

THE GODFATHER IS DEAD: A HYBRID MODEL OF ORGANIZED CRIME

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A decades-long debate has raged globally among academics about how to define and classify organized crime, its activities, members, and organizing structures.¹ This debate has inspired such interest because organized crime is an intangible concept with a wide range of activities and criminal capabilities, a diversity of participants, and different kinds of organizing structures. Law enforcement, however, has been largely absent from this discussion and is generally reluctant to participate in the construction of conceptual frameworks intended to strengthen our understanding of organized crime. Twenty two years ago, Grant Wardlaw (1989: 10) noted that conceptual frameworks are rudimentary in organized crime research. While our critical understanding of organized crime has evolved significantly, limited progress has been made in the development of formal models of organized crime and Wardlaw's observation remains sadly current.

This article seeks to contribute to the literature of conceptual models of organized crime through a critique of past theories and the introduction of a hybrid model. The first part critiques the pluralist-ethnic and bureaucratic-hierarchical models that have traditionally shaped law enforcement's conception of organized crime. The second part outlines the network, market, and enterprise models and then offers a new hybrid conceptual model. It then explores how this hybrid model can form a theoretical framework for a risk assessment methodology on organized crime.

Organized Crime Theoretical Framework

Conceptual models of organized crime are useful because they enable one to think systematically about the variables involved and, in complex policy situations, the range of levers that will influence outcomes (Wardlaw, 1989: 10). Law enforcement officials may be reluctant to participate in or support the construction of conceptual models, believing such exercises are too "academic" or outside real police work. Models that explain organized crime are directly relevant to policing as they guide how law enforcement collects information and intelligence, targets networks and individuals, and uses investigative tactics. However, the conceptual models that law

¹ For a comparison of different organized crime definitions see Albanese (2008) and Finckenauer (2005) and Von Lampe's exhaustive website: <http://www.organized-crime.de/OCDEF1.htm>.

enforcement uses in relation to organized crime are generally not documented or articulated publicly (or even internally within law enforcement). Moreover, Wardlaw argues that law enforcement's efforts to counter organized crime are "straight-jacketed by a narrow range of relatively unsophisticated concepts which have directed too much attention at some individuals and some enforcement options" (1989: 13).

Models of organized crime are generally divided into organization-focused and activity-focused conceptualizations (Cohen, 1977; Halstead, 1998). Some entities have a corporate or collective identity (e.g., a self-named street gang), while others may have no sense of common identity (Cohen, 1977: 98). Organization-focused models concentrate on assessing and classifying the criminal network's organizing structures, membership (e.g., the bonds of ethnicity or culture among individuals), internal dynamics (e.g., systems of organization or governance), and relationship to the external environment, both licit and illicit (Halstead, 1998: 2). Analysis may focus on structures of association between actors (e.g., buyer-seller) or networks, and assess the stability, formation, dissolution, and transformations of associations within and among criminal organizations (Cohen, 1977: 98).

Given that law enforcement's conceptual models in relation to organized crime are generally lacking—if not completely non-existent—clearly it is necessary to re-examine the assumptions held by police about it. Analysis of organized crime models demonstrates that many of law enforcement's assumptions about it can be traced to specific models (particularly the ethnic-pluralist and bureaucratic-hierarchical models). These assumptions have persisted, relatively unquestioned by law enforcement, for decades. However, if law enforcement seeks a more comprehensive understanding of organized crime and intends to move beyond what Wardlaw calls "target-of-opportunity enforcement" (1989: 3), then it must re-examine how it views organized crime.

Activity-focused models target the "what" of organized crime: the illicit and licit activities undertaken by these criminal organizations and the socio-economic environment in which they operate. The principles underlying this model are the inter-connectivity and inter-dependency of the illicit and licit economic sectors, and that criminals are rational, profit-maximizing actors (Halstead, 1998: 8). Of course, as van Duyne notes (2000), criminals are people, too, and therefore as likely as non-criminals to display irrational behavior.

