home without a moment’s notice. In addition, the contractor withheld a full month’s pay, about US\$1 500, after he left. The money was never recovered. As of our interview in May 2013, Miguel had recently arrived to a small farm with about 150 milking cows, where he was happy to report earnings of about US\$2 000 per month and consistent delivery of his pay.

Young and traveling alone, Miguel and farmworkers like him have few means to contest labor abuses when they arise. Without a strong network of locals or migrants to provide needed information about his rights in the U.S., Miguel found little opportunity to speak up against abusive situations; when he did, he was further punished for his assertiveness. Employers and *contratistas* have significant control in this paternalistic labor system, where basic needs like housing, food, and transportation (see the article by Mary Jo Dudley in this issue) are exchanged for long, hard hours of work. This paternalism takes many different forms, ranging from caring and attentive employers to abusive situations like those of Miguel, described above.

Employer paternalism is possible because of the very limited incorporation these migrants experience into mainstream U.S. society. Instead, their social networks and cultural attitudes remain focused on their communities at home.

A TRANSNATIONAL MODE OF INCORPORATION

“Transnationalism” refers to the peculiar sentiment of living in two societies at once—simultaneously “here and there”—⁶ and can be experienced by both migrants and those affected by migration. It is often characterized in contrast to assimilation, whereby immigrants come to adopt the cultural ways of their new society (although sociologists note they can be mutually reinforcing).⁷ Young undocumented farmworkers

**Employers and *contratistas*
have significant control in this paternalistic labor
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and transportation are exchanged for long,
hard hours of work.**

in Upstate New York live decisively transnational lives, with little opportunity to assimilate. This is because they live and work with other undocumented immigrants, often from the same communities or regions in Mexico, creating social and geographical separation from the mainstream U.S. population.

The creation of these ethnic enclaves can be explained by dairy farm hiring practices for immigrant workers, who are usually posted to the milking parlor. U.S. farm employers rely on immigrants’ existing social networks for recruitment to reduce the costs associated with searching for employees and labor turnover.⁸ In the case of New York dairy farms, workers usually bring family members or trusted friends from their hometowns in Mexico or Guatemala to replace outgoing workers. As a result, their primary social worlds involve interactions with other undocumented migrants with whom they live (often sharing rooms and even beds), speak in Spanish, share Mexican and Guatemalan meals, and discuss economic and family concerns from home. As 24-year-old Ismael put it, “Honestly, I like being here surrounded by my friends, people that I already know from my family. . . . We get to see each other, not regularly, but we see each other. We know we’re among family.”

Therefore, the institutional integration of young migrant workers is shaped by interactions with similarly positioned migrants in workplaces, rather than with U.S. citizen youth in schools or other civic spaces. In fact, when asked during interviews if they spend social time with any local U.S. citizens, the farmworkers in my study named only their employers and their employers’ spouses, Spanish-speaking Jehovah’s witnesses, and sometimes representatives of organizations providing specific support services to this population.⁹ Interaction with locals is limited because they travel to town infrequently, mainly to shop for basic supplies or to visit the doctor. Moreover, the labor hierarchy on the farm concentrates Latino immigrants in the lowest-paid ranks in the milking parlor, with little opportunity to interact with U.S.-born workers. These conditions mean that they live in a transnational social field that is much more “there” than “here,” despite residing in the U.S. for years at a time.

However, this transnational orientation provides a unique perspective on dairy farm work that attributes meaning and success to a job well done, in stark contrast to the disparaging views of U.S. citizens toward farm jobs. Rural Mexican youth were acculturated in their home societies into very different valuations of work than those held by mainstream U.S. society. From their transnational perspective, dairy work

The labor hierarchy on the farm concentrates Latino immigrants in the lowest-paid ranks in the milking parlor, with little opportunity to interact with U.S.-born workers.

is a means of acquiring social status. The most commonly cited benefit of dairy farm work is that the net pay is better, because farmers typically provide free housing, allowing them to send more money to their families or invest in their own farmland or homes in Mexico and Guatemala. Moreover, if they show longer-term loyalty to the farm (typically over a period of two or more years), they are often promoted from the milking parlor to higher-responsibility positions in calf care or animal medicine.

These youth express feeling empowered as they move upwards in the farm labor hierarchy, particularly in comparison to their U.S.-born colleagues. One worker who had replaced a U.S.-born worker as primary caregiver to newborn calves said with pride, “I saw the [U.S.] American, he was obeying the boss’s orders. . . . He wasn’t putting in his own brain, no effort to do better. . . . And I arrived . . . and now [the calves] don’t get sick.” Dairy farm jobs are valued because they facilitate socio-economic advancement at home, and promotions create a sense of empowerment that can be recounted to family and friends with pride. By contextualizing their experiences in transnational social fields, they find dignity in their farm work experience and demonstrate their agency in the face of seemingly impossible structural constraints.

CONCLUSIONS

This article has reflected on the decision-making processes and experiences of undocumented children and youth who move to the U.S. to work full time. They did not make the choice to move based on the desire for long-term integration in the U.S. or under their parents’ influence. Rather, they chose to enter undocumented status as a short-term strategy to help their families and to achieve more fulfilling forms of membership in their home societies through transnational activities. These findings demonstrate how age at migration and institutional integration together shape the life trajectories of young migrants. They also reveal how these farmworkers live their young adulthood in limbo, perpetu-

ally suspended in a set of unimaginable trade-offs between their families and their jobs, between the future they want and the means to achieve it.

This article has also explored an oversight in policies and discourse about the responsibilities of U.S. society toward young undocumented immigrants. Greater social inclusion of undocumented students, or Dreamers, has been based on their deep integration into the fabric of the mainstream—their being, legal status aside, “just like us.” However, young migrants who work in agriculture and other industries also merit recognition for their contributions to society and deserve equal relief from the threat of immigration enforcement. They demonstrate maturity and resolve from a young age in the sacrifices they make for the well-being of their families and to build their futures. Ironically, by excluding these young people from any legal protections, U.S. society denies social belonging to those who arguably demonstrate the values of hard work and family commitment that it most deeply cherishes. ■■■

NOTES

¹ The Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors Act was first introduced in the U.S. Senate in 2001, but it has failed to pass. The DREAM Act was intended to provide conditional permanent residency to certain immigrants of good moral character who had graduated from U.S. high schools. If passed by Congress, it would have granted them a pathway to U.S. citizenship. DACA provides temporary relief from deportation and the right to apply for a Social Security number, but it does not qualify recipients to apply for citizenship and, as an act of prosecutorial discretion, it could be repealed by subsequent presidents.

² Peggy Levitt and Nina Glick Schiller, “Conceptualizing Simultaneity: A Transnational Social Field Perspective on Society,” *International Migration Review* vol. 38, no. 3 (Fall 2004), pp. 1002-1039.

³ Thomas R. Maloney and Nelson L. Bills, “Survey of New York Dairy Farm Employers 2009” (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University, Dyson School of Economics and Management, 2011), <http://publications.dyson.cornell.edu/research/researchpdf/rb/2011/Cornell-Dyson-rb1101.pdf>.

⁴ Michael Piore, *Birds of Passage* (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 1979). The term “birds of passage” refers to economic migrants who temporarily relocate to a more developed country to improve their economic situation.

⁵ All names of interviewees are pseudonyms.

⁶ Levitt and Glick Schiller, op. cit.

⁷ Robert C. Smith, *Mexican New York: Transnational Lives of New Immigrants* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

⁸ Fred Krissman, “Sin coyote ni patrón: Why the ‘Migrant Network’ Fails to Explain International Migration,” *International Migration Review* vol. 39, no. 1 (Spring, 2005), pp. 4-44.

⁹ The Cornell Farmworker Program, Worker Justice Center of New York, and Workers’ Center of Central New York provide essential supports for workplace matters and beyond for many of the farmworkers I interviewed; they also introduced me to a large share of my interviewees.

The Mirage of the North


The Story of a Former New York State Dairy Worker

Agustín Omar Rodríguez Juárez*

My name is Agustín Omar Rodríguez Juárez. I live in the state of Morelos, Mexico. I'm 33 years old and a university student. Due to serious economic need, I had to go to work in the United States, where I joined the Workers Center of Central New York (WCCNY) after being subjected to severe labor abuses. In this account, I explain my experience there and my contact with the WCCNY, and how the center was decisive at a time when I found myself alone and didn't know who to ask for help.

I grew up in a family of merchants and peasants: my great grandparents lived in poverty and marginalization, documented by an anthropologist named Oscar Lewis in his book *Pedro Martínez*.¹ Later, my grandparents continued in the same circumstances, though with less deprivation. In an attempt to help the family get on, my mother emigrated to the United States where she worked for more than eight years. By sending back money and investing it in local businesses, she managed to get enough money together to be able to do medium-scale farming and large-scale apiculture and open a small corn mill. This notably improved the family situation for a time. Then my mother married and I grew up in a family that, while not rich, did enjoy slightly better circumstances.

Everything went on like that until I was 13, and we began to have financial problems. Corn mills stopped being a basic need in the town, and the new modern way of doing things meant that young wives no longer made tortillas by hand, as had been the tradition; this meant the business went bust. My grandfather died a few years later, and then my grandmother. Since the family business wasn't being managed properly, this led to a situation that, while not as bad as in



Courtesy of the author

the time of my great-grandparents, was still very precarious. That was when I had to start working in a company that didn't belong to the family.

I had always lived among peasants and workers, though I have relatives who are teachers and other kinds of professionals. It began to be hard for me to keep studying, and that's how things went until the university. I had to stop studying several times to go to work, but I always went back.

In Mexico, nationally-owned companies don't give young people much of a chance when they first set out looking for a

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job. It's very common to hear that you won't be hired for this or that job "because of lack of experience." Another reason is not having recommendations, because of nepotism, or corruption and influence trafficking. This forces many of our compatriots to emigrate to the United States and Canada. In my case, I had to emigrate to the United States.

In early 2014, I went to Florida and started working picking oranges. I noticed then that lots of labor abuses were taking place, like demanding that a worker pick nine tons of oranges a day. I'm from a mountain town where walking and getting lots of exercise are part of our daily routine, but when I got to that country and was faced with that kind of injustice, the change was extreme.

I had worked for a month and two weeks when a friend invited me to go to New York State, and I went to a dairy farm. I emigrated thinking that in a different state there would be fewer abuses; my hope was to find better working conditions, even if the amount of work wasn't less. Unfortunately, everything was different from what I had hoped.

I should mention that I already had experience as an agricultural laborer in Mexico and in Florida, but in New York, I met up with a whole different situation. When I arrived, it was extremely cold and everything was covered in snow. I went to Central New York, where most people are English speakers. So, I was working in a place covered with snow, where communication was almost completely in English, and I didn't speak it, though I understood quite a lot. And that made me suffer less abuse than the ones who didn't understand any at all. Since I was in an area bordering on Canada, I was afraid I would meet up with the Patrol and my scanty knowledge of the language would make it difficult for me to express myself, especially if I was nervous.

So, suddenly I'm in Lowville, New York, on a dairy farm where a Mexican supervisor meets me. At that time, I hadn't met the people who would be my bosses. They gave me a blanket "to sleep on an armchair in the living room," as the supervisor said, since there wouldn't be a bed for me until the next week. I didn't feel very good, but when I looked out the window and saw the countryside all covered with piles of snow, I had the feeling, at least right then, that I was protected, because I would be sleeping in the living room of the "trailer" (mobile home).

On the first days of work, a boy of about 15 or 16 was the one who trained me—if you can call it that, because it only lasted a day. The next day, two other people, a teenager and a man, trained me. The man said, "You should have

"Since I was in an area bordering on Canada,
I was afraid I would meet up with the Patrol
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learned by now; if you haven't, it's your problem; from tomorrow on, you work alone with your partner and you already have to have learned."

On the third day I asked what my wage would be and they answered that that depended on how hard I worked. When I wanted to ask the lady boss when my day off would be, I didn't know how to say it in English. Later they told me they would give me one, but that the wage, like they had said, would depend on how I performed. They told me I was lucky to have a day off because there are ranches where the workers have no day off the first year at all, and they work 120 hours a week.

I should mention that I took several advanced-English courses at the university and that my mother was bilingual since she had worked many years in the United States. In Mexico, my English is considered advanced, but in conversations with native speakers, that English didn't help me much. I don't even want to imagine how people who had no opportunity to take English classes in Mexico got along; they must have suffered more because they didn't understand even the most basic things. In the central part of New York, not understanding the language opens you up to abuse and mockery from the bosses.

In what we called the "parla" (the milking parlor), the work is done very quickly. A lot of the cows were aggressive and had kicked several workers. I milked hundreds a day. Once, when I was about to leave, I had to milk a very aggressive cow, and she suddenly kicked me in my chest around my heart. I felt that the kick was from the boss, who hadn't trained me to protect myself from the aggressive ones. Just by luck, or for reasons I cannot imagine, my heart didn't stop, but at that instant, I felt that its rhythm changed, and after that I suffered from dangerous arrhythmia. A fellow worker told the boss what had happened, but I wasn't taken to the hospital, and I didn't have a car or any possibility to drive there.

I left work and went to my "apartment" on foot. When I left the "parla," I thought getting some sleep would be enough to get better, but that night I couldn't breathe. My

lungs were swollen and I had a hard time taking a deep breath. The boss didn't even come to ask how I was doing! The supervisor told me that I should work the next day, and I did go to work even though I was in pain. But, a few minutes later, I told him that I couldn't, that it was just impossible; I was having difficulty breathing and I had a sharp pain in my chest.

I left the milking parlor and went to the dormitory with those symptoms. In the afternoon, the supervisor came to see me and asked, "Can you move your hands?" And I said that I could, and then he said, "So, you're okay. Tell me if you're going to work or not, so I can get somebody else.... You have a week to find another place to go." Right then, I began to think. I didn't know where to go. I thought about going back to Mexico because of my health after the accident. The decision to not work anymore was simply due to the fact that my condition wouldn't allow for it. The boss told the supervisor that I had eight days to leave the "trails"; he didn't care about my physical status.

At the last minute I got a call from the Worker Justice Center of New York, and they said they wanted to see me. A friend of mine who was a member of the center had told them about my accident. I was afraid: I thought that the boss would come and pay lawyers and deny any responsibility. But I accepted. I was afraid that the boss would buy people off. I was completely unaware of any worker's rights. The people who are now my *compañeros* and friends at the workers' center took me to the hospital and explained that I had the right for the boss to pay the medical bills because it had been a work-related accident.

I left the hospital and was also afraid that the state police would blame me for the accident. I remembered the corruption in my country and thought they would send me right back to Mexico. Later, they took me to the home of a workers' center leader, Rebeca Fuentes. She put me up in her home and didn't charge me a dime.

The aim of the Worker Justice Center of New York is to empower workers, whether they are U.S. citizens, residents, or undocumented workers, but mainly the latter because

"They told me I was lucky to have a day off because there are ranches where the workers have no day off the first year at all, and they work 120 hours a week."

they're susceptible to abuse because of their immigration status. I joined the center and participated in lots of activities. One was a protest on a big ranch in the northern part of the state because the boss's son-in-law, who was in charge, hit a worker because he didn't want to go to work on his day off. That's why the Worker Justice Center of New York organized that protest, which got some attention in the press. We arrived there and organized a caravan that was filmed by a local New York television station; other journalists from local media were there, too. We protested by shouting and chanting slogans in favor of the workers. I should mention that that day, many of them were closed up in their "trails" and ordered not to come out. They tricked them making them believe that the *migra* [immigration authorities] would be coming that day.