The Godfather Is Dead: The Pluralist-Ethnic Model

The pluralist-ethnic model explains organized crime as comprised of criminal groups that are relatively "ethnically, racially, or culturally homogeneous" (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987: 273). The origin of this model is the alien conspiracy model that was popularized in the early 1950s in the United States to explain what was seen as the "Italian Mafia."² In the pluralist-ethnic model, the conception of organized crime

² The alien conspiracy model is also sometimes referred to as the mafia model or the Godfather model.

is broadened from a single ethnicity (Italian) to a focus on multiple ethnicities that are separated by distinct and relatively rigid boundaries. Organized crime is therefore either “a single criminal entity (Cosa Nostra) or [a] body of large criminal conspiracies (Yakuza, the Triads, the Colombian Cartels, the Cuban Mafia, etc.)” (Southerland and Potter, 1993: 263). The pluralist model implicitly subscribes to the theory of “ethnic succession” (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987: 273) in which successive “waves” of ethnically or culturally homogeneous criminal immigrants establish controlling positions in the criminal marketplace as former criminals move on to respectability and legitimacy.³ Implicit within the pluralist model is that criminals are somehow distinct from or outside legitimate society and constitute an external threat.⁴

Many law enforcement agencies around the world implicitly subscribe to the pluralist-ethnic model. For example, on its website, the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation divides its organized crime section along ethnic lines: La Cosa Nostra, Italian organized crime and racketeering; Eurasian/Middle Eastern organized crime; and Asian and African criminal enterprises. Law enforcement agencies in Denmark, Germany, Hungary, and Europol divide organized crime into “ethnic” and “non-ethnic” groupings (e.g., Danish National Police, 2005; Federal Criminal Police Office [Germany], 2008; Poczik, 2009; and Europol, 2007). These agencies generally acknowledge the inherent weaknesses of the pluralist-ethnic model, such as the inability to explain multi-ethnic organizations, but continue to classify organized crime into broad ethnic categories.

In Canada, law enforcement’s use of the pluralist-ethnic model is shown in the reports on organized crime released annually to the public by Criminal Intelligence Service Canada (CISC).⁵ CISC, a national network of law enforcement agencies that exchanges intelligence on organized crime, has published these reports since 1970 on behalf of the criminal intelligence community. They categorize organized crime into ethnic or cultural-geographic groupings, such as Aboriginal, Asian, Eastern European, and Italian organized crime.⁶ Other groupings (e.g., Indo-Canadian or Haitian) are added to the model as law enforcement perceives these groupings to be present in Canada. Street gangs are also categorized by the dominant ethnicity (e.g., Somali). Canadian-born individuals are not explicitly identified in the model. Criminal actors that do not conveniently fit under the banner of the ethnic “other,” such as outlaw motorcycle gangs (predominantly Caucasian in Canada) and Caucasian street gangs, form a separate non-ethnic category of networks that are defined by their ethos (Black, Vander Beken, and De Ruyver, 2000). These criminal entities

³ For a critique of the ethnic succession model and the “queer ladder of mobility” theory, see Lupsha (1981).

⁴ Lupsha highlights the hypocrisy of such an obsessive focus on the “outsider”: “In a society that has always had a place for lawlessness, sharp practice, easy money, and a disdain for suckers, and an idolatry of mammon and lucre, organized crime is as American as McDonald’s” (1981: 22).

⁵ See www.cisc.gc.ca.

⁶ In 2006, CISC moved away from ethnic groupings and no longer refers to the ethnic or cultural identifiers of the organized crime group; it retains categories for street gangs and outlaw motorcycle gangs.

are classified on the basis of their shared distinctive characteristics, paraphernalia, and feelings of gang membership.

Not a Criminal Army: The Bureaucratic-Hierarchical Model

The pluralist-ethnic model is typically used in conjunction with the bureaucratic-hierarchical model that describes a highly formalized, authoritarian structure with a limited membership, specialized division of labor, and a strict system of rules and regulations (Abadinsky, 1990: 24). Like the alien conspiracy model, this one was first and most prominently associated with what was termed the “Italian Mafia” in the United States during the Kefauver Senate Commission of 1950-1951 that investigated organized crime. The bureaucratic-hierarchical model was subsequently broadened to explain organizing structures for other criminal enterprises. It assumes that criminal networks follow complex operating strategies and have godfather-like bosses who issue orders down a chain of command to workers (Southland and Potter, 1993: 263). Organized crime is depicted as a highly organized and strategically focused criminal army commanded by a mastermind general or a transnational corporation of evil headed by a brilliant but underworld chief executive officer.

The pluralist and bureaucratic-hierarchical models are often referred to collectively as the law enforcement model as it has contributed significantly to how many law enforcement agencies around the world conceive of organized crime (Southland and Potter, 1993; Beare and Naylor, 1999). Canada, like many other countries, has been extensively influenced by the law enforcement model, which has been exported from the United States and assumed to explain organized crime globally.