The Worker Justice Center of New York gave me moral support when I needed it most. They gave me lodging and trained me in my labor rights, which I can say I know better than a lot of my fellow migrants. But that's not because I'm smarter than they are; it's because many of them don't demand their rights because they're afraid. Their bosses have scared them, and they're afraid to investigate or ask. I hope that someday, the workers on the enormous dairy farms are given more humanitarian treatment, since the bosses get rich at the expense of the suffering of Latino migrants. They lose their families and sometimes leave everything behind to seek the opportunities they cannot find in their home countries, and they meet up with a group of ranchers who use them.

As long as they're treated like slaves, they're not called "undocumented," but as soon as they demand their rights, like a fair wage and decent treatment, then they're reminded that they're undocumented. In conclusion, the work of immigrant workers in the United States is by no means easy. It implies leaving behind their families, giving up everything to make someone else's dream a reality: far away and alone, immersed in a very different culture, where it's very hard to feel a part of things.

The exploitation of migrant workers can be seen on many dairy farms and in the apple orchards, among other places. They do work that is rarely accepted by U.S. citizens, very often because of the idea that a foreign employee is harder working and will do it because he needs it more. Migrant workers seem a convenient option to them because they work long hours, accept greater demands, and also, because they convince them that their immigration status means they have to accept being exploited, ignoring the fact that an un-

documented worker has almost all the same rights as a person with documents.

I have told my story, starting with the time of my grandparents, to show that in Mexico there have always been families that have wanted to get ahead, but, that when you live in an exclusionary society that doesn't offer opportunities to the most vulnerable, you find yourself in the painful necessity of having to look in another country for what you cannot find in your own. I also mentioned my academic background, not to brag, since I do not have a high IQ and I'm an average student. The reason was to express how many of us Mexicans desperately refuse to give up, and sometimes, there, in the fields of the United States, although we even cry often, we

have no choice but to keep working; and how we leave our youth, the best years of our lives, in the dairies of New York, in pursuit of a mirage, for that thirst to be taken into account and not be ignored. Once we get there, we are disillusioned by that mirage, and we have two options: either we suffer the humiliations and say nothing, or we join with other workers and demand our rights. ■■■

NOTES

¹ Oscar Lewis, *Pedro Martinez: A Mexican Peasant and His Family* (New York: Random House, 1964). [Editor's Note.]

Blind Eyes to Trafficked Labor In Western New York

Gonzalo Martínez de Vedia*

TRAFFICKED FARM LABOR IN NEW YORK

Early in the summer of 2002, when farm owners across the United States were bracing for a difficult harvest under the hottest and driest conditions since the Dust Bowl, federal prosecutors delivered the industry another blow by way of a criminal complaint in the rural Western District of New York. One Maria Garcia Botello and her associates, a group of contractors among the thousands who each year deliver farm hands to labor-intensive crops across the country, had been indicted on a slew of crimes, including the unusual charge of "human trafficking."

Though often used interchangeably with the term "smuggling," a felony to which the northern border of New York is no stranger, the legal definition of human trafficking refers to the exploitation of a person through force, fraud, or coercion and does not require international transportation.¹ Rather than a violation of a nation's borders, trafficking is the criminal abuse of a person for profit. Human smugglers offer willing custom-

ers a service; for human traffickers, people themselves are the commodity.

National media outlets soon picked up on this seemingly anachronistic story, reminiscent of the days of chattel slavery: Garcia Botello had lured a group of Mexican immigrants with false promises, packed them 30 to a van in Arizona, and driven them over 2000 miles across the United States to vegetable farms in Western New York, where they toiled for virtually no pay, sunrise to sunset, under armed threat.² "If we didn't work harder," said one of the men, "they would lock us in a small truck for a month without feeding us."³

More than charge a violation of the 13th Amendment prohibition of slavery, famously won and ratified in 1865 after the Civil War, prosecutors of the Botello case were making the first use in the continental U.S. of labor trafficking provisions in the 2000 Victims of Trafficking and Violence Prevention Act (TVPA), a landmark bill hailed by Congress as its answer to modern forms of forced and coerced labor.

This article will consider how prosecutions of labor trafficking such as the Botello case have become a rarity, rather

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Human trafficking conventions in the U.S. predominantly serve to intercept and disrupt criminal activity exclusively related to sexual exploitation and to address other types of human trafficking crimes mostly just in theory.

Global estimates indeed place the percentage of overall trafficking victims who are female at 55, a true—if slight—majority. Children make up just over a quarter.⁴ The past 15 years of application of the TVPA by law enforcement and prosecutors, however, suggests its architects may not have only been pointing to this numerical fact in their introductory qualification, but also signaling a broader moral pri-

oritization that deems sex trafficking of women, particularly young women and girls, a more urgent and prevalent problem than exploitation for labor.

In a country where 92 percent of constituents believe human trafficking victims “are almost always female,”⁵ the political coalitions necessary to sustain the now four-time reauthorization of this anti-trafficking law would have to respond first and foremost to that public perception, real or imagined. Accordingly, the last of these TVPA iterations⁶ passed Congress as an amendment to the 2013 Violence against Women Act. Likewise, New York’s own version of the law, the most recent enhancement of which was enacted in January of this year, met Governor Cuomo’s pen as part of a Women’s Equality Agenda.⁷ Although this embedding of trafficking legislation within women’s rights campaigns has proven politically strategic, such framing also inadvertently perpetuates the public image of trafficking as a one-gender issue.

At all jurisdictional levels, application of trafficking statutes strongly reflects this single-track outlook. Federal authorities reported that out of 257 trafficking cases pursued for prosecution under the TVPA in the last recorded 12-month period, more than 95 percent (249) exclusively concerned the sex trade.⁸ Records in Albany reveal an even heavier bias toward such cases within New York: of the 42 convictions obtained in the 9-year history of the state’s trafficking law, all but one involved commercial sex.⁹ (Although researchers have shown that boys and LGBTQ youth make up an under-identified portion of sex trafficking cases,¹⁰ the aforementioned prosecutions have almost invariably involved women and girls.)

These numbers from law enforcement and prosecutors stand in sharp contrast to the caseloads of another pillar of

than an industry-shifting, criminal enterprise-threatening recurrence. Further, it will suggest that human trafficking conventions in the U.S. predominantly serve to intercept and disrupt criminal activity that exclusively relates to commercial sex and sexual exploitation and to address other types of human trafficking crimes mostly just in theory. To date, workers such as the 40 plaintiffs in *Botello* are all too often left alone to find their own justice when they fall prey to exploiters.

THE TVPA AS A SEX TRAFFICKING-DRIVEN UMBRELLA LAW

In many circles, the application of the TVPA in the agricultural expanses of Western New York in *Botello* came as a surprise. The political context in which President Clinton signed the bill into law was far removed from that which once greeted Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, public awareness around the issue of slavery had long shifted away from U.S. farms toward a more complex image of transnational criminal enterprises trading in persons for exploitation in a range of private industries, particularly commercial sex.

In line with the concurrently-drafted United Nations Palermo Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons, the TVPA encompassed all forms of trafficking. But in a telling introductory clause, its authors memorialized their expectation that when it came to “this contemporary manifestation of slavery,” the victims would be “predominantly women and children,”³ a demographic disproportionately affected by sex trafficking.

the U.S. response to trafficking in persons: the broad network of federally-funded service providers for whom the identification by law enforcement of a trafficking victim is just the start of the work. Grant monitors for one of the two major funding streams for these services report that the majority of cases their grantees encounter are of labor trafficking—which affects all genders more evenly—in addition to a significant percentage with elements of both sexual and non-sexual exploitation.¹¹ Individual victim-serving agencies corroborate that national tendency in their own numbers: one of the largest New York legal services providers reported that as of February 2016, labor trafficking cases made up 60 percent of their overall trafficking caseload.¹²

A side-by-side comparison of such reports from the law enforcement and services sectors reveals a tiered response to human trafficking across the United States. Whereas trafficking crimes involving mostly younger women and girls for sexual exploitation trigger both service provision and prosecutions, the type of trafficking that exploits mostly foreign nationals of all ages and genders for manual labor is often identified and addressed by service providers, but elicits little to no response from federal investigators and prosecutors.

HARVEST OF SHAME

A nationwide survey service provider's records reveal that labor trafficking is most common in specific high-risk workplaces. Not surprisingly, the low-wage industries of domestic service and care giving, restaurants, hospitality, and agriculture topped the list. Of these, agriculture served as the venue for exploitation in nearly a fifth of the cases.¹³

These are uneasy statistics for New York, where agriculture brought in more than US\$7 billion in gross receipts in 2014, making it the state's number one industry. Unwilling to use these proceeds to provide wages and conditions attractive to locally-born workers, the 10 345 New York farms that hire outside help have turned to more pliant, economically desperate workers from as far as Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean. Within this increasingly consolidated industry, only 1 429 agricultural operations require more than 10 workers. It is that highest-earning tier of New York farms that most relies on the state's 60 944 farmworkers.¹⁴

These employers only formally sponsor about 9 percent of the statewide agricultural workforce through the H2-A Guest Worker Program,¹⁵ the only legal means to procure for-

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eign labor for work on U.S. farms. The vast majority of the overall industry instead relies on registered or informal labor contractors such as Botello to seek their hired help. The largest farms in particular, whose infrastructure often includes on-site barrack-style farm labor camps, pay top dollar to this sprawling army of brokers, who secure a constant flow of workers to harvest crops during narrow, unpredictable time windows or to staff 24-hour, 365-days-a-year milking rotations. Indeed, the latter industry, dairy, New York State's top agricultural sector, must rely on informal labor markets to procure foreign workers, since seasonal visas, by definition, cannot meet their year-round demands.

The work of these contractors does not end with a successful job placement. It is often these same facilitators who help finance the journeys of immigrants from impoverished, violence-ridden communities to the work camps and who manage them afterwards as crew bosses. As the United States continues to pour billions of dollars into militarizing its southern border, the cost of all northward journeys has steadily increased, forcing more immigrants to go into debt with smuggling networks.

As a result, a growing norm for new arrivals to U.S. agriculture is to spend their first months or years working off a debt to *coyotes* (smugglers), transporters, and labor brokers who walk a fine line between smuggling and trafficking. To secure the repayment of these often-exorbitant fees, smugglers may confiscate documents, threaten violence, firing or deportation, or simply apply unreasonable interest rates on the loan principals, turning smuggling into a form of trafficking defined in U.S. law as "debt bondage."¹⁶ Unlike the era when indentured servants tended Britain's colonial farms throughout North America for a fixed period of time, victims of this type of crime face indeterminate years of exploitation under coercive creditors as a rite of passage into the United States labor force.

Debt brokers and labor contractors are in constant and direct contact with New York's farmworkers by design. They provide a layer of deniability between the workforce and the end recipients of trafficked labor: the land-owning employers. Although cutting-edge litigation strategies have at times

succeeded in naming such parties liable as “joint employers” alongside their contractors, criminal justice responses to non-sexual labor trafficking have largely ignored the complicity of deeper-pocket farm employers, fixating on their hired henchmen instead.

As in Botello, these crew bosses are often second-generation immigrants or even former low-wage workers, who provide farms easy access to a known work force, often from their own hometowns in Latin America. The agricultural industry’s version of low-level management, they stand a rung above hand-harvesters and milkers, earning themselves higher pay that depends on their ability to extract efficient, compliant labor from the workers. Insofar as they employ coercive tactics to achieve production goals, the middlemen often assume complete and sole liability for the criminal activity. These *mayordomos*, as workers know them, are easily dispensable, allowing farmers to avoid legal ramifications in case of an outside inquiry.

The liability buffer created by this labor contracting system leaves farmworkers at constant and ubiquitous risk of extreme forms of exploitation under unafraid, unscrupulous employers who act with impunity. A survey of the undocumented Spanish-speaking farmworker population in San Diego County, California, revealed a 31-percent prevalence rate of violations that met the legal definition for human trafficking.¹⁷ Another study carried out just a few states down the East Coast migrant stream from New York, in North Carolina, found that 1 in 5 farmworkers in that area had experienced some form of trafficking, with significant numbers reporting deception and lies (21 percent), restriction and deprivation (15 percent), and even threats to physical integrity (12 percent).¹⁸

While the prevalence of the first two categories warn of increasing sophistication within farm labor trafficking schemes, involving bait-and-switch job offers, debt repayments, and psychological manipulation, the mere existence of the third serves as a sobering reminder that current farm labor standards for auditing and enforcement are weak enough to allow recurring cases where employers simply force their workers through actual or threatened physical harm.

As the United States continues to pour billions of dollars into militarizing its southern border, the cost of all northward journeys has steadily increased, forcing more immigrants to go into debt with smuggling networks.

GOVERNMENTAL ABDICATION

From the view of the federal government buildings around Niagara Square in downtown Buffalo, New York, the past 15 years have made the Botello case seem more a historical anomaly than a watershed moment. Federal officials have since inquired into only a handful of labor trafficking cases. Yet even when these rare probes into low-wage industries have led to the certification of victims of forced labor and referrals to social services, charges often fall short of the TVPA, instead focusing on the employers’ “harboring” or “transporting of illegal aliens.”

By taking this approach, officials send a problematic message to the undocumented community: that their irregular immigration status may be of more interest to the government than their victimization. Hesitant to apply a trafficking lens to the worst abuses taking place in farms, restaurants, and other businesses, officials in rural New York have joined a national trend of reserving use of the all-encompassing TVPA to only address sexual exploitation.¹⁹

For the Western District of New York (WDNY) specifically, anti-trafficking work has predominantly involved disrupting the activities of sex traffickers in Buffalo and Rochester. Those efforts alone generated so many trafficking cases in 2015 as to make theirs the district with the most prosecutions of that type in the entire country—a distinction made more dramatic considering the relatively low population density of their area compared to other jurisdictions.

WDNY’s record combatting these types of abuse is notable in its own right and speaks to the effectiveness of their interdisciplinary Human Trafficking Task Force (HTTF). But it also begs the question of why, in a district that is home to some of the country’s largest employers of vulnerable farmworkers, and given the known prevalence of forced labor in comparable agricultural areas, so few have had their rights vindicated in WDNY courts since Botello.

Asked point-blank about this dearth of non-sexual labor cases on live television, the then-United States Attorney for this district, William J. Hochul, Jr., offered a candid, telling theory:

From what I’ve seen, from my vantage point, it is very difficult to conduct an investigation when agriculture workers, *who may be here for two to five days during a harvest time*, are involved. By the time law enforcement would even get a lead that there is [sic] potential undocumented workers who are being held

against their will and then mobilize the resources to conduct the investigations, those workers may in fact have already moved on to the next community. [Author's emphasis.]²⁰

By conjuring the image of immigrant farmworkers spending days, not the usual months, harvesting New York's crops, WDNy's chief prosecutor minimizes both the contribution of that workforce to his district's economy, and its need for attention from his office. More broadly, the comment ignores the fact that, due in part to the presence of federal immigration officials as far as 100 miles inland from the northern U.S. border, 84 percent of New York State farmworkers no longer migrate,²¹ but rather choose to settle year-round in the relative safety of farm labor camps for fear of apprehension and deportation.

Whatever the factors are that keep WDNy officials from reaching workers at the farm labor camps or vice versa, the outcomes speak for themselves: of the 12 cases that earned WDNy its number-one place in trafficking prosecutions for 2015, none involved farm labor abuses or labor trafficking in any industry, an unlikely state of affairs for the district that once pioneered the application of labor trafficking law to agriculture at the dawn of the TVPA.

BOTELLO, EMBLEM OF A SYSTEM

Even if WDNy were to reprioritize forced labor alongside other types of trafficking prosecutions, it would only address one element of a broader, systemic issue. As much as the farming industry has preferred to believe since the sentencing of Botello that she was a rogue actor among an otherwise above-board *statu quo*, a comparison of her behavior to the current standards for agricultural labor brokering suggests the main difference between her and many other contractors still staffing New York's farms may be that she was caught.