Critique of the Law Enforcement Model

The pluralist-ethnic model is flawed as it assumes ethnic or cultural homogeneity where it often does not exist and is ineffective for categorizing multi-ethnic criminal networks. The model relies on law enforcement to interpret socio-cultural origins; however, when investigators or analysts misidentify an individual's ethnic or cultural/geographic heritage, entire criminal groupings are misclassified. Without common definitions of terms like “Asian” or “East-European,” there is no consistency in categorization. An underlying assumption of this model, often made with little evidence, is that linkages to ethnic homelands remain criminally relevant decades or even generations after immigration. The model's narrow focus on the ethnic “other” overlooks decades of organized criminality undertaken by native-born individuals. The pluralist model generates racially charged conceptions of organized crime (i.e., the foreigner as criminal) and distorts the public's perception of organized crime to the point that it bears little resemblance to reality (Queensland Crime Commission, 1999: ix).

Ethnicity or cultural/geographic origins can be of some relevance to explain or contextualize patterns of communication or behavior. For example, individuals of South Asian origin may use hawalas to transfer funds, and law enforcement must understand why these informal transfer systems are used both legally and illegally.⁷ As Morrison notes, “A shared culture, language, and set of values can sometimes (but not always) increase trust, communication, and, ultimately, the competitive advantage for some groups” (2002: 3). However, it is important to separate this use of relevant intelligence from the ineffective use of ethnicity as the “only, or main, dimension for classification of organized crime groups” (Morrison, 2002: 3).

The 1950s Kefauver Senate Commission in the United States gave prominence to the alien conspiracy and bureaucratic-hierarchical models. However, the commission has long been criticized and dismissed as unreliable as it came to its conclusions on Italian organized crime without independently corroborating the testimony of its witnesses and informants (Albanese, 1994). Critics condemned information given to the commission, particularly by its star informant-witness Joseph Valachi, as riddled with contradictions, factual errors, and incredible, uncorroborated assertions (e.g., Albanese, 1985; and Bynum, 1987, quoted in Mastrofski and Potter, 1987: 274). Pino Arlacchi, a prominent researcher on organized crime, argues, “Social research into the question of the mafia has probably now reached the point where we can say that the mafia, as the term is commonly understood, does not exist” (Arlacchi, 1986, quoted in Naylor, 1995: 54).

The bureaucratic-hierarchical model assumes that organized crime is implicitly monopolistic, hierarchical, and operates in an authoritarian, rule-bound fashion, but these assumptions are not supported by empirical evidence. Monopolies are the exception rather than the rule as the majority of organized criminal networks tend to be relatively small and loosely structured enterprises without the capacity for creating and sustaining monopolies (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Southerland and Potter, 1993; Von Lampe, 2006). Most local criminal networks are also not controlled by or subservient to larger international hierarchies. The majority of organized crime in Canada is comprised of loosely structured, competitive networks with fluid linkages between members and associates and few signs of authoritative leadership (CISC, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009). Another flaw in the bureaucratic-hierarchical model is the kingpin theory which states that targeting the authoritative leaders of hierarchical organizations should dismantle the organization. However, the resiliency of many criminal networks after the prosecution of their “leaders” disputes this assumption (Albanese, 1994; Woodiwiss, 2003; Mastrofski and Potter, 1987).

Despite decades of critiques of the pluralist and bureaucratic-hierarchical models, they have also had considerable influence on the public. One need only think of movies or television shows like *The Godfather*, *Goodfellas* and, more recently, the *Sopranos* and *Eastern Promises*, to observe how formative these movies have

⁷ Hawalas are often faster, cheaper, and more reliable than official banking systems when sending money to/from countries without efficient banking infrastructure and with widespread corruption.

been in constructing a particular worldview of organized crime. As an aside, the author finds that the unfortunately now-cancelled television series *Intelligence*⁸ rather accurately depicts organized crime in Vancouver and rejects the dominant worldview of the pluralist and bureaucratic-hierarchical models.

“Shifting Coalitions”: Adopting the Network Model

In contrast to the law enforcement model, the network model contends that organized crime is composed of small, loosely structured networks that are highly reactive to any changes in their environments and adapt quickly to them (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987: 275). These networks re-group, merge with others, or disband regularly due to law enforcement intervention, competition, and other pressures within the criminal marketplace. This model refutes the conception of organized crime as rigid, hierarchal corporate syndicates each run by a so-called and all-powerful Mr. Big. Some are family businesses and some rise around a charismatic leader, but the majority can be depicted as loose associations of people that form, split, and come together again as opportunity arises with interchangeable positions and frequently with overlapping roles in other criminal enterprises (Paoli, 2002: 67).