Indeed, a criminal-justice-only approach to labor trafficking might serve more to validate than to transform the industries that benefit from forced labor. By casting the precious few middlemen who are each year named in federal complaints charging forced and coerced labor as "bad apple" perpetrators, the U.S. justice system suggests that such instances are manageable ruptures in otherwise accountable industries, rather than predictable expressions of no-questions-asked supply chains, where consumers and middlemen simply demand the best quality product and services for the lowest possible price. By that standard, the pushing of work-

ers into maximum productivity through human trafficking is not a failing of the current system, but its purest achievement.

For their part, U.S. Attorney Hochul and his WDNy Human Trafficking Task Force recently convened a sub-group solely dedicated to the identification and prosecution of non-sexual labor trafficking. This new committee, one of the first of its kind in the country, is led by the Worker Justice Center of New York (WJCNy), which, under its previous name of Farmworker Legal Services, and in tandem with Hochul's predecessors, once helped Botello's victims escape indentured servitude.

One of the WJCNy staff involved in that extraction, Renán Salgado, coordinates the group, which includes prosecutors, law enforcement agencies, and service providers. His hope is to remind officials that although labor trafficking cases follow a different pattern than sex trafficking cases and their "low-hanging" evidentiary trails on web-based escort sites, they follow a pattern nonetheless, one more obvious and common than is widely accepted. "There is a mentality that these are difficult cases, which leads to a reluctance to dedicate resources," he says. "We are out to change that."²² ■■■

NOTES

¹ *Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000*, Public Law 106-386, U.S. Statutes at Large 114 (2000), 1486, codified at U.S. Code 18 (2000), § 1589.

² From here on, the author refers to the accused in this case as "Botello" instead of using both her last names "Garcia Botello" as in the Spanish-language usage. We have left this as is since the case is probably known this way due to the U.S. practice of only citing the second last name. [Editor's Note.]

³ *The New York Times*, June 21, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/21/nyregion/migrant-camp-operators-face-forced-labor-charges.html>.

⁴ *Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000*, Public Law 106-386, U.S. Statutes at Large 114 (2000), 1466.

⁵ International Labour Organization, "21 Million People Are Now Victims of Forced Labour, ILO Says," June 1, 2012, http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/newsroom/news/WCMS_181961/lang-en/index.htm.

⁶ Vanessa Bouche, Amy Farrell, and Dana Wittmer, "Identifying Effective Counter-Trafficking Programs and Practices in the U.S.: Legislative, Legal, and Public Opinion Strategies that Work," 2015, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/249670.pdf>.

⁷ *Violence against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013*, Public Law 113-4, U.S. Statutes at Large 127 (2000), 53.

⁸ New York State Governor's Office, "Governor Cuomo Signs Legislation to Protect and Further Women's Equality in New York State," October 21, 2015. <https://www.governor.ny.gov/news/governor-cuomo-signs-legislation-protect-and-further-women-s-equality-new-york-state>.

⁹ U.S. State Department, *Trafficking in Persons Report*, June 2016. <https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/258876.pdf>.

¹⁰ Interview by the author with New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services officers, November 3, 2015.

¹¹ Ric Curtis, Karen Terry, Meredith Dank, Kirk Dombrowski, and Bilal Khan, *The Commercial Sexual Exploitation of Children in New York City: Executive Summary*, September 2008, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, http://www.courtinnovation.org/sites/default/files/CSEC_NYC_Executive_Summary.pdf.

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- ¹⁴ U.S. Department of Agriculture, *Census of Agriculture*, 2012, http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2012/Full_Report/Volume_1,_Chapter_2_County_Level/New_York/.
- ¹⁵ U.S. Department of Labor, "Office of Foreign Labor Certification: H-2A Temporary Agricultural Labor Certification Program-Selected Statistics, FY 2015," https://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/pdf/H-2A_Selected_Statistics_FY_2015_Q4.pdf, accessed March 3, 2017.
- ¹⁶ *Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000*, Public Law 106-386, U.S. Statutes at Large 114 (2000), 1469.
- ¹⁷ Kelle Barrick, Pamela Lattimore, Wayne Pitts, and Sheldon Zhang, *Indicators of Labor Trafficking Among North Carolina Migrant Farmworkers*, 2013, National Institute of Justice, <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/240223.pdf>.
- ¹⁸ Ibid.
- ¹⁹ Annick Febrey, "Reevaluating the Trafficking Victims Protection Act," *The Hill*, March 31, 2016, <http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/civil-rights/274800-reevaluating-the-trafficking-victims-protection-act>.
- ²⁰ Helene Biandudi Hofer, "Human Trafficking in Monroe County," *WXXI News*, September 25, 2014, <http://wxixnews.org/post/watch-human-trafficking-monroe-county-need-know-special>.
- ²¹ USDA, *Census of Agriculture*, 2012.
- ²² Telephone interview by the author with Renán Salgado, November 3, 2015.

Tense Spaces

Navigating Relations between Immigrant Workers and Dairy Farmers

Mary Jo Dudley*

INTRODUCTION

Agriculture is big business in New York State, particularly the dairy sector, which contributed an estimated US\$14.8 billion to the state economy in 2014.¹ Increasingly, dairy farms rely on workers from Mexico and Guatemala, many of whom are believed to be unauthorized. While nearly all immigrant workers present social security cards upon applying for employment, these documents can be purchased for a nominal fee along the border or in any major U.S. city. Although federal law generally protects employers of undocumented immigrants from liability, farmers still worry about the possibility of an immigration audit or raid. This article focuses on the work of the Cornell Farmworker Program (CFP) to improve workplace relations within this often tense space, where employers rely on a workforce that may not be properly documented and workers are afraid to make waves for fear of reprisals.

THE CORNELL FARMWORKER PROGRAM

The Cornell Farmworker Program (formerly Cornell Migrant Program) started nearly 50 years ago when students working side-by-side with migrant workers in apple orchards organized to create a university program (under the umbrella of Cornell's colleges of Agriculture and Life Sciences, Human Ecology and Cornell Cooperative Extension) to address the needs of farmworkers and their families through outreach, research, and education. The CFP collaborates with farmworkers to develop materials and activities that address their most pressing shared need by grounding our efforts in the realities of their living and working conditions. Cornell University students are engaged in CFP endeavors through coursework and the CFP summer internship program.

In light of heavy immigration enforcement in New York State, the CFP engages farmworkers around topics that they themselves identify as important to their well-being and success as dairy farm employees. Through Spanish-language skits and role-play activities, we share information about how to respond to police, and through bilingual workshops we

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provide guidance on assigning power of attorney and guardianship for U.S.-born children. We also provide support during Mexican and Guatemalan consular visits to rural communities, where foreign-born workers can obtain and renew photo IDs (such as passports) issued by their home countries, which are required for the completion of legal documents. While these activities may alleviate some immediate stress for farmworkers, the large-scale immigration reform required for a more profound improvement is yet to be seen in the U.S. Congress.

Improving workplace relations between farm owners and hired workers is another CFP priority. Plagued by chronic labor instability and shortages, over the last ten years New York State dairy farmers have transitioned from hiring local labor to a primarily Mexican and Guatemalan workforce. This transition has presented new challenges to farm employers and to the Cornell University extension professionals who aim to help them. Farmers' allegiance to the university, many as alumni, creates a unique opening for the CFP to work with them to improve workplace and living conditions for their hired immigrant workers. While the CFP works in all commodity sectors, these observations draw primarily from my research on dairy farms as CFP director, including the contributions of my student research team.

IMPACTS OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ON FARMWORKERS' WELL-BEING

New York dramatically increased its immigration enforcement capacity after 9/11. The state's northern border with Canada is strictly controlled by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and Customs and Border Protection (CBP). According to the CBP, the number of its officers patrolling the northern border has increased ten-fold since 9/11.² Most of New York State falls within the Border Patrol's jurisdiction of 100 miles into the interior from international borders and coasts (see the ACLU map); therefore, a significant number of foreign-born farmworkers live under CBP jurisdiction. CFP research has found that when a Latino/a is stopped by local law enforcement on roadways, it is common practice for police, sheriffs, and state troopers to call ICE for "translation" support, often resulting in a detention. As a result of the state's heavy immigration enforcement environment, any time an unauthorized worker leaves the farm (even as a passenger in a car), s/he runs the risk of deportation. The fear of leaving home, combined with long working hours and residence in remote rural locations, means that many do not leave their place of employment for weeks at a time.



While nearly all immigrant workers present social security cards upon applying for employment, these documents can be purchased for a nominal fee along the border or in any major U.S. city.

Consequently, social, geographic, and linguistic isolation are common challenges for farmworkers and their families.

The deportation threat also raises significant economic concerns. Workers typically come to the U.S. to seek employment to support family members in their communities of origin, given the lack of meaningful economic opportunities at home. Farmworkers often use their families' assets (homes, animals, and land) as collateral for loans of several thousand dollars to travel to the U.S. The threat of deportation before loans are repaid or before workers are able to save enough to invest in a home or business for their return is a constant source of stress. For farmworkers with school-aged children, their undocumented status makes leaving home to attend routine meetings with teachers, tutors, and administrators a source of anxiety and fear. Parents sometimes fear that advocating for their children—or simply leaving home to pick them up from school—may dangerously draw attention to them. Unauthorized parents live in constant fear of being detained and consequently separated from their children. This stress on family life can be devastating for all involved.

Workers depend on farmers not only for employment but also for housing and transportation off the farm, a source of great concern. Most farmworkers are not able to drive legally and live outside the range of bus services. Travel to town is frequently coordinated by employers on a bi-weekly basis: those workers who organize their own transportation often hire out a ride, which can cost US\$50 to US\$100 per round trip.³ Because an immigration detention would interrupt the workplace, some farmers limit their workers' movement off the farm to avoid encounters with law enforcement officials, and many outright prohibit them from owning vehicles.

Employers' involvement in both their workplace and personal lives creates a power hierarchy that results in a loss of personal autonomy that is difficult for farmworkers to manage. Their reliance on their employers for their livelihood and housing exacerbates their sense of extreme vulnerability. Their undocumented status contributes to their sense that any misstep in their workplace could lead to their dismissal, and they are at risk of being reported to immigration officials at any time. As one farmworker noted, "If the boss-

es or [U.S.] American workers get angry with us, they could call immigration and that would be the end of us working here, right?"

THE CORNELL FARMWORKER PROGRAM WORKPLACE RELATIONS PROJECT

The CFP engages workers and employers in efforts to improve workplace relations through a multipronged research and education program. To improve farmworkers' job satisfaction and safety, we conduct farmworker interviews and focus groups without farm employers or managers being present. Topics in these discussions include job contracts, salaries, raises, training, equipment and chemical safety, treatment by superiors and co-workers, and housing issues. Uninhibited by fear of employer reprisal, workers are able to verbalize the pros and cons of their working environments and to generate ideas about improvements. We meet separately with farm owners and managers to discuss similar topics, as well as future employment and business plans. On larger farms, local and Hispanic managers are hired to manage, train, and supervise workers and thus play important roles in addressing conflicts. The information gathered is organized to protect the anonymity of all involved. The owners, managers, and workers are then brought together in a facilitated meeting to address the "hot spot" issues identified in the discussion groups and to share examples of best practices from other farms. Through this bi-lingual forum, we are able to openly address challenges, paying special attention to keeping responses anonymous from employers, and develop action plans tailored to the specific needs of each individual farm. This process allows us to explore innovative approaches that benefit both farmworkers and farm owners.

PROJECT OUTCOMES: ESTABLISHING PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RESPECT

This process has given us important insights into relationships between farmers, farm managers, and farmworkers. Participating farmers expressed their tremendous appreciation for a workforce that is dedicated, hardworking, always shows up for work, has a good attitude, is willing to learn new things, and takes good care of the animals. Farmers view these as important indicators of respect for the farmer and his business.

Plagued by chronic labor instability and shortages, over the last ten years New York State dairy farmers have transitioned from hiring local labor to a primarily Mexican and Guatemalan workforce.

Meanwhile, farmworkers think that much of the feedback they get from employers is negative, so they are unsure if their employers appreciate them. Workers express frustrations when they feel that they are being yelled at, receive no positive feedback, their concerns go unheard, or that farmers give greater priority to the cows than to their employees. As one worker noted, “The farmer always tells us what we do wrong, but they hardly ever tell us what we do well.”

Thus, CFP efforts to build positive workplace relations begin with a joint discussion of principles of mutual respect between workers and employers. Common topics in these discussions include daily greetings, tone, and attitude, opportunities for training and advancement, availability of supplies, equipment functioning, quality of housing, and transportation off the farm. Responsiveness is another important topic. As one farmer noted, “Regardless of how big or small you may think it is, for a worker to bring it to your attention, you need to respond.”

Once all perspectives are expressed, we develop a strategy through an iterative process to build greater mutual respect in the workplace. These negotiations often engage workers and farmers in clarifying the roles of all those working on the farms, discussing criteria for raises and promotions, sharing preferred methods of communications, and establishing forums through which all parties can suggest agenda items, share concerns, set goals, and assess progress.

PROJECT OUTCOMES: CAREFUL ATTENTION BY EMPLOYERS TO HOUSING

Most dairy employers provide on-farm housing to their non-local workforce, so they have a dual role as employer and landlord. For employers as well as workers, housing is a significant area of contention. It is common for farmers to provide older housing, which needs constant repairs and maintenance, a responsibility farmers sometimes do not meet. At the same time, workers’ commitment to housing cleanliness and maintenance varies greatly depending on the relationship between worker and housemates. Workers with family ties to each

other typically establish guidelines for household care and cleaning. On other farms where workers are unrelated, they might not enjoy sharing housing, and there is little or no cooperation around domestic responsibilities. On farms with significant worker turnover, wear and tear on household items and infrastructure is exacerbated. In any of these contexts, living conditions are made worse when housing is overcrowded and when workers hesitate to point out needed repairs for fear they will be held responsible for costs.

Most farmworkers consider decent housing a high priority when looking for (or deciding whether to stay at) a job, since these units are their primary social space (especially during the harsh winter). They often convey a sense of futility about asking for housing improvements and interpret inaction as an indication of how little they are valued on the farm. When asked why a critical housing repair that was requested was not made, one farmworker explained, “It’s obvious to me that the farmer cares much more about his cows than about his workers.” Even though they expressed frustration over housing quality, they felt that complaining to an outside agency would lead to grave repercussions rather than improvements due to their undocumented status. However, some farmworkers are fed up enough that the benefits of making a complaint outweigh the risks. As one said, “This housing isn’t fit for an animal, much less a human being. Sometimes I think that I should call the authorities so they can see that this housing is infested with cockroaches and bed bugs. It would be worth it even if I was deported because no one should have to live like this.”

Some employers are confused about why their workers do not inform them of housing-related concerns. One farmer noted, “You have to go into their house on a periodic basis because they won’t tell you when a cabinet that holds a bathroom sink has completely fallen apart. You know they won’t tell you any of that stuff. They don’t tell you the tub shower just runs constantly.” While workers are worrying about reprisals, employers perceive their silence on needed repairs as irresponsible behavior. Some express disparaging opinions that immigrants are more tolerant of household pests, lack of cleanliness, and disrepair. As one noted, “They come from a place where cockroaches are common. I think they bring them in their suitcases.”

Other farmers, however, invest in good housing, arguing that they want their workers to be well-rested and to have a nice space to spend their time off so that they will be content and continue to work on the farm. Many are aware that a

For employers as well as workers, housing is a significant area of contention. It is common for farmers to provide older housing, which needs constant repairs and maintenance.

primary motivation for workers to leave a farm is to find employment on another that offers better housing. One farmer said, “If someone has nicer housing than us, that’s when we build new housing. I am not going to be second or third when it comes to housing.”