In the hostile, competitive environment of the criminal marketplace, criminal networks need to be capable of rapid innovation and flexibility and to respond to possible law enforcement intervention, conflict from rivals, and market opportunities (Klerks, 1999: 57). Some organized crime networks remain criminally active after the imprisonment of leaders or principal members and adapt to the loss of imprisoned members, or the incarcerated individuals continue to direct or participate in illicit activities. Competition, treachery, and disorganization are more common than strict network discipline, and the fragmented nature of criminal networks impedes the creation of monopolistic enterprises (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987; Southerland and Potter, 1993). The high degree of redundancy and duplication in criminal networks is largely unnecessary in legitimate business but facilitates illicit networks' capacity to reconstitute after disruption (Williams and Godson, 2002: 333).

The network model sees organized crime as an “enemy within” rather than an alien conspiracy of outsiders, of pathological actors who are essentially different from the normal, law-abiding majority (Edwards and Gill, 2003: 268-269). Organized crime is “a set of shifting coalitions between groups of gangsters, businesspeople, politicians, and union leaders, normally local or regional in scope” (Levi, 2002, cited in Fati, 2004: 150). In this shifting coalition of individuals, it is apparent that some forms of organized crime are symbiotic with the licit marketplace rather than parasitic.

The corruption of upper-world figures to facilitate organized crime is not solely accomplished through coercion: some individuals are willing to be corrupted and

⁸ See www.intelligencetv.com for more information about the Canadian television series *Intelligence*.

others seek out opportunities for illicit entrepreneurship. Smith (1980) draws a parallel between a “corrupter” (organized crime) and a lobbyist (legitimate business) and notes that the functions are similar: to ensure that regulatory pressures (the legislature, regulatory agencies, and the judiciary) do not interfere unduly with the client’s operations. While some may feel that this comparison is a bit of a stretch, it does indicate the consensual nature of much of the corrupting activities that organized crime undertakes. It also demonstrates the interaction between the licit and illicit marketplaces.

Many law enforcement agencies that generally follow the ethnic-pluralist model also recognize that organized crime is more commonly organized into loose networks rather than pyramidal monoliths (Europol, 2007). In Canada, law enforcement observes that a sizable percentage of criminal networks re-group, merge with other networks, or disband on a regular basis due to law enforcement intervention, competition, and other pressures within the criminal marketplace (CISC, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009). Many of these networks also display a degree of flexibility or resiliency to law enforcement’s efforts, adapting to the incarceration of members or replacing those individuals (SOCA, 2009/10; Europol, 2007; and Netherlands Police Agency, 2008). In the network model, organized crime echoes the multi-ethnic, multi-cultural demographic nature of Canada. This stands in stark contrast to the ethnic-pluralist model’s conception of ethnically homogenous networks seen as “outsiders” to mainstream —i.e., Caucasian— Canadian society.

Adopting the Enterprise/Market Economic Models

The market and enterprise models explain how organized crime operates in the licit and illicit marketplaces. These models emphasize the profit-oriented rationality of criminal organizations (Halstead, 1998: 2).⁹ The illicit marketplace can be understood as an economic network in which buyers, sellers, perpetrators, and victims interact to exchange goods and services consensually, or through deception or force, and where the production, sale, and consumption of these goods and services are forbidden or strictly regulated.¹⁰ Some criminal markets emerge when organized crime identifies and exploits loopholes in legal markets that then become profitable market niches. Others, such as the markets for sex, drugs, and gambling, have existed for centuries and have flourished outside state regulations.

The market model explains activities at the macro level of the industry (Halstead, 1998), focusing on the dynamics of the marketplace —both licit and illicit— at the local, national, or global levels in terms of the supply, regulation, and competition of, as well as the demand for, goods and services. In this model, the criminal

⁹ While the great majority of organized crime groups operating in Canada are motivated by economic gain, it is recognized that some organized crime networks may have other motivations behind their illicit activities, such as a focus on territory or respect.

¹⁰ This definition is influenced by a variety of works, particularly Arlacchi (1998).

marketplace does not operate separately from the legitimate economy, nor can clear divisions be drawn between the so-called white and black economies. Actors move between the markets, in and out of roles, expand or minimize their criminal activities in response to regulatory or competitive pressures, adjust to variations in market demand and supply, and form short- and long-term mutually beneficial alliances. Analysis of the inter-dependencies between the legal and illegal economies involves working to “monitor and understand the market for illicit goods and services and the impact of a changing legal and social environment that shapes patterns of production, investment, and the interactions of organized criminals” (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987: 286).

The enterprise model focuses at the level of the criminal firm and details how these organizations operate in licit and illicit sectors. It is based substantially on Smith’s spectrum-based theory of enterprise in which “enterprise takes place across a spectrum that includes both business and certain kinds of crime [and] behavioral theory regarding organizations in general and business in particular can be applied to the entire spectrum” (1980: 370).¹¹ In the continuum of commercial activities, there are paragon firms that operate licitly, pariah firms that operate in the margins of legitimacy, and pirate firms that focus on illegality (379-383). The dividing line between illegality and legality in this continuum is fine, and, as Smith notes (372), can vary by industry and be redrawn with changes in regulation or legislation. Organized crime networks can be simultaneously involved in multiple activities across the continuum.

The legitimate marketplace, its processes and structures, offer a lens through which the similarities and differences of licit and illicit businesses can be assessed. Though criminal capabilities and intentions vary widely, this model contends that all enterprises on the licit-illicit continuum have similarities: they “typically scan their environment for opportunities, seek to make rational judgments about opportunities and dangers, and seek to maximize their profits where this does not involve unacceptably high levels of risk” (Williams and Godson, 2002: 324).

There are limitations to the enterprise model, however, as there are key differences between legitimate and illicit businesses. Naylor critiques the overall application of a model of legitimate business to illicit enterprise stating that the model represents “too facile an extension of free-market theory (with its assumptions of open competition among equals and free information flows)” (1995: 39). In contrast to licit businesses, businesses operating in the criminal marketplace typically keep layers of insulation between the illicit entrepreneur and the customer and constrict information in order to deter competitors and regulators (e.g., law enforcement) (Levi and Naylor, 2000; Mastrofski and Potter, 1987). Williams and Godson (2002: 324) highlight the violence, intimidation, and corruption criminal networks use as “business tools” and how they profit by concealing their operations. Levi and Naylor (2000: 19-20) note that illicit businesses have little access to legal capital

¹¹ Smith (1980) regards ethnicity as an underlying principle of organized crime, though one clearly subordinate to the theory of enterprise.

markets or legal protection of property rights, and, instead of brand loyalty, capitalize on personal loyalty.¹²

Despite these differences between legitimate and illicit businesses, this model offers a useful framework through which to consider criminal networks' interactions with clients, regulators, collaborators, and competitors. This model is both more nuanced (emphasizing the grey areas between licit and illicit behavior) and comprehensive (addressing all aspects of illicit entrepreneurship) than law enforcement's traditional conception of organized crime.

Proposal of a Hybrid Model

Organization- and activity-focused models have traditionally been regarded as empirically different. Halstead (1998: 1) contends that the historic division between these types of models can be significantly narrowed, and, in some cases, the models can be combined into hybrids. A hybrid model incorporating network and market-enterprise models represents a fundamental shift from law enforcement's traditional narrow focus on criminal organizations to a dual focus: an organization-focused analysis (network model) and an activity-focused analysis that assess organized crime's operating environment (the licit and illicit marketplaces). This shift will change how organized crime networks are identified and categorized, how criminal intelligence is collected and collated, and how the networks are assessed and prioritized by law enforcement.

In the shift from ethnicity as the key organizing structure, organized crime is no longer understood as a series of homogenous groupings of the "racialized" other, but is instead depicted as small, flexible networks of individuals, including Canadian-born nationals. This transformation demands that law enforcement personnel, from the street-level officer to the specialized intelligence and enforcement units, fundamentally change their vocabulary regarding organized crime. Organizational changes should also occur, for example, re-naming units focused on certain ethnicities (e.g., Asian organized crime).

Information about an individual's ethnicity or cultural/geographic origins that contextualizes or is of some relevance to illicit activities or *modus operandi* will continue to be used to determine the criminal networks' threats and vulnerabilities. However, law enforcement should clearly separate relevant intelligence from observations of an individual's race, ethnic origins, or cultural practices. For example, relevant cultural intelligence is when all criminal actors speak Russian on the phone to thwart police wiretaps or advertisements for counterfeit goods are placed in Chinese-language community newspapers in Toronto.