In response to this disconnect over housing quality complaints, the CFP developed a highly visual “housing checklist” that uses icons and a simple ranking system that allows employees to anonymously alert farmers of housing problems without needing to worry about being held responsible. Space is provided for employers to indicate when repairs will be made, so workers know that they are aware of and plan to address the concern. During a discussion about housing, a frustrated worker explained, “In the room where I sleep, water is always dripping from the ceiling. We have to wait two hours for hot water to bathe.” Using the checklist, the worker was able to anonymously report necessary repairs. In the all-farm meeting, we reviewed the checklist and the farmer stated when the repairs would be made. During a subsequent visit, both the farmer and the workers pointed to the checklist as the farmer jokingly reported, “I did my homework. The bathroom and the ceiling have been repaired on time too.” This illustrates how the housing checklist has been used as a catalyst for engaging farm owners in recognizing needed repairs and taking action to address housing concerns.

CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES OF ACTING AS A FARMWORKER-FARMER INTERMEDIARY

This research highlights shared interests among workers, employers, and managers to create positive changes in the work-

MONTHLY HOUSING QUALITY CHECK LIST LISTA DE VERIFICACIÓN MENSUAL PARA LA VIVIENDA

Date/ Dia: _____ Checked by/ Revisado por: _____

Kitchen		Cocina	Date/Time to Fix Dia/ Tiempo para reparar
Stove <input type="checkbox"/> Excellent <input type="checkbox"/> Adequate <input type="checkbox"/> Inadequate		Estufa <input type="checkbox"/> Excelente <input type="checkbox"/> Suficiente <input type="checkbox"/> Insuficiente	
Refrigerator <input type="checkbox"/> Excellent <input type="checkbox"/> Adequate <input type="checkbox"/> Inadequate		Refrigeradora <input type="checkbox"/> Excelente <input type="checkbox"/> Suficiente <input type="checkbox"/> Insuficiente	
Microwave <input type="checkbox"/> Excellent <input type="checkbox"/> Adequate <input type="checkbox"/> Inadequate		Microondas <input type="checkbox"/> Excelente <input type="checkbox"/> Suficiente <input type="checkbox"/> Insuficiente	

place, a win-win approach for all parties involved. However, our role as mediator situates us in a tenuous, often challenging, space. The success of these efforts depends on the extent to which workers and employers are willing and able to change the *statu quo* and invest in workplace and housing improvements. Furthermore, there tends to be a hard divide between those who advocate either for workers or for farmers. Worker advocates sometimes do not trust those who engage with farmers, while many farmers consider labor advocates to be working against their interests. Farmers often ask how we relate to and differ from advocate organizations. Since the CFP occupies a unique space as an intermediary working to bridge this divide, we must pay special attention to cultivating relationships with both farmers and farmworkers. In light of the many pressing challenges farmworkers and the CFP both face, this approach, while complicated and sometimes tense, contributes to farmworkers’ success and well-being at home and in the workplace. **NM**

NOTES

¹ New York State Department of Agriculture and Markets 2014 Annual Report, http://www.agriculture.ny.gov/annual_report.pdf.

² This was stated in a meeting with CBP representatives in April 2011. These figures align with national trends.

³ Estimated from CFP research.

Problemas del DESARROLLO

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LATINOAMERICANA
DE ECONOMÍA

Vol. 48, núm. 189, abril-junio 2017

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Publicación trimestral del Instituto de
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Suscripciones y ventas: revprode@unam.mx

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
Orgullo y prejuicios. Reputación e imagen de México

(Pride and Prejudices. Mexico's Reputation and Image)

Leonardo Curzio

CISAN, UNAM/Miguel Ángel Porrúa

Mexico City, 2016, 148 pp.



The recent U.S. elections have thrust the whole world into uncertainty about what will happen to that country's bilateral relations and the international system itself. In particular, Mexico's relationship with the United States is very important, not only because of the long border the two countries share, but also because of their strong commercial ties and the close link-up of their economies. From the time of the campaigns, many analysts realized not only how dangerous it could be for Republican candidate Donald Trump to win, but also the consequences that his speeches based on xenophobic, racist feelings were having. Given this panorama, it is imperative that Mexico take steps not only to let U.S. Americans, but the whole world, know what Mexico really is. In *Orgullo y prejuicios*, Leonardo Curzio analyzes Mexico's image and reputation using statistics, hard data, historical examples, and comparisons with other countries. He also puts forward a series of proposals that should be taken into account to improve the perception of Mexico in the world.

It is important to mention, as Curzio does in this, his most recent book, that we should not confuse image and reputation. While both are necessary and should be included on the national agenda, a country's image is more volatile and depends on momentary circumstances, while the construction of a reputation is a longer, more structured process that takes years. But why is the perception of Mexico abroad so important?

Observers have noted that a country's image is fundamental for tourism as well as for attracting investment. In addition, time has bestowed great strength on public opinion so it can be analyzed. In this, the concept of soft power developed by theoretician Joseph Nye plays an important role, since reputation and image are essential components of soft power. For Nye, three main spheres give rise to soft power: culture, a country's political values, and its foreign policy. While Mexico has a strong, attractive culture, due to its history, its entertainment value, its cuisine, etc., and a good projection to the outside world, its institutions reduce its soft power, keeping it from having a desirable reputation. It should be remembered that the image one has of oneself is not always the same as the one others have of us.

Where does Mexico fall down? The author reviews the deterioration of our country's reputation, with particular emphasis on the bad image it acquired due to the so-called "war on drug trafficking" headed by President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012). He mentions that in that period, the main issue regarding Mexico to hit the international media was its domestic insecurity, which, of course, was a constant in the president's speeches. In addition, the 2009 AH1N1 sanitary crisis also put Mexico in the spotlight in not the best way; as a result, the number of tourists dropped considerably.

Not only the issue of insecurity has affected the country's reputation and image throughout its history, but also the perception that it is headed up by a corrupt government, that it

is a place where doing business is not always easy for foreigners, since *compadrazgo*, or cronyism based on strong friendships, benefits the economic elite, a sector with close ties to politicians and decision-makers. In the same fashion, Mexico must overcome the lack of credibility remaining regarding how it has handled its border and reduce its important levels of social inequality.

Leonardo Curzio maintains that when Enrique Peña Nieto took office, the perception of Mexico began to improve, reaching a balance of opinion of 20 points in 2014 (while in 2013, it had been -2 according to Gallup polls). In part, this was due to the fact that the Presidente Peña opted for minimizing security issues in his speeches at the same time that he was perceived by the news media as the great reformer and “savior of Mexico.” However, events like Joaquín “El Chapo” Guzmán’s 2014 escape from prison and what happened to the Ayotzinapa normal school students that same year once again tarnished the government’s credibility.

After Donald Trump’s victory in the U.S. presidential elections, the Mexican government has to have a plan of action to repair the damage caused by his statements. The author proposes forging a different narrative about Mexico through favorable press coverage, developing public diplomacy to include more actors, to achieve a better understanding of Mex-

ican reality, an improvement in the country’s reputation, increasing its capacity to have an influence abroad, and bettering its ability to actually perceive what is said about Mexico in the world.

Our country has domestic aspects that must be improved, actions that would benefit the perception of us abroad, such as making a priority of reinforcing control of the border, increasing contact with the Diasporas to foster among them a feeling of greater proximity to Mexico, ridding ourselves of impunity, improving infrastructure, offering an efficient railway system, publicizing NAFTA’s benefits for the region, and promoting an easy-going, healthy lifestyle, among others.

In short, *Orgullo y prejuicios* is a relevant book today. Leonardo Curzio lays out a sweeping panorama of the importance of image and reputation, how they are built, as well as proposals for nourishing this nation’s so-very-necessary soft power. In today’s international scene, plagued by racist comments against our compatriots, it is important that decision-makers also weigh in on the matter and promote a better, fairer image of what Mexico really is. **MM**

Karla D. González Esquinca

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Menos constante que el viento


(Less Constant than the Wind)

Héctor Iván González

Abismos Casa Editorial

Mexico City, 2015, 204 pp.