Law enforcement must make other adaptations when adopting the network model. Bonds holding criminal networks together are not exclusively of kinship,

¹² For a detailed discussion of the differences between legal and illegal firms, see Levi and Naylor (2000).

culture, or geographic origin. Individuals also establish bonds through shared experiences in neighborhoods, school, social or business interactions, or prison. Furthermore, law enforcement should not assume hierarchical structure in criminal organizations to be the norm but instead determine each network's specific organizing structures.

The second component of the hybrid model is an activity-focused analysis of organized crime's environment. The market and enterprise models explicitly recognize inter-dependencies between the licit and illicit economies and the mobility of actors within and between these marketplaces. They require considering specific illicit activities or commodities within the dynamics of the licit and illicit marketplaces. Law enforcement often narrowly focuses on criminal actors and particular illicit activities (e.g., cocaine trafficking) in a specific, localized area and may not fully appreciate the broader context of the issue in terms of regional, national, or transnational trends in demand and supply, distribution routes, and shifting legal and socio-economic environments.

Like the network model, the market and enterprise models emphasize the consensual and entrepreneurial nature of the criminal marketplace in which there is a free-market exchange of many illicit goods and services among producers, distributors, and retailers on the supply side and, importantly, willing consumers on the demand side (Naylor, 2003: 83). Criminal entrepreneurs are not regarded as corrupting outsiders but rather "coequal partners involved in a symbiotic relationship" (Mastrofski and Potter, 1987: 269) with public officials and professionals. As a sizeable proportion of individuals desire some illicit goods and services, there can be significant public support for and patronage of those markets (Wardlaw, 1989: 4).

Proposal of Risk Assessment Framework

This article will now move from a critique of conceptual models to a discussion of how Canadian law enforcement will practically apply the hybrid model to strengthen its assessment of organized crime. It will be the theoretical foundation of a risk assessment of organized crime and build upon existing risk assessment methodology (specifically, Albanese, 2008; Vander Beken, 2004; Black, Vander Beken, and De Ruyver, 2000; and Black, Vander Beken, Frans, and Paternotte, 2001). Threat assessments examine the nature and magnitude of specific threats that can pose harm, while risk assessments examine the probability that an adverse event may occur and determine the impact of that event in terms of extent and severity.

Building upon the hybrid model's dual focus on organization (criminal actors) and activities (licit and illicit acts), the risk assessment will assess illicit organizations' criminal capabilities and examine the illicit and licit activities they undertake and the socio-economic environment in which they operate. A broad focus on organized crime's operating environment, rather than a narrow focus on actors or specific groups, is contrary to the practice of most law enforcement agencies (Vander Beken, 2004: 482).

Criminal Actors

Adoption of the network model formally replaces the traditional categorization of organized crime by ethnic or cultural-geographical origin (e.g., Asian organized crime) with a focus on individual criminal networks identified by the surname of a principal member (e.g., MacKinnon, et al.). Network names may change as principal members enter and depart. However, name changes illustrate the fluidity within social networks and require criminal intelligence units to gather network-specific information regularly and effectively rather than relying on inaccurate conceptions of monolithic entities. Cultural intelligence (i.e., relevant ethnic or cultural/geographic information) about criminal actors is of use to law enforcement; however, its pertinence must be established, not assumed.

Criminal networks should be understood as profit-oriented enterprises that control “the pressures they face from suppliers (sources), customers (demand), regulators (law, police), and competitors (other legal and illegal businesses and products)” (Albanese, 2008: 270). Analysis should focus on how legal and illegal actors work together, determine the frequency, duration, and intensity of interactions, and assess the benefits, risks, or crime-facilitative roles of legal actors (Passas, 2002: 15).

A major component of risk analysis is a structured evaluation of criminal actors' capabilities, intentions, limitations, vulnerabilities, and opportunities. These five components, examined in concert, indicate the particular level of threat of an individual or criminal group. A technique to measure the relative threat posed by organized criminal groups is the Sleipnir threat measurement technique. Created by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, Sleipnir uses a numerical rank-ordered set of criminal attributes to assess each group's capabilities (Strang, 2007). The sum of the attributes results in an aggregate score for each criminal network. This score (and accompanying analytical narrative) indicates the network's threat level based on its criminal capabilities and enables comparison among networks.

Canadian law enforcement undertakes an annual survey of criminal organizations: 800 in 2006, approximately 950 in 2007, about 900 in 2008, and about 750 in 2009 (CISC, 2006, 2007, 2008, and 2009). The changes in these numbers over time reflect a degree of fluidity in the criminal marketplace, disruptions by law enforcement, changes in intelligence collection practices, or a combination of these factors. Sleipnir is used to assess the relative threat levels and compare threat levels among groups and over time.

There are clear limitations to Sleipnir: the more that is known about a criminal organization, the greater, in general, the Sleipnir score. Knowledge about particular criminal actors or activities is greater where law enforcement has traditionally focused its efforts, such as illicit drugs or weapons, or highly visible criminal organizations like street gangs or outlaw motorcycle gangs. Sleipnir does not have a facility to determine the negative consequences or “harm” of organized crime. Therefore, it is unable to distinguish between a low-threat criminal network with a high-harm level (e.g., an unsophisticated network whose indiscriminant use of violence endangers the public) and a high-threat criminal network with a high-harm level (e.g., signi-

ficant financial losses to thousands of victims from fraud). The first network can be regarded as an immediate, public-safety risk that requires regular and intense but relatively short-term enforcement action, while the latter could be determined to pose a long-term economic risk.

Operating Environment

The market/enterprise models form a theoretical framework for the activity-focused analysis of organized crime's operating environment. The risk assessments will focus on a systematic analysis of both illicit economic sectors (e.g., illicit drugs or contraband goods) and licit economic sectors (e.g., the telecommunications industry). The purpose of sector analysis is to determine the nature and extent of organized crime in illicit and licit sectors, the vulnerability of specific sectors to organized crime, and, more importantly for decision-makers, where and when indicators of organized criminality may appear next. Risk assessments focus on determining high-risk illicit and licit sectors based on the nature and level of organized crime involvement and/or their level of vulnerability to organized crime.

Analysis will be divided into macro- and micro-level scans of illicit and licit sectors to contextualize current risks and forecast future ones by identifying and assessing indicators that enable (risk factor) or constrain (protective factor) organized criminality. Macro analysis of sectors will identify not only intelligence gaps about a specific sector but also indicators that, if analyzed correctly, should point to changes within and between sectors as well as changes in risk over time (Vander Beken, 2004: 503; Albanese, 2008: 270). Analysis should also include an evaluation of factors including new product opportunities, product dominance, profit margin, market needs and opportunities, degree of competition, and risk management (Williams and Godson, 2002: 324).

Once macro-level scan is complete, a micro-level scan of illicit sectors should be undertaken. The scan of licit sectors should not begin with the automatic assumption that organized crime is present as the sector may have attributes attractive to criminal networks but not necessarily be vulnerable (Vander Beken, 2004: 504). Of key importance within the licit scan is not only the examination of the nature and extent that the licit industry in question intersects with illicit sectors but also the persons in the legitimate marketplace who facilitate illicit activity, either inadvertently or by design.

This scan must be sensitive to "variations in supply, demand, regulation, and competition among localities and regions" and be undertaken separately for different illicit products and industries as their comparative risk levels may differ (Albanese, 2008: 271). This type of assessment can help determine the economic conditions for each illicit market and consequently, gather specific information on the nature, complexity, and magnitude of a network's criminal operations in each illicit sector.

Conclusion

This article is a rejection of the traditional ethnic-pluralist and bureaucratic-hierarchical models. But more importantly, it is a first step toward formalizing Canadian law enforcement's fragmentary conceptualizations of organized crime. The hybrid network and market/enterprise model represents a clear break with law enforcement's traditional conceptualizations of organized crime. Canadian law enforcement shows some resistance to moving away from the pluralist and bureaucratic-hierarchical models. The implementation of this model throughout the country requires a shift in its institutional mindset.

The formal adoption of the hybrid model will mark a sharp departure from typical practice, as law enforcement rarely explains publicly—much less defines internally—how it views organized crime. As a result, the hybrid model will provide a measure of transparency and accountability for law enforcement since it allows for the articulation of its underlying assumptions about organized crime.

Law enforcement agencies often do not fully engage in dialogue or collaboration with the wider community, in particular, academia, other government departments, private sector, non-governmental agencies, and the public. This article is an attempt to open a meaningful discussion with the wider community about the conceptualization and measurement of organized crime.

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