I have no doubt that literature fulfills fundamental psychological and social functions. For many writers, it is the means to visibility, a way of calling attention to themselves, of standing out, or at least of not going unnoticed, a last resort, Whitman’s barbaric yawp. It is also sometimes the only way of saying something, of getting it out, as though saying it was truly the equivalent of expelling or exorcizing. It can also be the only bearable way certain fantasies can be



realized; that is, dreaming while awake. Socially speaking, literature is an escape route, evasion. If humanity retains a minimum of sanity, it is thanks in part to the dose of inoffensive delirium that books, the cinema, and theater allow. It is also discourse: novels, poems, and essays modulate beliefs, orient ideas, regulate emotions. Literature fulfills all these functions, but, at least for those who hold it in esteem, for those who see it not as a means, but as an end in itself—as romantic as that might sound—not for sociologists, not for anthropologists, not for the political students of literature, and not even for its philosophers, but for those who, for example, read it and thank it in secret, literature would be a very small thing if it were not above all a pleasure, perhaps the most subtle, the most sophisticated pleasure, together with all the other arts.

Much else should be said about literary criticism. Yes, the criteria is for the individual who exercises the rite of appropriation, a way of possessing the work through observation, knowledge, sensibility—almost through touch—like in love, the definitive seal of an enormously personal relationship. It is the required road to wisdom. It is at times art in itself: creation that incorporates the re-combined and re-signified pieces of a previously existing product. At the same time, criticism is the arbiter of the relations between author and society. Whether we like it or not, it shows the way for collective tastes. It solves a problem for people who have neither the time nor, often, the aptitude: What to read; which novels to tackle first; which poet to listen to? Finding at least one critic to trust should be a task for any book aficionado. True criticism makes the powers that be of culture uncomfortable: publishing houses, communications channels, established authors, well-known reviewers. It is a call for intellectual and emotional rebellion. Without lively, fair, but accurate criticism, the literary milieu cannot be healthy. Neither, I am afraid, can society. Undoubtedly, criticism is fundamental for anyone who practices it and for the polis as a whole. However, for that same genre of romantics, that apparently idle minority, those pursuers of chimeras—the same ones, we forget, who with their creations distract the masses and the powerful from their day-to-day squalor—for them, if literary criticism is not above all a spur to enthusiasm, a playful bounce, a few hours in the park or an outing, it is nothing and is worth nothing.

Etymologically, having fun is the equivalent of “larking about.” *Menos constante que el viento* (Less Constant than the Wind) is an exercise in divertimento, in that precise sense.

The author takes a path, and walks down it unhurriedly; he arrives at a crossroads, takes one fork, jumps over to the main road, goes down it again, stops, throws himself down in the shade, resumes the slow march, reverses direction: in short, he fans out. He goes from one place to another following his curiosity, as he himself has said, and, by so doing, experiences the other nuance of the same term; he is entertained, he joins the playful flow of criticism. The first thing Héctor Iván González does in these pages is to quote Montaigne. Next, he distinguishes between exhaustive and disperse authors through satisfied, colloquial prose that remits us inevitably to the French essayist, in particular the meditations about his own writing. None of this is gratuitous. A “zigzagging” book of “broad frequencies,” given over to pleasure and, in addition, with a fortunate title, *Menos constante que el viento* belongs to the genre of thinking inaugurated by Montaigne.

Make no mistake about it, however: there should be no confusion between play and anarchy, between dissemination and dispersion, between a craving and indiscriminate gluttony. In his prologue, Héctor Iván mentions chance, his own “random behavior.” I wouldn’t use the word “chance.” Taste and urges can lead us to unexpected places, but not blindly. They seek their own satisfaction and know that they cannot find it just anywhere. That is why this book comes back time and again to Argentinean literature; that is why it never completely abandons Mexican literature; that is why it refers whenever it can to the French linguistic and cultural universe. In the temporal sphere, the twentieth century dominates. There are peeks at classical Greece, at the dawn of Italian humanism, at the second half of the nineteenth century. Where are the German romantics or the U.S. renaissance, among the enormous number of other movements that the author, in his journey, decides to bypass? It would be absurd to expect him to cover everything, but there are obvious preferences.

The focal distance is no less changing: in Héctor Iván’s book, there are close-ups that examine a single book by Paz, that dissect minutiae of his poetic expression; medium shots looking very closely at the drama of Jean Genet or Alfred Dreyfus; wide shots that situate an author like Dante in his social context; or panoramic shots: for example, the view of Latin American literature. However, I believe I can discern in Héctor Iván a certain weakness for the close-up, for the intimate, affective shot. In number, undoubtedly, the texts that impose a minimum critical distance predominate. But not in quality. The author counterposes to the strict, documented,

observation of Paz's poetry, to the fair, ordered dissection of Argentinean narrative, to the historical, distant review of Dante, the charm of Del Paso's complete narrative, the praise of William Faulkner, or the enthusiastic description of the work of Michon. But, above all, he counterposes to the former the literary portraits, perhaps less attractive, but more beloved, because they are warm and cordial, of people—not figures—like Manuel Vázquez Montalbán, Pura López Colomé, and strangely, like Nellie Campobello and Charles Baudelaire.

It is in this register, that of admiration but also of personal preferences, that Héctor Iván González produces his best prose. Not only in strictly grammatical terms. Here, like a plant that finally encounters the best environmental conditions, this author's writing flowers fully. Here, it no longer consists of hints and onsets; it is full creation. Some critics achieve their most assertive, most finished tone in adversity, in clashes, in denunciations. In my opinion, Héctor Iván achieves it in harmony, as implausible as that may sound. *Menos constante que el viento* does open with a rather belligerent spirit. It concludes, however, in a more conciliatory vein. The taste of incredulity at the poetry of Octavio Paz makes way little by little to faith in Baudelaire. And, for some reason, due to inspiration or because liking requires fine channels for expression, we find on his side true style, intensely significant words; that is, literary language.

I will just give a few examples. Of López Colomé, the author says that she moves in the opposite direction from the public, "as though her poetry was more a part of small confessions intoned with a mantilla and veil [when] dawn breaks" than of the acts of crowds. She refers to the light "not as simple [light], but the light that has been changed by the window of conscience." He clarifies that this work "is always a first time . . . , always has an inaugural encounter, a letting go without knowing if you're going to return. . . . You feel that the spirit, or, if you prefer, Pura's disposition spreads its wings

and begins to take flight." Of *Les Fleurs du mal* (The Flowers of Evil), he writes, "It is the biggest and most irrefutable answer that Man has given to industry. Baudelaire is the first author to perceive that there is more than one way to die, since in his understanding, death was not the end, but the leap to something different . . . ; in industrialization, he sees the most categorical way of ceasing to exist, of dissolving yourself in the masses without leaving a single trace." And he finishes by writing, "This is why, when Baudelaire returns to Shakespearean Denmark, he writes a *carpe diem* to his beautiful lover, Jeanne Duval, the most tender and loving, the most real poem ever written," the one that "from the second circle of Hell Petrarch would envy for ever and ever."

For congruence and friendship's sake, I must mention that in my opinion some of the book's sentences and paragraphs could do with certain modifications, certain strictly syntactical adjustments. Also, from time to time, the thread of the argument seems to get lost, such as in the first essay, subordinated perhaps to the enthusiasm, the otherwise positive zigzagging I mentioned at the start. Naturally, there are opinions I do not agree with; that is partially what the genre of the essay is all about. But I also recognize the noteworthy background in readings the author brings to his work, glimpsed here as it is in conversation; his critical spirit, which is receptive but also polemical, thoughtful, inquisitive; his literary talent, which is practically poetic; and, what is perhaps the most important, his love of his craft. *Menos constante que el viento* is a book that these attributes encourage. There are pages—many of them—on which we see them crystalize. This is the fruit of the game, of journeying on several levels, of a restless, uncommon, inconstant personality. **MM**

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REVISTA DE LA
Universidad de México

NUEVA ÉPOCA | NÚM. 158 | ABRIL 2017 | UNIVERSIDAD NACIONAL AUTÓNOMA DE MÉXICO | \$40.00 | ISSN 0185-1330

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